Datasets:

OOlajide

/

arbitrum_snapshot_data

like 0

0x57acaed2db622fa66de2bd70d3710f48984a5e55449a0bf6e4e661306d20d148

[Non-Constitutional AIP] Front-end interface to force transaction inclusion during sequencer downtime

### **Abstract** [WakeUp Labs](http://www.wakeuplabs.io/) proposal outlines the development of a simple but effective front-end interface that enables users to force-include transactions directly on L1 when the Arbitrum Sequencer is down, aiming to increase trust among end-users navigating the Arbitrum ecosystem. Inspired by a few community discussions ([Link 1](https://x.com/Cattin0x/status/1735779772054077917?s=20) & [Link 2](https://x.com/fede_intern/status/1754226077981893052?s=20)) , and validated historical events like: [Sequencer Downtime 1](https://offchain.medium.com/todays-arbitrum-sequencer-downtime-what-happened-6382a3066fbc), [Sequener Downtime 2](https://dedaub.com/blog/arbitrum-sequencer-outage), [Historical Sequencer Status](https://status.arbitrum.io/history/3) and [L2BEAT status](https://l2beat.com/scaling/risk). This tool aims to empower users with the ability to bypass the Sequencer in situations where it is unavailable or censoring transactions, thus aligning with Arbitrum's vision for progressive decentralization. WakeUp Labs has a proven track record of expertise in crafting exceptional blockchain tools and infrastructure. Their contributions extend to collaborating on [open-source projects for major DAOs](https://x.com/0xMilton/status/1755972182553899487?s=20), enhancing Ethereum Foundation-funded initiatives, building complex DeFi protocols, SmartContracts and offering a [developer platform](http://www.platform.wakeuplabs.io/) that facilitates robust and scalable API calls for smart contract deployment without requiring Solidity programming skills. (Currently operating even on the Arbitrum blockchain). ### **Introduction** The Arbitrum Sequencer is a critical component of the network, responsible for submitting users' transactions to L1. Under the current model, the Sequencer represents a point of failure that, if compromised, could delay or prevent transaction processing. There are ways to bypass it, but non-developer users lack that capability. This proposal seeks to mitigate such risks by providing a user-friendly alternative transaction submission pathway, thereby enhancing the network's resilience, user autonomy, and their confidence in the Arbitrum ecosystem. ### **Rationale** - **Decentralization and user empowerment:** By enabling direct L1 transaction submissions, users can circumvent Sequencer outages or censorship, maintaining their ability to transact without interruption. This capability is crucial for ensuring the network's operational integrity and aligns with the principle of progressive decentralization. - **Enhancing trustless security:** The proposed interface would serve as a valuable tool in rare situations where the Sequencer fails to perform its duties. It ensures that the Arbitrum Rollup maintains its trustless security model, even when permissioned components of the system are not functioning correctly. ### **WakeUp Labs core team** - **[Milton Berman](https://www.linkedin.com/in/miltonberman/)**, co-founder and CEO, brings extensive experience as a CTO in a decentralized identity project supported by IDB Lab and Bitcoin NGO. He has also worked as a Product Owner at Rootstock blockchain and as a CTO in a mobile game studio company. With a background in working with large corporations, Milton possesses the technical expertise and strategic vision necessary to drive the success of our project. - **[Maximiliano del Hoyo](https://www.linkedin.com/in/maximiliandh/)**, co-founder and CBDO, has a diverse background in software and finance. His previous experience at notable companies like Microsoft and Nestle provides him with the necessary knowledge and network to navigate the intersection of technology and business, ensuring the effective achievement of the project's goals. - **[Gonzalo Silman](https://www.linkedin.com/in/gonzalo-silman/)**, co-founder and COO, possesses a unique blend of expertise in economics (former university professor), finance, and entrepreneurial experience in creating gaming products for LATAM communities. This diverse background brings a fresh perspective and innovative thinking to our project, enabling us to understand user needs and craft tailored solutions that resonate with our target audience. ### **Proposal Details** ### Technical Implementation 1. **Transaction Monitoring:** Develop functionality to listen for user transactions on L2 that are not included by the Sequencer, with guidance from the Arbitrum SDK documentation. 2. **Manual Transaction Hash Input:** In cases where automatic detection is not feasible, provide a user interface for manually entering the transaction hash or implement manually the previous transaction in the new solution. 3. **L1 Transaction Replication:** Implement mechanisms to replicate the intended L2 transaction on L1, using "Forced Withdrawal" type transactions to push the L2 transaction from L1. 4. **Confirmation Display:** Ensure the interface provides feedback once the transaction has successfully been processed. 5. **Processing Time Consideration:** Account for the approximately 24-hour processing period to prevent errors or transaction duplication across chains. 6. **Hosting, Service & Maintenance:** WakeUp will host the service, ensuring it runs 24/7. For the first three months, we will fine-tune and iterate the service. Additionally, should any problems occur, the WakeUp team is committed to identifying and resolving these issues for a minimum of the next two years. ### Development Roadmap & Budget Allocation: 1. **Technical Research, POC, Documentation and Testing (3 weeks, $ARB 9000):** Deep dive into the Delayed Inbox functionality and its integration, along with creating a PoC and validating the necessity of a new internal tool for transaction monitoring and sequencer status. We will also carefully check that our solution doesn't disrupt the proper functioning of Arbitrum; if it does, we will enable this instance only when the official sequencer is not operating correctly. This research conducted by the WakeUp Team will be made public, and the community will be able to view it, both in a summary Twitter Thread and in an Article shared on the OSS Github repository once completed. 2. **Endpoint Development (1.5 weeks, $ARB 3500):** Creation of endpoints to interact with the backend logic. 3. **Logic Integration and Testing (2 weeks, $ARB 3500):** Connecting the frontend to the endpoints and verifying the operational logic, and test heavily the MVP. 4. **Design Phase (4 weeks, $ARB 5000):** Additional time allocated for the design process, ensuring a user-friendly experience. 5. **UI Development (3 weeks, $ARB 5500):** Crafting an aesthetic and intuitive user interface inspired by existing high-quality designs. 6. **Open-source Preparation (3 weeks, $ARB 6000):** Finalizing and documenting the codebase for open-source release. 7. **Service & Maintenance after Launch (24 months, $ARB 10000).** We commit to hosting the site on Vercel or AWS, ensuring 24/7 operation for at least 24 months. Initially, the WakeUp team will refine the website based on user and Arbitrum community feedback and conduct continuous testing to ensure its reliability. Any issues, such as downtime or crashes, will be promptly addressed by the WakeUp team at least for the next two years. ### **Budget and Resources** - **Estimated Timeframe:** Approximately 4.25 months for full implementation, including design phases; followed by 3 months dedicated to post-launch iterations and 24 months of hosting, monitoring, and bug fixing to address any possible error. - **Development Team:** One full-time Sr Solidity developer for the core implementation and Research, additional design and developer resources for the UI/UX phase. The proposal also considers a Sr part-time dev for the Maintenance after launch. Gonzalo or Milton from the core team will also keep track of the project as PO. - **Cost Estimate:** 42.500 $ARB ### **Conclusion** Developing a front-end interface to enable force-including transactions during Sequencer downtime is a crucial requirement in the Arbitrum ecosystem. This proposal aims to empower users by ensuring transaction capabilities even when the Sequencer is unavailable. By doing so, it aligns with Arbitrum's goals of decentralization and enhancing user autonomy. Additionally, the project will provide the open-source code for the back-end solution, thereby improving trust in the solution and tool. ### 03/11/2024 - Notes: Some changes have been made in this proposal, thanks to the feedback provided by @cp0x, @maxlomu and @frisson.

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

active

[3015887.0609958605, 22790.31026982852, 29441.319029749684]

[[3015887.0609958605], [22790.31026982852], [29441.319029749684]]

0xAbAbE91A907fAdff921720C43ABe4098e7245E99

0x5bede8277e7fe0beef5764d2915d1d1c288fcc47747c6fa576b501f5cb3d6115

Request for Continuation of the Arbitrum DDA Program Request

## **Summary** As we near the end of allocating the initial grant budget (link to proposal), where through the [Arbitrum Grants Program ](https://arbitrum.questbook.app/) run via the Delegated Domain Allocation model by Questbook, $912k has already been allocated to over 60 proposals. Based on the overwhelming response and number of quality proposals the grant program has received, we propose to start a new program for the Arbitrum Grants via DDA through Questbook with a budget of $4,000,000 spread across 4 domains over the next two quarters. We have received great feedback and support from the community, builders, and domain allocators for requesting additional budget and continue funding projects through the delegated domain allocation model. ### **Proposal** Based on the impact and insights derived from Arbitrum DDA program, we propose renewing the Program with a budget of $4M for two quarters. The domain allocators will utilize this budget to fund proposals that align with Arbitrum’s roadmap. After researching, gathering feedback from domain allocators, active community members, and builders, we propose supporting the same domains as the previous program: |Domain|Domain Allocator|Proposed Budget| | --- | --- | --- | |New Protocol Ideas|Jojo|$920,000| |Gaming|Adam|$920,000| |Dev Tooling|Juandi|$920,000| |Education, Growth, Community and Events|Cattin (Seed Latam)|$920,000| **RFPs, acceptance criteria and specifications for each domain** 1. New Protocol Ideas - [Link ](https://docs.google.com/document/d/120s88WVycDyP2pUfgcT0eE8ILuribuayHDnd5aeZxbM/edit#heading=h.4th1bgre9sv4) 2. Gaming - [Link](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1UIQA_kGeLsXQOZsIiGaNzE35TRTbqXBl5JauNt4LECQ/edit#heading=h.ig7e612gb5vt) 3. Dev Tooling - [Link](https://docs.google.com/document/d/144gTfeKKXOtPxMTEB9d73wELepJ9mNPjMJHjvCSy3uE/edit) 4. Education, Growth, Community and Events - [Link](https://www.notion.so/e8e86fbd9ee349beb0d9046607dae812?pvs=21) * We propose increasing the allocated grants budget for all domains equally to a higher budget based on the number of proposals received in the previous round. * Additionally, in the first round we set a soft cap of $25,000, and we propose increasing the cap to $50,000, with a few more steps for approving a grant that is larger than $25,000, requiring the involvement of two DAs to approve a proposal rather than just the specific domain allocator. * Considering the previous softcap being half of what is currently proposed, and that for an average of $220,000 for each domain the program was able to run for around 3.5 months before being maxed out, we project that providing 4X the amount of the previous iteration to each domain should allow the program to constantly allocate, at the same rate or even higher, for the full 6 months projected duration * The increased cap will allow the Questbook Program to keep covering the bootstrap belt of grant between $1,000 to $25,000 while, at the same time, be able to serve larger protocols that inherently might have larger needs. ### Specifications and Implementation Similar to the model implemented in the initial program, the renewed grants program will be run using **[Delegated Domain Capital Allocation Model 1](https://blog.questbook.xyz/posts/min-grants-dao-max-community-participation/)**. Each *domain allocator* will run their respective domain on-chain for full transparency using Questbook. The data and performance across key metrics will be visible to the community. While the program has produced, accordingly to preliminary conversation with protocols and delegates, good results, we want to address and integrate the feedbacks so far proposed and partially covered in the previous section, such as: * have better accountability for the increased soft cap * define a more robust and structured set of rules for applicants, in regards to providing a timeline for their project(s) * define a cost for the management and verification of milestones after the program is completed * define a plan to manage the volatility of funds being distributed by the DAO in ARB token. The DA will evaluate all the proposals through the rubrics provided for each domain, with the following framework: * in case of request below or equal to $25,000, the evaluation process will be the same of the previous iteration, with rubrics being evaluated and scored by the specific DA * in case of request above $25,000, and below the new soft cap of $50,000, the evaluation will involve a second DA, chosen by the first one based on the proximity of the specific expertise and knowledge to that proposal, that will have to publish a second evaluation of the rubrics alongside the score. Assuming N rubrics, scored from 1 to 5, the grant will be approved only if both the DA will give each a scoring equal or above to N*3. The disbursement of the grant will take place on-chain from a multi-sig wallet controlled by the program manager & the domain allocator. The domain allocator will approve or reject the application based on evaluation rubric. A Grants SAFE, with 3/5 multi-sig, between the program manager and 4 domain allocators will be setup. We will then have 4 SAFEs for each of the domains with a 2/2 between the program manager and the specific domain allocator. The funds for the grants program will flow from the treasury into the Grants SAFE. This SAFE will hold the funds related to operational costs, committee compensation, and the grants budget. Funds that will be disbursed to the proposers will reside in the domain-level SAFEs. After the end of two quarters, the grants committee and the Arbitrum community shall evaluate the performance of each domain using publicly available data and decide to eventually, renew the program and, if so, change any specification of the domains, the domain allocators or the program manager. To ensure predictability of the funding of the program and a proper runaway, upon receiving the amount from the DAO, the DAs alongside the PM will convert it in stables. If the protocols request it, specific grants or milestones might be paid in $ARB by converting the needed amount at the moment of payout. Arbitrum DDA program closed accepting new proposals from mid February. If the program will be renewed in the terms above, the DDA program will take care, alongside the evaluation of new proposal, to keep evaluating the milestones of the previous program, thus allowing for the continuity of the previous iteration in an accountable way for grantees. ### Compensation We propose the following payment structure for the PM and DAs, with a base salary of $100/h and an increased projected workload of DA by 33% compared to the previous program, in consideration of the fact that DA not only have on average worked more than what initially was expected in the previous program, but also that they will need to spend time to cross evaluate all proposals above $25,000. On the other hand, the compensation of the PM is instead unchanged. We are also adding overhead for an extra 6 months, equivalent to 20% of full-time salaries, for the Domain Allocators and the PM to keep evaluating the milestones of the grantees after the natural end of the program. This will ensure the proper continuation of the program and the followup with grantees, despite the program potentially not being renewed if so decided by the DAO. In case the program would be renewed with the same structure and people, or in case the milestone verification would come to an end before the due time, any leftover would be given back to the Arbitrum DAO. |Role|Monthly Cost|Total| | --- | --- | --- | |Program Manager and Questbook|$10000|$60,000*| |Domain Allocator|$8000|$192,000| |Overhead for extra 6 months|$8400|$50,400| |Operations Cost, Misc.||$10,000| ||Totals:|$312,400| *Note: Questbook will provide the grants committee its grants orchestration tool at a cost of $5000 per month, included in the numbers above with the PM’s payment. As per the above, the current costs to run program would be 7.8% of the overall budget of the grant program. * We suggest that the grants committee continue with [Synapse ](https://www.synaps.io/) for KYC services and [Docusign](https://www.docusign.com/en-in) for all contractual agreements, as we have been using these services throughout the Arbitrum DDA program 1. * However, for any specific asks from the grants team in order to run the process more smoothly, Questbook will charge for any additional feature requests based on the development overhead through a retrospective grant proposal from Arbitrum at the end of two quarters. ### Read the whole proposal on the forum for Domain Allocator roles, responsibilities, KPIs, and Expectations

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

active

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0xAbAbE91A907fAdff921720C43ABe4098e7245E99

0x13bcccfeeb736c732bdd08032841d6a07614d17dcee2d29a435e7b0114361a0a

[Non-Emergency Action] Fix Fee Oversight ArbOS v20 “Atlas”

Request Non-Emergency Security Council Action Abstract The transaction fee paid by users is composed of two parts, L2 fees and L1 fees, which together include the execution cost for running the transaction on Arbitrum alongside the cost of posting data to Ethereum (to learn more about this, read the deep dive on the subject 1). Historically, the rollup fee market has been dominated by the L1 cost component. With the Dencun upgrade soon being enabled on Ethereum, the current pricing structure may no longer be optimal. The ArbOS Version 20 “Atlas” upgrade is a step towards better consuming the new data availability affordances offered by Ethereum, but will also potentially require further adjustment once EIP-4844 has been deployed and tested. There was an oversight during the ArbOS Version 20 “Atlas” upgrade where two configuration should be updated for users when the Dencun upgrade occurs: L1 surplus fee. Reduce the surplus fee per byte from 32 gwei to 0. L2 base fee. Reduce the minimum from 0.1 gwei to 0.01 gwei. In both cases, the configuration changes will match what is currently implemented in Arbitrum Nova. As evidenced by the recent surge of transactions in Arbitrum Nova, the network can handle the increased transaction throughput while offering lower fees for users in general under that configuration. Impact on the ArbitrumDAO’s revenue The L2 base fee change will impact the revenue received by the ArbitrumDAO. The potential impact based on the past 30 days of activity was calculated, which if the changes had been implemented (ignoring potential changes in demand based on lower fees), would have resulted in overall profit going from 816.13 ETH → 79.89 ETH While the fee reduction will result in lower revenue for the ArbitrumDAO in the short term, it will ensure that the Arbitrum One network continues to offer competitive costs to its users and in turn it can lead to an increase in transaction traffic. Since the parameter change affects the revenue generated, it is important to carry out a temperature check for the ArbitrumDAO to discuss and ultimately vote on the change. If it is approved by the ArbitrumDAO, then the Security Council will be requested to initiate a non-emergency action to execute the configuration change. The goal is to ensure the fees are changed as soon as possible in line with the Decun upgrade. Implementation details The following configured values will be changed in the ArbOwner smart contract that can be viewed in Contract Address 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000006b | Arbiscan. The following governance action smart contracts will be used to initiate the action: ArbOneSetAtlasL1PricingRewardAction | Address 0x36D0170D92F66e8949eB276C3AC4FEA64f83704d | Arbiscan ArbOneSetAtlasMinBaseFeeAction | Address 0x849E360a247132F961c9CBE95Ba39106c72e1268 | Arbiscan The security council will separate the two parameter change actions to enable the ArbitrumDAO to decide whether to accept one, both, or neither. The ability to decide will be reflected on Snapshot using a ranked voting with the following options: Set L1 surplus fee and L2 minimum base fee. Set only L1 surplus fee. Set only L2 minimum base fee. Set neither option and cancel security council action. Timeline The ArbOS v20 “Atlas” upgrade is due to be activated on the 14th of March, and the following schedule will be pursued to address the configuration issues in a timely manner: 5th March - Temperature Vote on Snapshot 5th March - Initiate non-emergency security council action 18th March - Activate configuration change to reduce fees A non-emergency security council action is viewed as ideal as it exists primarily to approve and implement routine software upgrades, routine maintenance and other parameter adjustments in a non-emergency setting. Temperature check: Snapshot 3 Security council transaction: [update shortly] Taking this route will mean that Arbitrum One network will have higher than anticipated fees for 5 days. The following governance calls will also enable the community to discuss the technical changes: 6th March - Wednesday at 6pm EST 7th March - Thursday at 9am EST Both calls will be added to the governance call and more calls can be arranged if necessary.

['Set L1 surplus fee and L2 min.', 'Set only L1 surplus fee', 'Set only L2 minimum base fee', 'Set neither option and cancel']

closed

[200800130.2320098, 151037.45730578783, 105199.53000231614, 39797.76690599165]

[[200800130.2320098], [151037.45730578783], [105199.53000231614], [39797.76690599165]]

0xA7860E99e3ce0752D1ac53b974E309fFf80277C6

0xb04e968c2439cd68e429f722722944c960f82ce75d9f75efe8be52333e1d6554

ARDC Risk Member Election

The Risk member should ideally possess a range of skills. This includes a strong quantitative background for conducting thorough reviews, research, and modeling or simulations related to economic risk, design, and optimization. The Risk member is to provide the ArbitrumDAO [through the ARDC] with a comprehensive knowledge-base in relation to digital asset-focused risk identification, risk assessment & risk mitigation. The Risk member should ideally have experience re. risk-focused design, research, and modeling to determine how to incentivize usage, maximize economic efficiency, protect systemic protocol health, and plan for the future with rigorously validated insights. On the 22nd of January 2024, the ArbitrumDAO voted to establish & fund the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective; a collective of specialised individuals in Risk, Research & Security aimed at providing ongoing specialised assistance to the ArbitrumDAO: {https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/56002054155248055908873103086558103132748843103210580613728556162036150296506?chart=bubble} Following a call for applications, review process and amendment period in line with the Election Process as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO, we are now posting the elections for the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective in line with the applications as finalised on the 3rd of March 2024 [https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-development-collective-elections-applications/20805] We encourage all Arbitrum Delegates to vote with responsibility and in the best interests of the ArbitrumDAO.

['Elect Chaos Labs', "Don't Elect Chaos Labs"]

closed

[176162724.37748492, 186781.8266286507]

[[176162724.37748492], [186781.8266286507]]

0xb5B069370Ef24BC67F114e185D185063CE3479f8

0x3d41ffb43e44e83d004505e362e70f703aed0e740322e8ebfbb390d54724ca91

ARDC Security Member Election

The Security member should ideally possess skills in specific static analysis bug detection targeting code updates and developing fuzzing capabilities to validate upgrade states. They should be proficient in visualizing the state of governance contracts, ensuring correct encoding of values, and providing educational materials and guidelines for reviewing upgrade procedures. Additionally, they should have expertise in whitebox source code reviews, identifying design flaws, and ensuring security and correctness properties in on-chain upgrade proposals. This role is crucial for preventing governance attacks and may involve building tools and educational materials to support proposal reviews when no code review is required. On the 22nd of January 2024, the ArbitrumDAO voted to establish & fund the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective; a collective of specialised individuals in Risk, Research & Security aimed at providing ongoing specialised assistance to the ArbitrumDAO: {https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/56002054155248055908873103086558103132748843103210580613728556162036150296506?chart=bubble} Following a call for applications, review process and amendment period in line with the Election Process as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO, we are now posting the elections for the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective in line with the applications as finalised on the 3rd of March 2024 [https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-development-collective-elections-applications/20805] We encourage all Arbitrum Delegates to vote with responsibility and in the best interests of the ArbitrumDAO.

['DoDAO', 'Trail of Bits', 'Spearbit', 'Zellic/Dedaub', 'OpenZeppelin', 'Halborn', 'Nethermind']

closed

[456364.5767445516, 65642885.1925722, 2381944.705663065, 51156399.29032206, 76432044.46455939, 11556654.590019332, 8982191.647828484]

[[456364.5767445516], [65642885.1925722], [2381944.705663065], [51156399.29032206], [76432044.46455939], [11556654.590019332], [8982191.647828484]]

0xb5B069370Ef24BC67F114e185D185063CE3479f8

0x9210912a0a77090d1407107dcb9143864aa6c1faa5c6ed9046b6a0a56bf6bbcc

ARDC DAO Advocate Election

The DAOAdvocate will represent the ArbitrumDAO & maintains the ability to direct the ARDC’s efforts; Functions as the bridge between the ArbitrumDAO and the ARDC. The DAOAdvocate will be elected via Snapshot. The advocate will receive a stipend per month as per his ask in the application submitted to the DAO pre-election. The advocate’s main responsibility is ensuring that the Arbitrum DAO’s best interests are met by the ARDC & that the ARDC acts in accordance with its mandate & purposes. If a member of the ARDC is deemed to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO, the DAOAdvocate will have a legal obligation submit a proposal via Snapshot to terminate such a member of the ARDC together with the necessary details that justify such termination. Following this, the DAOAdvocate will have an ancillary legal obligation to submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat. The decision as to who ought to take up the vacant seat will be determined by the ArbitrumDAO via the election mechanism stipulated in this Forum Post. On the 22nd of January 2024, the ArbitrumDAO voted to establish & fund the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective; a collective of specialised individuals in Risk, Research & Security aimed at providing ongoing specialised assistance to the ArbitrumDAO: {https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/56002054155248055908873103086558103132748843103210580613728556162036150296506?chart=bubble} Following a call for applications, review process and amendment period in line with the Election Process as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO, we are now posting the elections for the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective in line with the applications as finalised on the 3rd of March 2024 [https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-development-collective-elections-applications/20805] We encourage all Arbitrum Delegates to vote with responsibility and in the best interests of the ArbitrumDAO.

['L2BEAT/Ant Federation', 'Pavel Fedotov']

closed

[186047236.4537226, 8351015.864153317]

[[186047236.4537226], [8351015.864153317]]

0xb5B069370Ef24BC67F114e185D185063CE3479f8

0x05e8fa22813e74fd6e5f3360fda4bb6388d0f85d4e6aef834acbb48451307b01

ARDC Research Member Election

The Research member should ideally possess a range of skills, including the ability to conduct objective analysis and contribute to the design of various mechanisms such as sequencers, fraud proofs, and data availability solutions, with a strong emphasis on objective data-driven research. They should also be proficient in creating processes that incentivize active delegate participation, such as developing delegate incentives frameworks and hosting regular collaborative calls. Additionally, they should be skilled in content creation to promote the Arbitrum ecosystem’s growth. Moreover, the candidate should have a knack for producing impartial, data-driven research to aid delegates in making informed decisions and improving proposal quality. Excellent communication skills and the ability to manage interactions with DAO stakeholders and service providers are essential, along with the capacity to document ARDC activities and recommend solutions for any issues that arise, maintaining a governance process for continuity. On the 22nd of January 2024, the ArbitrumDAO voted to establish & fund the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective; a collective of specialised individuals in Risk, Research & Security aimed at providing ongoing specialised assistance to the ArbitrumDAO: {https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/56002054155248055908873103086558103132748843103210580613728556162036150296506?chart=bubble} Following a call for applications, review process and amendment period in line with the Election Process as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO, we are now posting the elections for the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective in line with the applications as finalised on the 3rd of March 2024 [https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-research-development-collective-elections-applications/20805] We encourage all Arbitrum Delegates to vote with responsibility and in the best interests of the ArbitrumDAO.

['Blockworks/Delphi Digital', 'The Block']

closed

[160807559.98897567, 68900659.4173263]

[[160807559.98897567], [68900659.4173263]]

0xb5B069370Ef24BC67F114e185D185063CE3479f8

0x24344ab10eb905a4d7fa5885c6f681290e765a08a5f558ff6cfc5fedab42afb6

[Non-constitutional] Proposal to fund Plurality Labs Milestone 1B(ridge)

## Introduction Back in August, Arbitrum DAO passed our AIP-3 to build a pluralistic grants framework that decentralizes grants decision-making, avoids capture and scales valuable grants allocations, and grows the Arbitrum ecosystem overall. Our proposal [passed on Tally](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-3-non-constitutional-fund-the-arbitrum-grants-framework-proposal-milestone-1/14976) with ~99% of delegate votes. It had overwhelming support, we believe, because you a) trust our motives and capabilities, and b) understand how big and important the problem is: Nearly every DAO struggles to create sustainable value - largely because DAO decision-making is famously slow, and inefficient, which drives them to compromise their values and centralize. Arbitrum is committed to being better, and you believed in our ability to help. ## Background (Milestone 1a Retrospective) Across Milestones 1a, we pluralistically deployed funds via 12 different grants programs and different modalities for grants decision-making. Experimenting with multiple modalities allows us to allocate grants to support quick feedback about what works and can scale now. We can quickly evolve our grants decision making based the below success rubric, which determines where to allocate grants:  * Grow = double-down / start to scale * Coach = make changes / try again * Cut = discontinue / recommend to seed program In Milestone 1a, we seeded the initial 12 Grants Programs. In Milestone 1b, we will lean on our newly established Plurality Labs board (more later!) as well as community voices who can evaluate our grants via our Thrive Protocol to inform where to cut, coach, and grow. [Based on our pluralistic grants framework and success criteria, these are the current results of milestone 1 ([details here](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/plurality-labs-milestone-1-review/20198/2?u=senad.eth))] ### Milestone 1a Wins include: * Firestarters: Four proposals passed Snapshot because of our Firestarters program - which funds unbiased research, cat herding, and crafting of proposals crucial to the DAO. These include STIP, ARDC, ARPC, and STEP. ([TNorm talking about our role with STIP](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pAiy5IABZ48b0o-NqVIRcu4_NRuM9vzI/view?usp=sharing)) * Experimenting with Grants Decision-Making Modalities: We drove over 30 experiments in collective decision-making, including proactive and retroactive grant-making, and grant-making driven by experts, expert-counsels, permissionless counsels, random counsels, and direct input mechanisms. * Retroactive Grants: We drove the first retroactive grants program in Arbitrum, rewarding unpaid contributors, and setting the stage for follow-on experiments. Some of these people are creating obvious value in the ecosystem now, like Atom from castlecap who is now an LTIPP advisor. * Quadratic Funding: Via Gitcoin, we brought thousands of new users, and hundreds of builders and builder projects to the Arbitrum ecosystem. ### Milestone 1a Lessons: * Investing in documentation: We funded 250+ projects, and spurred movement all over the DAO. But we didn’t document our work and value well. More importantly, we didn’t deliver certain written deliverables that people in the DAO were expecting on time. It hurt us. We won’t make that mistake again. * Investing in communications: Our bias was for action. We cared about creating value and learning - and put blinders on for everything else. We should have hired a Marketing or Comms person. We didn’t. Going forward, we’ll button up. We have a good story to tell. We’re excited to tell it. * Leveraging internal team: Plurality Labs was acquired by ThriveCoin in August of 2023. We have a team of 26 people who support other big ecosystems. We could have leveraged Thrive best practices. But in an effort to stay “true” to the Milestone 1 proposal, we kept the teams separate - too separate. We’ll use all available resources this time. ### Vision We have a big vision. We’re seeking to build the most robust pluralistic grants ecosystem in DAO history. To do it, we took some big shots on goal in Milestone 1a - funding 12 grant programs using 30 decision making experiments to fund 250+ projects. Some shots scored and others missed. This is aligned with the expectations of the pluralistic grants approach. The only way to create and scale pluralistic grants is to decentralize bet taking… and to get as comfortable with the shots that embarrassingly fly into the stands as we are with the goals. We will use data to help us double-down on winners and cut others. With the data we’re collecting, we will create a robust, long-term pluralistic grants framework for Arbitrum DAO. This framework is emerging now, and it will continue to become clearer throughout Milestone 1b(ridge). ## Milestone 1(bridge): In our maiden proposal, the principal outcome we sought to achieve was to demonstrate that we could deliver and scale enormous value creation via a pluralistic grants framework. The general feedback from delegates has been: kind of… There seems to be wide agreement that we created value but need to scale, document, and showcase. Thus, after consultation with a number of the top delegates, we created this Milestone 1b(ridge) proposal that asks for the exact same amount of ARB and same timeframe as passed with 99% of delegate vote in August. In Milestone 1b, we will show: 1. We can build on winners and cut underperformers with our initial grants allocations. 2. We can continue to drive experimentation with new grants allocations. 3. We can deliver on all deliverables for Milestone 1 to the satisfaction of our top delegates. 4. We can leverage better tech and systems to support further scale in Milestone 2. To ensure we achieve these goals, we are implementing best-practices from the Thrive team that, also, are aligned with feedback we received from delegates: 1. Plurality Labs Board: We are welcoming a board of top voices in the Arbitrum community for oversight, and to ensure decentralized decision-making. 2. Human validations: Thrive Protocol allows us to validate when value is created, and pay out funds to projects upon value creation. This is critical for scale. We’ll use it. 3. Team upgrade: We are bringing in the big guns for this one, adding team members that know grants, know DAOs, and know scale. Here’s more information about our commitments in Milestone 1b(ridge): Plurality Labs Board: We brought together trusted and known voices in the Arbitrum community. Their role with us is to gather feedback and data from our Arbitrum community, and to make strategic decisions about grants allocators, specific grants / contributions, and validations. This board is part of this vote. We found people to represent the different stakeholder groups in Arbitrum. Now your votes will ratify this group - which includes two who voted "No" to our temp check for Milestone 2!  Human Validations: Going forward, we will fund our grants at specific milestones of value creation. White-listed Arbitrum community members will - in a pluralistic way - help clarify when value is created, and will also be rewarded for their services (more on this later). Team revamp: We are fully utilizing our 26-person ThriveCoin team), we have also added some key team members to our roster, including: Ben West (GitCoin grants lead), Kyler Wandler (DAO Research Collective), and Scott Mandel (Complex Labs, Flexa, 2Q Ventures). ## Cost As aligned with the feedback we’ve received from delegates and community members, we made this proposal easy: The total cost and timeframe are the same as the first proposal: 3.36M ARB and 6 months, with 336k ARB to Plurality Labs and 224k ARB to program management, as in the first proposal. 2.8M ARB will be funding ecosystem development, including demonstrating that we can create incrementally more value with our emerging pluralistic grants framework. We are also adding a layer of oversight to our work - welcoming an esteemed Plurality Labs board. They will, among other things, help ensure we deliver the value we promise. The 560k ARB services fee (same ARB and same buckets as first proposal) includes: As aligned with the feedback we’ve received from delegates and community members, we made this proposal easy: The total cost and timeframe are the same as the first proposal: 3.36M ARB and 6 months, with 336k ARB to Plurality Labs and 224k ARB to program management, as in the first proposal. 2.8M ARB will be funding ecosystem development, including demonstrating that we can create incrementally more value with our emerging pluralistic grants framework. We are also adding a layer of oversight to our work - welcoming an esteemed Plurality Labs board. They will, among other things, help ensure we deliver the value we promise. The 560k ARB services fee (same ARB and same buckets as first proposal) includes:  ## Impact: Our intention is for this to be one of the most impactful AIPs in the history of Arbitrum. If we do our work right (and we believe we’re on the right track) we should be spurring thriving, net-positive ecosystem activity in Arbitrum for years to come. Additionally, we’ll be doing it via a pluralistic grants framework that has a consistent bias for value creation, further decentralization, and resistance to capture. We will be building the future of web3 together, and providing a path for all great people and teams to work with Arbitrum. When the value of Milestone 1b is obvious, we’ll present Milestone 2.

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

[154496957.6586444, 1798379.2217890471, 16961291.95345207]

[[154496957.6586444], [1798379.2217890471], [16961291.95345207]]

0xAD16ebE6FfC7d96624A380F394cD64395B0C6144

0x07a26cd6b78a41745aab04190f22e97fdf9432f564651d0c4da0f8d0827888a6

Proposal: [Non-Constitutional] Funding for Into the Dungeons: Machinata - a PvP Digital Miniature Game V2

# Abstract This is a revised version of the initial proposal put forth to the DAO that can be found [here.](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-non-constitutional-funding-for-into-the-dungeons-machinata-a-pvp-digital-miniature-game/20806) ## Summary We have a lot to say about Into the Dungeons, a world we’ve been building for over 2 years, however, in the interest of preserving the DAO’s and delegates’ time this summary will aim to provide a concise overview of: 1. What is Machinata? 2. Our Ask 3. Why DAO Funding? 4. How does the DAO Benefit? Please ask questions. The goal of this post is to be direct and on point. Happy to share more details with whomever is curious, but wanted this post to be easy to follow. ## What is Machinata? Machinata is a 2 player turn based tactics digital miniature game where each player creates a 9 card deck consisting of units, buildings and spells. Each player then utilizes their deck to capture the opponent’s base. Machinata is designed to have short to medium session-based gameplay that lends itself to competitive gaming. This would be the first competitive e-sport like title in the Arbitrum ecosystem. We want to launch a playable version of Machinata during the 2nd half of 2024. ## Our Ask **We are asking the DAO for 60,000 $ARB up front as a first tranche, and 180,000 $ARB in total. The rest of the 120,000 $ARB would be paid out in two tranches, 60,000 $ARB each.** **1. First tranche of 60,000 $ARB to enable us to deliver the following:** |Deliverable| Description| |--- | ---| |Into the Dungeons Branding, Website, and Marketplace Pt.1 – BRANDING AND DESIGN | The ITD universe is expansive and will be much more than just one game. It will all live on Arbitrum. We are aiming for a site at the level of KPR and have already had calls with the design agency that made the site. The Marketplace is our first product – one where people will come to buy and sell their miniatures and so it needs to make an amazing impact. | |Progress on Base Miniature Deck Pt.1 – 7 ADDITIONAL CARDS | We currently have 5 cards completed and will be able to complete the rest of the cards with the funding. Each milestone will include delivery of 7 cards. | |UPDATED UNREAL ENGINE PROTOTYPE WITH 12 CARDS | The existing prototype has 4 cards integrated. We will integrate an additional 8 cards and release 2 small teaser scenarios for marketing purposes on our website that will be playable for free. The DAO is welcome to try the full build at the time. | **2. After the milestones above have been met and confirmed by the DAO, we would ask for the next tranche of 60,000 $ARB which will enable us to meet the following milestones:** |Deliverable | Description| |--- | ---| |Into the Dungeons Branding, Website, and Marketplace Pt.2 – RELEASE OF MARKETPLACE | This second tranche will enable us to work with the design agency and release the completed website that will not only serve as an entry point to the ITD universe but will also include our first completed product – the Marketplace. The Marketplace is where players will be able to purchase the Base Pack, Expansion, or Single Miniatures. The Marketplace is also a key part of the sustainability of the game. By allowing community members to submit their designs/variants of Miniatures or completely new units, we will be enabling a creator economy that will generate revenue for artists, creators, and Machinata. | |Progress on Base Miniature Deck Pt.2 – 7 additional cards completed | By the end of this milestone, we will have 19 cards completed. | |Smart Contracts | We will complete smart contracts for: 1. Minting miniatures (on behalf of the community creator, if a design is accepted) with their wallet receiving 70% of the proceeds and Machinata receiving 30% of the proceeds for each unit bought/sold. 2. Since miniatures are collectables, we want to enable collectors to trade them freely without paying us a percentage fee. However, if a miniature is traded to a player OTC, then to use it in the game, the player must register it with us by paying a small activation fee. 3. Match History to be written on chain. | **3. The final tranche of 60,000 $ARB will enable us to:** |Deliverable | Description| |--- | ---| |Begin Crowd sale of Base Game set (27 cards) + 1 PFP | With the previous two milestones completed, the last tranche will predominantly be used for launching our collection which will have an actual game tied to it! We are currently contemplating 7777 packs with a percentage reserved for the Arbitrum community – See next section | |Initial Marketing and Partnerships | A lot of marketing and partnership money will be coming from the actual crowd sale as that will be key to making an impact in the Web3 space and bringing more users into the Arbitrum community to play Machinata and all the other cool games the community has been and will continue to build!| This funding released over three tranches will allow us to speed up development and raise the rest of the capital required for longer term growth of the game that will include some features such as: 1. Streamed competitions (similar to what Parallel did with their invitational) 2. New miniature packs being released 3. New game modes 4. Further development of the ITD ecosystem ## Why Should the DAO Fund It? We know asking for 60,000 $ARB upfront is a risk for the DAO, but here is why we think it is worth it. 1. We have a playable prototype – footage from in-engine (Unreal Engine) gameplay can be seen in the forum post. 2. We are making a high-quality digital miniature game that has been self-funded so far. Each miniature has an illustration, which is turned into a card and 5 animated pixel art sprites – some of these sprites can be seen in the forum post. 3. We have been active participants of the ecosystem for the last several years. Our first project https://www.ruffionreborn.xyz was self-funded and is completely opensource with all client side (Godot), server side and assets (CC0) being freely available for the Arbitrum community to make their own games. We are currently working on adding smart contracts to Ruffion Reborn. 4. We are doxxed builders and Arbitrum is home! [Ali Husain | LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/ali-husain1/) [Zehra Akbar | LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/zehra-akbar/) ## How does the DAO Benefit? The digital miniature model is not something that has been done yet in Web3. Games Workshop, the company behind Warhammer40K is currently valued at 4.15B USD. The concept of collectable digital miniatures with different editions, enabling artists to create variants and create a community powered economy is something that fits in very with NFT technology. We are also creating some Arbitrum specific variants of miniatures. One example you can see in the forum post that the Soul Thief MUX variant placed alongside the Soul Thief Original Character. We recognize that Arbitrum has a large and thriving De-Fi community and we want to involve and reward (even if it is a subset of) them for being a part of the ecosystem. A portion of the total supply (total supply will be 7777 1st edition packs, but the portion is TBD, likely 777 packs for the community) will be distributed to the Arbitrum community for free as a thank you for helping us build the game. We would like to work with the Arbitrum community via the DAO to figure out a fair distribution mechanism when we reach that point. Machinata’s success is Arbitrum’s success as the network will see more users come onboard and more transactions. Most importantly, a very high quality IP, native to Web3, native to Arbitrum. Thank you, Zehra & Ali Forgotten Machine

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

[32725534.89057588, 112352169.1097861, 4505575.437721903]

[[32725534.89057588], [112352169.1097861], [4505575.437721903]]

0xb5B069370Ef24BC67F114e185D185063CE3479f8

0xf949b8c0629644390752cc09ba1ae641116fdf10733d32c35f8968e3ce79a399

Empowering Early Contributors: The community Arbiter Proposal 2.0

**Summary:** This proposal proposes to allocate 125,000 $ARB tokens, equal to 0.00125% of the total supply, to recognize and reward the outstanding contributions of the Arbitrum community member known as "Arbiter". Arbiter receives the arbiter community role in the arbitrum discord after having made significant contributions to Arbitrum, as recognized by members of the Arbitrum team. Over the three-year period 2021-2023, these contributors played a key role in the development of Arbitrum, from translating, advising, publicizing, and docking projects to community support, fraud prevention, and docking activities etc. At the time of the Arbitrum DAO's inception, Arbiters did not receive any airdrops or rewards. By establishing a transparent and fair reward system through the Arbitrum DAO, our goal is to recognize past contributions and inspire continued dedication to the development of the Arbitrum ecosystem. Considering that arbiters did not keep proof of their contributions before and after the establishment of the Arbitrum DAO, and that a great deal of their work could not be counted or quantified, the dedication of each arbiter is also exceptionally valuable. All members of arbiters unanimously agreed to initiate the proposal as a whole and agreed on an equal share of the reward amount. **Foreword:** 25 Arbiters come from different countries with different time zones, speak different languages. Arbiters have been deprecated by the Arbitrum team, and it has become extremely difficult to bring arbiters together. Arbiters who have made outstanding contributions to the Arbitrum community from 2021 to 2023. Compared to on-chain activists and ecosystem projects which have conducted a large number of airdrops, arbiters haven’t received any airdrop retroactive rewards Considering the large number of contributions made by arbiters prior to the establishment of the Arbitrum DAO that have not been effectively preserved, and the fact that there are many members whose work cannot be counted and quantified, and that the dedication of each arbiter has been exceptionally valuable, all members of the arbiters have agreed that arbiters as a whole should initiate the proposal. All members of Arbiters unanimously agreed to initiate the proposal and apply for retroactive awards for Arbiters as a whole. Arbiter as a whole (or project) is asking for retroactive rewards. If each member's contribution is listed one by one to make a forced comparison, this will bring arbiter infinite tug-of-war, mutual disputes, suspicion etc.. At the same time, Arbiter is not professional to establish a very systematic and perfect evaluation system. Special statement: As the earliest arbitrum contributor, arbiter is retroactively obtaining voting rights and voice in the governance of Arbitrum DAO. The Arbitrum DAO airdrop to early adopters and ecosystem projects also does not take price into account, but rather the weight of governance. The choice of 125,000 $ARB is fully considered (explained in detail below). If the current arb price is $0.1, the arbiter also only apply for 125,000 $ARB, which has little to do with price. **Motivation:** The Arbitrum community thrives on collaboration, decentralization, and the Ethereum community spirit. This proposal aligns with these principles and strives to: 1.Recognize the exceptional contributions made by Arbiters to Arbitrum’s development. 2.Demonstrate the spirit of collaboration and decentralization within the Arbitrum ecosystem, ensuring its long-term sustainability. 3.Establish a clear and equitable reward mechanism through the Arbitrum DAO, ensuring that Arbiters are treated fairly. 4.Inspire more individuals to actively participate in the advancement of the Arbitrum ecosystem by retroactively rewarding Arbiters. **Rationale:** The Arbitrum community, driven by its contributors, has been instrumental in shaping Arbitrum over the past two years. These dedicated individuals have contributed significantly through a wide range of activities, including translation, promotion, event organization, community guidance, safety assurance, and collaboration with other communities. These efforts have been essential to the success and vibrancy of the Arbitrum community. Please review the forum post for full proposal details: https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/non-constitutional-empowering-early-contributors-the-community-arbiter-proposal-2-0/20404

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

[83096263.09127909, 1827461.8033859895, 37829219.06590167]

[[83096263.09127909], [1827461.8033859895], [37829219.06590167]]

0xb5B069370Ef24BC67F114e185D185063CE3479f8

0xbecc45a6beb55a708e25195f34db2f5ff757e0da5ff55171ca731b39428e27c3

AIP: Batch Poster Manager and Sequencer Inbox Finality Fix

# Constitutional # Abstract This Constitutional AIP proposes two improvements to batch posting for Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova: * **Batch Poster Manager:** Introduce a “batch poster manager” role with the ability to grant/revoke batch-posting affordances. * **Increase MaxTimeVariation**: Change the max-time-variation “future blocks” and “future seconds” values to 64 and 768, respectively, in line with Ethereum’s proof of stake finality guarantees. These changes will allow the system to be more resilient, and don’t represent a change to the system’s current trust model. # Motivation **Batch Poster Manager:** Currently, both Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, each have a single address that is granted the batch-poster role (this is currently the same as the Sequencer). The Sequencer posts batches frequently, and thus the batch-poster address must be controlled by a hot wallet. This means that if the batch poster’s keys were compromised, Sequencing could be unstable until the DAO took action. This AIP proposes a system in which a “batch poster manager” role is granted to the operator of the Sequencer which has the ability to grant and revoke batch-posting affordances. This way, the batch poster manager could perform key rotations for the batch posters— routinely, and/or if a batch poster address is ever compromised — quickly and without the DAO needing to take coordinated action. Note that this proposal does not change the sequencer, but more so allow for easier key rotations on the batch poster. Crucially, this would not represent a change on the current system’s trust model: * In both the current and the new proposed system, the Sequencer is entrusted with managing the batch posting affordance; in the current system, for example, the entity behind Sequencer could technically grant batch posting to an additional entity by simply sharing it’s keys. * In the new system, the DAO would *still* have the same ability to revoke the Sequencer role; i.e., the DAO could update the batch poster manager (along with any batch posters). **MaxTimeVariation:** The futureBlocks value in the the SequencerInbox enforces a max block height that a batch can be posted relative to the current block (likewise with futureSeconds). The current value for futureBlocks is 12, which was set prior to the Ethereum merge. A small value for future blocks means that a relatively small L1 reorg can cause an otherwise valid batch to revert. This proposal increases the value to 64, two epochs, in line with Ethereum’s finality guarantees. # Implementation **Batch Poster Manager:** https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro-contracts/commit/c7554852a7c41ca5eaef298dab10472a7f550df7 Note that this implementation is currently under audit and is dependent on the ArbOS 20 AIP changes ([AIP: ArbOS Version 20](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-arbos-version-20/20957)). Depending on the timeline of the audits, the result the ArbOS20 AIP acceptance, and the feedback on this proposal, these changes can be bundled into the same proposal as the ArbOS 20 changes or proposed separately. **MaxTimeVariation**: https://github.com/ArbitrumFoundation/governance/pull/233 Audit: [publications/reviews/2024-01-offchainarbitrum-securityreview.pdf at master · trailofbits/publications · GitHub](https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2024-01-offchainarbitrum-securityreview.pdf)

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

[149376690.18429863, 260376.72931183229, 1319572.6790116746]

[[149376690.18429863], [260376.72931183229], [1319572.6790116746]]

0xAbAbE91A907fAdff921720C43ABe4098e7245E99

0x813a366e287a872ada13d4f8348e771c7aa2d8c3cb00b2be31539ceab5627513

AIP: ArbOS Version 20 “Atlas”

# Constitutional # Abstract This AIP proposes a number of improvements to Arbitrum chains, including the capability to leverage EIP 4844 to post batches of L2 transactions as Blobs on L1 Ethereum at a cheaper price. The proposal also includes support for most of the changes included in [Ethereum’s Dencun upgrade](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7569). The proposed ArbOS 20 “Atlas” upgrade will be ready for adoption by any Arbitrum Chain; this proposal concerns the Arbitrum One and Nova chains, as they are governed by the Arbitrum DAO. On a high level, an ArbOS upgrade can be seen as Arbitrum’s equivalent of a hard fork - more can be read about the subject over in [Arbitrum ArbOs upgrades ](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-arbos-upgrades/19695). Please note that ArbOS Version 20 “Atlas” is an upgrade that builds upon [ArbOS version 11](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-arbos-version-11/19696/) which has been adopted by the ArbitrumDAO - this proposal increments the version number to 20 instead of 12 due to technical details that allow for better Orbit chain customizability. Please review the forum post for a full description of changes included

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

[162448004.12334257, 74724.04844929496, 323440.1982201616]

[[162448004.12334257], [74724.04844929496], [323440.1982201616]]

0xb5B069370Ef24BC67F114e185D185063CE3479f8

0x5050ef61a4cbff56344ad558c2c880b547fef3b81df607818238ed3031f840b3

[Non-Constitutional]: Arbitrum Stable Treasury Endowment Program

TL;DR : This framework supports the budding RWA ecosystem on Arbitrum by diversifying 35 million ARB from our treasury (~1%) into stable & liquid bills or money market instruments earning a rate of return roughly equivalent to US Treasuries (hereby called ‘stable RWAs’) This proposal is a trial run for a larger investment policy of the ArbitrumDAO treasury, both in: 1. Creating a legal and infrastructural pipeline that future diversification proposals can take guidance from and 2. Proof of concept that we can diversify our treasury in a way that supports ecosystem growth This is NOT a grant; it is an investment that Arbitrum governance can exercise control over and recall, subject to agreed-upon conditions with a successful applicant. ### Overview The Stable Treasury Endowment Program (STEP) is the first proposal floated by the Treasury WG before the DAO. We are targeting stable RWAs backed by t-bills or money market instruments as the 1st step towards larger treasury diversification for several reasons; 1. Once we figure out how to hold stable RWAs on our books, we can easily diversify based on best practices rather than procedural considerations. The stable coins we use today in De-Fi are mostly backed by t-bill RWAs; creating our own exposure can increase capital efficiency and mitigate risk. 2. An insight from the Arbitrum Days workshop at Istanbul was the DAO needs a strategy/program for different verticals - RWAs, gaming, NFTs, De-Fi, DeSo, DeSci, etc. Another way of looking at STEP 1 is that it’s a proposal boosting the stable RWA vertical on Arbitrum, with the added advantage that it’s in the form of an investment rather than a grant. More generally, stable RWAs have an attractive risk-reward ratio for Arbitrum in terms of sectors we should be nurturing. The total US treasury market is over $20 trillion, some of which is expected to come onchain to satisfy demand from wealthy investors. As the home of De-Fi, we should not cede space to [Base](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/12/12/coinbase-debuts-rwa-platform-built-on-base-under-abu-dhabi-regulators-oversight/) or [Mantle](https://snapshot.org/#/bitdao.eth/proposal/0x26884fce58b66e82fa74735a2e255f76654618278432897f4ca2430702e95dcd) that have their own RWA support program. 3. Although protocols on Arbitrum and governance might wish to hold stable RWAs, they are limited by having to conduct due diligence on providers they can trust. This proposal creates a qualified screening committee that evaluates applicants and prepares a Assessment Report on them, providing a roster of vetted service providers that anyone can use for investing assets into RWAs In conclusion, we expect that lessons learned from implementation of this proposal can pave the way for a new form of an ecosystem support program, where the ArbitrumDAO supports projects not with grants but purchases of financial products built on our chain that also diversify our treasury holdings. ### Timeline and Procedure 1. Snapshot temperature check and [if successful] an on-chain vote via Tally to fully implement this framework in February 2024; 2. Screening committee publishes RFP with specific information requested from applicants and minimum criteria they must satisfy to be considered; 3. Receive applications from service providers (30-day submission window); 4. Screening committee reviews each application, and where needed, conduct additional due diligence and research; 5. Assessment report on eligible service providers released by screening committee (April); 6. ARB token holders divide their voting power among approved service providers to allocate sanctioned amount using the [Snapshot Weighted Voting](https://docs.snapshot.org/user-guides/proposals/voting-types) strategy. Providers receive an allocation proportionate to their support from ARB holders, provided they clear a threshold of 10% of all eligible votes. ### Additional Considerations 1. The Arbitrum foundation will act as the legal entity and face the service provider during the KYC process. They shall also hold any tokens/NFTs received in exchange of investments and have authority to withdraw assets from the service provider should any risks be discovered; however an explanation for the same shall be posted on the forum within 3 days of taking such an action. They will also periodically sweep interest earned from these assets to our treasury. Fire Drills will be periodically conducted to test solvency and clear out any AML delays in returning investments 2. Interest earned from RWAs will be swept to our treasury for increasing our bridged USDC holdings (currently at 10 cents). For reference, $20 million in t-bills currently returns roughly $1 million in annual interest. Delay of more than 60 days in returning interest earned will result in liquidation of an investment from a service provider. 3. Proposals to utilize interest earned will follow the same process as requesting funds from the treasury 4. The screening committee will comprise of 6 members: Karpatkey, GFX Labs Steakhouse Financial, Nethermind and North Lake Legal, & the Treasury WG acting as facilitator and tie-breaking vote * Karpatkey is a DeFi-native organisation specialising in professional DAO finance through industry-leading research and tooling since 2020. We’ve been working with GnosisDAO, Balancer, ENS, CoW Protocol, and Lido on financial planning, operations, and strategy, diversifying their treasuries into sustainable portfolios of DeFi investments designed to support DAOs in executing their missions. * GFX Labs is the leading provider of professional governance services in DeFi. We are most known for our extensive past and present contributions at Uniswap, MakerDAO, Compound, and Optimism. GFX focuses on operational improvements and improving organizational quality and structure, with strong relevant experience in real-world asset onboarding and stablecoins. * Steakhouse Financial is the leading CFO-as-a-service consulting company for DAOs. We specialize in stablecoins and RWAs. Our team has been merging TradFi and DeFi for years – our team met as contributors to the Strategic Finance Core Unit at MakerDAO. We’ve contributed extensively to asset-liability management research and structuring MakerDAOs RWA portfolio, including its exposure to treasuries. We specialize in deep due-diligence reports of tokenized issuers and publish the leading research report and Dune dashboards covering the space https://dune.com/steakhouse/tokenized-securities * *Nethermind* is a blockchain research and software engineering company empowering enterprises and developers worldwide to work with and build upon decentralized systems. Our work touches every part of the Web3 ecosystem, from fundamental cryptography research to security, node infrastructure, DeFi, and application-layer protocol development. We have a team of over 220, with more than 180 engineers on board. Nethermind is a key contributor to the development of Ethereum, with our execution client representing over a quarter of all synced nodes. Additionally, we actively build the Starknet ecosystem and support our institutional and enterprise partners in advanced blockchain, digital assets, and decentralized finance (DeFi) fields. * North Lakes Legal is a law firm at the leading edge of bridging decentralized finance, DAOs and Real World Assets. North Lakes Legal implemented the standards for the initial high-profile real- world asset (“RWA”) financings in the DeFi space. Christian Petersen is the principal of North Lakes Legal and has 26 years of cross border project and structured finance experience. In support of Maker DAO, North Lakes Legal has structured, negotiated, and implemented the following: - Société Generale – DAI 40 million, tokenized French covered bonds - Huntingdon Valley Bank – DAI 100 million vault to acquire RWA loan participations - BlockTower Credit – DAI 150 million vault utilizing Tinlake for various RWAs - Monetalis Clydesdale – DAI 500 million to acquire U.S. treasury ETF - Most recently, North Lakes Legal advised Ondo Finance in the development, structuring and launch of Ondo USDY. 5. The Assessment Report prepared by the screening committee on eligible service providers will be used to inform delegates and ARB holders in casting their weighted snapshot vote dividing sanctioned ARB among providers. Details in the Assessment Report include schedule for returning interest, relationship with Arbitrum (debtor or custodian), maturation period of asset, legal structure (bankruptcy remote assessment), solvency, Arbitrum alignment, turnaround time for returning investment, transparency level (proof of reserves/read only access to accounts), and fees charged. 6. 200,000 ARB for implementation of this proposal; unused funds returned to treasury Anticipated expenditures include * 6 month third party audit on selected providers * Honorarium of 500 ARB per application for each of the 6 screening committee members (NB: this * may * be supplemented with a small application fee not exceeding $1000 to prevent spam proposals; * Engaging external experts and due diligence specialists where relevant. * Full account of fund utilization will be posted on the forum. 7. Eligibility: Full RFP will be created by screening committee post Snapshot approval. Some preliminary considerations; * Tokenized tbills launched or bridged to Arbitrum are NOT a hard requirement to apply. * Attested for verifiability of assets by a 3rd party * Strong reputation with relevant team experience, evidence of managing assets, and regulatory compliance * Fully liquid, secured, and safe investments that can be called back by the DAO with 3 working days notice * Between 0.15-0.4% (15-40 bps) of total amount in fees with no bonuses, * Liquid t-bills or money market instruments approximating the so called “risk-free rate of return”

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

[132253619.10767262, 117879.53247205478, 360651.3777244666]

[[132253619.10767262], [117879.53247205478], [360651.3777244666]]

0x1B686eE8E31c5959D9F5BBd8122a58682788eeaD

0x4e064bc3f7335eb5b3b998c3b21921995d43b5c3d225da53897acaf57b51e826

[Constitutional] Changes to the Constitution and the Security Council Election Process

Abstract This Constitutional AIP proposes improvements to the ArbitrumDAO Constitution and the Security Council election process, which include: - Candidates are given a week to apply for a Security Council position before the nominee selection stage takes place. - Candidates need to sign a transaction from their EOA (Externally Owned Account) to apply for a Security Council position. - The ArbitrumDAO Constitution is updated to reflect these changes as well as correct previous mistakes in wording with regard to timing and quorum. Motivation This AIP aims to improve the election process ensuring that candidates are not overlooked during the nominee selection stage and that candidates stand an equal chance of being nominated to the following stage of the election process, irrespective of when in the registration period they express their interest. It also updates the system so contenders must provide a signed message before running in the elections - this ensures they are able to produce signed messages for the different chains that the Security Council needs the ability to act on. Issues with the current Security Council election process: - In the nominee Selection stage, because contender registration and endorsement occur in the same 7-day period, delegates are likely to overlook applications that are submitted at the end of the period. This results in candidates who submit their applications at the start of the period having an unfair advantage, as they are more likely to be endorsed and therefore progress to the next stage. - Candidates might sign up to the elections using an on-chain smart contract wallet which is not able to produce signatures valid for other ArbitrumDAO-governed chains. - The constitution does not clearly express the election procedure. Specifications Accordingly, this AIP aims to implement the following changes: 1. A 7-day ‘Contender Submission’ stage before the ‘Nominee Selection’ stage. Accordingly, the duration of the entire election process will increase from 42 days to 49 days. 2. For candidates to apply for a Security Council position, they are required to provide a signed message from their wallet. 3. The wording on the ArbitrumDAO Constitution is updated to correctly reflect how quorum for proposals (as well as the election process) is handled, which should also take into account ‘abstain’ votes. 4. The wording on the ArbitrumDAO Constitution is updated to reflect the new format of the Security Council elections.

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

[155276468.9459444, 182357.69185891916, 393557.77707459626]

[[155276468.9459444], [182357.69185891916], [393557.77707459626]]

0xA7860E99e3ce0752D1ac53b974E309fFf80277C6

0xbc8a34dea05bdcc295b390228874d7ccd76c204d43dc745555cc84d7d5d06f8d

Election of Procurement Committee Members (ADPC)

This snapshot accompanies the ongoing vote to establish the [Procurement Committee](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/43616303506326656287362617487331059827021737444126158637397168372555259240241) - Go Vote if you haven't already! ### Proposal Overview: If passed, this proposal seeks to elect three members to the newly formed ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee (ADPC). ### Background: The ADPC is crucial for managing and overseeing procurement activities within the ArbitrumDAO. The committee will consist of three members elected through this Snapshot voting process. Their role will include administering procurement frameworks as ratified by the ArbitrumDAO. ### Election Process: Open Election via Snapshot: The election will be conducted using Snapshot's weighted voting system. The top three candidates in terms of votes will be appointed to the ADPC. To learn more about this voting mechanism, please see the [Snapshot User Guide](https://docs.snapshot.org/user-guides/proposals/voting-types) Eligibility Criteria: Candidates and voters should adhere to the detailed eligibility criteria focusing on experience, integrity, and skills essential for the ADPC's effective functioning. The three highest ranked applicants at the end of the voting period will be elected to the ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee. ### Key Aspects of the Proposal: - **Implementation:** The elected members' roles will become effective upon passing the [on-chain proposal for establishing the ADPC.](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/43616303506326656287362617487331059827021737444126158637397168372555259240241) - **Member Composition:** The ADPC will consist of three members. - **Voting System:** The election will use Snapshot's weighted voting system. - **Eligibility and Criteria:** Detailed eligibility criteria have been outlined to ensure competent and ethical committee members. - **Election Timeline:** The process includes an application submission period, KYB/KYC compliance, and the final member election phase. - **Future Amendments:** Non-Constitutional AIPs may alter election rules in the future, but not during an ongoing election. ### Applicants and Applications - [**Pavel Fedotov**](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/procurement-committee-application-elections-due-22-jan-extended-from-19th/20536/3?u=dk3) - [**Joseph [Immutablelawyer]**](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/procurement-committee-application-elections-due-22-jan-extended-from-19th/20536/4?u=dk3) - [**Paul Imseih**](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/procurement-committee-application-elections-due-22-jan-extended-from-19th/20536/5?u=dk3) - [**Jeff G**](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/procurement-committee-application-elections-due-22-jan-extended-from-19th/20536/6?u=dk3) - [**Bernard Schmid [Areta]**](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/procurement-committee-application-elections-due-22-jan-extended-from-19th/20536/7?u=dk3) ## Call to Action: Review the detailed proposal and eligibility criteria on the ArbitrumDAO forum, and cast your vote for the candidates who best align with the ADPC's objectives and values. Let's work together to elect a capable and dedicated Procurement Committee! [-->To learn more about the initial proposal<--](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-non-constitutional-establish-the-arbitrumdao-procurement-committee/20064) Note: If any candidate fails to pass KYC/KYB via the foundation's preferred vendor, they will be deemed disqualified, and the next candidate in terms of accrued votes will become eligible unless challenged via forum post and the Arbitrum DAO community deems it necessary to hold an additional election snapshot.

['Pavel Fedotov [pfedprog]', 'Joseph [immutablelawyer]', 'Paul Imseih [pablo]', 'Jeff G [jeff_g]', 'Bernard Schmid [bernard]']

closed

[12674010.119706346, 55570612.98122398, 38161537.26782229, 7187541.026251411, 42087410.059293605]

[[12674010.11970634], [55570612.98122398], [38161537.26782229], [7187541.026251411], [42087410.059293605]]

0xAD16ebE6FfC7d96624A380F394cD64395B0C6144

0xc591f79422bf26faf13055df098142569785c04316fdae5be993e282721eb717

Constitutional AIP - Security Council Improvement Proposal

### **Abstract** This AIP seeks to propose changes to the structure of the security council so Arbitrum can maintain the “Stage 1” designation as per L2BEAT and not fall back to “Stage 0” designation. ### **Motivation** On December 7, [L2BEAT published an update](https://medium.com/l2beat/stages-update-security-council-requirements-4c79cea8ef52) to the security council requirements for the [Stages Framework](https://medium.com/l2beat/introducing-stages-a-framework-to-evaluate-rollups-maturity-d290bb22befe). The requirements were updated after a lot of research and feedback to make Stages more formal and precise. ### **Rationale** Upgrading the security council as per the Stage 1 requirements set by L2BEAT, will help ensure Arbitrum remains decentralized, but properly secured. See ‘Specifications’ for more details. ### **Key Terms** **Stages:** A framework, inspired by [Vitalik’s proposed milestones](https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/proposed-milestones-for-rollups-taking-off-training-wheels/11571), that categorises rollups into three distinct stages based on their reliance on these training wheels. You can learn [more about the Stages framework here](https://medium.com/l2beat/introducing-stages-a-framework-to-evaluate-rollups-maturity-d290bb22befe). **Security Council:** A group of 12 individuals who are responsible for addressing risks to the Arbitrum ecosystem through the selective application of **e**mergency actions and non-emergency actions. Learn more in [the ArbitrumDAO Docs](https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/concepts/security-council). **Timelock:** Smart contracts which implement a delay between an upgrade confirmation and execution. **Exit Window:** The actual time users have to exit the system in case of an unwanted upgrade. ### **Specifications** Arbitrum currently has two multisigs and they both contain the same set of members: a) A 9/12 multisig with instant upgrade power b) A 7/12 multisig that can upgrade with a 3+7+3 days delay While the higher threshold multisig can be classified as a Security Council, the lower one is below the minimum threshold and it’s considered a simple multisig according to the Stages framework introduced above. For normal multisigs, L2BEAT requires at least a 7 days exit window for users. The current exit window for Arbitrum is 2 days (see [this thread](https://x.com/stonecoldpat0/status/1737840485967032739?s=20) for a quick explanation). Moreover, the higher threshold multisig is supposed to stop malicious upgrades attempted by the lower threshold multisig. However, since the member set is the same, if the lower threshold agrees on something there are not enough members in the higher threshold to stop them, which means that the actual security of the upgradeability mechanism boils down to the 7/12 threshold. For the above reason, technically, with the updated requirements for Stages, Arbitrum falls back to the Stage 0 designation. Since we know that it takes time to upgrade Arbitrum, we decided to leave the Stage 1 designation with the promise of addressing the above issues in a timely manner. This proposal is about addressing the issues and moving them to be voted on by the DAO. **Proposed Solutions** 1) The **first solution** would be to remove the lower threshold (7/12) multisig entirely. This can be done in two ways: 1. The contract is removed which requires an on-chain upgrade, or, 2. The lower threshold multisig increases its threshold from 7/12 to 9/12 which requires no upgrade. Increasing the threshold gives us the flexibility to restore a lower threshold in the future should the need arise, and it’s also a very quick and easy fix since it doesn’t require an on-chain upgrade. On the other hand, removing the dependency on the lower threshold mutlisig for all the contracts in Arbitrum is a broad and potentially risky change. Therefore we suggest raising the threshold for the time being and revisiting the removal of all the dependencies at a later date if needed. 2) The **second solution** would be to leave the lower threshold multisig as it is, but to increase the exit window to 7 days. In practice, this involves increasing the L2 timelock delay from 3 days to 8 days, since there is a 1 day max delay to force transactions on Arbitrum via L1 using the ‘DelayedInbox’. Increasing the L1 Timelock would not be very beneficial due to delay attacks on the fraud proof systems, since, even with BoLD, the challenge period would end up being up to [16 days](https://x.com/DZack23/status/1737864854059335905?s=20). 3) The **third solution**, which is not strictly required by the Stages Framework for the Stage 1 designation, is to both remove the lower threshold multisig entirely and increase the L2 Timelock delay so users have more time to exit in case of unwanted upgrades, increasing the security of the system even more. ### Steps to Implement Following a week of discussion of this RFC, the proposal will go for a vote on Snapshot with the following 6 options (as they are or slightly adjusted), and/or any additional ones, should they arise from the discussion during the RFC phase: 1. Increase the threshold from 7/12 to 9/12. 2. Increase the L2 timelock delay from 3 days to 8 days. 3. Increase the threshold and the L2 timelock delay. 4. Make no changes. Following the temp-check, if any of the aforementioned options apart from No.4 is the most popular, the proposal will move to on-chain vote to execute the proposal. ### **Overall Cost** There’s no overhead to the DAO for the implementation of this proposal. ### **Timeline** **RFC -** January 11th to January 18th **Snapshot -** January 18th to January 25th **On-Chain Vote:** January 30th to February 13th **Execution Delay:** - February 13th to February 16th - L2 Waiting Period - February 16th to February 23rd - L2-to-L1 Message - February 23rd to February 27th - L1 Waiting Period **Please note the aforementioned timeline is tentative and the actual timeline might be slightly different.**

['Increase the threshold to 9/12', 'Increase the L2 timelock delay', 'Increase the threshold and delay', 'Make no changes.', 'Abstain']

closed

[111076415.5097518, 561076.31516187, 19799763.673925266, 168853.48141676493, 972395.061326395]

[[111076415.5097518], [561076.31516187], [19799763.673925266], [168853.4814167649], [972395.061326395]]

0x1B686eE8E31c5959D9F5BBd8122a58682788eeaD

0x1e5052579c5ed931f90e03e59f34274ba0a006093a6eeeab65e5e4df552668cc

Pilot Program Advisor Elections

## Intro This Snapshot serves to elect 3 Application Advisors for the Arbitrum Long-Term Incentive Pilot Program. More details can be found in the full proposal [here](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/19?u=matt_stablelab) ## Rules Voters can vote for up to 3 applicants. Applicants may not vote for themselves. Any group elected will be required to nominate a representative. The 3 applicants with the most votes will be elected as Application Advisors. ## Applicants and Applications * [Boardroom](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/16?u=boardroom) * [Castle Capital](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/10?u=matt_stablelab) * [Gabriele](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/31?u=matt_stablelab) * [JoJo](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/3?u=jojo) * [Milan Jonas](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/29) * [padzank](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/12) * [SEEDLatam Gov](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/19?u=pedrob) * [Serious People](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/9?u=serioustaylor) * [Travis Skweres](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/35)

['Boardroom', 'Castle Capital', 'Gabriele', 'JoJo', 'Milan | Jonas', 'padzank', 'SEEDLatam Gov', 'Serious People', 'Travis Skweres', 'Abstain']

closed

[37038414.93223259, 114111558.46533538, 6416482.52519249, 154756635.27476037, 8979790.893211663, 1261656.3580975998, 139631038.06483942, 110002933.90907703, 24422798.217448466, 23917060.004006505]

[[37038414.93223259], [114111558.46533538], [6416482.52519249], [154756635.27476037], [8979790.893211663], [1261656.3580975998], [139631038.06483942], [110002933.90907703], [24422798.217448466], [23917060.004006505]]

0x33DB27C21E0f7a2f3351A4C6DDceDFB9F713410b

0xc2d7ebf5ef78084b26544905fd6febf0b8256293ce7f67a71fdcdefc5e6284a4

Pilot program Council Elections

## Intro This Snapshot serves to elect 5 council Members for the Arbitrum Long-Term Incentive Pilot Program. More details can be found in the full proposal [here](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/19?u=matt_stablelab) ## Rules Voters can vote for up to 5 applicants. Applicants may not vote for themselves. Any group elected will be required to nominate a representative. The 5 applicants with the most votes will be elected to the council. ## Applicants and Applications * [1sla.eth](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/30?u=1sla.eth) * [404 DAO](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/17?u=404dao) * [Ali Husain (thechaingamer)](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/18) * [Bob-Rossi](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/5?u=bob-rossi) * [Curia](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/6?u=englandzz) * [Daniel Ospina](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/24) * [dumbird](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/38?u=realdumbird) * [Ferengi](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/34) * [GFX Labs](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/2?u=gfxlabs) * [GMX](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/32?u=saurabh) * [Ian Campbell](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/15?u=serioustaylor) * [Joseph [ImmutableLawyer]](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/4?u=immutablelawyer) * [Joshua Scigala](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/20?u=matt_stablelab) * [Karel Vuong](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/28?u=karelvuong) * [karpatkey](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/39?u=karpatkey) * [Keith Chen](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/33?u=matt_stablelab) * [Max Wavé](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/8?u=maxwave) * [Metagov](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/22) * [Pingus](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/11?u=matt_stablelab) * [Puncar](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/21?u=puncar) * [Smol Phil (Philip)](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/37?u=matt_stablelab) * [Tané](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/13?u=tane) * [The Rollup](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/7?u=therollupco) * [Wintermute](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/lti-pilot-program-position-application-thread/20329/23)

['1sla.eth', '404 DAO', 'Ali Husain (thechaingamer)', 'Bob-Rossi', 'Curia', 'Daniel Ospina', 'dumbird', 'Ferengi', 'GFX Labs', 'GMX', 'Ian Campbell', 'Joseph [ImmutableLawyer]', 'Joshua Scigala', 'Karel Vuong', 'karpatkey', 'Keith Chen', 'Max Wavé', 'Metagov', 'Pingus', 'Puncar', 'Smol Phil (Philip)', 'Tané', 'The Rollup', 'Wintermute', 'Abstain']

closed

[1666997.106274204, 83211534.98454396, 14155774.633699514, 6641749.559647379, 1461546.5280856842, 1363945.129098002, 56957335.72741239, 1202704.5443586782, 115698777.7501134, 76382354.95475484, 48791396.53036867, 73791789.46335839, 1107683.540947265, 75672088.02352086, 57166437.99638381, 24957573.832558163, 1061483.8442610228, 16940313.61128339, 1049869.509761249, 1042127.9447301752, 1061942.4747854494, 15771445.66383075, 28683533.977390263, 82453507.04343382, 49959029.179662414]

[[1666997.106274204], [83211534.98454396], [14155774.633699514], [6641749.559647379], [1461546.5280856842], [1363945.129098002], [56957335.72741239], [1202704.5443586782], [115698777.7501134], [76382354.95475486], [48791396.53036867], [73791789.46335839], [1107683.540947265], [75672088.02352086], [57166437.99638381], [24957573.832558163], [1061483.8442610228], [16940313.61128339], [1049869.509761249], [1042127.9447301752], [1061942.4747854494], [15771445.66383075], [28683533.977390263], [82453507.04343382], [49959029.179662414]]

0x33DB27C21E0f7a2f3351A4C6DDceDFB9F713410b

0x8112be08246466f870d0b91590fe99211f73d15cfdadac62ff3f1e6b2f74869a

Long-Term Incentives Pilot Program

**The full proposal exceeds Snapshot’s 20K character limit. A brief summary has been provided below. The full proposal can be seen [HERE](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/long-term-incentives-pilot-program/20223/19?u=matt_stablelab).** ## Summary This proposal establishes a Long Term Incentives Pilot Program for the DAO to test new incentive designs and answer the necessary questions to ensure we are ready to commit to the long-term program. This Pilot Program will distribute 25-45M ARB to protocols building on Arbitrum. The exact amount will be determined by the DAO via Snapshot vote and will be ratified via Tally vote. The program will distribute ARB to protocols for 12 weeks. The specifications of the Pilot Program were designed to remedy the 3 largest complaints regarding STIP Round 1. The Pilot Program hopes to be a test run for these additions for the DAO to determine if they should also be included in the long-term framework. #### Problem #1: Too large a burden placed on delegates In the original STIP, delegates voted on each incentive proposal individually, with almost 100 snapshot votes. This was extremely tiring for delegates and left many feeling they could not make informed decisions on every proposal. #### Solution #1 To remedy this problem, the Pilot Program will have a 5 person council elected by the DAO responsible for evaluating applications and selecting which protocols will advance to a snapshot vote to receive ARB. This will ensure all applications are thoughtfully evaluated with only the most deserving receiving incentives. Not only will this help to reduce the burden on delegates, but it will also help expedite the process and allow protocols to receive incentives quickly and efficiently. #### Problem #2: Protocols did not receive adequate feedback on their proposals A major gripe from protocols was they struggled to get feedback from delegates before the deadline. This left many feeling as though the better-connected protocols had an advantage as they were able to modify their proposals based on feedback to make them more competitive during the vote. Many protocols were willing to make changes to their applications to make them more appealing to the DAO but never received the proper feedback necessary to do so. #### Solution #2 The Pilot Program introduces Application Advisors. This will be impartial organizations tasked with providing each applicant with detailed feedback and guidance on how to improve their applications. This ensures each applicant can iterate on their proposal so they can put forward the best possible incentive plan for the council. #### Problem #3: Strict Limitations on Incentives Mechanisms STIP Round 1 had strict limitations on how the ARB could be used as incentives. This was done to protect the DAO and prevent misuse of funds. However, the strict rules resulted in the stifling of many innovative incentive designs. Many protocols had interesting designs that used the ARB in ways that increased alignment, improved cost efficiency, or helped to limit the dumping of ARB. However, these designs were not permitted in Round 1 leading to almost all protocols resulting in generic liquidity incentive models. #### Solution #3 The Pilot Program provides more flexibility to protocols to create innovative incentive structures. With the addition of the Council and Application Advisors, the Pilot Program does not require the rules to be as stringent. Malicious or inefficient designs will be first filtered out by the Application Advisors and then rejected by the council. Allowing protocols to innovate on incentive distribution mechanisms will allow Arbitrum protocols and community members to get a better idea of which designs work and which don’t work. This will help everyone as we prepare for a longer-term incentives program. ## Flow of V2 #### Application Period (2 week) Protocols will have 2 weeks to apply using the Pilot Program application template. The application template will be created by the Council and the Application Advisors to ensure everyone has the same goals and make it easier for the council to process applications. Applications will be posted in the Pilot Program section of the Arbitrum forum. Protocols only need to post the initial draft of their application during this period. They will then have 2 additional weeks during the feedback period to edit their applications. No late submissions will be accepted. #### Feedback Period (2 weeks) During the feedback period, the Applications Advisors will provide feedback and guidance on all proposals. Protocols will be assigned an Application Advisor who will provide feedback and guidance on applications on a rolling basis. Protocols will then use this time to work with the Advisors to edit their proposals before applications lock at the end of the 2 weeks. StableLab will also read all submissions during this period and highlight any rule violations to allow applicants to edit their submissions to ensure they comply with all program rules. #### Screening Period (1 week) During this period, the council will use the pre-determined rubric to grade each protocol and decide which protocols will advance to the voting period to receive ARB. The Council will use the rubric to select which applications will progress to a snapshot vote. The protocols that the council selects to advance to a snapshot vote must have a total funding amount that is equal to or lower than the incentives budget. This will ensure the DAO does not overspend should all Snapshot votes pass. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO. The rubric will be created by the Council and Application Advisors during the Tally voting period and will be publicly available by the time protocols begin to apply. The council will be required to publish a brief reasoning for all of their decisions on the forum to create transparency and accountability. The council must judge applications as they are and cannot accept protocols at lower amounts than their application states. For example, if an application asks for 200,000 ARB the council can not fund them with 100,000 ARB **EXAMPLE**: This is a hypothetical example using a budget of 10 ARB with 50 applicants that each request 1 ARB 50 protocols apply requesting 1 Arb Each -> Councils grades all 50 applications using the rubric and narrow the selection down to the top 10 applicants to not exceed the budget -> 10 snapshot votes are created to allow the DAO to confirm the council's decisions -> 9/10 Snapshot votes receive a majority of “fund” votes -> 9 protocols are funded with 1 ARB each and 1 Arb is returned to the DAO #### Voting Period (1 Week) Upon completion of the preliminary applicant screening process by the council, the selected applications will be formally presented for consideration. Each application will then be subject to a voting process via Snapshot, allowing Arbitrum delegates to vote on the allocation of funds. In the event that the Snapshot vote is favorably concluded, the respective protocol will commence receiving its funding through an Hedgey stream, facilitated by oSnap execution pending the protocol successfully passing KYC. #### Incentives Period (12 weeks) Selected protocols will receive their requested ARB using bi-weekly Hedgey streams for 12 weeks. During this time, protocols will be required to provide bi-weekly updates on the progress of their incentives using this [template](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/stip-bi-weekly-update-template/19436). Protocols will be required to finish their incentive distributions or return any unused funds two weeks after their final disbursement is available. During this period Application Advisors will continue to work with the protocols to help them analyze and improve their distribution mechanisms. Protocols will be allowed to adjust their incentive plans as long as they do not violate any rules and provide their updated plans in their next bi-weekly update. ## Overall Cost #### Total Cost: 25,815,000 - 45,815,000 ARB * **Incentives**: 25,000,000 - 45,000,000 ARB. The exact amount will be determined by the DAO through a Snapshot vote. The entire budget does not need to be spent by the council. Any unused funds will be returned to the DAO * **Council Members**: 125,000 ARB - 25,000 ARB each * **Application Advisors**: 105,000 ARB - 35,000 ARB each * **Research Bounties**: 200,000 ARB Total - the exact amount and sizes of specific bounties will be selected by the Council and can be vetoed by delegates. * **Data and Analytics Provider**: 150,000 ARB for data monitoring and reporting * **Program Manager**: 100,000 ARB for program design, organization, management, research report, and continuing development of the Long Term Incentives Framework. See the full list of responsibilities above. * **Proposal Creation Assistance:** 15,000 ARB - 10,000 ARB for Alex Lumley and 5,000 ARB for Bobby Bola for their time spent assisting with proposal design, hosting proposal office hour calls, and communicating with delegates to gather feedback. * **Retroactive Community Funding**: 100,000 ARB * **Multisig Signers**: 20,000 ARB - 2,500 ARB each

['Fund Program with 45,815,000', 'Fund Program with 35,815,000', 'Fund Program with 25,815,000', 'Don’t Fund Pilot Program']

closed

[102883951.6796747, 1447166.7392413008, 70207708.52451321, 4416482.138632245]

[[102883951.6796747], [1447166.7392413008], [70207708.52451321], [4416482.138632245]]

0x33DB27C21E0f7a2f3351A4C6DDceDFB9F713410b

0x2a25540406ad1c9f4460979b31cec5fba52637e4aff3bec97ab664a90ea8ed9e

Proposal [Non-Constitutional]: Establish the ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee

The ADPC (ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee) has the immediate mandate of overseeing the ‘Procurement Framework for Security Service Providers’ recently [ratified on by the ArbitrumDAO.](https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x3404df8a6e105dcf8b60cb22f22928aeedd3ffa5d80dc36e4f8fd74d0f5f14cb) The ADPC may add additional procurement frameworks if ratified through Snapshot. The committee will research and propose a subsidy fund for security-oriented services within the Arbitrum Ecosystem. A ‘Means Test’ will be implemented to determine project eligibility for security service-fee subsidies. The ADPC will establish procurement frameworks for various verticals and service types within the ArbitrumDAO. Three members will be elected to the ADPC through Snapshot’s weighted voting system. Eligibility criteria for members include experience, integrity, conflicts of interest disclosure, industry knowledge, analytical skills, financial acumen, communication skills, negotiation skills, project management abilities, ethical conduct, teamwork, technology proficiency, and decision-making skills. The election process involves application submission, KYC/KYB review, and member election via Snapshot. The ADPC’s term is 6 months, with a monthly stipend of 7,500ARB for each of the [3] elected members. Operational parameters include meeting minutes, monthly reports, bi-weekly calls, and a public dashboard. The ADPC’s Multi-Sig will be a 3/5, with signers receiving 1,000 ARB per month for their services. Signers cannot be Procurement Committee members. Streaming of funds and clawback capabilities are implemented for multisig accountability. The ADPC will be regulated via an Agreement with the Arbitrum Foundation. The Agreement will cover appointment, conflict of interest, mandate, record-keeping, duty of impartiality, recusal, self-dealing prohibition, and ethical trading standards for ADPC members. [Please see forum discussion for full details](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-non-constitutional-establish-the-arbitrumdao-procurement-committee/20064) Voting Options: Option A: Establish the ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee Option B: Do not Establish the ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee Option C: Abstain

['Establish Procurement Committee', 'Do not Establish the Committee', 'Abstain']

closed

[79881555.13640702, 268133.4821415642, 309285.811777245]

[[79881555.13640702], [268133.4821415642], [309285.811777245]]

0xAD16ebE6FfC7d96624A380F394cD64395B0C6144

0xf49d88ec2f4fa7373efc66a7cf9441d916519f48a2d90e7db3ea688357150a44

Proposal [Non-Constitutional]: Establish the ‘Arbitrum Research & Development Collective

**Please see the link to the forum discussion for the full text of this proposal** **Abstract** - This proposal aims to fund the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective to aid in turning Arbitrum DAO members’ ideas into reality for a term of 6 months. **Motivation** - The ARDC's role in reviewing and enhancing governance proposals, conducting code reviews for security, providing quantitative analysis for economic risk, and fostering active delegate engagement will contribute significantly to the growth and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem. It will provide valuable tools and reports for proposal authors, helping them refine their ideas and make better-informed decisions. **Rationale** - the ARDC's primary mandate aligns with the strategic priorities of the ArbitrumDAO, particularly in terms of governance optimization, risk management, research, and security. By funding the ARDC, the ArbitrumDAO can enhance its governance framework and future-proof the ecosystem through specialized verticals dedicated to these critical areas. **Steps to Implement** - Steps to Implement - The AIP will move to Snapshot on the 11th of December 2023. Following the conclusion of the Snapshot vote, the AIP will then proceed to the on-chain voting stage so as to ratify the funding & process for the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective. Once the forecited steps are concluded, @Immutablelawyer will be announcing the starting date of the election process. **Specifications & Timeline** - Specifications & timeline can be found in the following sections. **Overall Cost** - Option A: If the ARDC is funded with 880,000 ARB + Multi-Sig Budget. * 330,000 ARB [Security] [Applicable Cap] * 330,000 ARB [Research] [Applicable Cap] * 170,000 ARB [Risk] [Applicable Cap] * 50,000 ARB [DAOAdvocate] [Standard] Option B: If the ARDC is funded with 1.3 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget. * 500,000 ARB [Security] [Applicable Cap] * 500,000 ARB [Research] [Applicable Cap] * 250,000 ARB [Risk] [Applicable Cap] * 50,000 ARB [DAOAdvocate] [Standard] Option C: If the ARDC is funded with 1.715 Million ARB + Multi-Sig Budget. * 665,000 ARB [Security] [Applicable Cap] * 665,000 ARB [Research] [Applicable Cap] * 335,000 ARB [Risk] [Applicable Cap] * 50,000 ARB [DAOAdvocate] **[Excess ARB which will not be utilised as a result of the elected members and their corresponding fees will be returned to the ArbitrumDAO Treasury]**

['Fund with 880,000 ARB', 'Fund with 1,300,000 ARB', 'Fund with 1,715,000 ARB', "Don't fund", 'Abstain']

closed

[31531751.957894463, 0, 66389979.15911178, 27012590.231747206, 0]

[[31531751.957894463], [0], [66389979.15911178], [27012590.231747203], [0]]

0xb5B069370Ef24BC67F114e185D185063CE3479f8

0xef3ed3b3735cad375953947437980db576baebbba5a0c209b2cccabcb1c30740

Proposal: Experimental Incentive System for Active ArbitrumDAO Delegates

## **Abstract** We introduce an Experimental Incentive System aimed at the ArbitrumDAO delegates with a duration of six months. The goal is to assess the incentives' impact on the delegates' active participation and involvement in the DAO's governance. *This proposal is subject to changes.* ## **Motivation** This proposal represents an improved version compared to previous initiatives and requests for comments (RFCs): - [[RFC-2] Delegate Incentive System for ArbitrumDAO](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-2-delegate-incentive-system-for-arbitrumdao/15720) - [[DRAFT] Experimental Incentive System for Active ArbitrumDAO Delegates](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/draft-experimental-incentive-system-for-active-arbitrumdao-delegates/16501) We have developed this new proposal considering the comments and observations provided by other delegates. Our additional motivation lies in the recent increase in proposals and increased activity within ArbitrumDAO. We believe that delegates are the core base of the DAO and should be properly incentivized to maintain active participation, both in voting and feedback on proposals and in the ideation of governance processes. # **Delegate Incentive System** ## **Before reading the proposal, note how we have decided to structure it** This proposal is structured into four main sections: * **Option 1:** This is our main proposal detailing all the specifications of the incentive system. * **Option 2:** Introduces the implementation of "Karma" to automate certain processes. It's important to note that this option entails additional costs. * **General Summary:** An overview of the proposed items. * **Next Steps:** Voting deadline # **Option 1 - Main Proposal** # Specifications ## Duration of the Incentive System We've allocated an initial trial period of 6 months. This timeframe should allow us to gather initial metrics to gauge the system's functionality and its anticipated impact. ## Total Number of Delegates to Receive Incentives We have set the number at **50 delegates**. This figure isn't based on specific reasoning, but we believe it's a reasonable starting point. ## Funding - Incentives for delegates: 1,500,000 ARB - Incentive Program Administrator: 25,000 ARB ## Delegate Selection Process ### Requirements Based on the feedback received, we've opted for a single tier instead of a multi-tiered program, allowing a wider array of participants, the requirements would be as follows: * **Voting Power**: >50K ARB, corresponding to 194 delegates. (Source:[ Arbitrum Delegates and Voting Power - Dune Analytics](https://dune.com/pandajackson42/arbitrum-delegates-and-voting-power)). * **Delegates to Receive Incentives**: 50. * **Budget Allocation**: 1,500,000 ARB (5,000 ARB per delegate per month). * **Historical Participation Rate (Tally)**: Over 25% > **Note:** > * So following this model, the top fifty delegates - defined by their final score - within the range, would be compensated > * The 5000 ARB per month is the max amount a delegate could earn, but this amount could be lower depending on their score. > * Certain votes won't be counted towards the Tally Participation Rate, as detailed in the following links: > 1. [Core Test Proposal](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/60371879178081104082641012273221287927865067413661362234634146098631763379427) > 2. [Treasury test proposal](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/110793123084980773896129216551445203207286848914653873956746115694475823589450) > 3. [[OLD] AIP-1.1 - Lockup, Budget, Transparency ](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/79904733039853333959339953965823982558487956291458141923259498272549038367575) ### Incentive Program Application Delegates matching the requirements must confirm their participation in the Incentive System in the forum (a dedicated channel will be established for this). They must post using the template provided below, within a 7-day application window. **Incentive Program Confirmation Template:** * Forum Username (Link): * Twitter Profile (Link): * Snapshot Profile (Link): * Tally Profile with Exact All-time Participation Rate % (Link): > **Note:** > * Failing to send a confirmation message will exclude you from the incentive system, regardless of eligibility. > * Applicants should ensure accuracy in numbers and links, facilitating quicker verification. **Eligible delegates for the incentive program will be announced on the forum.** ## Scoring and Framework To determine which delegates will be paid on a monthly basis, we will use a point system and a framework that will be made public.  [Framework - Experimental Incentive](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1hTRXhxcw3o8RJYWw0Nvf48Ak0ihOe5kUJUcTWH0IDgg/edit#gid=374367862) ### Details: Terminology, Symbols, and Formulas We explain in detail the framework and points system: * **Delegates (DD):** Delegates with right to access to incentives * **Ranking (TOP):** Delegate's position in this Dune table https://dune.com/pandajackson42/arbitrum-delegates-and-voting-power * **Funds ARB (FARB):** The amount of ARB allocated per month to the delegates' payment * **Activity Weight (%):** Represents the weight assigned to each key activity to be measured in delegates. * **Participation Rate (PR) - Weight 20:** Percentage of the total participation of the member in votes. This parameter is extracted from Tally. This is the only parameter that is not reset monthly. * **PR% formula: (PR * 20) / 100** * **Snapshot Voting (SV) - Weight 15:** Percentage of delegate participation in snapshot voting. This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month. * **Tn:** Number of total proposals that were sent to snapshots for voting in the month. * **Rn:** Number of proposals the delegate voted on in the month. * **SV% formula: (SV(Tn) /SV(Fn)) * 15** * **Tally Voting (TV) - Weight 25:** Percentage of delegate participation in on-chain voting in Tally. This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month. * **Tn:** Number of total proposals that were sent to Tally for voting in the month. * **Rn:** Number of proposals the delegate voted in Tally in the month. * **TV% formula: (TV(Fn) - TV(Rn)) * 25** * **Communicating Rationale (CR) - Weight 25:** Percentage of communication threads with the justification of the delegate's vote on the proposals sent to snapshots and Tally (if necessary if the vote does not change). This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month. * **Tn:** Total number of proposals that were submitted to a vote. * **Rn:** Number of real communication rational threads where the delegate communicated and justified his/her decision. * **CR% formula: (CR(Fn) - CR(Rn)) * 25** * **Commenting Proposals (CP) - Weight 15:** Percentage of proposals where the delegate asked questions or generated important discussion for the advancement of the proposal. This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month. * **Tn:** Total number of formal proposals posted on the forum. * **Rn:** Number of actual proposals where the delegate made a genuine and quality contribution. Spam messages will not be considered. * **CP% formula: (CP(Fn) - CP(Rn)) * 15** * **Bonus Point (BP) - Extra +30% TP:** This parameter is extra. If the delegate makes a significant contribution to the DAO, he/she is automatically granted +40% extra TP. This parameter is at the discretion of the program administrator. This parameter is reset at the beginning of each month * **Total Participation (TP):** Sum of the results of activities performed by the delegate. A TP% of 100 indicates full participation. * **TP% formula: PR% + SV% + TV% + CR% + CP% + BP** * **Payment ARB (PARB):** Final amount of ARB that the delegate will receive based on his TP% and his position in the table. * **PARB formula: IF(TP% >=100; 50000 ;(5000 * TP% / 100))** #### Parameter summary * **Activity Weight (%):** * **Participation Rate (PR) - Weight 20%** * **Snapshot Voting (SV) - Weight 15%** * **Tally Voting (TV) - Weight 25%** * **Communicating Rationale (CR) - Weight 25%** * **Commenting on Proposals (CP) - Weight 15%** * **Bonus Point (BP) - Extra +30% TP (Total Participation)** * **Total Participation (TP):** * **TP = PR% + SV% + TV% + CR% + CP% + BP** ### Weight and activity considerations The activities that have been considered in shaping the framework and scope are measurable activities that we believe can positively impact governance. We have distributed the weight according to the type of activity, as we believe this is the fairest way to do it at the moment. **Surely both the activities and the weightings are far from being the final parameters, ideally after these 6 months we should have a clear idea of how to modify certain parameters or which ones to add/remove.** > **Note:** > We have not included the governance call in the list of activities because we feel that it may be difficult for delegates in different time zones to attend because of the specific timing of the call. Plus some delegates might not want to dox their voices. ### Total Participation (TP) The 50 delegates who conclude the month with a **TP score of +60%** will be the ones to receive incentives based on the result provided by the **PARB** parameter. Should more than 50 delegates have a **TP score of +60%**, only the top 50 scores will be selected. If fewer than 50 delegates have a **TP score of +60%**, only those meeting the criteria will be compensated > **Note:** > In the exceptional circumstance where scores are identical or more than 50 delegates exceed +90%, the entire month's budget may be distributed amongst all delegates with such scores. This decision is at the discretion of the program administrator. ### Bonus Point Should a delegate propose or actively participate in an enhancement proposal for Arbitrum DAO and execute it, like the [Arbitrum’s Short-Term Incentive Program (Arbitrum Improvement Proposal](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131)), they will be granted an additional +30% to their TP score for making a valuable contribution to the DAO. This could also be a governance process enhancement proposal or a template for grant selection. We understand that this is one of the weakest points of the proposal and we believe it is very objective. To assess this point we will try to answer these questions - Is the proposal of interest to the ArbitrumDAO, does it cover any vertical that has not yet been worked on? - Is the proposal well described, does it have details of the objectives it wants to achieve? - Does the proposal generate debate among delegates, is there interest among DAO members (for or against) about the proposal? - Does the proposer exhaust existing resources to demonstrate that their proposal adds value to ArbitrumDAO (governance calls, responds in the governance forum, etc). - Was the proposal put to a vote: was it a close vote or a resounding no? When evaluating the bonus points we will try to answer these questions and the administrator will have to upload a post to the forum with the answer and a justification of why he/she grants the bonus point. We also look forward to hearing the community's opinion on the matter. ### Parameter Snapshot When we refer to a month, we consider from the first day of the month 00:00 UTC to the last day 23:59hs UTC of each month. Within these days and hours, delegates have the opportunity to perform all actions to meet the parameters. The month's activities conclude on the last day of the month, so delegates must be punctual. ### Delegate Responsibilities Delegates are responsible for keeping track of their actions. At the end of the month, they have until the 3rd of the following month to submit a forum post with the following requirements: * A copy (Link) of the framework with their activity data for that month. * Additionally, the post must have a summary with all the links including: * Snapshot voting link * Forum post link explaining the reasoning behind the snapshot vote * Tally voting link * Forum post link explaining the tally vote reasoning (if you have changed your vote) * Commenting on Proposals link (only those that went to snapshots) * The summary should also include: * Delegate proposal links * Links to any significant contribution (discussion, questions, suggestions, etc.) made to a proposal. > **Note:** > * Delegates failing to post the requested information will not receive incentives. > * To avoid forum spam and disarray, we will ask the facilitators to add a channel for the incentive system so delegates can input all their information there. ### Incentive System Administrator Responsibilities After the delegates post and present their results in the framework, the incentive system administrator has 10 days to gather all the information, review, verify, and unify it. Then, present all the unified data on the forum in the [framework](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1hTRXhxcw3o8RJYWw0Nvf48Ak0ihOe5kUJUcTWH0IDgg/edit#gid=374367862) and attach a summary explaining that month's final result. Once the final result is presented, delegates have 2 days to file a claim in case of disagreement. #### Dispute Delegates have a 2-day window to dispute if they disagree with the results presented by the Incentive System Administrator. To raise a dispute, they must do so via a forum post with the following template: * Title: Dispute * Username * Reason for dispute (be detailed) The system administrator must promptly address the issue, resolving it within a maximum of 2 days. #### Incentive System Ban Should a delegate or any community member attempt to deceive or game the incentive system, they will be banned. This decision is at the discretion of the program administrator. We must remember that this system is experimental, and we hope for community members' cooperation for its success. ### Payment Execution If all goes according to plan, the delegate payments are expected to be sent as a proposal to Tally, with full details of the payments, between the 16th and 17th. This will be repeated for the 6 months, so that the DAO has control over the incentive program and can cut it off whenever it wants. **Payments are made in ARB tokens.** #### Considerations Like every new and experimental system, there may be delays, so please be [patient](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1lll5H9ekrsQPe7zMbvkiWTIzevlwpSJLkQql8B8UhTA/edit#gid=0). Estimated schedule:  ### Administrator Perspective 1. Start of the month: Track delegate participation in governance. 2. Last day of the month: Begin collecting delegate posts from the forum. 3. Review all the information, check for accuracy, and compile it into the framework. 4. Establish the results within the given timeframe. 5. If everyone agrees, send a proposal to Tally with the payment details, to be voted on. 6. Keep the DAO informed ## Incentive system administrator Given the short duration of the program and the lack of a DAO Facilitator, SEED Latam is willing to assume the administration of this program. This means that our delegation won't participate in it and that the adminstration won't be carried out by myself, but by the organization SEED Latam. However, we're also open to a group of delegates or potentially a third party administering this program, in which case we would obviously provide any assistance necessary. For the adminstration of said program the budget would be 25,000 ARB. This payment will also be divided into 6 months and will be sent in the proposal to Tally along with the payments to the delegates. In this way the DAO will have control over the administrator. --- # **Option 2 - Karma automation for delegate incentive program** ### Features summary Karma will develop features to enhance administrator efficiency and provide transparency to the Arbitrum community. The features that will be built include: 1. Automated fetching of all delegates with Voting Power (VP) over 50k, along with their details. 2. Profile display for each delegate, showing their voting history and voting reasons they post on Snapshot, Tally or Forum. 3. Calculation and display of PR, SV, TV, CR, CP (TBD if CP can be automated) for each delegate as specified in the proposal. **Karma will implement automatically fetching delegates’ forum data** 4. Functionality for the Administrator to allocate Bonus Points. 5. Computation and presentation of the final Total Points (TP) and PARBB for each delegate on: `arbitrum.karmahq.xyz/delegate-compensation`. **This automation eliminates the need for delegates to manually report their monthly activities.** ### Timeline - **Week 1:** Collaborating with administrators and community members to finalize the project requirements. - **Weeks 2 and 3:** Initiating the sprint to design and develop all the features - **Week 4:** The product will undergo comprehensive end-to-end testing and be deployed to production. At this stage, the community will gain full access to all features. - **Week 5 and Beyond:** Implementation of bug fixes and enhancements based on insights and feedback gathered. ### Payment Schedule - **Payment 1:** 10k ARB when the proposal passes and the project is kicked off. - **Payment 2:** 10K ARB on successful launch of the product (After week 4 per the timeline above) - **Payment 3:** 10K ARB 2 months after launch as we continue to fix bugs and make enhancements (week 12 of program kickoff) **Karma payments will also be executed from the DAO and tracked by the program administrator.** ### Cost - 30000 ARB ## **SEED Latam Commitment** Seed Latam is committed to monitoring the proper functioning of Karma and collecting feedback from the community on the dashboard's performance. We also commit to collaborating with Karma so that the dashboard meets the needs of the incentive system. As with Option 1, we are also open to having a group of delegates or potentially a third party administer Karma's progress and the program, in which case we would obviously provide all necessary assistance. For the administration of the program for this option the budget would be 20,000 ARB. This payment will also be divided into 6 months and will be sent in the proposal to Tally along with the payments to the delegates. In this way the DAO will have control over the administrator. ### Disclaimer SEED Latam does not have any commercial relationship with Karma nor does it receive any payment from them for incorporating them into this proposal. The only link between SEED Latam and Karma is that both want the success of the Arbitrum ecosystem. # Overview Proposal overview **Duration of the incentive system** * 6 month **Total Number of Delegates to Receive Incentives** * 50 delegates **Selection process** * **Voting Power**: >50K ARB, corresponding to 194 delegates. (Source:[ Arbitrum Delegates and Voting Power - Dune Analytics](https://dune.com/pandajackson42/arbitrum-delegates-and-voting-power)). * **Delegates to Receive Incentives**: 50. * **Budget Allocation**: 1,500,000 ARB (5,000 ARB per delegate per month). * **Historical Participation Rate (Tally)**: Over 25% *Eligible delegates must confirm their participation in the incentive system by posting a message on the forum.* ## CONT IN FORUM POST

['Option 1 - Without Karma', 'Option 2 - With Karma', 'Against']

closed

[40552285.320476435, 74809088.05227663, 14102290.789752742]

[[40552285.320476435], [74809088.05227663], [14102290.789752742]]

0xAbAbE91A907fAdff921720C43ABe4098e7245E99

0x1a0a7bee0c5b13a690275031c44d8b5efe78b86d86f6d2357299020e7a907d57

Timeline Extension for STIP and Backfund Grantees

## Abstract This proposal aims to extend the deadline for protocols in both STIP and the backfund proposal. Should this proposal pass, the new deadline for protocols to distribute ARB to users would be March 29th. 2024. Since backfunded protocols will experience significant delays to the start of their streams, this proposal aims to have backfunded streams continue until March 15th, 2024. These timeline modifications will help to ensure all protocols have enough time to distribute ARB to users. ## Motivation The [Proposal to Backfund Successful STIP Proposals](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/13413460212244439965325761903593975061091934953503684497413508380387288651335?chart=2) has recently passed quorum on Tally and will soon commence. The backfund proposal was inappropriately dated to end on January 31st, 2024. As it will likely take several weeks for back-funded protocols to pass KYC, this will only leave around 6 weeks for these protocols to distribute 16 weeks' worth of incentives. This extension proposal aims to continue the streams for these protocols until March 15th, 2024, and allow these protocols to continue incentivizing users until March 29th, 2024. This extension will allow these protocols closer to the full 16 weeks to distribute their ARB incentives to users. Additionally, due to extreme variations in KYC timing of the original STIP grantees, some protocols were given much shorter timelines to distribute their ARB incentives. This extension proposal also offers the option to extend the STIP deadline to distribute ARB to users until March 29th, 2024. This will ensure all STIP protocols are given adequate time to distribute their ARB. This however will not change their hedgey stream disbursement dates as the multisig has already started these streams. ## Rationale The grant funds for both STIP and the Backfund proposal are held by the incentives multisig as stated in the two previous proposals. However, these funds belong to the DAO and the multisig has agreed to follow the DAO's directions. This proposal signals to the multisig if the DAO would like to extend the timelines for STIP and the backfund grant. If this proposal passes the multisig will extend the backfunded protocols’ streams to end on March 15th, 2024, and will allow these protocols to continue distributing their ARB to users until March 29th, 2024. Additionally, should the DAO choose, this proposal could signal to the multisig to allow any original STIP protocols to continue distributing incentives to users until March 29th, 2024 without halting their streams. These extensions will ensure that protocols’ incentive distributions to users are not rushed. This will help even the playing field for those who took longer to pass KYC. It will allow the DAO to get more accurate data on the success of these programs. ## Key Terms - STIP - The full Short Term Incentives program proposal can be seen [here](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/92535731414466076465748260699234569033779695239254902723866669906112586724812?chart=2) Backfund Proposal - The full backfund proposal can be seen [here](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/13413460212244439965325761903593975061091934953503684497413508380387288651335?chart=2) Original Timeline - Originally both STIP and the backfund were to end by January 31st Hedgey Stream Disbursements - The ARB protocols receive biweekly from the multisig Grant Distributions - The ARB protocols award to users as incentives Incentives Multisig - The 5/9 multisig that holds the funds for both Incentives programs. Details can be seen [here](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/proposal/92535731414466076465748260699234569033779695239254902723866669906112586724812?chart=2) ## Specifications ### Extended Backfunded Protocol Timeline Protocols included in the backfund proposal will have their streams started in batches similar to STIP based on the time they pass KYC. These protocols will also receive disbursements from the multisig using hedgey streams every two weeks. The last disbursement date will be March 15th, 2024. Protocols will then have two weeks to finish distributing ARB incentives to users with a deadline of March 29th, 2024. ### Extended STIP Protocol Timeline Protocols included in the original STIP will have until March 29th, 2024 to finish distributing ARB incentives to users. These protocols do not have to extend their distribution schedules until this deadline. Many STIP protocols already have distribution plans in progress that end earlier than March 29th. Protocols may choose to keep their initial plans and finish distributing rewards earlier than March 29th. Protocols that do wish to extend to the March 29th deadline will be expected to update their distribution plans in their biweekly updates and maintain consistency with their fund usage as expressed in their grant application. The hedgey streams for the STIP protocols will not be adjusted as they have already been initiated by the multisig. ## Steps to Implement The multisig would initiate streams for all backfunded protocols to end on March 15th, 2024 given that the backfund proposal passes and these protocols pass KYC and sign grant agreements. STIP protocols that wish to adjust their distribution timelines will need to provide updated timelines in their next biweekly update. Backfunded protocols will also need to provide new distribution schedules that meet the March 29th Deadline. StableLab will work with the incentives multisig, foundation, protocols, and DAO to help coordinate KYC confirmation, stream initiation, stream monitoring, biweekly updates, and community questions throughout the process. ## Timeline March 15th, 2024 - Backfunded protocols receive their last stream disbursement March 29th, 2024 - Deadline for STIP / backfunded protocols to finish distributing ARB to users ## Overall Cost There is no additional to cost the DAO associated with this proposal ## Voting Options 1. Extend deadline for both STIP and Backfunded 2. Extend deadline only for backfunded protocols 3. Do not extend either deadline 4. Abstain

['Extend deadline for both', 'Extend deadline backfund only', 'Do not extend either deadline', 'Abstain']

closed

[154015030.49019444, 346665.97516060347, 225892.80959903015, 2803798.6008127807]

[[154015030.49019444], [346665.9751606034], [225892.80959903015], [2803798.6008127807]]

0xAD16ebE6FfC7d96624A380F394cD64395B0C6144

0xa635e39a2c527f7a1eabf5ea22bdec6f4a265d6c69a06076e65fde0ae0a5941b

AIP: ArbOS Version 11

# AIP: ArbOS Version 11 # Constitutional ## Abstract This AIP introduces a number of improvements to Arbitrum chains, including support for the EVM Shanghai upgrade and the PUSH0 opcode, along with miscellaneous bug fixes. These improvements are now audited and ready for adoption, including by Arbitrum Orbit chains, Arbitrum One, and Arbitrum Nova. This proposal concerns the latter two, as they are governed by the Arbitrum DAO. On a high level an ArbOS upgrade can be seen as Arbitrum's equivalent of a hardfork - more can be read about the subject over in https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrum-arbos-upgrades/19695 ## Changes Included ### 1. EVM Shanghai support (including the PUSH0 opcode) Recent versions of go-ethereum already includes support for the changes to the EVM made in the Shanghai L1 upgrade, but we need to enable them for Arbitrum chains. Instead of using a time based activation, it’s better to activate support based on the ArbOS version, which makes sure that even if the upgrade is delayed, Shanghai support will take effect uniformly and without causing divergences with out of date node software. PRs: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1583 https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1664 https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1712 ### 2. Retryable fixes Retryable fees previously always used the network fee account, instead of also using the infrastructure fee account. The infrastructure fee account should be paid fees from the basefee, and the network fee account should be paid any surplus fees when the gas price is elevated. That was correctly implemented for normal transactions, but retryables only dealt with the network fee account. Retryable redemption also reported an incorrect gas usage in the block header. This matters to Arbitrum Nova, where the infrastructure fee account pays out some fees to the Data Availability Committee members, but the network fee account does not. PRs: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1789 https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1980 ### 3. Fix the chain owner list returned by precompile This change doesn’t affect the actual chain owner set, but the list being returned by the ArbOwnerPublic precompile was incorrect for Arbitrum Nova due to an internal ArbOS issue. To be clear, this does not affect who was able to make chain owner actions. As intended, only the DAO is able to make chain owner actions on Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova. This change only affects the list of chain owners presented by the ArbOwnerPublic precompile. PRs: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1525 https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1768 ### 4. Fix some precompile methods taking up all gas when reverting Some precompile methods such as ArbSys’s arbBlockHash method took up all gas when reverting. That meant that if a transaction called arbBlockHash with an out-of-range block number, it’d use up all the gas when reverting. PR: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1490 ### 5. Create missing precompile methods to view some L1 pricing parameters The L1RewardReceipient and L1RewardRate were previously not exposed via precompiles. This change adds methods to get them to ArbGasInfo so that the current chain configuration can be easily checked. PR: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1775 ### 6. Fix the possibility of a staticcall from the owner to ArbOwner emitting a log This shouldn’t matter in practice, but it was theoretically for a staticcall from the chain owner to the ArbOwner precompile to emit a log. In the EVM, staticcalls should never be able to emit logs. This PR fixes the Arbitrum precompile logic to disallow emitting logs in staticcall contexts. PR: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1562 ### 7. Fix default L1 pricing params This shouldn’t matter for Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova, because these parameters were already corrected in [AIP-7](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-7-arbitrum-one-governance-parameter-fixes/15920). However, it’s included in ArbOS version 11 so that any Arbitrum Orbit chains automatically get the correct parameters. PR: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/pull/1549 ## Implementation The canonical version of ArbOS 11 this proposal aims to adopt is implemented in the Arbitrum Nitro git commit hash `df93361a1293574903f28fbbbe0469a3ea5c644d` That commit builds a WASM module root of `0xf4389b835497a910d7ba3ebfb77aa93da985634f3c052de1290360635be40c4a`, which is a hash of the code that’s put on-chain for fraud proofs. You can verify this WASM module root on a x86_64 computer (i.e. not on ARM which builds slightly different symbol names) with Docker setup by checking out the previously mentioned commit of the nitro repository, running `git submodule update --init --recursive`, and then running `docker build . --target module-root-calc --tag wavm-machine && docker run --rm wavm-machine cat /workspace/target/machines/latest/module-root.txt` This uses Docker to perform a reproducible build of the WebAssembly code used in fraud proofs, and outputs its hash. The above code has audited by Trail of Bits - the audit report can be viewed in https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uwA1PK3AB9ggHMqaw91mubu5WHcEp398/view?usp=sharing ### Upgrade Action smart contracts The Action smart contracts used to execute the on-chain upgrade can be viewed in https://github.com/ArbitrumFoundation/governance/pull/170 Action contract addresses: [SetArbOneArbOS11ModuleRootAction](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8e5dc1793d6fe39452ddcb90d12997fa39de1de#code) [SetNovaArbOS11ModuleRootAction](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6B125347f3B0790197d5247f32f91fd3e7140eD7#code) [SetArbOS11VersionAction](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xF6c7Dc6eaE78aBF2f32df899654ca425Dfa99481#code) [SetArbOS11VersionAction](https://nova.arbiscan.io/address/0x5357f4d3e8f8250a77bcddd5e58886ad1358220c#code) The above code has audited by Trail of Bits - the audit report can be viewed in https://drive.google.com/file/d/1N3197Z7DuqBpu9qdt-GWPewe8HQakfLY/view?usp=sharing ### Verifying the ArbOS Code Difference The current ArbOS version used on Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova is ArbOS 10, corresponding to the Arbitrum Nitro `consensus-v10` git tag. You can verify this by running the previously mentioned steps to build the WASM module root on that git tag, which produces the WASM module root `0x6b94a7fc388fd8ef3def759297828dc311761e88d8179c7ee8d3887dc554f3c3`, which is what the rollup contract’s `wasmModuleRoot()` method returns for both Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova. To audit the code difference from ArbOS 10 to ArbOS 11, you could simple generate a full nitro diff with `git diff consensus-v10 df93361a1293574903f28fbbbe0469a3ea5c644d` (and also generate a diff of the go-ethereum submodule mentioned in that nitro diff). However, that includes a lot of code that isn’t part of the WASM module root. To filter down to just the replay binary which defines the state transition function, you can start by generating a list of files in the nitro and go-ethereum repositories included by the replay binary in either ArbOS 10 or ArbOS 11 with bash: ``` #!/usr/bin/env bash set -e mkdir -p ~/tmp # this script uses ~/tmp as scratch space and output # this script should be run in the nitro repository git checkout df93361a1293574903f28fbbbe0469a3ea5c644d git submodule update --init --recursive make solgen go list -f "{{.Deps}}" ./cmd/replay | tr -d '[]' | sed 's/ /\\n/g' | grep 'github.com/offchainlabs/nitro/' | sed 's@github.com/offchainlabs/nitro/@@' | while read dir; do find "$dir" -type f -name '*.go' -maxdepth 1; done | grep -v '_test\\.go ``` Now, `~/tmp/replay-binary-dependencies.txt` contains a list of dependencies of the replay binary that were present in ArbOS 10 or 11. To use that to generate a smaller diff of the nitro repository, you can run: ``` git diff consensus-v10 df93361a1293574903f28fbbbe0469a3ea5c644d -- cmd/replay $(cat ~/tmp/replay-binary-nitro-dependencies.txt) ``` For the go-ethereum submodule, you can first find out what go-ethereum commit ArbOS 10 and 11 used: ``` $ git ls-tree consensus-v10 go-ethereum 128 ↵ 160000 commit 941aa323e5cbbde1d5806eb4e3dd70553c5a1298 go-ethereum $ git ls-tree df93361a1293574903f28fbbbe0469a3ea5c644d go-ethereum 160000 commit abe584818e104dd5b4fdb8f60381a14eede896de go-ethereum ``` Those commit hashes are the go-ethereum commit hashes pinned by each nitro commit. Then, you can again use `git diff` and the files generated by the earlier script to generate a diff limited to code used by the replay binary: ``` git diff 941aa323e5cbbde1d5806eb4e3dd70553c5a1298 abe584818e104dd5b4fdb8f60381a14eede896de -- $(cat ~/tmp/replay-binary-geth-dependencies.txt) ``` This diff also includes the diff between upstream go-ethereum versions v1.10.25 and v1.11.6, as ArbOS 10 used the former and ArbOS 11 uses the latter. To filter out that difference, you can use this tool to find the intersection of two git diffs: https://gist.github.com/PlasmaPower/795af590f88cfb5e21c5ad9b8a32afdf We can use that to find the intersection of the diff of ArbOS 11’s go-ethereum against ArbOS 10’s go-ethereum and the diff of ArbOS 11’s go-etheruem against upstream go-ethereum v1.11.6: ``` git diff 941aa323e5cbbde1d5806eb4e3dd70553c5a1298 abe584818e104dd5b4fdb8f60381a14eede896de -- $(cat ~/tmp/replay-binary-geth-dependencies.txt) > ~/tmp/arbos-10-vs-11-geth.diff git diff v1.11.6 abe584818e104dd5b4fdb8f60381a14eede896de -- $(cat ~/tmp/replay-binary-geth-dependencies.txt) > ~/tmp/arbos-11-vs-upstream-geth.diff diff-intersection.py ~/tmp/arbos-10-vs-11-geth.diff ~/tmp/arbos-11-vs-upstream-geth.diff ``` In addition, you can pass the following arguments to `diff-intersection.py` to ignore files that are included by the replay binary but whose components are not used: `--ignore-files 'core/blockchain*.go' arbitrum_types/txoptions.go 'rawdb/**' 'rpc/**'` Note that by default, `diff-intersection.py` does a line based intersection. To instead do an intersection based on chunks in the diff, known as hunks in git terminology, you can add the `--only-hunks` flag.

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

[168238852.0035423, 134714.5434028188, 133425.77047071827]

[[168238852.0035423], [134714.5434028188], [133425.77047071827]]

0xb5B069370Ef24BC67F114e185D185063CE3479f8

0x3404df8a6e105dcf8b60cb22f22928aeedd3ffa5d80dc36e4f8fd74d0f5f14cb

Procurement Framework | Security : Non-Constitutional Proposal

##### **Abstract** Creating a procurement framework for security-oriented service providers within the ArbitrumDAO. The proposal aims to create a streamlined & harmonised approach re. service procurement for security-oriented services. ##### **Motivation** Procurement Frameworks maintain quality control, ensuring consistency in the services procured. These frameworks also promote transparency and fairness, building trust and adhering to legal standards. Moreover, they aid in risk management, safeguarding against various procurement-related risks, and streamline processes for time-saving and operational efficiency. ##### **Rationale** This procurement framework is designed to ensure that only qualified and reliable security service providers are selected, thereby safeguarding the integrity and security of the projects within the Arbitrum Ecosystem. This will aid in ensuring that the security-specific needs of projects building within the Ecosystem are safeguarded to a larger extent & thus serve to safeguard the high standards and reputation of the Arbitrum Ecosystem. ##### **Specifications & Timeline** Specifications & Timeline can be found in the following sections. ###### **Steps to Implement** This AIP will move to a Snapshot vote on the 24th of November 2023. Passing of the Snapshot vote will be deemed as a ratification of the Procurement Framework. There are no associated costs with the implementation of the Procurement Framework. ##### **Overall Cost** No cost for AIP implementation. --- ## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** - This procurement process is designed to ensure that only the most qualified and reliable security service providers are selected, thereby safeguarding the integrity and security of the projects within the Arbitrum Ecosystem. - Should the ArbitrumDAO vote for the implementation/ratification of this framework, we wil then be proposing the setup of the Procurement Committee that will facilitate & administer this framework. - The proposal for the procurement committee will also contain further details on the operational implementations that are to be effected in documenting, record-keeping, and disclosing material in relation to the procurement framework. The document outlines a comprehensive procurement framework for the Arbitrum Ecosystem, focusing on sourcing and selecting service providers for blockchain security and related services. It comprises several key components: - Needs Assessment: Identifying and prioritizing the specific requirements of the Arbitrum Ecosystem, including evaluating the current situation and determining market availability for the required services. - Defining Eligibility Criteria: Establishing standards for technical expertise, reputation, tools and techniques, and financial stability that service providers must meet to be considered. - Publication of Request for Proposal (RFP): Detailing the scope of work required and the submission guidelines for prospective service providers, along with evaluation criteria and a timeline for the procurement process. - Proposal Submission: Requiring service providers to submit comprehensive documentation for evaluation, with submissions made via ArbitrumDAO Forums, allowing community feedback and private collection of sensitive information. - Evaluation of Proposals: This includes initial screening for eligibility, in-depth technical and commercial evaluations, reference checks, and possibly interviews, with a focus on transparency and community involvement. - Whitelisting, Onboarding & Contracting: Selecting the most suitable service providers, conducting Know-Your-Business processes, facilitating contract negotiations, and finalizing approval of agreements. - Ongoing Obligations and Ancillary Matters: Monitoring performance, establishing feedback loops, setting renewal criteria, outlining exit strategies, and ensuring thorough documentation and record-keeping using tools like Airtable for transparency. - Public Disclosure: Making key details of the procurement process and the list of whitelisted providers publicly available, respecting confidentiality agreements.  --- ## OVERVIEW [1] On the 3rd of November, DK (Myself) posted a proposal on the Arbitrum DAO Forums aimed at establishing a framework for security-oriented proposals via a consolidated framework ([Consolidate Security Proposals into a RFP Process](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-consolidate-security-proposals-into-a-rfp-process/19328)). By way of a summary, the proposal on the Arbitrum DAO forum discusses establishing a Request for Proposal (RFP) process to consolidate the selection of auditors and security service providers within the Arbitrum ecosystem (for the purposes of this endeavor, we shall be referring to this consolidated framework as the ‘Procurement Framework). [2] The Snapshot Vote for the establishment of the aforementioned Procurement Framework has since passed ([Snapshot 1](https://snapshot.org/#/arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x1ac6079871dc4af55b7d67eae130e4c1bbcbabd9bb35405bc1733ef2efe45875)). [3] On the 10th of November, Immutablelawyer posted a public consultation period on the Arbitrum Forums ([Public Consultation re. 'Consolidate Security Proposals into an RFP Process'](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/public-consultation-re-consolidate-security-proposals-into-an-rfp-process/19478)). This contained a base-line framework aimed at giving some context to community members & relevant stakeholders intending on participating in the public consultation. The Public Consultation ended on the 22nd of November 2023. Following calls held, submissions received & several discussions with numerous ecosystem participants, we would now like to present the final procurement framework for ratification via Snapshot. We would like to thank all participants who took their time to provide insight in this endeavor. This was a true testament to the collaborative nature of this ecosystem. Copy of Proposal in Google Docs: [Snapshot Proposal Ratification: Procurement Framework](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1g1W9BYCNMYWi67E4Zj_TjdtCke321fTL3yhpIuo73HY/edit?usp=sharing) --- ## [Procurement Framework for Ratification](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-non-constitutional-procurement-framework-security-service-providers/19704#procurement-framework-for-ratification-2) ### **1. ‘Needs’ Assessment** - Gather Phase: Collect detailed information on what is needed in the Arbitrum Ecosystem. This involves understanding the specific requirements of the end-users, the goals of relevant stakeholders, and any constraints (budgetary, time, legal, regulatory, procedural etc.). This stage often involves interviews, surveys, or group discussions with stakeholders. - Analyze Current Situation: Assess the current resources, systems, or services in place. Determine if there are gaps between the current state and the desired state. This analysis should consider whether existing solutions can be upgraded or if new solutions are needed. - Define the Scope of the Need: Clearly define what is needed to address the gap identified in the current situation analysis. This definition should be as specific as possible, outlining the functionalities, features, quality standards, quantities, and any other relevant attributes that are relevant. - Prioritize Needs: Not all needs have the same level of urgency or importance. Prioritize the needs based on factors like strategic importance, impact on operations, cost-benefit analysis, risk mitigation, and regulatory compliance. - Assess Market Availability: Research the market to understand what products or services are available that meet the needs identified above. ### **1.1. Defining Eligibility Criteria** - Technical Expertise: Prospective Service Providers must demonstrate expertise in blockchain security, including prior experience with smart contracts, the Ethereum network, and Layer 2 solutions like Arbitrum. - Reputation: A track record of successful security audits, with references and case studies. - Tools and Techniques: Tools for detecting vulnerabilities, including static and dynamic analysis, and formal verification methods. - Financial Stability: Proof of financial stability to ensure the longevity and reliability of the service provider. ### **2. Publication of the Request for Proposal (RFP)** - Scope of Work: Following the conclusion of the ‘Needs Assessment’ in the Procurement Committee will publish a request for submissions. This will be done via the ArbitrumDAO Forums wherein a detailed description of services required, including security audit scope, frequency, and expected deliverables will be provided by the PC. - Submission Guidelines: Clear instructions on how to apply, including formats and submission channels will be provided for prospective applicants so that the approach is harmonized in nature. - Evaluation Criteria: Metrics on how prospective service providers [as per ‘Eligibility Critera’]. - Timeline: Submission deadlines and timeline for the evaluation process. ### **3. Proposal Submission** - Documentation: Applicant service providers must submit comprehensive documentation, including company profiles, client testimonials, and detailed descriptions of methodologies. - Submissions: Will be effected on a dedicated section of the ArbitrumDAO Forums. This way, the PC can already get a sense of community feedback prior to putting the security service provider through the procurement process. Financial statements will & other ancillary information will not be required to be posted publicly but will be collected through private channels. ### **4. Evaluation of Proposals** - Initial Screening: Verification of compliance with the minimum eligibility criteria. - Technical Evaluation: In-depth review of technical capabilities, methodologies, and tools. - Commercial Evaluation: Assessment of cost-effectiveness and value for money. - References Check: Verification of the provider’s references and past performance. - Interviews: The PC may conduct interviews with the top candidates. - Emphasis should be placed on documenting each step of the procurement process and communicating select steps in a consolidated manner to the community for review & input. - In this regard, the PC can set up a dedicated notion page wherein the aforementioned details can be inputted, and then linked from the Forum updates posted by the PC. ### **5. Whitelisting, Onboarding & Contracting** - Selection: The PC will select the most suitable providers to be whitelisted for service-subsidies based on them validly passing the procurement process. - The PC will facilitate Know-Your-Business processes so as to make sure that all prospectively whitelisted service providers pass standard KYB checks. - Contract Negotiation: The PC will facilitate & administer the process for the finalization of the contractual provisions regulating the engagement between the service provider chosen by the projects & the project itself. Most importantly, the PC has to ensure that the pricing ‘advertised’ by the service provider for the service requested is consistent with the agreement. - Approval: Final agreements will be reviewed and approved by the PC before signing. #### **Ongoing Obligations of the Procurement Committee & Ancillary Matters** ##### [i] _**Performance Monitoring and Review**_ - Regular Audits: Random checks by the PC during the audit process so as to ensure compliance with SLAs. - Feedback Loop: A system for feedback from the projects utilizing the subsidized services. This will be pivotal in ensuring that the PC maintains a certain level of quality assurance so as to consistently assess whether any factors that led to the service provider passing the procurement process have changed. ##### [ii] _**Renewal and Exit Procedures**_ - Renewal Criteria: Every 4 months, the PC will re-evaluate whitelisted service providers by carrying out an assessment re. The Eligibility Criteria so as to make sure that Service Providers are still eligible. - Exit Strategy: If a Service Provider is removed from the whitelist, the PC will publish an announcement outlining the reasons thereof. ##### [iii] _**Documentation and Record Keeping**_ - Audit Trail: All stages of the procurement process will be documented and records maintained for accountability and transparency. - The PC will be using Airtable to document every stage of the procurement process. ##### [iv] _**Public Disclosure**_ - Transparency: Key details of the procurement process and the list of whitelisted providers will be made publicly available, respecting confidentiality agreements. We look forward to your final feedback and potentially seeking the framework in action! #### Voting For: Proceed with this framework, start discussions on PC Leadership Against: Do not move forward with this framework, it needs revision

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

[136281036.32331377, 1606852.1087498053, 14132017.14155571]

[[136281036.32331374], [1606852.1087498053], [14132017.14155571]]

0xAD16ebE6FfC7d96624A380F394cD64395B0C6144

0xe968af3f6b06d386958e513c2285f72f7172aabd2661311a485270bab3b1c7db

Funding Gas Rebate and Trading Competition Program to Amplify Arbitrum’s Ecosystem Growth

Abstract: This Arbitrum Improvement Proposal (AIP) is presented with the vision of further enhancing the Arbitrum ecosystem following the Short Term Incentive Program (STIP). Acknowledging the STIP’s instrumental role in the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem, this proposal seeks to extend its positive impact by introducing a gas rebate and trading incentive program created by Rage Trade, a native perp aggregator on Arbitrum. Through this initiative, we aspire to not only complement the milestones achieved by the STIP but also to significantly increase the influx of new traders into the Arbitrum ecosystem. Motivation: As the Short Term Incentive Program (STIP) kicks off, it sets the stage for the Arbitrum ecosystem to experience amplified growth. The STIP is poised to play a pivotal role in promoting on-chain activities and reinforcing key protocols. However, there is plenty of opportunity to intensify user engagement and participation, especially when considering innovative platforms like Rage Trade. This proposal is driven by the ambition to harness this potential, acting synergistically with the anticipated successes of the STIP. Through Rage Trade’s introduction of a gas rebate and trading incentive program, our objective is not just to elevate trading activity, but also to enhance the overall user experience, attracting and onboarding new traders to the ecosystem. This effort is geared towards empowering platforms that, in line with Arbitrum’s vision, are poised for growth but require additional support to maximize their contribution. Rationale: This proposal aligns with Arbitrum’s mission to foster a dynamic and engaged community. By allocating 100% of the grant funds to create a gas rebate and trading incentives program, Rage Trade’s platform aims to refine the user experience of traders while offering gas savings and trading incentives to stimulate a competitive yet cooperative environment. Specifications: A detailed breakdown of the platforms and technologies that will be used. Rage Trade Platform: As a prime broker and perpetual aggregator, Rage Trade unifies top decentralized perpetual exchanges across all EVM-compatible chains. It streamlines the trading experience by eliminating complexities associated with collateral and gas fund management, ensuring a faster, more efficient, and user-friendly environment for traders. Gas Tank Mechanism: The Gas Tank is a unique feature of Rage Trade that simplifies trading across different chains. Users deposit funds into their account, and a portion goes into the Gas Tank. This fund is then used to cover gas fees across various chains, eliminating the need for users to manage gas fees separately. Session-Based Trading System: Rage Trade employs a session-based trading system where users create a session that lasts for a specified duration (e.g., 7 days). This system reduces the need for manual transaction signing, making the trading experience smoother and more akin to centralized exchanges. Multi-Leg Trading and Auto-Populating Bridge: The platform allows users to create multiple trades from different chains and perps on Arbitrum, enabling them to spread risk and optimize execution. Additionally, Rage Trade handles all the bridging details, automatically selecting the best bridge or swap routes for seamless trade execution. Custom Route Selection: Users have the option to split their orders based on various criteria such as best execution price, lowest funding fees, or routes with bonuses like emissions or airdrops. This feature provides flexibility and optimization for trade execution. Aggregated Referral & Competitions: Rage Trade aggregates referrals and competitions across different perp protocols, allowing users to participate in various trading competitions and referral programs through a single platform. Incentive Distribution: The proposal involves the distribution of 1.5 million ARB tokens to incentivize trading volume on Rage Trade. The distribution will be structured to reward active traders and participants in trading competitions, fostering increased engagement and liquidity on the platform. Trading Competitions: A series of trading competitions will be organized, with ARB tokens allocated as prizes. These competitions aim to attract traders, boost trading volume, and create a vibrant trading community on Rage Trade. User Engagement and Performance Metrics: Rage Trade has successfully cultivated a dynamic user base, boasting 70,000 active traders who regularly engage with our platform. This robust participation is a testament to our platform’s appeal and functionality within the trading community. In addition to our active traders, we have nurtured a strong Liquidity Provider (LP) community, with 26,000 LPs contributing to our ecosystem. This substantial number of LPs underscores our platform’s reliability and the trust placed in us by those who provide liquidity, further cementing our role as a pivotal player in the Arbitrum ecosystem. Overall, our protocol’s historical performance not only demonstrates significant growth and adoption but also highlights our consistent delivery of value to our users, traders, and liquidity providers. These metrics are indicative of our integral position within the Arbitrum ecosystem and our potential to further enhance and expand our offerings with sustained support. Rage’s Perpetual Performance: Rage Trade v1 has experienced a remarkable market reception, evidenced by a staggering $735M in Total Trading Volume against Rage’s Total Value Locked (TVL). This impressive figure reflects the high demand and active engagement within our user base, showcasing the platform’s appeal and effectiveness. 962×642 21.9 KB Rage’s Vaults Performance: Our vault offerings, including the 80-20 Tricrypto Vault and GLP Vault, have achieved a notable peak TVL of approximately $19.87 million (at 100% max capacity since launch). This achievement highlights the trust and confidence users place in our vault products. At its peak, Rage Trade accounted for about 1.4% of the entire Arbitrum TVL, marking our significant contribution to the overall ecosystem. This percentage represents our substantial impact and the value we add to the broader Arbitrum community. The 80-20 Tricrypto vault, in particular, has demonstrated exceptional performance. Over its 10-month lifespan, it outperformed holding GLP by 8%. Specifically, from July 2022 to April 2023, the 80-20 Tricrypto vault yielded a 44% return compared to a 36% return from merely holding GLP, showcasing its effectiveness and profitability. Steps to Implement: The steps to implement the AIP, including associated costs, manpower, and other resources for each step where applicable. For the avoidance of doubt, any AIPs involving transactions with third parties (such as grants) will need to ensure that applicable legal documentation and procedures are also included. To implement this proposal, we will follow a structured approach, ensuring each phase contributes effectively to the overall goal. Here’s how we plan to proceed: Data Reporting and Transparency: Rage Trade is committed to transparency and will implement Dune dashboards for real-time tracking of all relevant metrics. These dashboards will ensure community members have access to up-to-date data, reflecting our progress and adherence to the commitments outlined in this proposal. This approach emphasizes our dedication to transparency and accountability within the Arbitrum ecosystem. Incentive Allocation: We will begin by using a portion of the ARB tokens for our gas rebate program to offset gas fees for our users. This will serve as the initial spark to ignite trading activities on the Rage Trade platform. Fee Offset & Trading Competitions: We will then allocate the remaining tokens to incentivize trading, including trade competitions and offsetting fees implemented by integrated perp protocols. The trading competitions will be strategically scheduled over time to ensure ongoing participation and interest. Regular Updates and Reporting: Throughout the implementation, we will continuously monitor platform performance, trader engagement, and community feedback. This will allow us to make real-time adjustments and improvements where necessary. To maintain transparency, we will provide the community with regular updates and reports. These will include key performance metrics and insights gained from the implementation process. Review and Analysis: At the end of the implementation phase, we will conduct a thorough review. This will involve analyzing successes, identifying areas for improvement, and extracting key learnings for future initiatives. By following these steps, we aim to ensure not just the successful implementation of the proposal but also to contribute valuable insights for the continuous growth and development of the Arbitrum ecosystem. Timeline: Relevant timing details, including but not limited to start date, milestones, and completion dates. The implementation of this proposal is structured into a 4-month period, with each month focusing on specific objectives and milestones: Month 1 - Initiation and Setup (Immediately upon approval): Allocation of ARB tokens to the designated multisig wallet to immediately initiate gas rebates and trading fee offsets. Setup of the Dune dashboard for tracking key metrics such as trading volume and unique traders. Announcement of the initiative and upcoming trading competitions to the community. Month 2 - Launch of Trading Competitions: Official launch of the first set of trading competitions. Active monitoring of trading activities and engagement levels. First monthly update provided to the community, highlighting early results and trader participation. Month 3 - Mid-term Review and Adjustments: Comprehensive review of the first two months, analyzing trader engagement and competition outcomes. Adjustments made to competitions and incentives based on feedback and data analysis. Second monthly update provided, including insights and any changes implemented. Month 4 - Final Push and Comprehensive Analysis: Continued incentivization and promotion of trading activities. Final monthly update provided, leading up to the comprehensive quarterly report. Preparation of the detailed analysis report, evaluating the proposal’s success based on predefined objectives. Post-4-Month Period - Evaluation and Reporting: Release of a comprehensive quarterly report, detailing the overall impact of the proposal on trading volume, trader engagement, and growth within the Arbitrum ecosystem. Evaluation of the initiative’s success and consideration of potential future actions based on the outcomes. This timeline ensures a structured approach to implementing the proposal, with regular updates and transparency. It allows for adjustments based on real-time data and community feedback, ensuring the initiative remains aligned with its goal of driving growth within the Arbitrum ecosystem. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): To measure the success of achieving the grant objectives, we will focus on the following Key Performance Indicators (KPIs): Daily Volume: Aiming for a 30-day moving average of $10M in daily volume. Daily Traders: Targeting a 30-day moving average of 300 unique traders. Integration: Committing to integrate 1 or more perpetual DEXes per 2 weeks (accounting for audit time). These KPIs will serve as benchmarks to gauge our progress and effectiveness in utilizing the grant to drive growth and engagement within the Arbitrum ecosystem. Grant Breakdown: Rage Trade aims to leverage the grant to attract a substantial influx of users to the Arbitrum ecosystem, bolstering user interaction, transaction volume, TVL, and overall activity. Strategically, Rage Trade will allocate ~ 33% of the grant to gas rebates, with the other ~ 66% of the grant being directed towards offsetting integrated perp protocols’ trading fees and various trading competitions. The endgame is to amplify user onboarding and trading enthusiasm, resonating with genuine market dynamics. It’s crucial to clarify that rebate rates will be determined by the genuine fees incurred by users. If our partnering protocols grant separate rebates or rewards, Rage Trade commits to ensuring that the total sum of rebates will never surpass the fees accrued. Throughout this promotional phase, trade-to-earn schemes will not be entertained. Additionally, the Rage Trade team will vigilantly deter and counteract wash trading and Sybil-attack incidents. Offending addresses linked with such activities will be publicly disclosed and denied the associated rebates. Gas Rebates Explained: Once a week, traders will receive ARB tokens as a gas rebate, mirroring the gas fees they’ve incurred throughout the week. This rebate system ensures that users can trade more freely, knowing a portion of their gas fees will be returned. The gas rebate will be uniformly applied across all protocols integrated with Rage Trade on Arbitrum, ensuring fairness and consistency for all traders. The rebate amount a trader receives will be directly proportional to the actual gas fees they’ve paid, eliminating any potential for manipulative practices like trade-to-earn schemes. Fee Rebates Explained: ARB tokens will be rewarded as fee rebates to our traders every Friday, reflecting the fees they’ve accumulated over the week. This fee waiver will be consistently applied across all collaborating protocols. Traders’ rebate entitlements will strictly correlate with their actual trading fees, nullifying the chance for trade-to-earn practices. The rate of expenditure from the grant will be contingent on the volume of organic trading transpiring each week. The Rage Trade team pledges to continually identify and thwart wash trading and sybil-attack attempts. To safeguard the integrity of the campaign, the specifics of the anti-wash-trading & anti-sybil-attack measures will be kept confidential and will be communicated post-event, mirroring best practices employed in protocol airdrop launches. Example of Fee Structure Post-Reduction: If additional perps trading mechanisms in the Arbitrum realm are incorporated with Rage Trade amidst this campaign, the fee waiver will extend to those as well. Integrated protocol trading fee rates before and after reduction GMX V1: 0.1% → 0% GMX V2: 0.05% / 0.07% → 0% Overall Cost: The total cost to implement the AIP. The total cost to implement this AIP for Rage Trade is 1.5M ARB tokens. This cost is solely dedicated to funding trading competitions and volume incentives on the Rage Trade platform. The breakdown is as follows: Gas Rebates: 500k ARB tokens will be allocated for offsetting gas fees when trading perps on Arbitrum. Trading Fee Rebates & Competitions: The remaining 1m ARB will be used as trading fee offsets and trading competitions. There are no additional costs involved in this proposal. The entire 1.5M ARB token request is focused on directly incentivizing users and enhancing their trading experience on Rage Trade.

['Fund (1.5m arb)', 'Do Not Fund']

closed

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0x9808E45C613eBA00bA18fB3D314dC4d4712c4A85

0xc040de9c6a85dee5ca15de10691165bf5595245ffac922cbef61e45199522345

Proposal to Backfund Successful STIP Proposals

# Empowering STIP to measure the impact of incentives for new builders  **Call to Action for Arbitrum ecosystem** This proposal represents a critical opportunity for our community to: * Support diverse, emerging builders and make Arbitrum a welcoming environment for new projects * Double the sample size and diversity of stages and categories in the STIP data set * Uphold constitutional values of Inclusion vs Exclusion * Avoid potentially irreversible harm of crushing small, high potential builders **Notes:** * This proposal draft has been prepared by the Arbitrum STIP Inclusion Working Group following a series of community calls and workshops involving various stakeholders. As a preliminary document, it seeks input from both the Arbitrum DAO and the Liquidity Working Group. * This proposal frequently cites AIP-9. * For all of our resources see here: [svy.gg/stip-backfund (DocSend)](https:/svy.gg/stip-backfund) # Abstract This proposal outlines a one-time backfund to all "approved but not funded proposals’’ from Arbitrum STIP. The proposed AIP increases the total budget by 21.4M to 71.4M while increasing the total participating protocols by 26, for a total of 56 funded projects. The program plans to allocate DAO-owned ARB towards incentives while leveraging distribution systems, consensus, and delegate diligence already created from STIP 1. This program is designed to backfund approved protocols while maintaining the timelines and systems of STIP 1: * Timeline: The program is scheduled to commence and conclude concurrently with STIP 1, or within a similar timeframe, starting from the first week of November and running through January 31, 2024. * KYC: The program will utilize the same KYC system as STIP 1. * Reporting: Participating grantees are required to self-report data, maintain dashboards, and regularly summarize grant performance # Considerations Before this proposal was drafted, a working group was formed to gauge sentiment, gather key data points, and outline the proposal's structure. The working group collaborated with delegates and projects affected by the STIP, engaging in multiple calls—including sessions with the creators of the STIP and the Incentive Working Group—to solicit feedback and refine the proposal accordingly. Key concerns discussed include: ### Why not just push towards a round 2 and go through voting for all proposals again? First and foremost, we believe that the successful execution of this Backfund proposal will, in time, serve as a crucial catalyst for future grant structures, including a successful STIP round 2. Why? This opportunity will unify the Arbitrum ecosystem by addressing key weaknesses in the original STIP 1 structure by quickly providing approved projects and other stakeholders with the resources/data needed to design and support future programs. Key issues associated with delaying an immediate backfund and moving towards a round 2 include: * Proper design and execution add considerable time delay to a highly competitive environment within Arbitrum and other L2s * Requires teams with limited resources approved already for STIP 1 to spend significant time lobbying delegates * Removes attention away from new Round 2 proposals * Adds additional burden to delegates that should be focused on long-term design improvements and new STIP grants not yet approved * Removes key data for STIP experiment analysis by skewing learnings towards larger, well-established projects * Delays the alignment of the STIP with the Arbitrum constitution values of inclusivity and diversity * Negatively impacts new builder sentiment towards Arbitrum at a critical time in the L2 Wars ### The budget set aside was 50M, and the DAO decided that was the acceptable spend for a short-term incentive. While the budget was set at 50M, the original working group proposed 75M so that: > "The budget was raised to 75M ARB to accommodate larger protocols (Pinnacle Grants) without compromising smaller applications." [tnorm, September 3rd 2023.](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131/12) Excess demand was a significant possibility due to the high interest in STIP and the absence of a cap for Pinnacle grants. Voters lacked the data to ascertain whether the initial 50M would be adequate to achieve the objectives of STIP. Noteworthy is that, in the event of excess demand, measures including backfunding were already outlined as potential options. Proper design and fulfillment of a Round 2 or similar future funding programs may take time to develop. Meanwhile, projects that received approval but no funding have immediate initiatives requiring support. Our opportunity is to fund these initiatives, level the competitive playing field, and enhance the data available for the STIP process.   ### Voting behaviors for a 50M proposal shouldn’t carry over to a proposal that includes the additional backfunded amounts. During our consultation process, we engaged in numerous discussions that brought forth questions about backfunding. Despite the criticisms, backfunding remains the most straightforward method to address the current STIP’s skewed sample size. We advocate that backfunding is the optimal approach to achieve the STIP’s intended outcomes—specifically, to examine the impact that incentives have on the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem. Furthermore, if the STIP continues without rectifying the issues with its sample, the analysis will be compromised by a significant methodological flaw. Backfunding is not just the “best” option; it is essential for preserving the integrity of the STIP overall. Voting behavior might have differed if the budget cap were set at 75M or 100M. The only way to determine this would be to repeat the experiment with a raised cap (an option that is unfeasible as time travel has not yet been realized). It's helpful for us to remember the original objectives of the STIP: * To provide incentives to a diverse and inclusive group of Arbitrum projects. * To quickly establish an incentives program that is in harmony with Arbitrum's values and constitution. * To generate robust, meaningful data to shape the future design of Arbitrum grants for projects of all types and sizes. # Motivation > Motivation - A statement on why the Arbitrum community should implement the AIP. How can Arbitrum create an incentives structure to grow the ecosystem? STIP started when the community began investigating creative uses for incentives. A short-term program was devised to act quickly, collect data about how incentives are used by Arbitrum protocols, and learn from the results to design new programs and grow the Arbitrum Ecosystem. An unexpected budget problem caused many successful STIP applications to receive no funding. The real-world consequence of this mistake caused the STIP sample to be cut in half - but not at random. To determine the final STIP cohort, the applications were sorted by approval, which inadvertently skewed the sample towards incumbent protocols. This sampling bias is most egregious for collecting data about the smallest protocols; over 70% of Beacon grants were rejected due to the sorting algorithm that was used. Consequently, STIP may not be collecting sufficient data about new builders on Arbitrum. This AIP seeks to achieve STIP's original motivations by: 1) nearly doubling the sample size; 2) adding protocols across a broad array of industry categories; and 3) including protocols at different stages of development. This AIP will ensure an important builder population is included in the study, while increasing the validity of the STIP results. One of the most important questions facing Arbitrum today is how to grow the ecosystem and win the L2 Wars. STIP is a novel study on the impact of incentives for growing the Arbitrum ecosystem. In practice, the STIP excluded most new builders from the study, severely limiting the data that will be collected about the early stages of the builder pipeline. This AIP includes a broader range of protocols in the STIP study, ensuring that Arbitrum gets the data it needs about how incentives impact new builders in the Arbitrum ecosystem. It stands to reason that extending incentives to smaller projects could serve to incubate projects that grow into the high-usage dApps of tomorrow. Extending the STIP may not only increase the inclusivity of the program but also incentivize significant growth for the broader Arbitrum ecosystem at a lower cost per project, and this possibility is worth exploring. # Rationale `Rationale - An explanation of how the AIP aligns with the Arbitrum community's mission and guiding values` Arbitrum's community values highlight the importance of diversity, which increases the fitness of the entire Arbitrum ecosystem by representing the needs of many kinds of participants. The original work to design STIP was careful to consider how both large and small protocols would fare under the framework. However, the unexpected budget cutoff caused the sample to skew towards large protocols, which is at odds with the values of the Arbitrum community. The cost of falling short of this ideal is that STIP systematically overlooks the possibility that incentives might be uniquely interesting to small and new protocols. By failing to incorporate protocols at the first stages of the builders onboarding pipeline, Arbitrum will be unsure about how incentives operate among this crucial group of protocols. The Arbitrum community also values neutrality, which received careful consideration during the STIP design stages. It was well-understood that incumbent protocols were likely to prevail with their STIP applications - but it was hoped this would not preclude smaller participants from also being funded. Unfortunately, this wish for inclusion was not fulfilled and - unintentional though it may have been - funding was nevertheless distributed according to a ranking that was likely to favor incumbents. Again, despite the best efforts of the DAO and the STIP designers, the result was at odds with the values of the Arbitrum community. Above all, Arbitrum seeks to create and nurture a thriving ecosystem - and the DAO's values are designed to provide guiding values that will always trend towards the health of the ecosystem. When the values aren't met - even unintentionally - it is possible the best interests of the ecosystem aren't met, either. In the case of STIP, accidentally excluding Beacon grants falls short of the community values - which, in all likelihood, is a critical oversight that Arbitrum would benefit from fixing. # Key Terms: - Approved but not funded STIP proposals - AIP-9 - Backfund - Extension - STIP - STIP Round 1 - STIP Backfunded # Specifications: `Specifications - A detailed breakdown of the platforms and technologies that will be used.` Will approve funding of an additional 21.4M ARB through the end of January 31, 2024. Please note the STIP Backfund will leverage the multiple sections of [AIP-9](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131) such as [Specification section](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131#financial-proposal-5) and [Outstanding Questions and Concerns](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131#outstanding-questions-and-concerns-13) and specifically: * [Financial Proposal](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131#financial-proposal-5) * [Multisig Setup](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131#eligibility-and-evaluation-guidelines-7) * [Eligibility Requirements](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131#what-are-the-eligibility-requirements-6) and [Eligibility and Evaluation Guidelines](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131#eligibility-and-evaluation-guidelines-7). * [KPIs](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/arbitrums-short-term-incentive-program-arbitrum-improvement-proposal/16131#what-are-the-eligibility-requirements-6) Steps to Implement - The steps to implement the AIP, including associated costs, manpower, and other resources for each step where applicable. For the avoidance of doubt, any AIPs involving transactions with third parties (such as grants) will need to ensure that applicable legal documentation and procedures are also included.` ## Specific Recipients and Amounts for Backfund Proposal **We used data provided by https://www.raho.me/stip to determine which successful STIP proposals did not receive funding. This list is also available [via google docs](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1e_HagHx883ezMlRKH3E0Ir6K_ZkoEEXzDIxPRHxKTng/).** Which protocols are included in this AIP? We used data provided by [https://www.raho.me/stip](https://www.raho.me/stip) to determine which successful STIP proposals did not receive funding. This list is also available [via google docs](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1e_HagHx883ezMlRKH3E0Ir6K_ZkoEEXzDIxPRHxKTng/).  **Total ARB for backfund** - 21.4M ARB - 26 protocols | **Project** | **ARB Amount** | | --- | --- | | WOOFi | 1,000,000 | | Gains Network [1] | 4,500,000 | | DefiEdge | 200,000 | | Synapse | 2,000,000 | | ~~PancakeSwap~~ [2]|~~2,000,000~~ | | RabbitHole [3] | 1,000,000 | | Notional | 500,000 | | Rodeo Finance | 250,000 | | Magpie | 1,250,000 | | Stargate Finance | 2,000,000 | | Savvy | 200,000 | | Tales of Elleria | 50,000 | | Thales | 500,000 | | TIDE | 80,000 | | Solv Protocol | 150,000 | | Furucombo | 59,500 | | dForce | 1,000,000 | | Sanko GameCorp | 500,000 | | Ramses | 1,248,000 | | Vela | 1,000,000 | | Thetanuts Finance | 200,000 | | JoJo | 200,000 | | Wormhole | 1,800,000 | | Shell Protocol | 750,000 | | Realm | 300,000 | | unshETH | 375,000 | | StakeDAO | 200,000 | | WINR [4] | 38,000 | [1] Gains Network originally asked for 7M ARB, but reduced their ask to 4.5M ARB. See [announcement.](https://twitter.com/GainsNetwork_io/status/1712399633790497199) [2] PancakeSwap has removed their proposal from consideration because of KYC requirements. [3] RabbitHole's inclusion in backfunding would replace their proposal titled: ["Proposal: Grow Arbitrum & STIP Teams by leveraging Quest Protocol built by RabbitHole"](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-grow-arbitrum-stip-teams-by-leveraging-quest-protocol-built-by-rabbithole/19185) [4] Currently, WINR will receive 462,000 of their ask - with backfunding WINR would receive 500,000. ### Overall Cost `Overall Cost - The total cost to implement the AIP.` Overall Cost - 71.4M ARB ## Projected Timeline `Timeline - Relevant timing details, including but not limited to start date, milestones, and completion dates.` _\*Note: Timeline may change based on option selected or amount of work needed to update and develop. For DAO proposals and voting procedures please see_ [_Section 2 in the constitution._](https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/dao-constitution#section-2-dao-proposals-and-voting-procedures) | **Phase** | **Date / Duration** | **Title** | **Description** | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Phase 1: Temp check (1 week) | Th, Nov 2nd | Draft posted to forum| Discussion hosted on forum, revisions to draft, broader working group call and revisions to AIP.| || Mon, Nov 6th | Temp check posted to snapshot by sponsor delegate | Reconvene in forum to post results and conclude temperature check.| | Phase 2: Formal AIP and call for voting (3 days): | Tues, Nov 8th | Phase 3: DAO votes on AIP, on Arbitrum One (14-16 days): | Thurs, Nov 10th | Snapshot vote begins(submit to Tally) | During this Phase 3, the ArbitrumDAO will be able to vote directly on-chain on a submitted AIP. Vote to approve AIP for non-constitutional funding. Tally voting: Quorum ~71.4M ARB; greater than 50% voting in favor.| || Thurs, Nov 24th | DAO vote ends, results are final || | Phase 4: L2 Waiting Period (3 days) | Wait | Waiting period of 3 days; then schedule on-chain txs to disburse ARB |

['For', 'Against', 'Abstain']

closed

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