Abstract:
An antifraud device for use with a self service terminal having a fascia formed with an entry slot accessed by a bank card and a keypad has a control system for disabling the terminal in the event of tampering. A cover overlying the entry slot has an opening aligned with the entry slot of the card reader. The cover has a selected thickness thereby allowing the card to pass through it without allowing additional travel should something capable of reading the card be placed over the cove the entry slot. The cover has a breakaway contact adapted to sense unauthorized removal. A detector is provided to sense the presence of an unauthorized object proximate to the entry slot or keypad or both. A control system responsive to the breakaway contact and detector disables the terminal if the cover is removed or if the entry slot is covered by an unauthorized reader.

Description:
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION  
       [0001]     The invention is directed to a method and apparatus for preventing fraud and tampering with self service terminals of the type having an access slot for a bank card. The invention is particularly for preventing a scam known as skimming, which is the unauthorized collection of card and personal user information during an otherwise proper transaction.  
         [0002]     Self service terminals allow consumers to access funds at remote locations such as at automated teller machines (ATM), or to make payment at point of sale locations. These remote terminals are usually equpped with devices to sense tampering, and to prevent certain types of fraud. For example, ATM machines have seismic sensors to detect vibrations if the machine is physically moved or disturbed. These machines have programs to disable the transaction if multiple attempts fail to properly verify a user&#39;s password. These features are generally designed to protect the contents of the machine, i.e. cash, or to protect the device itslef.  
         [0003]     While these features have generally been helpful in reducing physical attacks on the equipment, they do not prevent all forms of fraud and tampering. For example, over the past few years, individuals have been successful in illegally retrieving the information stored on a users bank card. The technique, known as skimming, allows an idividual to collect information sufficient to create a useable, but illegal, ATM or access card. Once an illegal card is created, it can not only be used to access the funds in an ATM, but it can be used to purchase goods and services at the expense of the cardholder or the institution issuing the card. Although uers are usually protected from financial loss by the bank or terminal operator, the losses, none the less have a significant impact on the businesses and customers who rely on a secure system to facilitate remote and self service transactions. There is a need therefore to reduce the occurrence of these losses.  
         [0004]     One common method to facilitate skimming is when thieves install an illegal card reader over the existing card reader slot in the terminal. When the customer inserts the card, it is passed through the illegal reader and the data stored on the magnetic strip on the card is captured. In many instances the thieves attach an inconspicuous miniature television camera to the terminal and video tape or photograph a user entering his or her personal identification number (PIN) on the key pad. Some thieves use an illegal key pad disposed atop the keypad on the terminal to capture PIN data. The information may be transmitted by the illegal card reader and key pad.  
         [0005]     After the illegally placed devices have been attached to the terminal for an hour or so, the thieves will go back to the machine and recover the devices. The equipment may be used at any location where it can be employed without being detected.  
         [0006]     The information may be recorded in the illegal device or it may be transmitted to a remote location for recordation. However this is accomplished, once the information is collected, the criminal now has the information recorded on the mangentic strip from the bank card and the PIN information. The scam is designed to allow the illegal equipment to serriptisiously collect the information without physically interfering with the transaction being conducted by the unsuspecting coustomer. So the theft of the information goes unnoticed until the thieves use the information to create and use a bogus card at sales, banking and service establishments.  
         [0007]     There is therefore a need for detecting these fraudulent activities and for rendering remote terminals resistant to tampering of the sort described. In the event that tampering is discovered, the terminal may be promptly disabled thereby reducing or eliminating the illegal collection of information at that location.  
       SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION  
       [0008]     The invention is based on the discovery that a self service terminal having an access device may be made resistant to tampering by employing a control system for monitoring the access device and interrupting the transaction underway in order to thwart illegal collection of card and PIN information.  
         [0009]     In a particular embodiment the device to be protected is a self service terminal having a power supply and a fascia formed with a card reader having an entry slot accessed by a bank card and a keypad. A control system in operative relation with the power supply interrups the power supplied to the terminal in response to tampering. A sensor may also be employed to produce an alarm indicative of tampering with the entry slot, the keypad or both. As these terminals are routinely monitored, interruption of power or an alarm will alert maintenance and security personnel who will then dispatch appropriate personnel to the location in order to investigate the interruption and service the terminal. The terminal is equpped with a selectable reset, operable by an authorized person, to reset the power after an incident.  
         [0010]     In a patricular embodiment the invention comprises a cover for the access slot of the motorized card reader. The cover is secured to the fascia and overlies the slot for preventing attachment of an unauthorized card reader. The cover has a surface texture and shape adapted to discourage attachemnt of an overlying card reader. The thickness of the cover is also sufficient to allow the card to pass through it without allowing additional travel should an illegal device capable of reading the card be placed over the cover. Thus, if an illegal card reader is placed over the slot, once the card is inserted it will be captured by the card reader. When the transaction is completed, the card will be returned or presented to the customer. However, because the overlying device is in the way, the customer cannont retrieve the card, which after a given time period is drawn back into the machine.  
         [0011]     A breakaway contact is secured to the cover which extends through the fascia and is coupled to the control system. If the thief notices the cover and tries to remove it forceably, the contact becomes an open circuit, thereby disabling the terminal and optionally raising an alarm.  
         [0012]     In an other embodiment, an infrared sensor located proximate to the access slot, key pad or both is operative to detect if an illegal device has been placed over the access slot or keyboard. The sensor, in response to tampering, disables the terminal and raises an alarm which summons security and maintenance personnel. The sensor comprises an IR transmitter for directing infrared radiation in an optical path, and an IR receiver responsive to the radiation. If something is located in the optical path, radiation is reflected towards the receiver which produces an output. A timer coupled to the receiver, times the duration of the output and disables the terminal and optionally initiates an alarm if the duration is longer than a selected time. The timer resets itself each time the reflected radiation is interrupted so that random signals which occur normally do not set off the alarm unintentionally. In other words, the condition indicative of tampering must endure for a time sufficient to avoid false alarms.  
     
    
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS  
       [0013]      FIG. 1  is an illustration of a self service terminal employing an anti fraud and anti tampering system according to the invention.  
         [0014]      FIG. 2  is a perspective view of a card guard for protecting the card entry slot of a self service terminal.  
         [0015]      FIG. 2A  is a sectional view of the card guard shown in  FIG. 2  taken along line  2 A thereof.  
         [0016]      FIG. 2B  is sectional view of the card guard shown in  FIG. 2  taken along line  2 B thereof.  
         [0017]      FIG. 2C  is a detail of the surface texture of the protrusions on the card guard.  
         [0018]      FIG. 3  is a rear elevation of the card guard shown in  FIG. 2 .  
         [0019]      FIG. 4  is a fragmentary sectional view of the card guard shown in  FIG. 3 , taken along line  4 - 4  thereof and showing a detail of the break away connection.  
         [0020]      FIG. 5  is an illustration of the optical detector.  
         [0021]      FIG. 6  is a schematic illustration of the operating optical detector.  
         [0022]      FIG. 7  is a schematic diagram of a control circuit employed in a self service terminal. 
     
    
     DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION  
       [0023]     The invention comprises an anti fraud and anti tampering apparatus for protecting a self service terminal  10  and users threof against fraud and tampering. In particular, the invention is for preventing a scam known as ‘skimming’ wherein a thief employing an illegal card reader serriptisciously obtains card information from an unsuspecting customer, which information allows the thief to create a useable but unauthorized bank card.  
         [0024]     The invention is generally illustrated in  FIG. 1  wherein the terminal  10  to be monitored and protected is coupled to a control system  12  adapted to disable the terminal in the event of tampering. One or more sensors  14  may be employed which are adapted to signal the control system to disable the terminal and optionally to provide an alarm signal to alert security and maintenance personnel of the incident. If tampering is detected, any transaction in progress is terminated.  
         [0025]     The terminal  10 , which is schematically illustrated, is exemplary of many different known devices. Such terminals are generally equipped with a card reader  12  mounted behind a fascia  15 . The card reader  12  has a card entry slot  16  formed in an opening in the fascia as illustrated. The card reader recieves the card in the entry slot and draws it into the reader for the duration of the transaction. The terminal will also have a keypad  18  or data entry device whereby the user enters a personal identification number (PIN) or other information as required in using such devices.  
         [0026]     According to one aspect of the invention, it is desirable to prevent or frustrate skimming by preventing the use of illegal card readers.  FIGS. 2-4  illustrate a device or cover  20  for such purpose. The cover  20  comprises a molded body  22  formed with a rounded outer face  24  and a rear face  26  that confronts the fascia. The cover  20  has an elongated through opening  28  having a central oval portion  30  and outboard slotted portions  32 . The cover  20  is adapted to be mounted onto the fascia by screws  33  passing through openings  35  in the fascia and secured in treaded bosses  34  formed in the rear surface  26  of the cover  20 . When mounted on the fascia  14 , the opening  28  is alligned with the entry slot  16  as illustrated.  
         [0027]     The rounded outer face  24  of the cover is formed with molded protrusions  36  which resemble spherical indentations on the surface ( FIG. 2C ). The rounded shape of the cover and the indentations reduce the stable adhesive surface area of the cover so that if thieves try to install a card reader over the entry slot  16  it will not adhere well, and if it adheres it will tend to be unstable or wobbly, thereby interfering with the scam.  
         [0028]     The cover is equpped with an insultated wire loop  38  which has a proximal end  40  secured in an opening  42  in the rear surface as shown, and a distall end  44  extending away from the cover and having a portion of the insulation removed thereby exposing metal conductive contact portions  46 . The loop is bent on itself at its proximate end  42  and forms a continuous conductor between the contact portions. The distall end  44  of the loop extends through an opening  48  in the fascia  15  and is coupled to control system by means of a break-away connector  50  having contacts  52  engaging the conductors  46 . If a thief tries to remove the cover  20 , doing so will cause the the loop  38  to be pulled away from the connector  50  thereby open circuiting the connection with the control system  12 . When the loop is open circuited, the control system  12  disables the terminal and optionally produces an alarm.  
         [0029]     The invention also may employ an optical sensor for detecting conditions which indicate tampering as well. For example,  FIGS. 1, 5  and  6 , illustrate an optical sensor  14  equipped with an infra red (IR) transmitter  62 , e.g. a light emmitting diode, and an infra red sensor or receiver  64  mounted on a base  66 . The sensor is mounted in an opening  68  in the fascia  15 . The transmitter produces, when energized, an IR output beam  70  which is directed outwardly of the fascia. If the transmitter is blocked or covered by an unauthorized device such as a card reader  72 , transmitted light strikes the device and some of the light  74  is reflected towards the receiver. This reflected light  74  is detected by the receiver which produces a signal input to a timer  78  in the control system.  
         [0030]     The timer is set for some period that is indicative of tampering. If the sensor detects light for longer than the allotted time, the terminal is disabled and an alarm is raised. Because the detector is sensitive to reflected light from the transmitter, the timer allows for spurious signals to be detected without immediately disabling the terminal. For example as the user interacts with the terminal, there may be reflected light sensed. However, it is only when the duration of the detected light exceeds the limit set in the timer that the terminal is disabled and an alarm is initiatiated.  
         [0031]      FIG. 7  is a schematic illustration of the control system according to the invention. As illustrated, the control system  12  is coupled to a power circuit  80  for carrying AC power from an AC source (not shown) which energizes the ATM  10 . Under the conditions illustrated in  FIG. 7 , the terminal  10  is energized and operable. The terminal is powered by the AC source  80  and the control system  12  is standing by to interrupt the power in the event of tampering.  
         [0032]     The control system  12  includes a DC power supply  82  coupled to the AC source  80 . The power supply  82  is equipped with a full wave rectifier  84  which feeds voltage regulators  86  and  88 . Regulator  86  provides a 12 volt output for relay circuits on line  90 , and regulator  88  provides a 5 volt output for the electronic circuits, both of which are described below.  
         [0033]     The control system employs a normally energized power relay  92  and a normally deenergized device or alarm relay  94 . Power  92  relay has a coil  96  for actuating moveable contacts  97  and fixed contacts  98 . Normally energized power relay  92  maintain contacts  98  closed, completing the AC power circuit  80  to the terminal  10 .  
         [0034]     The alarm relay  94  has normally closed moveable contacts  102  and  104 ; a contact actuating coil  106 , normally closed fixed contacts  107  and  108 , and normally open fixed contacts  110  and  111 . The power relay  92  is energized from the 12 volt line through normally closed front contacts  102  and  107 , coil  94 , loop  38 , break away connector  50  and rectifier  84 .  
         [0035]     When the loop  38  is open circuited as described above, indicating that the cover has been forceably removed, the coil circuit  96  of the power relay  92  is open, deenergizing the relay and thereby open circuiting the AC power for the termial. Once disabled in this way, the terminal remains off until the loop  38  is reinstalled by maintenance personnel.  
         [0036]     Power relay  92  may also be deenergized when the alarm relay  94  is activated if tampering is sensed by optical sensor  60 . As illustrated, the alarm relay  94  is powered from the 12 volt source through the coil  106 , resistor  114 , normally closed reset switch  116 , and transistor or electronic switch  118  to ground. The switch  118  is biased to be normally open circuit, or non conducting. Thus the alarm relay  94  is normally deenergized.  
         [0037]     The switch  118  is caused to conduct in the event of an alarm condition, described below, and when the switch  118  conducts, power is applied to the coil  106  causing the alarm relay  94  to energize. As a result, movable contacts  102  open the front contact  107  thereby opening the circuit for power relay  92 , and thus disabling the terminal. When the back contact  110  closes the circut for the alarm relay  94  is completed and is held energized via stick circuit incluidng resistor  120  and base resistor  122  feeding the base of switch  118 . The alarm relay  94  is deenergized by depressing the reset switch and opening the circuit to coil  106 . In this way, the alarm relay is held energized by the stick circuit until the normally closed reset switch  116  is opened by manual actuation.  
         [0038]     The control circuit includes an input for the optical sensor  60  illustrated in  FIG. 1 . The sensor detects the presence of an unauthorized object proximate to the entry slot and includes transmitter  62  and receiver  64  mounted on a support secured in an opening in the fascia. The sensor  60  is normally conducting and carries a 5 volt signal from the power supply  88  to the base circuit of a normally conducting transistor switch  130  which supplies power to a timer circuit  132 , which in turn controls the switch  118  in the power circuit of the alarm relay  94 . If the switch  130  is off or non conducting for a selected interval of time indicative of tampering, the alarm relay  94  is energized switch  118  as hereinabove described. The alarm relay  94 , once energized, must be manually reset by security and maintenance personnel. The sensor may be an infra red sensor as described, but may also be another type of device adapted to sense the presence of an unauthorized object near the slot of the terminal.  
         [0039]     As noted, the switch  130  is normally conducting and threby produces a low output feeding inverter  134 . The inverter, in turn, places a high on an input to timer circuit  132 . A selector switch  138  for the timer is adapted to selectively control the timer output  140  feeding the base circuit of switch  118  in alarm relay circuit. The selector switch  138  may be manually set for a desired time interval, and should the timer input remain high for such period, the timer produces an output to cause the normally non conducting switch  118  to conduct and threby energize the alarm relay  94 . The duration is selected so as to provide a positive indication of tampering, i.e. normal use of the machine may cause the detector to sense the presence of an object near the slot during normal useage. However, if the sensor momentarily senses the presence of an object, the timer will reset itself each time the reflected signal is interrupted. The alarm will not be raised unless and until the timer input has a sufficient duration as selected by the terminal operator. Once the realy conducts, maintenance personnel must manually reset the alarm relay to return the terminal to service.  
         [0040]     The invention contemplates a method whereby the cover and optical detector may be employed either alone or in combination to disable the terminal in the event of tampering and threby avert fraud against users of the equipment.  
         [0041]     While there has been provided what is an exemplary embodiment of the invention, it will be apparent to those of skill in the art that various changes and modifications may be made therein, and it is intended in appended claims to cover such changes and modifications as fall within the scope of the invention.