Abstract:
A system for authenticating a document, D. A trusted party applies an algorithm to D, for example, by treating each byte of data within D as a number, and treating the numbers as inputs to the algorithm. The trusted party obtains a result from the algorithm, termed a Message Authentication Code, MAC. The trusted party gives a courier both (1) D and (2) the MAC, as by loading both into a portable computer carried by the courier. The courier delivers both D and MAC to a recipient, who is equipped with the identical algorithm. The recipient applies the algorithm to D. If the recipient obtains the MAC, the recipient concludes that no tampering of D occurred. The reason is that successful tampering requires the courier to replace MAC with a fabricated MAC(fab). MAC(fab) must possess the characteristic that the algorithm would produce MAC(fab) when applied to the tampered document D. However, since the courier does not know the algorithm, and since the number of possible algorithms is nearly infinite, the courier cannot produce MAC(fab).

Description:
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
   This application claims priority under 35 U.S.C. §120 to the following commonly-assigned patent application, which is incorporated herein by reference: 
   Application Ser. No. 09/427,419, entitled “PERSONAL DIGITAL ASSISTANT AS SMART CARD,” by Thomas G. Brewer and Nelson H. Yount, filed on Oct. 27, 1999 now abandoned. 
   FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
   The invention concerns the use of a Personal Digital Assistant, or PDA, as a smart card. 
   BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
   Smart cards are in widespread use. A smart card resembles an ordinary plastic credit card, but having added features which include (1) a high-capacity memory, together with (2) an interface, which allows external equipment to communicate with that memory. In addition, some, or all, of the data stored within a smart card is stored in encrypted form, and some smart cards may be able to perform encryption and decryption of that data. 
   Smart cards are used by both individuals and industries. An industry may use smart cards, for example, in a manufacturing process. Each product undergoing manufacture, such as an automobile, is equipped with a smart card, which stores data indicating all manufacturing steps previously accomplished, thereby indicating the present state of completion of the product. 
   Individual persons commonly use smart cards in place of credit cards. For example, a bank provides equipment, such as an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), with which the smart card communicates. When a person who maintains an account with the bank wishes to obtain funds, the person presents a smart card to the ATM. The ATM loads data into the smart card which indicates a monetary amount, and deducts that amount from the account. The person then utilizes the smart card to make purchases of merchandise and services. 
   When the purchases are made, specialized equipment located at the site of the purchase (1) reads the monetary amount stored within the smart card, (2) determines whether the monetary amount will cover the purchases, and, if so, (3) deducts the amount of the purchase from the stored monetary amount. 
   As smart cards come into wider usage, more cards will enter circulation. Consequently, on average, the number of cards carried by each person is expected to increase. 
   It is not necessarily convenient for people to carry large numbers of smart cards. 
   OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION 
   An object of the invention is to provide the benefits of multiple smart cards, but eliminating the requirement of physical possession of a multiplicity of smart cards. 
   An object of the invention is to incorporate the functionality of a smart card into a personal digital assistant. 
   SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
   In one form of the invention, a portable computer, or Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), carries a digital document. The document contains material with which tampering is prohibited, such as a photograph of a person or a bank balance. The invention implements security measures which indicate whether tampering of the document has occurred. With these measures implemented, a recipient of the document can readily determine the document&#39;s authenticity. For example, if the recipient is a security agency controlling access to a building, the agency can admit, or reject, a person seeking entry to the facility, based on the document, which may be a photograph, in this case. 
   In another form of the invention, the computer, or PDA, carries multiple digital documents. 

   
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       FIG. 1  illustrates a prior-art portable computer. 
       FIG. 2  illustrates one form of the invention. 
       FIG. 3  is a flow chart illustrating logic implemented by one form of the invention. 
       FIG. 4  illustrates interaction between one form of the invention and a security station. 
   

   DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
   Introduction 
   The invention utilizes a Personal Digital Assistant, PDA, to implement several functions ordinarily found in smart cards, such as (1) storing data indicating monetary amounts and (2) storing data which identifies the owner of the smart card. Further, in one form of the invention, these implementations are accomplished in software. 
   That is, many smart cards rely on integrity of hardware to provide security. They physically isolate the electronic circuitry forming the card&#39;s memory from the outside world, using a stout housing which provides ready evidence of tampering. A hacker may attempt to physically break into the housing and gain access to the memory. However, such a break-in will be immediately detectable because of visible damage inflicted on the card. 
   In contrast with this approach to security, one form of the invention makes the stored data freely available to the user, or anyone else who wishes to read it. Mathematical techniques are applied to the data during financial transactions, which detect whether tampering has occurred to the data. 
   DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
   Personal Digital Assistant 
   The Personal Digital Assistant, PDA, will first be described. 
   The architecture of the Personal Digital Assistant, PDA, shares many features with a modem laptop computer, and both devices perform many of the same functions, although PDA&#39;s tend to be smaller in size, while laptops tend to be larger. However, as technology advances, it can be expected that the bulkier components of laptops, such disc drives, will become miniaturized, so that a complete laptop computer will soon be available in a pocket-sized edition. Ultimately, PDAs and laptops may become indistinguishable in both size and function. 
   For this reason, the present invention will be framed in terms of the architecture of the standard Personal Computer, PC. However, it is recognized that the invention is preferably implemented today as a PDA, because of the small size of the PDA. One type of PDA utilizes a subset of the components found in a personal computer. 
   One Form of Invention 
     FIG. 1  illustrates a standard laptop computer  3 .  FIG. 2  illustrates the computer  3  in schematic form, and lists several of the internal components of the computer  3 . In addition,  FIG. 2  illustrates one form of the invention  5 , including several components  6  which are added to the computer  3 . Device  5  will be designated a PDA herein. Various embodiments of the invention utilize different combinations of the added components  6 . 
   The added components include an infra-red communication link  7 , which preferably complies with the standard designated IrDA. IrDA is an acronym for Infra-red Developers Association, which is known in the art. This link  7  is used to transfer data to an external device, as explained below. 
   The invention adds programming, indicated as block  15 , which performs the tasks described below, and described in the flow charts illustrated in the drawings. 
   In this form of the invention, a digital document, indicated as block  17 , is stored in memory  20 . That document  17  may contain a photograph of the owner of the PDA  5 , or other protected information. In this example, the part of memory  20  storing the document  17  is a special type: it cannot be altered. That is, the memory  20  is of the read-only type, so that the document  17  cannot be modified. 
   Such non-writable memory is commonly used in computers. For example, the BIOS (Basic Input Output System) used in the personal computer is frequently non-writable. As another example, an ordinary readable ROM can be used, but in which the control line which enables the write operation has been disabled. 
   With this read-only arrangement, the digitized photograph is considered highly secure, and an imposter would be presented with significant difficulty in replacing the digitized photograph contained in memory  20  with the imposter&#39;s own photograph. 
   The imposter may attempt to open the case of the PDA  5 , physically extract the memory  20 , and replace it with a memory containing the imposter&#39;s photograph. This attempt can be thwarted by several expedients. One is to utilize a tamper-proof case, which is tamper-proof in the sense that tampering is not prevented, but is detectable if it occurs. Tamper-proof cases are known in the art. 
   A second approach is to treat the PDA  5  as a disposable item. The casing of the PDA is manufactured so that it cannot be opened, without visibly destroying part of it. That damage provides visible evidence of tampering. If the PDA malfunctions and requires repair, the PDA is discarded, because repairing would require invasion of the case, which would be interpreted as tampering. 
   Therefore, in this form of the invention, a secure document is contained within read-only memory located within a PDA or portable computer. That document may contain a photograph of a person. 
   Second Form of Invention 
   In another approach, no special memory  20  or hardware is used. Instead, mathematical techniques provide the desired security. 
   The document  17  is stored within ordinary memory. The document is made available to all parties who wish to obtain, or modify it. However, if modification of the document occurs, that modification will become detectable. The detection is accomplished through the encryption technique known as Message Authentication Coding, MAC, or a similar approach. 
   A simplified MAC will be described. However, the Inventors emphasize that this description is a simplification, for purposes of illustration. Even though the simple MAC described herein provides high security, actual MACs are much more complex, and provide an extremely high measure of security. 
   As stated above, the document  17  contains a digitized photograph. As such, the document  17  contains a collection of pixels. For example, the photograph may occupy a full VGA screen of 480×640 pixels, or 307,200 pixels total. Assume that each pixel requires one byte (ie, 8 bits) of data. Each pixel-byte can thus be considered a decimal number ranging from zero (0000 0000 binary) to 255 (1111 1111 binary). 
   Assume that, for purposes of this explanation, a smaller number of pixels is used, such as 100. Extension to a larger number of pixels is straightforward. 
   Each of the 100 pixel-bytes is treated as a mathematical variable, labeled from N 1  to N 100 . These variables are treated as the inputs of an equation. A simple equation is the following:
 
MAC= N 1+ N 2− N 3− N 4+ N 5− . . . + N 99− N 100.
 
In this equation, each variable is given an algebraic sign, and the result, MAC, is the algebraic sum of the signed variables. MAC is the Message Authentication Code discussed above.
 
   While this equation appears simple, if a hacker would attempt to guess the equation, the hacker would be confronted with a large number of possible equations. The number of possible equations is easily calculated. The algebraic sign given to each variable has two possibilities: positive or negative. 100 signs are involved. Consequently, the number of possible equations is 2 100 , or 2 raised to the 100 power, which equals about 10 raised to the thirtieth power. 
   This number of possible equations is enormous. Further, this number corresponds to the simplified case of 100 pixels. If all 307,200 pixels were used in an equation of this type, then the number of possible equations would be 2 raised to the 307,200 power, which is an inconceivably large number. 
   The large number of possible equations enhances the security of the invention, as will be seen shortly. 
   The equation given above produces a result, MAC, which is the Message Authorization Code. The MAC  25  is stored within the PDA  5 , as indicated in  FIG. 2 . This MAC  25  can be stored in ordinary memory along with the document  17 . The MAC  25  can be read, and altered, by any party. 
   The operations involved in the steps just described, namely, (1) storing the pixel-data within the PDA, (2) using the equation to compute MAC, and (4) and storing the MAC within the PDA are indicated by blocks  50 ,  55 , and  60  in  FIG. 3 . These operations are undertaken by a trusted party, such as the operator of the security devices SD, described below. 
   As stated above, the document and the MAC are stored in ordinary memory. Despite this fact, the invention effectively prevents tampering with the document, as will now be explained. 
   The owner of the PDA  5  in  FIG. 2 , whose photograph is stored as document  17 , carries the PDA  5  to a security station S in  FIG. 4 . The PDA  5  delivers the document to a receiver  95  contained within a computer  100 , as indicated by arrows  90 . The infra-red link  7  in  FIG. 2  handles the delivery. Block  65  in  FIG. 3  represents this step. 
   The computer  100  takes two actions. One, it generates a photograph using the document, and displays the photograph (not shown) on a display D. A security agent (not shown) compares the photograph with the owner of the PDA  5 . 
   Two, the computer  100  computes MAC, using the document. The computer  100  is able to perform this computation because it is equipped with the equation originally used by the trusted party in block  55  of  FIG. 3  to compute MAC. Blocks  70  and  75  in  FIG. 3  represent this step. 
   Decision block  80  inquires whether the computed MAC matches that downloaded from the PDA in block  60 . If not, the document is rejected, in block  88 . If a match occurs, block  89  indicates that the document is considered as authenticated. 
   Two features of this operation should be observed. One is that a hacker cannot substitute a document containing the hacker&#39;s photograph for the document  17  in  FIG. 2 . The reason is that the hacker cannot compute a valid MAC, because the hacker does not know the required equation. 
   That is, even though the hacker knows the inputs to the equation (the pixel-variables contained in the authentic document  17  in  FIG. 2 ), and also knows the output of the equation (MAC in  FIG. 2 ), the hacker does not know the equation itself. 
   Further, the equation is not derivable from these two known entities (the pixel-variables and the MAC). That is, there is no unique mathematical function relating the authentic pixel-data with the MAC. Restated, of the astronomical number of possible equations described above, a certain group of them will produce the correct MAC. If the hacker chooses one of that group, the hacker can input the pixel-variables of his own photograph to that equation. However, that equation will probably not match the equation used in block  55  of  FIG. 3 , and will thus produce the wrong MAC. That erroneous MAC will be detected when the hacker attempts to pass the security station S in  FIG. 4 . 
   A second feature is that the hacker cannot execute a brute-force attack to ascertain the correct equation. In a brute-force attack generally, a hacker would (1) select an equation, (2) enter data, (3) compute a MAC, and (4) determine whether the MAC is correct. If not, the hacker repeats steps (1) through (4). With modem computers, this repetition can be achieved in a short time. 
   However, step (4) is not available to the hacker. To execute that step, the hacker must present himself to the security station S. But as soon as an incorrect MAC is delivered to the computer  100 , the hacker will become exposed, and the brute-force attack will be foiled. 
   The previous discussion imposed a simplification, by assuming that plain-text of the pixel-data and MAC are stored. In practice, the pixel-data would be encrypted using a secret key, which is only available to (1) the trusted party of block  50  in  FIG. 3  and (2) computer  100  in  FIG. 4 . 
   Optionally, the MAC may be encrypted also. The encryption steps are indicated by the parentheticals in blocks  50  and  55  in  FIG. 3 . 
   With this arrangement, a hacker&#39;s difficulty becomes, in effect, insurmountable. The hacker must first ascertain the secret key, which is a significant problem in itself. Then, the hacker must de-crypt both the encrypted document, and possibly also the encrypted MAC. But, even though the hacker now possesses the key, the hacker does not know the encryption algorithm, and thereby faces another obstacle. 
   If the hacker obtains the algorithm, the hacker must still guess at the equation used to relate the document with the MAC. Next, the hacker must encrypt the pixel-data for his own photograph, using the secret key, and then compute a MAC, and store both the encrypted pixel-data and the MAC within the PDA. 
   The inventors submit that these tasks are, as a minimum, extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible. 
   Sources of MAC Algorithms 
   As stated previously, this explanation is a simplification, given for the purpose of illustration. In the art of cryptography, Message Authorization Codes, MACs, are highly developed, and are described in the text  Applied Cryptography , by Bruce Schneier (John Wiley &amp; Sons, New York, 1996, ISBN 0 471 12845 7). This text is hereby incorporated by reference. 
   Software for implementing MACs is commercially available. One source is Counterpane Systems, 101 E. Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis, Minn., USA. 
   In addition, the following publications describe various MAC approaches. These articles are hereby incorporated by reference. ANSI X9.9 (Revised), “American National Standard for Financial Institution Message Authentication (Wholesale),” American Bankers Association, 1986. 
   ANSI X9.19, American National Standard for Retail Message Authentication,” American Bankers Association, 1985. 
   D. W. Davies, “A Message Authentication Algorithm Suitable for a Mainframe Computer,”  Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto  82, Plenum Press, 1983, pp. 89-96. 
   D. W. Davies and W. L. Price, “The Application of Digital Signatures Based on Public-Key Cryptosystems,”  Proceedings of the Fifth International Computer Communications Conference , October, 1980, pp. 525-530. 
   D. W. Davies and W.L . Price, “Digital Signature-An Update,”  Proceedings of International Conference on Computer Communication , Sydney, October 1984, North Holland:Elsevier, 1985, pp. 843-847. 
   G. Garon and R. Outerbridge, “DES Watch: An Examination of the Sufficiency of the Data Encryption Standard for Financial Institution Information Security in the 1990&#39;s,”  Cryptologia, v.  15, n. 3, July, 1991, pp. 177-193. 
   M. Girault, “Hash-Functions Using Modulo-N Operations,”  Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT &#39; 87  Proceedings , Springer-Verlag, 1988, pp. 217-226. 
   ISO DIS 8731-1, “Banking-Approved Algorithms for Message Authentication—Part 1: DEA,” Association for Payment Clearing Services, London, 1987. 
   ISO DIS 8731-2, “Banking-Approved Algorithms for Message Authentication—Part 2: Message Authenticator Algorithm,” Association for Payment Clearing Services, London, 1987. 
   ISO/IEC 9797, “Data Cryptographic Techniques—Data Integrity Mechanism Using a Cryptographic Check Function Employing a Block Cipher Algorithm,” International Organization for Standardization, 1989. 
   ISO DIS 10118 DRAFT, “Information Technology-Security Techniques-Hash Functions,” International Organization for Standardization, 1989. 
   ISO DIS 10118 DRAFT, “Information Technology-Security Techniques-Hash Functions,” International Organization for Standardization, April 1991. 
   R. R. Jueneman, “Analysis of Certain Aspects of Output-Feedback Mode,”  Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto  82, Plenum Press, 1983, pp. 99-127. 
   R. R. Jueneman, “Electronic Document Authentication,”  IEEE Network Magazine , v. 1, n. 2, April 1978, pp. 17-23. 
   R. R. Jueneman, “A High Speed Manipulation Detection Code,”  Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO &#39; 86  Proceedings , Springer-Verlag, 1987, pp. 327-346. 
   R. R. Jueneman, S. M. Matyas, and C. H. Meyer, “Message Authentication with Manipulation Detection Codes,”  Proceedings of the  1983  IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy,  1983, pp. 733-54. 
   R. R. Jueneman, S. M. Matyas, and C. H. Meyer, “Message Authentication,”  IEEE Communications Magazine , v. 23, n. 9, September 1985, pp. 29-40. 
   X. Lai, R. A. Rueppel, and J. Woollven, “A Fast Cryptographic Checksum Algorithm Based on Stream Ciphers,”  Advances in Cryptology—AUSCRYPT &#39; 92  Proceedings , Springer-Verlag, 1993, pp. 339-348. 
   J. Linn, “Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I—Message Enciphering and Authentication Procedures,” RFC 1040, January, 1988. 
   K. Ohta and M. Matsui, “Differential Attack on Message Authentication Codes,”  Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO &#39; 93  Proceedings , Springer-Verlag, 1994. pp. 200-223. 
   Open Shop Information Services,  OSIS Security Aspects , OSIS European Working Group, WGI, final report, October, 1985. 
   B. Preneel, “Analysis and Design of Cryptographic Hash Functions,” Ph.D. dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, January, 1993. 
   Research and Development in Advanced Communication Technologies in Europe,  RIPE Integrity Primitives: Final Report of RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation , (R1040), RACE, June, 1992. 
   Standards Association of Australia, “Australian Standard 2805.4 1985: 
   Electronic Funds Transfer—Requirements for Interfaces: Part 4—Message Authentication,” SAA, North Sydney, NSW, 1985. 
   R. Taylor, “An Integrity Check Value Algorithm for Stream Ciphers,”  Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO &#39; 93  Proceedings , Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 40-48. 
   G. Tsudik, “Message Authentication with One-Way Hash Functions,”  ACM Computer Communications Review , v. 22, n. 5, 1992, pp. 29-38. 
   Therefore, in this form of the invention, a document, such as a photograph, is carried by the PDA. The document may, or may not, be encrypted. The document is accompanied by a MAC. 
   Processing the document according to a specific algorithm, which is the equation given above in the simplified example, and comparing the result with the MAC will ascertain validity of the document. 
   Third Form of Invention 
   The Inventors have deduced that the identification procedure described above may be viewed as involving (1) transporting a document (the digitized photograph) from a trusted source to the security station S and (2) verifying, at the station S, whether the document has been altered. 
   The Inventors have further deduced that a smart card involves similar operations. That is, (1) at a kiosk, such as an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), data is loaded into the smart card which represents a monetary amount. That data corresponds to the document described above. Then (2) the smart card is transported to a merchant, who corresponds to the security station S in  FIG. 4 . 
   The merchant (3) ascertains validity of the data, and then (4) deducts a purchase amount from the data. The merchant finally (5) writes new data to the smart card, representing a new monetary balance resulting after the deduction. The owner of the smart card then proceeds to another merchant, where the process is repeated. 
   These steps can, conceptually, be reduced to a single pair events: (1) receipt of a document (ie, data representing a monetary amount) from a kiosk and (2) transport of the document to a merchant. 
   After the transaction with the merchant occurs, these two steps are repeated. That is, the merchant replaces the document with a new document, which the owner of the smart card tranports to another merchant. 
   From this perspective, both (1) the owner of the PDA  5  in  FIG. 2  and (2) the owner of the smart card (not shown) act as couriers. Each courier carries a document from one party to another, namely, from an originating party to a destination party. 
   The destination party generates a new document, thereby becoming an originating party, and delivers it to the courier. The courier repeats the process, in carrying the document to another party. 
   With this perspective, the MAC-process described above can be used to replace a collection of smart cards. The collection of smart cards is replaced by a single PDA. That is, under this form of the invention, the document  17  in  FIG. 2  is replaced by several documents  17 A. Each document contains data indicating a monetary amount. 
   In addition, the MAC  25  is replaced by multiple MACs  25 A, one for each document  17 A. 
   In effect, multiple smart cards are now contained within the PDA, but the physical smart cards are absent. When a transaction is to be undertaken, the document  17 A corresponding to a smart card is authenticated, and the transaction is executed. If the transaction results in an alteration of a monetary amount stored in a document  17 A, the document is replaced by a new document, containing the new amount, and the corresponding MAC  25 A is also replaced. 
   In addition, the document may be “padded” with additional characters, in order to lengthen the message. For example, the message may contain 5,000 monetary amounts. By pre-arrangement, the actual monetary amount is the 4,999th. The rest act as padding. 
   In this form of the invention, the security station S in  FIG. 4  is equipped with multiple algorithms  120 A, each corresponding to a document  17 A in  FIG. 2 . Each document  17 A contains a code which identifies its algorithm. Alternately, the computer  100  in  FIG. 4  may use every algorithm to compute a MAC, and ascertain whether one of those MACs matches a MAC  25 A in  FIG. 2 . 
   For example, assume four algorithms  120  in  FIG. 4 , four smart cards  17 A in  FIG. 2 , and four MACs  25 A. When a transaction occurs, the computer  100  in  FIG. 4  receives a single document  17 A. It computes four MACs, using the four algorithms  120 . It compares the four MACs with the four MACS  25 A in  FIG. 2 . If one match occurs, authentication is presumed. 
   ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
   1. As explained above, a PDA, in general, contains a subset of the components of a portable personal computer. That subset may be a complete subset: the PDA and the computer may be functionally identical. 
   Perhaps the most common subset contains these elements: a processor; system memory, which includes program memory which stores running programs; a storage medium, such as a fixed disc, for storing programs while not running; stored programs within the storage medium; an input device, such as a keyboard, keypad, or pointing device; and a display. 
   In general, personal computer in question is the general-purpose, programmable, electronic digital computer. One such computer is that using the architecture designed around the 8xx86 series of microprocessors manufactured by Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, Calif. In one form of the invention, the PDA contains a subset of components which equips it with the characteristics just mentioned: it is programmable, in the sense that it can run programs. A user selects a program, and orders the PDA to run it. It is general-purpose, in the sense that it can perform generalized computation. In contrast, a decoder for a digital satellite television system may contain a computer, and may run programs. However, it is not of the general-purpose type: it cannot run generalized programs. 
   2. Many smart cards are powered by external sources. That is, they do not carry storage batteries or solar cells, and are powered by the stationary equipment with which they communicate. Consequently, while they are stored in a user&#39;s purse or wallet, this type of card remains dormant and unpowered. In contrast, the PDA is self-powered. 
   3. In one form of the invention, one of the documents  17 A in  FIG. 2  may contain a photograph. A corresponding MAC  25 A is also provided. The remaining documents  17 A are smart cards. In this form of the invention, authentication of a photograph identifying a party is provided. That party uses smart cards  17 A to execute financial transactions. 
   4. This point provides one definition of the term “authenticate.” 
   The invention is used to authenticate digital documents. In one embodiment, as explained above, the invention determines whether the MAC “matches” the digital document. Specifically, the invention determines whether the document, when processed by a test algorithm, such as the equation given above, produces a MAC which matches that accompanying the document. If so, authenticity is taken as proven. 
   The proof lies in the inference that the “test” algorithm is identical to that used by the originator of the document. The reason for the inference is that both algorithms produce the same MAC, when fed the same input, namely, the document. 
   Restated, the production of the correct MAC by the “test” algorithm indicates that the document-MAC pair originated with a party in possession of an identical algorithm. 
   If a group of two, or more, parties generate an appropriately complex algorithm and share it, the testing scenario just described will prove whether the document in question originated from one of the parties. Thereby, proof is attained that the document originated with a party in possession of the algorithm. That is taken as proof of the origin of the document, and also of its authenticity. The proof is authentication of the document. 
   This proof is not rebutted by dishonesty of one of the parties. For example, a party may sell the algorithm to a thief. Even if so, the testing procedure described above still proves whether the document originated with a party in possession of the algorithm, even if that party be a thief. 
   Restated in simpler terms: the invention identifies a class of parties from which the document originated, thereby authenticating the document. 
   5. In one form of the invention, no independent verification of the document  17  in  FIG. 2  occurs. That is, ordinarily, when a person executes a transaction with an ATM, the ATM contacts the person&#39;s bank, to verify whether the person maintains an account at the bank, and whether the account contains funds sufficient to cover the transaction. 
   However, under this form of the invention, no such verification occurs. This absence of verification is indicated by the parenthetical in block  89  in  FIG. 3 . Restated, the security computer  100  in  FIG. 4  makes no contact with a third party in connection with the transaction involving a document  17  in  FIG. 2 . That lack of contact exists whether the document is involved in a financial transaction, or an identification transaction. 
   Of course, in other forms of the invention, third-party involvement may be used. 
   6. For simplicity of explanation, much of the preceding discussion focused upon traditional uses of smart cards. The invention contemplates the use of smart cards for the transfer of all types of personal and privacy data which are transferred between a smart card holder and another agent involved in a transaction, such as a kiosk. 
   7. Specific data links between the invention and the kiosk, or other agent, were discussed above. However, it should be recognized that the type of link is not necessarily important, and that different links, even links which are not yet developed, can be used. 
   8. A significant aspect is that a person utilizing the invention need not enter certain required data at the time of the transaction. That data is stored within the invention, and is delivered by the invention, without entry by the person at the time of transaction. In addition, this type of delivery keeps the data secret, since the data is not exposed to external view, as would be key-presses, but is carried by the data link, in a concealed manner. 
   Numerous substitutions and modifications can be undertaken without departing from the true spirit and scope of the invention. What is desired to be secured by Letters Patent is the invention as defined in the following claims.