Abstract:
Methods and apparatuses for verifying HeNB. A method reduces and/or avoids affecting the operator&#39;s network due to the attack from HeNB, and ensures the safety of the users who have accessed the network.

Description:
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION(S) AND CLAIM OF PRIORITY 
       [0001]    The present application is related to and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. §119(a) to Chinese Patent Application Serial No. 201210375016.1, which was filed in the Chinese Patent Office on Sep. 29, 2012, the entire disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference. 
       TECHNICAL FIELD 
       [0002]    The present disclosure relates to a method and an apparatus for performing a handover in a wireless communication system. 
       BACKGROUND 
       [0003]    In the current mobile communication system, in order to provide better services to a user group, a Closed Subscriber Group (CSG) needs to be formed with multiple Radio Resource Management (RRM) entities (i.e., network entities, such as base stations or cells in various mobile communication systems, in responsible for managing radio resources and access of user devices in a radio access network) for the specific user group. For instance, all users in a company or a school form a CSG, for providing specific access services. As for a specific user group, it is ubiquitous that a CSG is formed with multiple RRM entities in the mobile communication system. In order to more clearly describe the situation, the description is given hereafter taking the Long Term Evolution (LTE) of the System Architecture Evolution (SAE) for example. 
         [0004]      FIG. 1  illustrates a schematic diagram of the structure of a LTE system. As shown in  FIG. 1 , in the radio access network of the LTE system, the RRM entities include eNBs and Home eNBs (HeNBs). The radio access network may optionally include a HeNB GW. An eNB may directly connect with the Mobile Management Entity (MME) in the core network. When the radio access network includes the HeNB Gateway (GW), the HeNB needs to connect with the MME via a HeNB GW. When the network does not include the HeNB GW, the HeNB may directly connect with the MME. 
         [0005]    As for the RRM entities in the LTE system, in order to provide more enriched access services, taking the HeNB for example, the conventional method provides several types including open, hybrid and CSG of the HeNB. The open-HeNB does not have a specific user group accessing the open-HeNB, and any UE may access the open-HeNB. The CSG-HeNB is a HeNB used by a user group formed by all the users in the company or the school mentioned above. The CSG-HeNB only permits the UEs in the specific user group served by the CSG-HeNB (For convenience of description, the UE in the specific user group is called the CSG UE) to access. The hybrid-HeNB not only forms a CSG with other HeNBs and permits the CSG UEs to access for convenience of providing better access services to the CSG UE, but also permits other non-CSG UEs (UEs which do not belong to this CSG) to access. 
         [0006]    It can be seen from the above description that in the conventional mobile communication system, as for the RRM entities, the CSG is not only formed with multiple RRM entities to provide the CSG-RRM entity, such as the CSG-HeNB, and the hybrid-RMM entity, such as the hybrid-HeNB is also provided for providing more enriched access services. Meanwhile, the eNB may also support the CSG function, or is used as a hybrid-eNB while supporting the CSG function. 
         [0007]    When the HeNB registers on the HeNB GW, the HeNB GW does not verify the HeNB, only the Safe Gateway (SeGW) verifies the HeNB. In this way, an attack HeNB may wiretap the information of the accessed UE using the ID of another HeNB. At present, there is no scheme on the network side to prevent this kind of HeNB attack. Therefore, the 3GPP puts forward a required for verifying the ID of the HeNB and the message of the accessed UE by the HeNB GW or the MME. 
         [0008]    Especially, as for the UE accessing the HeNB via the S1 handover procedure, how to verify the message of the UE accessed to the HeNB is not solved. 
       SUMMARY 
       [0009]    To address the above-discussed deficiencies, it is a primary object to provide a method and an apparatus for performing a handover in a wireless communication system, and a method and an apparatus for verifying a HeNB, which may avoid affecting the operator&#39;s network due to the attack from the eNB, and ensure the safety of the users who have accessed the network. 
         [0010]    In order to achieve the above object, the technical scheme of the present disclosure is implemented as follows. 
         [0011]    A method for verifying a Home eNB (HeNB) includes sending, by a Mobile Management Entity (MME), an access mode of a target HeNB received from a source eNB to a HeNB Gateway (GW); and verifying, by the HeNB GW, validity of the access mode of the target HeNB. 
         [0012]    It should be noted that the MME further sends a CSG ID to the HeNB GW, and the HeNB GW verifies the validity of the CSG ID of the target HeNB if a target cell is in a CSG mode. 
         [0013]    It should be noted that the access mode sent from the source eNB to the MME and/or the access mode sent from the MME to the HeNB GW includes an open mode, and the HeNB GW verifies the validity of the access mode of the target HeNB in the open mode. 
         [0014]    It should be noted that the HeNB GW determinates that a target cell is in an open mode according to the access mode in the message received from the MME and absence of a CSG ID, and the HeNB GW verifies the validity of the access mode of the target HeNB in the open mode. 
         [0015]    It should be noted that the HeNB GW determines that a target cell is in a hybrid mode according to a membership status and a CSG ID in the message received from the MME, and the HeNB GW verifies the validity of the access mode of the target HeNB in the hybrid mode. 
         [0016]    The present disclosure provides another method for verifying a HeNB, including: receiving, by a target HeNB, a handover request message; sending, by the target HeNB, the target HeNB&#39;s access mode and CSG ID to an upper layer node of the target HeNB; verifying, by the upper layer node of the target HeNB, validity of the access mode of the target HeNB, and verifying validity of the CSG ID of the target HeNB if the access mode is a CSG mode. 
         [0017]    It should be noted that in a situation that a HeNB GW is deployed, the upper layer node of the target HeNB is the HeNB GW. 
         [0018]    It should be noted that in a situation that a HeNB GW is not deployed, the upper layer node of the target HeNB is an MME. 
         [0019]    The present disclosure provides another method for verifying a HeNB, including: sending, by a source eNB, a handover required message to an MME, wherein the handover required message comprises an access mode of a target HeNB and a CSG ID; verifying, by the MME, validity of the access mode of the target HeNB, and verifying validity of the CSG ID of the target HeNB if the access mode is a CSG mode. 
         [0020]    The present disclosure provides another method for verifying a HeNB, including: sending, by a source eNB, a handover required message to an MME; sending, by the MME, a handover request message to a HeNB GW; sending, by the HeNB GW, the handover request message to a target HeNB; sending, by the target HeNB, a handover request acknowledgement message to the HeNB GW, wherein if the target cell is a CSG cell or a hybrid cell, the target HeNB includes the target HeNB&#39;s CSG ID in the handover request acknowledgement message, and the handover request acknowledgement message includes the access mode of the target cell; verifying, by the HeNB GW, validity of the access mode of the target. HeNB; verifying validity of the CSG ID of the target HeNB if the target cell is a CSG cell; sending, by the HeNB GW, the handover request acknowledgement message to the MME; sending, by the MME, a handover command to the source eNB; sending, by the source eNB, the handover command to a UE. 
         [0021]    The present disclosure provides another method for verifying a HeNB, including: sending, by a source eNB, a handover required message to an MME; sending, by the MME, the handover request message to a target HeNB; sending, by the target HeNB, a handover request acknowledgement message to the MME; wherein if the target cell is a CSG cell or a hybrid cell, the target HeNB includes the target HeNB&#39;s CSG ID in the handover request acknowledgement message, and the handover request acknowledgement message includes the access mode of the target cell; verifying, by the MME, validity of the access mode of the target HeNB in case of no HeNB GW deployment; verifying validity of the CSG ID of the target HeNB if the target cell is a CSG cell; sending, by the MME, a handover command to the source eNB; sending, by the source eNB, the handover command to a UE. 
         [0022]    In can be seen from the above technical scheme that with the method for verifying the HeNB provided by embodiments of the present disclosure, it may be avoided that the operator&#39;s network is affected due to the attack from the HeNB, and ensure the safety of the users who have accessed the network. 
         [0023]    Before undertaking the DETAILED DESCRIPTION below, it may be advantageous to set forth definitions of certain words and phrases used throughout this patent document: the terms “include” and “comprise,” as well as derivatives thereof, mean inclusion without limitation; the term “or,” is inclusive, meaning and/or; the phrases “associated with” and “associated therewith,” as well as derivatives thereof, may mean to include, be included within, interconnect with, contain, be contained within, connect to or with, couple to or with, be communicable with, cooperate with, interleave, juxtapose, be proximate to, be bound to or with, have, have a property of, or the like; and the term “controller” means any device, system or part thereof that controls at least one operation, such a device may be implemented in hardware, firmware or software, or some combination of at least two of the same. It should be noted that the functionality associated with any particular controller may be centralized or distributed, whether locally or remotely. Definitions for certain words and phrases are provided throughout this patent document, those of ordinary skill in the art should understand that in many, if not most instances, such definitions apply to prior, as well as future uses of such defined words and phrases. 
     
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         [0024]    For a more complete understanding of the present disclosure and its advantages, reference is now made to the following description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which like reference numerals represent like parts: 
           [0025]      FIG. 1  illustrates a schematic diagram of the structure of an LTE system; 
           [0026]      FIG. 2  illustrates a process flow diagram for a first embodiment for verifying a HeNB in accordance with the various embodiments of the present disclosure; 
           [0027]      FIG. 3  illustrates a process flow diagram for a second embodiment for verifying a HeNB in accordance with the various embodiments of the present disclosure; 
           [0028]      FIG. 4  illustrates a process flow diagram for third embodiment for verifying a HeNB in accordance with the various embodiments of the present disclosure; 
           [0029]      FIG. 5  illustrates a process flow diagram for a fourth embodiment for verifying a HeNB in accordance with the various embodiments of the present disclosure; 
           [0030]      FIG. 6  illustrates a process flow diagram for a fifth embodiment for verifying a HeNB in accordance with the various embodiments of the present disclosure; and 
           [0031]      FIG. 7  illustrates a process flow diagram for a sixth embodiment for verifying a HeNB in accordance with the various embodiments of the present disclosure. 
       
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
       [0032]      FIGS. 1 through 7 , discussed herein, and the various embodiments used to describe the principles of the present disclosure in this patent document are by way of illustration only and should not be construed in any way to limit the scope of the disclosure. Those skilled in the art will understand that the principles of the present disclosure may be implemented in any suitably arranged system or device. The present disclosure is further described in detail hereinafter with reference to the accompanying drawings to make the objective, technical solution and merits thereof more apparent. 
         [0033]    Embodiment one: a first embodiment of the present disclosure for verifying a HeNB is illustrated in  FIG. 2 . In this embodiment, a HeNB GW is deployed, and the HeNB accesses a core network via the HeNB GW. In this embodiment, the HeNB GW verifies the HeNB according to information of a target HeNB received from a MME. The embodiment is described hereafter in detail. In the interests of brevity, additional blocks that may be present in the process for verifying the HeNB are not described here in detail. 
         [0034]    In block  201 , a UE sends a measurement report to a source eNB. 
         [0035]    The measurement report includes a Physical Cell Identity (PCI) of the measurement cell. 
         [0036]    In block  202 , the source eNB configures a System Information (SI) request of a cell and a report corresponding to the specific PCI executed by the UE. 
         [0037]    In block  203 , a target HeNB broadcasts a cell ID, Tacking Area Identity (TAI) and CSG ID of a cell controlled by the target HeNB. 
         [0038]    In block  204 , the UE sends the measurement report to the source eNB. 
         [0039]    The UE obtains relevant system information of the target HeNB via an automatic gap. 
         [0040]    The measurement report includes an E-UTRAN Cell Global Identifier (ECGI), a Tracking Area Code (TAC), the CSG ID and a member indication of the target HeNB. 
         [0041]    In block  205 , the source eNB sends a handover required message to the MME. 
         [0042]    The handover required message includes the ECGI and CSG ID of the target HeNB cell. Furthermore, if the target cell is in a hybrid access mode, the handover required message further includes information indicating that the access mode of the cell is a hybrid mode. If the target cell is in an open access mode, the handover required message may further include information indicating that the cell access mode is the open mode. In this case, the corresponding CSI ID is not carried. In an alternative, when the target HeNB is in the open mode, the access mode needs not to be carried. The MME determines that the target HeNB is in the open mode according to the access mode, absence of the CSG ID and information indicating that the target eNB ID is a 28 bits, and verifies the access mode of the target HeNB in block  208 . 
         [0043]    In block  206 , the MME performs access control on the UE according to the received CSG ID and saved subscription CSG information of the UE. 
         [0044]    In this block, if the access control fails, the MME sends a handover preparation failure message to the source eNB to terminate the handover process. And, if the handover required message includes information indicating that the access mode is the hybrid mode, the MME determines a membership status of the UE, and sends the membership status to the target HeNB via the handover request message. 
         [0045]    In block  207 , the MME sends the handover request message to the target GW o    
         [0046]    The handover request message includes the CSG ID. If the target cell is in the hybrid access mode, the message further includes a CSG member indication. The handover request message further includes the access mode. The access mode may include the hybrid mode. The access mode may further include the open mode, and the CSG ID is not included in this case. In the alternative, when the target HeNB is in the open mode, the handover request message sent from the MME needs not to carry the access mode and the CSG ID. The HeNB GW determines that the target HeNB is in the open mode according to the access mode and the absence of the CSG ID, and verifies the access mode of the target HeNB in the open mode in block  208 . The message may further not carry an information element access mode, the HeNB GW determines that the target HeNB cell is in the CSG mode according to the CSG ID and the absence of membership status, determines that the target HeNB cell is in the hybrid mode according to the CSG ID and the membership status, determines that the target HeNB cell is in the open mode according to the absence of the CSG ID and the membership status, and verifies the validity of the access mode of the target HeNB in block  208 . 
         [0047]    In block  208 , the HeNB GW verifies that the access mode of the target HeNB is valid. If the target cell is the CSG cell, the HeNB GW verifies that the CSG ID of target HeNB cell is valid. 
         [0048]    In block  209 , the HeNB GW sends the handover request message to the target HeNB. 
         [0049]    In block  210 , the target HeNB sends a handover request acknowledgement message to the HeNB GW. 
         [0050]    In block  211 , the HeNB GW sends the handover request acknowledgement message to the MME. 
         [0051]    In block  212 , the MME sends a handover command message to the source eNB. 
         [0052]    In block  213 , the source eNB sends a handover command message to the UE. 
         [0053]    Till then, the description of the whole work flow of the first embodiment of the present disclosure is finished. 
         [0054]    Embodiment two: a second embodiment of the present disclosure for verifying a HeNB is illustrated in  FIG. 3 . In this embodiment, a HeNB GW is not deployed. In this embodiment, an MME verifies the HeNB according to information received from a source eNB. The embodiment is described hereafter in detail. In the interests of brevity, additional blocks that may be present in the process for verifying the HeNB are not described here in detail. 
         [0055]    In block  301 , a UE sends a measurement report to a source eNB. 
         [0056]    The measurement report includes a Physical Cell Identity (PCI) of the measurement cell. 
         [0057]    In block  302 , the source eNB configures a System Information (SI) request of a cell and a report corresponding to the specific PCI executed by the UE. 
         [0058]    In block  303 , a target HeNB broadcasts a cell ID, Tacking Area Identity (TAI) and CSG ID of a cell controlled by the target HeNB. 
         [0059]    In block  304 , the UE sends the measurement report to the source eNB. 
         [0060]    The UE obtains relevant system information of the target HeNB via an automatic gap. 
         [0061]    The measurement report includes an E-UTRAN Cell Global Identifier (ECGI), a Tracking Area Code (TAC), the CSG ID and a member indication of the target HeNB. 
         [0062]    In block  305 , the source eNB sends a handover required message to the MME. 
         [0063]    The handover required message includes the ECGI and CSG ID of the target HeNB cell. Furthermore, if the target cell is in a hybrid access mode, the handover required message further includes information indicating that the access mode of the cell is a hybrid mode. If the target cell is in an open access mode, the handover required message may further include information indicating that the cell access mode is the open mode. In this case, the corresponding CSI ID is not carried. In an alternative, when the target HeNB is in the open mode, the message needs not to include the access mode and the CSG ID. The MME determines that the target HeNB is in the open mode according to the access mode, absence of the CSG ID and information indicating that the ID of the target eNB is a 28 bits HeNB ID, and verifies the access mode of the target HeNB in the open mode in block  307 . 
         [0064]    In block  306 , the MME performs access control on the UE according to the received CSG ID and saved subscription CSG information of the UE. 
         [0065]    In this block, if the access control fails, the MME sends a handover preparation failure message to the source eNB to terminate the handover process. And, if the handover required message includes information indicating that the access mode is the hybrid mode, the MME determines a membership status of the UE, and sends the membership status to the target HeNB via the handover request message. 
         [0066]    In block  307 , the MME verifies that the access mode of the target HeNB is valid. If the target cell is the CSG cell, the MME verifies that the CSG ID of the target HeNB cell is valid. 
         [0067]    There is no absolute sequence between block  306  and block  307 . 
         [0068]    In block  308 , the MME sends a handover request message to the target HeNB. 
         [0069]    The handover request message includes the CSG ID. If the target cell is in the hybrid access mode, the message may further includes a CSG member indication. 
         [0070]    In block  309 , the target HeNB sends a handover request acknowledgement message to the MME. 
         [0071]    In block  310 , the MME sends a handover command message to the source eNB. 
         [0072]    In block  311 , the source eNB sends the handover command message to the UE. 
         [0073]    Till then, the description of the whole work flow of the second embodiment of the present disclosure is finished. 
         [0074]    Embodiment three: a third embodiment of the present disclosure for verifying a HeNB is illustrated in  FIG. 4 . In this embodiment, a HeNB GW is deployed, and the HeNB accesses a core network via the HeNB GW. In this embodiment, the HeNB GW verifies the HeNB according to information received from a target HeNB. The embodiment is described hereafter in detail. In the interests of brevity, additional blocks that may be present in the process for verifying the HeNB are not described here in detail. 
         [0075]    Blocks  401  to  404  are the same as blocks  201  to  204 , which are not repeated here. 
         [0076]    In block  405 , the source eNB sends a handover required message to the MME. 
         [0077]    The handover required message includes the ECGI and CSG ID of the target HeNB cell. Furthermore, if the target cell is in a hybrid access mode, the handover required message further includes information indicating that the access mode of the cell is a hybrid mode. 
         [0078]    In block  406 , the MME performs access control on the UE according to the received CSG ID and saved subscription CSG information of the UE. 
         [0079]    In this block, if the access control fails, the MME sends a handover preparation failure message to the source eNB to terminate the handover process. And, if the handover required message includes information indicating that the access mode is the hybrid mode, the MME determines a membership status of the UE, and sends the membership status to the target HeNB via the handover request message. 
         [0080]    In block  407 , the MME sends the handover request message to the target GW o    
         [0081]    The handover request message includes the CSG ID. If the target cell is in the hybrid access mode, the message further includes a CSG member indication. 
         [0082]    In block  408 , the HeNB GW sends the handover request message to the HeNB. 
         [0083]    In block  409 , the target HeNB sends a handover request acknowledgement message to the HeNB GW. The handover request acknowledgement message includes the access mode of the target HeNB cell. If the target HeNB cell is the type of the CSG or the type of the hybrid, the message further includes the CSG ID. The access mode includes the hybrid access mode. The access mode may further include the open mode. If the access mode is the open mode, the corresponding CSG ID is not included. In an alternative, when the target HeNB is in the open mode, the target HeNB needs not to include the access mode and the CSG ID. The HeNB GW determines that the target HeNB is in the open mode according to the absence of the access mode and the CSG ID, and verifies the access mode of the target HeNB in the open mode in block  410 . 
         [0084]    In block  410 , the HeNB GW verifies that the access mode of the target HeNB is valid. If the target cell is the CSG cell, the HeNB GW verifies that the CSG ID of the target HeNB cell is valid. 
         [0085]    Blocks  411  to blocks  413  may be performed similarly to the description of blocks  211  to  213  and a description thereof is not repeated here in the interests of brevity. 
         [0086]    Till then, the description of the whole work flow of the third embodiment of the present disclosure is finished. 
         [0087]    Embodiment four: a fourth embodiment of the present disclosure for verifying a HeNB is illustrated in  FIG. 5 . In this embodiment, a HeNB GW is not deployed. In this embodiment, an MME verifies the HeNB according to information received from a target HeNB. The embodiment is described hereafter in detail. In the interests of brevity, additional blocks that may be present in the process for verifying the HeNB are not described here in detail. 
         [0088]    Blocks  501  to  504  may be performed similarly to the description of blocks  301  to  304 , and a description thereof is not repeated here in the interests of brevity. 
         [0089]    In block  505 , the source eNB sends a handover required message to the MME. 
         [0090]    The handover required message includes the ECGI and CSG ID of the target HeNB cell. Furthermore, if the target cell is in a hybrid access mode, the handover required message further includes information indicating that the access mode of the cell is a hybrid mode. 
         [0091]    In block  506 , the MME performs access control on the UE according to the received CSG ID and saved subscription CSG information of the UE. 
         [0092]    In this block, if the access control fails, the MME sends a handover preparation failure message to the source eNB to terminate the handover process. And, if the handover required message includes information indicating that the access mode is the hybrid mode, the MME determines a membership status of the UE, and sends the membership status to the target HeNB via a handover request message. 
         [0093]    In block  507 , the MME sends the handover request message to the target HeNB. 
         [0094]    The handover request message includes the CSG ID. If the target cell is in the hybrid access mode, the message further includes the CSG member indication. 
         [0095]    In block  508 , the target HeNB sends a handover request acknowledgement message to the MME. The handover request acknowledgement message includes the access mode of the target HeNB cell. If the target HeNB cell is the type of the CSG or the type of the hybrid, the message further includes the CSG ID. The access mode includes the hybrid access mode. The access mode may further include the open mode. If the access mode is the open mode, the corresponding CSG ID is not included. In an alternative, when the target HeNB is in the open mode, the target HeNB needs not to include the access mode and the CSG ID. The MME determines that the target HeNB is in the open mode according to the absence of the access mode and the CSG ID, and the information that the ID of the target eNB is a 28 bits HeNB ID, and verifies the access mode of the target HeNB in the open mode in block  509 . 
         [0096]    In block  509 , the MME verifies that the access mode of the target HeNB is valid. If the target cell is the CSG cell, the MME verifies that the CSG ID of the target HeNB cell is valid. 
         [0097]    Blocks  510  and  511  are the same as the blocks  310  and  311 , which are not repeated here. 
         [0098]    Till then, the description of the whole work flow of the fourth embodiment of the present disclosure is finished. 
         [0099]    Embodiment five: a fifth embodiment of the present disclosure for verifying a HeNB is illustrated in  FIG. 6 . In this embodiment, in the process that the UE initially accesses the HeNB, the HeNB GW or the MME verifies the HeNB according to information received from the HeNB. The embodiment is described hereafter in detail. In the interests of brevity, additional blocks that may be present in the process for verifying the HeNB are not described here in detail. 
         [0100]    In block  601 , the UE sends an NAS message, such as an Attach message or a TA update request message, to the HeNB. In this block, the UE may send the UL NAS message to the HeNB via UL information transmission or RRC connection establishment. 
         [0101]    In block  602 , the HeNB sends an initial UE message to the HeNB GW or the MME. The message includes the NAS message received from the UE. In a situation that the HeNB GW is deployed, the message is sent to the HeNB GW first, and sent to the MME via the HeNB GW. In a situation that the HeNB GW is not deployed, the message is directly sent to the MME. 
         [0102]    The initial UE message includes the CSG ID of the HeNB cell. Furthermore, if the HeNB cell is in a hybrid access mode, the initial UE message further includes information indicating that the access mode of the cell is a hybrid mode. If the target cell is in an open access mode, the initial UE message may further include information indicating that the cell access mode is the open mode. In this case, the corresponding CSG ID is not included. In an alternative, when the HeNB is in the open mode, HeNB needs not to include the access mode and the CSG ID. The HeNB GW determines that the target HeNB is in the open mode according to the access mode and absence of the CSG ID. In the situation that the HeNB GW is not deployed, the MME determines that the HeNB is in the open mode according to the access mode, absence of the CSG ID and information indicating that the ID of the eNB is a 28 bits HeNB ID, and verifies the access mode of the target HeNB in the open mode in block  603 . 
         [0103]    In block  603 , the HeNB GW or the MME verifies that the access mode of the target HeNB is valid. If the target cell is the CSG cell, the HeNB GW or the MME verifies that the CSG ID of the target HeNB cell is valid. 
         [0104]    In the situation that the HeNB GW is deployed, the above verification is performed by the HeNB GW. In the situation that the HeNB GW is not deployed, the above verification is performed by the MME. 
         [0105]    In the situation that the HeNB GW is deployed, the HeNB GW sends the initial UE message to the MME. 
         [0106]    In block  604 , other processes may be the same as those in the conventional method, which are not repeated here. 
         [0107]    Till then, the description of the whole work flow of the fifth embodiment of the present disclosure is finished. 
         [0108]    Embodiment six: a sixth embodiment of the present disclosure for verifying a HeNB is illustrated in  FIG. 7 . In this embodiment, in the process that a UE accesses the HeNB via X2 handover, a HeNB GW or an MME verifies the HeNB according to information received from the HeNB. The embodiment is described hereafter in detail. In the interests of brevity, additional blocks that may be present in the process for verifying the HeNB are not described here in detail. 
         [0109]    In block  701 , an eNB sends a handover request message to the HeNB. 
         [0110]    In block  702 , the HeNB sends a handover request acknowledgement message to the eNB. 
         [0111]    In block  703 , the eNB sends an RRC connection reconfiguration message to the UE. 
         [0112]    In block  704 , the UE sends an RRC connection reconfiguration completion message to the HeNB. 
         [0113]    In block  705 , the HeNB sends a path hand over request message to the HeNB GW or MME. In a situation that the HeNB GW is deployed, the message is sent to the HeNB GW, and sent to the MME via the HeNB GW. In a situation that the HeNB GW is not deployed, the message is directly sent to the MME. 
         [0114]    The path handover request message includes the CSG ID of the HeNB cell. Furthermore, if the HeNB cell is in a hybrid access mode, path handover request message further includes information indicating that the access mode of the cell is a hybrid mode. If the target cell is in an open access mode, the path handover request message may further include information indicating that the cell access mode is the open mode. In this case, the corresponding CSI ID is not included. In an alternative, when the HeNB is in the open mode, HeNB needs not to include the access mode and the CSG ID. The HeNB GW determines that the target HeNB is in the open mode according to the access mode and absence of the CSG ID. In the situation that the HeNB GW is not deployed, the MME determines that the target HeNB is in the open mode according to the access mode, absence of the CSG ID and information indicating that the ID of the eNB is a 28 bits HeNB ID, and verifies the access mode of the target HeNB in the open mode in block  706 . 
         [0115]    In block  706 , the HeNB GW or the MME verifies that the access mode of the target HeNB is valid. If the target cell is the CSG cell, the HeNB GW or the MME verifies that the CSG ID of the target HeNB cell is valid. 
         [0116]    In the situation that the HeNB GW is deployed, the above verification is performed by the HeNB GW. In the situation that the HeNB GW is not deployed, the above verification is performed by the MME. 
         [0117]    In the situation that the HeNB GW is deployed, the HeNB GW sends the path handover request to the MME. 
         [0118]    In block  707 , the HeNB receives a path handover request acknowledgement message. In the situation that the HeNB GW is not deployed, the message is sent from the MME to the HeNB. In the situation that the HeNB GW is deployed, the message is sent to the HeNB from the MME via the HeNB GW. 
         [0119]    In block  708 , the HeNB sends a message for releasing UE contexts to the eNB. 
         [0120]    Till then, the description of the whole work flow of the sixth embodiment of the present disclosure is finished. 
         [0121]    Embodiment seven. The seventh embodiment of the present disclosure for verifying a HeNB includes: In the process that the UE accesses the HeNB via the S1 handover, in the situation that the HeNB GW is deployed, the HeNB GW verifies the HeNB twice. For example, the first verification maybe the same as that in the first embodiment, i.e.  FIG. 2 . The HeNB GW verifies the HeNB according to the information received from the MME, to terminate the access and the attack made by the UE to the eNB as soon as possible via this verification. In order to avoid that the UE provides error information to the source eNB, the second verification is the same as that in the third embodiment, i.e.,  FIG. 4 . The HeNB GW verifies the HeNB according to the information sent from the target HeNB to ensure that the information received from the UE in the first verification is correct. Through the verification mentioned above, the incomplete verification is avoided on the basis of ensuring that the verification is performed as soon as possible. 
         [0122]    Similarly, in the situation that the HeNB GW is not deployed, in the process that the UE accesses the HeNB via the S1 handover, the MME verifies the HeNB twice. The first verification is the same as that in the second embodiment, i.e.  FIG. 3 . The MME verifies the HeNB according to the information received from the source eNB, to terminate the access and attack made by the UE to the eNB as soon as possible via this verification. In order to avoid that the UE provides error information to the source eNB, the second verification is the same as that in the fourth embodiment, i.e.,  FIG. 5 . The MME verifies the HeNB according to the information sent from the target HeNB to ensure that the information received from the UE in the first verification is correct. Through the verification mentioned above, the incomplete verification is avoided on the basis of ensuring that the verification is performed as soon as possible. 
         [0123]    Till then, the description of the whole work flow of the seventh embodiment of the present disclosure is finished. 
         [0124]    In view of the above, the method for verifying the HeNB provided by the embodiments of the present disclosure may avoid affecting the operator&#39;s network due to the attack from the HeNB, and ensure the safety of the users who have accessed the operator&#39;s network. 
         [0125]    Although the present disclosure has been described with an exemplary embodiment, various changes and modifications may be suggested to one skilled in the art. It is intended that the present disclosure encompass such changes and modifications as fall within the scope of the appended claims.