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External Control of System or Configuration Setting

Base

Incomplete

One or more system settings or configuration elements can be externally controlled by a user.

Allowing external control of system settings can disrupt service or cause an application to behave in unexpected, and potentially malicious ways.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:642:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:610:VIEW ID:1000::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:20:VIEW ID:700:ORDINAL:Primary::

::TECHNOLOGY CLASS:Not Technology-Specific:TECHNOLOGY PREVALENCE:Undetermined::TECHNOLOGY CLASS:ICS/OT:TECHNOLOGY PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:Setting manipulation vulnerabilities occur when an attacker can control values that govern the behavior of the system, manage specific resources, or in some way affect the functionality of the application.::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Other:IMPACT:Varies by Context::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect sources (origins of input) with sinks (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Separation of Privilege:DESCRIPTION:Compartmentalize the system to have safe areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.::PHASE:Implementation Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:Because setting manipulation covers a diverse set of functions, any attempt at illustrating it will inevitably be incomplete. Rather than searching for a tight-knit relationship between the functions addressed in the setting manipulation category, take a step back and consider the sorts of system values that an attacker should not be allowed to control.::PHASE:Implementation Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:In general, do not allow user-provided or otherwise untrusted data to control sensitive values. The leverage that an attacker gains by controlling these values is not always immediately obvious, but do not underestimate the creativity of the attacker.::

::TAXONOMY NAME:7 Pernicious Kingdoms:ENTRY NAME:Setting Manipulation::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP25:ENTRY NAME:Tainted input to variable::

::13::146::176::203::270::271::579::69::76::77::

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Base

Stable

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as .. and / separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the ../ sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as /usr/local/bin, which may also be useful in accessing unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal. In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to widen the scope of attack. For example, the product may add .txt to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:706:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:706:VIEW ID:1003:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:668:VIEW ID:1000::

::ORDINALITY:Primary::ORDINALITY:Resultant::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::TERM:Directory traversal::TERM:Path traversal:DESCRIPTION:Path traversal is preferred over directory traversal, but both terms are attack-focused.::

::PHASE:Implementation::

::SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Availability:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:NOTE:The attacker may be able to create or overwrite critical files that are used to execute code, such as programs or libraries.::SCOPE:Integrity:IMPACT:Modify Files or Directories:NOTE:The attacker may be able to overwrite or create critical files, such as programs, libraries, or important data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, appending a new account at the end of a password file may allow an attacker to bypass authentication.::SCOPE:Confidentiality:IMPACT:Read Files or Directories:NOTE:The attacker may be able read the contents of unexpected files and expose sensitive data. If the targeted file is used for a security mechanism, then the attacker may be able to bypass that mechanism. For example, by reading a password file, the attacker could conduct brute force password guessing attacks in order to break into an account on the system.::SCOPE:Availability:IMPACT:DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart:NOTE:The attacker may be able to overwrite, delete, or corrupt unexpected critical files such as programs, libraries, or important data. This may prevent the product from working at all and in the case of a protection mechanisms such as authentication, it has the potential to lockout every user of the product.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis Cost effective for partial coverage: Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Web Application Scanner Web Services Scanner Database Scanners:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Fuzz Tester Framework-based Fuzzer:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Manual Source Code Review (not inspections) Cost effective for partial coverage: Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Source code Weakness Analyzer Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Architecture or Design Review:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction Cost effective for partial coverage: Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single . character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as / to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering / is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if ../ sequences are removed from the .../...// string in a sequential fashion, two instances of ../ would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the ../ string.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes .. sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Libraries or Frameworks:DESCRIPTION:Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.::PHASE:Operation:STRATEGY:Firewall:DESCRIPTION:Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth.:EFFECTIVENESS:Moderate::PHASE:Architecture and Design Operation:STRATEGY:Environment Hardening:DESCRIPTION:Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Enforcement by Conversion:DESCRIPTION:When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to inbox.txt and ID 2 could map to profile.txt. Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.::PHASE:Architecture and Design Operation:STRATEGY:Sandbox or Jail:DESCRIPTION:Run the code in a jail or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.:EFFECTIVENESS:Limited::PHASE:Architecture and Design Operation:STRATEGY:Attack Surface Reduction:DESCRIPTION:Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.::PHASE:Operation Implementation:STRATEGY:Environment Hardening:DESCRIPTION:When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2022-45918:DESCRIPTION:Chain: a learning management tool debugger uses external input to locate previous session logs (CWE-73) and does not properly validate the given path (CWE-20), allowing for filesystem path traversal using ../ sequences (CWE-24):LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-45918::REFERENCE:CVE-2019-20916:DESCRIPTION:Python package manager does not correctly restrict the filename specified in a Content-Disposition header, allowing arbitrary file read using path traversal sequences such as ../:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2019-20916::REFERENCE:CVE-2022-31503:DESCRIPTION:Python package constructs filenames using an unsafe os.path.join call on untrusted input, allowing absolute path traversal because os.path.join resets the pathname to an absolute path that is specified as part of the input.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-31503::REFERENCE:CVE-2022-24877:DESCRIPTION:directory traversal in Go-based Kubernetes operator app allows accessing data from the controller's pod file system via ../ sequences in a yaml file:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-24877::REFERENCE:CVE-2021-21972:DESCRIPTION:Chain: Cloud computing virtualization platform does not require authentication for upload of a tar format file (CWE-306), then uses .. path traversal sequences (CWE-23) in the file to access unexpected files, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-21972::REFERENCE:CVE-2020-4053:DESCRIPTION:a Kubernetes package manager written in Go allows malicious plugins to inject path traversal sequences into a plugin archive (Zip slip) to copy a file outside the intended directory:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-4053::REFERENCE:CVE-2020-3452:DESCRIPTION:Chain: security product has improper input validation (CWE-20) leading to directory traversal (CWE-22), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-3452::REFERENCE:CVE-2019-10743:DESCRIPTION:Go-based archive library allows extraction of files to locations outside of the target folder with ../ path traversal sequences in filenames in a zip file, aka Zip Slip:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2019-10743::REFERENCE:CVE-2010-0467:DESCRIPTION:Newsletter module allows reading arbitrary files using ../ sequences.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-0467::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-7079:DESCRIPTION:Chain: PHP app uses extract for register_globals compatibility layer (CWE-621), enabling path traversal (CWE-22):LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-7079::REFERENCE:CVE-2009-4194:DESCRIPTION:FTP server allows deletion of arbitrary files using .. in the DELE command.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-4194::REFERENCE:CVE-2009-4053:DESCRIPTION:FTP server allows creation of arbitrary directories using .. in the MKD command.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-4053::REFERENCE:CVE-2009-0244:DESCRIPTION:FTP service for a Bluetooth device allows listing of directories, and creation or reading of files using .. sequences.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-0244::REFERENCE:CVE-2009-4013:DESCRIPTION:Software package maintenance program allows overwriting arbitrary files using ../ sequences.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-4013::REFERENCE:CVE-2009-4449:DESCRIPTION:Bulletin board allows attackers to determine the existence of files using the avatar.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-4449::REFERENCE:CVE-2009-4581:DESCRIPTION:PHP program allows arbitrary code execution using .. in filenames that are fed to the include() function.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-4581::REFERENCE:CVE-2010-0012:DESCRIPTION:Overwrite of files using a .. in a Torrent file.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-0012::REFERENCE:CVE-2010-0013:DESCRIPTION:Chat program allows overwriting files using a custom smiley request.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-0013::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5748:DESCRIPTION:Chain: external control of values for user's desired language and theme enables path traversal.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5748::REFERENCE:CVE-2009-1936:DESCRIPTION:Chain: library file sends a redirect if it is directly requested but continues to execute, allowing remote file inclusion and path traversal.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-1936::

::File Processing::

::File or Directory::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:Path Traversal::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2007:ENTRY ID:A4:ENTRY NAME:Insecure Direct Object Reference:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2004:ENTRY ID:A2:ENTRY NAME:Broken Access Control:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:FIO02-C:ENTRY NAME:Canonicalize path names originating from untrusted sources::TAXONOMY NAME:SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard:ENTRY ID:IDS00-PL:ENTRY NAME:Canonicalize path names before validating them:MAPPING FIT:Exact::TAXONOMY NAME:WASC:ENTRY ID:33:ENTRY NAME:Path Traversal::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP16:ENTRY NAME:Path Traversal::TAXONOMY NAME:OMG ASCSM:ENTRY ID:ASCSM-CWE-22::

::126::64::76::78::79::

::TYPE:Relationship:NOTE:Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.::TYPE:Relationship:NOTE:Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing / on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).::TYPE:Terminology:NOTE:Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use directory traversal only to refer to the injection of .. and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories. Other variants like absolute pathname and drive letter have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve .. or equivalent.::TYPE:Research Gap:NOTE:Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.::TYPE:Research Gap:NOTE:Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that .. is vulnerable, but not test ../ which may also be vulnerable. Any combination of directory separators (/, , etc.) and numbers of . (e.g. ....) can produce unique variants; for example, the //../ variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.::

Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence

Base

Incomplete

The product is vulnerable to file system contents disclosure through path equivalence. Path equivalence involves the use of special characters in file and directory names. The associated manipulations are intended to generate multiple names for the same object.

Path equivalence is usually employed in order to circumvent access controls expressed using an incomplete set of file name or file path representations. This is different from path traversal, wherein the manipulations are performed to generate a name for a different object.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:706:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Implementation::

::SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Access Control:IMPACT:Read Files or Directories:IMPACT:Modify Files or Directories:IMPACT:Bypass Protection Mechanism:NOTE:An attacker may be able to traverse the file system to unintended locations and read or overwrite the contents of unexpected files. If the files are used for a security mechanism than an attacker may be able to bypass the mechanism.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Web Application Scanner Web Services Scanner Database Scanners:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Fuzz Tester Framework-based Fuzzer:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source Manual Source Code Review (not inspections):EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Source code Weakness Analyzer Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Architecture or Design Review:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction Cost effective for partial coverage: Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Output Encoding:DESCRIPTION:Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2000-1114:DESCRIPTION:Source code disclosure using trailing dot:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2000-1114::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1986:DESCRIPTION:Source code disclosure using trailing dot:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1986::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-2213:DESCRIPTION:Source code disclosure using trailing dot or trailing encoding space %20:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-2213::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-3293:DESCRIPTION:Source code disclosure using trailing dot:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-3293::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0061:DESCRIPTION:Bypass directory access restrictions using trailing dot in URL:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0061::REFERENCE:CVE-2000-1133:DESCRIPTION:Bypass directory access restrictions using trailing dot in URL:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2000-1133::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1386:DESCRIPTION:Bypass check for .lnk extension using .lnk.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1386::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0693:DESCRIPTION:Source disclosure via trailing encoded space %20:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0693::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0778:DESCRIPTION:Source disclosure via trailing encoded space %20:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0778::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1248:DESCRIPTION:Source disclosure via trailing encoded space %20:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1248::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0280:DESCRIPTION:Source disclosure via trailing encoded space %20:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0280::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-0622:DESCRIPTION:Source disclosure via trailing encoded space %20:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-0622::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1656:DESCRIPTION:Source disclosure via trailing encoded space %20:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1656::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1603:DESCRIPTION:Source disclosure via trailing encoded space %20:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1603::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0054:DESCRIPTION:Multi-Factor Vulnerability (MFV). directory traversal and other issues in FTP server using Web encodings such as %20; certain manipulations have unusual side effects.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0054::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1451:DESCRIPTION:Trailing space (+ in query string) leads to source code disclosure.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1451::REFERENCE:CVE-2000-0293:DESCRIPTION:Filenames with spaces allow arbitrary file deletion when the product does not properly quote them; some overlap with path traversal.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2000-0293::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1567:DESCRIPTION:+ characters in query string converted to spaces before sensitive file/extension (internal space), leading to bypass of access restrictions to the file.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1567::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0253:DESCRIPTION:Overlaps infoleak:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0253::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0446:DESCRIPTION:Application server allows remote attackers to read source code for .jsp files by appending a / to the requested URL.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0446::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0334:DESCRIPTION:Bypass Basic Authentication for files using trailing /:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0334::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0893:DESCRIPTION:Read sensitive files with trailing /:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0893::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0892:DESCRIPTION:Web server allows remote attackers to view sensitive files under the document root (such as .htpasswd) via a GET request with a trailing /.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0892::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-1814:DESCRIPTION:Directory traversal vulnerability in server allows remote attackers to read protected files via .. (dot dot) sequences in an HTTP request.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1814::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1483:DESCRIPTION:Read files with full pathname using multiple internal slash.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1483::REFERENCE:CVE-1999-1456:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a GET request with more than one leading / (slash) character in the filename.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-1456::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0578:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via leading slash (//) characters in a URL request.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0578::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0275:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and read restricted files via an extra / (slash) in the requested URL.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0275::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-1032:DESCRIPTION:Product allows local users to delete arbitrary files or create arbitrary empty files via a target filename with a large number of leading slash (/) characters.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1032::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1238:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to bypass access restrictions for files via an HTTP request with a sequence of multiple / (slash) characters such as http://www.example.com///file/.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1238::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-1878:DESCRIPTION:Product allows remote attackers to bypass authentication, obtain sensitive information, or gain access via a direct request to admin/user.pl preceded by // (double leading slash).:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1878::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1365:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a URL with multiple leading / (slash) characters and .. sequences.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1365::REFERENCE:CVE-2000-1050:DESCRIPTION:Access directory using multiple leading slash.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2000-1050::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1072:DESCRIPTION:Bypass access restrictions via multiple leading slash, which causes a regular expression to fail.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1072::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0235:DESCRIPTION:Archive extracts to arbitrary files using multiple leading slash in filenames in the archive.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0235::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1078:DESCRIPTION:Directory listings in web server using multiple trailing slash:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1078::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0847:DESCRIPTION:ASP.NET allows remote attackers to bypass authentication for .aspx files in restricted directories via a request containing a (1) (backslash) or (2) %5C (encoded backslash), aka Path Validation Vulnerability.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0847::REFERENCE:CVE-2000-0004:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to read source code for executable files by inserting a . (dot) into the URL.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2000-0004::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0304:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to read password-protected files via a /./ in the HTTP request.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0304::REFERENCE:CVE-1999-1083:DESCRIPTION:Possibly (could be a cleansing error):LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-1083::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0815:DESCRIPTION:/./////etc cleansed to .///etc then /etc:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0815::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0112:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to view password protected files via /./ in the URL.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0112::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0696:DESCRIPTION:List directories using desired path and *:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0696::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0433:DESCRIPTION:List files in web server using *.ext:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0433::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1152:DESCRIPTION:Proxy allows remote attackers to bypass denylist restrictions and connect to unauthorized web servers by modifying the requested URL, including (1) a // (double slash), (2) a /SUBDIR/.. where the desired file is in the parentdir, (3) a /./, or (4) URL-encoded characters.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1152::REFERENCE:CVE-2000-0191:DESCRIPTION:application check access for restricted URL before canonicalization:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2000-0191::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1366:DESCRIPTION:CGI source disclosure using dirname/../cgi-bin:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1366::REFERENCE:CVE-1999-0012:DESCRIPTION:Multiple web servers allow restriction bypass using 8.3 names instead of long names:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-0012::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0795:DESCRIPTION:Source code disclosure using 8.3 file name.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0795::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-0471:DESCRIPTION:Multi-Factor Vulnerability. Product generates temporary filenames using long filenames, which become predictable in 8.3 format.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-0471::

::File or Directory::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:Path Equivalence::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:FIO02-C:ENTRY NAME:Canonicalize path names originating from untrusted sources::

::3::

::TYPE:Relationship:NOTE:Some of these manipulations could be effective in path traversal issues, too.::

Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

Base

Draft

The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:706:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:706:VIEW ID:1003:ORDINAL:Primary::

::ORDINALITY:Resultant::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::OPERATING SYSTEM CLASS:Windows:OPERATING SYSTEM PREVALENCE:Sometimes::OPERATING SYSTEM CLASS:Unix:OPERATING SYSTEM PREVALENCE:Often::

::Soft links are a UNIX term that is synonymous with simple shortcuts on Windows-based platforms.::

::TERM:insecure temporary file:DESCRIPTION:Some people use the phrase insecure temporary file when referring to a link following weakness, but other weaknesses can produce insecure temporary files without any symlink involvement at all.::TERM:Zip Slip:DESCRIPTION:Zip slip is an attack that uses file archives (e.g., ZIP, tar, rar, etc.) that contain filenames with path traversal sequences that cause the files to be written outside of the directory under which the archive is expected to be extracted [REF-1282]. It is most commonly used for relative path traversal (CWE-23) and link following (CWE-59).::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Access Control:IMPACT:Read Files or Directories:IMPACT:Modify Files or Directories:IMPACT:Bypass Protection Mechanism:NOTE:An attacker may be able to traverse the file system to unintended locations and read or overwrite the contents of unexpected files. If the files are used for a security mechanism then an attacker may be able to bypass the mechanism.::SCOPE:Other:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:NOTE:Windows simple shortcuts, sometimes referred to as soft links, can be exploited remotely since a .LNK file can be uploaded like a normal file. This can enable remote execution.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Web Application Scanner Web Services Scanner Database Scanners:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Fuzz Tester Framework-based Fuzzer:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source Manual Source Code Review (not inspections):EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Source code Weakness Analyzer Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Architecture or Design Review:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction Cost effective for partial coverage: Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Separation of Privilege:DESCRIPTION:Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system. Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas that can be trusted.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-1999-1386:DESCRIPTION:Some versions of Perl follow symbolic links when running with the -e option, which allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-1386::REFERENCE:CVE-2000-1178:DESCRIPTION:Text editor follows symbolic links when creating a rescue copy during an abnormal exit, which allows local users to overwrite the files of other users.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2000-1178::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0217:DESCRIPTION:Antivirus update allows local users to create or append to arbitrary files via a symlink attack on a logfile.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0217::REFERENCE:CVE-2003-0517:DESCRIPTION:Symlink attack allows local users to overwrite files.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-0517::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0689:DESCRIPTION:Window manager does not properly handle when certain symbolic links point to stale locations, which could allow local users to create or truncate arbitrary files.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0689::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1879:DESCRIPTION:Second-order symlink vulnerabilities:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1879::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1880:DESCRIPTION:Second-order symlink vulnerabilities:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1880::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1916:DESCRIPTION:Symlink in Python program:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1916::REFERENCE:CVE-2000-0972:DESCRIPTION:Setuid product allows file reading by replacing a file being edited with a symlink to the targeted file, leaking the result in error messages when parsing fails.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2000-0972::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-0824:DESCRIPTION:Signal causes a dump that follows symlinks.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-0824::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1494:DESCRIPTION:Hard link attack, file overwrite; interesting because program checks against soft links:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1494::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0793:DESCRIPTION:Hard link and possibly symbolic link following vulnerabilities in embedded operating system allow local users to overwrite arbitrary files.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0793::REFERENCE:CVE-2003-0578:DESCRIPTION:Server creates hard links and unlinks files as root, which allows local users to gain privileges by deleting and overwriting arbitrary files.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-0578::REFERENCE:CVE-1999-0783:DESCRIPTION:Operating system allows local users to conduct a denial of service by creating a hard link from a device special file to a file on an NFS file system.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-0783::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-1603:DESCRIPTION:Web hosting manager follows hard links, which allows local users to read or modify arbitrary files.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1603::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-1901:DESCRIPTION:Package listing system allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a hard link attack on the lockfiles.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1901::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1111:DESCRIPTION:Hard link race condition:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1111::REFERENCE:CVE-2000-0342:DESCRIPTION:Mail client allows remote attackers to bypass the user warning for executable attachments such as .exe, .com, and .bat by using a .lnk file that refers to the attachment, aka Stealth Attachment.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2000-0342::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1042:DESCRIPTION:FTP server allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and directories by uploading a .lnk (link) file that points to the target file.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1042::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1043:DESCRIPTION:FTP server allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and directories by uploading a .lnk (link) file that points to the target file.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1043::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-0587:DESCRIPTION:Browser allows remote malicious web sites to overwrite arbitrary files by tricking the user into downloading a .LNK (link) file twice, which overwrites the file that was referenced in the first .LNK file.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-0587::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1386:DESCRIPTION:.LNK. - .LNK with trailing dot:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1386::REFERENCE:CVE-2003-1233:DESCRIPTION:Rootkits can bypass file access restrictions to Windows kernel directories using NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject function to create symbolic link:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-1233::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0725:DESCRIPTION:File system allows local attackers to hide file usage activities via a hard link to the target file, which causes the link to be recorded in the audit trail instead of the target file.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0725::REFERENCE:CVE-2003-0844:DESCRIPTION:Web server plugin allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on predictable temporary filenames.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-0844::REFERENCE:CVE-2015-3629:DESCRIPTION:A Libcontainer used in Docker Engine allows local users to escape containerization and write to an arbitrary file on the host system via a symlink attack in an image when respawning a container.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2015-3629::REFERENCE:CVE-2021-21272:DESCRIPTION:Zip Slip vulnerability in Go-based Open Container Initiative (OCI) registries product allows writing arbitrary files outside intended directory via symbolic links or hard links in a gzipped tarball.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-21272::REFERENCE:CVE-2020-27833:DESCRIPTION:Zip Slip vulnerability in container management product allows writing arbitrary files outside intended directory via a container image (.tar format) with filenames that are symbolic links that point to other files within the same tar file; however, the files being pointed to can also be symbolic links to destinations outside the intended directory, bypassing the initial check.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-27833::

::File Processing::

::File or Directory::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:Link Following::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:FIO02-C:ENTRY NAME:Canonicalize path names originating from untrusted sources::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:POS01-C:ENTRY NAME:Check for the existence of links when dealing with files::TAXONOMY NAME:SEI CERT Perl Coding Standard:ENTRY ID:FIO01-PL:ENTRY NAME:Do not operate on files that can be modified by untrusted users:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP18:ENTRY NAME:Link in resource name resolution::

::132::17::35::76::

::TYPE:Theoretical:NOTE:Link following vulnerabilities are Multi-factor Vulnerabilities (MFV). They are the combination of multiple elements: file or directory permissions, filename predictability, race conditions, and in some cases, a design limitation in which there is no mechanism for performing atomic file creation operations. Some potential factors are race conditions, permissions, and predictability.::

Improper Handling of File Names that Identify Virtual Resources

Base

Draft

The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a file name that identifies a virtual resource that is not directly specified within the directory that is associated with the file name, causing the product to perform file-based operations on a resource that is not a file.

Virtual file names are represented like normal file names, but they are effectively aliases for other resources that do not behave like normal files. Depending on their functionality, they could be alternate entities. They are not necessarily listed in directories.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:706:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Implementation::PHASE:Operation::

::SCOPE:Other:IMPACT:Other::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Web Application Scanner Web Services Scanner Database Scanners:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Fuzz Tester Framework-based Fuzzer:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source Manual Source Code Review (not inspections):EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Source code Weakness Analyzer Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Architecture or Design Review:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction Cost effective for partial coverage: Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::REFERENCE:CVE-1999-0278:DESCRIPTION:In IIS, remote attackers can obtain source code for ASP files by appending ::$DATA to the URL.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-0278::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-1084:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to read files and resource fork content via HTTP requests to certain special file names related to multiple data streams in HFS+.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1084::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0106:DESCRIPTION:Server allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a series of requests to .JSP files that contain an MS-DOS device name.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0106::

::File Processing::

::File or Directory::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:Virtual Files::

External Control of File Name or Path

Base

Draft

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

This could allow an attacker to access or modify system files or other files that are critical to the application. Path manipulation errors occur when the following two conditions are met: 1. An attacker can specify a path used in an operation on the filesystem. 2. By specifying the resource, the attacker gains a capability that would not otherwise be permitted. For example, the program may give the attacker the ability to overwrite the specified file or run with a configuration controlled by the attacker.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:642:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:610:VIEW ID:1000::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:20:VIEW ID:700:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:CanPrecede:CWE ID:22:VIEW ID:1000::NATURE:CanPrecede:CWE ID:41:VIEW ID:1000::NATURE:CanPrecede:CWE ID:98:VIEW ID:1000::NATURE:CanPrecede:CWE ID:434:VIEW ID:1000::NATURE:CanPrecede:CWE ID:59:VIEW ID:1000::

::ORDINALITY:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::OPERATING SYSTEM CLASS:Unix:OPERATING SYSTEM PREVALENCE:Often::OPERATING SYSTEM CLASS:Windows:OPERATING SYSTEM PREVALENCE:Often::OPERATING SYSTEM CLASS:macOS:OPERATING SYSTEM PREVALENCE:Often::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Confidentiality:IMPACT:Read Files or Directories:IMPACT:Modify Files or Directories:NOTE:The application can operate on unexpected files. Confidentiality is violated when the targeted filename is not directly readable by the attacker.::SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Availability:IMPACT:Modify Files or Directories:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:NOTE:The application can operate on unexpected files. This may violate integrity if the filename is written to, or if the filename is for a program or other form of executable code.::SCOPE:Availability:IMPACT:DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart:IMPACT:DoS: Resource Consumption (Other):NOTE:The application can operate on unexpected files. Availability can be violated if the attacker specifies an unexpected file that the application modifies. Availability can also be affected if the attacker specifies a filename for a large file, or points to a special device or a file that does not have the format that the application expects.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:The external control or influence of filenames can often be detected using automated static analysis that models data flow within the product. Automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or require any code changes.::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to inbox.txt and ID 2 could map to profile.txt. Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.::PHASE:Architecture and Design Operation:DESCRIPTION:Run your code in a jail or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single . character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as / to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering / is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if ../ sequences are removed from the .../...// string in a sequential fashion, two instances of ../ would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the ../ string.:EFFECTIVENESS:High::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes .. sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).::PHASE:Installation Operation:DESCRIPTION:Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.::PHASE:Operation Implementation:DESCRIPTION:If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.::PHASE:Testing:DESCRIPTION:Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2022-45918:DESCRIPTION:Chain: a learning management tool debugger uses external input to locate previous session logs (CWE-73) and does not properly validate the given path (CWE-20), allowing for filesystem path traversal using ../ sequences (CWE-24):LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-45918::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5748:DESCRIPTION:Chain: external control of values for user's desired language and theme enables path traversal.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5748::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5764:DESCRIPTION:Chain: external control of user's target language enables remote file inclusion.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5764::

::TAXONOMY NAME:7 Pernicious Kingdoms:ENTRY NAME:Path Manipulation::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP16:ENTRY NAME:Path Traversal::

::13::267::64::72::76::78::79::80::

::TYPE:Maintenance:NOTE:CWE-114 is a Class, but it is listed a child of CWE-73 in view 1000. This suggests some abstraction problems that should be resolved in future versions.::TYPE:Relationship:NOTE:The external control of filenames can be the primary link in chains with other file-related weaknesses, as seen in the CanPrecede relationships. This is because software systems use files for many different purposes: to execute programs, load code libraries, to store application data, to store configuration settings, record temporary data, act as signals or semaphores to other processes, etc. However, those weaknesses do not always require external control. For example, link-following weaknesses (CWE-59) often involve pathnames that are not controllable by the attacker at all. The external control can be resultant from other issues. For example, in PHP applications, the register_globals setting can allow an attacker to modify variables that the programmer thought were immutable, enabling file inclusion (CWE-98) and path traversal (CWE-22). Operating with excessive privileges (CWE-250) might allow an attacker to specify an input filename that is not directly readable by the attacker, but is accessible to the privileged program. A buffer overflow (CWE-119) might give an attacker control over nearby memory locations that are related to pathnames, but were not directly modifiable by the attacker.::

Improper Neutralization of Equivalent Special Elements

Base

Draft

The product correctly neutralizes certain special elements, but it improperly neutralizes equivalent special elements.

The product may have a fixed list of special characters it believes is complete. However, there may be alternate encodings, or representations that also have the same meaning. For example, the product may filter out a leading slash (/) to prevent absolute path names, but does not account for a tilde (~) followed by a user name, which on some *nix systems could be expanded to an absolute pathname. Alternately, the product might filter a dangerous -e command-line switch when calling an external program, but it might not account for --exec or other switches that have the same semantics.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:75:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::

::ORDINALITY:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Other:IMPACT:Other::

::PHASE:Requirements:DESCRIPTION:Programming languages and supporting technologies might be chosen which are not subject to these issues.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Utilize an appropriate mix of allowlist and denylist parsing to filter equivalent special element syntax from all input.::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:Equivalent Special Element Injection::

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Base

Stable

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

This could allow attackers to execute unexpected, dangerous commands directly on the operating system. This weakness can lead to a vulnerability in environments in which the attacker does not have direct access to the operating system, such as in web applications. Alternately, if the weakness occurs in a privileged program, it could allow the attacker to specify commands that normally would not be accessible, or to call alternate commands with privileges that the attacker does not have. The problem is exacerbated if the compromised process does not follow the principle of least privilege, because the attacker-controlled commands may run with special system privileges that increases the amount of damage. There are at least two subtypes of OS command injection: The application intends to execute a single, fixed program that is under its own control. It intends to use externally-supplied inputs as arguments to that program. For example, the program might use system(nslookup [HOSTNAME]) to run nslookup and allow the user to supply a HOSTNAME, which is used as an argument. Attackers cannot prevent nslookup from executing. However, if the program does not remove command separators from the HOSTNAME argument, attackers could place the separators into the arguments, which allows them to execute their own program after nslookup has finished executing. The application accepts an input that it uses to fully select which program to run, as well as which commands to use. The application simply redirects this entire command to the operating system. For example, the program might use exec([COMMAND]) to execute the [COMMAND] that was supplied by the user. If the COMMAND is under attacker control, then the attacker can execute arbitrary commands or programs. If the command is being executed using functions like exec() and CreateProcess(), the attacker might not be able to combine multiple commands together in the same line. From a weakness standpoint, these variants represent distinct programmer errors. In the first variant, the programmer clearly intends that input from untrusted parties will be part of the arguments in the command to be executed. In the second variant, the programmer does not intend for the command to be accessible to any untrusted party, but the programmer probably has not accounted for alternate ways in which malicious attackers can provide input.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:77:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1003:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:77:VIEW ID:1305:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:77:VIEW ID:1340:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:CanAlsoBe:CWE ID:88:VIEW ID:1000::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::TERM:Shell injection::TERM:Shell metacharacters::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Availability:SCOPE:Non-Repudiation:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:IMPACT:DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart:IMPACT:Read Files or Directories:IMPACT:Modify Files or Directories:IMPACT:Read Application Data:IMPACT:Modify Application Data:IMPACT:Hide Activities:NOTE:Attackers could execute unauthorized commands, which could then be used to disable the product, or read and modify data for which the attacker does not have permissions to access directly. Since the targeted application is directly executing the commands instead of the attacker, any malicious activities may appear to come from the application or the application's owner.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives. Automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or require any code changes. Automated static analysis might not be able to detect the usage of custom API functions or third-party libraries that indirectly invoke OS commands, leading to false negatives - especially if the API/library code is not available for analysis.::METHOD:Automated Dynamic Analysis:DESCRIPTION:This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.:EFFECTIVENESS:Moderate::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Since this weakness does not typically appear frequently within a single software package, manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all potentially-vulnerable operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Web Application Scanner Web Services Scanner Database Scanners:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Fuzz Tester Framework-based Fuzzer:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Manual Source Code Review (not inspections) Cost effective for partial coverage: Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Source code Weakness Analyzer Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Architecture or Design Review:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction Cost effective for partial coverage: Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.::PHASE:Architecture and Design Operation:STRATEGY:Sandbox or Jail:DESCRIPTION:Run the code in a jail or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.:EFFECTIVENESS:Limited::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Attack Surface Reduction:DESCRIPTION:For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Libraries or Frameworks:DESCRIPTION:Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Output Encoding:DESCRIPTION:While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Parameterization:DESCRIPTION:If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ; and > characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components. Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Enforcement by Conversion:DESCRIPTION:When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.::PHASE:Operation:STRATEGY:Compilation or Build Hardening:DESCRIPTION:Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's -T switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).::PHASE:Operation:STRATEGY:Environment Hardening:DESCRIPTION:Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's -T switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.::PHASE:Operation:STRATEGY:Sandbox or Jail:DESCRIPTION:Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.::PHASE:Operation:STRATEGY:Firewall:DESCRIPTION:Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth.:EFFECTIVENESS:Moderate::PHASE:Architecture and Design Operation:STRATEGY:Environment Hardening:DESCRIPTION:Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.::PHASE:Operation Implementation:STRATEGY:Environment Hardening:DESCRIPTION:When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2020-10987:DESCRIPTION:OS command injection in Wi-Fi router, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-10987::REFERENCE:CVE-2020-10221:DESCRIPTION:Template functionality in network configuration management tool allows OS command injection, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-10221::REFERENCE:CVE-2020-9054:DESCRIPTION:Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) in username parameter, leading to OS command injection (CWE-78), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-9054::REFERENCE:CVE-1999-0067:DESCRIPTION:Canonical example of OS command injection. CGI program does not neutralize | metacharacter when invoking a phonebook program.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-0067::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1246:DESCRIPTION:Language interpreter's mail function accepts another argument that is concatenated to a string used in a dangerous popen() call. Since there is no neutralization of this argument, both OS Command Injection (CWE-78) and Argument Injection (CWE-88) are possible.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1246::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0061:DESCRIPTION:Web server allows command execution using | (pipe) character.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0061::REFERENCE:CVE-2003-0041:DESCRIPTION:FTP client does not filter | from filenames returned by the server, allowing for OS command injection.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-0041::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-2575:DESCRIPTION:Shell metacharacters in a filename in a ZIP archive:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2575::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1898:DESCRIPTION:Shell metacharacters in a telnet:// link are not properly handled when the launching application processes the link.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1898::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-4304:DESCRIPTION:OS command injection through environment variable.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4304::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-4796:DESCRIPTION:OS command injection through https:// URLs:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4796::REFERENCE:CVE-2007-3572:DESCRIPTION:Chain: incomplete denylist for OS command injection:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-3572::REFERENCE:CVE-2012-1988:DESCRIPTION:Product allows remote users to execute arbitrary commands by creating a file whose pathname contains shell metacharacters.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2012-1988::

::Program Invocation::

::System Process::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:OS Command Injection::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2007:ENTRY ID:A3:ENTRY NAME:Malicious File Execution:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2004:ENTRY ID:A6:ENTRY NAME:Injection Flaws:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:ENV03-C:ENTRY NAME:Sanitize the environment when invoking external programs::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:ENV33-C:ENTRY NAME:Do not call system():MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:STR02-C:ENTRY NAME:Sanitize data passed to complex subsystems::TAXONOMY NAME:WASC:ENTRY ID:31:ENTRY NAME:OS Commanding::TAXONOMY NAME:The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011):ENTRY ID:IDS07-J:ENTRY NAME:Do not pass untrusted, unsanitized data to the Runtime.exec() method::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP24:ENTRY NAME:Tainted input to command::TAXONOMY NAME:OMG ASCSM:ENTRY ID:ASCSM-CWE-78::

::108::15::43::6::88::

::TYPE:Terminology:NOTE:The OS command injection phrase carries different meanings to different people. For some people, it only refers to cases in which the attacker injects command separators into arguments for an application-controlled program that is being invoked. For some people, it refers to any type of attack that can allow the attacker to execute OS commands of their own choosing. This usage could include untrusted search path weaknesses (CWE-426) that cause the application to find and execute an attacker-controlled program. Further complicating the issue is the case when argument injection (CWE-88) allows alternate command-line switches or options to be inserted into the command line, such as an -exec switch whose purpose may be to execute the subsequent argument as a command (this -exec switch exists in the UNIX find command, for example). In this latter case, however, CWE-88 could be regarded as the primary weakness in a chain with CWE-78.::TYPE:Research Gap:NOTE:More investigation is needed into the distinction between the OS command injection variants, including the role with argument injection (CWE-88). Equivalent distinctions may exist in other injection-related problems such as SQL injection.::

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Base

Stable

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities occur when: Untrusted data enters a web application, typically from a web request. The web application dynamically generates a web page that contains this untrusted data. During page generation, the application does not prevent the data from containing content that is executable by a web browser, such as JavaScript, HTML tags, HTML attributes, mouse events, Flash, ActiveX, etc. A victim visits the generated web page through a web browser, which contains malicious script that was injected using the untrusted data. Since the script comes from a web page that was sent by the web server, the victim's web browser executes the malicious script in the context of the web server's domain. This effectively violates the intention of the web browser's same-origin policy, which states that scripts in one domain should not be able to access resources or run code in a different domain. There are three main kinds of XSS: Type 1: Reflected XSS (or Non-Persistent) - The server reads data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. Reflected XSS exploits occur when an attacker causes a victim to supply dangerous content to a vulnerable web application, which is then reflected back to the victim and executed by the web browser. The most common mechanism for delivering malicious content is to include it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs constructed in this manner constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby an attacker convinces a victim to visit a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. After the site reflects the attacker's content back to the victim, the content is executed by the victim's browser. Type 2: Stored XSS (or Persistent) - The application stores dangerous data in a database, message forum, visitor log, or other trusted data store. At a later time, the dangerous data is subsequently read back into the application and included in dynamic content. From an attacker's perspective, the optimal place to inject malicious content is in an area that is displayed to either many users or particularly interesting users. Interesting users typically have elevated privileges in the application or interact with sensitive data that is valuable to the attacker. If one of these users executes malicious content, the attacker may be able to perform privileged operations on behalf of the user or gain access to sensitive data belonging to the user. For example, the attacker might inject XSS into a log message, which might not be handled properly when an administrator views the logs. Type 0: DOM-Based XSS - In DOM-based XSS, the client performs the injection of XSS into the page; in the other types, the server performs the injection. DOM-based XSS generally involves server-controlled, trusted script that is sent to the client, such as Javascript that performs sanity checks on a form before the user submits it. If the server-supplied script processes user-supplied data and then injects it back into the web page (such as with dynamic HTML), then DOM-based XSS is possible. Once the malicious script is injected, the attacker can perform a variety of malicious activities. The attacker could transfer private information, such as cookies that may include session information, from the victim's machine to the attacker. The attacker could send malicious requests to a web site on behalf of the victim, which could be especially dangerous to the site if the victim has administrator privileges to manage that site. Phishing attacks could be used to emulate trusted web sites and trick the victim into entering a password, allowing the attacker to compromise the victim's account on that web site. Finally, the script could exploit a vulnerability in the web browser itself possibly taking over the victim's machine, sometimes referred to as drive-by hacking. In many cases, the attack can be launched without the victim even being aware of it. Even with careful users, attackers frequently use a variety of methods to encode the malicious portion of the attack, such as URL encoding or Unicode, so the request looks less suspicious.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1003:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:CanPrecede:CWE ID:494:VIEW ID:1000::NATURE:PeerOf:CWE ID:352:VIEW ID:1000::

::ORDINALITY:Resultant::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::TECHNOLOGY CLASS:Web Based:TECHNOLOGY PREVALENCE:Often::

::The Same Origin Policy states that browsers should limit the resources accessible to scripts running on a given web site, or origin, to the resources associated with that web site on the client-side, and not the client-side resources of any other sites or origins. The goal is to prevent one site from being able to modify or read the contents of an unrelated site. Since the World Wide Web involves interactions between many sites, this policy is important for browsers to enforce. When referring to XSS, the Domain of a website is roughly equivalent to the resources associated with that website on the client-side of the connection. That is, the domain can be thought of as all resources the browser is storing for the user's interactions with this particular site.::

::TERM:XSS:DESCRIPTION:A common abbreviation for Cross-Site Scripting.::TERM:HTML Injection:DESCRIPTION:Used as a synonym of stored (Type 2) XSS.::TERM:CSS:DESCRIPTION:In the early years after initial discovery of XSS, CSS was a commonly-used acronym. However, this would cause confusion with Cascading Style Sheets, so usage of this acronym has declined significantly.::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Access Control:SCOPE:Confidentiality:IMPACT:Bypass Protection Mechanism:IMPACT:Read Application Data:NOTE:The most common attack performed with cross-site scripting involves the disclosure of information stored in user cookies. Typically, a malicious user will craft a client-side script, which -- when parsed by a web browser -- performs some activity (such as sending all site cookies to a given E-mail address). This script will be loaded and run by each user visiting the web site. Since the site requesting to run the script has access to the cookies in question, the malicious script does also.::SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Availability:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:NOTE:In some circumstances it may be possible to run arbitrary code on a victim's computer when cross-site scripting is combined with other flaws.::SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Availability:SCOPE:Access Control:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:IMPACT:Bypass Protection Mechanism:IMPACT:Read Application Data:NOTE:The consequence of an XSS attack is the same regardless of whether it is stored or reflected. The difference is in how the payload arrives at the server. XSS can cause a variety of problems for the end user that range in severity from an annoyance to complete account compromise. Some cross-site scripting vulnerabilities can be exploited to manipulate or steal cookies, create requests that can be mistaken for those of a valid user, compromise confidential information, or execute malicious code on the end user systems for a variety of nefarious purposes. Other damaging attacks include the disclosure of end user files, installation of Trojan horse programs, redirecting the user to some other page or site, running Active X controls (under Microsoft Internet Explorer) from sites that a user perceives as trustworthy, and modifying presentation of content.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible, especially when multiple components are involved.:EFFECTIVENESS:Moderate::METHOD:Black Box:DESCRIPTION:Use the XSS Cheat Sheet [REF-714] or automated test-generation tools to help launch a wide variety of attacks against your web application. The Cheat Sheet contains many subtle XSS variations that are specifically targeted against weak XSS defenses.:EFFECTIVENESS:Moderate::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Libraries or Frameworks:DESCRIPTION:Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.::PHASE:Implementation Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters. Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the: HTML body Element attributes (such as src=XYZ) URIs JavaScript sections Cascading Style Sheets and style property etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body. Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.::PHASE:Architecture and Design Implementation:STRATEGY:Attack Surface Reduction:DESCRIPTION:Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.:EFFECTIVENESS:Limited::PHASE:Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Parameterization:DESCRIPTION:If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Output Encoding:DESCRIPTION:Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component. The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Attack Surface Reduction:DESCRIPTION:To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XMLHTTPRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.:EFFECTIVENESS:Defense in Depth::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing XSS, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent XSS, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, in a chat application, the heart emoticon (<3) would likely pass the validation step, since it is commonly used. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the web page because it contains the < character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the < might reduce the risk of XSS, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the emoticon would not be recorded. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it would be more important in a mathematical forum that wants to represent inequalities. Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address. Ensure that you perform input validation at well-defined interfaces within the application. This will help protect the application even if a component is reused or moved elsewhere.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Enforcement by Conversion:DESCRIPTION:When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.::PHASE:Operation:STRATEGY:Firewall:DESCRIPTION:Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth.:EFFECTIVENESS:Moderate::PHASE:Operation Implementation:STRATEGY:Environment Hardening:DESCRIPTION:When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2021-25926:DESCRIPTION:Python Library Manager did not sufficiently neutralize a user-supplied search term, allowing reflected XSS.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-25926::REFERENCE:CVE-2021-25963:DESCRIPTION:Python-based e-commerce platform did not escape returned content on error pages, allowing for reflected Cross-Site Scripting attacks.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-25963::REFERENCE:CVE-2021-1879:DESCRIPTION:Universal XSS in mobile operating system, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-1879::REFERENCE:CVE-2020-3580:DESCRIPTION:Chain: improper input validation (CWE-20) in firewall product leads to XSS (CWE-79), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-3580::REFERENCE:CVE-2014-8958:DESCRIPTION:Admin GUI allows XSS through cookie.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2014-8958::REFERENCE:CVE-2017-9764:DESCRIPTION:Web stats program allows XSS through crafted HTTP header.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-9764::REFERENCE:CVE-2014-5198:DESCRIPTION:Web log analysis product allows XSS through crafted HTTP Referer header.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2014-5198::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5080:DESCRIPTION:Chain: protection mechanism failure allows XSS:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5080::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-4308:DESCRIPTION:Chain: incomplete denylist (CWE-184) only checks javascript: tag, allowing XSS (CWE-79) using other tags:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4308::REFERENCE:CVE-2007-5727:DESCRIPTION:Chain: incomplete denylist (CWE-184) only removes SCRIPT tags, enabling XSS (CWE-79):LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-5727::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5770:DESCRIPTION:Reflected XSS using the PATH_INFO in a URL:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5770::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-4730:DESCRIPTION:Reflected XSS not properly handled when generating an error message:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-4730::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5734:DESCRIPTION:Reflected XSS sent through email message.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5734::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-0971:DESCRIPTION:Stored XSS in a security product.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-0971::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5249:DESCRIPTION:Stored XSS using a wiki page.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5249::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-3568:DESCRIPTION:Stored XSS in a guestbook application.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-3568::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-3211:DESCRIPTION:Stored XSS in a guestbook application using a javascript: URI in a bbcode img tag.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-3211::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-3295:DESCRIPTION:Chain: library file is not protected against a direct request (CWE-425), leading to reflected XSS (CWE-79).:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-3295::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:Cross-site scripting (XSS)::TAXONOMY NAME:7 Pernicious Kingdoms:ENTRY NAME:Cross-site Scripting::TAXONOMY NAME:CLASP:ENTRY NAME:Cross-site scripting::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2007:ENTRY ID:A1:ENTRY NAME:Cross Site Scripting (XSS):MAPPING FIT:Exact::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2004:ENTRY ID:A1:ENTRY NAME:Unvalidated Input:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2004:ENTRY ID:A4:ENTRY NAME:Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws:MAPPING FIT:Exact::TAXONOMY NAME:WASC:ENTRY ID:8:ENTRY NAME:Cross-site Scripting::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP24:ENTRY NAME:Tainted input to command::TAXONOMY NAME:OMG ASCSM:ENTRY ID:ASCSM-CWE-79::

::209::588::591::592::63::85::

::TYPE:Relationship:NOTE:There can be a close relationship between XSS and CSRF (CWE-352). An attacker might use CSRF in order to trick the victim into submitting requests to the server in which the requests contain an XSS payload. A well-known example of this was the Samy worm on MySpace [REF-956]. The worm used XSS to insert malicious HTML sequences into a user's profile and add the attacker as a MySpace friend. MySpace friends of that victim would then execute the payload to modify their own profiles, causing the worm to propagate exponentially. Since the victims did not intentionally insert the malicious script themselves, CSRF was a root cause.::TYPE:Applicable Platform:NOTE:XSS flaws are very common in web applications, since they require a great deal of developer discipline to avoid them.::

Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')

Base

Draft

The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.

When creating commands using interpolation into a string, developers may assume that only the arguments/options that they specify will be processed. This assumption may be even stronger when the programmer has encoded the command in a way that prevents separate commands from being provided maliciously, e.g. in the case of shell metacharacters. When constructing the command, the developer may use whitespace or other delimiters that are required to separate arguments when the command. However, if an attacker can provide an untrusted input that contains argument-separating delimiters, then the resulting command will have more arguments than intended by the developer. The attacker may then be able to change the behavior of the command. Depending on the functionality supported by the extraneous arguments, this may have security-relevant consequences.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:77:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1003:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:77:VIEW ID:1305:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:77:VIEW ID:1340:ORDINAL:Primary::

::ORDINALITY:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::LANGUAGE NAME:PHP:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Often::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Availability:SCOPE:Other:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:IMPACT:Alter Execution Logic:IMPACT:Read Application Data:IMPACT:Modify Application Data:NOTE:An attacker could include arguments that allow unintended commands or code to be executed, allow sensitive data to be read or modified or could cause other unintended behavior.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect sources (origins of input) with sinks (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Parameterization:DESCRIPTION:Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.:EFFECTIVENESS:High::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.::PHASE:Testing:DESCRIPTION:Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.::PHASE:Testing:DESCRIPTION:Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2022-36069:DESCRIPTION:Python-based dependency management tool avoids OS command injection when generating Git commands but allows injection of optional arguments with input beginning with a dash, potentially allowing for code execution.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-36069::REFERENCE:CVE-1999-0113:DESCRIPTION:Canonical Example - -froot argument is passed on to another program, where the -f causes execution as user root:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-1999-0113::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0150:DESCRIPTION:Web browser executes Telnet sessions using command line arguments that are specified by the web site, which could allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0150::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0667:DESCRIPTION:Web browser allows remote attackers to execute commands by spawning Telnet with a log file option on the command line and writing arbitrary code into an executable file which is later executed.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0667::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0985:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in the mail function for PHP may allow attackers to bypass safe mode restrictions and modify command line arguments to the MTA (e.g. sendmail) possibly executing commands.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0985::REFERENCE:CVE-2003-0907:DESCRIPTION:Help and Support center in windows does not properly validate HCP URLs, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via quotation marks in an hcp:// URL.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-0907::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0121:DESCRIPTION:Mail client does not sufficiently filter parameters of mailto: URLs when using them as arguments to mail executable, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary programs.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0121::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0473:DESCRIPTION:Web browser doesn't filter - when invoking various commands, allowing command-line switches to be specified.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0473::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0480:DESCRIPTION:Mail client allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a URI that uses a UNC network share pathname to provide an alternate configuration file.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0480::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0489:DESCRIPTION:SSH URI handler for web browser allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or conduct port forwarding via the a command line option.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0489::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0411:DESCRIPTION:Web browser doesn't filter - when invoking various commands, allowing command-line switches to be specified.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0411::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-4699:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in TellMe 1.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to modify command line arguments for the Whois program and obtain sensitive information via -- style options in the q_Host parameter.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-4699::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-1865:DESCRIPTION:Beagle before 0.2.5 can produce certain insecure command lines to launch external helper applications while indexing, which allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands. NOTE: it is not immediately clear whether this issue involves argument injection, shell metacharacters, or other issues.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-1865::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-2056:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in Internet Explorer 6 for Windows XP SP2 allows user-assisted remote attackers to modify command line arguments to an invoked mail client via (double quote) characters in a mailto: scheme handler, as demonstrated by launching Microsoft Outlook with an arbitrary filename as an attachment. NOTE: it is not clear whether this issue is implementation-specific or a problem in the Microsoft API.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-2056::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-2057:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in Mozilla Firefox 1.0.6 allows user-assisted remote attackers to modify command line arguments to an invoked mail client via (double quote) characters in a mailto: scheme handler, as demonstrated by launching Microsoft Outlook with an arbitrary filename as an attachment. NOTE: it is not clear whether this issue is implementation-specific or a problem in the Microsoft API.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-2057::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-2058:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in Avant Browser 10.1 Build 17 allows user-assisted remote attackers to modify command line arguments to an invoked mail client via (double quote) characters in a mailto: scheme handler, as demonstrated by launching Microsoft Outlook with an arbitrary filename as an attachment. NOTE: it is not clear whether this issue is implementation-specific or a problem in the Microsoft API.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-2058::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-2312:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in the URI handler in Skype 2.0.*.104 and 2.5.*.0 through 2.5.*.78 for Windows allows remote authorized attackers to download arbitrary files via a URL that contains certain command-line switches.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-2312::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-3015:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in WinSCP 3.8.1 build 328 allows remote attackers to upload or download arbitrary files via encoded spaces and double-quote characters in a scp or sftp URI.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-3015::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-4692:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in the Windows Object Packager (packager.exe) in Microsoft Windows XP SP1 and SP2 and Server 2003 SP1 and earlier allows remote user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted file with a / (slash) character in the filename of the Command Line property, followed by a valid file extension, which causes the command before the slash to be executed, aka Object Packager Dialogue Spoofing Vulnerability.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4692::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-6597:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in HyperAccess 8.4 allows user-assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary vbscript and commands via the /r option in a telnet:// URI, which is configured to use hawin32.exe.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-6597::REFERENCE:CVE-2007-0882:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection vulnerability in the telnet daemon (in.telnetd) in Solaris 10 and 11 (SunOS 5.10 and 5.11) misinterprets certain client -f sequences as valid requests for the login program to skip authentication, which allows remote attackers to log into certain accounts, as demonstrated by the bin account.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-0882::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1246:DESCRIPTION:Language interpreter's mail function accepts another argument that is concatenated to a string used in a dangerous popen() call. Since there is no neutralization of this argument, both OS Command Injection (CWE-78) and Argument Injection (CWE-88) are possible.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1246::REFERENCE:CVE-2019-13475:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection allows execution of arbitrary commands by injecting a -exec option, which is executed by the command.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2019-13475::REFERENCE:CVE-2016-10033:DESCRIPTION:Argument injection in mail-processing function allows writing unxpected files and executing programs using tecnically-valid email addresses that insert -o and -X switches.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2016-10033::

::System Process::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:Argument Injection or Modification::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:ENV03-C:ENTRY NAME:Sanitize the environment when invoking external programs::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:ENV33-C:ENTRY NAME:Do not call system():MAPPING FIT:Imprecise::TAXONOMY NAME:CERT C Secure Coding:ENTRY ID:STR02-C:ENTRY NAME:Sanitize data passed to complex subsystems::TAXONOMY NAME:WASC:ENTRY ID:30:ENTRY NAME:Mail Command Injection::

::137::174::41::460::88::

::TYPE:Relationship:NOTE:At one layer of abstraction, this can overlap other weaknesses that have whitespace problems, e.g. injection of javascript into attributes of HTML tags.::

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

Base

Stable

The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component.

Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data. This can be used to alter query logic to bypass security checks, or to insert additional statements that modify the back-end database, possibly including execution of system commands. SQL injection has become a common issue with database-driven web sites. The flaw is easily detected, and easily exploited, and as such, any site or product package with even a minimal user base is likely to be subject to an attempted attack of this kind. This flaw depends on the fact that SQL makes no real distinction between the control and data planes.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:943:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1003:ORDINAL:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::TECHNOLOGY NAME:Database Server:TECHNOLOGY PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:This weakness typically appears in data-rich applications that save user inputs in a database.::

::SCOPE:Confidentiality:IMPACT:Read Application Data:NOTE:Since SQL databases generally hold sensitive data, loss of confidentiality is a frequent problem with SQL injection vulnerabilities.::SCOPE:Access Control:IMPACT:Bypass Protection Mechanism:NOTE:If poor SQL commands are used to check user names and passwords, it may be possible to connect to a system as another user with no previous knowledge of the password.::SCOPE:Access Control:IMPACT:Bypass Protection Mechanism:NOTE:If authorization information is held in a SQL database, it may be possible to change this information through the successful exploitation of a SQL injection vulnerability.::SCOPE:Integrity:IMPACT:Modify Application Data:NOTE:Just as it may be possible to read sensitive information, it is also possible to make changes or even delete this information with a SQL injection attack.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives. Automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or do not require any code changes. Automated static analysis might not be able to detect the usage of custom API functions or third-party libraries that indirectly invoke SQL commands, leading to false negatives - especially if the API/library code is not available for analysis.::METHOD:Automated Dynamic Analysis:DESCRIPTION:This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.:EFFECTIVENESS:Moderate::METHOD:Manual Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Database Scanners Cost effective for partial coverage: Web Application Scanner Web Services Scanner:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Cost effective for partial coverage: Fuzz Tester Framework-based Fuzzer:EFFECTIVENESS:SOAR Partial::METHOD:Manual Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Manual Source Code Review (not inspections) Cost effective for partial coverage: Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis - Source Code:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Source code Weakness Analyzer Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer:EFFECTIVENESS:High::METHOD:Architecture or Design Review:DESCRIPTION:According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction Cost effective for partial coverage: Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Libraries or Frameworks:DESCRIPTION:Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Parameterization:DESCRIPTION:If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using exec or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]::PHASE:Architecture and Design Operation:STRATEGY:Environment Hardening:DESCRIPTION:Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations. Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Output Encoding:DESCRIPTION:While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88). Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name O'Reilly would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the ' apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded. When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Enforcement by Conversion:DESCRIPTION:When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.::PHASE:Operation:STRATEGY:Firewall:DESCRIPTION:Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth.:EFFECTIVENESS:Moderate::PHASE:Operation Implementation:STRATEGY:Environment Hardening:DESCRIPTION:When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2023-32530:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection in security product dashboard using crafted certificate fields:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-32530::REFERENCE:CVE-2021-42258:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection in time and billing software, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-42258::REFERENCE:CVE-2021-27101:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection in file-transfer system via a crafted Host header, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-27101::REFERENCE:CVE-2020-12271:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection in firewall product's admin interface or user portal, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-12271::REFERENCE:CVE-2019-3792:DESCRIPTION:An automation system written in Go contains an API that is vulnerable to SQL injection allowing the attacker to read privileged data.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2019-3792::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-0366:DESCRIPTION:chain: SQL injection in library intended for database authentication allows SQL injection and authentication bypass.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-0366::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-2790:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection through an ID that was supposed to be numeric.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2790::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-2223:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection through an ID that was supposed to be numeric.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2223::REFERENCE:CVE-2007-6602:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection via user name.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-6602::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5817:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection via user name or password fields.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5817::REFERENCE:CVE-2003-0377:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection in security product, using a crafted group name.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-0377::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-2380:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection in authentication library.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-2380::REFERENCE:CVE-2017-11508:DESCRIPTION:SQL injection in vulnerability management and reporting tool, using a crafted password.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2017-11508::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:SQL injection::TAXONOMY NAME:7 Pernicious Kingdoms:ENTRY NAME:SQL Injection::TAXONOMY NAME:CLASP:ENTRY NAME:SQL injection::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2007:ENTRY ID:A2:ENTRY NAME:Injection Flaws:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2004:ENTRY ID:A1:ENTRY NAME:Unvalidated Input:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2004:ENTRY ID:A6:ENTRY NAME:Injection Flaws:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:WASC:ENTRY ID:19:ENTRY NAME:SQL Injection::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP24:ENTRY NAME:Tainted input to command::TAXONOMY NAME:OMG ASCSM:ENTRY ID:ASCSM-CWE-89::TAXONOMY NAME:SEI CERT Oracle Coding Standard for Java:ENTRY ID:IDS00-J:ENTRY NAME:Prevent SQL injection:MAPPING FIT:Exact::

::108::109::110::470::66::7::

::TYPE:Relationship:NOTE:SQL injection can be resultant from special character mismanagement, MAID, or denylist/allowlist problems. It can be primary to authentication errors.::

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an LDAP Query ('LDAP Injection')

Base

Draft

The product constructs all or part of an LDAP query using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended LDAP query when it is sent to a downstream component.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:943:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::TECHNOLOGY NAME:Database Server:TECHNOLOGY PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Availability:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:IMPACT:Read Application Data:IMPACT:Modify Application Data:NOTE:An attacker could include input that changes the LDAP query which allows unintended commands or code to be executed, allows sensitive data to be read or modified or causes other unintended behavior.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect sources (origins of input) with sinks (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2021-41232:DESCRIPTION:Chain: authentication routine in Go-based agile development product does not escape user name (CWE-116), allowing LDAP injection (CWE-90):LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-41232::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-2301:DESCRIPTION:Server does not properly escape LDAP queries, which allows remote attackers to cause a DoS and possibly conduct an LDAP injection attack.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-2301::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:LDAP injection::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2007:ENTRY ID:A2:ENTRY NAME:Injection Flaws:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:WASC:ENTRY ID:29:ENTRY NAME:LDAP Injection::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP24:ENTRY NAME:Tainted input to command::

::136::

::TYPE:Relationship:NOTE:Factors: resultant to special character mismanagement, MAID, or denylist/allowlist problems. Can be primary to authentication and verification errors.::

XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)

Base

Draft

The product does not properly neutralize special elements that are used in XML, allowing attackers to modify the syntax, content, or commands of the XML before it is processed by an end system.

Within XML, special elements could include reserved words or characters such as <, >, , and &, which could then be used to add new data or modify XML syntax.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1003:ORDINAL:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Availability:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:IMPACT:Read Application Data:IMPACT:Modify Application Data::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect sources (origins of input) with sinks (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:XML injection (aka Blind Xpath injection)::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2007:ENTRY ID:A2:ENTRY NAME:Injection Flaws:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2004:ENTRY ID:A6:ENTRY NAME:Injection Flaws:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:WASC:ENTRY ID:23:ENTRY NAME:XML Injection::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP24:ENTRY NAME:Tainted input to command::

::250::83::

::TYPE:Maintenance:NOTE:The description for this entry is generally applicable to XML, but the name includes blind XPath injection which is more closely associated with CWE-643. Therefore this entry might need to be deprecated or converted to a general category - although injection into raw XML is not covered by CWE-643 or CWE-652.::TYPE:Theoretical:NOTE:In vulnerability theory terms, this is a representation-specific case of a Data/Directive Boundary Error.::TYPE:Research Gap:NOTE:Under-reported. This is likely found regularly by third party code auditors, but there are very few publicly reported examples.::

Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')

Base

Draft

The product uses CRLF (carriage return line feeds) as a special element, e.g. to separate lines or records, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes CRLF sequences from inputs.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:CanPrecede:CWE ID:117:VIEW ID:1000::

::ORDINALITY:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Integrity:IMPACT:Modify Application Data::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect sources (origins of input) with sinks (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Avoid using CRLF as a special sequence.::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:Appropriately filter or quote CRLF sequences in user-controlled input.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1771:DESCRIPTION:CRLF injection enables spam proxy (add mail headers) using email address or name.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1771::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1783:DESCRIPTION:CRLF injection in API function arguments modify headers for outgoing requests.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1783::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-1513:DESCRIPTION:Spoofed entries in web server log file via carriage returns:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1513::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-4624:DESCRIPTION:Chain: inject fake log entries with fake timestamps using CRLF injection:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4624::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1951:DESCRIPTION:Chain: Application accepts CRLF in an object ID, allowing HTTP response splitting.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1951::REFERENCE:CVE-2004-1687:DESCRIPTION:Chain: HTTP response splitting via CRLF in parameter related to URL.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2004-1687::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:CRLF Injection::TAXONOMY NAME:OWASP Top Ten 2007:ENTRY ID:A2:ENTRY NAME:Injection Flaws:MAPPING FIT:CWE More Specific::TAXONOMY NAME:WASC:ENTRY ID:24:ENTRY NAME:HTTP Request Splitting::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP24:ENTRY NAME:Tainted input to command::

::15::81::

Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

Base

Draft

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

When a product allows a user's input to contain code syntax, it might be possible for an attacker to craft the code in such a way that it will alter the intended control flow of the product. Such an alteration could lead to arbitrary code execution. Injection problems encompass a wide variety of issues -- all mitigated in very different ways. For this reason, the most effective way to discuss these weaknesses is to note the distinct features which classify them as injection weaknesses. The most important issue to note is that all injection problems share one thing in common -- i.e., they allow for the injection of control plane data into the user-controlled data plane. This means that the execution of the process may be altered by sending code in through legitimate data channels, using no other mechanism. While buffer overflows, and many other flaws, involve the use of some further issue to gain execution, injection problems need only for the data to be parsed. The most classic instantiations of this category of weakness are SQL injection and format string vulnerabilities.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:74:VIEW ID:1003:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:913:VIEW ID:1000::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Interpreted:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Sometimes::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Access Control:IMPACT:Bypass Protection Mechanism:NOTE:In some cases, injectable code controls authentication; this may lead to a remote vulnerability.::SCOPE:Access Control:IMPACT:Gain Privileges or Assume Identity:NOTE:Injected code can access resources that the attacker is directly prevented from accessing.::SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Availability:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:NOTE:Code injection attacks can lead to loss of data integrity in nearly all cases as the control-plane data injected is always incidental to data recall or writing. Additionally, code injection can often result in the execution of arbitrary code.::SCOPE:Non-Repudiation:IMPACT:Hide Activities:NOTE:Often the actions performed by injected control code are unlogged.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect sources (origins of input) with sinks (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.::PHASE:Architecture and Design:DESCRIPTION:Run your code in a jail or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().::PHASE:Testing:DESCRIPTION:Use automated static analysis tools that target this type of weakness. Many modern techniques use data flow analysis to minimize the number of false positives. This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.::PHASE:Testing:DESCRIPTION:Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.::PHASE:Operation:STRATEGY:Compilation or Build Hardening:DESCRIPTION:Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's -T switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).::PHASE:Operation:STRATEGY:Environment Hardening:DESCRIPTION:Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's -T switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).::PHASE:Implementation:DESCRIPTION:For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].:EFFECTIVENESS:Discouraged Common Practice::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2022-2054:DESCRIPTION:Python compiler uses eval() to execute malicious strings as Python code.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-2054::REFERENCE:CVE-2021-22204:DESCRIPTION:Chain: regex in EXIF processor code does not correctly determine where a string ends (CWE-625), enabling eval injection (CWE-95), as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-22204::REFERENCE:CVE-2020-8218:DESCRIPTION:Code injection in VPN product, as exploited in the wild per CISA KEV.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-8218::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5071:DESCRIPTION:Eval injection in PHP program.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5071::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1750:DESCRIPTION:Eval injection in Perl program.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1750::REFERENCE:CVE-2008-5305:DESCRIPTION:Eval injection in Perl program using an ID that should only contain hyphens and numbers.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2008-5305::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1752:DESCRIPTION:Direct code injection into Perl eval function.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1752::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-1753:DESCRIPTION:Eval injection in Perl program.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-1753::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1527:DESCRIPTION:Direct code injection into Perl eval function.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1527::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-2837:DESCRIPTION:Direct code injection into Perl eval function.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-2837::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1921:DESCRIPTION:MFV. code injection into PHP eval statement using nested constructs that should not be nested.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1921::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-2498:DESCRIPTION:MFV. code injection into PHP eval statement using nested constructs that should not be nested.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-2498::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-3302:DESCRIPTION:Code injection into Python eval statement from a field in a formatted file.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-3302::REFERENCE:CVE-2007-1253:DESCRIPTION:Eval injection in Python program.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2007-1253::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-1471:DESCRIPTION:chain: Resultant eval injection. An invalid value prevents initialization of variables, which can be modified by attacker and later injected into PHP eval statement.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-1471::REFERENCE:CVE-2002-0495:DESCRIPTION:Perl code directly injected into CGI library file from parameters to another CGI program.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2002-0495::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1876:DESCRIPTION:Direct PHP code injection into supporting template file.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1876::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-1894:DESCRIPTION:Direct code injection into PHP script that can be accessed by attacker.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-1894::REFERENCE:CVE-2003-0395:DESCRIPTION:PHP code from User-Agent HTTP header directly inserted into log file implemented as PHP script.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2003-0395::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY ID:CODE:ENTRY NAME:Code Evaluation and Injection::TAXONOMY NAME:ISA/IEC 62443:ENTRY ID:Part 4-2:ENTRY NAME:Req CR 3.5::TAXONOMY NAME:ISA/IEC 62443:ENTRY ID:Part 3-3:ENTRY NAME:Req SR 3.5::TAXONOMY NAME:ISA/IEC 62443:ENTRY ID:Part 4-1:ENTRY NAME:Req SVV-1::TAXONOMY NAME:ISA/IEC 62443:ENTRY ID:Part 4-1:ENTRY NAME:Req SVV-3::

::242::35::77::

Missing XML Validation

Base

Draft

The product accepts XML from an untrusted source but does not validate the XML against the proper schema.

Most successful attacks begin with a violation of the programmer's assumptions. By accepting an XML document without validating it against a DTD or XML schema, the programmer leaves a door open for attackers to provide unexpected, unreasonable, or malicious input.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:1286:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:20:VIEW ID:700:ORDINAL:Primary::

::ORDINALITY:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Implementation::

::SCOPE:Integrity:IMPACT:Unexpected State::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect sources (origins of input) with sinks (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Always validate XML input against a known XML Schema or DTD. It is not possible for an XML parser to validate all aspects of a document's content because a parser cannot understand the complete semantics of the data. However, a parser can do a complete and thorough job of checking the document's structure and therefore guarantee to the code that processes the document that the content is well-formed.::

::TAXONOMY NAME:7 Pernicious Kingdoms:ENTRY NAME:Missing XML Validation::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP24:ENTRY NAME:Tainted input to command::

::230::231::

Misinterpretation of Input

Base

Incomplete

The product misinterprets an input, whether from an attacker or another product, in a security-relevant fashion.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:436:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::PHASE:Architecture and Design::PHASE:Implementation::

::SCOPE:Integrity:IMPACT:Unexpected State::

::METHOD:Fuzzing:DESCRIPTION:Fuzz testing (fuzzing) is a powerful technique for generating large numbers of diverse inputs - either randomly or algorithmically - and dynamically invoking the code with those inputs. Even with random inputs, it is often capable of generating unexpected results such as crashes, memory corruption, or resource consumption. Fuzzing effectively produces repeatable test cases that clearly indicate bugs, which helps developers to diagnose the issues.:EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2005-2225:DESCRIPTION:Product sees dangerous file extension in free text of a group discussion, disconnects all users.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2005-2225::REFERENCE:CVE-2001-0003:DESCRIPTION:Product does not correctly import and process security settings from another product.:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2001-0003::

::TAXONOMY NAME:PLOVER:ENTRY NAME:Misinterpretation Error::

::TYPE:Research Gap:NOTE:This concept needs further study. It is likely a factor in several weaknesses, possibly resultant as well. Overlaps Multiple Interpretation Errors (MIE).::

Improper Output Neutralization for Logs

Base

Draft

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes output that is written to logs.

This can allow an attacker to forge log entries or inject malicious content into logs. Log forging vulnerabilities occur when: Data enters an application from an untrusted source. The data is written to an application or system log file.

::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:116:VIEW ID:1000:ORDINAL:Primary::NATURE:ChildOf:CWE ID:20:VIEW ID:700:ORDINAL:Primary::

::ORDINALITY:Primary::

::LANGUAGE CLASS:Not Language-Specific:LANGUAGE PREVALENCE:Undetermined::

::Applications typically use log files to store a history of events or transactions for later review, statistics gathering, or debugging. Depending on the nature of the application, the task of reviewing log files may be performed manually on an as-needed basis or automated with a tool that automatically culls logs for important events or trending information.::

::PHASE:Implementation:NOTE:REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.::

::SCOPE:Integrity:SCOPE:Confidentiality:SCOPE:Availability:SCOPE:Non-Repudiation:IMPACT:Modify Application Data:IMPACT:Hide Activities:IMPACT:Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands:NOTE:Interpretation of the log files may be hindered or misdirected if an attacker can supply data to the application that is subsequently logged verbatim. In the most benign case, an attacker may be able to insert false entries into the log file by providing the application with input that includes appropriate characters. Forged or otherwise corrupted log files can be used to cover an attacker's tracks, possibly by skewing statistics, or even to implicate another party in the commission of a malicious act. If the log file is processed automatically, the attacker can render the file unusable by corrupting the format of the file or injecting unexpected characters. An attacker may inject code or other commands into the log file and take advantage of a vulnerability in the log processing utility.::

::METHOD:Automated Static Analysis:DESCRIPTION:Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect sources (origins of input) with sinks (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.):EFFECTIVENESS:High::

::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Output Encoding:DESCRIPTION:Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component.::PHASE:Implementation:STRATEGY:Input Validation:DESCRIPTION:Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.::

::REFERENCE:CVE-2006-4624:DESCRIPTION:Chain: inject fake log entries with fake timestamps using CRLF injection:LINK:https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4624::

::TAXONOMY NAME:7 Pernicious Kingdoms:ENTRY NAME:Log Forging::TAXONOMY NAME:Software Fault Patterns:ENTRY ID:SFP23:ENTRY NAME:Exposed Data::TAXONOMY NAME:The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011):ENTRY ID:IDS03-J:ENTRY NAME:Do not log unsanitized user input:MAPPING FIT:Exact::TAXONOMY NAME:SEI CERT Oracle Coding Standard for Java:ENTRY ID:IDS03-J:ENTRY NAME:Do not log unsanitized user input:MAPPING FIT:Exact::

::268::81::93::