By way of elaborating the first contention Counsel pointed out that suit No. 832/1982 filed by Renusagar is merely for a declaration that the three claims sought to be referred to arbitration are beyond the scope and purview of the Arbitration Clause and no other relief on the merits of those claims is sought, that such a suit is really in the nature of a petition under s.33 of the , inasmuch as it seeks to have the effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement determined, that such a suit can never be stayed under s.3 of the Foreign Awards Act and that, therefore, the petition under s.3 (which is really in the nature of s.34 application under the ) is totally misconceived and liable to be dismissed; Counsel further submitted that the suit filed by Renusagar is not "in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration" as required by s.3 and, therefore, the stay sought for by G.E.C. should be refused; Counsel further urged that the Court acting under s.3 (like the Court acting under s.34 of the ) being a Court of limited jurisdiction cannot determine the question of the existence, validity or effect of the arbitration agreement (which is the only issue to be tried in Ranusagar 's suit) and it is for the Court trying the suit to decide the question raised in the suit and, therefore, a stay, if granted under s.3, would finally determine the suit or render it almost dead for all practical purposes and, therefore, no relief on the stay petition can be granted which will have such effect; Counsel finally submitted that the question raised in the suit relating to the effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement, which is the same as the question relating to the existence thereof, is such as is incapable of being finally determined by the Arbitrators and hence such a suit cannot be stayed under s.3 of the Foreign Awards Act.