For in stance, if Parliament had not enacted the 1974 Act but had only enacted an extension of the Transfer of Property Act to Chandigarh, could it have been said that a subsequent noti fication cannot extend the provisions of the 1949 Act to Chandigarh because the subject of leases is governed by the Transfer of Property Act which has been already extended and there is, therefore, no "vacuum" left which could be filled in by 'such extension? Again, suppose, initially, a Rent Act is extended by Parliament which does not contain a provision regarding one of the grounds on which a landlord can seek eviction say, one enabling the owner to get back his house for reoccupation and then the Government thinks that anoth er enactment containing such a provision may also be extend ed, can it not be plausibly said that the latter is a matter on which there is no legislation enacted in the territory and that the extension of the latter enactment only fills up a void or vacancy? Again, suppose the provisions of a gener al code like, say, the Code of Civil Procedure are extended to the Union Territory, should be construe section 87 so as to preclude the extension of a later amendment to one of the rules to one of the Orders of the C.P.C. merely on the ground that it will have the effect of varying or amending an existing law? We think it would not be correct to thus unduly restrict the scope of a provision like section 87.