However, on a consideration of the rival authorities that have been cited at the Bar bay Counsel on either side we are inclined to accept the contention of Counsel for G.E.C. for the following reasons: (a) that conceptually a challenge to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement contained in an underlying Commercial Contract is fundamentally different from an inquiry into the scope and effect of such agreement in as much as the former goes to the root of the arbitration agreement whereas the latter pre supposes that the arbitration agreement exists in fact and in law and the inquiry is then undertaken as to its true scope and effect; (b) that indisputably, decided cases have made this distinction between the two concepts, e.g. in Jawahar Lal Barman 's case (supra) this Court has noted this distinction for the purposes of procedural aspects arising under sections 31(2), 32 and 33 of the , but the English cases particularly Heyman vs Darwins Ltd. (supra) and Willesford vs Watson (supra) have made that distinction substantively; (c) that certain observations made by this Court in para 6 of its judgment in Water Supply Service India (P) Ltd. vs The Union of India and Others(1) on which Counsel for Renusagar have relied in support of their contention that existence of an arbitration agreement is the same as the effect (scope) thereof, do not, in our view, have the effect of equating the question of the scope of the arbitration agreement with the question of its existence; in that case the application made under section 5 of the to revoke the arbitration was obviously mis conceived inasmuch as the ground on which the revocation was sought was that the disputes sought to be referred to arbitration were not within the purview of the arbitration clause and 506 it was in that context that the observations were made in para 6 of the judgment to say that such a dispute was as regards the existence of the arbitration agreement; in fact, the ratio of the decision was that the controversy raised in the case fell within the scope of section 33 of the and not section 5; in any case, in our view, the incidental observation in para 6 of the judgment in that case on which Counsel for Renusagar have relied cannot outweigh the distinction which has been noticed by this Court in its well considered judgment in Jawahar Lal Barman 's case (supra); (d) that an analysis of several decisions cited at the Bar, we venture to suggest, shows that almost all the decision which articulate the principle broadly by saying that an arbitrator has no power to decide questions of his own jurisdiction are cases in which the question of either the existence or the validity of the arbitration agreement was involved, whereas whenever the question of arbitrator 's jurisdiction depended upon the scope or effect of the arbitration agreement Courts appear to have readily directed the parties to go before the arbitrators; and (e) in any event the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chancery in Willesford vs Watson (supra) which decision has been annotated and digested in Russell on Arbitration (20th Edn.) is a clear authority for the proposition that where the arbitration clause was very widely worded so as to include within its scope any dispute "touching the construction of" the contract which contained the arbitration clause, the Court would not decide but would leave it to the arbitrator to decide the question whether the matter in dispute between the parties fell within the arbitration agreement.