(6) The proposition laid down in Manni Lal 's case (ibid) to the effect that subsequent acquittal by the appellate court in a criminal matter has the effect of wiping out the conviction from the date of its very inception is not applicable to the case in hand because: (a) Manni Lal 's case was one under Section 100(1) (a); while the present case is under Section 100(1) (d) (i); (b) in Manni Lal 's case the returned candidate was not disqualified on the date of the scrutiny; whereas in the instant case the disqualification of the appellant did, in fact exist on the date of the scrutiny, although the same may have ceased to exist in point of law due to his subsequent acquittal; and (c) Section 36(2) (a) fixes a date for judging the qualification of a candidate and if the legal fiction of retrospective repeal is applied 646 to the case of subsequent acquittal wiping out the disqualification which in fact existed on the date of scrutiny, Section 36(2) (a) could be rendered nugatory and several inconsistent situations could arise.