The Appellate Bench, however, proceeded to examine the various provisions and the scheme of the Act and held (1) that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the Act was of a limited character, (2) that it gets seisen of an industrial dispute only when its jurisdiction is invoked by a reference under section 4(k) or by a voluntary reference to arbitration under section 5B, (3) that under section 4D proceedings before it are deemed to commence from the date of such reference and are, deemed to be completed on the date when its award becomes enforceable, (4) that its jurisdiction which emanates from the reference gets exhausted on the completion of the proceedings before it and the Labour Court itself becomes functus officio on the date when its award becomes final and enforceable, (5) that it cannot thereafter reconstitute itself or take seisen of a dispute, which it has already adjudicated and proceedings relating to it have become concluded, without a fresh reference and (6) that, therefore, its correctional jurisdiction under section 6(6), unlike that of a civil court under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not unlimited.