Daily Papers

Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans. At present, interpretability is divided into two paradigms: the intrinsic paradigm, which believes that only models designed to be explained can be explained, and the post-hoc paradigm, which believes that black-box models can be explained. At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior. This is important, as false but convincing explanations lead to unsupported confidence in artificial intelligence (AI), which can be dangerous. This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness. First, by examining the history of paradigms in science, we see that paradigms are constantly evolving. Then, by examining the current paradigms, we can understand their underlying beliefs, the value they bring, and their limitations. Finally, this paper presents 3 emerging paradigms for interpretability. The first paradigm designs models such that faithfulness can be easily measured. Another optimizes models such that explanations become faithful. The last paradigm proposes to develop models that produce both a prediction and an explanation.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

A major issue with using deep learning models in sensitive applications is that they provide no explanation for their output. To address this problem, unsupervised selective rationalization produces rationales alongside predictions by chaining two jointly-trained components, a rationale generator and a predictor. Although this architecture guarantees that the prediction relies solely on the rationale, it does not ensure that the rationale contains a plausible explanation for the prediction. We introduce a novel training technique that effectively limits generation of implausible rationales by injecting noise between the generator and the predictor. Furthermore, we propose a new benchmark for evaluating unsupervised selective rationalization models using movie reviews from existing datasets. We achieve sizeable improvements in rationale plausibility and task accuracy over the state-of-the-art across a variety of tasks, including our new benchmark, while maintaining or improving model faithfulness.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Algorithmic approaches to interpreting machine learning models have proliferated in recent years. We carry out human subject tests that are the first of their kind to isolate the effect of algorithmic explanations on a key aspect of model interpretability, simulatability, while avoiding important confounding experimental factors. A model is simulatable when a person can predict its behavior on new inputs. Through two kinds of simulation tests involving text and tabular data, we evaluate five explanations methods: (1) LIME, (2) Anchor, (3) Decision Boundary, (4) a Prototype model, and (5) a Composite approach that combines explanations from each method. Clear evidence of method effectiveness is found in very few cases: LIME improves simulatability in tabular classification, and our Prototype method is effective in counterfactual simulation tests. We also collect subjective ratings of explanations, but we do not find that ratings are predictive of how helpful explanations are. Our results provide the first reliable and comprehensive estimates of how explanations influence simulatability across a variety of explanation methods and data domains. We show that (1) we need to be careful about the metrics we use to evaluate explanation methods, and (2) there is significant room for improvement in current methods. All our supporting code, data, and models are publicly available at: https://github.com/peterbhase/InterpretableNLP-ACL2020

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time explanation generation whereby a computational model learns to translate an autonomous agent's internal state and action data representations into natural language. Training on human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper, using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe (a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence, humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability. The second study further explores user preferences between the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended differences in features of the generated rationales and the perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting, participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable mental model of the agent's behavior.

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations aid people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To help with this, we first review fitting existing metrics. We then establish requirements for datasets to be suitable for application-grounded evaluations. Among over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP, we find that 4 meet our criteria. By finetuning Flan-T5-3B, we demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified suitable tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

One way to increase confidence in the outputs of Large Language Models (LLMs) is to support them with reasoning that is clear and easy to check -- a property we call legibility. We study legibility in the context of solving grade-school math problems and show that optimizing chain-of-thought solutions only for answer correctness can make them less legible. To mitigate the loss in legibility, we propose a training algorithm inspired by Prover-Verifier Game from Anil et al. (2021). Our algorithm iteratively trains small verifiers to predict solution correctness, "helpful" provers to produce correct solutions that the verifier accepts, and "sneaky" provers to produce incorrect solutions that fool the verifier. We find that the helpful prover's accuracy and the verifier's robustness to adversarial attacks increase over the course of training. Furthermore, we show that legibility training transfers to time-constrained humans tasked with verifying solution correctness. Over course of LLM training human accuracy increases when checking the helpful prover's solutions, and decreases when checking the sneaky prover's solutions. Hence, training for checkability by small verifiers is a plausible technique for increasing output legibility. Our results suggest legibility training against small verifiers as a practical avenue for increasing legibility of large LLMs to humans, and thus could help with alignment of superhuman models.

Language models (LMs) are widely used by an increasing number of users, underscoring the challenge of maintaining factuality across a broad range of topics. We first present VERIFY (Verification and Evidence RetrIeval for FactualitY evaluation), a pipeline to evaluate LMs' factuality in real-world user interactions. VERIFY considers the verifiability of LM-generated content and categorizes content units as supported, unsupported, or undecidable based on the retrieved evidence from the Web. Importantly, factuality judgment by VERIFY correlates better with human evaluations than existing methods. Using VERIFY, we identify "hallucination prompts" across diverse topics, i.e., those eliciting the highest rates of incorrect and inconclusive LM responses. These prompts form FactBench, a dataset of 1K prompts across 150 fine-grained topics. Our dataset captures emerging factuality challenges in real-world LM interactions and can be regularly updated with new prompts. We benchmark widely-used LMs from GPT, Gemini, and Llama3.1 family on FactBench, yielding the following key findings: (i) Proprietary models exhibit better factuality, with performance declining from Easy to Hard hallucination prompts. (ii) Llama3.1-405B-Instruct shows comparable or lower factual accuracy than Llama3.1-70B-Instruct across all evaluation methods due to its higher subjectivity that leads to more content labeled as undecidable. (iii) Gemini1.5-Pro shows a significantly higher refusal rate, with over-refusal in 25% of cases. Our code and data are publicly available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/launch/factbench.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Recent work on explainable NLP has shown that few-shot prompting can enable large pretrained language models (LLMs) to generate grammatical and factual natural language explanations for data labels. In this work, we study the connection between explainability and sample hardness by investigating the following research question - "Are LLMs and humans equally good at explaining data labels for both easy and hard samples?" We answer this question by first collecting human-written explanations in the form of generalizable commonsense rules on the task of Winograd Schema Challenge (Winogrande dataset). We compare these explanations with those generated by GPT-3 while varying the hardness of the test samples as well as the in-context samples. We observe that (1) GPT-3 explanations are as grammatical as human explanations regardless of the hardness of the test samples, (2) for easy examples, GPT-3 generates highly supportive explanations but human explanations are more generalizable, and (3) for hard examples, human explanations are significantly better than GPT-3 explanations both in terms of label-supportiveness and generalizability judgements. We also find that hardness of the in-context examples impacts the quality of GPT-3 explanations. Finally, we show that the supportiveness and generalizability aspects of human explanations are also impacted by sample hardness, although by a much smaller margin than models. Supporting code and data are available at https://github.com/swarnaHub/ExplanationHardness

Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed as powerful tools for several natural language processing (NLP) applications. Recent works show that modern LLMs can generate self-explanations (SEs), which elicit their intermediate reasoning steps for explaining their behavior. Self-explanations have seen widespread adoption owing to their conversational and plausible nature. However, there is little to no understanding of their faithfulness. In this work, we discuss the dichotomy between faithfulness and plausibility in SEs generated by LLMs. We argue that while LLMs are adept at generating plausible explanations -- seemingly logical and coherent to human users -- these explanations do not necessarily align with the reasoning processes of the LLMs, raising concerns about their faithfulness. We highlight that the current trend towards increasing the plausibility of explanations, primarily driven by the demand for user-friendly interfaces, may come at the cost of diminishing their faithfulness. We assert that the faithfulness of explanations is critical in LLMs employed for high-stakes decision-making. Moreover, we urge the community to identify the faithfulness requirements of real-world applications and ensure explanations meet those needs. Finally, we propose some directions for future work, emphasizing the need for novel methodologies and frameworks that can enhance the faithfulness of self-explanations without compromising their plausibility, essential for the transparent deployment of LLMs in diverse high-stakes domains.

Methods for understanding the decisions of and mechanisms underlying deep neural networks (DNNs) typically rely on building intuition by emphasizing sensory or semantic features of individual examples. For instance, methods aim to visualize the components of an input which are "important" to a network's decision, or to measure the semantic properties of single neurons. Here, we argue that interpretability research suffers from an over-reliance on intuition-based approaches that risk-and in some cases have caused-illusory progress and misleading conclusions. We identify a set of limitations that we argue impede meaningful progress in interpretability research, and examine two popular classes of interpretability methods-saliency and single-neuron-based approaches-that serve as case studies for how overreliance on intuition and lack of falsifiability can undermine interpretability research. To address these concerns, we propose a strategy to address these impediments in the form of a framework for strongly falsifiable interpretability research. We encourage researchers to use their intuitions as a starting point to develop and test clear, falsifiable hypotheses, and hope that our framework yields robust, evidence-based interpretability methods that generate meaningful advances in our understanding of DNNs.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

Contrastive explanations, where one decision is explained in contrast to another, are supposed to be closer to how humans explain a decision than non-contrastive explanations, where the decision is not necessarily referenced to an alternative. This claim has never been empirically validated. We analyze four English text-classification datasets (SST2, DynaSent, BIOS and DBpedia-Animals). We fine-tune and extract explanations from three different models (RoBERTa, GTP-2, and T5), each in three different sizes and apply three post-hoc explainability methods (LRP, GradientxInput, GradNorm). We furthermore collect and release human rationale annotations for a subset of 100 samples from the BIOS dataset for contrastive and non-contrastive settings. A cross-comparison between model-based rationales and human annotations, both in contrastive and non-contrastive settings, yields a high agreement between the two settings for models as well as for humans. Moreover, model-based explanations computed in both settings align equally well with human rationales. Thus, we empirically find that humans do not necessarily explain in a contrastive manner.9 pages, long paper at ACL 2022 proceedings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Many commonsense reasoning NLP tasks involve choosing between one or more possible answers to a question or prompt based on knowledge that is often implicit. Large pretrained language models (PLMs) can achieve near-human performance on such tasks, while providing little human-interpretable evidence of the underlying reasoning they use. In this work, we show how to use these same models to generate such evidence: inspired by the contrastive nature of human explanations, we use PLMs to complete explanation prompts which contrast alternatives according to the key attribute(s) required to justify the correct answer (for example, peanuts are usually salty while raisins are sweet). Conditioning model decisions on these explanations improves performance on two commonsense reasoning benchmarks, as compared to previous non-contrastive alternatives. These explanations are also judged by humans to be more relevant for solving the task, and facilitate a novel method to evaluate explanation faithfulfness.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

Argumentation is one of society's foundational pillars, and, sparked by advances in NLP and the vast availability of text data, automated mining of arguments receives increasing attention. A decisive property of arguments is their strength or quality. While there are works on the automated estimation of argument strength, their scope is narrow: they focus on isolated datasets and neglect the interactions with related argument mining tasks, such as argument identification, evidence detection, or emotional appeal. In this work, we close this gap by approaching argument quality estimation from multiple different angles: Grounded on rich results from thorough empirical evaluations, we assess the generalization capabilities of argument quality estimation across diverse domains, the interplay with related argument mining tasks, and the impact of emotions on perceived argument strength. We find that generalization depends on a sufficient representation of different domains in the training part. In zero-shot transfer and multi-task experiments, we reveal that argument quality is among the more challenging tasks but can improve others. Finally, we show that emotions play a minor role in argument quality than is often assumed.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Human feedback has become the de facto standard for evaluating the performance of Large Language Models, and is increasingly being used as a training objective. However, it is not clear which properties of a generated output this single `preference' score captures. We hypothesise that preference scores are subjective and open to undesirable biases. We critically analyse the use of human feedback for both training and evaluation, to verify whether it fully captures a range of crucial error criteria. We find that while preference scores have fairly good coverage, they under-represent important aspects like factuality. We further hypothesise that both preference scores and error annotation may be affected by confounders, and leverage instruction-tuned models to generate outputs that vary along two possible confounding dimensions: assertiveness and complexity. We find that the assertiveness of an output skews the perceived rate of factuality errors, indicating that human annotations are not a fully reliable evaluation metric or training objective. Finally, we offer preliminary evidence that using human feedback as a training objective disproportionately increases the assertiveness of model outputs. We encourage future work to carefully consider whether preference scores are well aligned with the desired objective.

When answering questions, LLMs can convey not only an answer, but a level of confidence about the answer being correct. This includes explicit confidence markers (e.g. giving a numeric score) as well as implicit markers, like an authoritative tone or elaborating with additional knowledge. For LLMs to be trustworthy knowledge sources, the confidence they convey should match their actual expertise; however, most current models tend towards overconfidence. To calibrate both implicit and explicit confidence markers, we introduce a pragmatic, listener-aware finetuning method (LACIE) that models the listener, considering not only whether an answer is right, but whether it will be accepted by a listener. We cast calibration as preference optimization, creating data via a two-agent game, where a speaker model's outputs are judged by a simulated listener. We then finetune three LLMs (Mistral-7B, Llama3-8B, Llama3-70B) with LACIE, and show that the resulting models are better calibrated w.r.t. a simulated listener. Crucially, these trends transfer to human listeners, helping them correctly predict model correctness: we conduct a human evaluation where annotators accept or reject an LLM's answers, finding that training with LACIE results in 47% fewer incorrect answers being accepted while maintaining the same level of acceptance for correct answers. Furthermore, LACIE generalizes to another dataset, resulting in a large increase in truthfulness on TruthfulQA when trained on TriviaQA. Our analysis indicates that LACIE leads to a better confidence separation between correct and incorrect examples. Qualitatively, we find that a LACIE-trained model hedges more and implicitly signals certainty when it is correct by using an authoritative tone or including details. Finally, LACIE finetuning leads to an emergent increase in model abstention (e.g. saying "I don't know") for answers that are likely wrong.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

Visual arguments, often used in advertising or social causes, rely on images to persuade viewers to do or believe something. Understanding these arguments requires selective vision: only specific visual stimuli within an image are relevant to the argument, and relevance can only be understood within the context of a broader argumentative structure. While visual arguments are readily appreciated by human audiences, we ask: are today's AI capable of similar understanding? We collect and release VisArgs, an annotated corpus designed to make explicit the (usually implicit) structures underlying visual arguments. VisArgs includes 1,611 images accompanied by three types of textual annotations: 5,112 visual premises (with region annotations), 5,574 commonsense premises, and reasoning trees connecting them to a broader argument. We propose three tasks over VisArgs to probe machine capacity for visual argument understanding: localization of premises, identification of premises, and deduction of conclusions. Experiments demonstrate that 1) machines cannot fully identify the relevant visual cues. The top-performing model, GPT-4-O, achieved an accuracy of only 78.5%, whereas humans reached 98.0%. All models showed a performance drop, with an average decrease in accuracy of 19.5%, when the comparison set was changed from objects outside the image to irrelevant objects within the image. Furthermore, 2) this limitation is the greatest factor impacting their performance in understanding visual arguments. Most models improved the most when given relevant visual premises as additional inputs, compared to other inputs, for deducing the conclusion of the visual argument.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Transformers have been shown to emulate logical deduction over natural language theories (logical rules expressed in natural language), reliably assigning true/false labels to candidate implications. However, their ability to generate implications of a theory has not yet been demonstrated, and methods for reconstructing proofs of answers are imperfect. In this work we show that a generative model, called ProofWriter, can reliably generate both implications of a theory and the natural language proof(s) that support them. In particular, iterating a 1-step implication generator results in proofs that are highly reliable, and represent actual model decisions (rather than post-hoc rationalizations). On the RuleTaker dataset, the accuracy of ProofWriter's proofs exceed previous methods by +9% absolute, and in a way that generalizes to proof depths unseen in training and on out-of-domain problems. We also show that generative techniques can perform a type of abduction with high precision: Given a theory and an unprovable conclusion, identify a missing fact that allows the conclusion to be proved, along with a proof. These results significantly improve the viability of neural methods for systematically reasoning over natural language.

We consider objective evaluation measures of saliency explanations for complex black-box machine learning models. We propose simple robust variants of two notions that have been considered in recent literature: (in)fidelity, and sensitivity. We analyze optimal explanations with respect to both these measures, and while the optimal explanation for sensitivity is a vacuous constant explanation, the optimal explanation for infidelity is a novel combination of two popular explanation methods. By varying the perturbation distribution that defines infidelity, we obtain novel explanations by optimizing infidelity, which we show to out-perform existing explanations in both quantitative and qualitative measurements. Another salient question given these measures is how to modify any given explanation to have better values with respect to these measures. We propose a simple modification based on lowering sensitivity, and moreover show that when done appropriately, we could simultaneously improve both sensitivity as well as fidelity.

Instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs) excel at many tasks, and will even provide explanations for their behavior. Since these models are directly accessible to the public, there is a risk that convincing and wrong explanations can lead to unsupported confidence in LLMs. Therefore, interpretability-faithfulness of self-explanations is an important consideration for AI Safety. Assessing the interpretability-faithfulness of these explanations, termed self-explanations, is challenging as the models are too complex for humans to annotate what is a correct explanation. To address this, we propose employing self-consistency checks as a measure of faithfulness. For example, if an LLM says a set of words is important for making a prediction, then it should not be able to make the same prediction without these words. While self-consistency checks are a common approach to faithfulness, they have not previously been applied to LLM's self-explanations. We apply self-consistency checks to three types of self-explanations: counterfactuals, importance measures, and redactions. Our work demonstrate that faithfulness is both task and model dependent, e.g., for sentiment classification, counterfactual explanations are more faithful for Llama2, importance measures for Mistral, and redaction for Falcon 40B. Finally, our findings are robust to prompt-variations.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

Providing high quality explanations for AI predictions based on machine learning is a challenging and complex task. To work well it requires, among other factors: selecting a proper level of generality/specificity of the explanation; considering assumptions about the familiarity of the explanation beneficiary with the AI task under consideration; referring to specific elements that have contributed to the decision; making use of additional knowledge (e.g. expert evidence) which might not be part of the prediction process; and providing evidence supporting negative hypothesis. Finally, the system needs to formulate the explanation in a clearly interpretable, and possibly convincing, way. Given these considerations, ANTIDOTE fosters an integrated vision of explainable AI, where low-level characteristics of the deep learning process are combined with higher level schemes proper of the human argumentation capacity. ANTIDOTE will exploit cross-disciplinary competences in deep learning and argumentation to support a broader and innovative view of explainable AI, where the need for high-quality explanations for clinical cases deliberation is critical. As a first result of the project, we publish the Antidote CasiMedicos dataset to facilitate research on explainable AI in general, and argumentation in the medical domain in particular.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Empowering large language models to accurately express confidence in their answers is essential for trustworthy decision-making. Previous confidence elicitation methods, which primarily rely on white-box access to internal model information or model fine-tuning, have become less suitable for LLMs, especially closed-source commercial APIs. This leads to a growing need to explore the untapped area of black-box approaches for LLM uncertainty estimation. To better break down the problem, we define a systematic framework with three components: prompting strategies for eliciting verbalized confidence, sampling methods for generating multiple responses, and aggregation techniques for computing consistency. We then benchmark these methods on two key tasks-confidence calibration and failure prediction-across five types of datasets (e.g., commonsense and arithmetic reasoning) and five widely-used LLMs including GPT-4 and LLaMA 2 Chat. Our analysis uncovers several key insights: 1) LLMs, when verbalizing their confidence, tend to be overconfident, potentially imitating human patterns of expressing confidence. 2) As model capability scales up, both calibration and failure prediction performance improve. 3) Employing our proposed strategies, such as human-inspired prompts, consistency among multiple responses, and better aggregation strategies can help mitigate this overconfidence from various perspectives. 4) Comparisons with white-box methods indicate that while white-box methods perform better, the gap is narrow, e.g., 0.522 to 0.605 in AUROC. Despite these advancements, none of these techniques consistently outperform others, and all investigated methods struggle in challenging tasks, such as those requiring professional knowledge, indicating significant scope for improvement. We believe this study can serve as a strong baseline and provide insights for eliciting confidence in black-box LLMs.

Free-text rationales justify model decisions in natural language and thus become likable and accessible among approaches to explanation across many tasks. However, their effectiveness can be hindered by misinterpretation and hallucination. As a perturbation test, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) perform rationale generation under the effects of readability level control, i.e., being prompted for an explanation targeting a specific expertise level, such as sixth grade or college. We find that explanations are adaptable to such instruction, though the requested readability is often misaligned with the measured text complexity according to traditional readability metrics. Furthermore, the generated rationales tend to feature medium level complexity, which correlates with the measured quality using automatic metrics. Finally, our human annotators confirm a generally satisfactory impression on rationales at all readability levels, with high-school-level readability being most commonly perceived and favored.

Post-hoc gradient-based interpretability methods [Simonyan et al., 2013, Smilkov et al., 2017] that provide instance-specific explanations of model predictions are often based on assumption (A): magnitude of input gradients -- gradients of logits with respect to input -- noisily highlight discriminative task-relevant features. In this work, we test the validity of assumption (A) using a three-pronged approach. First, we develop an evaluation framework, DiffROAR, to test assumption (A) on four image classification benchmarks. Our results suggest that (i) input gradients of standard models (i.e., trained on original data) may grossly violate (A), whereas (ii) input gradients of adversarially robust models satisfy (A). Second, we introduce BlockMNIST, an MNIST-based semi-real dataset, that by design encodes a priori knowledge of discriminative features. Our analysis on BlockMNIST leverages this information to validate as well as characterize differences between input gradient attributions of standard and robust models. Finally, we theoretically prove that our empirical findings hold on a simplified version of the BlockMNIST dataset. Specifically, we prove that input gradients of standard one-hidden-layer MLPs trained on this dataset do not highlight instance-specific signal coordinates, thus grossly violating assumption (A). Our findings motivate the need to formalize and test common assumptions in interpretability in a falsifiable manner [Leavitt and Morcos, 2020]. We believe that the DiffROAR evaluation framework and BlockMNIST-based datasets can serve as sanity checks to audit instance-specific interpretability methods; code and data available at https://github.com/harshays/inputgradients.

For large language models (LLMs) to be trusted by humans they need to be well-calibrated in the sense that they can accurately assess and communicate how likely it is that their predictions are correct. Recent work has focused on the quality of internal LLM confidence assessments, but the question remains of how well LLMs can communicate this internal model confidence to human users. This paper explores the disparity between external human confidence in an LLM's responses and the internal confidence of the model. Through experiments involving multiple-choice questions, we systematically examine human users' ability to discern the reliability of LLM outputs. Our study focuses on two key areas: (1) assessing users' perception of true LLM confidence and (2) investigating the impact of tailored explanations on this perception. The research highlights that default explanations from LLMs often lead to user overestimation of both the model's confidence and its' accuracy. By modifying the explanations to more accurately reflect the LLM's internal confidence, we observe a significant shift in user perception, aligning it more closely with the model's actual confidence levels. This adjustment in explanatory approach demonstrates potential for enhancing user trust and accuracy in assessing LLM outputs. The findings underscore the importance of transparent communication of confidence levels in LLMs, particularly in high-stakes applications where understanding the reliability of AI-generated information is essential.

Research in mechanistic interpretability seeks to explain behaviors of machine learning models in terms of their internal components. However, most previous work either focuses on simple behaviors in small models, or describes complicated behaviors in larger models with broad strokes. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting an explanation for how GPT-2 small performs a natural language task called indirect object identification (IOI). Our explanation encompasses 26 attention heads grouped into 7 main classes, which we discovered using a combination of interpretability approaches relying on causal interventions. To our knowledge, this investigation is the largest end-to-end attempt at reverse-engineering a natural behavior "in the wild" in a language model. We evaluate the reliability of our explanation using three quantitative criteria--faithfulness, completeness and minimality. Though these criteria support our explanation, they also point to remaining gaps in our understanding. Our work provides evidence that a mechanistic understanding of large ML models is feasible, opening opportunities to scale our understanding to both larger models and more complex tasks.

Despite the success of chain of thought in enhancing language model reasoning, the underlying process remains less well understood. Although logically sound reasoning appears inherently crucial for chain of thought, prior studies surprisingly reveal minimal impact when using invalid demonstrations instead. Furthermore, the conventional chain of thought does not inform language models on what mistakes to avoid, which potentially leads to more errors. Hence, inspired by how humans can learn from both positive and negative examples, we propose contrastive chain of thought to enhance language model reasoning. Compared to the conventional chain of thought, our approach provides both valid and invalid reasoning demonstrations, to guide the model to reason step-by-step while reducing reasoning mistakes. To improve generalization, we introduce an automatic method to construct contrastive demonstrations. Our experiments on reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that contrastive chain of thought can serve as a general enhancement of chain-of-thought prompting.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Large language models (LLMs) can produce erroneous responses that sound fluent and convincing, raising the risk that users will rely on these responses as if they were correct. Mitigating such overreliance is a key challenge. Through a think-aloud study in which participants use an LLM-infused application to answer objective questions, we identify several features of LLM responses that shape users' reliance: explanations (supporting details for answers), inconsistencies in explanations, and sources. Through a large-scale, pre-registered, controlled experiment (N=308), we isolate and study the effects of these features on users' reliance, accuracy, and other measures. We find that the presence of explanations increases reliance on both correct and incorrect responses. However, we observe less reliance on incorrect responses when sources are provided or when explanations exhibit inconsistencies. We discuss the implications of these findings for fostering appropriate reliance on LLMs.

The increasing capability of Large Language Models to act as human-like social agents raises two important questions in the area of opinion dynamics. First, whether these agents can generate effective arguments that could be injected into the online discourse to steer the public opinion. Second, whether artificial agents can interact with each other to reproduce dynamics of persuasion typical of human social systems, opening up opportunities for studying synthetic social systems as faithful proxies for opinion dynamics in human populations. To address these questions, we designed a synthetic persuasion dialogue scenario on the topic of climate change, where a 'convincer' agent generates a persuasive argument for a 'skeptic' agent, who subsequently assesses whether the argument changed its internal opinion state. Different types of arguments were generated to incorporate different linguistic dimensions underpinning psycho-linguistic theories of opinion change. We then asked human judges to evaluate the persuasiveness of machine-generated arguments. Arguments that included factual knowledge, markers of trust, expressions of support, and conveyed status were deemed most effective according to both humans and agents, with humans reporting a marked preference for knowledge-based arguments. Our experimental framework lays the groundwork for future in-silico studies of opinion dynamics, and our findings suggest that artificial agents have the potential of playing an important role in collective processes of opinion formation in online social media.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to persuasion, which can pose risks when models are faced with an adversarial interlocutor. We take a first step towards defending models against persuasion while also arguing that defense against adversarial (i.e. negative) persuasion is only half of the equation: models should also be able to accept beneficial (i.e. positive) persuasion to improve their answers. We show that optimizing models for only one side results in poor performance on the other. In order to balance positive and negative persuasion, we introduce Persuasion-Balanced Training (or PBT), which leverages multi-agent recursive dialogue trees to create data and trains models via preference optimization to accept persuasion when appropriate. PBT consistently improves resistance to misinformation and resilience to being challenged while also resulting in the best overall performance on holistic data containing both positive and negative persuasion. Crucially, we show that PBT models are better teammates in multi-agent debates. We find that without PBT, pairs of stronger and weaker models have unstable performance, with the order in which the models present their answers determining whether the team obtains the stronger or weaker model's performance. PBT leads to better and more stable results and less order dependence, with the stronger model consistently pulling the weaker one up.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Large language models are increasingly capable of generating fluent-appearing text with relatively little task-specific supervision. But can these models accurately explain classification decisions? We consider the task of generating free-text explanations using human-written examples in a few-shot manner. We find that (1) authoring higher quality prompts results in higher quality generations; and (2) surprisingly, in a head-to-head comparison, crowdworkers often prefer explanations generated by GPT-3 to crowdsourced explanations in existing datasets. Our human studies also show, however, that while models often produce factual, grammatical, and sufficient explanations, they have room to improve along axes such as providing novel information and supporting the label. We create a pipeline that combines GPT-3 with a supervised filter that incorporates binary acceptability judgments from humans in the loop. Despite the intrinsic subjectivity of acceptability judgments, we demonstrate that acceptability is partially correlated with various fine-grained attributes of explanations. Our approach is able to consistently filter GPT-3-generated explanations deemed acceptable by humans.

Generating rationales that justify scoring decisions has been a promising way to facilitate explainability in automated scoring systems. However, existing methods do not match the accuracy of classifier-based methods. Plus, the generated rationales often contain hallucinated information. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework capable of generating more faithful rationales and, more importantly, matching performance with classifier-based black-box scoring systems. We first mimic the human assessment process by querying Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate a thought tree. We then summarise intermediate assessment decisions from each thought tree path for creating synthetic rationale data and rationale preference data. Finally, we utilise the generated synthetic data to calibrate LLMs through a two-step training process: supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves a 38% assessment performance improvement in the QWK score compared to prior work while producing higher-quality rationales, as recognised by human evaluators and LLMs. Our work sheds light on the effectiveness of performing preference optimization using synthetic preference data obtained from thought tree paths.

Multimodal machine learning has achieved remarkable progress in a wide range of scenarios. However, the reliability of multimodal learning remains largely unexplored. In this paper, through extensive empirical studies, we identify current multimodal classification methods suffer from unreliable predictive confidence that tend to rely on partial modalities when estimating confidence. Specifically, we find that the confidence estimated by current models could even increase when some modalities are corrupted. To address the issue, we introduce an intuitive principle for multimodal learning, i.e., the confidence should not increase when one modality is removed. Accordingly, we propose a novel regularization technique, i.e., Calibrating Multimodal Learning (CML) regularization, to calibrate the predictive confidence of previous methods. This technique could be flexibly equipped by existing models and improve the performance in terms of confidence calibration, classification accuracy, and model robustness.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

As machine learning models evolve, maintaining transparency demands more human-centric explainable AI techniques. Counterfactual explanations, with roots in human reasoning, identify the minimal input changes needed to obtain a given output and, hence, are crucial for supporting decision-making. Despite their importance, the evaluation of these explanations often lacks grounding in user studies and remains fragmented, with existing metrics not fully capturing human perspectives. To address this challenge, we developed a diverse set of 30 counterfactual scenarios and collected ratings across 8 evaluation metrics from 206 respondents. Subsequently, we fine-tuned different Large Language Models (LLMs) to predict average or individual human judgment across these metrics. Our methodology allowed LLMs to achieve an accuracy of up to 63% in zero-shot evaluations and 85% (over a 3-classes prediction) with fine-tuning across all metrics. The fine-tuned models predicting human ratings offer better comparability and scalability in evaluating different counterfactual explanation frameworks.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various tasks, but their performance is highly sensitive to the prompts utilized. This variability poses challenges for accurate assessment and user satisfaction. Current research frequently overlooks instance-level prompt variations and their implications on subjective evaluations. To address these shortcomings, we introduce ProSA, a framework designed to evaluate and comprehend prompt sensitivity in LLMs. ProSA incorporates a novel sensitivity metric, PromptSensiScore, and leverages decoding confidence to elucidate underlying mechanisms. Our extensive study, spanning multiple tasks, uncovers that prompt sensitivity fluctuates across datasets and models, with larger models exhibiting enhanced robustness. We observe that few-shot examples can alleviate this sensitivity issue, and subjective evaluations are also susceptible to prompt sensitivities, particularly in complex, reasoning-oriented tasks. Furthermore, our findings indicate that higher model confidence correlates with increased prompt robustness. We believe this work will serve as a helpful tool in studying prompt sensitivity of LLMs. The project is released at: https://github.com/open-compass/ProSA .

Hallucination plagues even frontier LLMs--but how bad is it really for summarizing academic papers? We evaluate Factored Verification, a simple automated method for detecting hallucinations in abstractive summaries. This method sets a new SotA on hallucination detection in the summarization task of the HaluEval benchmark, achieving 76.2% accuracy. We then use this method to estimate how often language models hallucinate when summarizing across multiple academic papers and find 0.62 hallucinations in the average ChatGPT (16k) summary, 0.84 for GPT-4, and 1.55 for Claude 2. We ask models to self-correct using Factored Critiques and find that this lowers the number of hallucinations to 0.49 for ChatGPT, 0.46 for GPT-4, and 0.95 for Claude 2. The hallucinations we find are often subtle, so we advise caution when using models to synthesize academic papers.

In this paper, we conduct a thorough investigation into the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), focusing specifically on the Open Pretrained Transformers (OPT) models as a representative of such models. Our study entails finetuning three different sizes of OPT on a carefully curated reasoning corpus, resulting in two sets of finetuned models: OPT-R, finetuned without explanations, and OPT-RE, finetuned with explanations. We then evaluate all models on 57 out-of-domain tasks drawn from the SUPER-NATURALINSTRUCTIONS benchmark, covering 26 distinct reasoning skills, utilizing three prompting techniques. Through a comprehensive grid of 27 configurations and 6,156 test evaluations, we investigate the dimensions of finetuning, prompting, and scale to understand the role of explanations on different reasoning skills. Our findings reveal that having explanations in the fewshot exemplar has no significant impact on the model's performance when the model is finetuned, while positively affecting the non-finetuned counterpart. Moreover, we observe a slight yet consistent increase in classification accuracy as we incorporate explanations during prompting and finetuning, respectively. Finally, we offer insights on which skills benefit the most from incorporating explanations during finetuning and prompting, such as Numerical (+20.4%) and Analogical (+13.9%) reasoning, as well as skills that exhibit negligible or negative effects.

A plethora of methods have been proposed to explain how deep neural networks reach their decisions but comparatively, little effort has been made to ensure that the explanations produced by these methods are objectively relevant. While several desirable properties for trustworthy explanations have been formulated, objective measures have been harder to derive. Here, we propose two new measures to evaluate explanations borrowed from the field of algorithmic stability: mean generalizability MeGe and relative consistency ReCo. We conduct extensive experiments on different network architectures, common explainability methods, and several image datasets to demonstrate the benefits of the proposed measures.In comparison to ours, popular fidelity measures are not sufficient to guarantee trustworthy explanations.Finally, we found that 1-Lipschitz networks produce explanations with higher MeGe and ReCo than common neural networks while reaching similar accuracy. This suggests that 1-Lipschitz networks are a relevant direction towards predictors that are more explainable and trustworthy.

Fact-checking is the task of verifying the veracity of claims by assessing their assertions against credible evidence. The vast majority of fact-checking studies focus exclusively on political claims. Very little research explores fact-checking for other topics, specifically subject matters for which expertise is required. We present the first study of explainable fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise. For our case study we choose the setting of public health. To support this case study we construct a new dataset PUBHEALTH of 11.8K claims accompanied by journalist crafted, gold standard explanations (i.e., judgments) to support the fact-check labels for claims. We explore two tasks: veracity prediction and explanation generation. We also define and evaluate, with humans and computationally, three coherence properties of explanation quality. Our results indicate that, by training on in-domain data, gains can be made in explainable, automated fact-checking for claims which require specific expertise.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities given chain-of-thought prompts (examples with intermediate reasoning steps). Existing benchmarks measure reasoning ability indirectly, by evaluating accuracy on downstream tasks such as mathematical reasoning. However, it is unclear how these models obtain the answers and whether they rely on simple heuristics rather than the generated chain-of-thought. To enable systematic exploration of the reasoning ability of LLMs, we present a new synthetic question-answering dataset called PrOntoQA, where each example is generated from a synthetic world model represented in first-order logic. This allows us to parse the generated chain-of-thought into symbolic proofs for formal analysis. Our analysis on InstructGPT and GPT-3 shows that LLMs are quite capable of making correct individual deduction steps, and so are generally capable of reasoning, even in fictional contexts. However, they have difficulty with proof planning: When multiple valid deduction steps are available, they are not able to systematically explore the different options.

In a recent paper, Erasmus et al. (2021) defend the idea that the ambiguity of the term "explanation" in explainable AI (XAI) can be solved by adopting any of four different extant accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science: the Deductive Nomological, Inductive Statistical, Causal Mechanical, and New Mechanist models. In this chapter, I show that the authors' claim that these accounts can be applied to deep neural networks as they would to any natural phenomenon is mistaken. I also provide a more general argument as to why the notion of explainability as it is currently used in the XAI literature bears little resemblance to the traditional concept of scientific explanation. It would be more fruitful to use the label "understandable AI" to avoid the confusion that surrounds the goal and purposes of XAI. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for a pragmatic conception of understanding that is better suited to play the central role attributed to explanation in XAI. Following Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), the conditions of satisfaction for understanding an ML system are fleshed out in terms of an agent's success in using the system, in drawing correct inferences from it.

Scaling the test-time compute of large language models has demonstrated impressive performance on reasoning benchmarks. However, existing evaluations of test-time scaling make the strong assumption that a reasoning system should always give an answer to any question provided. This overlooks concerns about whether a model is confident in its answer, and whether it is appropriate to always provide a response. To address these concerns, we extract confidence scores during reasoning for thresholding model responses. We find that increasing compute budget at inference time not only helps models answer more questions correctly, but also increases confidence in correct responses. We then extend the current paradigm of zero-risk responses during evaluation by considering settings with non-zero levels of response risk, and suggest a recipe for reporting evaluations under these settings.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Retrieval-augmented language models are being increasingly tasked with subjective, contentious, and conflicting queries such as "is aspartame linked to cancer". To resolve these ambiguous queries, one must search through a large range of websites and consider "which, if any, of this evidence do I find convincing?". In this work, we study how LLMs answer this question. In particular, we construct ConflictingQA, a dataset that pairs controversial queries with a series of real-world evidence documents that contain different facts (e.g., quantitative results), argument styles (e.g., appeals to authority), and answers (Yes or No). We use this dataset to perform sensitivity and counterfactual analyses to explore which text features most affect LLM predictions. Overall, we find that current models rely heavily on the relevance of a website to the query, while largely ignoring stylistic features that humans find important such as whether a text contains scientific references or is written with a neutral tone. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of RAG corpus quality (e.g., the need to filter misinformation), and possibly even a shift in how LLMs are trained to better align with human judgements.

Large language models (LMs) are capable of generating free-text rationales to aid question answering. However, prior work 1) suggests that useful self-rationalization is emergent only at significant scales (e.g., 175B parameter GPT-3); and 2) focuses largely on downstream performance, ignoring the semantics of the rationales themselves, e.g., are they faithful, true, and helpful for humans? In this work, we enable small-scale LMs (approx. 200x smaller than GPT-3) to generate rationales that not only improve downstream task performance, but are also more plausible, consistent, and diverse, assessed both by automatic and human evaluation. Our method, MaRio (Multi-rewArd RatIOnalization), is a multi-reward conditioned self-rationalization algorithm that optimizes multiple distinct properties like plausibility, diversity and consistency. Results on five difficult question-answering datasets StrategyQA, QuaRel, OpenBookQA, NumerSense and QASC show that not only does MaRio improve task accuracy, but it also improves the self-rationalization quality of small LMs across the aforementioned axes better than a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) baseline. Extensive human evaluations confirm that MaRio rationales are preferred vs. SFT rationales, as well as qualitative improvements in plausibility and consistency.

Training deep neural networks in low rank, i.e. with factorised layers, is of particular interest to the community: it offers efficiency over unfactorised training in terms of both memory consumption and training time. Prior work has focused on low rank approximations of pre-trained networks and training in low rank space with additional objectives, offering various ad hoc explanations for chosen practice. We analyse techniques that work well in practice, and through extensive ablations on models such as GPT2 we provide evidence falsifying common beliefs in the field, hinting in the process at exciting research opportunities that still need answering.

Attribution methods can provide powerful insights into the reasons for a classifier's decision. We argue that a key desideratum of an explanation method is its robustness to input hyperparameters which are often randomly set or empirically tuned. High sensitivity to arbitrary hyperparameter choices does not only impede reproducibility but also questions the correctness of an explanation and impairs the trust of end-users. In this paper, we provide a thorough empirical study on the sensitivity of existing attribution methods. We found an alarming trend that many methods are highly sensitive to changes in their common hyperparameters e.g. even changing a random seed can yield a different explanation! Interestingly, such sensitivity is not reflected in the average explanation accuracy scores over the dataset as commonly reported in the literature. In addition, explanations generated for robust classifiers (i.e. which are trained to be invariant to pixel-wise perturbations) are surprisingly more robust than those generated for regular classifiers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

The reasoning steps generated by LLMs might be incomplete, as they mimic logical leaps common in everyday communication found in their pre-training data: underlying rationales are frequently left implicit (unstated). To address this challenge, we introduce RATIONALYST, a model for process-supervision of reasoning based on pre-training on a vast collection of rationale annotations extracted from unlabeled data. We extract 79k rationales from web-scale unlabelled dataset (the Pile) and a combination of reasoning datasets with minimal human intervention. This web-scale pre-training for reasoning allows RATIONALYST to consistently generalize across diverse reasoning tasks, including mathematical, commonsense, scientific, and logical reasoning. Fine-tuned from LLaMa-3-8B, RATIONALYST improves the accuracy of reasoning by an average of 3.9% on 7 representative reasoning benchmarks. It also demonstrates superior performance compared to significantly larger verifiers like GPT-4 and similarly sized models fine-tuned on matching training sets.

The fluency and creativity of large pre-trained language models (LLMs) have led to their widespread use, sometimes even as a replacement for traditional search engines. Yet language models are prone to making convincing but factually inaccurate claims, often referred to as 'hallucinations.' These errors can inadvertently spread misinformation or harmfully perpetuate misconceptions. Further, manual fact-checking of model responses is a time-consuming process, making human factuality labels expensive to acquire. In this work, we fine-tune language models to be more factual, without human labeling and targeting more open-ended generation settings than past work. We leverage two key recent innovations in NLP to do so. First, several recent works have proposed methods for judging the factuality of open-ended text by measuring consistency with an external knowledge base or simply a large model's confidence scores. Second, the direct preference optimization algorithm enables straightforward fine-tuning of language models on objectives other than supervised imitation, using a preference ranking over possible model responses. We show that learning from automatically generated factuality preference rankings, generated either through existing retrieval systems or our novel retrieval-free approach, significantly improves the factuality (percent of generated claims that are correct) of Llama-2 on held-out topics compared with RLHF or decoding strategies targeted at factuality. At 7B scale, compared to Llama-2-chat, we observe 58% and 40% reduction in factual error rate when generating biographies and answering medical questions, respectively.

As synthetic media becomes progressively more realistic and barriers to using it continue to lower, the technology has been increasingly utilized for malicious purposes, from financial fraud to nonconsensual pornography. Today, the principal defense against being misled by synthetic media relies on the ability of the human observer to visually and auditorily discern between real and fake. However, it remains unclear just how vulnerable people actually are to deceptive synthetic media in the course of their day to day lives. We conducted a perceptual study with 1276 participants to assess how accurate people were at distinguishing synthetic images, audio only, video only, and audiovisual stimuli from authentic. To reflect the circumstances under which people would likely encounter synthetic media in the wild, testing conditions and stimuli emulated a typical online platform, while all synthetic media used in the survey was sourced from publicly accessible generative AI technology. We find that overall, participants struggled to meaningfully discern between synthetic and authentic content. We also find that detection performance worsens when the stimuli contains synthetic content as compared to authentic content, images featuring human faces as compared to non face objects, a single modality as compared to multimodal stimuli, mixed authenticity as compared to being fully synthetic for audiovisual stimuli, and features foreign languages as compared to languages the observer is fluent in. Finally, we also find that prior knowledge of synthetic media does not meaningfully impact their detection performance. Collectively, these results indicate that people are highly susceptible to being tricked by synthetic media in their daily lives and that human perceptual detection capabilities can no longer be relied upon as an effective counterdefense.

A feature-based model explanation denotes how much each input feature contributes to a model's output for a given data point. As the number of proposed explanation functions grows, we lack quantitative evaluation criteria to help practitioners know when to use which explanation function. This paper proposes quantitative evaluation criteria for feature-based explanations: low sensitivity, high faithfulness, and low complexity. We devise a framework for aggregating explanation functions. We develop a procedure for learning an aggregate explanation function with lower complexity and then derive a new aggregate Shapley value explanation function that minimizes sensitivity.

It is known that human speech and certain animal vocalizations can convey meaningful content because we can decipher the content that a given utterance does convey. This paper explores an alternative approach to determining whether a signal is meaningful, one that analyzes only the signal itself and is independent of what the conveyed meaning might be. We devise a method that takes a waveform as input and outputs a score indicating its degree of `meaningfulness`. We cluster contiguous portions of the input to minimize the total description length, and then take the length of the code of the assigned cluster labels as meaningfulness score. We evaluate our method empirically, against several baselines, and show that it is the only one to give a high score to human speech in various languages and with various speakers, a moderate score to animal vocalizations from birds and orcas, and a low score to ambient noise from various sources.

We contribute the largest publicly available dataset of naturally occurring factual claims for the purpose of automatic claim verification. It is collected from 26 fact checking websites in English, paired with textual sources and rich metadata, and labelled for veracity by human expert journalists. We present an in-depth analysis of the dataset, highlighting characteristics and challenges. Further, we present results for automatic veracity prediction, both with established baselines and with a novel method for joint ranking of evidence pages and predicting veracity that outperforms all baselines. Significant performance increases are achieved by encoding evidence, and by modelling metadata. Our best-performing model achieves a Macro F1 of 49.2%, showing that this is a challenging testbed for claim veracity prediction.

Large Language Models are trained on vast amounts of text from the internet, which contains both factual and misleading information about the world. Can language models discern truth from falsehood in this contradicting data? Expanding on the view that LLMs can model different agents producing the corpora, we hypothesize that they can cluster truthful text by modeling a truthful persona: a group of agents that are likely to produce truthful text and share similar features. For example, trustworthy sources like Wikipedia and Science usually use formal writing styles and make consistent claims. By modeling this persona, LLMs can generalize truthfulness beyond the specific contexts in which each agent generated the training text. For example, the model can infer that the agent "Wikipedia" will behave truthfully on topics that were only generated by "Science" because they share a persona. We first show evidence for the persona hypothesis via two observations: (1) we can probe whether a model's answer will be truthful before it is generated; (2) finetuning a model on a set of facts improves its truthfulness on unseen topics. Next, using arithmetics as a synthetic environment, we show that language models can separate true and false statements, and generalize truthfulness across agents; but only if agents in the training data share a truthful generative process that enables the creation of a truthful persona. Overall, our findings suggest that models can exploit hierarchical structures in the data to learn abstract concepts like truthfulness.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

Concept-based explanations for convolutional neural networks (CNNs) aim to explain model behavior and outputs using a pre-defined set of semantic concepts (e.g., the model recognizes scene class ``bedroom'' based on the presence of concepts ``bed'' and ``pillow''). However, they often do not faithfully (i.e., accurately) characterize the model's behavior and can be too complex for people to understand. Further, little is known about how faithful and understandable different explanation methods are, and how to control these two properties. In this work, we propose UFO, a unified method for controlling Understandability and Faithfulness Objectives in concept-based explanations. UFO formalizes understandability and faithfulness as mathematical objectives and unifies most existing concept-based explanations methods for CNNs. Using UFO, we systematically investigate how explanations change as we turn the knobs of faithfulness and understandability. Our experiments demonstrate a faithfulness-vs-understandability tradeoff: increasing understandability reduces faithfulness. We also provide insights into the ``disagreement problem'' in explainable machine learning, by analyzing when and how concept-based explanations disagree with each other.

Rationality is the quality of being guided by reason, characterized by decision-making that aligns with evidence and logical principles. It plays a crucial role in reliable problem-solving by ensuring well-grounded and consistent solutions. While large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in generating human-like text, they still exhibit limitations such as bounded knowledge space and inconsistent outputs. In response, recent efforts have shifted toward developing multimodal and multi-agent systems, as well as integrating modules like external tools, programming codes, symbolic reasoners, utility function, and conformal risk controls rather than relying solely on a single LLM for decision-making. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art advancements in language and multimodal agents, evaluates how they contribute to make intelligent agents more rational, and identifies open challenges and future research directions. We maintain an open repository at https://github.com/bowen-upenn/Agent_Rationality.

Multimodal reasoning is a challenging task that requires models to reason across multiple modalities to answer questions. Existing approaches have made progress by incorporating language and visual modalities into a two-stage reasoning framework, separating rationale generation from answer inference. However, these approaches often fall short due to the inadequate quality of the generated rationales. In this work, we delve into the importance of rationales in model reasoning. We observe that when rationales are completely accurate, the model's accuracy significantly improves, highlighting the need for high-quality rationale generation. Motivated by this, we propose MC-CoT, a self-consistency training strategy that generates multiple rationales and answers, subsequently selecting the most accurate through a voting process. This approach not only enhances the quality of generated rationales but also leads to more accurate and robust answers. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach significantly improves model performance across various benchmarks. Remarkably, we show that even smaller base models, when equipped with our proposed approach, can achieve results comparable to those of larger models, illustrating the potential of our approach in harnessing the power of rationales for improved multimodal reasoning. The code is available at https://github.com/chengtan9907/mc-cot.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly impacted nearly every domain of human knowledge. However, the explainability of these models esp. to laypersons, which are crucial for instilling trust, have been examined through various skeptical lenses. In this paper, we introduce a novel notion of LLM explainability to laypersons, termed ReQuesting, across three high-priority application domains -- law, health and finance, using multiple state-of-the-art LLMs. The proposed notion exhibits faithful generation of explainable layman-understandable algorithms on multiple tasks through high degree of reproducibility. Furthermore, we observe a notable alignment of the explainable algorithms with intrinsic reasoning of the LLMs.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) often generate plausible but incorrect responses to visual queries. However, reliably quantifying the effect of such hallucinations in free-form responses to open-ended queries is challenging as it requires visually verifying each claim within the response. We propose Programmatic VLM Evaluation (PROVE), a new benchmarking paradigm for evaluating VLM responses to open-ended queries. To construct PROVE, we provide a large language model (LLM) with a high-fidelity scene-graph representation constructed from a hyper-detailed image caption, and prompt it to generate diverse question-answer (QA) pairs, as well as programs that can be executed over the scene graph object to verify each QA pair. We thus construct a benchmark of 10.5k challenging but visually grounded QA pairs. Next, to evaluate free-form model responses to queries in PROVE, we propose a programmatic evaluation strategy that measures both the helpfulness and truthfulness of a response within a unified scene graph-based framework. We benchmark the helpfulness-truthfulness trade-offs of a range of VLMs on PROVE, finding that very few are in-fact able to achieve a good balance between the two. Project page: https://prove-explorer.netlify.app/.

To maintain user trust, large language models (LLMs) should signal low confidence on examples where they are incorrect, instead of misleading the user. The standard approach of estimating confidence is to use the softmax probabilities of these models, but as of November 2023, state-of-the-art LLMs such as GPT-4 and Claude-v1.3 do not provide access to these probabilities. We first study eliciting confidence linguistically -- asking an LLM for its confidence in its answer -- which performs reasonably (80.5% AUC on GPT-4 averaged across 12 question-answering datasets -- 7% above a random baseline) but leaves room for improvement. We then explore using a surrogate confidence model -- using a model where we do have probabilities to evaluate the original model's confidence in a given question. Surprisingly, even though these probabilities come from a different and often weaker model, this method leads to higher AUC than linguistic confidences on 9 out of 12 datasets. Our best method composing linguistic confidences and surrogate model probabilities gives state-of-the-art confidence estimates on all 12 datasets (84.6% average AUC on GPT-4).

Large language models (LLMs) have accomplished remarkable reasoning performance in various domains. However, in the domain of reasoning tasks, we discover a frailty: LLMs are surprisingly brittle to the ordering of the premises, despite the fact that such ordering does not alter the underlying task. In particular, we observe that LLMs achieve the best performance when the premise order aligns with the context required in intermediate reasoning steps. For example, in deductive reasoning tasks, presenting the premises in the same order as the ground truth proof in the prompt (as opposed to random ordering) drastically increases the model's accuracy. We first examine the effect of premise ordering on deductive reasoning on a variety of LLMs, and our evaluation shows that permuting the premise order can cause a performance drop of over 30%. In addition, we release the benchmark R-GSM, based on GSM8K, to examine the ordering effect for mathematical problem-solving, and we again observe a significant drop in accuracy, relative to the original GSM8K benchmark.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown impressive performance in various language tasks. However, they are prone to spurious correlations, and often generate illusory information. In real-world applications, PLMs should justify decisions with formalized, coherent reasoning chains, but this challenge remains under-explored. Cognitive psychology theorizes that humans are capable of utilizing fast and intuitive heuristic thinking to make decisions based on past experience, then rationalizing the decisions through slower and deliberative analytic reasoning. We incorporate these interlinked dual processes in fine-tuning and in-context learning with PLMs, applying them to two language understanding tasks that require coherent physical commonsense reasoning. We show that our proposed Heuristic-Analytic Reasoning (HAR) strategies drastically improve the coherence of rationalizations for model decisions, yielding state-of-the-art results on Tiered Reasoning for Intuitive Physics (TRIP). We also find that this improved coherence is a direct result of more faithful attention to relevant language context in each step of reasoning. Our findings suggest that human-like reasoning strategies can effectively improve the coherence and reliability of PLM reasoning.

We introduce Inference-Time Intervention (ITI), a technique designed to enhance the truthfulness of large language models (LLMs). ITI operates by shifting model activations during inference, following a set of directions across a limited number of attention heads. This intervention significantly improves the performance of LLaMA models on the TruthfulQA benchmark. On an instruction-finetuned LLaMA called Alpaca, ITI improves its truthfulness from 32.5% to 65.1%. We identify a tradeoff between truthfulness and helpfulness and demonstrate how to balance it by tuning the intervention strength. ITI is minimally invasive and computationally inexpensive. Moreover, the technique is data efficient: while approaches like RLHF require extensive annotations, ITI locates truthful directions using only few hundred examples. Our findings suggest that LLMs may have an internal representation of the likelihood of something being true, even as they produce falsehoods on the surface.

Neural language models (LMs) can be used to evaluate the truth of factual statements in two ways: they can be either queried for statement probabilities, or probed for internal representations of truthfulness. Past work has found that these two procedures sometimes disagree, and that probes tend to be more accurate than LM outputs. This has led some researchers to conclude that LMs "lie" or otherwise encode non-cooperative communicative intents. Is this an accurate description of today's LMs, or can query-probe disagreement arise in other ways? We identify three different classes of disagreement, which we term confabulation, deception, and heterogeneity. In many cases, the superiority of probes is simply attributable to better calibration on uncertain answers rather than a greater fraction of correct, high-confidence answers. In some cases, queries and probes perform better on different subsets of inputs, and accuracy can further be improved by ensembling the two. Code is available at github.com/lingo-mit/lm-truthfulness.

Despite their impressive capabilities, large pre-trained language models (LMs) struggle with consistent reasoning; recently, prompting LMs to generate explanations that self-guide the inference has emerged as a promising direction to amend this. However, these approaches are fundamentally bounded by the correctness of explanations, which themselves are often noisy and inconsistent. In this work, we develop Maieutic Prompting, which infers a correct answer to a question even from the noisy and inconsistent generations of LM. Maieutic Prompting induces a tree of explanations abductively (e.g. X is true, because ...) and recursively, then frames the inference as a satisfiability problem over these explanations and their logical relations. We test Maieutic Prompting for true/false QA on three challenging benchmarks that require complex commonsense reasoning. Maieutic Prompting achieves up to 20% better accuracy than state-of-the-art prompting methods, and as a fully unsupervised approach, performs competitively with supervised models. We also show that Maieutic Prompting improves robustness in inference while providing interpretable rationales.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

We study whether Large Language Models (LLMs) latently perform multi-hop reasoning with complex prompts such as "The mother of the singer of 'Superstition' is". We look for evidence of a latent reasoning pathway where an LLM (1) latently identifies "the singer of 'Superstition'" as Stevie Wonder, the bridge entity, and (2) uses its knowledge of Stevie Wonder's mother to complete the prompt. We analyze these two hops individually and consider their co-occurrence as indicative of latent multi-hop reasoning. For the first hop, we test if changing the prompt to indirectly mention the bridge entity instead of any other entity increases the LLM's internal recall of the bridge entity. For the second hop, we test if increasing this recall causes the LLM to better utilize what it knows about the bridge entity. We find strong evidence of latent multi-hop reasoning for the prompts of certain relation types, with the reasoning pathway used in more than 80% of the prompts. However, the utilization is highly contextual, varying across different types of prompts. Also, on average, the evidence for the second hop and the full multi-hop traversal is rather moderate and only substantial for the first hop. Moreover, we find a clear scaling trend with increasing model size for the first hop of reasoning but not for the second hop. Our experimental findings suggest potential challenges and opportunities for future development and applications of LLMs.

In recent years numerous methods have been developed to formally verify the robustness of deep neural networks (DNNs). Though the proposed techniques are effective in providing mathematical guarantees about the DNNs behavior, it is not clear whether the proofs generated by these methods are human-interpretable. In this paper, we bridge this gap by developing new concepts, algorithms, and representations to generate human understandable interpretations of the proofs. Leveraging the proposed method, we show that the robustness proofs of standard DNNs rely on spurious input features, while the proofs of DNNs trained to be provably robust filter out even the semantically meaningful features. The proofs for the DNNs combining adversarial and provably robust training are the most effective at selectively filtering out spurious features as well as relying on human-understandable input features.

Large-scale high-quality training data is important for improving the performance of models. After trained with data that has rationales (reasoning steps), models gain reasoning capability. However, the dataset with high-quality rationales is relatively scarce due to the high annotation cost. To address this issue, we propose Self-motivated Learning framework. The framework motivates the model itself to automatically generate rationales on existing datasets. Based on the inherent rank from correctness across multiple rationales, the model learns to generate better rationales, leading to higher reasoning capability. Specifically, we train a reward model with the rank to evaluate the quality of rationales, and improve the performance of reasoning through reinforcement learning. Experiment results of Llama2 7B on multiple reasoning datasets show that our method significantly improves the reasoning ability of models, even outperforming text-davinci-002 in some datasets.

The self-rationalising capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have been explored in restricted settings, using task/specific data sets. However, current LLMs do not (only) rely on specifically annotated data; nonetheless, they frequently explain their outputs. The properties of the generated explanations are influenced by the pre-training corpus and by the target data used for instruction fine-tuning. As the pre-training corpus includes a large amount of human-written explanations "in the wild", we hypothesise that LLMs adopt common properties of human explanations. By analysing the outputs for a multi-domain instruction fine-tuning data set, we find that generated explanations show selectivity and contain illustrative elements, but less frequently are subjective or misleading. We discuss reasons and consequences of the properties' presence or absence. In particular, we outline positive and negative implications depending on the goals and user groups of the self-rationalising system.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

The last decade has seen tremendous progress in our ability to generate realistic-looking data, be it images, text, audio, or video. Here, we discuss the closely related problem of quantifying realism, that is, designing functions that can reliably tell realistic data from unrealistic data. This problem turns out to be significantly harder to solve and remains poorly understood, despite its prevalence in machine learning and recent breakthroughs in generative AI. Drawing on insights from algorithmic information theory, we discuss why this problem is challenging, why a good generative model alone is insufficient to solve it, and what a good solution would look like. In particular, we introduce the notion of a universal critic, which unlike adversarial critics does not require adversarial training. While universal critics are not immediately practical, they can serve both as a North Star for guiding practical implementations and as a tool for analyzing existing attempts to capture realism.

Reasoning has long been viewed as an emergent property of large language models (LLMs), appearing at or above a certain scale (sim100B parameters). However, recent studies challenge this assumption, showing that small language models (SLMs) can also achieve competitive reasoning performance. SLMs are increasingly favored for their efficiency and deployability. However, there is a lack of systematic study on the reasoning abilities of diverse SLMs, including those trained from scratch or derived from LLMs through quantization, pruning, and distillation. This raises a critical question: Can SLMs achieve reasoning abilities comparable to LLMs? In this work, we systematically survey, benchmark, and analyze 72 SLMs from six model families across 14 reasoning benchmarks. For reliable evaluation, we examine four evaluation methods and compare four LLM judges against human evaluations on 800 data points. We repeat all experiments three times to ensure a robust performance assessment. Additionally, we analyze the impact of different prompting strategies in small models. Beyond accuracy, we also evaluate model robustness under adversarial conditions and intermediate reasoning steps. Our findings challenge the assumption that scaling is the only way to achieve strong reasoning. Instead, we foresee a future where SLMs with strong reasoning capabilities can be developed through structured training or post-training compression. They can serve as efficient alternatives to LLMs for reasoning-intensive tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step, "Chain-of-Thought" (CoT) reasoning before answering a question, but it is unclear if the stated reasoning is a faithful explanation of the model's actual reasoning (i.e., its process for answering the question). We investigate hypotheses for how CoT reasoning may be unfaithful, by examining how the model predictions change when we intervene on the CoT (e.g., by adding mistakes or paraphrasing it). Models show large variation across tasks in how strongly they condition on the CoT when predicting their answer, sometimes relying heavily on the CoT and other times primarily ignoring it. CoT's performance boost does not seem to come from CoT's added test-time compute alone or from information encoded via the particular phrasing of the CoT. As models become larger and more capable, they produce less faithful reasoning on most tasks we study. Overall, our results suggest that CoT can be faithful if the circumstances such as the model size and task are carefully chosen.

Human-annotated textual explanations are becoming increasingly important in Explainable Natural Language Processing. Rationale extraction aims to provide faithful (i.e., reflective of the behavior of the model) and plausible (i.e., convincing to humans) explanations by highlighting the inputs that had the largest impact on the prediction without compromising the performance of the task model. In recent works, the focus of training rationale extractors was primarily on optimizing for plausibility using human highlights, while the task model was trained on jointly optimizing for task predictive accuracy and faithfulness. We propose REFER, a framework that employs a differentiable rationale extractor that allows to back-propagate through the rationale extraction process. We analyze the impact of using human highlights during training by jointly training the task model and the rationale extractor. In our experiments, REFER yields significantly better results in terms of faithfulness, plausibility, and downstream task accuracy on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution data. On both e-SNLI and CoS-E, our best setting produces better results in terms of composite normalized relative gain than the previous baselines by 11% and 3%, respectively.

Current open-source Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) excel at tasks such as open-vocabulary language grounding and segmentation but can suffer under false premises when queries imply the existence of something that is not actually present in the image. We observe that existing methods that fine-tune an LMM to segment images significantly degrade their ability to reliably determine ("see") if an object is present and to interact naturally with humans ("say"), a form of catastrophic forgetting. In this work, we propose a cascading and joint training approach for LMMs to solve this task, avoiding catastrophic forgetting of previous skills. Our resulting model can "see" by detecting whether objects are present in an image, "say" by telling the user if they are not, proposing alternative queries or correcting semantic errors in the query, and finally "segment" by outputting the mask of the desired objects if they exist. Additionally, we introduce a novel False Premise Correction benchmark dataset, an extension of existing RefCOCO(+/g) referring segmentation datasets (which we call FP-RefCOCO(+/g)). The results show that our method not only detects false premises up to 55% better than existing approaches, but under false premise conditions produces relative cIOU improvements of more than 31% over baselines, and produces natural language feedback judged helpful up to 67% of the time.

Reasoning, as an essential ability for complex problem-solving, can provide back-end support for various real-world applications, such as medical diagnosis, negotiation, etc. This paper provides a comprehensive survey of cutting-edge research on reasoning with language model prompting. We introduce research works with comparisons and summaries and provide systematic resources to help beginners. We also discuss the potential reasons for emerging such reasoning abilities and highlight future research directions. Resources are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/Prompt4ReasoningPapers (updated periodically).

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in handling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step rationale generation. However, recent studies have raised concerns regarding the hallucination and flaws in their reasoning process. Substantial efforts are being made to improve the reliability and faithfulness of the generated rationales. Some approaches model reasoning as planning, while others focus on annotating for process supervision. Nevertheless, the planning-based search process often results in high latency due to the frequent assessment of intermediate reasoning states and the extensive exploration space. Additionally, supervising the reasoning process with human annotation is costly and challenging to scale for LLM training. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a framework to learn planning-based reasoning through direct preference optimization (DPO) on collected trajectories, which are ranked according to synthesized process rewards. Our results on challenging logical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our learning framework, showing that our 7B model can surpass the strong counterparts like GPT-3.5-Turbo.

Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have demonstrated superior performance on a variety of natural language processing (NLP) tasks including sentiment analysis, mathematical reasoning and summarization. Furthermore, since these models are instruction-tuned on human conversations to produce "helpful" responses, they can and often will produce explanations along with the response, which we call self-explanations. For example, when analyzing the sentiment of a movie review, the model may output not only the positivity of the sentiment, but also an explanation (e.g., by listing the sentiment-laden words such as "fantastic" and "memorable" in the review). How good are these automatically generated self-explanations? In this paper, we investigate this question on the task of sentiment analysis and for feature attribution explanation, one of the most commonly studied settings in the interpretability literature (for pre-ChatGPT models). Specifically, we study different ways to elicit the self-explanations, evaluate their faithfulness on a set of evaluation metrics, and compare them to traditional explanation methods such as occlusion or LIME saliency maps. Through an extensive set of experiments, we find that ChatGPT's self-explanations perform on par with traditional ones, but are quite different from them according to various agreement metrics, meanwhile being much cheaper to produce (as they are generated along with the prediction). In addition, we identified several interesting characteristics of them, which prompt us to rethink many current model interpretability practices in the era of ChatGPT(-like) LLMs.

Does prompting a large language model (LLM) like GPT-3 with explanations improve in-context learning? We study this question on two NLP tasks that involve reasoning over text, namely question answering and natural language inference. We test the performance of four LLMs on three textual reasoning datasets using prompts that include explanations in multiple different styles. For these tasks, we find that including explanations in the prompts for OPT, GPT-3 (davinci), and InstructGPT (text-davinci-001) only yields small to moderate accuracy improvements over standard few-show learning. However, text-davinci-002 is able to benefit more substantially. We further show that explanations generated by the LLMs may not entail the models' predictions nor be factually grounded in the input, even on simple tasks with extractive explanations. However, these flawed explanations can still be useful as a way to verify LLMs' predictions post-hoc. Through analysis in our three settings, we show that explanations judged by humans to be good--logically consistent with the input and the prediction--more likely cooccur with accurate predictions. Following these observations, we train calibrators using automatically extracted scores that assess the reliability of explanations, allowing us to improve performance post-hoc across all of our datasets.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Machine learning plays a role in many deployed decision systems, often in ways that are difficult or impossible to understand by human stakeholders. Explaining, in a human-understandable way, the relationship between the input and output of machine learning models is essential to the development of trustworthy machine learning based systems. A burgeoning body of research seeks to define the goals and methods of explainability in machine learning. In this paper, we seek to review and categorize research on counterfactual explanations, a specific class of explanation that provides a link between what could have happened had input to a model been changed in a particular way. Modern approaches to counterfactual explainability in machine learning draw connections to the established legal doctrine in many countries, making them appealing to fielded systems in high-impact areas such as finance and healthcare. Thus, we design a rubric with desirable properties of counterfactual explanation algorithms and comprehensively evaluate all currently proposed algorithms against that rubric. Our rubric provides easy comparison and comprehension of the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and serves as an introduction to major research themes in this field. We also identify gaps and discuss promising research directions in the space of counterfactual explainability.

Supervised machine learning models boast remarkable predictive capabilities. But can you trust your model? Will it work in deployment? What else can it tell you about the world? We want models to be not only good, but interpretable. And yet the task of interpretation appears underspecified. Papers provide diverse and sometimes non-overlapping motivations for interpretability, and offer myriad notions of what attributes render models interpretable. Despite this ambiguity, many papers proclaim interpretability axiomatically, absent further explanation. In this paper, we seek to refine the discourse on interpretability. First, we examine the motivations underlying interest in interpretability, finding them to be diverse and occasionally discordant. Then, we address model properties and techniques thought to confer interpretability, identifying transparency to humans and post-hoc explanations as competing notions. Throughout, we discuss the feasibility and desirability of different notions, and question the oft-made assertions that linear models are interpretable and that deep neural networks are not.

We propose a framework for robust evaluation of reasoning capabilities of language models, using functional variants of benchmarks. Models that solve a reasoning test should exhibit no difference in performance over the static version of a problem compared to a snapshot of the functional variant. We have rewritten the relevant fragment of the MATH benchmark into its functional variant MATH(), with functionalization of other benchmarks to follow. When evaluating current state-of-the-art models over snapshots of MATH(), we find a reasoning gap -- the percentage difference between the static and functional accuracies. We find reasoning gaps from 58.35% to 80.31% among the state-of-the-art closed and open weights models that perform well on static benchmarks, with the caveat that the gaps are likely to be smaller with more sophisticated prompting strategies. Here we show that models which anecdotally have good reasoning performance over real-world tasks, have quantifiable lower gaps, motivating the open problem of building "gap 0" models. Code for evaluation and new evaluation datasets, three MATH() snapshots, are publicly available at https://github.com/consequentai/fneval/.

Common methods for aligning large language models (LLMs) with desired behaviour heavily rely on human-labelled data. However, as models grow increasingly sophisticated, they will surpass human expertise, and the role of human evaluation will evolve into non-experts overseeing experts. In anticipation of this, we ask: can weaker models assess the correctness of stronger models? We investigate this question in an analogous setting, where stronger models (experts) possess the necessary information to answer questions and weaker models (non-experts) lack this information. The method we evaluate is debate, where two LLM experts each argue for a different answer, and a non-expert selects the answer. We find that debate consistently helps both non-expert models and humans answer questions, achieving 76% and 88% accuracy respectively (naive baselines obtain 48% and 60%). Furthermore, optimising expert debaters for persuasiveness in an unsupervised manner improves non-expert ability to identify the truth in debates. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for the viability of aligning models with debate in the absence of ground truth.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), achieving remarkable performance across diverse tasks and enabling widespread real-world applications. However, LLMs are prone to hallucination, generating content that either conflicts with established knowledge or is unfaithful to the original sources. Existing hallucination benchmarks primarily focus on sentence- or passage-level hallucination detection, neglecting dialogue-level evaluation, hallucination localization, and rationale provision. They also predominantly target factuality hallucinations while underestimating faithfulness hallucinations, often relying on labor-intensive or non-specialized evaluators. To address these limitations, we propose HalluDial, the first comprehensive large-scale benchmark for automatic dialogue-level hallucination evaluation. HalluDial encompasses both spontaneous and induced hallucination scenarios, covering factuality and faithfulness hallucinations. The benchmark includes 4,094 dialogues with a total of 146,856 samples. Leveraging HalluDial, we conduct a comprehensive meta-evaluation of LLMs' hallucination evaluation capabilities in information-seeking dialogues and introduce a specialized judge language model, HalluJudge. The high data quality of HalluDial enables HalluJudge to achieve superior or competitive performance in hallucination evaluation, facilitating the automatic assessment of dialogue-level hallucinations in LLMs and providing valuable insights into this phenomenon. The dataset and the code are available at https://github.com/FlagOpen/HalluDial.

Knights and knaves problems represent a classic genre of logical puzzles where characters either tell the truth or lie. The objective is to logically deduce each character's identity based on their statements. The challenge arises from the truth-telling or lying behavior, which influences the logical implications of each statement. Solving these puzzles requires not only direct deductions from individual statements, but the ability to assess the truthfulness of statements by reasoning through various hypothetical scenarios. As such, knights and knaves puzzles serve as compelling examples of suppositional reasoning. In this paper, we introduce TruthQuest, a benchmark for suppositional reasoning based on the principles of knights and knaves puzzles. Our benchmark presents problems of varying complexity, considering both the number of characters and the types of logical statements involved. Evaluations on TruthQuest show that large language models like Llama 3 and Mixtral-8x7B exhibit significant difficulties solving these tasks. A detailed error analysis of the models' output reveals that lower-performing models exhibit a diverse range of reasoning errors, frequently failing to grasp the concept of truth and lies. In comparison, more proficient models primarily struggle with accurately inferring the logical implications of potentially false statements.

Multi-agent debates have been introduced to improve the accuracy of Large Language Models (LLMs) by having multiple agents discuss solutions to a problem over several rounds of debate. However, models often generate incorrect yet confident-sounding responses, which can mislead others. This issue arises partly because agents do not consider how confident their peers are. To address this, we propose DebUnc, a debate framework that uses uncertainty metrics to assess agent confidence. Confidence is then conveyed through a modified attention mechanism that adjusts token weights, or through textual prompts. Evaluations across benchmarks show that attention-based methods are particularly effective and that performance continues to improve as uncertainty estimation becomes more reliable. The code is available at https://github.com/lukeyoffe/debunc.

Deep models that are both effective and explainable are desirable in many settings; prior explainable models have been unimodal, offering either image-based visualization of attention weights or text-based generation of post-hoc justifications. We propose a multimodal approach to explanation, and argue that the two modalities provide complementary explanatory strengths. We collect two new datasets to define and evaluate this task, and propose a novel model which can provide joint textual rationale generation and attention visualization. Our datasets define visual and textual justifications of a classification decision for activity recognition tasks (ACT-X) and for visual question answering tasks (VQA-X). We quantitatively show that training with the textual explanations not only yields better textual justification models, but also better localizes the evidence that supports the decision. We also qualitatively show cases where visual explanation is more insightful than textual explanation, and vice versa, supporting our thesis that multimodal explanation models offer significant benefits over unimodal approaches.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Recent surge in large-scale generative models has spurred the development of vast fields in computer vision. In particular, text-to-image diffusion models have garnered widespread adoption across diverse domain due to their potential for high-fidelity image generation. Nonetheless, existing large-scale diffusion models are confined to generate images of up to 1K resolution, which is far from meeting the demands of contemporary commercial applications. Directly sampling higher-resolution images often yields results marred by artifacts such as object repetition and distorted shapes. Addressing the aforementioned issues typically necessitates training or fine-tuning models on higher resolution datasets. However, this undertaking poses a formidable challenge due to the difficulty in collecting large-scale high-resolution contents and substantial computational resources. While several preceding works have proposed alternatives, they often fail to produce convincing results. In this work, we probe the generative ability of diffusion models at higher resolution beyond its original capability and propose a novel progressive approach that fully utilizes generated low-resolution image to guide the generation of higher resolution image. Our method obviates the need for additional training or fine-tuning which significantly lowers the burden of computational costs. Extensive experiments and results validate the efficiency and efficacy of our method. Project page: https://yhyun225.github.io/DiffuseHigh/

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform better when asked to reason step-by-step before answering a question. However, it is unclear to what degree the model's final answer is faithful to the stated reasoning steps. In this paper, we perform a causal mediation analysis on twelve LLMs to examine how intermediate reasoning steps generated by the LLM influence the final outcome and find that LLMs do not reliably use their intermediate reasoning steps when generating an answer. To address this issue, we introduce FRODO, a framework to tailor small-sized LMs to generate correct reasoning steps and robustly reason over these steps. FRODO consists of an inference module that learns to generate correct reasoning steps using an implicit causal reward function and a reasoning module that learns to faithfully reason over these intermediate inferences using a counterfactual and causal preference objective. Our experiments show that FRODO significantly outperforms four competitive baselines. Furthermore, FRODO improves the robustness and generalization ability of the reasoning LM, yielding higher performance on out-of-distribution test sets. Finally, we find that FRODO's rationales are more faithful to its final answer predictions than standard supervised fine-tuning.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.