Upload International System And.txt
Browse files- International System And.txt +1423 -0
International System And.txt
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+
World Politics
|
2 |
+
http://journals.cambridge.org/WPO
|
3 |
+
Additional services for World Politics:
|
4 |
+
Email alerts: Click here
|
5 |
+
Subscriptions: Click here
|
6 |
+
Commercial reprints: Click here
|
7 |
+
Terms of use : Click here
|
8 |
+
International System And Foreign Policy
|
9 |
+
Approaches: Implications for Conict Modelling
|
10 |
+
and Management
|
11 |
+
Raymond Tanter
|
12 |
+
World Politics / Volume 24 / Supplement S1 / March 1972, pp 7 - 39
|
13 |
+
DOI: 10.2307/2010558, Published online: 18 July 2011
|
14 |
+
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887100002860
|
15 |
+
How to cite this article:
|
16 |
+
Raymond Tanter (1972). International System And Foreign Policy Approaches:
|
17 |
+
Implications for Conict Modelling and Management. World Politics, 24, pp 7-39
|
18 |
+
doi:10.2307/2010558
|
19 |
+
Request Permissions : Click here
|
20 |
+
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/WPO, IP address: 130.60.206.75 on 06 May 2015
|
21 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND
|
22 |
+
FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES:
|
23 |
+
Implications for Conflict Modelling
|
24 |
+
and Management
|
25 |
+
By RAYMOND TANTER*
|
26 |
+
. . . The international system is an expanding version of the notion of
|
27 |
+
two-actors-in-interaction. . . . Interaction analysis focuses on the outputs
|
28 |
+
of national systems. The national systems, themselves, are black-boxed.
|
29 |
+
—Charles A. McClelland1
|
30 |
+
If a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organizational
|
31 |
+
components must yesterday have been performing (or have had established
|
32 |
+
routines for performing) an action only marginally different from
|
33 |
+
that action.
|
34 |
+
—Graham T. Allison2
|
35 |
+
INTRODUCTION
|
36 |
+
THE quotations from Charles A. McClelland and Graham T. Allison
|
37 |
+
represent two distinct approaches to the study of international
|
38 |
+
relations: (i) international system analysis; and (2) foreign policy
|
39 |
+
analysis. Essentially, international system analysts seek to explain interactions
|
40 |
+
between nations by phenomena such as their prior interactions
|
41 |
+
and the structure of the system. Foreign policy analysts, on the other
|
42 |
+
hand, seek to explain foreign policy behavior as the output of subnational
|
43 |
+
organizations following standard operating procedures or engaging
|
44 |
+
in a problem-solving search. Given the international system and
|
45 |
+
foreign policy approaches as contrasting points of departure, the goals
|
46 |
+
of the present study are:
|
47 |
+
•Acknowledgments to ONR Contract Number Noooi4-67-A-oi8i-oo26, ARPA #1411
|
48 |
+
for support; to Cheryl Kugler, Hazel Markus, Michael Mihalka, Stephen Shaffer, and
|
49 |
+
Lewis Snider for research assistance; to Patricia Armstrong for typing; to Graham T.
|
50 |
+
Allison, Robert R. Beattie, Morton H. Halperin, Nazli Choucri, Robert C. North and
|
51 |
+
Robert A. Young, whose ideas helped guide this inquiry; to Lutz Erbring, Edward L.
|
52 |
+
Morse, Richard H. Ullman and Oran R. Young for helpful critique; to Charles A.
|
53 |
+
McClelland, whose ideas and World Event/Interaction Survey provided a basis for the
|
54 |
+
modelling and coding procedures used in the study; and to Walter Corson for providing
|
55 |
+
his data, scaling system, and helpful interpretations.
|
56 |
+
1 Charles A. McClelland, Theory and the International System (New York 1966),
|
57 |
+
20, 104.
|
58 |
+
2 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston
|
59 |
+
1971), 87.
|
60 |
+
8 RAYMOND TANTER
|
61 |
+
1. to evaluate models based on an international system approach, a
|
62 |
+
foreign policy approach, and a combination of both approaches as they
|
63 |
+
are used to study alliance behavior in conflict situations; and
|
64 |
+
2. to infer from the evaluation of these models some implications for
|
65 |
+
conflict modelling and management.
|
66 |
+
International system approaches may imply interaction models,
|
67 |
+
whereas foreign policy approaches may suggest decision-making models.
|
68 |
+
For example, J. D. Singer posits that by focusing on the international
|
69 |
+
system, we can study the patterns of interaction which the system
|
70 |
+
reveals,3 while game theoretic approaches to the study of conflicts of
|
71 |
+
interest blend both interaction and decision-making concepts through
|
72 |
+
their emphasis on strategic interaction and rational choice behavior.4
|
73 |
+
Game theory deals with strategic situations in which the consequences
|
74 |
+
of action are uncertain; several different outcomes may result from a
|
75 |
+
given action.0 Players in a game confront others who are assumed to be
|
76 |
+
rational and whose choices also affect the outcome of the game. A game
|
77 |
+
theoretic approach to conflict thus emphasizes strategic interaction and
|
78 |
+
bargaining under conditions of risk.0
|
79 |
+
An alternative set of conflict models widely employed in world politics
|
80 |
+
concerns arms race processes. The most familiar is the Richardson
|
81 |
+
process model, named after Lewis Richardson.7 Richardson's model
|
82 |
+
stresses interaction processes between nations but ignores rational choice
|
83 |
+
behavior. The outcome of Richardson's model " . . . is what would occur
|
84 |
+
if instinct and tradition were allowed to act uncontrolled."8 The model
|
85 |
+
ignores choice processes internal to a state and stresses the automatic
|
86 |
+
response of one nation to the arms expenditures of another. The model
|
87 |
+
3 J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in
|
88 |
+
Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System (Princeton 1961), 80.
|
89 |
+
It should be noted that the interaction approach is often distinguished from the international
|
90 |
+
system approach. The latter orientation is based on the assumption that international
|
91 |
+
politics is more than the sum of converging interactions and transactions;
|
92 |
+
properties of the system as a whole are assumed to influence the behavior of individual
|
93 |
+
nations.
|
94 |
+
4 The term strategic interaction in game theory often refers to the outcome of
|
95 |
+
competing strategies. Here, interaction means the process where each actor pays attention
|
96 |
+
to and responds to the prior patterns of his opponent.
|
97 |
+
5 See Herbert Simon, "Some Strategic Considerations in the Construction of Social
|
98 |
+
Science Models," in Paul Lazarsfeld, ed., Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences
|
99 |
+
(Glencoe 1954), 388-415. Also see Herbert Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational;
|
100 |
+
Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting (New York
|
101 |
+
1957), 241-60.
|
102 |
+
6 See Anatol Rapoport, Two-Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor 1966).
|
103 |
+
7 Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes
|
104 |
+
and Origins of War (Pittsburgh i960).
|
105 |
+
*lbid., 12.
|
106 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 9
|
107 |
+
is deterministic and described in terms of "social physics."9 There are
|
108 |
+
a variety of arms race models which have attempted to improve on
|
109 |
+
Richardson's formulation. Martin McGuire's model, for example, incorporates
|
110 |
+
rational choice behavior.10
|
111 |
+
Less formal than the game theoretic and Richardson process models
|
112 |
+
are the mediated stimulus response (S-R) and event/interaction models
|
113 |
+
of Robert North and Charles McClelland respectively.11 North's model
|
114 |
+
focuses on perception as an explanatory concept intervening between a
|
115 |
+
stimulus and a response. McClelland, on the other hand, emphasizes
|
116 |
+
prior international event/interaction sequences and systemic configurations
|
117 |
+
as explanations for present international interactions.12
|
118 |
+
The game theory model assumes rational choice behavior; the mediated
|
119 |
+
stimulus response, the event/interaction, and Richardson process
|
120 |
+
models allow for irrational (misperception) or non-rational (recurring
|
121 |
+
event sequence) behavior.13 Nevertheless, all four classes of models have
|
122 |
+
in common the interaction theme. That is, each model explains present
|
123 |
+
interaction on the basis of prior interaction with a minimum of focus
|
124 |
+
on the internal attributes of the actor.14 Of these four interaction models,
|
125 |
+
9 Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor i960), 15-107; and
|
126 |
+
"Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution,
|
127 |
+
1 (September 1957), 249-99. See also Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A
|
128 |
+
General Theory (New York 1962); Paul Smoker, "Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathematical
|
129 |
+
Study," in J. N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (2nd
|
130 |
+
ed., New York 1969), 573-82.
|
131 |
+
lu Martin C. McGuire, Secrecy and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass. 1965).
|
132 |
+
11 Robert C. North, "Research Pluralism and the International Elephant," in Klaus
|
133 |
+
Knorr and James Rosenau, eds., Contending Approaches to International Politics
|
134 |
+
(Princeton 1969), 218-42; Robert C. North, "The Behavior of Nation-States: Problems
|
135 |
+
of Conflict and Integration," in Morton Kaplan, ed., New Approaches to International
|
136 |
+
Relations (New York 1968), 203-356; Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard,
|
137 |
+
"Conflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations," in Rosenau (fn. 9), 711-24.
|
138 |
+
12 Charles A. McClelland, "The Acute International Crisis," in Knorr and Verba
|
139 |
+
(fn. 3), 182-204; "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-1963,"
|
140 |
+
in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics (New York 1968), 159-86.
|
141 |
+
Event/interactions are international actions such as threats and promises (words) or
|
142 |
+
uses of force and offers of proposals (deeds). Event/interactions are different from
|
143 |
+
transactions such as trade and mail flows between nations. The present study deals
|
144 |
+
only with connective event/interactions since there were too few cooperative interactions
|
145 |
+
during the Berlin conflict of 1961 to perform statistical analysis.
|
146 |
+
13 See below, however, for a discussion of how recurring event sequences may be
|
147 |
+
subsumed under learning models and how such models explain limited rational search
|
148 |
+
behavior.
|
149 |
+
11 The mediated S-R model draws on internal attributes (perceptions) more than
|
150 |
+
the other models. Similarly, game theory models applied to world politics focus on
|
151 |
+
the rational intentions of decision-makers, which tap internal attributes of nations. A
|
152 |
+
major criticism of game theory models, however, is their treatment of an actor as a
|
153 |
+
black-box, ignoring psychological and behavioral attributes. See John C. Harsanyi,
|
154 |
+
"Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories,"
|
155 |
+
World Politics, xxi (July 1969), 513-38; Michael Shapiro, "Rational Political
|
156 |
+
Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," American Po10
|
157 |
+
RAYMOND TANTER
|
158 |
+
the present study draws most from the event/interaction model. A hypothesis
|
159 |
+
derived from this model is that the current behavior of the
|
160 |
+
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in an East-West conflict is a consequence
|
161 |
+
of a prior pattern of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
|
162 |
+
(NATO) actions, and vice versa.
|
163 |
+
Recall the earlier suggestion that international system approaches suggest
|
164 |
+
interaction models while foreign policy approaches may imply
|
165 |
+
decision-making models. An early decision-making scheme is the one
|
166 |
+
pioneered by Richard Snyder and his associates.15 Although their original
|
167 |
+
decision-making scheme allows for international system determinants
|
168 |
+
of foreign policy behavior, the scheme mostly relies on the organizational
|
169 |
+
roles—communication, information, and personality variables,
|
170 |
+
especially motivation—which constitute the internal setting of decisions.
|
171 |
+
16 As with game theory, the decision-making scheme assumes
|
172 |
+
rationality, but rationality is a more limited concept than the comprehensive
|
173 |
+
version assumed in game theory. In game theory goals are
|
174 |
+
ranked, all alternatives are specified, consequences are calculated, and
|
175 |
+
rational choice consists of selecting the value-maximizing alternative.
|
176 |
+
In the decision-making scheme, however, men are bounded by: (i) the
|
177 |
+
lack of an explicit preference ordering; (2) incomplete information on
|
178 |
+
alternatives; and (3) inadequate computational skills to calculate the
|
179 |
+
consequences of each option. All three limitations violate the requirements
|
180 |
+
of comprehensive rationality.17
|
181 |
+
The Snyder scheme focuses on the attributes of individuals as well
|
182 |
+
titical Science Review, LXIH (December 1969), 1106-19. Simon modified game theory
|
183 |
+
by incorporating attributes of the actor and then inferring a new decision-rule—
|
184 |
+
"satisficing" (Simon, fn. 5, 241-60). Experimental gaming explicitly treats properties of
|
185 |
+
the actors such as competitiveness, risk, and temptation, as well as rewards and punishment.
|
186 |
+
Melvin Guyer, "A Review of the Literature on Zero-Sum and Non-Zero-Sum
|
187 |
+
Games in the Social Sciences," Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan,
|
188 |
+
Mimeo, n.d.
|
189 |
+
15 Richard C. Snyder and others, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York
|
190 |
+
1962); James A. Robinson and Richard C. Snyder, "Decision-Making in International
|
191 |
+
Politics," in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior (New York 1965), 433-63;
|
192 |
+
Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision (New York 1968); Charles F. Hermann, Crises in
|
193 |
+
Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis (Indianapolis 1969); J. A. Robinson and others,
|
194 |
+
"Search Under Crisis in Political Gaming and Simulation," in D. G. Pruitt and R. C.
|
195 |
+
Snyder, eds., Theory and Research on the Causes of War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1969),
|
196 |
+
80-94.
|
197 |
+
16 Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, "The United States Decision to Resist
|
198 |
+
Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme," in f. N. Rosenau, ed.,
|
199 |
+
International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York 1961), 196.
|
200 |
+
17 Simon (fn. 5); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York
|
201 |
+
1958); Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
|
202 |
+
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963).
|
203 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 11
|
204 |
+
as on their foreign policy organizations. The decision-making model
|
205 |
+
explicated by Graham Allison primarily stresses organizational processes.
|
206 |
+
18 Allison's model explains government behavior as the output of
|
207 |
+
large organizations functioning according to standard operating procedures
|
208 |
+
and search processes. Like Snyder's scheme, Allison's model assumes
|
209 |
+
limited rationality rather than the comprehensive rationality of
|
210 |
+
game theory models. Allison's organizational processes explanation
|
211 |
+
asserts the following principle: Stop searching with the first alternative
|
212 |
+
that is good enough—the "satisficing" rule.19 The present study draws
|
213 |
+
more on the Allison work than on Snyder's efforts. Consider Allison's
|
214 |
+
inference from an organizational processes model: "The best explanation
|
215 |
+
of an organization's behavior at [time] t is / — i; the best prediction
|
216 |
+
of what will happen at / -)- i is t."20 Following Allison's model, a
|
217 |
+
hypothesis is that the current behavior of WTO in an East-West conflict
|
218 |
+
is a consequence of its own prior pattern of actions, and similarly
|
219 |
+
for NATO.
|
220 |
+
The international system and foreign policy approaches may both
|
221 |
+
yield adequate explanations of international behavior. Similarly, event/
|
222 |
+
interaction and organizational processes models may apply to the same
|
223 |
+
situation. Thus, the study evaluates: (i) an event/interaction model;
|
224 |
+
(2) an organizational processes model; and (3) a combined interaction/
|
225 |
+
organizational model. Consider the following illustrations of these
|
226 |
+
three models. The event/interaction model assumes that WTO behavior
|
227 |
+
was a reaction to the prior pattern of NATO events. That is,
|
228 |
+
WTO countries decided to construct the Berlin Wall as a result of prior
|
229 |
+
NATO provocations, e.g., the encouragement of a mass refugee flow
|
230 |
+
from East Germany to West Germany via Berlin. Similarly, NATO
|
231 |
+
behavior was a reaction to prior WTO events. NATO countries increased
|
232 |
+
their defense budgets and sought alliance agreement on economic
|
233 |
+
sanctions in reaction to Soviet threats to sign a separate peace
|
234 |
+
treaty with the East Germans and to turn over control of Berlin access
|
235 |
+
routes.
|
236 |
+
An organizational processes model, on the other hand, might stress
|
237 |
+
such variables as standard operating procedures and the problem-solving
|
238 |
+
search processes of organizations as explanations for alliance actions.
|
239 |
+
Consider this explanation of an official U. S. reply to the Soviet aide
|
240 |
+
18 Allison (fn. 2). 19 Simon (fn. 5).
|
241 |
+
20 Allison (fn. 2), 87. Allison's "explanation" of present behavior as determined by
|
242 |
+
prior behavior is not an explanation in the sense of specifying why the present behavior
|
243 |
+
occurs. A learning model may be able to explain why organizations repeat or deviate
|
244 |
+
from prior patterns.
|
245 |
+
12 RAYMOND TANTER
|
246 |
+
memoire and subsequent U. S. actions during the Berlin conflict of
|
247 |
+
1961: For weeks President John F. Kennedy waited to reply to a Soviet
|
248 |
+
threat to Western access routes to Berlin which was implied by a Soviet
|
249 |
+
aide memoire. The Department of State drafted a reply; Kennedy rejected
|
250 |
+
it as stale and uninspired. He asked Theodore Sorensen to draft
|
251 |
+
a new reply. Then Kennedy discovered the new reply could not be released
|
252 |
+
without going through complicated allied and interdepartmental
|
253 |
+
clearances. He gave up the new attempt and issued the earlier State Department
|
254 |
+
reply.21 The organizational processes model anticipates standard
|
255 |
+
operating procedures and helps explain some of the foreign policy
|
256 |
+
output. Perhaps partly as a result of his dissatisfaction with the perfunctory
|
257 |
+
U. S. reply, Kennedy searched for more direct ways of answering
|
258 |
+
the Soviet aide memoire, e.g., by increasing the military budget.22
|
259 |
+
The interaction/organization model combines the reaction and organizational
|
260 |
+
process explanations into a single model. Prior studies suggest
|
261 |
+
that a combination may be more powerful as an explanatory device
|
262 |
+
than either the international system or foreign policy approach taken
|
263 |
+
separately. Consider the studies by Nazli Choucri and Robert North.
|
264 |
+
Although Choucri and North seek to explain international conflict behavior
|
265 |
+
over longer periods of time, their work is nevertheless relevant
|
266 |
+
here. Between 1870 and 1914, they find that a nation's role in international
|
267 |
+
conflict was less a consequence of changes in that nation's own
|
268 |
+
capabilities (i.e., the foreign policy approach) than of the changing
|
269 |
+
distances between itself and rival nations, particularly its closest rival
|
270 |
+
(i.e., the international system approach). They conclude, however, that
|
271 |
+
neither the foreign policy nor the international system approach alone
|
272 |
+
is adequate to explain the international conflict process.23 Thus, the present
|
273 |
+
study combines the international system and foreign policy type approaches
|
274 |
+
in creating an interaction/organization model. A specific
|
275 |
+
hypothesis based on the interaction/organization model is that WTO
|
276 |
+
behavior in an East-West conflict is a consequence of both its own prior
|
277 |
+
actions and prior NATO actions, and similarly for NATO.
|
278 |
+
The following three working hypotheses, thus, are: (1) an alliance's
|
279 |
+
behavior in conflict situations results from the prior pattern of actions
|
280 |
+
of its opponent (event/interaction); (2) an alliance's behavior in conflict
|
281 |
+
situations results from its own prior patterns of actions (organiza-
|
282 |
+
21 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York 1965), 587.
|
283 |
+
22 This interpretation of the organizational model seems to imply that Kennedy increased
|
284 |
+
the U.S. military budget because of his dissatisfaction with the State Department.
|
285 |
+
External factors such as the W T O threat clearly should be considered to explain
|
286 |
+
the increase in the military budget in this case.
|
287 |
+
23 See the essay by Nazli Choucri and R. C. North in this volume.
|
288 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 13
|
289 |
+
tional processes); (3) an alliance's behavior in conflict situations results
|
290 |
+
from both the opponent's prior pattern of behavior and its own prior
|
291 |
+
pattern of actions (interaction/organization).233
|
292 |
+
AN EVENT/INTERACTION MODEL
|
293 |
+
McClelland has laid the theoretical framework for the event/interaction
|
294 |
+
model in a series of essays. In the 1961 special issue of World
|
295 |
+
Politics, his essay on "The Acute International Crisis" explicates an
|
296 |
+
event/interaction model.24 He suggests that events in conflicts might
|
297 |
+
form a chain of interaction sequences, and the discovery of these sequences
|
298 |
+
would permit comparisons across cases. McClelland's model
|
299 |
+
describes the state of the international system in terms of its pattern
|
300 |
+
(process), structure, and performance. Needed data are of two types:
|
301 |
+
relationships to tap structure, and interactions as indicators of system
|
302 |
+
process.25 In a later article, McClelland evaluated several propositions
|
303 |
+
with interaction data concerning access to Berlin, 1948-1963.26 For example,
|
304 |
+
he evaluated one of the ideas put forward in the 1961 article: the
|
305 |
+
greater the number of intense conflicts between two actors, the more
|
306 |
+
likely each will develop routines for minimizing violence. These routines
|
307 |
+
develop as bureaucrats learn standard operating procedures to
|
308 |
+
process repetitive conflicts.27 Although the 1968 design does not provide
|
309 |
+
an explicit test of the learning idea, there is some evidence supporting
|
310 |
+
it in the Berlin case. Finally, an assumption of McClelland's event/interaction
|
311 |
+
model is that there are certain international processes, such as
|
312 |
+
arms races, which occur regularly with specific international situations
|
313 |
+
such as intense conflicts. The task of the analyst of the international
|
314 |
+
system is to discover the processes which accompany various situations
|
315 |
+
and to forecast future processes.28
|
316 |
+
23a The distinction between event/interaction and organizational processes is for t he
|
317 |
+
sake of convenience of presentation. In a sense, there is only one model that contains
|
318 |
+
interaction and organization parameters. Interaction parameters may be relatively more
|
319 |
+
important at times, while organizational factors may be more significant at other
|
320 |
+
times. See Tanter, 1972, for a more complete synthesis of interaction and organizational
|
321 |
+
parameters than given here.
|
322 |
+
"McClelland, in Knorr and Verba (fn. 3 ) .
|
323 |
+
25 McClelland (fn. 1), chapter 4.
|
324 |
+
26 McClelland, in Singer (fn. 12) 159-86.
|
325 |
+
27 McClelland, in Knorr and Verba (fn. 3 ) , 200-201. Note that one can explain
|
326 |
+
event/interaction processes with an organizational model, a partial synthesis of the
|
327 |
+
approaches of McClelland and Allison. Also, McClelland actually uses the term crisis
|
328 |
+
where the interpretation in the text above refers to conflicts. T h e word crisis refers
|
329 |
+
to the most intense phase of a conflict in the present study.
|
330 |
+
28 Robert A. Young, "Prediction and Forecasting in International Relations: An
|
331 |
+
Exploratory Analysis," unpub. Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California (June
|
332 |
+
1970).
|
333 |
+
14 RAYMOND TANTER
|
334 |
+
McClelland's event/interaction model is the least formal and the least
|
335 |
+
explicitly theoretical of the interaction models discussed above. It makes
|
336 |
+
the simple assumption that an interaction pattern will continue under
|
337 |
+
the conditions of a specific international situation and structure. Recall
|
338 |
+
Allison's inference from his organizational processes model: "The best
|
339 |
+
explanation of an organization's behavior at [time] t is / — i; the best
|
340 |
+
prediction of what will happen at t -f-1 is /." McClelland's model makes
|
341 |
+
a similar statement but it explains continuity of patterns by referring
|
342 |
+
to the international situation and structure. McClelland's model, however,
|
343 |
+
does not explain the continuation of a pattern by referring to
|
344 |
+
axiomatic assumptions regarding rationality or learning, assumptions
|
345 |
+
which would provide closure for either a deductive or inductive explanation.
|
346 |
+
For example, game theory draws upon rationality in a deductive
|
347 |
+
argument to explain rational choice. The power of game theory lies
|
348 |
+
in its elegant deductive explanation of a wide range of rational choice
|
349 |
+
behavior. When applied to the complexities of world politics, however,
|
350 |
+
game theory loses its elegance as well as its deductive power. In a model
|
351 |
+
of world politics, one cannot have deductive power without sacrificing
|
352 |
+
the empirical fit of the model. There are definite trade-offs between
|
353 |
+
logical closure on the one hand and empirical fit on the other hand.
|
354 |
+
One can gain some closure by assuming that event/interaction patterns
|
355 |
+
will continue as a consequence of prior reinforcement—a learning
|
356 |
+
model. The learning model explains inductively the continuity of specific
|
357 |
+
event patterns.
|
358 |
+
Regarding inductive and deductive explanations, Abraham Kaplan
|
359 |
+
asserts, ". . . we know the reason for something either when we can fit
|
360 |
+
it into a known pattern, or else when we can deduce it from known
|
361 |
+
truths."29 Kaplan states that the inductive pattern type of explanation
|
362 |
+
may be appropriate to a more mature science. Even in the early stages,
|
363 |
+
however, the generalizations explaining a continuing pattern can function
|
364 |
+
as general laws in a deductive argument. In addition, the patterned
|
365 |
+
behavior can be written as a tendency statement and then operate in
|
366 |
+
an inductive explanation.30
|
367 |
+
A learning model can explain why event/interaction patterns repeat.
|
368 |
+
In behavioral psychology, an individual's patterns result from prior
|
369 |
+
socialization. Kenneth Langton states that, " . . . the continuity of many
|
370 |
+
29 Abraham Kaplan, Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco 1964), 332.
|
371 |
+
30 Carl G. Hempel, "Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation," in H. Feigl
|
372 |
+
and G. Maxwell, eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis
|
373 |
+
1962), 98-169.
|
374 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 15
|
375 |
+
patterns over time and place suggests that the individual has been modified
|
376 |
+
in the course of his development in such a way so that he often
|
377 |
+
exhibits persistent behavior apart from the momentary effect of his
|
378 |
+
immediate environment. This behavior results from the socialization
|
379 |
+
process: an individual's learning from others in his environment the
|
380 |
+
social patterns and values of his culture."31 Hence, socialization models
|
381 |
+
seem appropriate to explain why an event/interaction pattern will hold
|
382 |
+
in the future. One can classify learning and game models as similar
|
383 |
+
explanations of rational behavior. Simon asserts that, "Implicit in any
|
384 |
+
theory of learning is a motivational assumption—i.e., that learning consists
|
385 |
+
in the acquisition of a pattern of behavior appropriate to 'goal
|
386 |
+
achievement,' . . . In parallel fashion, game theory . . . (is) concerned
|
387 |
+
with discovering the course of action in a particular situation that will
|
388 |
+
'optimize' the attainment of some objective or 'payoff'."32
|
389 |
+
Since learning and game models both explain rational choice behavior,
|
390 |
+
it may be possible to subsume event/interaction patterns under
|
391 |
+
a more general model based on rationality.33 Thus, an event/interaction
|
392 |
+
sequence only appears to be non-rational. It may not be the least theoretical
|
393 |
+
of the interaction models discussed above. An event/interaction
|
394 |
+
analyst, however, need not pay attention to the implicit assumptions
|
395 |
+
concerning learning and/or rationality. For example, McClelland and
|
396 |
+
his associates identified recurring patterns in the flows of events with
|
397 |
+
little reference to assumptions about learning or rationality which
|
398 |
+
might have explained such patterns.34 Given their purpose of forecasting
|
399 |
+
from these patterns, it may be adequate just to know the existence
|
400 |
+
of patterns rather than why the pattern existed.
|
401 |
+
If one does not know why the pattern exists, he may have difficulty
|
402 |
+
anticipating changes in patterns. Learning models may explain why
|
403 |
+
international event patterns exist or change. In world politics, just as
|
404 |
+
in behavioral psychology, one may need to know prior reinforcement
|
405 |
+
and present behavior to forecast future behavior. Behavioral psychologists
|
406 |
+
initiate their investigations and/or therapy by establishing prior reinforcement
|
407 |
+
schedules. Thereafter, they monitor and reward present
|
408 |
+
behavior in relation to the prior schedules. McClelland and his associ-
|
409 |
+
31 Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization (New York 1969), 3.
|
410 |
+
32 Simon (fn. 5 ) , 274.
|
411 |
+
33 Learning models, unlike game theory, use a more bounded concept of rationality.
|
412 |
+
Goals may not be ranked, and search for an alternative which satisfies a goal replaces
|
413 |
+
choice of an optimal alternative.
|
414 |
+
34 McClelland, in Singer (fn. 12); McClelland and Hoggard, in Rosenau (fn. 9),
|
415 |
+
711-24.
|
416 |
+
16 RAYMOND TANTER
|
417 |
+
ates would be on more solid theoretical ground if they first attempted
|
418 |
+
to discover the prior reinforcement schedules of nations and then discovered
|
419 |
+
their performance records.35
|
420 |
+
The present study attempts to infer prior reinforcement from present
|
421 |
+
interaction patterns. For example, if WTO tends to respond to NATO
|
422 |
+
in the most intense phase of the Berlin conflict, this might reflect the
|
423 |
+
experience of prior situations when WTO leaders were rewarded for
|
424 |
+
responding to NATO actions during the intense phases of prior conflicts.
|
425 |
+
Indeed, an assumption in this regard is that alliance leaders are
|
426 |
+
more likely to recall learned behavior from the most intense phase of
|
427 |
+
a prior conflict than from less intense phases. Moreover, as conflictive
|
428 |
+
intensity increases, the greater may be the perception of interdependence
|
429 |
+
among the actors. Oran Young, furthermore, suggests that actual
|
430 |
+
interdependence increases during the most intense phase of conflict because
|
431 |
+
each actor is able to exercise less and less control over the interaction.
|
432 |
+
As a result, each actor increasingly considers both the actual and
|
433 |
+
potential actions of the other party.36
|
434 |
+
Nazli Choucri and Robert North also stress the interdependence of
|
435 |
+
interactions during periods of high conflict intensity. In their contribution
|
436 |
+
to this volume, Choucri and North discuss three models of international
|
437 |
+
conflict behavior that deal with national expansion, competition,
|
438 |
+
and crisis. The national expansion model assumes that a nation
|
439 |
+
generates its own dynamic of conflict behavior irrespective of its rivals.
|
440 |
+
The competitive model assumes that a nation's level of conflict may be
|
441 |
+
a consequence of the difference in power capability between itself and
|
442 |
+
its nearest rival. The crisis model assumes that a nation's involvement
|
443 |
+
in conflict is a response to the behavior of the opponent. The crisis
|
444 |
+
model anticipates reaction processes, as does the Richardson model. In
|
445 |
+
arguing for a mixed model, Choucri and North assert that the earlier
|
446 |
+
stages of a conflict are dominated by dynamics internal to the nation,
|
447 |
+
as explained by the national expansion model. During later stages,
|
448 |
+
processes of competition become more evident than the internal self-
|
449 |
+
35 Acknowledgments to Judith Tanter for assistance with the behavioral modification
|
450 |
+
analogy. Subsequently, McClelland and his associates have begun to use learning models
|
451 |
+
in their World Event/Interaction Survey. Thanks to Gary Hoggard and John Sigler
|
452 |
+
for bringing these learning models to the author's attention. See McClelland's "Verbal
|
453 |
+
and Physical Conflict in the Contemporary International System," Mimeo, August 1970,
|
454 |
+
especially 4-8.
|
455 |
+
36 Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises
|
456 |
+
(Princeton 1968), 19, 28; Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge,
|
457 |
+
Mass, i960), 15-16. Note also that evidence suggests that perceptions become more
|
458 |
+
important the more intense the conflictive interactions. See Ole Holsti and others,
|
459 |
+
"Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in Singer (fn. 12), 123-58.
|
460 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 17
|
461 |
+
generating forces. Even later come the interdependent interactions
|
462 |
+
characteristic of crises. Some of their most important discoveries are
|
463 |
+
the "breakpoints," where external dynamics begin to dominate internal
|
464 |
+
dynamics as determinants of conflictive interactions.
|
465 |
+
Following Choucri and North, the present study hypothesizes that
|
466 |
+
internal attributes are more important in pre- and post-crisis phases.37
|
467 |
+
The present study divides the Berlin conflict into three phases (precrisis,
|
468 |
+
crisis, and post-crisis) in order to consider whether interdependent
|
469 |
+
behavior between WTO and NATO increases during the crisis
|
470 |
+
phase in contrast to other phases. During the crisis phase, an event/
|
471 |
+
interaction model should explain alliance behavior more adequately
|
472 |
+
than an organizational processes model. In short, limited rational actors
|
473 |
+
learn patterns of interdependence from prior conflicts. They generalize
|
474 |
+
these patterns and, particularly at the most intense phase of an
|
475 |
+
ongoing conflict, tend to repeat the learned behavior.
|
476 |
+
AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES MODEL
|
477 |
+
Recall Charles McClelland's description of the international system.
|
478 |
+
He ignores the internal attributes of the actors and stresses prior interactions
|
479 |
+
as an explanation for current behavior. Graham Allison's foreign
|
480 |
+
policy approach, on the other hand, ignores prior interaction and emphasizes
|
481 |
+
standard operating procedures and the search behavior of complex
|
482 |
+
organizations within each actor.38 An event/interaction model can
|
483 |
+
employ the concept of learning to explain recurrent patterns between
|
484 |
+
actors; the organizational processes model can use learning to explain
|
485 |
+
organizational routines and search processes within actors.
|
486 |
+
One important set of organizational routines are standard operating
|
487 |
+
procedures (SOP's). The existence of standard operating procedures
|
488 |
+
implies that the actor is adaptively rational. Although the actors are
|
489 |
+
business firms, Richard Cyert and James March suggest that standard
|
490 |
+
operating procedures are the result of a long run adaptive process
|
491 |
+
through which a business firm learns.39 Standard operating procedures
|
492 |
+
are internal characteristics of the actor. If the actor has a need to behave
|
493 |
+
adaptively in the changing environment of a conflict, however, he has
|
494 |
+
37 T h e temporal domain of the present study differs from the Choucri-North study.
|
495 |
+
They base their study on observations covering the period 1870-1914, while the present
|
496 |
+
study concerns the eight-month period immediately prior, during, and after the intense
|
497 |
+
conflict over Berlin in 1961. While the important events in the Choucri-North study
|
498 |
+
unfold over a period of years or even decades, the theoretically meaningful unit of time
|
499 |
+
in the present study is a period of days.
|
500 |
+
38 Allison (fn. 2), explicitly acknowledges other models of foreign policy decisionmaking,
|
501 |
+
e.g., Allison's rational actor model explicitly includes interaction.
|
502 |
+
39 Cyert and March (fn. 17), 101 and 113.
|
503 |
+
18 RAYMOND TANTER
|
504 |
+
to take into account the dynamic nature of that environment. Standard
|
505 |
+
operating procedures are not tailored to specific environments. Rather,
|
506 |
+
they are generalized routines which have been applied previously to
|
507 |
+
similar problems.40
|
508 |
+
When a conflict occurs, standard operating procedures may not be
|
509 |
+
an adequate basis for decision-making. In routine situations, the explanation
|
510 |
+
of the output of an actor may depend heavily on standard operating
|
511 |
+
procedures. During a conflict, rational adaptation suggests that the
|
512 |
+
actor search for more innovative solutions than those provided by
|
513 |
+
standard operating procedures. As Julian Feldman and Herschel Kanter
|
514 |
+
assert: "The major variable affecting the initiation of search is dissatisfaction—
|
515 |
+
the organization will search for additional alternatives when
|
516 |
+
the consequences of the present alternatives do not satisfy its goals."41
|
517 |
+
The concept of search fits nicely with the idea of "satisficing"—an actor
|
518 |
+
searches until he finds an alternative which is satisfactory.42
|
519 |
+
During a conflict, the organizational standard operating procedures
|
520 |
+
tend to give way to search processes which are more likely to respond
|
521 |
+
particularly to the external environment. Even these search processes,
|
522 |
+
however, occur primarily in the neighborhood of prior or existing alternatives
|
523 |
+
because of the prominence of these options and the ease of
|
524 |
+
calculating their consequences. In this respect, search simply builds
|
525 |
+
incrementally on standard operating procedures relying on prior cases
|
526 |
+
to provide alternatives that may satisfy organizational goals.
|
527 |
+
Organizational processes models are to event/interaction models as
|
528 |
+
decision-making models of the firm are to some economic explanations
|
529 |
+
of firm behavior. That is, some economic explanations stress the environment
|
530 |
+
external to the firm as the basis of rational choice. Regarding
|
531 |
+
event/interaction models, the market-determined firm is equivalent to
|
532 |
+
the international system-determined nation. The external environment
|
533 |
+
in a market economy consists of all other competitive firms, e.g., all
|
534 |
+
firms are striving to maximize net revenue, given certain prices and a
|
535 |
+
technologically determined production function. Similarly, consider
|
536 |
+
nations as firms, where nations seek to maximize their national interest.
|
537 |
+
If the market determined each firm's behavior irrespective of internal
|
538 |
+
organizational processes, domestic attributes would be irrelevant to an
|
539 |
+
explanation of a nation's foreign policy decisions. Cyert and March provide
|
540 |
+
an alternative to the market-based ideas just as Allison provides
|
541 |
+
"Allison (fn. a ) , 85.
|
542 |
+
41 Julian Feldman and Herschel Kanter, "Organizational Decision-Making," in
|
543 |
+
James G. March, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago 1965), 662.
|
544 |
+
42 Donald W. Taylor, "Decision-Making and Problem Solving," in March, ibid., 662.
|
545 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 19
|
546 |
+
an alternative to international system ideas. Cyert and March supplement
|
547 |
+
market analysis with an explanation of the internal operation of
|
548 |
+
the individual firm. Indeed, their analysis indicates that a firm's resource
|
549 |
+
allocation decisions are very dependent upon prior patterns of
|
550 |
+
allocation.43 In a related inquiry, Aaron Wildavsky finds that the most
|
551 |
+
important determinant of the size and content of a given year's budget
|
552 |
+
is the previous year's budget—a type of organizational incrementalism.44
|
553 |
+
Organizational processes models are to event/interaction models as
|
554 |
+
decision-making models of budgeting are to community power studies.
|
555 |
+
For example, John P. Crecine's study of municipal budgeting employs
|
556 |
+
a decision-making model that stresses organizational factors. His findings
|
557 |
+
provide empirical support to the organizational processes model of
|
558 |
+
Cyert and March. Crecine finds that the lack of adequate data on
|
559 |
+
agency performance leaves the decisionmakers with little choice. They
|
560 |
+
must use prior budgets as a reference for current budget decisions.
|
561 |
+
Crecine also discusses external citizen demand in the budgeting process.
|
562 |
+
This kind of external demand has a counterpart in the event/interaction
|
563 |
+
model of the present inquiry. Crecine acknowledges that external citizen
|
564 |
+
demand may determine the pattern of expenditure within certain
|
565 |
+
accounts. But he finds that there is no direct connection between political
|
566 |
+
pressure and departmental budget levels. Crecine does suggest,
|
567 |
+
however, that external pressures may have a cumulative, long run effect
|
568 |
+
on governmental problem-solving.45 In contrast, community power
|
569 |
+
studies assume a process of mutual interaction comparable to the event/
|
570 |
+
interaction model presented here. Community power studies do not
|
571 |
+
allow for organizational explanations of the process by which local
|
572 |
+
governments allocate values. The community power studies assume
|
573 |
+
that a business dominated elite, or multiple elites specializing in particular
|
574 |
+
issues, determine governmental resource allocation.46 In other
|
575 |
+
words the elitist and pluralist community power models both assume
|
576 |
+
that resource allocation in the polity is a consequence of external factors,
|
577 |
+
an assumption comparable to the logic of the event/interaction model.47
|
578 |
+
43 Cyert and March (fn. 17).
|
579 |
+
44 Aaron B. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston 1964), n ff.;
|
580 |
+
also cf. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration
|
581 |
+
Review, xxxvi (Spring 1959), 79-88; David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom,
|
582 |
+
A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York 1963).
|
583 |
+
45 John P. Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving: A Computer Simulation of
|
584 |
+
Municipal Budgeting (Chicago 1969), 219; "Defense Budgeting: Organizational
|
585 |
+
Adaptation to External Constraints," RAND Corporation (March 1970).
|
586 |
+
46 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel
|
587 |
+
Hill 1953).
|
588 |
+
4T Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New
|
589 |
+
Haven 1961).
|
590 |
+
20 RAYMOND TANTER
|
591 |
+
There are several implications from organizational studies which are
|
592 |
+
relevant to the present inquiry.48 One such inference is that rriost actions
|
593 |
+
taken by alliances may consist of the repetition or continuance of what
|
594 |
+
was done in the past. In the absence of some reason to change behavior,
|
595 |
+
alliances may simply continue doing what they have been doing.49 An
|
596 |
+
organizational processes model assumes that most present behavior is
|
597 |
+
a result of prior behavior and organizational routines. Explanation of
|
598 |
+
an action begins at the base line of prior behavior and routines, noting
|
599 |
+
incremental deviations.50 The incremental deviations may result from
|
600 |
+
the external environment. Thus, the organizational based studies also
|
601 |
+
suggest a combined interaction/organization model.
|
602 |
+
Recall the specific hypothesis emerging from a foreign policy decision-
|
603 |
+
making approach: an alliance's behavior during a conflict results
|
604 |
+
from its own pattern of actions. Given the discussion of conflict phases
|
605 |
+
above, consider the following expansion and modification of this hypothesis:
|
606 |
+
an alliance's behavior in pre- and post-crisis results from its
|
607 |
+
intra-organizational standard operating procedures and search processes.
|
608 |
+
Specifically, WTO should respond more to its own prior behavior
|
609 |
+
than to NATO during the pre- and post-crisis phases of the Berlin
|
610 |
+
conflict, and similarly for NATO. Finally, the interaction/organization
|
611 |
+
model simply combines the event/interaction and organizational processes
|
612 |
+
models.
|
613 |
+
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS DECISIONS
|
614 |
+
A fundamental assumption of the design is that indicators can tap
|
615 |
+
unmeasured concepts. That is, the data are the intensities of conflictive
|
616 |
+
interactions between the WTO and NATO alliances. No data are presented
|
617 |
+
here on such theoretically interesting concepts as learning, rationality,
|
618 |
+
standard operating procedures, or search processes. Nonetheless,
|
619 |
+
the design assumes that event/interaction patterns can be used as
|
620 |
+
indicators of these theoretically significant concepts.51
|
621 |
+
If an alliance's current actions are a response more to its own prior
|
622 |
+
behavior, the inference is that organizational processes are more important
|
623 |
+
than interaction patterns. Conversely, if an alliance's current
|
624 |
+
48 SOP's in bureaucracies imply long-term stability of behavior, while the present
|
625 |
+
analysis treats continuity of action over periods of several days. Nonetheless, the organizational
|
626 |
+
literature may provide useful analogies for the study of short-term conflict.
|
627 |
+
49 Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, The Brookings
|
628 |
+
Institute (March 1970).
|
629 |
+
50Ibid.; Allison (fn. 2).
|
630 |
+
51 Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "The Measurement Problem: A Gap between the Language
|
631 |
+
of Theory and Research," in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. and Ann B. Blalock, eds., Methodology
|
632 |
+
in Social Research (New York 1968), 5-27.
|
633 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 21
|
634 |
+
actions are a response more to the other alliance's prior behavior, then
|
635 |
+
the inference is that interaction patterns are more important than organizational
|
636 |
+
processes. In both cases, measured indicators (actions) tap
|
637 |
+
unmeasured concepts (e.g., event/interactions and organizational processes).
|
638 |
+
By no stretch of the imagination, then, does this design test
|
639 |
+
models or their implications. Rather, the design simply evaluates the
|
640 |
+
models which seem to be implied by certain patterns in the data. This
|
641 |
+
design is inductive in orientation, but it does more than search for regularities
|
642 |
+
in the data. The study uses patterns as a point of departure for
|
643 |
+
making inferences about models. In short, the design seeks to develop
|
644 |
+
an interface between strategies that stress logical closure via tight models
|
645 |
+
and those which search for empirical regularities.52
|
646 |
+
Specifically, the design allows for the evaluation of the following
|
647 |
+
hypotheses:
|
648 |
+
1. Prior WTO connective action intensities determine current
|
649 |
+
WTO action intensities.53
|
650 |
+
2. Prior NATO conflictive action intensities determine current
|
651 |
+
NATO action intensities.
|
652 |
+
3. Prior WTO conflictive action intensities determine current
|
653 |
+
NATO action intensities.
|
654 |
+
4. Prior NATO conflictive action intensities determine current
|
655 |
+
WTO action intensities.
|
656 |
+
5. Prior WTO and NATO conflictive action intensities determine
|
657 |
+
current WTO action intensities.
|
658 |
+
6. Prior WTO and NATO conflictive action intensities determine
|
659 |
+
current NATO action intensities.
|
660 |
+
The first four hypotheses correspond to the paths in Figure 1. Hypotheses
|
661 |
+
five and six combine paths one and four as well as paths two
|
662 |
+
and three respectively. Paths one and two are called vertical paths
|
663 |
+
while three and four are the diagonal paths in this study. If the diagonals
|
664 |
+
are greater than the verticals, this might indicate that an event/
|
665 |
+
interaction model is more valid than an organizational processes model.
|
666 |
+
If the verticals are greater than the diagonals, this might indicate that
|
667 |
+
an organizational processes model is more valid than an event/interaction
|
668 |
+
model. If both the diagonals and verticals are equally strong, this
|
669 |
+
might indicate that the interaction/organization model is the valid one
|
670 |
+
relative to its components. If neither the diagonals nor the verticals are
|
671 |
+
52 See the article by Oran R. Young in this volume regarding strategies that stress
|
672 |
+
logical closure and those that emphasize the search for empirical regularities.
|
673 |
+
53 The term action intensity includes both word and deed intensities.
|
674 |
+
22 RAYMOND TANTER
|
675 |
+
strong, this might indicate one or two things: ( i ) the models specified
|
676 |
+
here are invalid; (2) a significant amount of measurement error is
|
677 |
+
present in the data.
|
678 |
+
NATO
|
679 |
+
(2)
|
680 |
+
FIGURE 1
|
681 |
+
Prior Action Intensity
|
682 |
+
(3)
|
683 |
+
NATO
|
684 |
+
WTO
|
685 |
+
(4)
|
686 |
+
Current Action Intensity
|
687 |
+
(1)
|
688 |
+
WTO
|
689 |
+
With the six hypotheses diagrammed in Figure 1, the author hopes
|
690 |
+
to account for the systematic variance in the study. Other variance may
|
691 |
+
be due to error or is systematic variance which is extraneous here. The
|
692 |
+
design, therefore, seeks to minimize error variance and rule out extraneous
|
693 |
+
variance, e.g., rival hypotheses which might explain the dependent
|
694 |
+
variables. One plausible rival hypothesis, for example, is that
|
695 |
+
the actions of the Chinese People's Republic might determine the interactions
|
696 |
+
between WTO and NATO. There is some evidence of a close
|
697 |
+
connection between the long term connective actions of the C.P.R.,
|
698 |
+
U.S.S.R., and the U.S.54 An assumption of this study, however, is that
|
699 |
+
the relationship between the WTO and NATO countries in a given conflict
|
700 |
+
is not a result of their respective interactions with China.
|
701 |
+
A further design decision concerns the measurement of conflict intensity
|
702 |
+
and the identification of the distinct phases of the Berlin conflict.
|
703 |
+
Walter Corson made available his conflict intensity scale and coded
|
704 |
+
data from the Berlin conflict of 1961.55 Corson divides the Berlin con-
|
705 |
+
54 Walter H. Corson, "Conflict and Cooperation in East-West Relations: Measurement
|
706 |
+
and Explanation," paper delivered at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political
|
707 |
+
Science Association, Los Angeles, September, 1970. Also, see Allen S. Whiting,
|
708 |
+
"United States-Chinese Political Relations," The University of Michigan, Mimeo,
|
709 |
+
1970, 17.
|
710 |
+
55 Corson constructed the scale in two phases. He administered questionnaires to 53
|
711 |
+
citizens of 13 non-Western and Western countries. In the first phase, there were 54
|
712 |
+
conflictive actions arranged in irregular order. With each action printed on a separate
|
713 |
+
card, respondents arranged the actions in rank-order of increasing intensity. The responses
|
714 |
+
from these questionnaires constituted information to compute a mean rankorder
|
715 |
+
for each action, resulting in a 54-item rank-order conflict intensity scale. In the
|
716 |
+
second phase, respondents had 14 conflictive actions selected from the original group
|
717 |
+
of 54; these actions covered the full range of intensity. They were printed on separate
|
718 |
+
cards and presented to respondents in irregular order. Respondents assigned a number
|
719 |
+
to each action proportional to its intensity as they perceived it. Using the responses
|
720 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 23
|
721 |
+
flict into five phases on the basis of changes in the types and intensities
|
722 |
+
of both conflictive and cooperative behavior. Corson's second criterion
|
723 |
+
for disaggregating the total interaction process is. events which act as
|
724 |
+
obvious thresholds.
|
725 |
+
The present study draws partially on Corson's criteria to specify the
|
726 |
+
phases of the Berlin Conflict. In contrast to the Corson analysis, the
|
727 |
+
present study excludes cooperative interaction patterns.58 Instead, total
|
728 |
+
conflictive intensity scores are used for NATO and WTO by day from
|
729 |
+
i May 1961 to 31 December 1961.
|
730 |
+
The data show that conflictive intensity remains low until 25 July
|
731 |
+
when President Kennedy announced major U.S. military preparations.
|
732 |
+
Conflictive intensity peaked for WTO on 13 August when the East
|
733 |
+
Germans sealed the border, and for NATO on 17 August when France
|
734 |
+
and Britain strengthened their armed forces and NATO demanded an
|
735 |
+
end to the travel ban. The last high conflict peak occurred on 17 September
|
736 |
+
when the U.S.S.R. protested West German air intrusion over
|
737 |
+
Berlin. Beginning with the meetings between Soviet Premier Khrushchev
|
738 |
+
and Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak on 18 September over the
|
739 |
+
German treaty, events of moderate cooperative intensity occur with relative
|
740 |
+
frequency. The time from 25 July to 17 September is thus delineated
|
741 |
+
as the crisis phase for three reasons: (1) conflictive interaction
|
742 |
+
is more intense during this 56 day period than during any other; (2)
|
743 |
+
although this phase has several clear peaks, the intensity remained
|
744 |
+
high for several days; and (3) the crisis phase begins on 25 July with an
|
745 |
+
event of high conflictive intensity and ends with an event on 17 September
|
746 |
+
of high conflictive intensity. Figure 2 presents all three phases
|
747 |
+
of the 1961 Berlin conflict.57
|
748 |
+
The design evaluates the three models of conflict (event/interaction,
|
749 |
+
organizational processes, and a combination of both) and their corresponding
|
750 |
+
hypotheses by regressing each alliance's current conflictive
|
751 |
+
action intensity (dependent variable) on both its own prior conflictive
|
752 |
+
from these questionnaires, the geometric mean for each event reflected its intensity
|
753 |
+
across respondents. From these data, he developed a 14-item conflict intensity scale
|
754 |
+
and assigned intensity values by interpolation to the remaining 40 conflictive actions.
|
755 |
+
Details of the scaling project are given in Walter H. Corson, "Conflict and Cooperation
|
756 |
+
in East-West Crises: Dynamics of Crisis Interaction," unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
|
757 |
+
Harvard University, December, 1970.
|
758 |
+
56 T h e conflict phases outlined in this paper are based on empirical data from a
|
759 |
+
specific conflict and describe only that conflict. Work is under way by the author and
|
760 |
+
his colleagues on the development of a process model of conflict which will draw on
|
761 |
+
this analysis but not be limited to it.
|
762 |
+
57 Corson originally identified five conflict phases: pre-crisis, intensification, peak,
|
763 |
+
reduction, and post-crisis. For the present analysis, crisis includes intensification, peak,
|
764 |
+
and reduction. Corson (fn. 55).
|
765 |
+
24 RAYMOND TANTER
|
766 |
+
FIGURE 2
|
767 |
+
PHASES OF THE 1961 BERLIN CONFLICT
|
768 |
+
Phase Period No. of Days
|
769 |
+
All Phases 1 May 1961 - 31 December 1961 245
|
770 |
+
Pre-crisis 1 May - 24 July 84
|
771 |
+
Crisis 25 July -17 September 56
|
772 |
+
Post-crisis 18 September - 31 December 105
|
773 |
+
action intensity and the other alliance's prior action intensity for each
|
774 |
+
phase of the Berlin conflict. These operations yielded the path coefficients
|
775 |
+
reported in this analysis.
|
776 |
+
A crucial substantive and design problem confronted in this paper
|
777 |
+
is the meaning of time. As a variable and unit of analysis, time is usually
|
778 |
+
measured in terms of increments of solar time—minutes, hours,
|
779 |
+
days, weeks, months, years, and so on. Yet it is very likely that time
|
780 |
+
holds a different meaning for decisionmakers caught up in a crisis.
|
781 |
+
Time, thus, could be thought of as "diplomatic time" and measured in
|
782 |
+
a variety of ways including aggregating solar time to periods of specific
|
783 |
+
duration on the basis of explicit theoretical criteria, or abandoning solar
|
784 |
+
time units altogether. A variety of studies of crisis58 converge in their
|
785 |
+
identification of two criteria integral to the nature of crises: (1) action
|
786 |
+
intensity, and (2) elapsed time between actions.
|
787 |
+
Corson finds that the elapsed time between actions varies inversely
|
788 |
+
with total conflictive intensity in his study of the 1961 Berlin conflict.59
|
789 |
+
This implies that as events increase in conflictive intensity, they also
|
790 |
+
become more frequent. However, a day is the unit of time in this study
|
791 |
+
for three reasons: (1) the author knows of no theory relating the frequency
|
792 |
+
of events with the intensity of conflict in a continuous fashion;
|
793 |
+
58 Holsti and others, in Singer (fn. 12); Hermann (fn. 15); Corson (fn. 55). Thanks
|
794 |
+
to Paul Smoker for his thoughts on the study of time.
|
795 |
+
59 Corson (fn. 55), 186. Corson speculated that time period should be an aggregation
|
796 |
+
of days rather than a single day. T h e criteria he employed are three: (1) if total conflictive
|
797 |
+
intensity for N A T O and W T O on a given day was less than 30 on the Corson
|
798 |
+
scale, the intensity of conflictive actions on that day and the preceding six days predicted
|
799 |
+
the intensity of conflictive actions for the next three days; (2) if total given
|
800 |
+
intensity on a given day was between 30 and 150, action intensity on that day and the
|
801 |
+
preceding four days predicted action intensity for the next three days; and (3) if total
|
802 |
+
intensity on a given day was greater than 150, action intensity on that day and the
|
803 |
+
preceding two days predicted deed intensity for the next two days. There are at least
|
804 |
+
three difficulties with this method. First, it is difficult to implement this aggregation
|
805 |
+
scheme without overlapping time periods. Second, the method is discontinuous when it
|
806 |
+
should most properly be of the form
|
807 |
+
t = all
|
808 |
+
where / is the aggregation period, /, the conflictive intensity, and, a, the proportionality
|
809 |
+
constant. As the intensity gets large the aggregation period gets small. Third,
|
810 |
+
the method only represents more intuition than empirical finding.
|
811 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 25
|
812 |
+
(2) if time periods were aggregated, stronger relationships would be
|
813 |
+
found according to the "ecological fallacy;" (3) the multi-lagged
|
814 |
+
models tested did not contribute any additional information over and
|
815 |
+
above the single-lagged models.00 Thus, the study predicts current action
|
816 |
+
intensity by prior action intensity across each day of the conflict.
|
817 |
+
A further decision was to aggregate data to the alliance level of analysis.
|
818 |
+
61 An initial decision was to study only Soviet-American behavior in
|
819 |
+
the Berlin conflict. It became apparent, however, that East and West
|
820 |
+
Germany would have to be included. Then what does one do with
|
821 |
+
relevant actions by other countries during the conflict? These actions
|
822 |
+
should also be taken into account. Hence, the alliance became the unit
|
823 |
+
of aggregation. The alliance unit of aggregation may be more valid
|
824 |
+
for a case such as Berlin than for a case such as the Cuban Missile Crisis
|
825 |
+
of 1962. There, alliance participation was secondary to the Soviet-American
|
826 |
+
confrontation.02
|
827 |
+
Regarding the data, there are 337 events for the Berlin conflict from 1
|
828 |
+
May 1961 through 31 December 1961—245 days. Primary data sources
|
829 |
+
included the New Yor\ Times front page, Deadline Data on World Affairs,
|
830 |
+
as well as The World Almanac and Boo\ of Facts, 1961, 1962. The
|
831 |
+
present study does not use events per se in analysis. Rather, the daily
|
832 |
+
intensities aggregated across events for each alliance comprise the data
|
833 |
+
for analysis. The coding and aggregation design decisions prepared the
|
834 |
+
data for analysis. The method used is path analysis, which consists of regression
|
835 |
+
analyses of theoretically specified relationships using standardized
|
836 |
+
data.03 Path analysis is appropriate for determining the relative
|
837 |
+
contribution of competing paths in explaining a dependent variable.
|
838 |
+
The assumptions of the method compare nicely with the measurement
|
839 |
+
60 Multi-lagged models were run under two hypotheses: (1) the connective intensity
|
840 |
+
on any given day would be some linear combination of the conflictive intensities of
|
841 |
+
the previous six days; (2) conflictive intensity would have a decreasing effect as time
|
842 |
+
from the present increased. Neither of these two hypotheses were supported by the
|
843 |
+
models or the data. The only different model which arose out of this analysis is found
|
844 |
+
in footnote 73.
|
845 |
+
61 Aggregating to the alliance level as in the present study may result in a lack of fit
|
846 |
+
between an organizational model and the alliance. The study assumes, however, that
|
847 |
+
organizational models are equally valid irrespective of the level of analysis.
|
848 |
+
62 In the Berlin conflict of 1961, 2 8% of W T O actions recorded involved other W T O
|
849 |
+
members acting with or without the U.S.S.R.; 48% of all N A T O actions recorded
|
850 |
+
involved other NATO members acting with or without the United States. See ibid.
|
851 |
+
63 Here is a summary of the methodology: The independent variables are prior
|
852 |
+
WTO and/or prior NATO action intensities. Both word and deed intensity comprise
|
853 |
+
the action category. The author standardized action intensity within the three conflict
|
854 |
+
phases for each alliance, e.g., action intensity had a mean of zero and a standard deviation
|
855 |
+
of unity, pre-conditions for path analysis. Standardized NATO and WTO action
|
856 |
+
intensities were each regressed on standardized prior NATO and WTO action intensities,
|
857 |
+
resulting in the path coefficients.
|
858 |
+
26 RAYMOND TANTER
|
859 |
+
system and theoretical specification of this study. For example, path
|
860 |
+
analysis assumes interval scale data and specification of some of the
|
861 |
+
paths. The Corson scale probably meets the interval level assumption,
|
862 |
+
and the present study specifies most of the paths explicitly.
|
863 |
+
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
|
864 |
+
Here is a very brief historical overview of key events in the Berlin
|
865 |
+
conflict from i May 1961 through 31 December 1961, followed by the
|
866 |
+
path analysis whose purpose is to evaluate the three proposed models.64
|
867 |
+
During May of 1961 (pre-crisis) WTO countries began to intensify
|
868 |
+
their demands that the West terminate its presence in Berlin. There
|
869 |
+
was concern with the problem of the flow of refugees fleeing East Germany—
|
870 |
+
almost 200,000 in i960. The refugee problem was a major
|
871 |
+
motivating factor in precipitating the conflict. Recall the inference from
|
872 |
+
the Choucri-North study that during the pre-crisis phase it is likely
|
873 |
+
that the focus would be on internal attributes of the actor rather than
|
874 |
+
on the opponent's actions. Intra-alliance factors such as the refugee
|
875 |
+
problem and potential unrest in East Germany appear to be more important
|
876 |
+
than NATO actions as determinants of WTO conflict intensification.
|
877 |
+
There followed a slow but steady intensification of conflict
|
878 |
+
which, although self-generated, was modified by Western actions occasionally.
|
879 |
+
The WTO "ultimatum" of June, the threat to sign a separate
|
880 |
+
peace treaty with East Germany and end the legal basis for the Western
|
881 |
+
presence in Berlin, illustrates a key event in the intensification.
|
882 |
+
In the crisis phase there seemed to be a greater amount of competitive
|
883 |
+
action and reaction than in the pre-crisis phase. For example, the WTO
|
884 |
+
actions of 13 August 1961 to erect the Wall may have resulted from
|
885 |
+
WTO dissatisfaction with Western response to the demand for a separate
|
886 |
+
peace treaty with East Germany. The Western response consisted
|
887 |
+
partly of a reiteration of three essentials: (1) continued allied presence
|
888 |
+
in Berlin; (2) unrestricted access routes to and from Berlin; and (3)
|
889 |
+
64 For a historical overview of the Berlin crisis, see: George Bailey, "The Gentle
|
890 |
+
Erosion of Berlin," The Reporter (April 26, 1962); Arnold L. Horelick and Myron
|
891 |
+
Rush, "The Political Offensive Against Berlin," Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign
|
892 |
+
Policy (Chicago 1965), chap. 10; John W. Keller, Germany, the Wall and Berlin:
|
893 |
+
Internal Policies During an International Crisis (New York 1964); Jean Edward Smith,
|
894 |
+
"Berlin: The Erosion of a Principle," The Reporter (November 21, 1963); Jean Edward
|
895 |
+
Smith, The Defense of Berlin (Baltimore 1963); Hans Speier, Divided Berlin (New
|
896 |
+
York 1961); Jack M. Schick, "The Berlin Crisis of 1961 and U.S. Military Strategy,"
|
897 |
+
Orbis, vm (Winter 1965); Oran R. Young, The Politics of Force (Princeton 1966);
|
898 |
+
Charles McClelland, "Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948-
|
899 |
+
1963," in Singer (fn. 12), 159-86.
|
900 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 27
|
901 |
+
freedom for West Berliners to choose their own form of government.
|
902 |
+
The Western response consisted of concrete acts which strengthened
|
903 |
+
NATO military forces and reinforced NATO troops in Berlin. (One
|
904 |
+
could select an event from the post-crisis phase to illustrate the deemphasis
|
905 |
+
on interaction and the consequent reassertion of domestic
|
906 |
+
factors, but it is not necessary to illustrate the point.) One problem with
|
907 |
+
selecting historical incidents as illustrations is that it is generally easy
|
908 |
+
to find an event which demonstrates the idea! Systematic comparative
|
909 |
+
inquiry seeks to avoid such biased sampling "to prove" one's ideas. A
|
910 |
+
comparison of action intensities across time, based on a universe of
|
911 |
+
events, is more valid than the selective sampling of events in a verbal
|
912 |
+
descriptive account, although both are necessary.
|
913 |
+
Another way of analyzing the Berlin conflict is to look at the level
|
914 |
+
of conflictive intensities over time. For example, from i May through
|
915 |
+
24 July, total conflictive intensity was low for both alliances.65 Disaggregating
|
916 |
+
conflictive action into its components for a moment, consider
|
917 |
+
the period between 25 July through 12 August. WTO threats were
|
918 |
+
much higher in intensity than WTO disapproval, demands, or deeds.
|
919 |
+
In contrast, NATO conflictive deeds were much higher in intensity
|
920 |
+
than its words: disapproval, demands, or threats.66
|
921 |
+
From 13 August to 17 September, conflictive intensities were at their
|
922 |
+
highest levels. Disaggregating the conflictive actions from 13 to 26 August
|
923 |
+
shows that WTO conflictive actions were comprised of low demand,
|
924 |
+
high threat, and low to moderately intense deeds. In contrast, NATO's
|
925 |
+
conflictive actions in this period had moderately intense deeds (including
|
926 |
+
troop movements), high demand, and low threat intensity (including
|
927 |
+
frequent protests of the border closing but few threats of action
|
928 |
+
which would counter the closing). Between 27 August and 17 September
|
929 |
+
the nature of WTO and NATO conflictive intensity levels are similar:
|
930 |
+
threats and deeds were relatively high, disapproval and demands
|
931 |
+
were relatively low.07 In the post-crisis phase, 18 September through 31
|
932 |
+
December, events of cooperative intensity were more frequent than
|
933 |
+
those of conflictive intensity.68 In summary, total conflictive intensity for
|
934 |
+
65 For the purposes of this study, 1 May 1961 is the beginning of the Berlin conflict.
|
935 |
+
This establishes a base line period several weeks prior to the WTO ultimatum in early
|
936 |
+
June.
|
937 |
+
6 6Corson (fn. 55).
|
938 |
+
67 Corson, ibid.
|
939 |
+
68 T h e meetings between Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Belgian Foreign Minister
|
940 |
+
Spaak on 18-19 September mark the transition to the post-crisis phase. The analysis
|
941 |
+
ends on 31 December 1961 because the frequency and intensity of actions began to
|
942 |
+
approach the pre-crisis level of June.
|
943 |
+
28 RAYMOND TANTER
|
944 |
+
WTO and NATO averaged lowest in the pre-crisis phase (daily average
|
945 |
+
= 14 points on the Corson scale), moderate in the post-crisis phase
|
946 |
+
(29 points on the Corson scale), and highest in the crisis phase (96
|
947 |
+
points on the Corson scale).
|
948 |
+
Given this brief historical overview and the description of intensities
|
949 |
+
of conflictive behavior, Figure 3 contains the results of the quantitative
|
950 |
+
analysis. Recall the general proposition that the organizational processes
|
951 |
+
model should explain alliance behavior in the pre- and post-crisis phases
|
952 |
+
FIGURE 3
|
953 |
+
RESULTS FOR THE 1961 BERLIN CONFLICT1'9
|
954 |
+
(N = 245)
|
955 |
+
Pre-Crisis NATO,.,
|
956 |
+
.27
|
957 |
+
NATO WTO.
|
958 |
+
Conflict Days 1-84
|
959 |
+
N =83
|
960 |
+
Crisis NATO,
|
961 |
+
.12
|
962 |
+
NATO WTO,
|
963 |
+
Conflict Days 85-140
|
964 |
+
N =55
|
965 |
+
Post-Crisis NATO
|
966 |
+
.13
|
967 |
+
NATO
|
968 |
+
WTO
|
969 |
+
7-1
|
970 |
+
.14
|
971 |
+
WTO,
|
972 |
+
Conflict Days 141-245
|
973 |
+
N=104
|
974 |
+
69 Note that when variables are lagged, you lose one degree of freedom. Thus, N is
|
975 |
+
always smaller than the number of conflict days in each phase.
|
976 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 29
|
977 |
+
while the event/interaction model should explain such behavior during
|
978 |
+
the crisis phase.'0
|
979 |
+
The values in Figure 3 are path coefficients, which generally range
|
980 |
+
from —1.0 to -f-i-o- They indicate the relative magnitude of each path
|
981 |
+
in determining current alliance action intensity. High vertical path
|
982 |
+
coefficients relative to the diagonals are consistent with an organizational
|
983 |
+
processes model. Large diagonal coefficients relative to the verticals
|
984 |
+
are compatible with an event/interaction model.71
|
985 |
+
How are the numbers to be interpreted in light of the hypotheses of
|
986 |
+
the study? Paths may be thought of as flows of influence between variables,
|
987 |
+
indicating both the direction of the "flow" and the strength of
|
988 |
+
the dependence of one variable on another. Donald Stokes likens paths
|
989 |
+
to a system of interlocking waterways with the flow of water through
|
990 |
+
the paths directed by gates and the amount of water flowing through
|
991 |
+
each gate determined by the magnitudes of the path coefficients.72
|
992 |
+
According to the organizational processes model for the pre-crisis
|
993 |
+
phase, the vertical paths for both WTO and NATO should be
|
994 |
+
stronger than the diagonals, and, indeed, this is generally the case. However,
|
995 |
+
for WTO, the vertical path coefficient is only .06 while the diagonal
|
996 |
+
is just •—-.ii. These results suggest that the model is inadequate
|
997 |
+
and/or there is large measurement error in the data. On the other
|
998 |
+
hand, the vertical path coefficient for NATO is .27 while the diagonal
|
999 |
+
is .21. Given the small difference between these two values, it would
|
1000 |
+
seem that both the organizational process model and the event/interaction
|
1001 |
+
model apply to NATO activity in this period, but one should not
|
1002 |
+
draw strong inferences because of the small magnitude of the coefficients.
|
1003 |
+
The fit does not improve for the crisis phase, although, as one would
|
1004 |
+
expect, the event/interaction model has a slight edge in predictive
|
1005 |
+
power. For NATO, the diagonal path coefficient, .23, is twice as large
|
1006 |
+
as the vertical, .12, but given the small sample size the difference would
|
1007 |
+
70 Besides the organizational processes model, there are several other foreign policy
|
1008 |
+
type models that might explain incremental outputs during the pre- and post-crisis
|
1009 |
+
phases (cf. Allison and Halperin in this volume).
|
1010 |
+
71 The path coefficients for the entire period can be seen in the following diagram:
|
1011 |
+
22 ^~~^~^^^ 14 Entire P«riod
|
1012 |
+
* ^ ^ " ^ - ^ * N = 244
|
1013 |
+
NATO,
|
1014 |
+
72 See Donald E. Stokes, "Compound Paths in Political Analysis," The University of
|
1015 |
+
Michigan, Mimeo, n.d.
|
1016 |
+
30 RAYMOND TANTER
|
1017 |
+
not be statistically significant.73 The fit is even worse for WTO; the
|
1018 |
+
diagonal path coefficient, .11, is about the same as the vertical path coefficient,
|
1019 |
+
.08. Thus, one should be cautious in drawing any inferences.
|
1020 |
+
In the post-crisis phase, the vertical coefficients are larger than the
|
1021 |
+
diagonals, but not of sufficient magnitude to suggest a reversion to
|
1022 |
+
standard operating procedures and the organizational processes model.
|
1023 |
+
For NATO the vertical coefficient is .13 while the diagonal coefficient
|
1024 |
+
is .01. For WTO the vertical coefficient is .14 while the diagonal coefficient
|
1025 |
+
is —x>8.74
|
1026 |
+
Given the inconclusive results of the data analysis, the author cannot
|
1027 |
+
select between the models. The organizational processes model may or
|
1028 |
+
may not be adequate for the pre-crisis and post-crisis phases; the organizational
|
1029 |
+
processes model might be as relevant or irrelevant to the crisis
|
1030 |
+
phase as the event/interaction model.75
|
1031 |
+
There are at least three possible explanations for the inconclusive
|
1032 |
+
results. First, the models may be mis-specified; that is, not all of the
|
1033 |
+
predictive variables were included in the analysis. Recall that the refugee
|
1034 |
+
problem was a major motivating factor in precipitating the conflict.
|
1035 |
+
Thus, at least one major causal variable was left out of the model. Indeed,
|
1036 |
+
internal conflictive behavior was left out of the model. There is
|
1037 |
+
justification for expecting little relationship between domestic and
|
1038 |
+
foreign conflictive behavior, but now may be the time to re-examine the
|
1039 |
+
73 This study does not use statistical inference procedures in evaluating the models.
|
1040 |
+
Here is an alternate model for NATO in the crisis phase, the only instance where the
|
1041 |
+
author felt the multiple lags contributed new information:
|
1042 |
+
= 55
|
1043 |
+
Here is an indication of the strength of the interaction relationships. NATO reacts
|
1044 |
+
strongest to WTO actions lagged by four days.,
|
1045 |
+
74 Results of an earlier analysis using the aggregation periods defined in footnote 59
|
1046 |
+
supported the hypotheses that organizational processes were more important in the preand
|
1047 |
+
post-crisis phases, and that organizational processes may have been important in
|
1048 |
+
the crisis phase as well. Because of the reasons stated in the text, most especially because
|
1049 |
+
of the ecological fallacy, these results are not presented here. Although the ecological
|
1050 |
+
fallacy demonstrates little effect on the functional relationship between variables,
|
1051 |
+
the regression coefficient, it has profound effects on the strength of that association,
|
1052 |
+
the beta weight. In path analysis only the beta weight is presented, which would be
|
1053 |
+
inflated because of the aggregation of days. Thus, it may be misleading to draw inferences,
|
1054 |
+
based as they might be on an artifact of aggregation. For a reference, see
|
1055 |
+
Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill
|
1056 |
+
1964), 97-114.
|
1057 |
+
73 Given the alternative model in footnote 73, it appears that the event/interaction
|
1058 |
+
model has more explanatory power for NATO during the crisis phase.
|
1059 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 31
|
1060 |
+
internal-external relationship, given the nature of the Berlin conflict.76
|
1061 |
+
Second, the Corson scale as used here may be inappropriate. Summing
|
1062 |
+
conflictive intensities about interactions may not be sufficient
|
1063 |
+
to tap such theoretically interesting concepts as standard operating procedures.
|
1064 |
+
The Corson scale should be re-examined for its assumptions
|
1065 |
+
and its applicability to models of relevance to the current study.
|
1066 |
+
Third, there is some question as to whether action intensity, which is
|
1067 |
+
the aggregate of both words and deeds, should be used as the indicator
|
1068 |
+
in the models. Action intensity was used initially as a means of tapping
|
1069 |
+
the total behavior of the actors, but this may be unsatisfactory for three
|
1070 |
+
reasons: (i) deeds have a longer preparation time than words; (2)
|
1071 |
+
international politics words can be disregarded with greater frequency
|
1072 |
+
than deeds—it is very difficult to ignore the Berlin Wall; (3) words are
|
1073 |
+
subject to greater misinterpretation than deeds. The author is at present
|
1074 |
+
addressing himself to the above problems in his forthcoming book on
|
1075 |
+
the 1948-49 and 1961 Berlin conflicts."
|
1076 |
+
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT MODELLING AND MANAGEMENT
|
1077 |
+
The twin goals of this paper are to make a tentative evaluation of
|
1078 |
+
models based on an international system approach, a foreign policy
|
1079 |
+
approach, and a combination of these two approaches; and to infer
|
1080 |
+
from the evaluation of these models some implications for conflict
|
1081 |
+
modelling and management. The inconclusive nature of the above
|
1082 |
+
analysis only points up the problems facing the conflict manager, and
|
1083 |
+
in this section the author attempts to address the implications of the
|
1084 |
+
study of the Berlin conflict of 1961 for the more general problem of conflict
|
1085 |
+
management.
|
1086 |
+
If one is to generalize about conflicts, it would make sense to have
|
1087 |
+
information on as many cases as possible. An analyst hopes to draw
|
1088 |
+
inferences from a limited number of cases which are representative of
|
1089 |
+
the larger universe of all conflicts. The Berlin conflict of 1961 may not
|
1090 |
+
be at all representative. As McClelland indicates, the Berlin conflicts of
|
1091 |
+
1948, 1958, and 1961 may have been increasingly routinized as a consequence
|
1092 |
+
of a bureaucratic processing that became almost self-generating.
|
1093 |
+
That is, conflict over Berlin occurred so frequently that organizational
|
1094 |
+
processes assumed greater importance over time. Quite possibly, standard
|
1095 |
+
operating procedures grew up around the conflicts as a result of this
|
1096 |
+
76 Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations,
|
1097 |
+
1958-1960," Journal of Conflict Resolution, x (March 1966), 41-64.
|
1098 |
+
77 Raymond Tanter, The Berlin Crises: Modelling and Managing International Conflicts
|
1099 |
+
(forthcoming, 1972).
|
1100 |
+
32 RAYMOND TANTER
|
1101 |
+
repetitive pattern.78 Yet, in a case such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of
|
1102 |
+
1962, the event/interaction model might be more valid within the
|
1103 |
+
crisis phase. Thus, it is important to create a universe of cases for the
|
1104 |
+
comparative inquiry of conflicts before drawing firm inferences from
|
1105 |
+
any one case. (The new conflict data should include information on the
|
1106 |
+
interactions and on organizational processes if possible.)
|
1107 |
+
In addition to obtaining data on more cases, it is necessary to explicate
|
1108 |
+
further the present models and to develop additional models to explain
|
1109 |
+
conflictive interactions. The present models allow one to make little
|
1110 |
+
sense of patterns in the data. Certainly, this result of the data analysis
|
1111 |
+
indicates a need to develop further process models that would describe
|
1112 |
+
and explain the evolution of conflict situations.'0 In the interest of preventing
|
1113 |
+
the explosion of conflicts into crisis, it is extremely important to
|
1114 |
+
discern the connection, if any, between apparently dissimilar conflicts.
|
1115 |
+
This might be accomplished through the development of models and
|
1116 |
+
through the long and tedious process of making, rejecting, and accepting
|
1117 |
+
hypotheses based on these models.
|
1118 |
+
The results of this study have other tentative implications for an effort
|
1119 |
+
at model-building. For instance, the evidence does not indicate that
|
1120 |
+
the author should ally himself with "disillusioned interaction analysts"
|
1121 |
+
and join the growing number of organizational analysts. Such a decision
|
1122 |
+
would be premature, especially since the times call for a synthesis
|
1123 |
+
of the two approaches. Perhaps the Thomas Schellings and Charles
|
1124 |
+
McClellands overemphasize the role of interaction processes; perhaps
|
1125 |
+
Graham Allison and Morton Halperin overemphasize organizational
|
1126 |
+
processes in relation to interaction notions. It is not for the author to
|
1127 |
+
say at this time; the jury is still out.
|
1128 |
+
How would the organizational theorists view the Berlin conflict?
|
1129 |
+
Halperin, for example, might claim that "In periods viewed by senior
|
1130 |
+
players as crises . . . , organizations will calculate how alternative policies
|
1131 |
+
and patterns of action will affect future definitions of roles and
|
1132 |
+
missions. . . . [Organizations] will press for policies which they believe
|
1133 |
+
78 This study, however, does not compare intensities for the three Berlin conflicts;
|
1134 |
+
rather, it only has data on the Berlin conflict of 1961. Thus, there are no hard data
|
1135 |
+
presented here on the routinization of conflict decision-making.
|
1136 |
+
79 Process modelling is a research strategy designed to disaggregate a complex set
|
1137 |
+
of interrelated events and behaviors into stages representing discrete actions or distinct
|
1138 |
+
choice points. Process models serve several useful purposes. First, they direct our attention
|
1139 |
+
to processes such as learning, forgetting, or precedent search which underlie
|
1140 |
+
highly complex patterns of behavior. Thus, process models reduce complex situations
|
1141 |
+
to their basic elements, permitting an economy of description and explanation. Finally,
|
1142 |
+
process modelling could explain the breakpoints in a conflict—those points where the
|
1143 |
+
internal dynamics give way to external factors.
|
1144 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 33
|
1145 |
+
will maintain or extend their roles and missions, even if at some cost
|
1146 |
+
to the immediate objectives of the President. . . ."so Regarding the present
|
1147 |
+
study, Halperin's explanation suggests that alliances should respond
|
1148 |
+
more to intra-alliance than to inter-alliance considerations. Halperin's
|
1149 |
+
explanation also poses the question whether alliances are useful units
|
1150 |
+
of analysis to tap organizational processes. (See footnote 61.) If bureaucracies
|
1151 |
+
respond, as Halperin contends, to their roles as defined within a
|
1152 |
+
particular country, there is no reason to suppose that this response is
|
1153 |
+
consistent with other countries in the alliance. Indeed, one might suspect
|
1154 |
+
the contrary. The alliance problem may account for the relatively
|
1155 |
+
weak organizational process link found in the analysis of the Berlin
|
1156 |
+
conflict of 1961. To determine the effects of organizational processes, it
|
1157 |
+
might be better to examine individual countries and, especially, the
|
1158 |
+
various bureaucracies in those countries.
|
1159 |
+
One of the more interesting aspects of this study comes from the
|
1160 |
+
examination of the plots of conflictive intensity. For the pre-crisis and
|
1161 |
+
post-crisis phases, activity is relatively minor; many of the days register
|
1162 |
+
no activity at all. This might conform to Halperin's statement that,
|
1163 |
+
". . . most of the actions taken by bureaucrats . . . involve doing again
|
1164 |
+
or continuing to do what was done in the past. In the absence of some
|
1165 |
+
reason to change their behavior, organizations keep doing what they
|
1166 |
+
have been doing."81 This notion of "bureaucratic incrementalism," explaining
|
1167 |
+
the performance of foreign service personnel around the
|
1168 |
+
world, is certainly intuitively appealing. Evidence from the budgeting
|
1169 |
+
studies, moreover, suggests that municipal politicians may have something
|
1170 |
+
in common with their statesmen counterparts in the foreign
|
1171 |
+
service.
|
1172 |
+
There is a problem, however, with the incrementalist thesis. How
|
1173 |
+
can the incrementalist thesis account for an innovative sequence of interactions
|
1174 |
+
such as WTO's ultimatum to NATO, NATO's response increasing
|
1175 |
+
its conventional military capabilities, the Berlin Wall, and
|
1176 |
+
negotiations ? Although these events are measured, the present quantitative
|
1177 |
+
analysis fails to account for such innovative sequences. Similarly,
|
1178 |
+
the budgeting studies which stress quantitative budget totals may overlook
|
1179 |
+
the quality of the programs. Thus, quantitative analysis needs to
|
1180 |
+
be supplemented by a study of the qualitative aspects. The latter may be
|
1181 |
+
more apt to yield event/interaction sequences.82
|
1182 |
+
80 Halperin (fn. 49), 50.
|
1183 |
+
81 Ibid., 9.
|
1184 |
+
82 As stated previously, however, one must be careful to avoid selecting historical
|
1185 |
+
events in order "to prove" one's hypothesis. Thanks to Alexander George for the
|
1186 |
+
critique of the incrementalist thesis regarding the quality of programs.
|
1187 |
+
34 RAYMOND TANTER
|
1188 |
+
In summary, this study implies that in modelling conflict an analyst
|
1189 |
+
should: (i) specify a universe of cases for comparative inquiry across
|
1190 |
+
conflicts; (2) further explicate the event/interaction and organizational
|
1191 |
+
processes models, emphasizing their formal axioms and data requirements;
|
1192 |
+
(3) develop process models that describe and explain the evolution
|
1193 |
+
of conflict in general—emphasizing breakpoints where internal
|
1194 |
+
dynamics give way to external factors; and (4) integrate qualitative
|
1195 |
+
evaluation of events with quantitative analysis, to ensure that one takes
|
1196 |
+
into account the nature of events.
|
1197 |
+
A project underway by the author and his colleagues seeks to implement
|
1198 |
+
those modelling implications with the construction of a
|
1199 |
+
Computer-Aided Conflict Information System (CACIS). Coders are
|
1200 |
+
classifying major power conflicts since World War II in terms of environmental
|
1201 |
+
factors, policy options, national interests and involvement,
|
1202 |
+
goals, intentions, resources employed (military, economic diplomatic),
|
1203 |
+
and outcomes. CACIS will also include a capability for specifying event/
|
1204 |
+
interaction and organizational models, among others, within the general
|
1205 |
+
framework of a process model of conflict. An important aspect of
|
1206 |
+
the process model will be its formal status. Rather than using the relatively
|
1207 |
+
loose verbal models of the present study, CACIS will emphasize
|
1208 |
+
tight, deductively oriented formal models.
|
1209 |
+
One principal attribute of CACIS is that it is being built around four
|
1210 |
+
separate but interrelated modules:
|
1211 |
+
1. The memory module which stores information about prior
|
1212 |
+
conflicts.
|
1213 |
+
2. The experience module which stores evaluations of strategies
|
1214 |
+
used in prior conflicts, and the number of successes, failures, or
|
1215 |
+
indeterminate outcomes.
|
1216 |
+
3. The involvement module which estimates the type and magnitude
|
1217 |
+
of interests (or values) of conflict participants.
|
1218 |
+
4. The operational environment module which includes external
|
1219 |
+
events and domestic political factors. This module could serve
|
1220 |
+
as the basis for the evaluation of the relative potencies of internal
|
1221 |
+
processes vs. external events on the policy-making process,
|
1222 |
+
as well as provide parameters for an all-machine simulation
|
1223 |
+
of conflict decision-making.
|
1224 |
+
A second major characteristic of CACIS is its reliance on the process
|
1225 |
+
of precedent search.83 That is, a party to a conflict, in seeking a solution
|
1226 |
+
83Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Cheryl Christensen, "From Causal Modelling to Artificial
|
1227 |
+
Intelligence: The Evolution of a U.N. Peace-Making Simulation," Massachusetts
|
1228 |
+
Institute of Technology, Mimeo, n.d.
|
1229 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 35
|
1230 |
+
commensurate with its goals, will search for prior conflicts similar to
|
1231 |
+
the current conflict as policy guides. Precedent search behavior assumes
|
1232 |
+
the existence of rules or "precedent logics"84—i.e., criteria guiding precedent
|
1233 |
+
search—as well as the identification of dimensions of similarity
|
1234 |
+
and differences along which conflicts may be located.
|
1235 |
+
CACIS supplements the Computer-Aided System for Handling Information
|
1236 |
+
on Local Conflicts (CASCON), developed by Lincoln
|
1237 |
+
Bloomfield and Robert Beattie.85 CASCON focuses on local conflicts
|
1238 |
+
between small powers or between a small power and one major power,
|
1239 |
+
while CACIS will include mainly the CASCON cases and those conflicts
|
1240 |
+
involving more than one major power. Some overlap, however, is
|
1241 |
+
expected in the sample of cases selected. CACIS will offer more options
|
1242 |
+
to the analyst through the programming of multiple models rather than
|
1243 |
+
the single model of local conflict of Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss in
|
1244 |
+
CASCON.86 Finally, unlike CASCON, CACIS is expected to have a
|
1245 |
+
machine simulation capability enabling the user to look at "what might
|
1246 |
+
have been" by recalling prior relevant cases, applying alternative policy
|
1247 |
+
options, and examining the simulated outcomes in relation to a current
|
1248 |
+
conflict.
|
1249 |
+
Implications of the present study for conflict management are less
|
1250 |
+
certain. Glenn Paige faced a similar problem in deciding whether to
|
1251 |
+
draw implications for conflict management from a single case—Korea,
|
1252 |
+
1950. He wondered ". . . whether it is not premature and irresponsible
|
1253 |
+
for the student of decision-making analysis to venture suggestions of an
|
1254 |
+
applied nature on the basis of a single case. . . ." Paige concluded that
|
1255 |
+
international crises are such important phenomena that it is well worth
|
1256 |
+
the risk to venture suggestions.8' Following Paige's lead, the present
|
1257 |
+
study will also make inferences regarding conflict management, with
|
1258 |
+
similar caveats about over-generalizing.
|
1259 |
+
The idea of conflict management assumes that conflicts are similar
|
1260 |
+
enough to plan for in advance. Some national security policy planners
|
1261 |
+
argue that the element of surprise places great constraints upon planning.
|
1262 |
+
For example, G. A. Morgan asserts: "The number of theoretically
|
1263 |
+
possible crises in the years ahead is virtually infinite. Even to try to plan
|
1264 |
+
systematically for all that are moderately likely would be a questionable
|
1265 |
+
silbid., 21.
|
1266 |
+
85 Lincoln Bloomfield and Robert Beattie, "Computers and Policy-Making: The
|
1267 |
+
CASCON Experiment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, xi (March 1971); Robert Beattie,
|
1268 |
+
and Lincoln Bloomfield, CASCON: Computer-Aided System for Handling Information
|
1269 |
+
on Local Conflicts (Cambridge, Mass. 1969); also cf. Fisher Howe, The Computer and
|
1270 |
+
Foreign Affairs (Washington 1967).
|
1271 |
+
86 Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for
|
1272 |
+
the igjo's (New York 1969).
|
1273 |
+
"Paige (fn. 15).
|
1274 |
+
36 RAYMOND TANTER
|
1275 |
+
expenditure of resources."88 Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern agree
|
1276 |
+
with this, concluding that planning is difficult because intense conflicts
|
1277 |
+
are " . . . essentially unpredictable.. . ."80
|
1278 |
+
The notion that conflict planning is virtually impossible because of
|
1279 |
+
unpredictability overlooks the fact that contingency planning takes
|
1280 |
+
place in several areas where phenomena are not easily predicted. For
|
1281 |
+
example, earthquakes are rarely predictable in advance. Nonetheless,
|
1282 |
+
areas where they frequently occur have developed standard operating
|
1283 |
+
procedures for processing the injured, alleviating congestion, and communicating
|
1284 |
+
in the absence of normal channels. Similarly, in international
|
1285 |
+
security planning, conflict need not be fully predictable for management
|
1286 |
+
plans to be written and used as general guides.
|
1287 |
+
Social scientists should not feel uncomfortable at being unable to
|
1288 |
+
make point predictions of specific events. Physicists often do not forecast
|
1289 |
+
individual events, but they are able to explain and forecast processes
|
1290 |
+
and general classes of events. Social scientists also should seek to explain
|
1291 |
+
and forecast processes and classes of events. Process models are promising
|
1292 |
+
ways of developing explanatory and predictive theory both for
|
1293 |
+
processes and general event-classes. The development of conflict intensity
|
1294 |
+
scales is a way of constructing more general event-classes.90 Computer
|
1295 |
+
based models and the acquisition of comparable data on a series
|
1296 |
+
of historical cases promise to improve the generality of event concepts.
|
1297 |
+
The creation of computer based models such as CACIS should
|
1298 |
+
facilitate conflict management in several ways. For example, the results
|
1299 |
+
of the coming inquiry might serve as a basis for specifying models in
|
1300 |
+
CACIS. Suppose then, that these analyses found that an organizational
|
1301 |
+
processes model explained WTO and NATO alliance behavior better
|
1302 |
+
than an event/interaction model, especially in the pre- and post-crisis
|
1303 |
+
phases. In such a case, a foreign policy decision-making approach may
|
1304 |
+
yield more than an international system approach for the conflict. If a
|
1305 |
+
new Berlin conflict were to erupt, an analyst might expect the predominance
|
1306 |
+
of intra- as opposed to inter-alliance factors. CACIS would allow
|
1307 |
+
the analyst to compare recurring conflict over Berlin with what oc-
|
1308 |
+
88 G. A. Morgan, "Planning in Foreign Affairs: The State of the Art," Foreign
|
1309 |
+
Affairs, xxxix (January 1961), 278. T h e thrust of Morgan's argument is for selective
|
1310 |
+
planning. However, some authors advocate more planning—J. C. Ausland and J. F.
|
1311 |
+
Richardson, "Crisis Management: Berlin, Cyprus, Laos," Foreign Affairs, XLIV (January
|
1312 |
+
1966), 291-303.
|
1313 |
+
89 Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern, Political Conjecture in Military Planning,
|
1314 |
+
Princeton University, Center of International Studies, Policy Memorandum No. 35
|
1315 |
+
(1968), 10-15.
|
1316 |
+
90 A conflict intensity scale produces more general classes than raw event data. That
|
1317 |
+
is, the scales allow an analyst to aggregate across a variety of events to calculate a
|
1318 |
+
general intensity score for the actor.
|
1319 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 37
|
1320 |
+
curred in 1948, 1958, and 1961, especially regarding the organizational
|
1321 |
+
processes of the actors. If such a comparison proved useful, the analyst
|
1322 |
+
might expect the bureaucratic patterns of the past to repeat themselves.
|
1323 |
+
As a result, the analyst can develop his plans anticipating standard
|
1324 |
+
operating procedures and search processes.
|
1325 |
+
Another way that CACIS might facilitate conflict management is
|
1326 |
+
as an aid to memory in the form of an information retrieval system.
|
1327 |
+
The information would describe prior conflicts, the policy measures
|
1328 |
+
used, and their consequences. The institutionalization of prior crisis
|
1329 |
+
patterns, and the policy measures employed, is important for several
|
1330 |
+
reasons. First, the memory of complex organizations too often resides
|
1331 |
+
in now departed personnel who were instrumental in prior conflict
|
1332 |
+
problem-solving. CACIS would thus be an aid to memory in immediately
|
1333 |
+
accessible form. As an aid to memory, CACIS would facilitate the
|
1334 |
+
search for alternative options. Recall the search style of limited rational
|
1335 |
+
actors—they learn to search for alternatives until they find the one that
|
1336 |
+
satisfies goal achievement.91
|
1337 |
+
It is also very important to institutionalize alternatives. During a conflict
|
1338 |
+
there is a higher probability that stress may cause the replacement
|
1339 |
+
of complex problem solving habits by more basic forms. That is, if
|
1340 |
+
stress is intense and persistent, there is a tendency for more recent and
|
1341 |
+
usually more complex behavior to disappear and for simpler and more
|
1342 |
+
basic forms of behavior to reappear.92 Thus, there might be a tendency
|
1343 |
+
to revert to the standard operating procedures and other familiar organizational
|
1344 |
+
routines during periods of highest conflictive intensity.
|
1345 |
+
Rather than bringing about a greater sensitivity to the external environment,
|
1346 |
+
crisis induced stress may result in increased reliance upon standard
|
1347 |
+
operating procedures in the intense crisis phase.
|
1348 |
+
Finally, institutionalization of alternatives would permit the examination
|
1349 |
+
of the consequences of conflict management attempts in prior
|
1350 |
+
cases. For example, Alexander George specifies seven principles of crisis
|
1351 |
+
management, some of which relate nicely to the present inquiry. He
|
1352 |
+
asserts that there should be: (1) high level political control of military
|
1353 |
+
options; (2) pauses in military operations; (3) clear and appropriate
|
1354 |
+
demonstrations to show resolution; (4) military action coordinated
|
1355 |
+
with political-diplomatic action; (5) confidence in the effectiveness and
|
1356 |
+
discriminating character of military options; (6) military options that
|
1357 |
+
91 James G. March, "Some Recent Substantive and Methodological Developments in
|
1358 |
+
the Theory of Organizational Decision-Making," in Austin Ranney, ed., Essays on the
|
1359 |
+
Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana 1962), 191-208.
|
1360 |
+
92 Thomas W. Milburn, "The Management of Crisis," Mimeo, 1970.
|
1361 |
+
38 RAYMOND TANTER
|
1362 |
+
avoid motivating the opponent to escalate; and (7) avoidance of the
|
1363 |
+
impression of a resort to large scale warfare.93 CACIS may aid the control
|
1364 |
+
over military options by specifying alternatives (emphasizing political
|
1365 |
+
ones?) and estimating consequences. CACIS could be used to
|
1366 |
+
evaluate the effects of timely pauses in military operations in a current
|
1367 |
+
conflict by suggesting what the implications were for such pauses in prior
|
1368 |
+
conflicts. CACIS may help develop clear and appropriate demonstrations
|
1369 |
+
of resolution, as well as help discriminate among options based
|
1370 |
+
upon such intensity scaling as developed by Corson. In addition, an improved
|
1371 |
+
Corson scale might allow for a more subtle selection of politicomilitary
|
1372 |
+
options and decrease the probability of escalation.
|
1373 |
+
SUMMARY
|
1374 |
+
The present study evaluates an international system and a foreign
|
1375 |
+
policy decision-making approach via their corresponding models:
|
1376 |
+
event/interaction, organizational processes, and interaction/organizational
|
1377 |
+
models. The design used actions between East and West in the
|
1378 |
+
Berlin conflict of 1961 to infer the unmeasured models. The Corson
|
1379 |
+
scale of conflict intensity provided a discriminator of politico-military
|
1380 |
+
options, even though there may be problems with the scale and the
|
1381 |
+
coding.94 The Berlin conflict of 1961 provided a laboratory for the exploration
|
1382 |
+
of the three models. The resulting path coefficients did not
|
1383 |
+
support the original hypotheses. The magnitude of the coefficients is so
|
1384 |
+
low that the results are inconclusive.
|
1385 |
+
The implications of this study for conflict modelling and management
|
1386 |
+
are tentative but potentially promising. Regarding modelling, the
|
1387 |
+
study concludes that analysts should: (1) specify a universe of cases for
|
1388 |
+
comparative inquiry across conflicts; (2) explicate the event/interaction
|
1389 |
+
and organizational processes models, emphasizing formal axioms and
|
1390 |
+
data requirements; (3) develop process models that describe and explain
|
1391 |
+
the evolution of conflict, emphasizing breakpoints where internal
|
1392 |
+
dynamics give way to external factors; and (4) integrate qualitative
|
1393 |
+
evaluation of events with their quantitative analysis to make sure that
|
1394 |
+
93 Alexander George and others, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston 1971),
|
1395 |
+
8-15.
|
1396 |
+
94 Cf. Edward Azar, "Analysis of International Events," Peace Research Reviews, iv
|
1397 |
+
(November 1970), 83. Azar asserts that, "We code events and measure their violence
|
1398 |
+
content with the 13 point interval scale. Although we realize that participants to a
|
1399 |
+
conflict situation do not use such an objective instrument, we maintain that they employ
|
1400 |
+
an implicit (or possibly explicit) scale which ranks signals by their violence
|
1401 |
+
content." Also see William A. Garrison and Andre Modigliani, Untangling the Cold
|
1402 |
+
War: A Strategy for Testing Rival Theories (Boston 1971), for an attempt to quantify
|
1403 |
+
and scale East-West interactions.
|
1404 |
+
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 39
|
1405 |
+
the quality of the policies is taken into account. Regarding conflict management,
|
1406 |
+
the study concludes that: (i) the results of the present inquiry
|
1407 |
+
could help specify models for a Computer-Aided Conflict Information
|
1408 |
+
System, which could be used to compare a current conflict with prior
|
1409 |
+
relevant cases; and (2) CACIS might institutionalize prior alternatives
|
1410 |
+
and estimate their consequences in similar cases. Such institutionalization
|
1411 |
+
should expand the political options short of military force available
|
1412 |
+
to decision-makers. Finally, CACIS should not be used to freeze options
|
1413 |
+
on the basis of historical precedents. Rather, CACIS should provide
|
1414 |
+
a fresh set of alternatives for the adaptively rational actor.95
|
1415 |
+
95 Also, see Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in
|
1416 |
+
Models of the International System," in Knorr and Verba (fn. 3), 93-117. Acknowledgments
|
1417 |
+
to Dennis Doolin for calling attention to the danger of freezing options on
|
1418 |
+
the basis of historical precedents with a system such as CACIS. There is a great need
|
1419 |
+
for what Doolin calls ". . . creative politics—which is really the essence and true
|
1420 |
+
genius of politics—and there seems to be a danger in an approach that could view
|
1421 |
+
routinization as a rule of action." Letter from Dennis Doolin, 28 June 1971. CACIS
|
1422 |
+
attempts to address itself to Doolin's perceptive critique and to facilitate "creative
|
1423 |
+
politics."
|