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Such a choice pattern would have had a consistency level of about 50 per cent.,0 |
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In the previous review of the SP-IPD much of the theoretical framework of the measure was not presented.,0 |
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We now lay out the hypotheses using the payoff matrix in Figure 1 to clarify some of the ideas.,0 |
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Our findings thus far show that the sanction reduced the number of chips that participants allocated to themselves and that it only increased the number of chips allocated to the yellow pool when there were two options.,1 |
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We also conducted sessions with homogeneous groups of Colombian and American students to control for and compare base levels of cooperativeness in the two settings.,0 |
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e l s e v i e r .,0 |
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Gumballs were used because their round shape allowed them to roll down the ramps in the apparatus.,1 |
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Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) found that fishermen in Brazil who are more cooperative and patient in lab experiments are also less likely to exploit the common pool resource in the sense that they use shrimp traps with bigger holes (where small shrimp can escape) and fishnets with larger mesh sizes (where only bigger fish are caught).,1 |
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Leniency and forgiveness seem to be motivated by strategic concerns rather than social preferences.,1 |
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The result suggests that cooperative play in video games-whether violent or not-has the potential to improve cooperation in different circumstances.,1 |
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In other words such a player would be unwilling to receive an S payoff very often.,0 |
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Previous studies often show that unrestricted punishment can promote cooperation in public goods environments although restricted ones are more effective.,1 |
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The building of an emergency sandbag levee by neighbors to protect their community from a flood has been important over the centuries.,0 |
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Thus if subject A is more co-operative than B he will tend to lose in this situation.,1 |
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These results illustrate how conversational dynamics can influence evolutionary signaling.,1 |
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Types of communication that reduce cheating generally reduce the incentives to cheat.,1 |
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In the first part of the experiment there is basically no difference in efficiency between the treatments.,0 |
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Your total income is the sum of the income from your private account and the income from the project account:,0 |
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Our observation that angry subjects contribute less could be the result of a change in social preferences or a change in beliefs about the behaviour of others.,1 |
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Our results suggest that the competition scheme is attractive enough to gather sufficient support in a majority vote but not if individual groups are given a veto.,1 |
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Mis-coordination tends to arise in networks where two players are symmetrically situated.,1 |
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Mean proportions of competitive choice are presented in Table 1.,0 |
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Subjects in position A play the role of a central coordinator in the star-out network.,0 |
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This indicates that the behavior of each individual group could be accounted for reasonably by the main effects of prior experience and reward.,1 |
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Cooperation thus tends only to occur if people are under the impression that they can trust one another.,1 |
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Our own speculation is that a kind of culturally imposed norm leads people who are strangers to each other to act guardedly.,1 |
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Figure 1.3: Average First Mover Cooperation by Treatment (First 10 Rounds),0 |
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Subjects might have inferred from the capable-but-failing partner's behavior that he or she disvalued the task or the performance incentive.,1 |
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"One of the variations that may be well learned is that when groups are involved, competitiveness, or a max rel orientation is valued.",1 |
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"Swingle and Gillis's finding can be explained by the optimality argument of Downing et al. (1968): if the other is consistently competitive, rational pursuit of own gain dictates reciprocated competition in the prisoner's dilemma game, which was used.",1 |
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"We assigned players to groups of either 3, 4, or 5 people and remained fixed during the whole session.",0 |
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Gürerk et al. (2010) hypothesize that punishment may not explain a cooperative equilibrium if players are inequity averse and the setting is such that the current ability to contribute to the public good is a fraction of total earnings from the game.,1 |
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"Second, the present study only weakly corroborated a previous characterization of the effects of ingroup cohesion upon intergroup biases.",0 |
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"Mediation analyses revealed a pattern of results that is consistent with the possibility that the role of social support was mediated by max rel, or participants' concern for maximizing the relative outcomes of their group. |
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In the standard condition, such a $5 loss occurs if an individual's contribution would be either deficient or redundant.",0 |
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"While value domains are generally fuzzy concepts (Schwartz, 1994, p. 25), the values included in our Prosocial domain were largely consistent with Feather's (1991) Universal prosocial domain (equality, a world of beauty, a world at peace, inner harmony and freedom). |
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Finally, taking into account the above-mentioned elements, Batson and colleagues (Batson, Ahmad, et al., 1999;Batson, Batson, et al., 1995) point out a third element. |
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Unlike in our experiments, many real group members can simply leave the group for another, more welcoming group if threatened with exclusion. |
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Given the limited number of punishment instances after the first punishment stage, and because our main interest is to explore how the possibility of a feud affects altruistic punishment, we will henceforth focus our analysis of punishment on first-stage punishment. |
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Equally, if a designated noncontributor were, for some reason, to go ahead and contribute, the contribution of each member of the designated set would not be critical, and there would be the opportunity for at least one designated contributor to free ride. |
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The TPBG is sufficiently simple that most sessions were completed within two hours, even with chat, and play largely stabilized by the end of Round 20. |
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The same brain functions appear to be involved in different cooperative settings, but to a much lesser extent when they involve synergy. |
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Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) show conditions under which the probability of the public good provision converges towards unity with an increase in group size, and they prove there exists an equilibrium in which the lowestcost agent eventually provides the public good. |
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Since priming was conducted at the supraliminal and subliminal level, it is possible that the situational cues may not be mediated by impressions of the partner but rather have a direct effect on cooperative behaviour (Bargh et al., 1996;Smeesters et al., 2003). |
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Given the opportunity to discuss the problem and coordinate strategies for 10 min before making their decisions privately, the subjects organized themselves by specifying the m contributors in a way that always resulted in an efficient provision of the public good. |
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Games with the exact same objective structures produce different behaviour depending on the framing (Hoffman et al., 1996(Hoffman et al., , 1999)). |
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Therefore, such knowledge may represent a strong motivation for potential members of a club to exert sufficient effort to reach a provision target. |
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This idea has received criticism, however, by those who suggest that the speeded responses to fearful or threatening stimuli are due to the relevance of the stimuli to the individual rather than its negative valence (Sander et al., 2003;Brosch et al., 2007Brosch et al., , 2008Brosch et al., , 2010)). |
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Historically, women have taken on peacekeeping roles in groups (De Groot & Peniston-Bird, 2000;Goldstein, 2003), perhaps because they are more concerned with preserving group harmony (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997;Geary, 1998). |
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However, the effect is moderately large (the probability of voting in favour of competition is 18.9 percentage points lower for risk-averse subjects) and the lack of statistical significance may be ascribed to the small number of subjects classified as risk averse. |
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The increase-only mechanism helps prevent players from being free ridden, providing them with a kind of assurance. |
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In Appendix A, we present an alternate model that accounts for in-group preferences and can explain some of the behavior we observe. |
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In addition, they suggest several avenues for further investigation regarding the subcomponents of psychopathy. |
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Given that tit for tat yielded greater outcomes than cooperative or noncooperative partners, and given that tit for tat has received considerable attention as a functional strategy, it is interesting to note that in social dilemmas in which locomotion is possible, tit for tat can do even better if this strategy is accompanied by locomotions to high interdependence rather than low interdependence. |
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When a leader can allocate the benefits, the leader can incentivize workers by allocating benefits to those who contribute the most and withholding them from those who free-ride. |
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Previous research reports that overall, internals are more associated with cooperation than externals (Boone et al., 1999a). |
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The first four columns indicate the session number, the number of subjects that took part in the session, the location, and Group assignments remained constant for the entire session. |
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This scenario holds virtually irrespective of b, only that for strong temptations to defect the clusters of cooperative players become larger, and accordingly larger is also the clustering coefficient presented in Fig. 3. |
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Consistent with sociological literature for off-line experiments, voice communication was found to have an extremely powerful effect on people's tendency to trust and cooperate with each other.",1 |
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"Substituting (s i ) from Equation (3) into Equation (4), one obtains the approval variable as a function of relative contributions.",0 |
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"Given the minimal costs associated with using passive, self-sacrificing cooperation in the iterated PD game, it is fair to suggest that older adults were more effective than young adults at managing conflict with the Selfish Stranger.",1 |
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"As a larger degree naturally results in a larger transitivity, we calculate the expected value of transitivity given a certain network degree and a certain size in a random graph in simulations (10,000 iterations), and report the deviation of the observed transitivity from the expected transitivity (that is, observed transitivity minus expected transitivity).",0 |
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"Therefore, the challenge, for the facilitator/researcher, is to keep the bubble safe, and effectively control the high number of elements present in the dynamics.",0 |
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None of the main effects and interactions were significant.,0 |
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"If participants in the simultaneous game play the zero contribution equilibrium with some positive probability, then the comparative static of the low-fixed-cost treatment should still hold.",1 |
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"Finally, we measured support for two conditional strategies: emulation and counteraction.",0 |
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"To a p-estimator in the 3-pcrson game, the probability of having both others pick C is p2, of only one C is 2p(lp) and of both D is (1p)2.",0 |
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The increase is much larger and is highly significant when the refund bonus is 0.75 and in the late periods 31-60.,1 |
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This has implications for the design of public policy where ranges of motivations are present.,0 |
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The belief version goes on to suggest that there may be certain assumptions built-in to our cognitive processing of social dilemmas that leads members of our species to systematically misunderstand (or disbelieve) some aspect of the experimental game.,1 |
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"Complementing this preliminary evidence, the dissertation presents several studies that support the reverse appraisal proposal; in particular, the dissertation presents evidence that, when engaged in a social dilemma, people are capable of inferring, from emotion displays, how the counterpart is appraising the ongoing interaction and, from this information, further infer what the counterpart's intentions are. |
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ur pilot experiments indicated that the realized duration of games, especially in the early repeated games, had a substantial effect on the subjects' cooperation rates.",1 |
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"Mathematical models have indeed shown that the larger the group, the more unlikely it is that cooperation for public goods can evolve (Boyd & Richerson, 1988).",1 |
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"We test asymmetric breadth by regressing the absolute values of the non-inertial adjustments conditional on steady/increasing payoffs versus payoff declines, controlling for session, phase, group, period and individual fixed effects with individual-level clustering.",0 |
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"In particular, Results 1 and 3 suggest that, depending on the research question, the researcher may face a tradeoff: high incentives for exact beliefs increase belief accuracy but strongly incentivized beliefs may also bias contributions away from levels that would be observed were beliefs not elicited at all or only hypothetically.",1 |
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Our experiments provide direct tests between the rapport explanation and rival explanations.,0 |
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"We selected 106 participants, 56 males and 50 females, and scheduled them according to their availability.",0 |
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"Then the participants made their decisions, received their payment, and were debriefed.",0 |
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"On the other hand, in our experiment, the simple instruction that a partner is a computer agent caused our participants largely shift their behavior to offer defect actions.",1 |
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"The term, guilt aversion, is adopted from Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) where they define a guilt-averse player as someone who ""suffers from guilt to the extent he believes he hurts others relative to what they believe they will get.""",0 |
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"This is because consumers, under low efficacy conditions, may believe that there is ""strength in numbers.""",1 |
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"Nevertheless, individuals may form beliefs about who sanctioned them based on who sanctioned others, and may attempt to counter-punish based on this information.",1 |
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Your contribution decision will therefore depend on how much other group members contribute.,0 |
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"In addition, the data showed that the subjects were more highly motivated to minimize differences in final outcomes in the case of equal time investments than in the case of unequal time investments.",1 |
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"Numerous studies have reported that individuals are more likely to cooperate when they expect other group members to cooperate than when they expect others to defect (Dawes, fcfavish, & Shaklee, 1977;Messe & Sivacek, 1979;Messick et al., 1983;Talarowski, 1982).",1 |
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"However, the results of this study indicate that when the slopes of the payoff functions are not equal, this assumption is violated.",1 |
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"However, increasing reward does have a small significant effect on contributions and a larger significant effect on provision.",1 |
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"the NPD as the number of players increases, but, in order to reach the benefit, one needs more people to cooperate.",1 |
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"Behaviour in the dilemma has been investigated by social psychologists, who have found that reward structure can influence the degree of cooperation but that personality variables do not serve as reliable predictors of behaviour.",1 |
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"With the Buss apparatus, Leventhal,'Shemberg 8 van Schoelandt (1968) and Leventhal 6 Shemberg (1969) found that women with traditional sex role values had higher aggression scores than women who did not confirm to traditional values when aggression was sanctioned by the situation. |
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While we attribute the increase in contributions primarily to group size, we must note that other design features did not remain constant between treatments and may be responsible for the observed differences. |
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Group, clearly putting all our money in the group investment is paying off because it's doubling our profit if we go it alone, Let's stick to putting all 10 E$ in the group account. |
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In the unanimity condition, the sanction was only executed when it was requested by all three remaining group members. |
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According to this view, an 'irrational' impulse would lead the punisher to disregard the future consequences of punishing norm violations. |
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Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh, and Lipetz ( 5 ) and Minas, Scodel, Marlowe, and Rawson (4) have demonstrated that the Prisoner's Dilemma, when played as an iterated game, results in both players employing a noncooperative strategy.",1 |
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The intuition behind the proposition is straightforward.,0 |
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"satisfying a necessary condition for mediation (i.e., that the potential mediator be significantly related to the dependent variable).",0 |
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is significant heterogeneity across members in the benefits from group activities.,0 |
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"Although no large difference between the original and reactive model was found when explaining the behavior of human participants in the current experiment, we would predict a larger difference in the behavior of these two models under circumstances where the other player changes its behavior.",0 |
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"Recently, Stith and colleagues explored situational stress factors for couples that met the criteria of situational couple violence (Stith, Amandor-Boadu, Miller, Menhusen, & Few-Demo, 2011).",0 |
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"By playing a sequential game, it is possible to separate the effect through preferences from the effect through beliefs.",0 |
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This time the initial network was a small-world network with an average nodal clustering of .71.,0 |
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Hump-shaped contributors have the same conditional contribution pattern as conditional cooperator up to some maximum point and then negative correlation based on the same criterion as for conditionally cooperating behavior.,0 |
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"Much has been written about the impact of climate change on resource conflicts (Ember and Ember 1992, Mwiturubani 2010, Downing et al. 2014;Harari and La Ferrara 2014, unpublished manuscript).",0 |
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"The pattern of results in Fig. 1D is very similar to the one reported by Nalbantian & Schotter (1997), who found that with equilibrium contribution close to the upper bound of the strategy space mean contribution levels were stable over trials but somewhat below the equilibrium level.",0 |
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"We find at least some evidence that giving in the trust, public good and dictator games, and reciprocity in the trust and ultimatum games vary over the menstrual cycle.",0 |
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"The Pareto-optimal request and contribution level, shown in the left panel of Table 1, are the same across the three treatments.",0 |
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Our exploratory analyses revealed regional overlaps in the genotype-by-CAS interaction contrasts.,0 |
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In the conclusion we discuss why we find evidence for discovered rather than constructed preferences.,0 |
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We decomposed the interaction by comparing patterns of implicit racial bias between ineffective and effective external incentive conditions.,0 |
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The integer payoff values are understood so that 4 (or 1) is the most (or least) preferred outcome.,0 |
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"Within the fine and no-fine conditions for both the pregame and postgame data, the distribution of choices from males was compared to that of females using the chi square test.",0 |
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"In six different trials, we found two reciprocal pairs per trial significantly more often than would be expected by chance.",0 |
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"Given the fact that public services or goods are quite difficult to maintain, understanding how and when sanctioning systems may work in an effective manner to promote contributions to those public goods is an important task for social dilemma researchers.",0 |
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"Among this latter group, we jointly estimate a warm-glow model with logit decision error, and find warmglow and noise parameter values which are comparable between the treatments.",0 |
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This section looks at the impact of initial income inequality in order to examine Hypothesis 3. I use a between-subjects comparison. 27,0 |
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"24 In the experiment, we (the experimenters) finance the incentive.",0 |
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Result 2. There is a positive association between conditional cooperation and the average cooperation by others.,0 |
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"The purpose of the chi-square tests was to evaluate the signi®cance of departures from chance in the relative frequencies of Stackelberg (h) and non-Stackelberg (non-h) strategy choices, the main hypothesis being that there would be a sig-ni®cant bias towards h strategies in each of the h-soluble games.",0 |
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You should record these on your record sheet under the column headed ``My Point for this Round''.,0 |
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"First, we will describe the characteristics of the commons dilemma and the search for solutions.",0 |
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The experiment took about 15 minutes.,0 |
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"The player screen approximates that of player Blue midway through session CC4, and the chat box contents are excerpted from that session.",0 |
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"Second, the set of options or reactions that is available in the PD for the behavioral translation of the players' expectations is extremely limited. |
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While the research reported here suggests that sympathy is important for social order, several questions remain. |
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In other words, expectations of the partner's behavior in one game were found to correlate with a player's choice in another game. |
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In more modern times, Le Bon (18951 1896) stated that when in crowds the individual . . . |
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In this paper, we complement this project by comparing these mechanisms in a field experiment. |
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In contrast, the aim of our experimental investigation is to test the efficacy of partial and imperfect transparency. |
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The most extensive and systematic efforts to study the effects of group discussion have come from an ambitious program of research undertaken by Dawes, Orbell, van de Kragt, and their colleagues (e.g., Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1989;Dawes et ah, 1977;Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1988;Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1990;Orbell et ah, 1988;Orbell, Dawes, & van de Kragt, 1990;Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1991;van de Kragt et ah, 1983; van de Kragt, Dawes, Orbell, Braver, & Wilson, 1986). |
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Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are in parentheses. |
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In Experiments 1, 2, and 3 we used a social dilemma game to measure prosocial behavior. |
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