Upload 3 files

adding datasets!

ssc_test.csv

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+text,label
+"demonstrating that on average, participants in the collective identity condition contributed more each round than in the individual identity condition.",1
+Such a choice pattern would have had a consistency level of about 50 per cent.,0
+"These were: (a) reciprocation or contingency of the opponent's behavior upon one's own, (b) unilateral offers and initiatives, and (c) consistently honest communication of intentions.",0
+In the previous review of the SP-IPD much of the theoretical framework of the measure was not presented.,0
+We now lay out the hypotheses using the payoff matrix in Figure 1 to clarify some of the ideas.,0
+"Fisher, Isaac, Schatzberg, and Walker (1995), for example, study settings with homogenous and heterogenous marginal per capita returns across group members.",0
+"Of course since there was no feedback regarding others"" choices on ""earlier"" rounds, these five bids actually represent five ""one-shot"" prisoner's dilemmas, rather than an iterated dilemma).",0
+Our findings thus far show that the sanction reduced the number of chips that participants allocated to themselves and that it only increased the number of chips allocated to the yellow pool when there were two options.,1
+"Thus, whereas at first sight guilt merely indicates the presence of a repentant transgressor, other group members may indirectly profit from this emotional display because it may lead third parties to evaluate them as prosocial.",1
+"In treatment T3, however, there is the possibility that highly cooperative groups could produce miscoordination if they cooperate at levels that are no longer supported in equilibrium.",1
+"Therefore, the two sessions in Condition EG2 were combined, as were the two sessions in Conditions PR2.",0
+"By recruiting an equally large male sample, it was possible to examine whether male participants would show a different pattern of results.",0
+"This missing piece of information may lead subjects to estimate their counterparts' reputation to be lower than what they would do with more information, and therefore to decrease their cooperativeness.",1
+"First, we can assess the correlation between beliefs and contributions, which we expect to differ between types of players and which helps us to check on the player type as elicited in the P-experiment.",0
+"First, it is possible that a cooperative strategy reduces greed because greedbased actions are frequently justified through defensive assertions.",1
+"Instead, I opt to take advantage of the natural tendency toward free-riding by increasing the number of periods prior to each stoppage while fixing the total length of the experiment.",1
+We also conducted sessions with homogeneous groups of Colombian and American students to control for and compare base levels of cooperativeness in the two settings.,0
+"Consistent with this tendency to operate according to personality type, many of the participants in my laboratory study were slow to change their behaviors when they were at low performing ranks.",1
+"An irrigation cooperative is an example of what Ostrom (1990) called a common pool resource, which features a slowly regenerating resource pool that when harvested optimally, supplies some valuable resource without permanent damage to the viability of that resource.",0
+e l s e v i e r .,0
+"Instead, participants (n=27, 67% female, mean age=20.44",0
+"Here, we will refer to the sequences of treatments in the same manner as in Table 3, which is portrayed again in Table 13.",0
+Gumballs were used because their round shape allowed them to roll down the ramps in the apparatus.,1
+Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) found that fishermen in Brazil who are more cooperative and patient in lab experiments are also less likely to exploit the common pool resource in the sense that they use shrimp traps with bigger holes (where small shrimp can escape) and fishnets with larger mesh sizes (where only bigger fish are caught).,1
+"Therefore, significant t-values in the models indicate that expectations significantly affect the probability of cooperation.",1
+"The subject made his choice by setting a toggle switch on the lower right to either C or D, then pressing a button next to the toggle switch to register the choice.",0
+"The added strategic incentives for weak reciprocity significantly increased the estimated reciprocity in both maintenance and provision (Fig. 3b, panel 1; multilevel mixed effects models, P < 0.001; Supplementary Table 4).",1
+"If the harvesters in a commons cooperate by following quotas or use other means to regulate their catches, the resource will sustain a given yield indefinitely.",1
+"In particular, high status individuals, by setting examples, can encourage particular behaviors among followers (Hermalin, 1998; Vesterlund, 2003).",1
+Leniency and forgiveness seem to be motivated by strategic concerns rather than social preferences.,1
+"However, rational proselfs will cooperate when it is in their best interest to do so.",0
+"Because this analysis is limited to cases where two NE exist, we cannot theoretically identify the effect of increasing uncertainty on individuals' discrete choices.",1
+"However, the experiment shows that communication causes cooperation to increase rapidly, reaching almost the social optimal amount of profits in some cases.",1
+"Akerlof (1980) and Romer (1984), for example, argue that social customs are maintained by the social sanction imposed by loss of reputation when breaking the custom.",1
+The result suggests that cooperative play in video games-whether violent or not-has the potential to improve cooperation in different circumstances.,1
+"Upon entering the laboratory, the subjects were randomly assigned cubicles in which they were seated.",0
+"A demand for behavioral norms arises when members of a group have individual incentives to take actions that reduce the group's overall welfare (James S. Coleman, 1990).",1
+In other words such a player would be unwilling to receive an S payoff very often.,0
+"Implicit evaluations are not only sensitive to individuals' goals, but also to situationally variable affordances.",1
+Previous studies often show that unrestricted punishment can promote cooperation in public goods environments although restricted ones are more effective.,1
+"One possibility would be that greedy people's continual striving for more would make them more sensitive to the magnitude of outcomes and less to the associated probabilities, leading to more risk taking.",1
+"Thus, it is to be expected that the discontinuity eect will remain but will be reduced more in the successive than in the more uncertain simultaneous condition.",1
+"The present findings fill this gap and, by so doing, suggest that groups are more competitive than individuals not simply because the intergroup context (and not the interpersonal context) renders salient group morality but because each context renders salient its own unique moral code, with group morality producing competition in intergroup interactions and individual morality producing cooperation in interpersonal interactions.",1
+"Communication provides greater opportunity for cooperation, but that opportunity may either not be used, ineptly used, or used for deceit and vituperation [p. 22].",1
+"In the latter, the citizens need only decide whether or not to provide an exogenously fixed level of the public good while in the former, they must decide how much, if any, to provide.",0
+The building of an emergency sandbag levee by neighbors to protect their community from a flood has been important over the centuries.,0
+"In the words of sociologist Granovetter (1995), economic transactions are 'socially embedded'.",0
+"However, insiders cannot correct such free riding through directed punishment; indeed, the only option insiders have for hurting free-riding outsiders is to limit their contributions.",1
+"The use of rewards and punishments is usually proposed as a means to promote cooperative choice behavior (Hardin, 1968;Olson, 1965).",1
+"In this standard design, increasing m has two effects: first it increases the return to others from contributions to the public account, and second it lowers the private cost of those contributions.",1
+Thus if subject A is more co-operative than B he will tend to lose in this situation.,1
+"Therefore, institutional incentives are more powerful than peer incentives in promoting cooperation because the incentive institutions work although not all defectors are punished.",1
+"In other words, we propose that even in situations where several people suffer from one individual's selfish behavior, most of the involved parties tend to be discouraged from punishing the selfish individual.",1
+"If you choose , I will choose Whatever you choose now, I'll choose on the next trial.",0
+These results illustrate how conversational dynamics can influence evolutionary signaling.,1
+"SD = 1.29) and those in the ''many violators"" condition (M = 1.39;",0
+"In 6 sessions with a total of 96 subjects, the VCM game produced 49 conditional cooperators who increased their contributions as the average of the others' contribution increased, 43 of whom also conditionally cooperated in the trustee game.",0
+"That is, equality in outcomes becomes virtually irrelevant when outcomes for the self are positive and outcomes for the other are negative (or vice versa), because such a mixture of positive and negative outcomes represents large discrepancies between outcomes for the self and outcomes for the other in both options.",1
+"However, contributions to public goods can be self-serving if each investor gains a disproportionate benefit from its own contribution.",1
+"If the decision maker faces a finite number of possible opponents, the rule is incentive compatible in the cases where her subjective expectation corresponds to one of the outcomes that the aggregate choices of her opponents could possibly generate, but it is not incentive compatible for all possible beliefs that could be stated.",1
+"The four payoff amounts presented in Figure 1 accompany, respectively, each of the four lights on the subject's matrix.",0
+Types of communication that reduce cheating generally reduce the incentives to cheat.,1
+In the first part of the experiment there is basically no difference in efficiency between the treatments.,0
+"In particular, depending on how leaders formulate their messages they can also elicit distress by focusing too much on some negative aspects of followers' past behavior.",1
+"This outcome suggests that if both the economic and the psychological contexts of decisions are carefully replicated, the laboratory can be used as an inexpensive way to test potential policy mechanisms.",1
+"Accordingly, it is unclear whether the priming manipulations in those studies altered such perceptions, and if so, what associations there were between the relevant perceptions and the dependent measure.",0
+"Although findings on this topic have been controversially discussed (e.g., Bushman, Rothstein, & Anderson, 2010;Ferguson & Kilburn, 2010), the most recent meta-analyses show that exposure to video game violence can have detrimental short-and long-term effects on aggressive and prosocial behavior (Anderson et al., 2010;Greitemeyer & Mügge, 2014).",1
+"Institutions also frame whether a situation is cooperative or competitive, which determines which preferences and norms people apply.",1
+"An additional analysis that investigated the relationships among decision frame, decision, and expectations revealed that the significant relationship between decision frame and expectations (F = 5.11, p < .05)",0
+"Accordingly, new research is needed to unravel whether ingroup favoritism in situations lacking interdependence emerges because of social identity concerns, reputational concerns, or perhaps some combination of these two.",1
+"Finally, we will explain how your earnings are calculated.",0
+"Summary statistics Only pay-off relevant rounds are included, not the two training rounds at the beginning.",0
+Your total income is the sum of the income from your private account and the income from the project account:,0
+Our observation that angry subjects contribute less could be the result of a change in social preferences or a change in beliefs about the behaviour of others.,1
+"They showed that a sanctioning system could undermine interpersonal trust, which can result in decreased cooperation in a similar social dilemma situation without a sanctioning system.",1
+"As far back as the Upper Palaeolithic, we see evidence of large settlements behind defensive walls (Johnson & Earle 2000).",0
+"The effect of actions by prior participants on the behaviors of subsequent participants was examined primarily in voluntary contribution experiments that examined how an initial voluntary contribution by a group leader led to contributions by others (Güth, Levati, Sutter, & van der Heijden, 2007) and experiments that examined how contributions by players informed about the value of a public good can positively influence contributions by uninformed players when such contributions are sequential (Potters, Sefton, & Vesterlund, 2005).",1
+"Sure, I'd receive $9, but the fact that he received no money because of my selfish action I believe significantly outweighs the monetary value of $9.",1
+Our results suggest that the competition scheme is attractive enough to gather sufficient support in a majority vote but not if individual groups are given a veto.,1
+Mis-coordination tends to arise in networks where two players are symmetrically situated.,1
+"In particular, in the S-treatment the anticipation of social reward and disapproval may become more salient in later periods leading to higher contributions in the final periods than under anonymity.",1
+Mean proportions of competitive choice are presented in Table 1.,0
+Subjects in position A play the role of a central coordinator in the star-out network.,0
+"More specifically, anger will be instigated especially if the leader of the group violates equality, because the leader is expected to behave fairly.",1
+"Third, narcissists may experience performance deficits over the long term that occur when the illusion of success interferes with obtaining real success (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004;Robins & Beer, 2001).",1
+"In terms of the mechanism(s) that account for why we would expect happy music to facilitate cooperative behavior within groups, Study 1 focuses on the direct and independent relationship between listening to happy music and cooperating with others.",1
+"They understood that rendering people interdependent, in the marketplace and elsewhere, increases the stakes they have in others' outcomes and thereby fosters the development of other-regarding motives.",1
+"It may be that for fcmalc S's the Prisoner's Dilemma game is less interesting or important than for male Ss and consequently their cooperative and competitive acts conveyed very little meaning with regard to interpersonal feelings, Another possibility is that in behavior communicated to another person, females reveal less about their feelings toward that person and their own feelings are, in turn, less affected by the actions of that person as compared to malts.",1
+"Though not as high as the theory predicts, proposer power is increased with the presence of a vote of confidence procedure, and proposers take advantage of that power.",1
+This indicates that the behavior of each individual group could be accounted for reasonably by the main effects of prior experience and reward.,1
+Cooperation thus tends only to occur if people are under the impression that they can trust one another.,1
+"At least 2 factors may influence the emergence of cooperative behavior in this well-known collective action problem: the incentive structure of the game itself, and the intrinsic social preferences of each of the players.",1
+"As predicted, there is a highly significant interaction between time pressure and experience (column 2, coefficient ¼ 0.350, P ¼ 0.008).",0
+"The shift toward strategies of conditional cooperation in the framed games may indicate that people understood the framed game as a context where extrinsic motivations apply and the standard game as a context where intrinsic motivations apply, as Baumard implies.",1
+"In the left panel, the payoff for player i is a function of his or her individual level of extraction under two scenarios.",0
+"However, by cooperating, P also ensures that the gain to OP is 2 units (regardless of OP's choice): If P cooperates and OP cooperates, OP earns 3 units (rather than 1, if P had defected); if P cooperates and OP defects OP earns 4 units (rather than 2, if P had defected).",0
+Our own speculation is that a kind of culturally imposed norm leads people who are strangers to each other to act guardedly.,1
+"In natural settings, punishment occurs in various forms, for example, formal versus informal, public versus private, material versus symbolic.",0
+"Figure 1 and Table 1 show that when the first mover keeps more than $7, directness is punished more harshly: Average punishment is greater when the first mover extracts rents directly, and many subjects punish in this direction.",1
+"A total of 144 subjects, 72 of each sex, was assigned to promise credibility conditions of 10%, 50%, and 90%; reward levels of $5, $10, and $20; and simulated strategies which were either 50% or 90% cooperative over the 100 trials.",0
+"Newcomers might pose a threat to the power structure of a group (Moreland & Levine, 1988;Ziller, 1965), the social identity of group members (Lois, 1999;Widdicombe & Woofitt, 1990) or the performance of a group (Ziller, Behringer, & Jansen, 1961).",1
+"No partner (i.e., friend) effects were significant, although a marginal tendency emerged for participants whose friends reported higher initial liking to report greater final closeness to these friends.",1
+Figure 1.3: Average First Mover Cooperation by Treatment (First 10 Rounds),0
+"Since this time, human evolution has seen little change, as the hominid has been estimated to experience gene alterations every 100,000 years (Shepard, 1998).",0
+"Those with larger endowments realize that their contributions will make a larger impact in earning the public good, increasing their motivation to contribute.",1
+"It is anticipated here that in the absence of an established distribution rule (uncertainty), the division of resources among individuals in group and coalition distributions will be anchored by cues from the surrounding context.",1
+"Perhaps because residents of the USA have a narrower, more localized view, they tend to contribute a much higher proportion to their local public good.",1
+"The logic behind this is natural: It is cheaper to spur on members to make additional contributions when their impact on the group account return increases, since every single contribution will give rise to more positive externalities to all group members.",1
+"More data, and possibly greater variation in the contributions of others, can be obtained by pooling decisions from repeated play.",1
+Subjects might have inferred from the capable-but-failing partner's behavior that he or she disvalued the task or the performance incentive.,1
+"One of the variations that may be well learned is that when groups are involved, competitiveness, or a max rel orientation is valued.",1
+"Swingle and Gillis's finding can be explained by the optimality argument of Downing et al. (1968): if ""the other"" is consistently competitive, rational pursuit of own gain dictates reciprocated competition in the prisoner's dilemma game, which was used.",1
+"We assigned players to groups of either 3, 4, or 5 people and remained fixed during the whole session.",0
+Gürerk et al. (2010) hypothesize that punishment may not explain a cooperative equilibrium if players are inequity averse and the setting is such that the current ability to contribute to the public good is a fraction of total earnings from the game.,1
+"Second, the present study only weakly corroborated a previous characterization of the effects of ingroup cohesion upon intergroup biases.",0
+"Mediation analyses revealed a pattern of results that is consistent with the possibility that the role of social support was mediated by max rel, or participants' concern for maximizing the relative outcomes of their group.",1
+The addition of this variable makes a significant contribution to the explanatory power of the decision-making model.,1
+"In the standard condition, such a $5 loss occurs if an individual's contribution would be either deficient or redundant.",0
+"While value domains are generally fuzzy concepts (Schwartz, 1994, p. 25), the values included in our Prosocial domain were largely consistent with Feather's (1991) Universal prosocial domain (equality, a world of beauty, a world at peace, inner harmony and freedom).",0
+"Finally, taking into account the above-mentioned elements, Batson and colleagues (Batson, Ahmad, et al., 1999;Batson, Batson, et al., 1995) point out a third element.",0
+"Unlike in our experiments, many real group members can simply leave the group for another, more welcoming group if threatened with exclusion.",1
+The upper boxes both contained red doors; the lower boxes both contained green doors.,0
+"Given the limited number of punishment instances after the first punishment stage, and because our main interest is to explore how the possibility of a feud affects altruistic punishment, we will henceforth focus our analysis of punishment on first-stage punishment.",1
+"Equally, if a designated noncontributor were, for some reason, to go ahead and contribute, the contribution of each member of the designated set would not be critical, and there would be the opportunity for at least one designated contributor to free ride.",1
+Thus individual uncertainty was reduced leading to a better transition process with more stable institutions.,1
+The authors proved evidence of the superior performance of seed contributions for the reason that the challenge treatment outperformed both control conditions.,1
+"The TPBG is sufficiently simple that most sessions were completed within two hours, even with chat, and play largely stabilized by the end of Round 20.",0
+"The same brain functions appear to be involved in different cooperative settings, but to a much lesser extent when they involve synergy.",1
+"Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) show conditions under which the probability of the public good provision converges towards unity with an increase in group size, and they prove there exists an equilibrium in which the lowestcost agent eventually provides the public good.",1
+"Since priming was conducted at the supraliminal and subliminal level, it is possible that the situational cues may not be mediated by impressions of the partner but rather have a direct effect on cooperative behaviour (Bargh et al., 1996;Smeesters et al., 2003).",1
+This suggests that punishment also triggers feelings of guilt and shame that induce individuals to behave pro-socially (Barr 2001;Fessler & Haley 2003).,1
+"Given the opportunity to discuss the problem and coordinate strategies for 10 min before making their decisions privately, the subjects organized themselves by specifying the m contributors in a way that always resulted in an efficient provision of the public good.",1
+The direct implication is that happiness is good for worker productivity and in turn good for firms' profits.,1
+Third-party punishment game (Wave 6) TPPG: average proportion of endowment participants gave to the recipient as an allocator across the two TPPGs a,0
+The fact that subjects who display a larger context-dependent change in connectivity between right DLPFC and pfffff reject unfair offers more frequently also suggests the possibility of a deeper understanding of individual differences in normative behavior in terms of connectivity differences between these brain regions.,1
+"Games with the exact same objective structures produce different behaviour depending on the framing (Hoffman et al., 1996(Hoffman et al., , 1999)).",1
+Higher coefficient for the current game in the second half would indicate that the subjects were learning to conditionalise more on the game (which imply less contrast effect of the previous game).,1
+"Therefore, such knowledge may represent a strong motivation for potential members of a club to exert sufficient effort to reach a provision target.",1
+"This idea has received criticism, however, by those who suggest that the speeded responses to fearful or threatening stimuli are due to the relevance of the stimuli to the individual rather than its negative valence (Sander et al., 2003;Brosch et al., 2007Brosch et al., , 2008Brosch et al., , 2010)).",1
+Efficiency levels fall because the maximum earnings possible increase with carryover (due to higher endowments or MPCR levels in stage 2).,1
+Participants were told a cover story that they were part of a large ongoing study in which they would be playing the role of proposer and they would make the decision about how to divide the money for 20 different receivers.,0
+"Historically, women have taken on peacekeeping roles in groups (De Groot & Peniston-Bird, 2000;Goldstein, 2003), perhaps because they are more concerned with preserving group harmony (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997;Geary, 1998).",1
+"However, the effect is moderately large (the probability of voting in favour of competition is 18.9 percentage points lower for risk-averse subjects) and the lack of statistical significance may be ascribed to the small number of subjects classified as risk averse.",1
+"The increase-only mechanism helps prevent players from being free ridden, providing them with a kind of assurance.",1
+"In Appendix A, we present an alternate model that accounts for  in-group preferences and can explain some of the behavior we observe.",0
+Our statistical tests are all extremely powerful because the noise levels are moderate at worst and because the experiments usually have a minimum of 500 degrees of freedom for the error terms.,1
+Three studies find that individuals high in self-reliance (vs.,0
+This reduction in negativity may have increased the perceived effectiveness of the leader solution for the task difficulty group.,1
+"In addition, they suggest several avenues for further investigation regarding the subcomponents of psychopathy.",0
+"Given that tit for tat yielded greater outcomes than cooperative or noncooperative partners, and given that tit for tat has received considerable attention as a functional strategy, it is interesting to note that in social dilemmas in which locomotion is possible, tit for tat can do even better if this strategy is accompanied by locomotions to high interdependence rather than low interdependence.",1
+"When a leader can allocate the benefits, the leader can incentivize workers by allocating benefits to those who contribute the most and withholding them from those who free-ride.",1
+"Previous research reports that overall, internals are more associated with cooperation than externals (Boone et al., 1999a).",0
+"The first four columns indicate the session number, the number of subjects that took part in the session, the location, and Group assignments remained constant for the entire session.",0
+"This scenario holds virtually irrespective of b, only that for strong temptations to defect the clusters of cooperative players become larger, and accordingly larger is also the clustering coefficient presented in Fig. 3.",0
+Communication coupled with mutual commitments provides such dictators with a failsafe way of cooperating.,1
+Recent efforts attempt to explain differences in willingness to cooperate using social and psychological measurements.,0
+"Consistent with sociological literature for off-line experiments, voice communication was found to have an extremely powerful effect on people's tendency to trust and cooperate with each other.",1
+"Substituting (s i ) from Equation (3) into Equation (4), one obtains the approval variable as a function of relative contributions.",0
+"Given the minimal costs associated with using passive, self-sacrificing cooperation in the iterated PD game, it is fair to suggest that older adults were more effective than young adults at managing conflict with the Selfish Stranger.",1
+"As a larger degree naturally results in a larger transitivity, we calculate the expected value of transitivity given a certain network degree and a certain size in a random graph in simulations (10,000 iterations), and report the deviation of the observed transitivity from the expected transitivity (that is, observed transitivity minus expected transitivity).",0
+"Therefore, the challenge, for the facilitator/researcher, is to keep the bubble safe, and effectively control the high number of elements present in the dynamics.",0
+None of the main effects and interactions were significant.,0
+"If participants in the simultaneous game play the zero contribution equilibrium with some positive probability, then the comparative static of the low-fixed-cost treatment should still hold.",1
+"Finally, we measured support for two conditional strategies: emulation and counteraction.",0
+"To a p-estimator in the 3-pcrson game, the probability of having both others pick C is p2, of only one C is 2p(lp) and of both D is (1p)2.",0
+The increase is much larger and is highly significant when the refund bonus is 0.75 and in the late periods 31-60.,1
+This has implications for the design of public policy where ranges of motivations are present.,0
+ The belief version goes on to suggest that there may be certain assumptions built-in to our cognitive processing of social dilemmas that leads members of our species to systematically misunderstand (or disbelieve) some aspect of the experimental game.,1
+"Complementing this preliminary evidence, the dissertation presents several studies that support the reverse appraisal proposal; in particular, the dissertation presents evidence that, when engaged in a social dilemma, people are capable of inferring, from emotion displays, how the counterpart is appraising the ongoing interaction and, from this information, further infer what the counterpart's intentions are.",1
+3. To observe whether or not the time at which the motivational predisposition is gauged has any importance for the behaviour observed (Study 3).,0
+"ur pilot experiments indicated that the realized duration of games, especially in the early repeated games, had a substantial effect on the subjects' cooperation rates.",1
+"Mathematical models have indeed shown that the larger the group, the more unlikely it is that cooperation for public goods can evolve (Boyd & Richerson, 1988).",1
+"We test asymmetric breadth by regressing the absolute values of the non-inertial adjustments conditional on steady/increasing payoffs versus payoff declines, controlling for session, phase, group, period and individual fixed effects with individual-level clustering.",0
+"In particular, Results 1 and 3 suggest that, depending on the research question, the researcher may face a tradeoff: high incentives for exact beliefs increase belief accuracy but strongly incentivized beliefs may also bias contributions away from levels that would be observed were beliefs not elicited at all or only hypothetically.",1
+Our experiments provide direct tests between the rapport explanation and rival explanations.,0
+"We selected 106 participants, 56 males and 50 females, and scheduled them according to their availability.",0
+"Then the participants made their decisions, received their payment, and were debriefed.",0
+"On the other hand, in our experiment, the simple instruction that a partner is a computer agent caused our participants largely shift their behavior to offer defect actions.",1
+"The term, guilt aversion, is adopted from Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) where they define a guilt-averse player as someone who ""suffers from guilt to the extent he believes he hurts others relative to what they believe they will get.""",0
+"This is because consumers, under low efficacy conditions, may believe that there is ""strength in numbers.""",1
+"Nevertheless, individuals may form beliefs about who sanctioned them based on who sanctioned others, and may attempt to counter-punish based on this information.",1
+Your contribution decision will therefore depend on how much other group members contribute.,0
+"In addition, the data showed that the subjects were more highly motivated to minimize differences in final outcomes in the case of equal time investments than in the case of unequal time investments.",1
+"Numerous studies have reported that individuals are more likely to cooperate when they expect other group members to cooperate than when they expect others to defect (Dawes, fcfavish, & Shaklee, 1977;Messe & Sivacek, 1979;Messick et al., 1983;Talarowski, 1982).",1
+"However, the results of this study indicate that when the slopes of the payoff functions are not equal, this assumption is violated.",1
+"However, increasing reward does have a small significant effect on contributions and a larger significant effect on provision.",1
+"the NPD as the number of players increases, but, in order to reach the benefit, one needs more people to cooperate.",1
+"Behaviour in the dilemma has been investigated by social psychologists, who have found that reward structure can influence the degree of cooperation but that personality variables do not serve as reliable predictors of behaviour.",1
+"With the Buss apparatus, Leventhal,'Shemberg 8 van Schoelandt (1968) and Leventhal 6 Shemberg (1969) found that women with traditional sex role values had higher aggression scores than women who did not confirm to traditional values when aggression was sanctioned by the situation.",1
+"While we attribute the increase in contributions primarily to group size, we must note that other design features did not remain constant between treatments and may be responsible for the observed differences.",1
+"Group, clearly putting all our money in the group investment is paying off because it's doubling our profit if we go it alone, Let's stick to putting all 10 E$ in the group account.",1
+"In the unanimity condition, the sanction was only executed when it was requested by all three remaining group members.",0
+Any more complicated reward or punishment technology would have made the choice task of the participants more difficult and would not have added important further insights.,1
+Note: Correlations of r P 0.18 (N = 129) or r P 0.14 (N = 200) are significant on p < 0.05.,0
+This indicates that some realizations (depending on l and b) of the coevolutionary game give rise to compact clusters of players.,0
+All effects other than subjects' gender are far from significant in the Mosuo data.,0
+"According to this view, an 'irrational' impulse would lead the punisher to disregard the future consequences of punishing norm violations.",1
+"Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh, and Lipetz ( 5 ) and Minas, Scodel, Marlowe, and Rawson (4) have demonstrated that the Prisoner's Dilemma, when played as an iterated game, results in both players employing a noncooperative strategy.",1
+The intuition behind the proposition is straightforward.,0
+"satisfying a necessary condition for mediation (i.e., that the potential mediator be significantly related to the dependent variable).",0
+is significant heterogeneity across members in the benefits from group activities.,0
+"Although no large difference between the original and reactive model was found when explaining the behavior of human participants in the current experiment, we would predict a larger difference in the behavior of these two models under circumstances where the other player changes its behavior.",0
+"Recently, Stith and colleagues explored situational stress factors for couples that met the criteria of situational couple violence (Stith, Amandor-Boadu, Miller, Menhusen, & Few-Demo, 2011).",0
+"By playing a sequential game, it is possible to separate the effect through preferences from the effect through beliefs.",0
+This time the initial network was a small-world network with an average nodal clustering of .71.,0
+Hump-shaped contributors have the same conditional contribution pattern as conditional cooperator up to some maximum point and then negative correlation based on the same criterion as for conditionally cooperating behavior.,0
+"Much has been written about the impact of climate change on resource conflicts (Ember and Ember 1992, Mwiturubani 2010, Downing et al. 2014;Harari and La Ferrara 2014, unpublished manuscript).",0
+"The pattern of results in Fig. 1D is very similar to the one reported by Nalbantian & Schotter (1997), who found that with equilibrium contribution close to the upper bound of the strategy space mean contribution levels were stable over trials but somewhat below the equilibrium level.",0
+"We find at least some evidence that giving in the trust, public good and dictator games, and reciprocity in the trust and ultimatum games vary over the menstrual cycle.",0
+"The Pareto-optimal request and contribution level, shown in the left panel of Table 1, are the same across the three treatments.",0
+Our exploratory analyses revealed regional overlaps in the genotype-by-CAS interaction contrasts.,0
+In the conclusion we discuss why we find evidence for discovered rather than constructed preferences.,0
+We decomposed the interaction by comparing patterns of implicit racial bias between ineffective and effective external incentive conditions.,0
+The integer payoff values are understood so that 4 (or 1) is the most (or least) preferred outcome.,0
+"Within the fine and no-fine conditions for both the pregame and postgame data, the distribution of choices from males was compared to that of females using the chi square test.",0
+"In six different trials, we found two reciprocal pairs per trial significantly more often than would be expected by chance.",0
+"Given the fact that public services or goods are quite difficult to maintain, understanding how and when sanctioning systems may work in an effective manner to promote contributions to those public goods is an important task for social dilemma researchers.",0
+"Among this latter group, we jointly estimate a warm-glow model with logit decision error, and find warmglow and noise parameter values which are comparable between the treatments.",0
+This section looks at the impact of initial income inequality in order to examine Hypothesis 3. I use a between-subjects comparison. 27,0
+"24 In the experiment, we (the experimenters) finance the incentive.",0
+Result 2. There is a positive association between conditional cooperation and the average cooperation by others.,0
+"The purpose of the chi-square tests was to evaluate the signi®cance of departures from chance in the relative frequencies of Stackelberg (h) and non-Stackelberg (non-h) strategy choices, the main hypothesis being that there would be a sig-ni®cant bias towards h strategies in each of the h-soluble games.",0
+You should record these on your record sheet under the column headed ``My Point for this Round''.,0
+"First, we will describe the characteristics of the commons dilemma and the search for solutions.",0
+The experiment took about 15 minutes.,0
+"The player screen approximates that of player Blue midway through session CC4, and the chat box contents are excerpted from that session.",0
+"Second, the set of options or reactions that is available in the PD for the behavioral translation of the players' expectations is extremely limited.",0
+Similar effects of anonymity have been found by Bixenstine et al. (1966) and Jerdee and Rosen (1974).,0
+"While the research reported here suggests that sympathy is important for social order, several questions remain.",0
+We expected group cohesiveness to mediate the relationship between forgiveness and cooperation differently depending on transgressor response.,0
+To test this we conducted three studies.,0
+"In other words, expectations of the partner's behavior in one game were found to correlate with a player's choice in another game.",0
+This effect would be due primarily to the significantly lower amount of cooperation for subjects assigned to the low potential reward position.,0
+We use the control of corruption variable developed by KKM due to the large number of countries included in this data set.,0
+The fa duced by Kreps et al. (1982) incorporates a touc obtains the qualitative prediction that cooperat y increases.,0
+"In more modern times, Le Bon (18951 1896) stated that when in crowds the ""individual . . .",0
+This pair condition is suggested to have an impact on their contribution in the public goods game.,0
+Where X is the statement: Play 1 is the best choice for this trial.,0
+"In this paper, we complement this project by comparing these mechanisms in a field experiment.",0
+" In contrast, the aim of our experimental investigation is to test the efficacy of partial and imperfect transparency.",0
+"The most extensive and systematic efforts to study the effects of group discussion have come from an ambitious program of research undertaken by Dawes, Orbell, van de Kragt, and their colleagues (e.g., Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1989;Dawes et ah, 1977;Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1988;Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1990;Orbell et ah, 1988;Orbell, Dawes, & van de Kragt, 1990;Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1991;van de Kragt et ah, 1983; van de Kragt, Dawes, Orbell, Braver, & Wilson, 1986).",0
+The comparison of EX-PUN and FIX-PUN allows studying how slow community growth influences cooperation.,0
+"Standard errors, clustered at the subject level, are in parentheses.",0
+We now turn to more formal tests of these hypotheses.,0
+"In Experiments 1, 2, and 3 we used a social dilemma game to measure prosocial behavior.",0
+life lion-nialie comparisons between the two-parameter conditions.,0

ssc_val.csv

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+text,label
+"Each participant was given a pseudonym so that he/she could acquire a reputation in the game yet still remain anonymous, and dividers prevented visual contact between participants.",0
+We controlled for different (possibly) intervening variables.,0
+"Controls for missing gender information are included in (2), (",0
+In IF25 the feedback on the others' average contribution was exaggerated by about 25%. 4 More precisely the feedback was calculated as the average of the others' contribution multiplied by 1.25.,0
+These methods were approved by the faster University Research Ethics Board.,0
+"Typically, an alliance ends when the project is completed, or when one or both partners decide to opt-out.",0
+"We predicted that in absence of a sanctioning system, people would show little support for a sanctioning system unless there is collective inefficiency, and that in presence of a sanctioning system, people would support the sanctioning system, irre-spective of the information people have concerning collective (in)efficiency.",1
+"If industries can relocate easily, then the level of pollution would depend on the country with the weakest environmental regulation.",1
+"It serves people's short-term self interest not to contribute to the establishment of an authority, but if none or only few group members cooperate there will be no authority in place to monitor the good, and therefore the good may fail to be provided.",1
+"More interesting, however, is that the Sanction × Options interaction effect showed that the sanction increased the collective outcomes only in the two options condition.",1
+"As Axelrod (1984) has noted, when discount rates increase the probability that a defecting strategy is optimal also increases.",1
+Result 7: Take framing weakly reduces cooperation for men and weakly increase cooperation for women.,1
+"Each subject was told to use a prepared tally sheet to record, during an intertrial interval, his own earnings for the preceding trial.",0
+Sign-up sheets contained spaces for two names for each to believe throughout the experiment that they were interacting with a same-sex peer.,0
+"As one individual increases his or her effort, the personal payoff increases regardless of other individuals' actions (the left panel); however, as the aggregate effort of the other individuals increases, the payoff for that particular individual decreases (the right panel), more clearly demonstrating the negative externality.",1
+"In many social-game protocols, ranging from gift-exchange over ultimatum bargaining to public-good situations, human behaviour differs substantially from the Nash-equilibrium that results if we assume that players care only about their own monetary payoff.",1
+These results suggest that the shared outcomes involved in cooperation did increase cohesiveness.,1
+"In two behavioral experiments, we offer individuals the latter possibility: Participants can work together to increase the total size of the pie and hence increase the size of their own slice.",1
+"The alternative model predicts the following predictions: P 1 : When there is no tax imposed, individual contributions will exceed 5. P 2 : When a tax of 3 is imposed, total individual contributions will exceed the individual contributions made when there is no tax imposed.",1
+Participants were undergraduate students enrolled in psychology and business classes at Temple University who completed the proposed study to fulfill course requirements.,0
+"In addition, the interactive effect of leadership and forgiveness turned non-significant, t = −.70,",0
+We used the same manipulation from Study 1a.,0
+"As a result, followers might want to leave the group or even take retributive actions on the leader (Fitness, 2000).",0
+"Means and correlations between constructs, Study 1.",0
+"This fact was not noted in the original report, although it was referenced in a correction notice published by the authors (Heider & Skowronski, in press).",0
+Bargainers with a significant threat tend to threaten and fine more often.,1
+"However, previous research showed that SVO, measured a substantial amount of time in advance, still affected behavior in the predicted ways (e.g., mcclintock & Allison, 1989).",1
+"Furthermore, due to this TFT strategy, we cannot observe how a participant in the scarcity condition would respond to defection on the part of their partner; our program defects only if the participant is the first to deviate from cooperation.",0
+The discrepant levels of attention paid to music in relation to consumer behavior and employee or organizational behavior are most clear when considering retail workspaces because (i) customers and employees cohabit the locations and (ii) it is reasonable to expect that music that is selected to influence the behaviors of customers would have similar influences on employees.,1
+""" 5 contexts lead actors to rely more on contributions to the group than competitive contexts, while competitive contexts lead actors to rely more on punishment of others than cooperative contexts.",1
+"Furthermore, the highest contributor in the group earned more prestige when the good was unattainable, suggesting an association between status and conspicuous cooperation (Hypothesis 3).",1
+"As a consequence, confounding effects such as reputation building through punishment or strategic reasons for punishing to increase cooperation in repeated interactions, as shown by Gächter et al. (2004) and Gächter and Herrmann (2009), can be excluded and a clear theoretical benchmark for standard preferences can be derived.",1
+We argue and show that an important reason why people apply the do-no-harm principle to their use of sanctions is because they feel personally responsible for the harm done.,1
+"The institutional mechanism implemented in Study 1 is richer than an ultimatum game and simultaneously changes the incentive structure depending on the priors of the participants: if players believe that others will contribute at levels just above the lowest current contributor, and believe that others believe this, pure self-interest will generate the observed ratchet pattern.",1
+"Fear is associated with the goal to avoid risk, which in a social dilemma induces a tendency to avoid exploitation or loss.",1
+"This implies that conflict increases parochialism both by increasing preferences for in-group cooperation, and by decreasing preferences for out-group cooperation.",1
+The mutuality of the response improves the prognosis for the couple's staying together.,1
+The basis for the division into groups was never mentioned.,0
+My understanding of people's ideas about cooperation in Kamchatka was significantly enhanced by the opportunity to refer back to the game when explaining my thoughts and posing my questions.,1
+The employers appeal to the strong reciprocity of the workers by being more generous as  the desired effort level becomes more costly to the worker.,1
+We also find that the level of contribution under different default options is sensitive to the type of the public goods game employed.,1
+"''Random TOP"" is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in the Random TOP treatment, and 0 elsewhere.",0
+"These two psychological factors may operate in opposite directions, reducing the overall effect.",0
+When communication within teams is possible communication is an efficient means to coordinate team members' efforts at higher levels and to reduce the free-rider problem within teams.,1
+"Specifically, highly extrinsic primary participants tended to select other materialists as peers to participate in the study.",1
+"Just as one should take care not to toss out the baby with the bathwater, there would be no reason to cast aside the boredom notion merely because it did not appear to be affected by variations in reward size.",0
+An alternative would have been to conduct a series of regression analyses.,0
+"A number of studies have argued that survey-based measures have to be treated with caution in the CDD context and that this may explain the mixed evidence on CDD and social capital in the first place (Avdeenko & Gilligan, 2015;Ban et al., 2015;Mansuri & Rao, 2013;Wong, 2012).",1
+"A sample of 41 individuals played four economic games each believed to measure a different aspect of cooperation: prisoner's dilemma (reciprocity), trust game (trust), ultimatum game (fairness), and public goods game (group reciprocity, punishment, and norms).",0
+"Mason et al. (1991, p. 228) comment that ``[k]nowing the gender of a rival may have crystallized gender motivated dierences in behavior causing such dierences to persist and apparently become more pronounced over time.",1
+"Both the Outcome for Others and the Equality of Outcomes depend on others, meaning when the total group is greater than two people, these others' properties are combinations of multiple people's behaviors, not just a single individual's behavior.",1
+Forty-four undergraduate students at the Ohio State University at Lima played an IPD game against a computer program in exchange for partial fulfilment of a requirement or for extra credit in their introductory psychology course.,0
+The binary-choice is used because there is no a priori way of determining whether a second decider will interpret a given level of cooperation by the first decider in the continuous cooperation/sequential version as 'cooperative' or 'non-cooperative'.,1
+"Although all participants agreed that ""the advisor was friendly"" and that ""the advisor was pleasant,"" those in the video condition agreed more strongly, F(1, 77) = 13.023,",0
+"Replications with people from other age groups or nations would help to establish the generalizability of these findings, which is important to do because researchers have suggested that apologies and offers of compensation are species-typical ways of promoting forgiveness (e.g., fcfullough, 2008;fcfullough, Kurzban, et al., 2010).",1
+"Compromise Effect Task Statistics by Riskiness for Experiment Three The table gives the percentage of trials in which participants chose the compromise, most risky, and least risky lotteries respectively; this uses the results from all five decision problems.",0
+The conventional result of increasing reciprocity with increasing sender's trust is clearly the case for strongly pro-social individuals.,1
+We ®nd that subjects made themselves worse-o when they faced a modestly enforced government-imposed regulation that standard theory would predict to be welfare-improving.,0
+"To summarize, discrimination occurs as an outcome of intergroup bias where the discrimination is not a result of hostility toward out-group members, but is rather a result of in-group loving.",1
+"interactions reduce the degree of control in the experiment because it is difficult to assess whether appearances, show banter, and the like influence observed decisions.",1
+The models of Falk and Fischbacher (1999) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) also predict the existence of third-party punishment.,0
+"While the same zero-contribution equilibrium as in the unconstrained case exists for the same range of social returns, the resource constraint also allows for other more efficient equilibria.",0
+"For these estimations, we use an approach that is similar to that used for the first stage contributions.",0
+"Alternately (or additionally) she may value the public good or charity itself and, believing that contribution levels are strategic complements, give more to influence others to give more.",1
+More intelligent subjects were significantly more likely to vote for whichever of FS or IS was associated with higher earnings ex post.,1
+"Similarly G-allele carriers of rs53576, in contrast to AA-homozygotes, were susceptible to the quality of the childhood family environment [Bradley et al., 2013] resp.",0
+There are indications that the unequal range of pay-off accelerated the observed trends rather than reversing them.,1
+"Selfish players may choose to reveal private information through costless and non-binding communication or cheap talk; such revelation can lead to efficiency gains, as shown by Crawford and Sobel (1982).",1
+"It relies on the idea that people react to unfair intentions by sacrificing a part of their payoffs in order to punish others, even when there are no reputation gains from doing so (Rabin 1993;Falk and Fischbacher 2006).",1
+"If this is the case, a was found above and in previous work (e.g.",0
+"Because the approach of pausing first-order collective action for multiple punishment stages has been explored extensively by others and because situations that it may fail to mirror well strike us as common and important, we study higher-order punishment in a repeated play dilemma game with the constraint that the number of punishment stages not exceed the number of contribution stages by more than a factor of two.",1
+"Outside the laboratory, partner preferences and time constraints typically inhibit equal rates of interaction between group members, the result being that people (and other social animals) interact with some individuals more than others.",1
+The conversion rate between € and LD is 1:100.,0
+The order of the experiment (whether experiment 1 was run first or second) did not significantly affect within-group cooperation (all p > 0.27) and thus this factor was not included in the analyses presented below.,0
+The absence of an end-game effect or of a negative time trend in these groups is remarkable and offers evidence that unobservable sanctions can have a long-term impact on cooperation.,1
+"Finally, if fishermen care only about their own catch, and there are no (variable) harvesting costs, then the net present value of an agent's welfare is then equal to:",0
+Competition for access to mates could indeed select for cooperation.,0
+"The extent of individual cooperation tends to be higher among high-identifying individuals, either because they place greater value in the good itself (De Cremer & Van Vugt, in press;Kerr, 1996), because they have greater trust in the cooperative intentions of fellow group members (Brann & Foddy, 1987;Brewer & Kramer, 1986;Kramer & Brewer, 1984), or both.",1
+The dependent variable is contributions and we examine each trust measure as an independent variable.,0
+"This is because probability theory will predict that individuals will not allocate higher weight to any particular numbers, because the probability of winning should be the same for all numbers.",1
+Do experimental games measure the same thing (presumably prosocial norms) in the same way across societies?,0
+This phenomenon is called an end effect.,0
+"To Fig. 1 we have added a candidate xį (x −i ) to graph a representative best-response function, x į (x −i ), for an individual who balances altruism and pure self-interest.",0
+"In line with prior PSM studies, as person-related control variables, we include a dummy for female (versus male as the reference group), age, and religion, with dummies for Catholic, Protestant, and Evangelical, Islamic, no religion, and religion not indicated.",0
+"This idea can be linked to the one in Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982): if fully rational and egoistic individuals have the faintest suspicion they might be interacting with tit-fortat players, there is room for cooperative equilibria.",1
+"Instead, Andreoni (1995), among others, has suggested that this decrease might be due to ""frustrated attempts at kindness.""",1
+"This paper examines four aspects of personality: preference for competition, preference for risk, passion for profit, and trust in others.",0
+We construct a theoretical model of a public good game with players with heterogeneous initial endowments and show that voluntary contributions can be explained by a preference for social approval.,0
+"However, if each individual attempts to maximize his or her self-interest, the collective outcome will be less desirable than if each individual attempts to maximize the collective interest (Dawes, 1980).",1
+"Generally, if the first five periods are not considered which can be classed as 'learning periods,' contributions are almost constant over the 20 last periods for the M, H and VH treatments.",0
+11 Period 10 is excluded to not capture end game effects.,0
+The interaction effect which was not predicted resulted from high contribution in the Low-Cont/Hi-Var condition.,0
+Working together on a team-building task enhanced cooperative tendencies even with little or no financial incentive for performing the task.,1
+"For if such a 'high-trust' society were characterized by the existence of many separate groups producing public goods with negative externalities for each other, the overall result would likely be worse than would have been the case had trust been low.",1
+"Our result suggests that the selfish prediction is prone to deviations when the equilibrium results in unequal distributions of payoffs, and there are alternative outcomes that increase both equality and the payoff of the disadvantaged party.",1
+"However, we believe that excludability can (and does) provide an effective, low-cost way to induce cooperation, increase efficiency and support team production in social dilemmas and related situations.",1
+"When people do not know the victims and have little if any positive regard for them, their donation behavior may be influenced primarily by criteria that they apply independently of their feelings of sympathy or empathy.",1
+"As actors participate in the production of public goods, processes of social comparison may affect the decisions about the individual contributions as well as the endogenously changing structure of an underlying social network.",1
+"Since the same presentation of information was used in her experiment, significant positive effects of trust on group size was observed even in the experimental situation where only this minimal information about others' behavior was presented.",1
+We did not run a similar Tobit estimate for a contribution level of 20 because there are too many values of 0 for the dependent variable (91.25% of all observations).,0
+"The assistance ol the following in the conduct of this research is gratefully acknowledged: Stuart Oskamp, Robert Moss, David Wollcr, and Ann Wichman.",0
+"Our hypotheses on the impact of identity on contributions to laboratory public goods and local organizations could be formulated by applying Akerlof andfranton's (2000, 2003) model to the public goods setting.",0
+Boyd and Richerson (1989) view this as a generalization of tit-for-tat to the case of indirect reciprocity.,0
+"A significant restart effect is observed (as in Andreoni, 1988 anderson, 1996), with contributions again decreasing over the second ten periods.",0
+No significant time or medium main effects or any interactions were observed.,0
+"In fact, of course, the experiment ended after 10 trials, at which point the secretary was asked to ®ll out a postexperimental questionnaire.",0
+First let me show you how your choices are structured.,0
+"Second, an interaction between group identification and feedback is predicted (Hypothesis 2).",0
+"In the following, when we refer to the impact of sanctions on trust and cooperation, we are specifically referring to the effects that emerge after the removal of the sanctioning system.",0
+One domain of interaction is addressed in the model: the workplace.,0