Newsgroup: it.scienza.biologia
Titolo: Egalitarian Fiction (per Verolini) Was: perche' il razzismo e' giusto

dalla biblioteca razziale di David Duke :
http://www.duke.org/library/innate/gottfredson.html
Egalitarian Fiction and Collective Fraud
Linda S. Gottfredson
Society, March-April 1994
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brief Summary: Social Science researchers have contributed to the myth that
there is no difference in intelligence levels among different racial and ethnic
groups. Some researchers ignored significant data because it did not fit into
the accepted belief of genetic equality. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social science today condones and perpetuates a great falsehood - one that
undergirds much current social policy. This falsehood, or "egalitarian fiction,"
holds that racial-ethnic groups never differ in average developed intelligence
(or, in technical terms, g, the general mental ability factor). While scientists
have not yet determined their source, the existence of sometimes large group
differences in intelligence is as well-established as any fact in the social
sciences. How and why then is this falsehood perpetrated on the public? What
part do social scientists themselves play, deliberately or inadvertently, in
creating and maintaining it? Are some of them involved in what might be termed
"collective fraud?" Intellectual dishonesty among scientists and scholars is, of
course, nothing new. But watchdogs of scientific integrity have traditionally
focused on dishonesty of individual scientists, while giving little attention to
the ways in which collectivities of scientists, each knowingly shaving or
shading the truth in small but similar ways, have perpetuated frauds on the
scientific community and the public at large. Perhaps none of the individuals
involved in the egalitarian fiction could be accused of fraud in the usual sense
of the term. Indeed, I would be the first to say that, like other scientists,
most of these scholars are generally honest. Yet, their seemingly minor
distortions, untruths, evasions, and biases collectively produce and maintain a
witting falsehood. Accordingly, my concern here is to explore the social process
by which many otherwise honest scholars facilitate, or feel compelled to
endorse, a scientific lie. 
The Egalitarian Fiction 
It is impossible here to review the voluminous evidence showing that
racial-ethnic differences in intelligence are the rule rather than the exception
(some groups performing better than whites and others worse), and that the
well-documented black-white gap is especially striking. All groups span the
continuum of intelligence, but some groups contain greater proportions of
individuals that are either gifted or dull than others. Three facts regarding
these group differences are of particular importance here for together they
contradict the claim that there are no meaningful group differences.
Racial-ethnic differences in intelligence are real. The large average group
differences in mental test scores in the United States do not result from test
bias, which is minuscule overall, as even a National Academy of Science panel
concluded in 1982. Moreover, intelligence and aptitude tests measure general
mental abilities, such as reasoning and problem solving, not merely accumulated
bits of knowledge - and thus tap what experts and laymen alike view as
"intelligence." 
Regardless of how we choose to construe them, differences in intelligence are of
great practical importance. Overall they predict performance in school and on
the job better than any other single attribute or condition we have been able to
measure. Intelligence certainly is not the only factor that affects performance,
but higher levels of intelligence greatly increase people's odds of success in
many life settings. Group disparities in intelligence are stubborn. Although
individuals fluctuate somewhat in intelligence during their lives, differences
among groups seem quite stable. The average black-white difference, for example,
which appears by age six, has remained at about 18 Stanford-Binet IQ points
since it was first measured in large national samples over seventy years ago. It
is not clear yet why the disparities among groups are so stubborn - the reasons
could be environmental, genetic, or a combination of both - but so far they have
resisted attempts to narrow them. Although these facts may seem surprising, most
experts on intelligence believe them to be true but few will acknowledge their
truth publicly. 
Misrepresentation of Expert Opinion 
The 1988 book The IQ Controversy: The Media and Public Policy by
psychologist-lawyer Mark Snyderman and political scientist Stanley Rothman
provides strong evidence that the general public receives a highly distorted
view of opinion among "IQ experts." In essence, say Snyderman and Rothman,
accounts in major national newspapers, newsmagazines, and television reports
have painted a portrait of expert opinion that leaves the impression that "the
majority of experts in the field believe it is impossible to adequately define
intelligence, that intelligence tests do not measure anything that is relevant
to life performance, and that they are biased against minorities, primarily
blacks and Hispanics, as well as against the poor." However, say the authors,
the survey of experts revealed quite the opposite: On the whole, scholars with
any expertise in the area of intelligence and intelligence testing ... share a
common view of [what constitute] the most important components of intelligence,
and are convinced that [intelligence] can be measured with some degree of
accuracy. An overwhelming majority also believe that individual genetic
inheritance contributes to variations in IQ within the white community, and a
smaller majority express the same view about the black-white and SES
[socioeconomic] differences in IQ. 
Unfortunately, such wholesale misrepresentation of expert opinion is not limited
to the field of intelligence, as Rothman has shown in parallel studies of other
policy-related fields such as nuclear energy or environmental cancer research.
However, the study of IQ experts revealed something quite surprising. Most
experts' private opinions mirrored the conclusions of psychologist Arthur
Jensen, whom the media have consistently painted as extreme and marginal for
holding precisely those views. As Snyderman and Rothman point out, the experts
disclosed their agreement with this "controversial" and putatively marginal
position only under cover of anonymity. No one, not even Jensen himself, had any
inkling that his views now defined the mainstream of expert belief. Although
Jensen regularly received private expressions of agreement, he and others had
been, as Snyderman and Rothman note, widely castigated by the expert community
for expressing some of those views. 
Several decades ago, most experts, among them even Jensen, believed many of the
views that the media now wrongly describe as mainstream - for example, that
cultural bias accounts for the large black-white differences in mental test
scores. While the private consensus among IQ experts has shifted to meet
Jensen's "controversial" views, the public impression of their views has not
moved at all. Indeed, the now-refuted claim that tests are hopelessly biased is
treated as a truism in public life today. The shift in private, if not public,
beliefs among IQ experts is undoubtedly a response to the overwhelming weight of
evidence which has accumulated in recent decades on die reality and practical
importance of racial-ethnic differences in intelligence. This shift is by all
indications a begrudging one, and certainly no flight into "racism." 
Snyderman and Rothman found that as many IQ experts as journalists and science
editors (two out of three) agreed with the statement that "strong affirmative
action measures should be used in hiring to assure black representation." Fully
63 percent of the IQ experts described themselves as liberal politically, 17
percent as middle of the road, and 20 percent as conservative - not much
different than the results for journalists (respectively, 64, 21, and 16
percent). Moreover, as Snyderman and Rothman suggest (and as is consistent with
personal accounts by Jensen and others), many of the surveyed experts, while
agreeing with Jensen's conclusions, may disapprove of his expressing these
conclusions openly. Consistent with this, when queried about their respect for
the work of fourteen individuals who have written about intelligence or
intelligence testing, the IQ experts rated Jensen only above the widely but
apparently unjustly) vilified Cyril Burt. Despite the fact that most agreed with
Jensen, they rated him far lower than often like-minded psychometricians who had
generally stayed clear of the fray. Jensen even received significantly lower
ratings than his vocal critics, such as psychologist Leon Kamin, whose
scientific views are marginal by the experts' own conclusions. By contrast, the
experts in environmental cancer research behaved as one would expect; they gave
higher reputational ratings to peers who are closer to the mainstream than to
high-profile critics. Snyderman's and Rothman's findings therefore suggest that
a high proportion of experts are misrepresenting their beliefs or are keeping
silent in the face of a public falsehood. It is no wonder that the public
remains misinformed on this issue. 
Living Within a Lie 
IQ experts feel enormous pressure to "live within a lie," to use a phrase by
Czech writer and leader Vaclav Havel characterizing daily life under communist
rule n Eastern Europe. Havel argued, in The Power of the Powerless, that, by
living a lie, ordinary citizens were complicit in their own tyranny. Every
greengrocer, every clerk who agreed to display official slogans not reflecting
his own beliefs, or who voted in elections known to be farcical, or who feigned
agreement at political meetings, normalized falsification and tightened the
regime's grip on thought. Each individual who lived the lie, who capitulated to
"ideological pseudo-reality," became a petty instrument of the regime. As many
commentators have noted, Americans may not speak certain truths about racial
matters today. To adapt a phrase, there is a "structured silence." 
Social scientists had already begun subordinating scientific norms to political
preferences and creating much of our current pseudo-reality on race by the
mid-1960s. Sociologist Eleanor Wolf, in a 1972 article in Race, for example,
detailed her distress at how fellow social scientists were misusing research
data to support particular positions on civil rights policy: presenting
inconclusive data as if it were decisive; lacking candor about "touchy" subjects
(such as the undesirable behavior of lower-class students); blurring or shaping
definitions (segregation, discrimination, racism) to suit "propagandistic"
purposes; making exaggerated claims about the success of favored policies
(compensatory education and school integration) while minimizing or ignoring
contrary evidence. As a result, social science and social policy are now
dominated by the theory that discrimination accounts for all racial disparities
in achievements and well-being. This theory collapses, however, if deprived of
the egalitarian fiction, as does the credibility of much current social policy.
Neither could survive intact if their central premise were scrutinized. 
No wonder, then, that IQ researchers find themselves under great professional
and institutional pressure to avoid not only engaging in such scrutiny but even
appearing to countenance it. The scrutiny itself must be discredited; the
egalitarian fiction must be raised above serious scientific question. Scientists
must at least appear to believe the dogma. As was the case in Havel's
communist-dominated Eastern Europe, in American academe feigned belief in the
official version of reality is maintained largely by routine obeisance of
academics as they pursue their own ambitions. 
Scholars realize their scholarly ambitions primarily through other scholars.
Peer recognition is the currency of academic and scientific life. It is crucial
to a scholarly reputation and all the steps toward status and success -
publications, professional invitations and awards, promotion, tenure, grants,
fellowships, election to professional office, appointment to prestigious panels.
One's ability even to carry out certain kinds of research, funded or not, may be
contingent upon peer recognition and respect - for instance, getting
collaborators, subjects, or cooperation from potential research sites. Just as
in personal life, a high professional reputation depends upon a sustained
history of "appropriate" behavior, and it may be irreparably damaged by hints of
scandal or impropriety. Similarly, the reputations of scientists and their
organizations are enhanced or degraded by those for whom they show regard and
approval. Associating oneself with highly regarded individuals or ideas
enhances, even if slightly, one's own status. 
Awarding an honor to a luminary can enhance the reputation of one's own
organization, especially if the recipient accepts the honor with genuine
appreciation. By the same token, one risks "staining" one's reputation by
associating with, honoring, defending, or even failing to condemn the "wrong"
sort of individual or idea. In short, how one gives or withholds one's regard is
important for one's professional reputation because it affects the regard one
receives. Such a social system enhances the integrity of science and is
furthered by personal ambition when the members of the community base their
regard on scholarly norms, such as competence, creativity, and intellectual
rigor. However, such a system breeds intellectual corruption when members
systematically subordinate scientific norms to other considerations - money,
politics, religion, fear. This is what appears to be happening today in the
social sciences on matters of race and intelligence. As sociologist Robert
Gordon argues, social science has become "one-party science." 
Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative, virtually all American
intellectuals publicly adhere to, if not espouse, the egalitarian fiction. And
many demonstrate their party loyalty by enforcing the fiction in myriad small
ways in their academic routine, say, by off-handedly dismissing racial
differences in intelligence as "a racist claim, of course," criticizing authors
for "blaming the victim," or discouraging students and colleagues from doing
"sensitive" research. One can feel the gradient of collective alarm and
disapproval like a deepening chill as one approaches the forbidden area.
Researchers who cross the line occasionally face overt censorship, or calls for
it. For example, one prominent (neoconservative) editor rejected an author's
paper, despite finding it scientifically sound, because there are social
"considerations" which "overweigh the claims of social science." Another eminent
editor, after asking an author to soften the discussion in his article, recently
published the revised paper with an editorial postscript admonishing scientists
in the field to find a "balance" between the need for free exchange of research
results on intelligence and the (presumably comparable) "need" that "no segment
of our society. . .feel threatened" by it. 
Covert and Overt Censorship 
Whether motivated by a sincere concern over supposedly "dangerous" ideas or by a
desire to distance themselves publicly from unpopular ideas, editors who use
such non-academic standards discourage candor and stifle debate. They deaden
social science by choking off one source of the genuine differences of opinion
that are its lifeblood. Overt censorship of research is uncommon, probably
because it is an obvious affront to academic norms. Less striking forms of
censorship directly affect many more academics, however, and so may be more
important. Easier to practice without detection and to disguise as "academic
judgment," they serve to keep scholars from pursuing ideas that might undermine
the egalitarian dogma. 
A less obvious form of censorship, which has become somewhat common recently, is
indirect censorship. It is accomplished when academic or scientific
organizations approve some views but repudiate or burden others on ideological
grounds. Sometimes the ideological grounds are explicit Campus speech codes are
a well-known example which, had they been upheld in the courts, would have made
repudiation of the egalitarian fiction a punishable offense on some campuses.
The earlier (unsuccessful) attempt to include possible "offense to minority
communities" as grounds for refusing human subjects approval is another example.
Gordon reports yet others, including the National Institutes of Health's new
extra layer of review for politically "sensitive" grant proposals and the
University of Delaware's recent policy (reversed by a national arbitrator) of
banning a particular funding source because, so the university claimed, it
supports research on race which "conflicts with the university's mission to
promote racial and cultural diversity." Gordon also outlines in detail - as
political scientist Jan Blits has done - the covert application of ideological
standards to facilitate expression of some views but burden others. This form of
indirect censorship, also falling under the rubric of "political correctness,"
occurs when university administrators, faculty, or officers of professional
associations disguise as "professional judgment" an ideological bias in their
enforcing of organizational rules, extending faculty privileges, protecting
faculty rights, and weighing evidence in faculty promotions and grievances. 
Recently, some American universities have invoked "professional judgment" as a
pretext for reclassifying "controversial" scholarly publications in their annual
merit reviews as "non-research," to misrepresent outside peer reviews in
evaluating controversial professionals up for promotion, and to limit student
access to these professors. Such thinly veiled bias publicly demonstrates the
officials' own adherence to the prescribed institutional attitudes and their
willingness to enforce them, not only protecting those officials from protest
but also encouraging fellow members of the institution to toe the line. 
Covert censorship is far more common than overt or indirect censorship. It
consists of bias in the application of scientific norms when reviewers evaluate
their peers' work for funding, publication, presentation, or dissemination.
Individual ideological biases are found in all fields, of course, but the hope
is that such biases remain small and will cancel each other out over the long
run-hence the importance of a free and open exchange of data, theories, and
results. What I have in mind is systematic bias and a pervasive double standard
which impedes one line of research and accords another undeserved hegemony. In
one-party science, the disfavored line of work is subjected to intense scrutiny
and nearly impossible standards, while the favored line of work is held to lax
standards in which flaws are overlooked (called "oversight bias" in the
psychological literature). Similarly, the disfavored idea is rejected unless it
is "balanced" by including proponents of the favored view (even if that view is
the equivalent of "flat-earth theory"), where the favored line of work is
readily accepted for publication or presentation, even when it totally ignores
the opposing literature. Getting a controversial paper accepted under such
circumstances often becomes a test of endurance between the editor and reviewers
(in coming up with criticisms) and the author (in rebutting them). Submitting IQ
research or grant proposals outside the narrowest professional confines exposes
intelligence researchers to yet other biases, usually of the kind to which
reviewers of the proposals will accept no rebuttal. 
The broader circle of critics in the social sciences often implicitly dismisses
the legitimacy of research on intelligence itself by arguing that "intelligence"
is undefinable or unmeasurable - as if the critics' own favored constructs
(social class, culture, self-concept, anxiety, and so on) were as well validated
and operationalized. Others now also seek to deny IQ researchers (but not
themselves) use of the concept "race" because, they assert, race is not a
biological condition, but is socially constructed. The double standards can even
ricochet back and forth, depending on the particular question being considered.
Gordon recalls how sociologists failed to criticize sociologist James Coleman
for omitting student ability from his analyses of school integration (which led
to overstating the impact of integrated schools on black achievement-for
sociologists a favorable outcome), but how they criticized him roundly for the
very same omission in analyses of private versus public schools,(which led to
overstating the impact of private schools on black achievement - an unfavorable
outcome). In short, in one-party science, scientific regard flows like political
patronage to loyal and active party members, who can demonstrate their loyalty
by being alert to hints of dissidence. Like all one-party political systems,
one-party science becomes intellectually corrupt and arrogant as it gains
confidence in its power. 
The most insidious corruption to which one-party science leads is pervasive
self-censorship, what involved researchers generally prefer to regard as
"prudence" or "avoiding unnecessary trouble." Coleman has drawn particular
attention to the problem of "self-suppression "the impulse not to ask the
crucial question" - in research on race. In an example from his own research for
the influential "Coleman Report," he describes his failure to conduct important
analyses that might have produced embarrassing findings about the abilities of
black teachers. Another way of avoiding unwanted results is to ignore certain
data, subjects, or variables. Or unwanted results can be omitted, buried in
footnotes, explained away, or simply ignored in one's conclusions. The most
subtle form of self-censorship is deliberate avoidance of making crucial
connections, or denying them. Psychologist Richard Herrnstein has noted that it
was his drawing out the implications of one such connection, namely, that some
portion of (white) social class differences in intelligence is genetic, that
sparked his public excoriation in the 1970s. 
Normally, scholars are eager to explicate illuminating connections between
subspecialties. They are reluctant to do so, however, when these connections put
in question the egalitarian dogma on race. Virtually all sociologists and
economists ignore the literature on intelligence despite its central importance
to core issues in their disciplines, such as inequalities in occupation and
income. Researchers in the various subfields of intelligence obviously cannot
ignore the literature with impunity. Yet they, too, often prefer to stay
strictly within the confines of their specialties rather than making crucial,
but unpopular, connections, or they use language that obscures what otherwise
would be quite obvious. 
Many psychometricians, especially those working for large testing organizations,
avoid referring to "intelligence" and often seem reluctant to say much about the
practical or theoretical meaning of the racial differences they observe on
unbiased tests. But even remaining within one's subfield is often not enough,
for the field of intelligence itself is widely suspect. Hence some scholars
explicitly disavow unpopular connections that critics might attribute to them.
For example, they will argue in favor of the importance of intelligence for
scholastic performance but then assure their readers, over-optimistically, that
the racial gap "seems to be closing rapidly." The tenor of these preemptive
disclaimers is clear. While researchers in any field may lightly dismiss the
credibility of key connections regarding race and intelligence, no one ever
lightly endorses their credibility with impunity. Even those of us committed to
candor are exceedingly cautious when expressing informed opinions on certain
topics, especially the genetics of race. Thus, publicly stated opinions of
researchers about matters outside their subfields tend in one direction - to
dispute or undercut the facts necessary for toppling the egalitarian fiction.
What may be tolerable behavior at the individual level becomes intolerable bias
at the aggregate level. Censorship - even self-censorship - requires
justification, or at least apparent justification. 
On the whole, those who would squelch open inquiry of the egalitarian fiction
base their justification on two assertions: 1) Research on racial differences in
intelligence has already been scientifically "discredited." 2) Inquiry into
racial differences is immoral. 
Point one asserts that the egalitarian premise is absolute truth and hence
beyond scientific scrutiny. Point two is indifferent to its truth. Both counsel
outrage at the very thought of the research. The claim that the research has
been discredited rests largely on extensive misrepresentation that is often
embarrassingly crude or casual - for example, contradicting arguments an author
never made, while ignoring what was actually stated; attributing policy
preferences to an author which are opposite of what the author actually
expressed; or simply alleging fraud or gross incompetence without any
substantiation whatsoever. The claim that the research is immoral rests squarely
on the view that, regardless of the truth, the study itself can only be harmful.
In fact, some critics assert (mostly privately) that the greater the truth, the
greater the danger it poses to lower-scoring groups, and thus the greater the
need to suppress it. 
Despite their differences, both justifications for censorship often take the
form of demonizing open inquiry by labeling it (and the people who practice it)
as "dangerous," "fascist," "ideological," or "racist." The study of race and
intelligence is something, they tell us, that no decent person - let alone a
serious scientist - would ever do and that every decent person and serious
researcher would oppose. Thus, in a kind of Orwellian inversion, marked by what
Gordon calls "high talk and low blows," the suppression of science presents
itself as science itself. Intellectual dishonesty becomes the handmaiden of
social conscience, and ideology is declared knowledge while knowledge is
dismissed as mere ideology. Neither social policy, nor science, nor society
itself is served well by scientific silence on racial differences in
intelligence. 
Enforcement of the egalitarian fiction has tragic consequences, especially for
blacks. The outcomes are even worse than researchers of intelligence predicted
two decades ago. The falsehood, because it tries to defy a reality that has
conspicuous repercussions in daily life, is doing precisely what it was meant to
avoid: producing pejorative racial stereotypes, fostering racial tensions,
stripping members of lower-scoring groups of their dignity and incentives to
achieve, and creating permanent social inequalities between the races.
Enforcement of the lie is gradually distorting and degrading all institutions
and processes where intelligence is at least somewhat important (which is
practically everywhere) but especially where it is most important (in public
schools, higher education, the professions, and high-level executive work). The
falsehood requires that there be racial preferences and that their use be
disguised, wherever intelligence has at least moderate importance. Society is
thus being shaped to meet the dictates of a collective fraud. The fiction is
aiding and abetting bigots to a fat greater degree than any truth ever could,
because its specific side-effects - racial preferences, official mendacity,
free-wielding accusations of racism, and falling standards - are creating deep
cynicism and broad resentment against minorities, blacks in particular, among
the citizenry. 
Enforcement of the egalitarian fiction is not a moral or scientific imperative;
it is merely political. It is terribly short-sighted, for it corrupts both
science and society. However, just as the fiction is sustained by small
untruths, so can it be broken down by many small acts of scientific integrity.
This requires no particular heroism. All that is required is for scientists to
act like scientists-to demand, clearly and consistently, respect for truth and
for free inquiry in their own settings, and to resist the temptation to win easy
approval by endorsing a comfortable lie. 
Linda S. Gottfredson is professor of educational studies at the University of
Delaware and co-director of the Project for the Study of Intelligence and
Society. She has published widely on fairness in testing and racial inequality,
focusing most recently on race-norming and the dilemmas in managing workforce
diversity. Her current work examines social policy based on the egalitarian
fiction. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
READINGS SUGGESTED BY THE AUTHOR
Jan H. Blits and Linda S. Gottfredson. "Equality or Lasting Inequality?"
Society, 27 (3) March/April 1990. 
Robert A. Gordon. The Battle to Establish a Sociology of Intelligence: A Case
Study in the Sociology of Politicized Disciplines. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns
Hopkin University, Department of Sociology, 1993. 
Linda S. Gottfredson. "Dilemmas in Developing Diversity Programs." In Diversity
in the Workplace: Human Resources Initiatives, Susan Jackson (ed.). New York:
The Guilford Press, 1992. 
Linda S. Gottfredson and James C. Sharf (eds.). "Fairness in Employment
Testing." Journal of Vocational Behavior, 33, December 1988. 
Richard J. Herrnstein. "A True Tale from the Annals of Orthodoxy." Preface to IQ
in the Meritocracy. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1973. 
Daniel Seligman. A Question of intelligence. New York: Birch Lane Press, 1992. 


http://www.duke.org/library/innate/gottfredson.html
Mega snip.
Senti ma mi dici come connettere tutte le menate del sito con la
teoria evoluzionistica della coscienza e con l'origine epigenetica
delle funzioni cerebrali superiori?
Sai... in quelle righe si parlava solo di studi sul QI e ho gia' detto
che il test QI e' in contrasto con quelle teorie di cui sopra. 
Il QI - anche se vogliamo per le molle accettare - ci parla di
ereditarieta' fenotipica... null'altro. Come passi da questa
all'ereditarieta'  genetica? Hai da porre una soluzione?
Siamo sin d'ora in attesa...  e vai mentekazzista... che ti stiamo ad
ascoltare. Vedi come siamo magnanimi? Diamo liberta' d'espressione
anche ad inferiori razzisti come te... ;-D
VR