Newsgroup: it.sport.arti-marziali
Titolo: Morte e torture in Cina - leggete per favore

Per favore dedicate un po' del vostro tempo a scorrere questa
documentazione, basterebbe solo guardare le figure.
Aprite tutti i links.
Questo sta succedendo in Cina a gente che pratica il Falun Gong, un tipo di
qigong.
Rendetevi conto personalmente.
Mi domando: può esistere una qualsiasi giustificazione per trattare così
gente che fa qigong alla mattina nei parchi e fa dell'applicazione dei
principi di Verità, Compassione e Tolleranza lo scopo della propria vita???
Bene! Wong crede di conoscerla.
Se ne avete voglia, chiedetegliela.  :-(((
http://web.tiscali.it/fotofalundafa/vecchio.htm
http://web.tiscali.it/falundafa/repressione.htm
http://www.faluninfo.net/hrreports/WomensAbuse10.pdf
http://www.faluninfo.net/hrreports/PsychAbuse.pdf
http://www.faluninfo.net/devstories/women/index.asp
grazie    lob

Se ne avete voglia, chiedetegliela.  :-(((
Mi pare che Wong si sia limitato a dire che il movimento ha
connotazioni politicamente eversive. La cosa non stupisce: mi sembra
del tutto normale, e questo nonostante i membri non se ne rendano
conto o fingano di non rendersene conto.
Il punto semmai è che difficilmente si può essere a favore del governo
che malmena e condanna a morte chi pratica Falun, presumibilmente dopo
un processo farsa. Purtroppo dire che il leader è pericoloso non
basta... bisognerebbe prima avere modo di toccarla con mano, questa
pericolosità: l'omicidio di stato come prevenzione non è una gran
cosa, mi pare. Dopo tutto, che erano pericolosi lo dicevano anche
degli ebrei.
Ciao
Geppo
--
Non c'è peggior Troll di chi non vuol Capire
(Geppo)
"Io? Be', io pratico il W la T*pa"
(Anonimo...)

 Se ne avete voglia, chiedetegliela.  :-(((
lob, se hai voglia di parlare e scambiare opinioni con me sei il benvenuto
se vuoi solo fare polemica e propaganda allora ti lascio andare avanti da
solo
la situazione in Cina e' molto complessa, risultato sopratutto degli ultimi
decenni di storia
un equilibrio alquanto precario se vuoi, che puo' essere facilmente
distrutto da organizzazioni di questo tipo
inutile dire che sono addolorato per le morti, le torture e tutto quello che
avviene in Cina, non soltanto nei confronti di quelli del Falun Gong (ti
interessano solo loro?)
ti faccio una domanda semplice-semplice: da qualche anno come ben sai c'e'
una legge che vieta la pratica del FLG, sopratutto all'aperto - giusta o
sbagliata che sia una legge decisa dal governo che i cittadini sono tenuti a
rispettare
per quale motivo allora singoli o gruppi di praticanti si mobilitano per
andare contro questa legge ?
se Verita', Compassione e Tolleranza sono gli scopi della loro vita, per
quale motivo non li praticano nelle loro case, nei loro cuori ?
ripeto, questa legge e' probabilmente ingiusta ma - secondo me - aiuta a
preservare l'integrita' del Paese (come ti ho detto, se avessi vissuto gli
ultimi 20 anni di Cina forse potresti capire)
se in Italia fanno la legge contro il fumo, tu (fumatore) che fai ? fumi
apposta dove e' vietato ?
visto che pare comunque tu non abbia piacere a sentire opinioni che
contrastano con le tue, per le cose che ti stanno a cuore, chiudo qui il
discorso
YM
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 andare contro questa legge ?
scusa, mi inserisco un secondo e poi riscompaio solo per dire che se una
legge è fatta dal governo, non per qs deve essere ciecamente seguita,
soprattutto se è limitativa delle libertà individuali e mira ad influire
sulla sfera personale di un singolo individuo che non reca, ne' direttamente
ne' indirettamente, danno ad alcuno.oh, ovviamente, IMHO. oltretutto
bisognerebbe vedere quanto il governo in questione sia stato
democraticamente eletto.
sul resto non mi intrometto in quanto ne so troppo poco.
ciao
teopas(jj)

 soprattutto se è limitativa delle libertà individuali ...
ciao teopas,
la Cina non e' l'Italia.
In Cina c'e' la pena di morte - per esempio - per diffusione della
pornografia. Significa che se pubblichi o semplicemente distribuisci
materiale pornografico ti becchi una pallottola in testa.
Poi c'e' la pena di morte per lo sfruttamento della prostituzione, le
tangenti  ....
E' giusto o sbagliato ? Pur essendo personalmente contro la pena di morte
(sopratutto per questi reati) ti assicuro che - come cinese - mi guarderei
bene dallo scendere in piazza e protestare perche' non ho ottenuto la
licenza per distribuire Playboy in Cina.
L'equilibrio e' precario e le cose devono cambiare in maniera lenta e
graduale se non si vuole ottenere il contrario di quello che si chiede. Il
governo ne e' cosciente e cerca a suo modo di gestire il cambiamento nella
maniera meno traumatica e piu' sicura possibile per il Paese, sicuramente
commette degli errori ma con una visione delle cose un po' piu' ampia di
quella del cittadino.
Per questo dicevo che bisogna conoscere - ed aver vissuto - la situazione in
Cina per potersi permettere dei giudizi +o- oggettivi (sempre nel limite
della umana oggettivita').
ciao


all'inizio nn volevo leggere questo post, poi quando a fianco ho letto
"leggete per favore" ho detto, dev'essere una cosa importante,e la è in
effetti.
sono rimasto semplicemente senza parole.
D'altronde il comunismo è diventato una dittatura, e la gente non può far
niente...
il mondo è davvero uno skifo
che Dio li aiuti
GaleNINJA

 niente...
Non è che il comunismo sia mai stato nulla di meglio eh....
-- 
Ragno
Kenpo karate

 degli ebrei.
Ah perchè non è vero? :PPPPPPPPPPP
-- 
Ragno
Kenpo karate

quella del cittadino.
Be', è ovvio: il cittadino, nel suo piccolo, non può capire come mai
suo figlio venga giustiziato per hacking e gli organi venduti ai
trafficanti. Meno male che c'è il governo che ha una visione un po'
più ampia delle cose. 


 principi di Veritą, Compassione e Tolleranza lo scopo della propria
vita???
Insisto, credo  che il regime tema uno sconvolgimento di tutto ciņ che ha
instaurato..
--
PIPPO  Jeet Kune Do e Aikido
Icq#61125575
"Spero che la prossima volta che ci incontreremo
sarą per bere un thč assieme e non per batterci"

 più ampia delle cose.
La retorica serve a poco e come vedi si entra nella politica, quella che
fanno anche i gruppi come il FLG
A Singapore solo i ricchi sono 'autorizzati' ad avere figli, ai poveri dopo
il primo figlio e' 'consigliata' una vasectomia.
Ti pare giusto ?
Secondo quel governo lo e' --- ci sono sempre (almeno) due modi di vedere le
cose, e spesso nessuno dei due e' completamente giusto/sbagliato.
Pero' a giudicare da 10000 chilometri di distanza sono tutti bravi


 più ampia delle cose.
come vedi si entra nella politica, quella che fanno anche i gruppi come il
FLG
A Singapore solo i ricchi sono 'autorizzati' ad avere figli, ai poveri dopo
il primo figlio e' 'consigliata' una vasectomia.
Ti pare giusto ? Secondo quel governo lo e' --- ci sono sempre (almeno) due


 Pero' a giudicare da 10000 chilometri di distanza sono tutti bravi
Per curiosità Wong, hai utilizzato un diverso newsreader per mandare 
questo messaggio? Perché mi è stato visualizzato correttamente, mentre 
gli altri tuoi interventi non vengono scaricati dal mio server...
un saluto,
Jashugan
(WingTsun)
-- 
«Ha tinto le mie vesti d'un rosso a tutti sconosciuto. Ora non vi è
più nessuno che le sfiori. Uccide gli uomini in viaggio e, guardando
il cielo, una donna piange».
(Hiroaki Samura)

 gli altri tuoi interventi non vengono scaricati dal mio server...
lo stesso con il quale sto' scrivendo ora, che quindi sarai l'unico a vedere
!
quindi aveva ragione il Bottoni, Netvigator e' bannato da (quasi) tutti
leggi via Tiscali ? Chi altro legge questo messaggio ?
ciao
YM

 Per curiositą Wong, hai utilizzato un diverso newsreader
diciamo che ha trovato finalmente un altro news SERVER; il programma che
adopera non c'entra nulla.
Paolo

>
Lo vedo, lo vedo; adesso sto a Roma e mi collego col news server TIN , e se
lo vede TIN dovrebbe essere ridistribuito a tutti. In teoria... In realtà
raramente gli amministratori si preoccupano di controllare su tutti  i
server, si limitano a scroccare da quelli notoriamente piú efficienti.
Paolo

"Paolo Bottoni" <pbo...@Xcompuserve.com> wrote in message

?!?
a questo punto non ci capisco piu' nulla
"PAOLOOOOOOOOOOO"
YM

 "PAOLOOOOOOOOOOO"
Confermo: dal server TIN vedo sia i messaggi provenienti da Netfeed, che
QUESTO cui sto rispondendo che hai mandato da Netvigator: Non ho modo di
sapere se li vedo tutti, ma la cosa non è strana: basta che un server - uno
solo -  accetti Netvigator perché i messaggi vengano ridistribuiti anche ad
altri; purtroppo in  maniera casuale, perché come ho detto ogni
amministratore decide come gli pare a lui con quali altri server
sincronizzarsi.
Paolo

 leggi via Tiscali ? Chi altro legge questo messaggio ?
Che bello, ora ti leggo... io non uso tiscali, uso un server tedesco 
(
CIS.DFN.DE
). Continua così! :-)
ciao,


 Chi altro legge questo messaggio ?
Io.
Tac
-- 
Oggi
10.000 opere d'arte
Cadono
http://tacone.cjb.net

 ha scritto nel messaggio
news:agtdur$r0...@imsp212.netvigator.com...
Chi altro legge questo messaggio ?
Io ti leggo.
Ciao
Ego
--
Va e riferisci agli spartani
o straniero che passi
che obbedienti al loro comando
noi qui giacciamo

 leggi via Tiscali ? Chi altro legge questo messaggio ?
io
Giorgio (Hung Gar)
"Sei troppo vecchio per smettere di allenarti!" (un amico)

Pero' a giudicare da 10000 chilometri di distanza sono tutti bravi
Scusami Wong, stai cercando di dirmi che esiste una giustificazione al
massacro di migliaia di persone all'anno solo per aver pubblicato un
giornaletto porno o violato un sito internet? 


 giornaletto porno o violato un sito internet?
in un certo senso si
dato che una legge vieta la pubblicazione del giornaletto porno e che quella
stessa legge punisce con la pena capitale chi lo ha pubblicato
non dico che sia giusto, ma certo chi si appresta a pubblicare il
giornaletto sa' a cosa va' incontro
personalmente reputo la severita' di queste punizioni (queste leggi)
assolutamente con commisurata alla 'gravita' dei fatti, ma allo stesso tempo
non vedo la logica dietro il tentativo di cambiare (migliorare) quel sistema
legale attraverso azioni dirette e che vanno proprio nel verso di
contravvenire quelle stesse leggi
proprio in questi giorni qualcuno ha postato questi links su un altro NG
http://www.atimes.com/china/CA27Ad01.html
http://www.atimes.com/china/CA30Ad01.html
http://www.atimes.com/china/CA31Ad01.html
l'analisi fatta - IMHO - e' consistente ed in buona parte condivisibile, in
basso ho copiato-incollato l'articolo
YM
FALUNGONG
Part 1: From sport to suicide
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - The Chinese Year of the Dragon ended with five followers of the
Falungong movement torching themselves in Tiananmen Square, China's holiest
ground, in an act of defiance against the government. The next day, January
24, the poisonous Year of the Snake started with hundreds of policemen
patrolling the square in temperatures well below zero.
The self-immolations - one successful, four attempted - were reminiscent of
those of Vietnamese Buddhist monks opposing the US military intervention in
Vietnam in the 1960s. More moderate Falungong followers were shocked and
hurried to claim that their master, Li Hongzhi, self exiled in America,
expressly forbids suicide. In China, suicide is a sin against the ancestors
and Tuesday's action is bound to convince more common people that Falungong
is indeed a cult, as the government claims.
Actually, a few days before the suicide the government had scored a
significant victory over the sect after months of stalemate. "Focus",
China's most popular TV news program, interviewed some Falungong followers
detained after a wave of protests around January 1. On camera, the Falungong
members said they had no names because had become gods.
"I'm god, does god have a name? The name of god is god, I have no name,"
pronounced a follower who looked as if he had lost some of his wits. One
detainee, an elderly woman, refused to be treated for dangerously high blood
pressure, claiming that she was afraid of nothing because Master Li Hongzhi
was protecting her. It was an implicit reply to the sect that had denounced
the death of dozens of followers in detention.
China Central Television, for once, was flooded with letters of support for
the government crackdown on the sect. The government seemed to have found
the right tool to isolate the zealots. In cases of future protests, it would
let the Falungong speak for themselves.
The Tiananmen suicide seems therefore to be a reply to the government. The
sect will no longer surrender prisoners who can easily be used by the
government in its propaganda efforts, but will move to a mode of protest
that will show the government in the worst possible light.
The suicide could mark the end of a stubborn wave of peaceful protests that
has gone on for almost two years since some 10,000 Falungong members laid
siege to Zhongnanhai, the enclave containing the residences and offices of
the highest-ranking members of the Communist Party, on April 25, 1999. It
could signal a start of new, bloodier confrontations for the sect which
wants ... Well, what does it want?
Abroad, spokesmen for the sect say they want freedom to practice their
faith, because the government has forbidden public gatherings. However,
Beijing has made clear that it won't persecute believers practicing the
discipline in the privacy of their homes.
One may wonder why it is so necessary for Falungong to have public
gatherings. Certainly, limitations on the right of free assembly are
violations against human rights. Yet, all governments forbid assemblies in
certain areas, and the prohibition of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square,
though repulsive, doesn't itself constitute a human rights infringement.
One could thus construe that Falungong advocates freedom and Western values,
and is just a bit too gung-ho. But this analysis doesn't compute.
Why do they protest so stubbornly while Buddhists loyal to the banned Dalai
Lama, Protestants, and Catholics of the underground church who prayed for
the Pope at the risk of their own lives during the tough years of the
Cultural Revolution, do not join the struggle? Why can millions of
underground Christians pray at home, or in small semi-clandestine churches,
submitting themselves for decades to the danger of routine police raids,
while Falungong can't?
These questions take us back to the Falungong demonstration of April 25,
1999. Before that day, and in fact up until July of that year when the sect
was banned, Falungong was free. Every day, in almost every park in Chinese
cities, there were groups of devotees practicing their morning rites.
But that April 25 the Falungong wanted more than that. They wanted to be
fully recognized as a religion.
Previously, they had been officially under the state's sports
administration, like many other disciplines based on the ancient Chinese
breathing exercise called Qigong. A promotion to one of the official
religions of China, like Buddhism, Taoism, and Catholicism, would elevate
the Falungong leadership to the formal Chinese People's Consultative
Conference, headed by Li Ruihuan, number four in the communist hierarchy,
and thus closer to the heart of Chinese power.
The April 25 protest had a twist which looks strange if one believes the
Falungong are freedom fighters: they demanded severe punishment for an
elderly, soft-spoken and well-mannered physicist named Professor He Zuoxiu.
Prof He was guilty of having penned an article moderately critical of the
Falungong in an obscure weekly published in Tianjin with a circulation of a
mere few thousand.
A few of weeks earlier, in March, the Falungong had mounted a demonstration
in Tianjin demanding the magazine retract the article and publish a eulogy
of the sect. Such demonstrations were not new. In the previous few years
Falungong had organized several protests against those who dared speak ill
of it, and it always obtained what it wanted.
In one of the best-known cases, the same Prof He in 1998 had given an
interview to Beijing Radio in which he cautioned youngsters against
practicing Falungong. The following day, the sect organized a protest around
the radio station's premises and obtained a retraction and another program
speaking in favor of Falungong.
From as early as 1997 there had been warnings about the sect, yet the
government had urged all official propaganda departments not to raise any
fuss by airing negative views about it.
Falungong followers have told me that they were particularly concerned about
Prof He because "he spoke for some one else, he represented the voice of
someone in the government who was against the Falungong and had long
prepared for the crackdown". "Nonsense," replied Prof He when I confronted
him with the Falungong explanation. "If I had the support of the central
government I wouldn't have been writing in an obscure Tianjin weekly but in
the [official party organ] People's Daily."
The motivations for his article were simple: his best student, whom he loved
like a son, had gone insane by practicing Falungong. He felt a moral
obligation to warn other youths about the discipline, the more so because he
felt he had done little when the young man had started practicing. He had
thus embarked on his solitary campaign, and said it had taken him months to
get his article published.
Surprisingly though, the Tianjin magazine did not give in to the Falungong
demands in March 1999, and even more surprisingly, the police intervened to
stop the protest. A scuffle between police and demonstrators ensued in
which, for the first time, some Falungong followers were arrested. This, in
turn, prompted the April 25 protest, when the Falungong demanded it be
recognized as a religion and that Prof He be punished.
When China's leaders woke up on April 25, 1999, they were astounded to see
that for the first time in the history of communist China their official
compound, Zhongnanhai, was under siege. At least 10,000 mostly elderly
people were quietly practicing the Falungong exercises that some of the
leaders knew quite well, having learned the discipline themselves.
A delegation of demonstrators had a petition for Premier Zhu Rongji, who had
just returned from a trip abroad, and asked to talk to him. Despite later
Falungong claims, it seems Zhu refused to meet the delegates and sent his
secretary to collect the message.
It took until that night for police to regain control of the streets around
Zhongnanhai, by persuading the people to take buses back home.
The demonstration was an incredible sight, but even more incredible was the
fact that the police apparently had no forewarning and had no clue about how
to deal with it. The demonstrators simply refused to speak to the officers
and referred them to sect officials responsible for dealing with the
authorities.
Zhongnanhai, just west of the Forbidden City, is China's power enclave.
Since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, it has been the
residence of the highest ranking members of the Communist Party. It also
contains the offices of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the
State Council, the Central People's Government and the Military Commission
of the Party Central Committee.
The fact that the security system appeared taken completely by surprise was
a major blow to the leadership. This time Falungong had staged a peaceful
demonstration, but what if they decided to take up arms against the
government? There were only two explanations for the serious security lapse.
The security apparatus either didn't know about the demonstration
beforehand, and thus must have been highly incompetent, or it knew but
covered it up, and thus even a coup might be in the offing.
According to foreign security experts, it is impossible to mobilize
thousands of people in a city like Beijing without all kinds of warning
signs. Most likely, police officers did not pass on the message of the
impending demonstration, or did not pass it on with due urgency. In other
words, the security apparatus had been at least partly infiltrated by
Falungong.
In fact, there were stories that some policemen sent to spy on the Falungong
had been converted by the sect and had started to collaborate with it. It is
hard to verify these stories, but certainly in previous years police and
army had introduced some Falungong training, supposed to be good for the
physical readiness of soldiers. Through such training, the Falungong could
have made deep inroads into the army and police. Besides, it was no secret
that some senior military officers were practicing Falungong and were making
converts.
In this atmosphere, what was President Jiang Zemin to think? The sect had
mobilized a huge crowd, yet its demands had been relatively modest: the
recognition of Falungong as a religion and the punishment of physicist He
Zuoxiu, who had written an article critical of the sect (see Part 1: "From
sport to suicide"). The demonstration appeared more like a threatening show
of force by Falungong, which proved it could elude the security apparatus or
could boast good accomplices there. And any state that can't rely on its
security forces is in deep danger. This was the logical conclusion of the
leadership.
Furthermore, in the preceding months Falungong had attracted quite a lot of
the government's attention. A discreet investigation at the end of 1998
ascertained there were some 40 million Falungong practitioners all over the
country. The figure was lower than the 70 million that Li Hongzhi, the
Falungong master, had boasted about, but it still represented a huge force.
Qiao Shi, who had retired from all official posts a year earlier after a
drawn-out power struggle with Jiang, had suggested that nothing be done
against Falungong. Qiao was formerly head of China's security and through
his aide Wei Jianxing still had influence there.
Put together, these facts were enough to make Jiang suspect a more
complicated plot. And certainly, given the nature of Chinese politics, Jiang
should have acted as if a plot was indeed afoot.
This does not mean that any present or past senior leader was actively
involved in a plot. On the contrary, in January 2001 a Falungong bulletin
circulated in China reported about Qiao's suggestion on handling the sect.
This indicates that the retired leader had not been actively involved with
the sect. Yet, in the spring of 1999, there were further indications of a
possible conspiracy.
The government made an effort to persuade Falungong to stop its protests. In
several commentaries, the official People's Daily newspaper tried to reach
out to the sect, saying that it should halt its demonstrations demanding
recognition as an official religion. What was so important about being a
religion rather than just a sport association? The official label did not
make any difference to its spiritual practices, so, arguably, the issue was
not about religion but about power. And Falungong would not step back.
So was somebody pulling strings behind the Falungong movement? In fact the
Falungong agenda looked quite political. The sect was against modern Western
science, preached the end of the world, forbade its followers watching TV or
being treated in hospitals, and maintained that diseases do not exist and
that ailments are due to sins people commit.
Reminiscent of the American movie Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956,
remade in 1978), Falungong said that UFOs had arrived on earth, aliens had
taken over human bodies, and were trying to annihilate humanity through the
control of TV and radio. One can look at such teaching as pure madness, or
one can detect a deep-seated plan to carry out its own indoctrination. A
Falungong follower who does not watch TV is not influenced by government
propaganda, and by entrusting his own health to the sect rather than to
public hospitals, he cedes all his person to the sect.
Many Falungong followers had strong reservations about current Chinese
politics. They were conservative, xenophobic old party members, strongly
opposed to the government's reforms and opening up. Cynical and materialist
Chinese leaders certainly saw politics as the issue, and probably many other
governments would have done so in similar circumstances.
From this analysis came the sudden banning of the sect in July 1999. The ban
took Falungong by surprise and proved to its followers, the world and the
Chinese people that the Communist Party was still in control. Before news of
the ban leaked out, police managed to arrest a few Falungong leaders.
In the following months the authorities collected more evidence of a
Falungong plot. The sect's leader, Li Hongzhi, had been in Beijing briefly
to finalize plans for the April demonstration. The actual organizer of the
Zhongnanhai siege was a retired general, Yu Changxin. (On January 6, 2000,
the 74-year-old general was sentenced to 17 years in jail, which at his age
amounted to a life sentence.) Furthermore, the very organization of the sect
pointed to a politically motivated force. It was structured on the model of
the Chinese Communist Party, with cells and an underground central
committee, local stations in every province and three lines of cadres ready
to replace those who would be arrested in case of a crackdown.
It is not yet clear how far Falungong was involved in a political plot, but
certainly the involvement of the general, the political agenda, and the
organization of the sect showed it had ambitions of attaining real power.
Beijing realized then that the fact that millions of people believed the
"body-snatcher" doctrine proved that the policy of opening up was too
cautious, rather than too bold.
But, of course, the government could not simply denounce Falungong as a
political conspiracy, and arguably it did not choose the best method of
fighting the perceived threat.
Although the Falungong protests were accompanied by political maneuvering,
the movement's rise points to some deep changes in Chinese society.
Along with Falungong, half a dozen other sects, formerly registered under
China's Sports Administration, were banned in 1999. It is hard to tell how
many people followed Falungong and the other sects, but it can be safely
assumed that at their peak there must have been at least 200 million
followers. Most quit after the ban, many kept on practicing at home, while
just some thousands went on protesting in Tiananmen Square. Nevertheless,
the successful expansion of these sects illustrates the spiritual vacuum in
modern China.
The old, traditional system of values, centered on the family, worship of
the ancestors and respect for the state, has long vanished after decades of
communist persecution, and communism itself is no longer an issue of faith
as it was during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and '70s. Communism is
no longer a totalitarian belief - while Mao Zedong was deified, nobody
believes President Jiang Zemin is god.
Yet, spiritual needs are always there. People seek a connection with nature,
with what happens after death. Falungong and other sects were able to
satisfy these needs in a way that satisfied Chinese people better than
Christianity could. Christianity, in fact, preaches a belief and culture
that is largely alien to the Chinese mind-frame.
Falungong and other sects re-elaborated old, well-known Taoist and Buddhist
routines, used the old vocabulary that people found familiar, and revamped
them in a simple, persuasive way. It was an unsophisticated and simplistic
"theological" effort as far as doctrine was concerned, which was quite
effective in catching minds which retained superficial traces of the old
beliefs.
It is interesting that many elderly military people fell for Falungong. Used
to obeying orders, raised in a disciplined atmosphere, the tight hierarchy
and neat, simple doctrine of Falungong was something they could relate to.
For many ex-soldiers, the sect could effectively replace a Communist Party
that no longer wanted to impose discipline and was setting up a modern
society very different from the one they were used to in the 1950s.
Furthermore, there was an issue of morality. The party and society were
corrupt, and not only in the sense that bribes were passed around. There was
a "deeper" corruption: clever people could make money and become rich
without defying the law. The wealth of these youngsters was itself an
offense in the eyes of the elderly who had toed the party line for decades
and now found themselves poor and living in rotten houses.
In a society where the only standard of success is money, millions of people
who can't make it feel left out: they are "losers" who need some spiritual
support and justification. While Falungong is certainly not the answer, a
developing society like China, with mounting social differences and
undergoing seismic upheavals, needs several religious groups to compensate
for the stresses on the moral fabric. It must be "several groups", because
the state must be able to control their expansion and avoid what in Europe
has been in past centuries a conflict between State and Church.
In China's new atmosphere, one shouldn't rule out the rise of a faith akin
to a non-belligerent Falungong, non-confrontational, tolerant and without
brainwashing. Something intellectually more sophisticated than the present
form of mumbo-jumbo that even forbids people to be treated in hospitals.
This brings us to the second aspect that helped the spread of these sects -
the lack of proper health care in China.
Chinese hospitals are gravely overworked. The reasons are complex but,
briefly, it can be said that health care in China does not differentiate
enough: people with a cold or with a cancer line up in the same corridor,
vexing the same doctor who gives five minutes of his time to each patient.
Furthermore, treatment is expensive and doctors do not personally follow
patients. The next time a person is ill, another doctor will see him. In
contrast, Falungong provided good, cheap care for its practitioners. Ill
people were given great moral support, were encouraged to pray, have faith
and exercise - all things, every doctors knows, that can be of great help to
many people with minor ailments. No payment was required - just the purchase
of a few Falungong books.
Therefore, as part of its fight against the sects the state needs to
accelerate the reform of its health care system. But this will not be
enough. Non-governmental organizations and proper religious organizations
could step in to assist ailing people. This would take a lot of pressure off
the hospitals and improve the quality of service there.
On another level, the Falungong experience also illustrates the need for
more political transparency in China. The fear of a political conspiracy
behind the Falungong protests was a product of the murkiness of Chinese
politics. In a case like the serious lapse of security of April 25, 1999,
when Falungong followers laid siege to Zhongnanhai (See Part 2: A rude
awakening), it was hard to tell who was plotting what.
Political reforms and more transparency in decision-making processes do not
rule out the possibility of conspiracy, but make it more difficult and
easier to check.
In a country like China, with 1.3 billion people, it always will be easy to
find a few thousands activists ready to embrace any given cause. As long as
politics remains locked behind closed doors, both the country's leaders and
the public could always suspect a plot behind any protest. And behind the
curtain of clouded politics, anybody could use any given protest for his own
goals.
Fast-changing China can't afford to be bogged down in such fears. On the
other hand, Falungong serves as a reminder of the dangers looming for
fast-changing China. In the 1970s in Iran, the world, and even the United
States, came to support the Ayotollah Khomeini against the Shah. In the end,
the world realized that the Shah was bad but Khomeini was far worse.
The case of Falungong was a god-sent opportunity for the Communist Party to
prove that it must exercise some control over social life. Actually, the
party mishandled it by embarking on a mass campaign reminiscent of those of
the '70s. Such campaigns are something China must shed as it moves ahead in
the 21st century.
As Falungong steps up its campaign against the state, perhaps the Communist
Party should avoid stepping up its own campaign, avoid overreacting, and
keep security measures low key. Even if things are very much the way
Falungong master Li Hongzhi would like them to be, followers would make up
only 10 percent of China's population. Hard-core, militant devotees, holding
beliefs most of the population would find hard to take seriously, would
number under 100,000.
Faced with these numbers, China needs only effective, modern security
measures. Mass campaigns against Falungong most likely will help spread the
disease, not check it.

 giornaletto porno o violato un sito internet?
in un certo senso si
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contravvenire quelle stesse leggi
Sono d'accordo: se dobbiamo sostituire un regime con un altro
improntato al fanatismo religioso, non si va molto lontano. Il mio
quesito è se effettivamente il governo sia interessato ad un
cambiamento/miglioramento, visto e considerato che l'abolizione della
pena di morte per i reati minori (quelli che qui vengono condonati in
massa, per capirci) non sarebbe un gesto di incredibile complessità né
suscettibile di provocare sconvolgimenti socio-politici pazzeschi...
Come dice giustamente l'articolista, il governo dovrebbe cercare di
tenere basso il profilo delle misure contro il Falun; ma è un discorso
che andrebbe applicato in molti altri campi della politica cinese.


 che andrebbe applicato in molti altri campi della politica cinese.
si


si
Alč: to', fulminato lě... ;D
Ciao
Geppo
--
Non c'č peggior Troll di chi non vuol Capire
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