Newsgroup: it.media.tv
Titolo: Che cosa hanno in comune ...

... cose a prima vista così diverse come il movimento dei Gilet Gialli e 
il dilagare del voto leghista e di quello grillino? Semplice: sono tutti 
avvisaglie che ci stiamo avvicinando a un nuovo 1789, in quanto la crisi 
colpisce pesantemente anche il livello di vita della classe media e non 
più solo quello dei proletari. Al riguardo, segnalo:
 
https://rep.repubblica.it/pwa/traduzione/2019/01/17/news/il_debito_pubblico_e_la_nostalgia_del_1989-216826004/
 
 
   Il debito e la nostalgia del 1789
 
   Se continuiamo a dire che è impossibile far pagare gli europei più 
ricchi, allora ci esponiamo a un futuro di rivolte gravi
 
   di Thomas Piketty
 
   Con i gilet gialli, abbiamo visto sbocciare l'idea di un referendum 
sull'annullamento del debito pubblico. Per alcuni, discorsi di questo 
tipo, già sentiti in Italia, sono la dimostrazione dell'estensione del 
pericolo "populista": come si può immaginare di non rimborsare un 
debito? In realtà la storia mostra che è abituale far ricorso a 
soluzioni eccezionali quando il debito raggiunge livelli simili. 
Tuttavia, un referendum non consente di re...
 
Il testo di Piketty si può leggere completo in inglese:
 
http://piketty.blog.lemonde.fr/2019/01/15/1789-the-return-of-the-debt/
 
 
   1789, the return of the debt
 
   One of the ideas raised by the yellow vests is the possibility of a 
referendum on the cancellation of the public debt. For some, this type 
of proposal, already heard in Italy, demonstrates the extent of the 
‘populist’ danger: how can one possibly imagine not repaying a debt? In 
reality history shows that it is customary to resort to exceptional 
solutions when the debt reaches this type of level. However, a 
referendum would not enable us to solve such a complex problem. There 
are numerous ways of cancelling a debt, with very different social 
effects. This is what should be discussed instead of leaving these 
decisions to others and to the forthcoming crises.
 
   To ensure that everyone can make up their minds, I am going to give 
two sets of information here. The first concerns the present European 
regulations; then I will turn to the way in which debts of this size 
have been dealt with in history.
 
   Let’s begin with the European regulations which are not well known 
and have generated a certain amount of confusion. Many people continue 
to refer to the ‘3% rule’ and do not understand why Italy, which was 
considering a deficit of 2.5% of GDP, before agreeing to a compromise of 
2%, has been blacklisted. The explanation is that the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) was amended by the new budgetary treaty adopted in 2012. Its real 
name is the Treaty for Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). 
This text stipulates that henceforth the deficit must not exceed 0.5% of 
GDP (Article 3), with the exception however of the countries whose debt 
is ‘significantly less than 60% of GDP’ in which case the deficit can 
rise to 1%. Barring ‘exceptional circumstances’ the non-observance of 
these rules leads to automatic penalties.
 
   We should point out that the deficit targeted by these texts is 
always the secondary deficit, that is, after payment of interest on the 
debt. If a country has a debt equal to 100% of GDP and the interest rate 
in 4% then the interest will be 4% of GDP. To achieve a secondary 
deficit limited to 0.5%, a primary surplus of 3.5% of GDP is required. 
In other words, taxpayers will have to pay taxes which are higher than 
the expenditures benefitting them, with a difference of 3.5% of GDP 
possibly for decades.
 
   The TSCG approach is not illogical: if we choose not to cancel the 
debt, and if we have almost zero inflation and limited growth, then only 
huge primary surpluses can reduce debts in the range of 100% of GDP. 
However the social and political consequences of this type of choice 
have to be considered.
 
   Although they have been reduced by the unusually low rates which will 
perhaps not last forever, at the moment interest payments stand at 2% of 
GDP in the Euro zone (the average deficit is 1% and the primary surplus 
1%). This amounts to over 200 billion Euros per annum, which one can 
compare for example with the miserable 2 billion per annum invested in 
the Erasmus programme. This is a possible choice, but are we sure that 
it is the best one to prepare for the future? If similar amounts were 
devoted to training and research, then Europe could become the leading 
pole of innovation at world level, ahead of the United States. In Italy, 
the interest payments represent 3% of GDP, or 6 times the budget for 
higher education.
 
   What is certain is that history shows that there are other ways of 
proceeding. One example often quoted is the big debts of the 20th 
century. Germany, France and the United Kingdom all found themselves 
with debts ranging from 200% and 300% of GDP in post-World War Two which 
have never been repaid. Their debts were written off in a few years by a 
mix of cancellation pure and simple, inflation and exceptional taxation 
of private property (which is the same thing as inflation, but is more 
civilised: the rich can be made to pay more and the middle class 
protected). The German external debt was frozen by the London Debt 
Agreement in 1953, and then definitively written off in 1991. This is 
how Germany and France found themselves with no public debt and able to 
invest in growth in the years 1950-1960.
 
   However, the most relevant comparison is the Revolution in 1789. The 
Ancien Régime was unable to force its privileged classes to pay taxes 
and had accumulated a debt of approximately one year of national income, 
even a year and a half if the sale of charges and offices (official 
posts and functions) are included (these were a way for the State to 
obtain money immediately in exchange for the future revenue to be 
collected from the population). In 1790, the Assembly obtained the 
publication of the list of names in the Grand livre des pensions which 
contained both annuities to courtiers, as well as payments to former 
senior officials, with payments ten or twenty times higher than the 
average income, which created a scandal (the comparison with the salary 
of the President of the National Commission for Public Debate springs to 
mind). It all ended with the setting up of a somewhat fairer form of 
taxation and above all, the bankruptcy of two-thirds of those named and 
a major inflation of the assignats or promissory notes.
 
   In comparison the present situation is both more complex (each 
country holds a part of the debt of the others) and more simple: we 
have, with the ECB, an institution which enables us to freeze debts and 
we could adopt a fairer system of European tax system by finally setting 
up a sovereign Assembly. But if we continue to explain that it is 
impossible to make the richest Europeans pay and that only the immobile 
classes have to pay, then inevitably we run the risk of facing serious 
rebellions in the future.
 
   PS. On current debt interests and primary surplus in the euro zone, 
see Economic Bulletin ECB December 2018, p.36, Chart 27, and  p.S23-S25. 
On the schedule of Italian debt interest payments, see  Italy 
Governement Securities, Debt Service (ECB Statistical DataWarehouse)
 
   PS2. On the history of debt in 18th-20th centuries, see for instance 
Capital in the 21st century, 2014, chapters 3-5; for complete series, 
see this article published in QJE 2014 and its appendices.
 
E in francese:
 
http://piketty.blog.lemonde.fr/2019/01/15/1789-le-retour-de-la-dette/
 
 
   1789, le retour de la dette
 
   Avec les gilets jaunes, on a vu fleurir l’idée d’un référendum sur 
l’annulation de la dette publique. Pour certains, ce type de propos, 
déjà entendu en Italie, montre l’ampleur du danger « populiste » : 
comment peut-on imaginer ne pas rembourser une dette ? En réalité, 
l’histoire montre qu’il est habituel d’avoir recours à des solutions 
exceptionnelles quand la dette atteint de tels niveaux. Pour autant, un 
référendum ne permet pas de régler un problème aussi complexe. Il existe 
de multiples façons d’annuler une dette, avec des effets sociaux très 
différents. C’est de cela dont il faut débattre, au lieu d’abandonner 
ces décisions à d’autres et aux crises à venir.  [...]

 ... cose a prima vista
 
e un po' di nostalgia per "la vittoria mutilata" no?
 
-- 
_  _
0  0;
  @-
 
E. Delacroix

 e un po' di nostalgia per "la vittoria mutilata" no?
 
No. Ti invito piuttosto a riflettere su questi due punti dell'articolo 
di Piketty:
 
<< Although they have been reduced by the unusually low rates which will 
perhaps not last forever, at the moment interest payments stand at 2% of 
GDP in the Euro zone (the average deficit is 1% and the primary surplus 
1%). This amounts to over 200 billion Euros per annum, which one can 
compare for example with the miserable 2 billion per annum invested in 
the Erasmus programme. This is a possible choice, but are we sure that 
it is the best one to prepare for the future? If similar amounts were 
devoted to training and research, then Europe could become the leading 
pole of innovation at world level, ahead of the United States. In Italy, 
the interest payments represent 3% of GDP, or 6 times the budget for 
higher education.
 
   Bien qu’amoindris par des taux inhabituellement bas, qui ne dureront 
peut-être pas éternellement, les intérêts sont actuellement de 2% du PIB 
en zone euro (le déficit moyen est de 1%, et l’excédent primaire de 1%). 
Soit plus de 200 milliards d’euros par an, à comparer par exemple avec 
les malheureux 2 milliards par an investis dans le programme Erasmus. 
C’est un choix possible, mais est-on bien sûr que ce soit le meilleur 
pour préparer l’avenir ? Si l’on consacrait de telles sommes à la 
formation et à la recherche, alors l’Europe pourrait devenir le premier 
pôle mondial d’innovation, devant les Etats-Unis. En Italie, les 
intérêts représentent 3% du PIB, soit 6 fois plus que le budget de 
l’enseignement supérieur. >>
 
· Chiaro? Invece di spenderli in educazione e ricerca, cosa che ci 
consentirebbe di superare gli USA come leader mondiali nell'innovazione, 
noi europei diamo ogni anno oltre 200 miliardi di euro di interessi agli 
strozzini come Soros. E in Italia tali interessi sono 6 volte il budget 
dell'intero insegnamento universitario. Bello, vero?
 
<< In 1790, the Assembly obtained the publication of the list of names 
in the Grand livre des pensions which contained both annuities to 
courtiers, as well as payments to former senior officials, with payments 
ten or twenty times higher than the average income, which created a 
scandal (the comparison with the salary of the President of the National 
Commission for Public Debate springs to mind). It all ended with the 
setting up of a somewhat fairer form of taxation and above all, the 
bankruptcy of two-thirds of those named and a major inflation of the 
assignats or promissory notes.
 
   En 1790, l’Assemblée obtînt la publication nominative du Grand livre 
des pensions, qui contenait aussi bien des rentes à des courtisans que 
des paiements à d’anciens dignitaires, avec des versements dix ou vingt 
fois plus élevés que le revenu moyen, qui firent scandale (la 
comparaison avec le salaire de la présidente de la commission du débat 
public saute aux yeux). L’ensemble se termina par la mise en place d’une 
fiscalité un peu plus juste, et surtout par la banqueroute des deux 
tiers et la grande inflation des assignats. >>
 
· Incredibile! Nel 1790 si scandalizzarono perché i dignitari 
dell'Ancien Régime ricevevano da 10 a 20 volte più dei salari medi. E 
oggi che i grandi manager guadagnano enormemente più dei loro dipendenti 
(Tim Cook 300 volte più dell'impiegato medio Apple), la rivoluzione non 
la facciamo! Nel 1790 erano tutti meno ricchi, ma oggi ai vertici sono 
ancora più iniqui. Alla faccia dei perversi ingannatori comunistoidi...
 
https://www.rt.com/business/448387-tim-cook-apple-salary-employee/
 
 
   Tim Cook makes 300 times more than average Apple employee – company’s 
filing
 
Bye,
 
   *GB*