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Titolo: The Kosovo effect

The Kosovo effect
 I opposed intervention in Kosovo in 1999. I was right to do so: it made
things worse on the ground and set a dangerous precedent
Kosovo's recent unilateral declaration of independence brought back
memories. I publicly opposed Nato's attack on Serbia - carried out in the
name of protecting the Kosovans from Serb atrocities - in March 1999. At
that time, I was a member of the opposition front bench in the House of
Lords. The then Conservative leader, William Hague, immediately expelled
me to the back benches. Thus ended my (minor) political career. Ever
since, I have wondered whether I was right or wrong. 
I opposed military intervention for two reasons. Firstly, I argued that
while it might do local good, it would damage the rules of international
relations as they were then understood. The UN charter was designed to
prevent the use of force across national lines except for self-defence and
enforcement measures ordered by the security council. Human rights,
democracy, and self-determination are not acceptable legal grounds for
waging war. 
Secondly, I argued that while there might be occasions when, regardless of
international law, human rights abuses are so severe that one is morally
obliged to act, Kosovo was not such a case. I considered the "imminent
humanitarian disaster" that the intervention was ostensibly aimed at
preventing, to be largely an invention. I further argued that non-military
means to resolve the humanitarian issue in Kosovo were far from being
exhausted, and that the failed Rambouillet negotiation with Serbia in
February-March 1999 was, in Henry Kissinger's words, "merely an excuse to
start the bombing". 
This view was vindicated by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe's (OSCE) report on human rights violations in Kosovo, published
in December 1999. The report showed that the level of violence fell
markedly when OSCE monitors were placed in Kosovo following the
Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement of September 23 1998; and that it was only
after the monitors were withdrawn on March 20 1999, in preparation for the
bombing, that general and systematic violation of human rights began. 
Between March and June 1999 - the period of Nato bombing - the number of
deaths and expulsions in Kosovo shot up. The "humanitarian disaster" was
in fact precipitated by the war itself. Despite this, the term "genocide",
freely bandied about by western interventionists, was grotesquely
inappropriate at any time. 
Without doubt, Nato air strikes and the subsequent administration of
Kosovo as a protectorate improved the political situation for Albanian
Kosovans. Without Nato intervention, they probably would have remained
second-class citizens within Serbia. Against this must be set large-scale
deterioration in the economic situation of all Kosovans, Albanian and
Serbian (44% unemployment), widespread criminalisation, and the fact that
under Nato rule, Kosovo was ethnically cleansed of half its Serb minority.
Kosovo remains in political limbo to this day. Two thousand EU officials
run the country, and 16,000 Nato troops guard its security. Its
"independence" is rejected by Serbia, unrecognised by the security
council, and opposed by Russia, China, and most multi-national states in
Europe and Asia, which fear setting a precedent for their own
dismemberment. Indeed, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov was quick to
blame the disturbances in Tibet on Kosovo's declaration of independence. 
A Serbian insurgency and de facto partition of Kosovo remain possible, and
we have yet to face the destabilising effects of Kosovo's claim to
independence on other divided Balkan states such as Bosnia and Macedonia.
But the balance sheet is even worse in terms of international relations.
Kosovo was a stalking horse for Iraq, as the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention morphed into George Bush's doctrine of "pre-emptive war", by
which the US claimed the right to attack any state that it deemed a threat
to its national security. As then-UN secretary general Kofi Annan rightly
argued, this opened the door to the proliferation of unilateral, lawless
use of force. 
Not the least damaging consequence of the Bush doctrine is that it
dispenses with the need for public proof of aggressive intent. The Iraq
invasion was justified by the same use of fraudulent evidence as was
displayed in Kosovo. 
On balance, I believe that I was right to oppose the Kosovo war. It was a
regressive answer to a genuine international problem: how to hold together
multi-ethnic, multi-religious states in a reasonably civilised way. Since
1999, Kosovans have rejected Serbian offers of autonomy, because they were
confident of American support for independence. 
Western countries must consider more seriously how far they should press
their human rights agenda on states with both the power and the will to
defend their territorial integrity. Under American leadership, it is the
west that has emerged as the restless, disturbing force in international
affairs. China should certainly grant Tibet more autonomy; but is pumping
up the Dalai Lama into a world leader or threatening to boycott the
Beijing Olympics the best way to secure a better deal for Tibetans, or to
obtain Chinese cooperation on matters that are far more important than
Tibet's status? 
Activists, impassioned by the justice of their cause, will not consider
these questions. But world leaders should take them seriously. 
With the cooperation of Project Syndicate, 2008.
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 The Kosovo effect
qundo le diceva la LEGA per te erano balle, vero? 

*POMERO* ha scritto:


"qundo" le diceva la Lega? e dice pure qualcosa la LEGA? secondo me
grugnite e basta. 
