Newsgroup: it.politica.pds
Titolo: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Some 60 years ago Arnold Toynbee concluded, in his monumental "Study
of History," that the ultimate cause of imperial collapse was
"suicidal statecraft." Sadly for George W. Bush's place in history and
— much more important — ominously for America's future, that adroit
phrase increasingly seems applicable to the policies pursued by the
United States since the cataclysm of 9/11.
Though there have been some hints that the Bush administration may be
beginning to reassess the goals, so far defined largely by slogans, of
its unsuccessful military intervention in Iraq, President Bush's
speech Thursday was a throwback to the demagogic formulations he
employed during the 2004 presidential campaign to justify a war that
he himself started.
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That war, advocated by a narrow circle of decision-makers for motives
still not fully exposed, propagated publicly by rhetoric reliant on
false assertions, has turned out to be much more costly in blood and
money than anticipated. It has precipitated worldwide criticism. In
the Middle East it has stamped the United States as the imperialistic
successor to Britain and as a partner of Israel in the military
repression of the Arabs. Fair or not, that perception has become
widespread throughout the world of Islam.
Now, however, more than a reformulation of U.S. goals in Iraq is
needed. The persistent reluctance of the administration to confront
the political background of the terrorist menace has reinforced
sympathy among Muslims for the terrorists. It is a self-delusion for
Americans to be told that the terrorists are motivated mainly by an
abstract "hatred of freedom" and that their acts are a reflection of a
profound cultural hostility. If that were so, Stockholm or Rio de
Janeiro would be as much at risk as New York City. Yet, in addition to
New Yorkers, the principal victims of serious terrorist attacks have
been Australians in Bali, Spaniards in Madrid, Israelis in Tel Aviv,
Egyptians in the Sinai and Britons in London.
There is an obvious political thread connecting these events: The
targets are America's allies and client states in its deepening
military intervention in the Middle East. Terrorists are not born but
shaped by events, experiences, impressions, hatreds, ethnic myths,
historical memories, religious fanaticism and deliberate brainwashing.
They are also shaped by images of what they see on television, and
especially by feelings of outrage at what they perceive to be the
brutal denigration of their religious kin's dignity by heavily armed
foreigners. An intense political hatred for America, Britain and
Israel is drawing recruits for terrorism not only from the Middle East
but as far away as Ethiopia, Morocco, Pakistan, Indonesia and even the
Caribbean.
America's ability to cope with nuclear nonproliferation has also
suffered. The contrast between the attack on the militarily weak Iraq
and America's forbearance of a nuclear-armed North Korea has
strengthened the conviction of the Iranians that their security can
only be enhanced by nuclear weapons. Moreover, the recent U.S.
decision to assist India's nuclear program, driven largely by the
desire for India's support for the war in Iraq and as a hedge against
China, has made the U.S. look like a selective promoter of nuclear
weapons proliferation. This double standard will complicate the quest
for a constructive resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem.
Compounding such political dilemmas is the degradation of America's
moral standing in the world. The country that has for decades stood
tall in opposition to political repression, torture and other
violations of human rights has been exposed as sanctioning practices
that hardly qualify as respect for human dignity. Even more
reprehensible is the fact that the shameful abuse and/or torture in
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib was exposed not by an outraged
administration but by the U.S. media. In response, the administration
confined itself to punishing a few low-level perpetrators; none of the
top civilian and military decision-makers in the Department of Defense
and on the National Security Council who sanctioned "stress
interrogations" (a.k.a. torture) were publicly disgraced, prosecuted
or forced to resign. The administration's opposition to the
International Criminal Court now seems quite self-serving.
Finally, complicating this sorry foreign policy record are war-related
economic trends. The budgets for the departments of Defense and
Homeland Security are now larger than the total budget of any nation,
and they are likely to continue escalating as budget and trade
deficits transform America into the world's No. 1 debtor nation. At
the same time, the direct and indirect costs of the war in Iraq are
mounting, even beyond the pessimistic prognoses of its early
opponents, making a mockery of the administration's initial
predictions. Every dollar so committed is a dollar not spent on
investment, on scientific innovation or on education, all
fundamentally relevant to America's long-term economic primacy in a
highly competitive world.
It should be a source of special concern for thoughtful Americans that
even nations known for their traditional affection for America have
become openly critical of U.S. policy. As a result, large swathes of
the world — including nations in East Asia, Europe and Latin America —
have been quietly exploring ways of shaping regional associations tied
less to the notions of transpacific, or transatlantic, or hemispheric
cooperation with the United States. Geopolitical alienation from
America could become a lasting and menacing reality.
That trend would especially benefit America's historic ill-wishers and
future rivals. Sitting on the sidelines and sneering at America's
ineptitude are Russia and China — Russia, because it is delighted to
see Muslim hostility diverted from itself toward America, despite its
own crimes in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and is eager to entice America
into an anti-Islamic alliance; China, because it patiently follows the
advice of its ancient strategic guru, Sun Tzu, who taught that the
best way to win is to let your rival defeat himself.
In a very real sense, during the last four years the Bush team has
dangerously undercut America's seemingly secure perch on top of the
global totem pole by transforming a manageable, though serious,
challenge largely of regional origin into an international debacle.
Because America is extraordinarily powerful and rich, it can afford,
for a while longer, a policy articulated with rhetorical excess and
pursued with historical blindness. But in the process, America is
likely to become isolated in a hostile world, increasingly vulnerable
to terrorist acts and less and less able to exercise constructive
global influence. Flailing away with a stick at a hornets' nest while
loudly proclaiming "I will stay the course" is an exercise in
catastrophic leadership.
But it need not be so. A real course correction is still possible, and
it could start soon with a modest and common-sense initiative by the
president to engage the Democratic congressional leadership in a
serious effort to shape a bipartisan foreign policy for an
increasingly divided and troubled nation. In a bipartisan setting, it
would be easier not only to scale down the definition of success in
Iraq but actually to get out — perhaps even as early as next year. And
the sooner the U.S. leaves, the sooner the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis
will either reach a political arrangement on their own or some
combination of them will forcibly prevail.
With a foreign policy based on bipartisanship and with Iraq behind us,
it would also be easier to shape a wider Middle East policy that
constructively focuses on Iran and on the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process while restoring the legitimacy of America's global role.

 ha
scritto:
Precisazione sulla fonte
L'editoriale  di Brzezinski è apparso sul Los Angeles Times del  9
ottobre 2005.con il titolo di American debacle