Newsgroup: it.economia.borsa
Titolo: Discorso integrale di Greenspan - tradotto in parte (scusate il ritardo)

Anche se cio' e' ormai roba vecchia (Alan aveva gia' spifferato tutto
al ng tramite Villapando) i collezionisti dei discorsi di mr.
Grattanaso potranno apprezzare:
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Testimonianza del capo della Fed Alan Greensan.
Rapporto semestrale della Banca Centrale sulla politica monetaria
davanti al Comitato Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Senato
Americano.
23 febbraio 1999.
Signor moderatore e membri del comitato, apprezzo l'opportunita' di
presentare il rapporto semestrale della Fed sulla politica monetaria.
La economia americana l'anno scorso si e' comportata mirabilmente.
Nonostante le sfide costituite dalla grave recessione economica in un
gran numero di paesi stranieri e tempeste finanziarie episodiche fuori
o qui dentro, il nostro PIL reale e' cresciuto di circa il 4 percento
per il terzo anno di fila. Nel 1998, sono stati creati 2,75 milioni di
posti di lavoro, portando l'aumento totale dei pagamenti a piu' di 18
milioni (di $ ovvio) durante la presente espansione economica, che e'
diventata la piu' lunga nella storia dei periodi di pace. Il tasso di
disoccupazione e' caduto ulteriormente al 4,25%, il piu' basso dal
1970.
E, nonostante il mercato del lavoro teso, l'inflazione anche e' caduta
al tasso piu' basso in molte decadi in larga misura, sebbene una parte
del suo declino e' dovuto al calo dei prezzi del petriolio, beni di
consumo, ed altri prodotti di importazione, il che improbabilmente si
ripetera'.
La paga oraria, aggiustata per l'inflazione, ha mostrato ulteriori
notevoli (impressive) guadagni. I guadagni reali di salario sono stati
permessi dal robusto aumento della produttivita', che a sua volta ha
in parte riflesso il pesante investimento in impianti ed
equipaggiamenti, spesso con tecnologie innovative.
Puo' questa favorevole performance essere sostenuta?
Per molti aspetti i fondamentali sottostanti la recente performance
sono forti. Il mercato flessibile ed il passaggio all'attivo del
bilancio federale facilitano la costruzione di un brillante aumento
della massa di capitale. Questo aumento dissemina rapidi aumenti della
produttivita' che aiutano a tenere l'inflazione sotto controllo. Le
nuove tecnologie e l'ottimismo dei consumatori ed investitori
sostengono gli investimenti ed acquisti continui.
Ma, dopo otto anni di espansione economica, l'economia appare tesa
(stretched) in molti aspetti, implicando notevoli rischi verso l'alto
ed il basso, nella previsione. La forte crescita della produzione ha
usato le nostre forze lavoro di riserva, suggerendo che la recente
forza dei consumatori non puo' continuare senza una ripresa di
inflazione a meno che la produttivita' lavorativa aumenti
ulteriormente di molto. I prezzi delle azioni sono abbatanza alti per
sollevare domande se esse sono sopravvalutate. Il debito delle
famiglie e del settore commercio e' aumentato, cosi come il debito
estero nel complesso, riflettendo l'inasprirsi del corrente deficit
(di bilancia commerciale) . Rimaniamo vulnerabili al rapido mutare
delle condizioni extranazionali che, come vedemmo la scorsa estate, si
possoni trasmettere ai mercati americani rapidamente e
traumaticamente. Commentero' molti di questi aspetti mentro rivedo lo
sviluppo degli anni scorsi e le prospettive future.
Alla luce di tutti questi rischi, la politica monetaria deve essere
pronta a muoversi rapidamente in ogni direzione dovessimo percepire
squilibri e distorsioni che si viluppino a minare la espansione
economica.
Recenti sviluppi
Un punto chiave della nostra prestazione economica e' stata la
continua espansione degli investimenti produttivi. La competizione dei
percati globali e il continuo progresso tecnologico hanno entrambi
stimolato la corsa verso affari piu' efficienti ed hai ndotto cali di
prezzi per molti tipi di equipaggiamenti, che hanno reso
l'investimento piu' attraente.
(ora mi sono rotto di tradurre, e' veramente troppo lungo)
Business success in enhancing productivity and the expectation of
still further, perhaps accelerated, advances buoyed public optimism
about profit prospects, which contributed to another sizable boost in
equity prices. Rising household wealth along with strong growth in
real income, related to better pay, slower inflation, and expanding
job opportunities, boosted consumption at the fastest clip in a decade
and a half. The gains in income and wealth last year, along with a
further decrease in mortgage rates, also prompted considerable
activity in the housing sector. 
The impressive performance of the private sector was reflected in a
continued improvement in the federal budget. Burgeoning receipts,
along with continuing restraint on federal spending, produced the
first unified budget surplus in thirty years, allowing the Treasury to
begin to pay down the federal debt held by the public. This shift in
the federal government's fiscal position has fostered an increase in
overall national saving as a share of GDP to 17-1/4 percent from the
14-1/2 percent low reached in 1993. This rise in national saving has
helped to hold down real interest rates and to facilitate the
financing of the boom in private investment spending. 
Foreign savers have provided an additional source of funds for
vigorous domestic investment. The counterpart of our high and rising
current account deficit has been ever faster increases in the net
indebtedness of U.S. residents to foreigners. The rapid widening of
the current account deficit has some disquieting aspects, especially
when viewed in a longer-term context. Foreigners presumably will not
want to raise indefinitely the share of their portfolios in claims on
the United States. Should the sustainability of the buildup of our
foreign indebtedness come into question, the exchange value of the
dollar may well decline, imparting pressures on prices in the United
States. 
In the recent economic environment, however, the widening of the trade
and current account deficits had some beneficial aspects. It provided
a safety valve for strong U.S. domestic demand, thereby helping to
restrain pressures on U.S. resources. It also cushioned, to some
extent, economic weakness in our trading partners. 
Moreover, decreasing import prices, which partly came from the
appreciation of the dollar through mid-summer, contributed to low
overall U.S. inflation, as did ample manufacturing capacity in the
United States and lower prices for oil and other commodities stemming
from the weak activity abroad. The marked drop in energy prices
significantly contributed to the subdued, less than 1 percent,
increase in the price index for total personal consumption
expenditures during 1998. In addition, supported by rapid accumulation
of more efficient capital, the growth of labor productivity picked up
last year, allowing nominal labor compensation to post another sizable
gain without putting added upward pressure on costs and prices. I
shall return to an analysis of the extraordinary performance of
inflation later in my remarks. 
The Federal Open Market Committee conducted monetary policy last year
with the aim of sustaining the remarkable combination of economic
expansion and low inflation. At its meetings from March to July, the
inflation risks accompanying the continued strength of domestic demand
and the tightening of labor markets necessitated that the FOMC place
itself on heightened inflation alert. Although the FOMC kept the
nominal federal funds rate unchanged, it allowed the real funds rate
to rise with continuing declines in inflation and, presumably,
inflation expectations. In August, the FOMC returned to an unbiased
policy predilection in response to the adverse implications for the
U.S. outlook of worsening conditions in foreign economies and in
global financial markets, including our own. 
Shortly thereafter, a further deterioration in financial market
conditions began to pose a more serious threat to economic stability.
In the wake of the Russian crisis and subsequent difficulties in other
emerging-market economies, investors perceived that the uncertainties
in financial markets had broadened appreciably and as a consequence
they became decidedly more risk averse. Safe-haven demands for U.S.
Treasury securities intensified at the expense of private debt
securities. As a result, quality spreads escalated dramatically,
especially for lower-rated issuers. Many financial markets turned
illiquid, with wider bid-asked spreads and heightened price
volatility, and issuance was disrupted in some private securities
markets. Even the liquidity in the market for seasoned issues of U.S.
Treasury securities dried up, as investors shifted toward the more
actively traded, recently issued securities and dealers pared
inventories, fearing that heightened price volatility posed an
unacceptable risk to their capital. 
Responding to losses in foreign financial markets and to pressures
from counterparties, highly leveraged investors began to unwind their
positions, which further weighed on market conditions. As credit
became less available to business borrowers in capital markets, their
demands were redirected to commercial banks, which reacted to the
enlarged borrowing, and more uncertain business prospects, by
tightening their standards and terms on such lending. 
To cushion the domestic economy from the impact of the increasing
weakness in foreign economies and the less accommodative conditions in
U.S. financial markets, the FOMC, beginning in late September,
undertook three policy easings. By mid-November, the FOMC had reduced
the federal funds rate from 5-1/2 percent to 4-3/4 percent. These
actions were taken to rebalance the risks to the outlook, and, in the
event, the markets have recovered appreciably. Our economy has
weathered the disturbances with remarkable resilience, though some
yield and bid-asked spreads still reflect a hesitancy on the part of
market participants to take on risk. The Federal Reserve must continue
to evaluate, among other issues, whether the full extent of the policy
easings undertaken last fall to address the seizing-up of financial
markets remains appropriate as those disturbances abate. 
To date, domestic demand and hence employment and output have remained
vigorous. Real GDP is estimated to have risen at a annual rate
exceeding 5-1/2 percent in the fourth quarter of last year. Although
some slowing from this torrid pace is most likely in the first
quarter, labor markets remain exceptionally tight and the economy
evidently retains a great deal of underlying momentum despite the
global economic problems and the still-visible remnants of the earlier
financial turmoil in the United States. At the same time, no evidence
of any upturn in inflation has, as yet, surfaced. 
Abroad, the situation is mixed. In some East Asian countries that, in
recent years, experienced a loss of investor confidence, a severe
currency depreciation, and a deep recession, early signs of
stabilization and economic recovery have appeared. This is
particularly the case for Korea and Thailand. Authorities in those
countries, in the context of IMF stabilization programs, early on
established appropriate macroeconomic policies and undertook
significant structural reforms to buttress the banking system and
repair the finances of the corporate sector. As investor confidence
has returned, exchange rates have risen and interest rates have
fallen. With persistence and follow-through on reforms, the future of
those economies has promise. 
The situations in some other emerging market economies are not as
encouraging. The Russian government's decision in mid-August to
suspend payments on its domestic debt and devalue the ruble took
markets by surprise. Investor flight exacerbated the collapse of
prices in Russian financial markets and led to a sharp depreciation of
the ruble. The earlier decline in output gathered momentum, and by
late in the year inflation had moved up to a triple-digit annual rate.
Russia's stabilization program with the IMF has been on hold since the
financial crisis hit, and the economic outlook there remains
troubling. 
The Russian financial crisis immediately spilled over to some other
countries, hitting Latin America especially hard. Countering downward
pressure on the exchange values of the affected currencies, interest
rates moved sharply higher, especially in Brazil. As a consequence of
the high interest rates and growing economic uncertainty, Brazil's
economic activity took a turn for the worse. Higher interest rates
also had negative consequences for the fiscal outlook, as much of
Brazil's substantial domestic debt effectively carries floating
interest rates. With budget reform legislation encountering various
setbacks, market confidence waned further and capital outflows from
Brazil continued, drawing down foreign currency reserves. Ultimately,
the decision was taken to allow the real to float, and it subsequently
depreciated sharply. 
Brazilian authorities must walk a very narrow, difficult path of
restoring confidence and keeping inflation contained with monetary
policy while dealing with serious fiscal imbalances. Although the
situation in Brazil remains uncertain, there has been limited
contagion to other countries thus far. Apparently, the slow onset of
the crisis has enabled many parties with Brazilian exposures to hedge
those positions or allow them to run off. With the net exposure
smaller, and increasingly held by those who both recognized the
heightened risk and were willing to bear it, some of the elements that
might have contributed to further contagion may have been
significantly reduced. 
The Economic Outlook
These recent domestic and international developments provide the
backdrop for U.S. economic prospects. Our economy's performance should
remain solid this year, though likely with a slower pace of economic
expansion and a slightly higher rate of overall inflation than last
year. The stocks of business equipment, housing, and household durable
goods have been growing rapidly to quite high levels relative to
business sales or household incomes during the past few years, and
some slowing in the growth of spending on these items seems a
reasonable prospect. Moreover, part of the rapid increase in spending,
especially in the household sector, has resulted from the surge in
wealth associated with a runup in equity prices that is unlikely to be
repeated. And the purchasing power of income and wealth has been
enhanced by declines in oil and other import prices, which also are
unlikely to recur this year. Assuming that aggregate demand
decelerates, underlying inflation pressures, as captured by core price
measures, in all likelihood will not intensify significantly in the
year ahead, though the Federal Reserve will need to monitor
developments carefully. We perceive stable prices as optimum for
economic growth. Both inflation and deflation raise volatility and
risks that thwart maximum economic growth. 
Most Governors and Reserve Bank Presidents foresee that economic
growth this year will slow to a 2-1/2 to 3 percent rate. Such growth
would keep the unemployment rate about unchanged. The central tendency
of the Governors' and Presidents' predictions of CPI inflation is 2 to
2-1/2 percent. This level represents a pickup from last year, when
energy prices were falling, but it is in the vicinity of core CPI
inflation over the last couple of years. 
This outlook involves several risks. The continuing downside risk
posed by possible economic and financial instability around the world
was highlighted earlier this year by the events in Brazil. Although
financial contagion elsewhere has been limited to date, more
significant knock-on effects in financial markets and in the economies
of Brazil's important trading partners, including the United States,
are still possible. Moreover, the economies of several of our key
industrial trading partners have shown evidence of weakness, which if
it deepens could further depress demands for our exports. 
Another downside risk is that growth in capital spending, especially
among manufacturers, could weaken appreciably if pressures on domestic
profit margins mount and capacity utilization drops further. And it
remains to be seen whether corporate earnings will disappoint
investors, even if the slowing of economic growth is only moderate.
Investors appear to have incorporated into current equity price levels
both robust profit expectations and low compensation for risk. As the
economy slows to a more sustainable pace as expected, profit forecasts
could be pared back, which together with a greater sense of
vulnerability in business prospects could damp appetites for equities.
A downward correction to stock prices, and an associated increase in
the cost of equity capital, could compound a slowdown in the growth of
capital spending. In addition, a stock market decline would tend to
restrain consumption spending through its effect on household net
worth. 
But on the upside, our economy has proven surprisingly robust in
recent years. More rapid increases in capital spending, productivity,
real wages, and asset prices have combined to boost economic growth
far more and far longer than many of us would have anticipated. 
This "virtuous cycle" has been able to persist because the behavior of
inflation also has been surprisingly favorable, remaining well
contained at levels of utilization of labor that in the past would
have produced accelerating prices. That it has not done so in recent
years has been the result of a combination of special one-time factors
holding down prices and more lasting changes in the processes
determining inflation. 
Among the temporary factors, the sizable declines in the prices of
oil, other internationally traded commodities, and other imports
contributed directly to holding down inflation last year, and also
indirectly by reducing inflation expectations. But these prices are
not likely to fall further, and they could begin to rise as some Asian
economies revive and the effects of the net depreciation of the dollar
since mid-summer are felt more strongly. 
At the same time, however, recent experience does seem to suggest that
the economy has become less inflation prone than in the past, so that
the chances of an inflationary breakout arguably are, at least for
now, less than they would have been under similar conditions in
earlier cycles. 
Several years ago I suggested that worker insecurity might be an
important reason for unusually damped inflation. From the early 1990s
through 1996, survey results indicated that workers were becoming much
more concerned about being laid off. Workers' underlying fear of
technology-driven job obsolescence, and hence willingness to stress
job security over wage increases, appeared to have suppressed labor
cost pressures despite a reduced unemployment rate. More recently,
that effect seems to have diminished in part. So while job loss fears
probably contributed to wage and price suppression through 1996, it
does not appear that a further heightening of worker insecurity about
employment prospects can explain the more recent improved behavior of
inflation. 
Instead, a variety of evidence, anecdotal and otherwise, suggests that
the source of recent restrained inflation may be emanating more from
employers than from employees. In the current economic setting,
businesses sense that they have lost pricing power and generally have
been unwilling to raise wages any faster than they can support at
current price levels. Firms have evidently concluded that if they try
to increase their prices, their competitors will not follow, and they
will lose market share and profits. 
Given the loss of pricing power, it is not surprising that individual
employers resist pay increases. But why has pricing power of late been
so delimited. Monetary policy certainly has played a role in
constraining the rise in the general level of prices and damping
inflation expectations over the 1980s and 1990s. But our current
discretionary monetary policy has difficulty anchoring the price level
over time in the same way that the gold standard did in the last
century. 
Enhanced opportunities for productive capital investment to hold down
costs also may have helped to damp inflation. Through the 1970s and
1980s, firms apparently found it easier and more profitable to seek
relief from rising nominal labor costs through price increases than
through cost-reducing capital investments. Price relief evidently has
not been available in recent years. But relief from cost pressures
has. The newer technologies have made capital investment distinctly
more profitable, enabling firms to substitute capital for labor far
more productively than they would have a decade or two ago. 
Starting in 1993, capital investment, especially in high-tech
equipment, rose sharply beyond normal cyclical experience, apparently
the result of expected increases in rates of return on the new
investment. Had the profit expectations not been realized, one would
have anticipated outlays to fall back. Instead, their growth
accelerated through the remainder of the decade. 
More direct evidence confirms improved underlying profitability.
According to rough estimates, labor and capital productivity has risen
significantly during the past five years. It seems likely that the
synergies of advances in laser, fiber optic, satellite, and computer
technologies with older technologies have enlarged the pool of
opportunities to achieve a rate of return above the cost of capital.
Moreover, the newer technologies have facilitated a dramatic
foreshortening of the lead times on the delivery of capital equipment
over the past decade, presumably allowing businesses to react more
expeditiously to an actual or expected rise in nominal compensation
costs than, say, they could have in the 1980s. In addition, the surge
in investment not only has restrained costs, it has also increased
industrial capacity faster than factory output has risen. The
resulting slack in product markets has put greater competitive
pressure on businesses to hold down prices, despite taut labor
markets. 
The role of technology in damping inflation is manifest not only in
its effects on U.S. productivity and costs, but also through
international trade, where technological developments have
progressively broken down barriers to cross-border trade. The enhanced
competition in tradeable goods has enabled excess capacity previously
bottled up in one country to augment worldwide supply and exert
restraint on prices in all countries' markets. The resulting price
discipline also has constrained nominal wage gains in internationally
tradeable goods industries. As workers have attempted to shift to
other sectors, gains in nominal wages and increases in prices in
nontradeable goods industries have been held down as well. 
The process of price containment has potentially become, to some
extent, self-reinforcing. Lower inflation in recent years has altered
expectations. Workers no longer believe that escalating gains in
nominal wages are needed to reap respectable increases in real wages,
and their remaining sense of job insecurity is reinforcing this. Since
neither firms nor their competitors can count any longer on a general
inflationary tendency to validate decisions to raise their own prices,
each company feels compelled to concentrate on efforts to hold down
costs. The availability of new technology to each company and its
rivals affords both the opportunity and the competitive necessity of
taking steps to boost productivity. 
It is difficult to judge whether these significant shifts in the
market environment in which firms function is sufficient to account
for our benign overall price behavior during the past half decade.
Undoubtedly, other factors have been at work as well, including those
temporary factors I mentioned earlier and some more lasting I have not
discussed, such as worldwide deregulation and privatization, and the
freeing up of resources previously employed to produce military
products that was brought about by the end of the cold war. There also
may be other contributory forces lurking unseen in the wings that will
only become clear in time. Over the longer run, of course, the actions
of the central bank determine the degree of overall liquidity and
hence rate of inflation. It is up to us to validate the favorable
inflation developments of recent years. 
Although the pace of productivity increase has picked up in recent
years, the extraordinary strength of demand has meant that the
substitution of capital for labor has not prevented us from rapidly
depleting the pool of available workers. This worker depletion
constitutes a critical upside risk to the inflation outlook because it
presumably cannot continue for very much longer without putting
increasing pressure on labor markets and on costs. 
The number of people willing to work can be usefully defined as the
unemployed component of the labor force plus those not actively
seeking work, and thus not counted in the labor force, but who
nonetheless say they would like a job if they could get one. This pool
of potential workers aged 16 to 64 currently numbers about 10 million,
or just 5-3/4 percent of that group's population--the lowest such
percentage on record, which begins in 1970, and 2-1/2 percentage
points below its average over that period. The rapid increase in
aggregate demand has generated growth of employment in excess of
growth in population, causing the number of potential workers to fall
since the mid-1990s at a rate of a bit under 1 million annually. We
cannot judge with precision how much further this level can decline
without sparking ever greater upward pressures on wages and prices.
But, should labor market conditions continue to tighten, there has to
be some point at which the rise in nominal wages will start
increasingly outpacing the gains in labor productivity, and prices
inevitably will begin to accelerate. 
Ranges for Money and Credit
At its February meeting, the Committee elected to ratify the
provisional ranges for all three aggregates that it had established
last July. Specifically, the Committee again has set growth rate
ranges over the four quarters of 1999 of 1 to 5 percent for M2, 2 to 6
percent for M3, and 3 to 7 percent for domestic nonfinancial debt. As
in previous years, the Committee interpreted the ranges for the
broader monetary aggregates as benchmarks for what money growth would
be under conditions of price stability and sustainable economic
growth, assuming historically typical velocity behavior. 
Last year, these monetary aggregates far overshot the upper bounds of
their annual ranges. While nominal GDP growth did exceed the rate
likely consistent with sustained price stability, the rapid growth of
M2 and M3 also reflected outsized declines in their velocities, that
is, the ratio of nominal GDP to money. M2 velocity dropped by about 3
percent, while M3 velocity plunged by 5-1/4 percent. 
Part of these velocity declines reflected some reduction in the
opportunity cost of holding money; interest rates on Treasury
securities, which represent an alternative return on non-monetary
assets, dropped more than did the average of interest rates on
deposits and money market mutual funds in M2, drawing funds into the
aggregate. Even so, much of last year's aberrant behavior of broad
money velocity cannot readily be explained by conventional
determinants. Although growth of the broad aggregates was strong
earlier in the year, it accelerated in the fourth quarter after credit
markets became turbulent. Perhaps robust money growth late in the year
partly reflected a reaction to this turmoil by the public, who began
scrambling for safer and more liquid financial assets. Monetary
expansion has moderated so far this year, evidently in lagged response
to the calming of financial markets in the autumn. Layered on top of
these influences, though, the public also may have been reapportioning
their savings flows into money balances because the huge runup in
stock prices in recent years has resulted in an uncomfortable portion
of their net worth in equity. 
For the coming year, the broad monetary aggregates could again run
high relative to these ranges. To be sure, the decline in the
velocities of the broader aggregates this year should abate to some
extent, as money demand behavior returns more to normal, and growth in
nominal GDP should slow as well, as suggested by the Governors' and
Presidents' central tendency. Both factors would restrain broad money
expansion relative to last year. Still, the growth of M2 and M3 could
well remain outside their price-stability ranges this year. Obviously,
considerable uncertainty continues to surround the prospective
behavior of monetary velocities and growth rates. 
Domestic nonfinancial debt seems more likely than the monetary
aggregates to grow within its range for this year. Indeed, domestic
nonfinancial debt also could grow more slowly this year than last
year's 6-1/4 percent pace, which was in the upper part of its 3 to 7
percent annual range. With the federal budget surplus poised to widen
further this year, federal debt should contract even more quickly than
last year. And debt in each of the major nonfederal sectors in all
likelihood will decelerate as well from last year's relatively
elevated rates, along with the projected slowing of nominal GDP
growth. 
The FOMC's Disclosure Policy
The FOMC at recent meetings has discussed not only the stance of
policy, but also when and how it communicates its views of the
evolving economic situation to the public. The FOMC's objective is to
release as much information about monetary policy decision making, and
as promptly, as is consistent with maintaining an effective
deliberative process and avoiding roiling markets unnecessarily. Since
early 1994, each change in the target nominal federal funds rate has
been announced immediately with a brief rationale for the action. The
FOMC resolved at its December meeting to take advantage of an
available, but unused policy, originally stated in early 1994, of
releasing, on an infrequent basis, a statement immediately after some
FOMC meetings at which the stance of monetary policy has not been
changed. The Federal Reserve will release such a statement when it
wishes to communicate to the public a major shift in its views about
the balance of risks or the likely direction of future policy. Such an
announcement need not be made after every change in the tilt of the
directive. Instead, this option would be reserved for situations in
which the consensus of the Committee clearly had shifted
significantly, though not by enough to change current policy, and in
which the absence of an explanation risked misleading markets about
the prospects for monetary policy. 
Year 2000 Issues
Before closing, I'd like to address an issue that has been receiving
increasing attention--the century date change. While no one can say
that the rollover to the year 2000 will be trouble free, I am
impressed by the efforts to date to address the problem in the banking
and financial system. For our part, the Federal Reserve System has now
completed remediation and testing of 101 of its 103 mission-critical
applications, with the remaining two to be replaced by the end of
March. We opened a test facility in June at which more than 6000
depository institutions to date have conducted tests of their Y2K
compliant systems, and we are well along in our risk mitigation and
contingency planning activities. As a precautionary measure, the
Federal Reserve has acted to increase the currency in inventory by
about one-third to approximately $200 billion in late 1999 and has
other contingency arrangements available if needed. While we do not
expect currency demand to increase dramatically, the Federal Reserve
believes it is important for the public to have confidence in the
availability of cash in advance of the rollover. As a result of these
kinds of activities, I can say with assurance that the Federal Reserve
will be ready in both its operations and planning activities for the
millennium rollover. 
The banking industry is also working hard, and with evident success,
to prepare for the event. By the end of the first quarter, every
institution in the industry will have been subject to two rounds of
on-site Y2K examinations. The Federal Reserve, like the other
regulators, has found that only a small minority of institutions has
fallen behind in their preparations, and those institutions have been
targeted for additional follow-up and, as necessary, formal
enforcement actions. The overwhelming majority of the industry has
made impressive progress in their remediation, testing, and
contingency planning efforts. 
Concluding Comment
Americans can justifiably feel proud of their recent economic
achievements. Competitive markets, with open trade both domestically
and internationally, have kept our production efficient and on the
expanding frontier of technological innovation. The determination of
Americans to improve their skills and knowledge has allowed workers to
be even more productive, elevating their real earnings. Macroeconomic
policies have provided a favorable setting for the public to take
greatest advantage of opportunities to improve its economic well
being. The restrained fiscal policy of the Administration and the
Congress has engendered the welcome advent of a unified budget
surplus, freeing up funds for capital investment. A continuation of
responsible fiscal and, we trust, monetary policies should afford
Americans the opportunity to make considerable further economic
progress over time." 
(Greetings to Villapando, Ciamo, and all the italian fellows of that
newsgroup, if they have survived my tedious speech.)
Alan

Ciao Gigi,che bel lavoro che hai fatto,ti dovrebbero pagare per questo,mi
interesserebbe conoscere una tua "personale" morale della favola.Grazie
Ciamo (grazie per la citazione finale ,hai visto quando si è toccato il
naso?)

...


naso?)
   ;-)
No, non ce la faccio proprio (non potrei dire niente di piu' di quello
che c'e' scritto sul Sole).
  Me la sto facendo sotto per il crollo dell'obbligazionario Usa, col
future t-bond a 121 (sto scrivendo di mattina, senza sapere i valori
di oggi).
121 e' una soglia tecnica importante, se rimbalza bene, se no i
rendimenti volano oltre al 5,5% ed allora adios.. il tuo venerdi' nero
arriva, gia'  a partire da giovedi' (anche se la cosa fara' felice te
e gli altri al ribasso).
Circa Alan posso solo ricordare che,come tutti sappiamo, faceva la
danza dell'orso nel  marzo '97 con il Dj a 6300, e con lui Soros, Bill
Gate$, etc., tutta gente che ne capisce un pochino di finanza.
Ora oltre i 9000 non ha secondo me neanche piu' il coraggio di
parlare. Si e' andati troppo in la' e si puo' solo sperare che la
bolla si sgonfi piano. Credo che tutte le teste pensanti (poche
invero) americane siano atterrite, mentre i buoi USA continuano
felicemente a comprare azioni ridicolmente sopravvalutate con i soldi
presi a prestito. Titanic?
Sono andato fuori tema.
Risulta comunque confermata, Francesco, la tua teoria del 'giorno
dopo' i discorsi del vecchio Alan. Quando parla la borsa cala di colpo
pavlovianamente, anche se lui si mette a cantare 'la vispa Teresa';
poi risale; il giorno dopo cominciano a realizzare... mah..
un po' lenti di comprendonio gli americanoni...
Arrichiamoci speculandoci sopra, la prossima volta ;-))
Gigi  
attanagliato dalla paura del crack.


Ciao Gigi, penso che la prossima volta sia già troppo tardi. Oramai il
giochetto l'hanno capito tutti e sai come vanno le cose in borsa, si gioca
sempre d'anticipo, praticamente quando si tocca il naso devi essere già in
collegamento con directa :-))
Gianlux


Ebbene, ci attrezzeremo per l'occorrenza  :-)
Gigi