Newsgroup: it.cultura.ebraica
Titolo: Hannah Arendt e la deportazione degli ebrei italiani

Sto leggendo "La banalità del male" di Hannah Arendt e il capitolo sulla 
deportazione degli ebrei italiani mi ha lasciato con la sensazione che 
la Arendt giudichi il comportamento degli italiani in quel frangente in 
maniera un po' troppo "buonista". Qualcuno che ha letto il libro può 
confermare/confutare questa mia impressione?
-- 
Cris Carampa (
spamto:cri...@operamail.com
)
"Mussolini did not murder anyone"
(Silvio Berlusconi)
---
Per il manifesto, le FAQ ed un'interfaccia Web visita 
http://www.menorah.it/

 confermare/confutare questa mia impressione?
confermo, stessa impressione avuta anche io.
d'altra parte non so quanto, all'inizio degli anni 60, fosse studiato (e
tradotto) quel periodo in italia.
ipazia


 confermare/confutare questa mia impressione?
Qualche giorno fa (pensa tu il caso) parlavo con mio padre proprio di
questo. Mi consigliava di leggere "destini personali" (l'età della
colonizzazione delle coscienze) di Remo Bodei - Feltrinelli 2003.
Parla (tra le altre cose) proprio di questo errore della Harendt.
ciao
lina


 Parla (tra le altre cose) proprio di questo errore della Harendt.
Grazie. Ho visto che in biblioteca ce l'hanno, quindi approfondirò.
-- 
Cris Carampa (
spamto:cri...@operamail.com
)
"Mussolini did not murder anyone"
(Silvio Berlusconi)
---


 Grazie. Ho visto che in biblioteca ce l'hanno, quindi approfondirò.
Mannaggia, era fuori a prestito. Pure il Baumann. I libri consigliati 
dagli ICErs sono sempre richiestissimi :) Ho preso "Gli ebrei 
nell'italia fascista" di Michele Sarfatti, lo conoscete?
P.S. Ho appena finito il libro di Cornwell su Pio XII, a suo tempo 
consigliato da Nahum, e non posso che consigliarne la lettura a mia 
volta, soprattutto ai cattolici. Sono riuscito anche a farlo leggere a 
mia moglie :)


 nell'italia fascista" di Michele Sarfatti, lo conoscete?
[cut]
Ti do la mia bibliografia sull'argomento:
Centro Furio Jesi (a cura), La menzogna della razza. Documenti e immagini
del razzismo e dell'antisemitismo fascista, Bologna, Grafis, 1994
Mario Toscano, Ebraismo e antisemitismo in Italia. Dal 1848 alla guerra dei
sei giorni, Franco Angeli, 2003
Klaus Voigt, Il rifugio precario. Gli esuli in Italia dal 1933 al 1945, 2
voll., La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1993 e 1996
Liliana Picciotto Fargion, Il Libro della memoria. Gli Ebrei deportati
dall'Italia (1943-1945). Ricerca della Fondazione Centro di Documentazione
Ebraica Contemporanea, Mursia, Milano 2002
Bugio (a cura di), Nel nome della razza. Il razzismo nella storia d'Italia.
1870-1845, Il Mulino, 2000
Capelli A., Broggini R., Antisemitismo in Europa negli anni Trenta.
Legislazioni a confronto, Franco Angeli,  2001
Di Sante (a cura di), I campi di concentramento in Italia. Dall'internamento
alla deportazione (1940-1945), F. Angeli, 2001
Cinquini, Minelli (a cura di), Con la massima sollecitudine. A scuola nell'
anno delle leggi razziali, CLUEB, 2000
Casali, Bugio, Studi sul razzismo italiano, CLUEB, 1999
Germinario, Razza del sangue, razza dello spirito. Julius Evola, l'
antisemitismo e il nazionalsocialismo (1920-45), Bollati Boringhieri, 2001
D. Bidussa, Il mito del bravo italiano, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1994
Saluti,
Arturo


 (Silvio Berlusconi)
per carità, cambia sign, che ogni volta che leggo 'sta cosa mi vien male...
A.


 per carità, cambia sign, che ogni volta che leggo 'sta cosa mi vien male...
Ogni tuo desiderio è un ordine :)
-- 
Cris Carampa (
spamto:cri...@operamail.com
)
---


 Ti do la mia bibliografia sull'argomento:
Keep. Grazie mille.
-- 
Cris Carampa (
spamto:cri...@operamail.com
)
---


 Ogni tuo desiderio è un ordine :)
Allora metti come sign: Redfiddler è un genio.
:-DDDDDDDDDDDDDD
ciao
A.


 Allora metti come sign: Redfiddler è un genio.
Fatto. Le modalità di pagamento per l'affitto dello spazio ti verranno 
comunicate per e-mail :)
-- 
Cris Carampa (
spamto:cri...@operamail.com
)
Redfiddler è un genio.


 Redfiddler è un genio.
L'ho sempre pensato anch'io....:-)
ciao
A.


 Di fatto, anche Cornwell è stato accusato di voler regolare conti.....
[cut]
Forse può essere interessante questa recensione del libro, opera di uno
storico tedesco, recentemente postata dall'autore su ICS:
NOTE: This is a review of the German translation of Cornwell's book,
Hitler's Pope, entitled: Pius XII, the Pope who remained silent
(Munich: Beck Verlag, 1999), by Dr. Rainer Decker, Paderborn
(Germany).
Page numbers refer to the English original.
In the past year two British historians have captured public
attention in Germany.  The first is the Oxford professor, Niall
Ferguson.  His book, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I,
criticizes England's intervention in the First World War.  By posing
the contrary to fact question, 'What would have happened if Germany
had won the war?' Ferguson opened new perspectives - for some readers
provocative, for others irrelevant.
His older colleague at Cambridge, John Cornwell, travels a
well worn path, indicated by the (German) sub-title: The Pope who
remained silent, which recalls Rolf Hochhuth's play, The
Representative.   The title of the English original is sharper still:
Hitler's Pope: The secret history of Pius XII.  Cornwell goes beyond
Hochhuth's polemic, mounting a massive attack on Pius XII's conduct
which culminates in a systematic indictment of papal centralism from
the First Vatican Council to Pope John Paul II.  "It has been the
urgent thesis of this book," Cornwell writes on p. 371, "that when the
papacy waxes strong at the expense of the people of God, the Catholic
Church declines in moral and spiritual influence to the detriment of
us all."  In order to enforce its claim to supremacy over local
churches, Cornwell argues, the Vatican entered into negotiations with
national states which produced the Concordats with Fascist Italy (in
1929) and with Nazi Germany (in 1933).  The price for these agreements
was recognition of these regimes and silence regarding their murderous
policies, especially the Holocaust.
Cornwell argues his case biographically.  His sources include
two collections of largely unpublished material.  The first is
testimony collected by the Vatican in connection with the process of
beatification for Pius XII.  This gives personal and family
information about Pacelli, but offers no substantially new insights.
Second, Cornwell draws on the archives of the Vatican Secretariat of
State, which are now accessible for the pontificate of Pope Benedict
XV, who died in 1922.  This material has already been studied, and in
part published, by the Italian historian Emma Fattorini in her 1992
book (which Cornwell fails to mention) about Pacelli's work as Nuncio
in Munich from 1917 to 1923.
After sketching Pacelli's upbringing in Rome by traditionally
Catholic  parents loyal to the papacy, Cornwell emphasizes the
formative influence on the young priest of the conservative papacy of
Pius X (1903-1914), whom Pacelli would later canonize.  Working in the
Secretariat of State, Pacelli played a major role, Cornwell contends,
in negotiating a Concordat with Serbia shortly before the outbreak of
World War I.  The treaty enabled the curia to circumvent older
Austrian laws for the protection of Catholics in the Balkans, thus
giving fresh impetus to Serbian nationalism and adding to the
incendiary material which exploded in August 1914 - a remarkable
contribution to the controversy over the blame for the outbreak of
war.
Describing Archbishop Pacelli's role as Nuncio in Munich (from
1917) and later in Berlin (until 1929), Cornwell describes Pacelli's
efforts to negotiate Concordats with the German states and the Reich,
and emphasizes his experiences with the Munich "Conciliar Republic" in
early 1919 which, Cornwell contends, caused the Nuncio to link his
anti-Communism with anti-Semitism.  A key document for Cornwell is a
letter Pacelli sent to Cardinal Secretary of State Gasparri on April
18, 1919, in which the Nuncio passes on and affirms the report of his
representative, Msgr. Schioppa, about the "totally chaotic" situation
he encountered in a personal meeting with the head of the Communist
government, Max Levien.  Cornwell's translation diverges at several
points from the original Italian text published by Emma Fattorini,
thus giving the reader "an impression of stereotypical anti-Semitic
contempt" (p. 75).  For instance, where Fattorini's original text
speaks of a "gruppo femminile" [1], i..e a "group of women" or a
"female group," Cornwell translates this as "female rabble."  His
German translator heightens this even farther: "rabble" becomes
"scum," so that the passage reads: "The boss of this female scum was
Levien's mistress ..."
Cornwell contends that Pacelli was prejudiced not only against
Jews but against blacks, citing his concern about sexual attacks on
civilians by black French  or American troops, in the Rhineland in
1920 and in Italy in 1944.  He never mentions that in October 1939
Pius ordained the first black African bishops of modern times, or that
from 1950 onward he appointed further native African bishops almost
every year.
Cornwell's use of important scholarly material is highly
selective.  With few exceptions he uses German sources and studies
only when they have been translated into English.  In the German
translation the editors conceal this defect by citing German works.
The account of the Reich Concordat of 1933 is based almost exclusively
on that of Klaus Scholder, which has been translated into English.
Cornwell accepts uncritically Scholder's contention that there was a
direct connection between the Catholic Center Party's assent to the
Enabling Act in March 1933, alleged Roman desires, and the conclusion
of the Concordat.  Scholder's critic, Konrad Repgen, whose refutation
of Scholder is available only in German, is for all practical purposes
ignored.  At one point Cornwell does consider a contrary position: in
footnote 24 to chapter 7.  This mentions - only to dismiss at once as
""niggling and not entirely accurate" - Rudolf Morsey's criticism of a
passage in the memoirs of the Catholic former Reich Chancellor
Heinrich Brüning, in which the latter severely criticizes Pacelli's
Concordat policy.  Significantly, this footnote has been dropped in
the German translation - which has given rise to considerable
speculation.
Cornwell's charge, that the curia's concordat policy in
various countries was intended to support papal centralism, is
arguable, but one sided.  For the policy also had a defensive aspect:
defending the church against state control and interference, as seen
in the Kulturkampf, still fresh in the curial memory.  The Reich
Concordat exemplified this defensive aspect, providing a legal basis
for challenges to Nazi persecution of the church.  The enhancement of
Hitler's prestige which the Concordat brought him was fleeting and
should not be overemphasized.  The church struggle which started a
year or two later left no doubt about Nazism's true ideology.  When
Cornwell criticizes the passivity of the Vatican (apart from a few
expressions of sympathy for the Jews by the aging Pius XI), of the
German bishops, and of German Catholics generally in the face of
increasing discrimination of the Jews, he is indulging in hindsight.
At the time no one foresaw the events of 1941 to 1945.  Nonetheless
the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge, co-authored by Pacelli (Secretary
of State since 1930), sharply condemned Nazi racial ideology, though
without mentioning the Jews explicitly.
Cornwell's description of the wartime policy of the new Pope,
elected in March 1939, in particular of his alleged "silence," is the
weakest part of the book.  At least he reports Pius XII's role, long
known to historians but not to the public at large, in mediating in
the winter of 1939/40 between military opponents of Hitler in Germany
and the British government, in the hope of obtaining favorable peace
terms following Hitler's overthrow.  (This from "Hitler's Pope"!)
This was fraught with extreme danger had the plot become known - not
only for the Pope personally but for the Catholic Church in both
Germany and Italy.  Cornwell is thus correct when he says that the
Pontiff's actions during World War II were not dictated by cowardice.
Must we therefore accept the further charge that anti-Bolshevism and
latent anti-Semitism were the leading motives for the Pope's
"silence"?
Two statements by Pius XII in May 1940, not mentioned by
Cornwell, are relevant here.  The first is a memorandum he wrote on
May 11, the day after his telegrams of sympathy he sent to the
monarchs of the Benelux countries following the German attack of their
lands.  Written for the benefit of his immediate collaborators, it
described a conversation he had with the Italian consul in Warsaw, who
had just returned to Italy.  "He [the consul] confirmed, as did his
wife, that one could not imagine the cruelty and sadism of the
Germans, or more accurately of the Gestapo - led by a genuine
criminal, Himmler, and composed of the most repulsive personalities -
who were tormenting the Polish people and trying to destroy them."
Two days later, in a conversation with the Italian Ambassador Alfieri,
the Pope defended his telegrams and then addressed the situation in
Poland.  "They [the Italians] have full and exact knowledge of what is
gong on in Poland.  We ought to utter fiery protests against this, and
the only thing that prevents our doing so is the knowledge that
anything we said would worsen the victims' fate." [2]
The Pope's words are a clear statement of the reason why he
refrained from denouncing  the Nazi regime.  This motive runs like a
golden thread through all the Vatican documents and is most clearly
expressed in the Pope's 1943 letter to Bishop Preysing of Berlin: "ad
maiora mala vitanda - to avoid worse evils."  Cornwell completely
ignores all of these statements.  About the Pope's veiled reference to
the murder of the Jews and the oppression of the Poles in his 1942
Christmas address Cornwell writes: "Hitler himself could not have
wished for a more convoluted and innocuous reaction from the Vicar of
Christ to the greatest crime in human history" (p. 293).  If that were
true, we would have no explanation for the biting analysis of this
speech by "Hitler's Pope" in a memorandum prepared by the Reich
Security Office for Ribbentrop's Foreign Ministry.  This culminated in
the sentence: "[The Pope] is virtually accusing the German people of
injustice against the Poles and Jews and makes himself the mouthpiece
and advocate of these genuine war criminals." [3]  This too Cornwell
totally ignores.
Also one-sided, indeed in essential points false, is
Cornwell's account of the Vatican's action in connection with the
arrest and deportation of more than 1000 Jews in mid-October 1943.
"To his everlasting shame," Cornwell writes, "and to the shame of the
Catholic Church, Pacelli disdained to recognize the Jews of Rome as
members of his Roman flock" (p. 318).  Quite apart from the question
of whether such a value judgment belongs in a book claiming to be a
work of scholarship, the sources show that Cornwell's statement of the
facts, as well as his evaluation of them are false.  One example: his
charge that the Pope "was prepared to countenance the deaths of a
thousand Roman Jews to prevent the consequences of a Communist
takeover in Rome" (p. 316).
Cornwell claims that the German Ambassador to the Holy See,
Ernst von Weiszaecker, and his trusted First Secretary, Albrecht von
Kessel, 'urged Pacelli that day [Oct. 16] to make 'an official
protest'" (p. 304).  In support of this claim Cornwell cites a
telegram sent by Moellhausen, Consul at the German embassy to the
Quirinal [seat of the Italian government] to the Foreign Office in
Berlin.  Cornwell's own footnote shows, however, that this telegram
had been sent on October 7, and thus said nothing about any plan urged
on the Vatican by German diplomats.   In the conversation that
Weizsaecker had with Secretary of State Cardinal Maglione on October
16 the ambassador did not urge the Pope to act energetically, as
Cornwell claims.  His citation of Maglione's record of this meeting,
and his interpretation of it, are distorted.  In reality, at this
meeting Weizsaecker explicitly urged the Pope not to protest, since -
in the ambassador's opinion - this could not cancel the arrests, and
indeed would make the situation worse: the Nazi persecutors, appealing
to Hitler's "supreme authority," would intensify the persecution, and
the Pope himself would be in  danger.  Instead Weizsaecker hoped, by
working behind the scenes and by sending Berlin reports about bad
publicity and Vatican displeasure, to get the order for the Jews'
deportation changed into forced labor (in which he failed), and to
prevent future arrests.  He had partial success in the latter regard.
In the months following, the Nazis respected international law
guaranteeing the neutrality of Vatican City, making it possible to
offer refuge both in the Vatican and in many religious houses in Rome
to hundreds of anti-Fascists and Jews, and thus saving lives.
The view of Weizsaecker and Kessel, that protests would do no
good, and would actually make matters worse, was consistent from the
start of the war.  Cornwell's German translator seems to have been
aware that the author falsified the strategy of the two diplomats, for
on p. 365 of the German translation there is a phrase, lacking in the
English original, which says that the Pope refrained from protesting
the roundup of Roman Jews "on the explicit advice of Weizsaecker."
The German translation is more historically accurate at this point.
But the translator has overlooked Cornwell's claim on previous pages
that Weizsacker demanded papal protests.
Among the sources which support the account just given of the
role played by the German diplomats at the Vatican is the impressive
statement of Kessel during the controversy over Hochhuth's play in
1963 - and never mentioned by Cornwell: "Von Weizsaecker has to fight
on two fronts.  He had to advise the Holy See, i.e. the Pope, not to
undertake any ill considered actions - anything, that is, which had
not been thought through to its ultimate, possible deadly
consequences.  And at the same time Weizsaecker had to convince the
Nazis, i.e. Hitler, by carefully framed reports that the Vatican was
well disposed, in Hitler's eyes weak.  His reports to Berlin
represented the Vatican's countless actions on behalf of the Jews as
so insignificant that they need not be taken seriously."  This means
that all of Weizsaecker's reports about the Vatican's political
attitude must be read with a sharply critical eye.  Kessel's statement
continues: "Finally all of us at the German Embassy to the Vatican,
despite our different judgments of the situation, were untied in the
conviction that a flaming protest by Pius XII against the persecution
of the Jews would in all probability have brought him and the curia
into acute danger.  And at that late date, in the autumn of 1943, such
a protest could not possibly have saved a single Jewish life.  Hitler,
like an encircled predatory animal, would have increased his cruelty
in the measure in which he encountered resistance."[4]
In hindsight one can ask whether this view of the matter was
not too pessimistic.  But that does not diminish the integrity of
those who held this view.  Cornwell is not interested in subtleties or
ambiguities.  He gives readers no opportunity to judge for themselves,
to doubt, or to presume [5].   Everything is black-and-white.  He
wishes to contribute to inner-Catholic dialogue with the goal of
"genuine collegiality and pluralism" in the Catholic Church.  That is
a legitimate aspiration.  Does this book contribute to this end,
however?  Is it conceivable that a more collegial and pluralistic
Catholic Church would have opposed Nazism more vigorously that a
Rome-centered church?  The example of the German Protestant Church
does not support such a supposition.  It points in exactly the
opposite direction.
[Translated by John Jay Hughes]
1 . Emma Fattorini, Germania e Santa sede.  Le nunziature di Paceilli
tra la Grande guerra e la Repubblica di Weimar (Bologna 1992), p. 116.
2 . Reviewer's translation of the Italian text in Actes et Documents
du Sant Siège relatifs á la second guerre mondiale, vol. 3/1, No. 137
and vol. 1 No. 313.
3 . Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Inland I D/Kirche 17/9 R
98833); partially cited (with the wrong date) by Anthony Rhodes, The
Vatican in the Age of the Dictators 1922-45 (London 1973), p. 273.
4 . Cited from Die Welt April 6, 1963; reprinted in, Fritz J. Raddatz
(ed.), Summa iniuria oder Durfte der Papst schweigen? (Reinbek 1963)
p. 169f.
5 . The reviewer is preparing a critical edition of the sources,
accessible to the general reader and not only to scholars, with this
end in view.  Provisional title: The Vatican and the Third Reich.
Saluti,
Arturo


 storico tedesco, recentemente postata dall'autore su ICS:
Grazie, mi sembra una recensione assai articolata.
In sostanza, riassume un po' le critiche che avevo letto qua' e là.
A leggere quanto scrive il professore tedesco, c'è da diffidare.
Il risultato è che su certe questioni, si va avanti diffidando di tutti gli
storici, da qualsiasi parte provengano.
Non è buona cosa....
Ho le idee più confuse di prima.
A.


 Ho le idee più confuse di prima.
Premesso che imho avere le idee confuse non è necessariamente un male, mi
pare normale che anche fra gli storici ve ne siano di poco seri. Sta proprio
alla comunità scientifica nel suo insieme "denunciarli" come tali (e infatti
non ho letto una sola recensione specialistica positiva del libro di
Cornwell). Detto questo, per mia esperienza è buona norma tenersi lontano
dai deliberati "casi" storiografici (libri neri, storie criminali,
finalmente la verità su..., eccetera), fidarsi degli specialisti accreditati
(per es., per una lettura non certo filopacelliana ma seria, vd. G. Miccoli,
I dilemmi e i silenzi di Pio XII, di cui è uscita la nuova edizione in
francese) ed essere disponibili a rivedere le proprie opinioni.
Saluti,
Arturo


 essere disponibili a rivedere le proprie opinioni.
Naturalmente :)
Grazie anche da parte mia. Ciao.
-- 
Cris Carampa (
spamto:cri...@operamail.com
)
---


 sembra che il taglio fosse più divulgativo che accademico.
Credo che il problema sia il seguente: bisognerebbe diffidare dei libri "a
tesi".
Non dovrebbe essere scopo di uno storico partire con una tesi e poi
presentare solo i documenti volti a sostenere questa determinata tesi.
Si ebbe qui una volta una discussione su Goldhagen.
Ecco a mio avviso uno che scrive libri a tesi.
Questo vuol dire che ciò che racconta è falso?
Per nulla, anzi.
Sono le conclusioni che si fanno derivare da certi fatti storici che possono
essere a volte interpretate in modo tendenzioso.
Materia molto difficile, forse l'obiettività in realtà è una chimera.
ciao
A.
