Newsgroup: it.discussioni.energie-alternative
Titolo: DISCUTERE O FARE?

  Mentre in questo NG ci si interroga se e quanto le luci accese
dell'auto fanno sprecare energia, lo stato Italiano sta facendo
qualcosa di concreto per una mobilità più efficiente: sta portando
avanti il più grande investimento della storia della repubblica per
potenziare la nostra rete ferroviaria.
http://archinauti.blogspot.com/2007/08/v-day-lo-scandalo-tav.html
LOL (ma ci sarebbe da piangere)
saluti
d.aniele

 LOL (ma ci sarebbe da piangere)
Ma rifarci gli occhi con quello sono capaci di fare i nostri vicini di
casa, come a Brandis in Germania dell'est:
550.000 pannelli, per una produzione annuale di 40 megawatt/ora.
La news dell'impianto solare da record, sul sole24ore di oggi. 
Qualche precedente info:
http://www.juwi.de/it/download/juwi_PV_Leistungsspektrum_IT.pdf
p.s.: l'8 settembre, però, c'è anche Italia-Francia eh!
 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/vaffanculoday/
-- 
Salva saluti da:
echo 40959219681464777729187986074393988395592896740592906P | dc
Volete un mondo pulito? Scopate!

 compagnia bella.
Sati buono, NON mi toccare Di Pietro, perché - per ora - è l'unico sano.

 Sati buono, NON mi toccare Di Pietro, perché - per ora - è l'unico sano.
Che coltellata!!! Mi hai trafitto al cuore, con questa indubitata verità.
Speriamo che, almeno, vada con la Brambilla.

 Speriamo che, almeno, vada con la Brambilla.
Si a fare il partito delle maiale......

 Volete un mondo pulito? Scopate!
LOL
Cmq i nostri politici non se lo fanno certo mancare (Mele DOCET) non è
che però ne risultino molto più puliti.
;-)

 parte guardare.
Certo. Sennò ci avrebbero cacciato.
Riporto qui sotto un'articolo apparso sullo special di Natale
dell'Economist di tre anni fa, dove racconta le 10 transazioni più lucrose
della storia della finanza.
Il primo posto è stato dato all'operazione di emissione di debito da parte
delle Poste Italiane, *senza passare per la Banca d'Italia*, che è la sola
autorizzata a piazzare sul mercato il debito pubblico italiano.
In pratica hanno scavato una voragine nascosta nei conti pubblici senza che
questa figurasse da nessuna parte. Quando i certificati di credito sono
stati riscattati (erano buoni senza interesse, venivano venduti ad un terzo
del valore finale), voilà, è venuto alla luce il buco, ma ormai dopo
l'entrata nell'Euro.
Alla fine l'articolo deve ammettere che, se questo enorme *falso in
bilancio* l'avesse fatto una qualunque azienda quotata in borsa, tutto il
management sarebbe finito in galera.
La cosa più schifosa della stampa komunista è che, invece di ammettere le
malversazioni dei governi del centro-sinistra, l'hanno pure usata per
screditare Tremonti.
L'inflazione, tenuta nascosta da panieri ISTAT sempre più folli (secondo
loro l'affitto incide per il 9,6% nella spesa media delle famiglie
italiane, le quali, peraltro, spendono parecchio in "supporti per la
memorizzazione e stampa di fotografie digitali", che, guarda caso, sono
diminuite di prezzo in modo vertiginoso), che è stata attribuita
all'entrata nell'Euro, è semplicemente dovuta al riallineamento delle 1.936
lire per Euro calcolate senza il buco nascosto alle poco più di 1.000 che
era il valore tenendo conto del falso in bilancio.
Anche qui la colpa è stata attribuita a Berlusconi ed ai negozianti
disonesti. Ma dove li vedete tutti questi negozianti miliardari? Il mio
verduraio, un anno fa, ha ceduto l'attività che aveva da 15 anni per andare
a fare il corriere per la SDA. Chissà quanti soldi ha in Svizzera...
Del resto, vista l'ignoranza, la superficialità e la sfegatata
partigianeria dei lettori a cui si rivolgono, perché mai Repubblica & c.
dovrebbero dire la verità?
Why didn't I think of that?
Dec 16th 2004
From The Economist print edition
Were these the best financial trades ever carried out?
THE history buff is in no doubt: the greatest trade ever was the Louisiana
purchase in 1803. It was certainly a splendid deal for America, which
picked up a great whack of land between the Mississippi and the Rockies for
a song. But was it a trade? More of a treaty with a sale-and-purchase
agreement tacked on, actually, as was the snapping up of Alaska from the
Russians some 60 years or so later. To qualify as a trade—at least for the
purposes of this article—a deal must be a financial transaction designed
and executed using financial instruments to profit from an insight into a
market opportunity. In other words, it cannot be something that happened by
accident or sheer luck. And it cannot be a deal—a breathtaking takeover, an
audacious property punt or an early investment in Google. Any of these
might be both clever and lucrative, but it would not be a trade.
Unfortunately, that rules out one of history's quirkiest exchanges. In
parts of 15th-century Africa, salt was more precious, because scarcer, even
than gold. Traders determined enough to transport salt a thousand or so
miles from the north found they could exchange the white stuff for its
equal weight in gold—surely one of the best deals ever, reckons Peter
Bernstein, whose book on “The Power of Gold” includes this tale. True, but
it was sheer luck combined with grim effort, not special financial skill,
that brought wealth to those fortunate barterers. Nor were financial tools
essential.
Also ruled out must be the group of middle-class women running a charity in
Arbois, a small town in France, two centuries ago. In the autumn of 1807
they noticed that bad weather was threatening the grain harvest. Fearing
that high prices during the winter would stop their distribution of food to
the poor, they went to the local market and paid well above the prevailing
price in order to lock in future supplies—an early example of futures
trading. During the winter, prices indeed shot up. Had they been
speculating, they would have made a fat profit. That was not their aim,
though, and there is no evidence that they continued to trade.
No, to be among the greatest trades, there must be something of that
special characteristic that makes observers wonder why they had failed to
think of it themselves. The quality that elicits admiration may be just the
simplicity of the idea; or it may be the sheer imagination that constructed
a complex set of interactions designed to bring about a specific profitable
outcome. Trades involving the modern mechanisms for trading commodities are
certainly eligible to be called the greatest: some of the biggest, boldest
and most secretive traders are to be found in the oil and metals markets.
So, too, are deals involving derivatives, for they are more than mere
mechanisms for executing trades, often using extra techniques to boost
returns.
Soros sets a standard
Some trades are already well known, and deservedly so. George Soros became
a household name after he made Britain's chancellor of the exchequer look
an idiot by forcing the pound out of Europe's exchange-rate mechanism in
1992. Mr Soros is reckoned to have made a profit of $1 billion by borrowing
heavily to bet that sterling would be devalued. That sets a testing
benchmark against which to measure other candidates.
But plenty of traders have made tidy sums and had arguably brighter ideas.
Often they wish to remain anonymous, either embarrassed by their success
or, more likely, anxious to avoid the attentions of mendicants. A fine
example is the young Morgan Stanley man who retired after the 1987
stockmarket crash. His insight was that the heady levels of the market were
strikingly reminiscent of an earlier boom that had gone spectacularly bust
in 1929.
He used his knowledge of the market to load up on put options (those that
give the holder the right to sell) on the S&P 500 share index, and even
persuaded his mother to buy some. The options were ridiculously cheap
because no one thought they would ever be exercised, so far would the
market have to fall for them to be valuable. Fall it did, and the trader
had the nerve to wait for Black Monday—October 19th 1987—rather than cash
in during the tremors of the previous week. Having sold his options for
about 800 times what he had paid for them, he is said to have walked away
with $13m and was last heard of living on a ranch in Montana.
That combination of pluck, tenacity and reserve is powerful. But $13m is
small change for Mr Soros. Moreover, the winner of the biggest-trade title
will get no prize for modesty. In fact, most traders are far from shy about
their talents. Remember the Big Swinging Dicks made famous by Michael Lewis
in his novel, “Liar's Poker”? One BSD merits such a mention. In the 1980s
Andy Krieger was a star at Bankers Trust, an investment bank that later
imploded. In his heyday there, Mr Krieger made hundreds of millions of
trading profits, before resigning in 1998—to go, as it happens, to work for
Mr Soros.
Putting the kiwi to flight
Mr Krieger is scarcely remembered these days except perhaps in one country,
New Zealand. The trade for which he deserves mention involved the kiwi, as
the New Zealand dollar is known in currency markets. And here is a measure
of just how big a BSD Mr Krieger was. During 1987 he sold short (hoping to
buy back more cheaply in future) more kiwis than the entire money supply of
New Zealand. So huge were his bets against the currency that it is not
really surprising that they succeeded, causing the kiwi to collapse. It is
said, apocryphally, that New Zealand's finance minister telephoned Bankers
Trust to complain and beg for mercy. In fact, the government was privately
pleased, because the weaker currency gave a helpful push to the country's
struggling exports.
To put Mr Krieger's effrontery into context, he was just one trader in a
veritable sea of them on Wall Street, in London and elsewhere. In a sense,
he took on his entire industry and won. But some context is important. Mr
Krieger was on to options early, and he soon realised that the youngish
options market was inefficient, not least in its failure to ensure that
options prices were a fair reflection of prices on the underlying cash
markets. Much of his success came from his readiness to make maximum use of
that inefficiency by placing huge bets.
Having sold his options for about 800 times what he had paid for them, he
is said to have walked away with $13m and was last heard of living on a
ranch in Montana
It would be impossible to repeat his feats today. One reason is that banks
are far warier and no one is usually accorded the almost limitless freedoms
Mr Krieger enjoyed. When big trades are done, they are often seen
afterwards as failures of risk management. Another reason why the world
will probably not see another Mr Krieger is that today's markets are much
more efficient: the excess returns that he scooped up are no longer on the
table, and only if new markets emerge will there be fresh sources of profit
for pioneers. Indeed, a feature of modern financial markets is that they
are tending to become more efficient, and that has made great trades harder
than ever to concoct. That is one reason why those that do occur get big
rewards.
Most great trades are done in secret by highly paid traders working for
investment banks, hedge funds and so on. Rarely does this institutional
activity cross paths with the world of retail finance. But for
inventiveness in linking the two activities, one trade clearly stands out.
It originated in 1992 when the Italian government changed its previously
lax rules on withholding tax for Eurobonds. At that time some specialist
teams in London and other big financial centres did nothing but seek out
tax arbitrages: by buying this bond here and moving it there, it was often
possible to avoid taxes at the point of purchase and thereby earn extra
returns. Exploiting Italy's rules had been one of the neatest such wheezes,
so when it was thwarted several of the tax teams found themselves wondering
what to do next.
Among them was Ludovico Filotti, who worked for Barings. In 1993 Mr Filotti
was on holiday in Italy. Reading the local newspaper, something caught his
eye. An advertisement was encouraging companies to buy bonds issued by
Italy's Post Office. These bonds were postal savings bonds, rather like
Britain's national savings certificates, and carried the guarantee of the
Italian state. Mr Filotti was curious: normally such bonds would only be
for retail investors, so he wondered on what terms companies could invest.
Back in Britain, he sent his Italian father the equivalent of £100 and
asked him to nip down to a post office to buy a bond certificate so that he
could study the small print on the bond.
What he found was encouraging. The postal bonds were “zero coupon”, that
is, unlike most bonds, which pay annual interest instalments, they would
pay nothing until they matured, so investors would have to wait a set
period before pocketing their returns and recovering their original
investment. The bonds promised a return of three times the initial
investment after 12 years—a rate equivalent to 9.6% a year.
Back at his bank, Mr Filotti explained his discovery to a colleague, John
Hunter, who realised that this highly attractive rate would be even more so
if the equally juicy rates on Italian-government bonds were to fall. That
would open a spread between Italy's ordinary borrowings and the postal
bonds, just the kind of “arbitrage” opportunity traders love. But the most
remarkable feature of the offer was that there was no upper limit on how
much could be invested. Nor were there disadvantageous tax obligations for
foreigners.
In fact, the arbitrage quickly disappeared when Italy's interest rates rose
rather than fell. The trading idea sat on a shelf. But, towards the end of
1995, Italy's economy began its path towards convergence with those of the
other countries hoping to join the euro. That meant its interest rates
began to fall. And, in the summer of 1996, they started to fall
dramatically. Suddenly, the Post Office trade was on. Mr Hunter persuaded
his new employer, a big Japanese bank, to buy $50m of the postal bonds.
At this stage, his trade became one of the greatest ever. It also became
amusing. Mr Filotti, who had also gone to work at the same Japanese bank,
flew to Italy and, escorted by police, carried a banker's draft for the
equivalent of $50m into a post office. Queuing up alongside pensioners
claiming their modest weekly infusion, he exchanged the draft for a savings
bond. Soon the certificate was safely lodged in London. With no limit on
the amounts that could be invested, a huge and profitable arbitrage was
there for the taking.
Readers who are not financial experts need not worry about exactly how
banks can exploit such trades, while the experts will understand that the
bonds offered both option and swap opportunities to lock in big profits.
Around the time of the trade, there was also large and unusual activity in
the market for swaptions (options on swaps).
Mr Hunter, however, was unable to persuade his conservative masters to go
further. No matter: he sold the idea for the trade, first to a single rival
bank, then to several others. This set off a mad rush to buy the bonds
before the opportunity disappeared. Bankers flew in droves to Italy,
jostling to be in front of each other in the queue. In double-quick time
UBS bought over $1 billion-worth of the bonds. CSFB bought the most, but,
according to International Financing Review, a trade magazine, later gave
back its profits when the Italian government threatened to withhold
lucrative mandates for privatisations. Nomura made the biggest single
purchase, plonking down $1.1 billion on the counter of a bemused clerk, who
duly filled out a certificate for more than a trillion lire.
Of course, it could not last. After $3.6 billion of the bonds had been
issued in the space of a few days, the Italian government suddenly put a
ceiling on the amount that could be bought and made threats to the banks'
future fee income. Too bad. Mr Hunter, however, is now the chief executive
of Brains, a specialist broker that tries to make money by selling clever
ideas to other traders.
Bubble, bubble, short and double
However, an even better contender for the title must be the trade conceived
by Sir John Templeton to profit from the 1990s internet bubble. A renowned
investor, Sir John will be remembered for many trades, not least the one in
1939 in which he bought shares in 104 almost worthless, and in some cases
already bankrupt, New York stockbrokers. Hitler had just invaded Poland,
and the young Mr Templeton correctly foresaw that abundant surpluses of
goods and commodities would soon become scarcities, leading to a strong
recovery of financial-asset prices. Within three years he had turned a
profit on 100 of the 104 purchases.
Sixty years later, long experience suggested to Sir John that technology
and internet shares were an especially inflated part of a huge bubble. The
problem was to construct an investment strategy that could exploit this.
His solution was ingenious, so much so that it wins the “Wish I'd thought
of that” prize by a mile.
Nomura made the biggest single purchase, plonking down $1.1 billion on the
counter of a bemused clerk, who duly filled out a certificate for more than
a trillion lire
For every flotation there is a “lock-up” period during which insiders at
the company are forbidden to sell any of their shares. Sir John reasoned
that, in a bubble market, these insiders would generally be keen to sell
once they could. After all, this was their only way of getting a lot of
money out of their venture if it was unlikely to mature into a profitable
long-term business and, as insiders, they ought to know better than anyone
that few of their companies were likely to stay the course. So he
systematically sold their shares short just before the end of the lock-up.
That meant he could buy the shares back more cheaply if they fell in price,
as he reckoned they would.
Sir John acted with great discipline. First, he decided to sell only those
shares that were trading at more than three times their original price.
Then he set precise points at which he would take profits if prices
fell—and he would ruthlessly cut his losses if a particular share held up
unexpectedly. In the end he made 84 separate transactions, each for $2.2m.
The results were spectacular. Sir John made a return of almost 50% on his
$185m bet. On some positions, he made profits of more than 90%.
Not bad, but still pretty piffling by Mr Soros's standards. To outdo his $1
billion coup, consider a scheme whose returns have been so great they are
unmeasurable. Fittingly, as the winner of the “greatest trade” title, it
requires only brief description. In 1996 and 1997 Italy (yes, again) was
desperate to reduce its public-sector deficit so that the country would
qualify for entry into the euro. One unintended boost came from the sale of
the postal bonds described above—bizarrely, because they matured after the
euro deadline, they were not counted as current debt. But the stroke of
genius by officials in Italy's finance ministry was to enter into a secret
trade that simultaneously brought in cash, took some debt off the books and
deferred the repayment of the cash and the debt until after the euro
deadline had been successfully reached.
Many economists were amazed when Italy defied expectations to qualify for
the euro. And its admission into the system has been worth an incalculable
fortune. It has brought huge savings via systematically lower interest
rates and greater economic efficiency. Had Italy not qualified, its economy
might have crumbled. Certainly, its public-sector finances would be in dire
straits.
The trade itself was fairly simple, though complicated enough to ensure
that it came to light only in late 2001, when Gustavo Piga, an economics
professor, stumbled across it while studying public-debt policies.
Essentially, Italy used a swap to defer interest payments on an issue of
$1.7 billion of yen-denominated bonds that it had made in 1995, at the same
time taking an up-front payment for the swap that was later repaid with
interest. Thus was Italy able to make it into the euro, merely at the price
of a big repayment on the swap in 1998.
Think of the various elements of the trade. It was bold and risky. It
relied on secrecy. It was brilliantly conceived to solve a specific, and
apparently insurmountable, problem. It was executed with great skill. And,
for a fee, it gave Italy the opportunity to be part of the euro system,
with its incalculable rewards. Part of its appeal is that the profits came
not from the counterparty on the trade itself, but from the economic
consequences of the trade.
Of course, it was also thoroughly dodgy—had it been done by a company, the
management would probably be in prison for cooking the books—though the
Italians have always maintained that it exploited weak rules, rather than
broke strong ones. But there is no need to be churlish. This was, after
all, the greatest trade ever. Bravissimo!

 Why didn't I think of that?
...
ha sbagliato NG... questo incomincia con it. quindi si posta in
Italiano. ;-)

 Italiano. ;-)
So che scherzi, ma mi preme ugualmente puntualizzare di aver riassunto la
parte rilevante dell'articolo, che ho riportato solo come "prova".

 ragionevole.
...
Purtroppo manco nessun uomo che conosco, ma c'è da capirlo... la
tifoseria è tutto quello che si richiede all'elettore Italiano: la
tifoseria se non fa bene alla politica fa certo bene ai politici ed ai
partiti.
saluti
d.aniele

 partiti.
:-(

 vedere...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EXj4_hRIIZA
...
LOL certe dichiarazioni fanno gli fanno onore rispetto al suo modo di
svolgere la sua professione di avvocato immagino.
Cmq tanto per rispettare l'OT e per metterti di buonumore:
http://archinauti.blogspot.com/2007/08/v-day-lo-scandalo-del-portale-italiait.html
poi cerco di smetterla, prometto.
saluti
d.aniele

 
http://archinauti.blogspot.com/2007/08/v-day-lo-scandalo-del-portale-italiait.html
Il filmato l'avevo visto, in originale, a Tetris. Di 
italia.it
 avevo
sentito qualcosa, ma non pensavo che fosse una cosa così rivoltante. 
D'altronde, quando ho cercato di far casino per i 500 milioni dati dalla
Provincia di Genova (allora capeggiata dal nostro attuale sindaco, la
Vincenzi, come se non ci bastasse già avere l'ex-galeotto, idiota e
portasfiga come presidente della Regione, ma a GE vengono eletti quelli
indicati dal PCI, per quanto schifosi possano essere) per il sito
mediaterraneo.it
, nessuno m'è stato a sentire.
In fondo, in proporzione ai i budget, era più costoso della Rutellata...

 wrote:
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Ma ROTFL
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