Newsgroup: it.cultura.filosofia.moderato
Titolo: help - Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie

Non trovo più la pagina dove Heidegger dice all'incirca "bisogna che truppe
e artiglieria siano orientate in modo adeguato". Potrebbe trovarsi anche in
GA 61. Sono grato a chiunque possa aiutarmi, magari dandomi il riferimento
di pagina dell'edizione tedesca.


Il riferimento di pagina all'edizione tedesca (M.Heidegger
Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles. Einführung in die
phänomenologische Forschung , Gesamtausgabe Band 61, Frankfurt: Klostermann,
1985) non l'ho sottomano, però ho trovato una traduzione inglese, se vuoi
(Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle:
Initiation into Phenomenological Research. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz.
Bloomington, IN:  Indiana University Press, 2001) -il riferimento che
cercavi è alla fine, tra asterischi [a pag.15; ossia ricompreso all'interno
della Part II "What is philosophy?", Chap. I "The Task of Definition",  A.
"The Twofold Error in the Overestimation" a) "The uncritical idea of
definition"]
[inizio citazione]
" [p.14] a) The uncritical idea of definition
Two different errors can lead to overestimation. The one error is to accept
uncritically as a norm the idea of definition which develops out of a
certain formal logic. To this norm a universally valid determination of the
sense of philosophy has to comply. Defining then takes its direction from
the conceptual structures of the object which are pre-given in the very idea
of definition: definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam.
["Definition is made through the nearest genus and the specific
difference."] Insofar as we accept this idea of definition, in some way or
another, as the guideline -which we also do if we declare resignedly that it
could (unfortunately) never be satisfied with regard to ultimate objects
without our falling into the circle strictly forbidden by the same logic
which is the origin of that idea of definition- insofar as we accept this
norm of definition, we take philosophy as an object of the same character as
the objects the just-named concept of definition is meant to fit and whose
mode of apprehension justifies it: the rose is [p.15] a plant, a plant is an
organism, etc. For quite definite regions of objects and for objects
intended in one particular cognitive context, this norm of definition is
meaningful.
Philosophy is something; formally speaking, it is an object. But is it an
object of the character of a rose, i.e., a thing, an article? Can philosophy
be understood as such an object, i.e., understood in advance and implicitly
as an object included in the purview of the just-named norm of definition?
It is important, right at the beginning of our consideration, to grasp the
original sense of definition, from which the usual idea of definition is but
a particular derivative. Definitio: decisio, determinatio alicuius dicitur,
quod tenendum et credendum declaratur, manifestatur et indicatur.
['Definition is said to be a decision about or a determination of something,
which determination is declared, manifested, and indicated as having to be
held and believed.'] The genuine bearing of the definition! The full
definition is not merely its content, the proposition!
Within its own realm of validity, the usual idea of definition has this
peculiarity that, with respect to the normative way of grasping things in
such a realm, the definition determines the object properly and securely.
And although we can indeed always add illustrating cases, these contribute
nothing fundamental.
This moment, however, does not pertain to every definition; indeed, there
are definitions which present the object indeterminately, though in such a
way that the actualization of the understanding of the particular definition
leads to correct possibilities of more precise determination. There are
definitions which merely introduce the concomitant full determination. *They
do provide a first impetus, but -if a misplaced image be allowed- alignment
and troop strength must still be surveyed, munitions prepared, and the
position of the object reconnoitered* ".
[fine citazione]
Un saluto,
Nico

oddio, non volevo farti perdere così tanto tempo, era sufficiente
un'indicazione approssimativa. mi capita spesso di non ritrovare più il
luogo di alcune frasi che mi ritornano in mente.
Grazie per l'attenzione e soprattutto per la celerità, a buon rendere.
Se poi per caso ti interessa il tema dell'indicazione formale sarebbe utile
scambiarsi qualche riferimento bibliografico sull'argomento (non molto
studiato), mi sembra di aver letto tutto (almeno in italiano, un po' meno in
inglese e tedesco), ma trovo sempre qualcosa che mi era sfuggito (p. es.
un'articolo di un tale Dahlstrom, magari lo possiedi...).
Comunque sia, grazie ancora,
ste

 Nico
Un saluto,
Chérie