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{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "433 U.S. 334, 334", "parenthetical": "Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification exception is \"extremely narrow\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (4th Cir.1987) (citation omitted) (employer has burden to prove that gender-based distinction is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business”); see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334, 97 S.Ct. 2720 (Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification exception is “extremely narrow”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "818 F.2d 1114, 1117-18", "parenthetical": "employer has burden to prove that gender-based distinction is \"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (4th Cir.1987) (citation omitted) (employer has burden to prove that gender-based distinction is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business”); see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334, 97 S.Ct. 2720 (Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification exception is “extremely narrow”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "818 F.2d 1114, 1117-18", "parenthetical": "employer has burden to prove that gender-based distinction is \"reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (4th Cir.1987) (citation omitted) (employer has burden to prove that gender-based distinction is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business”); see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334, 97 S.Ct. 2720 (Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification exception is “extremely narrow”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification exception is \"extremely narrow\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1117-18 (4th Cir.1987) (citation omitted) (employer has burden to prove that gender-based distinction is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business”); see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334, 97 S.Ct. 2720 (Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification exception is “extremely narrow”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "179 P.3d 998, 1008", "parenthetical": "although appellate courts generally do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal, court addressed unpreserved legal issue of contract construction where no material facts were in dispute", "sentence": "Blades v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317, 322, 323 (Colo.1985) (court considered plaintiffs' objections to peremptory challenges notwithstanding that they did not cite C.R.C.P. 47(h)); BS & C Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Barnett, 186 P.3d 128, 130 (Colo.App.2008) (court addressed defendant's argument regarding motion to set aside default judgment, even though he did not cite C.R.C.P. 55(b), concluding that his argument \"sufficed to focus the trial court's attention on the correct issue\"); see also Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1008 (Colo.2008) (although appellate courts generally do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal, court addressed unpreserved legal issue of contract construction where no material facts were in dispute)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "704 P.2d 317, 322, 323", "parenthetical": "court considered plaintiffs' objections to peremptory challenges notwithstanding that they did not cite C.R.C.P. 47(h", "sentence": "Blades v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317, 322, 323 (Colo.1985) (court considered plaintiffs' objections to peremptory challenges notwithstanding that they did not cite C.R.C.P. 47(h)); BS & C Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Barnett, 186 P.3d 128, 130 (Colo.App.2008) (court addressed defendant's argument regarding motion to set aside default judgment, even though he did not cite C.R.C.P. 55(b), concluding that his argument \"sufficed to focus the trial court's attention on the correct issue\"); see also Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1008 (Colo.2008) (although appellate courts generally do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal, court addressed unpreserved legal issue of contract construction where no material facts were in dispute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "179 P.3d 998, 1008", "parenthetical": "although appellate courts generally do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal, court addressed unpreserved legal issue of contract construction where no material facts were in dispute", "sentence": "Blades v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317, 322, 323 (Colo.1985) (court considered plaintiffs' objections to peremptory challenges notwithstanding that they did not cite C.R.C.P. 47(h)); BS & C Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Barnett, 186 P.3d 128, 130 (Colo.App.2008) (court addressed defendant's argument regarding motion to set aside default judgment, even though he did not cite C.R.C.P. 55(b), concluding that his argument \"sufficed to focus the trial court's attention on the correct issue\"); see also Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1008 (Colo.2008) (although appellate courts generally do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal, court addressed unpreserved legal issue of contract construction where no material facts were in dispute)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "186 P.3d 128, 130", "parenthetical": "court addressed defendant's argument regarding motion to set aside default judgment, even though he did not cite C.R.C.P. 55(b", "sentence": "Blades v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d 317, 322, 323 (Colo.1985) (court considered plaintiffs' objections to peremptory challenges notwithstanding that they did not cite C.R.C.P. 47(h)); BS & C Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Barnett, 186 P.3d 128, 130 (Colo.App.2008) (court addressed defendant's argument regarding motion to set aside default judgment, even though he did not cite C.R.C.P. 55(b), concluding that his argument \"sufficed to focus the trial court's attention on the correct issue\"); see also Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1008 (Colo.2008) (although appellate courts generally do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal, court addressed unpreserved legal issue of contract construction where no material facts were in dispute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "62 F.2d 261, 271", "parenthetical": "selection of bystander jurors by \"interested\" marshal under repealed federal statute", "sentence": "See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1978) (unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff’s personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors); cf. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 271 (8th Cir.1933) (selection of bystander jurors by “interested” marshal under repealed federal statute), cert, denied, 289 U.S. 733, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. 1481 (1933)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "581 F.2d 172, 174-75", "parenthetical": "unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff's personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors", "sentence": "See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1978) (unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff’s personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors); cf. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 271 (8th Cir.1933) (selection of bystander jurors by “interested” marshal under repealed federal statute), cert, denied, 289 U.S. 733, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. 1481 (1933)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "581 F.2d 172, 174-75", "parenthetical": "unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff's personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors", "sentence": "See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1978) (unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff’s personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors); cf. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 271 (8th Cir.1933) (selection of bystander jurors by “interested” marshal under repealed federal statute), cert, denied, 289 U.S. 733, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. 1481 (1933)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "selection of bystander jurors by \"interested\" marshal under repealed federal statute", "sentence": "See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1978) (unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff’s personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors); cf. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 271 (8th Cir.1933) (selection of bystander jurors by “interested” marshal under repealed federal statute), cert, denied, 289 U.S. 733, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. 1481 (1933)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "selection of bystander jurors by \"interested\" marshal under repealed federal statute", "sentence": "See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1978) (unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff’s personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors); cf. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 271 (8th Cir.1933) (selection of bystander jurors by “interested” marshal under repealed federal statute), cert, denied, 289 U.S. 733, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. 1481 (1933)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "581 F.2d 172, 174-75", "parenthetical": "unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff's personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors", "sentence": "See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1978) (unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff’s personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors); cf. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 271 (8th Cir.1933) (selection of bystander jurors by “interested” marshal under repealed federal statute), cert, denied, 289 U.S. 733, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. 1481 (1933)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "selection of bystander jurors by \"interested\" marshal under repealed federal statute", "sentence": "See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1978) (unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff’s personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors); cf. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 271 (8th Cir.1933) (selection of bystander jurors by “interested” marshal under repealed federal statute), cert, denied, 289 U.S. 733, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. 1481 (1933)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "581 F.2d 172, 174-75", "parenthetical": "unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff's personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors", "sentence": "See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1978) (unconstitutional underrepresentation of blacks on master jury list was not cured, by sheriff’s personal selection of blacks as bystander jurors); cf. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 271 (8th Cir.1933) (selection of bystander jurors by “interested” marshal under repealed federal statute), cert, denied, 289 U.S. 733, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. 1481 (1933)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs", "sentence": "See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (holding that plaintiff “tendfed]” to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where “testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having ‘a yellow streak’ up his back ‘a foot wide’, and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife’s] chastity and virtue in a gross manner”); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, 294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (1982) (finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff \"tendfed]\" to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where \"testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having 'a yellow streak' up his back 'a foot wide', and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife's] chastity and virtue in a gross manner\"", "sentence": "See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (holding that plaintiff “tendfed]” to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where “testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having ‘a yellow streak’ up his back ‘a foot wide’, and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife’s] chastity and virtue in a gross manner”); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, 294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (1982) (finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff \"tendfed]\" to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where \"testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having 'a yellow streak' up his back 'a foot wide', and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife's] chastity and virtue in a gross manner\"", "sentence": "See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (holding that plaintiff “tendfed]” to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where “testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having ‘a yellow streak’ up his back ‘a foot wide’, and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife’s] chastity and virtue in a gross manner”); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, 294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (1982) (finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67", "parenthetical": "finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs", "sentence": "See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (holding that plaintiff “tendfed]” to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where “testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having ‘a yellow streak’ up his back ‘a foot wide’, and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife’s] chastity and virtue in a gross manner”); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, 294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (1982) (finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs", "sentence": "See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (holding that plaintiff “tendfed]” to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where “testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having ‘a yellow streak’ up his back ‘a foot wide’, and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife’s] chastity and virtue in a gross manner”); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, 294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (1982) (finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "354 S.E.2d 413, 414", "parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff \"tendfed]\" to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where \"testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having 'a yellow streak' up his back 'a foot wide', and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife's] chastity and virtue in a gross manner\"", "sentence": "See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (holding that plaintiff “tendfed]” to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where “testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having ‘a yellow streak’ up his back ‘a foot wide’, and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife’s] chastity and virtue in a gross manner”); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, 294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (1982) (finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "354 S.E.2d 413, 414", "parenthetical": "holding that plaintiff \"tendfed]\" to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where \"testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having 'a yellow streak' up his back 'a foot wide', and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife's] chastity and virtue in a gross manner\"", "sentence": "See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (holding that plaintiff “tendfed]” to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where “testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having ‘a yellow streak’ up his back ‘a foot wide’, and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife’s] chastity and virtue in a gross manner”); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, 294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (1982) (finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67", "parenthetical": "finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs", "sentence": "See Mauck, 280 S.E.2d at 219; compare with Covey v. Fields, 177 W.Va. 481, 354 S.E.2d 413, 414 (1987) (holding that plaintiff “tendfed]” to make out a prima facie case under section 55-7-2 where “testimony was given to the effect that [defendant] had accused [plaintiff] of having ‘a yellow streak’ up his back ‘a foot wide’, and that [defendant] threatened to either pound or grind [plaintiffs] head into the sidewalk upon their next meeting ..., accused [plaintiff] of participating in homosexual and Oedipal dalliances, and attributed to him a canine lineage- ... [and] impugned [plaintiffs wife’s] chastity and virtue in a gross manner”); see also Cunningham v. Martin, 170 W.Va. 411, 294 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (1982) (finding error in a jury instruction regarding section 55-7-2 where words were, overall, not vituperative epithets or racial slurs)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "6 F.Supp.2d 178, 186", "parenthetical": "denying due process challenge to arbitral award because \"private arbitrators are not state actors and, absent state action, there can be no violation of [the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments]\"", "sentence": "Porush v. Lemire, 6 F.Supp.2d 178, 186 (E.D.N.Y.1998)(denying due process challenge to arbitral award because “private arbitrators are not state actors and, absent state action, there can be no violation of [the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments]”); See also, United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 708 F.Supp. 95, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y.1989)(finding that a petitioner claiming that his due process rights were violated by an arbitration panel’s methods had “failed to demonstrate any state action which would trigger the applicability of the due process clause.”)" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "708 F.Supp. 95, 96-97", "parenthetical": "finding that a petitioner claiming that his due process rights were violated by an arbitration panel's methods had \"failed to demonstrate any state action which would trigger the applicability of the due process clause.\"", "sentence": "Porush v. Lemire, 6 F.Supp.2d 178, 186 (E.D.N.Y.1998)(denying due process challenge to arbitral award because “private arbitrators are not state actors and, absent state action, there can be no violation of [the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments]”); See also, United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 708 F.Supp. 95, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y.1989)(finding that a petitioner claiming that his due process rights were violated by an arbitration panel’s methods had “failed to demonstrate any state action which would trigger the applicability of the due process clause.”)" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "466 U.S. 109, 113", "parenthetical": "holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, \"[a] 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "510 U.S. 49, 49", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good's home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "510 U.S. 49, 49", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good's home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656", "parenthetical": "holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, \"[a] 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "510 U.S. 49, 49", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good's home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, \"[a] 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "114 S.Ct. 498, 498", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good's home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "466 U.S. 109, 113", "parenthetical": "holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, \"[a] 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656", "parenthetical": "holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, \"[a] 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "114 S.Ct. 498, 498", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good's home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "114 S.Ct. 498, 498", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good's home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, \"[a] 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property\"", "sentence": "See Good, 510 U.S. at 49, 114 S.Ct. at 498 (stating that “[t]he Government does not, and could not, dispute that the seizure of Good’s home and four-acre parcel deprived him of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause”); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (holding that, in the Fourth Amendment context, “[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "945 F.2d 881, 888", "parenthetical": "presuming that in eases such as ours, where the government offers no evidence of guilt, the judge would enter a finding of not guilty prior to any possible testimony from the accused while affirming that, if an accused testifies, that testimony might become \"evidence of guilt to add to the other evidence.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1325-26 (11th Cir.2004); United States v. McCarrick, 294 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir.2002); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 868 (4th Cir.1996) (“Thus, Burgos’s lying on the stand may have aided in establishing the fact that he was guilty.”) (emphasis added); Pleasant, 71 M.J. at 713; see also United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 888 (7th Cir.1991) (presuming that in eases such as ours, where the government offers no evidence of guilt, the judge would enter a finding of not guilty prior to any possible testimony from the accused while affirming that, if an accused testifies, that testimony might become “evidence of guilt to add to the other evidence.”) (emphasis added)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "94 F.3d 849, 868", "parenthetical": "\"Thus, Burgos's lying on the stand may have aided in establishing the fact that he was guilty.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1325-26 (11th Cir.2004); United States v. McCarrick, 294 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir.2002); United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 868 (4th Cir.1996) (“Thus, Burgos’s lying on the stand may have aided in establishing the fact that he was guilty.”) (emphasis added); Pleasant, 71 M.J. at 713; see also United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 888 (7th Cir.1991) (presuming that in eases such as ours, where the government offers no evidence of guilt, the judge would enter a finding of not guilty prior to any possible testimony from the accused while affirming that, if an accused testifies, that testimony might become “evidence of guilt to add to the other evidence.”) (emphasis added)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "715 F.2d 784, 786", "parenthetical": "state regulation setting maximum commission that life insurance salesmen may earn saved from preemption", "sentence": "See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744, 105 S.Ct. at 2391 (finding no “contrary case authority suggesting that laws regulating the terms of insurance contracts should not be understood as laws that regulate insurance”); cf. American Progressive Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983) (state regulation setting maximum commission that life insurance salesmen may earn saved from preemption)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "471 U.S. 744, 744", "parenthetical": "finding no \"contrary case authority suggesting that laws regulating the terms of insurance contracts should not be understood as laws that regulate insurance\"", "sentence": "See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744, 105 S.Ct. at 2391 (finding no “contrary case authority suggesting that laws regulating the terms of insurance contracts should not be understood as laws that regulate insurance”); cf. American Progressive Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983) (state regulation setting maximum commission that life insurance salesmen may earn saved from preemption)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "715 F.2d 784, 786", "parenthetical": "state regulation setting maximum commission that life insurance salesmen may earn saved from preemption", "sentence": "See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744, 105 S.Ct. at 2391 (finding no “contrary case authority suggesting that laws regulating the terms of insurance contracts should not be understood as laws that regulate insurance”); cf. American Progressive Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983) (state regulation setting maximum commission that life insurance salesmen may earn saved from preemption)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "105 S.Ct. 2391, 2391", "parenthetical": "finding no \"contrary case authority suggesting that laws regulating the terms of insurance contracts should not be understood as laws that regulate insurance\"", "sentence": "See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744, 105 S.Ct. at 2391 (finding no “contrary case authority suggesting that laws regulating the terms of insurance contracts should not be understood as laws that regulate insurance”); cf. American Progressive Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir.1983) (state regulation setting maximum commission that life insurance salesmen may earn saved from preemption)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "750 F.3d 273, 297-300", "parenthetical": "evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for malicious prosecution brought against investigating police officers", "sentence": "See also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir.2010) (interpreting Hartman to require “that plaintiffs bringing retaliatory prosecution claims must allege and prove lack of probable cause as an element of causation ” and not as the entirety of the causation analysis (emphasis added)); see also Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 09-cv-5505, 2014 WL 3952936, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 12, 2014) (evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for retaliatory inducement to prosecution); cf. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 297-300 (3d Cir. 2014) (evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for malicious prosecution brought against investigating police officers)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "598 F.3d 139, 154", "parenthetical": "interpreting Hartman to require \"that plaintiffs bringing retaliatory prosecution claims must allege and prove lack of probable cause as an element of causation \" and not as the entirety of the causation analysis (emphasis added", "sentence": "See also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir.2010) (interpreting Hartman to require “that plaintiffs bringing retaliatory prosecution claims must allege and prove lack of probable cause as an element of causation ” and not as the entirety of the causation analysis (emphasis added)); see also Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 09-cv-5505, 2014 WL 3952936, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 12, 2014) (evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for retaliatory inducement to prosecution); cf. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 297-300 (3d Cir. 2014) (evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for malicious prosecution brought against investigating police officers)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2014 WL 3952936, at *4", "parenthetical": "evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for retaliatory inducement to prosecution", "sentence": "See also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir.2010) (interpreting Hartman to require “that plaintiffs bringing retaliatory prosecution claims must allege and prove lack of probable cause as an element of causation ” and not as the entirety of the causation analysis (emphasis added)); see also Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 09-cv-5505, 2014 WL 3952936, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 12, 2014) (evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for retaliatory inducement to prosecution); cf. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 297-300 (3d Cir. 2014) (evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for malicious prosecution brought against investigating police officers)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "750 F.3d 273, 297-300", "parenthetical": "evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for malicious prosecution brought against investigating police officers", "sentence": "See also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir.2010) (interpreting Hartman to require “that plaintiffs bringing retaliatory prosecution claims must allege and prove lack of probable cause as an element of causation ” and not as the entirety of the causation analysis (emphasis added)); see also Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 09-cv-5505, 2014 WL 3952936, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 12, 2014) (evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for retaliatory inducement to prosecution); cf. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 297-300 (3d Cir. 2014) (evaluating causation and lack of probable cause as distinct elements in claim for malicious prosecution brought against investigating police officers)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "461 U.S. 138, 142", "parenthetical": "\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "543 U.S. 77, 80", "parenthetical": "\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "543 U.S. 77, 80", "parenthetical": "\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "543 U.S. 77, 80", "parenthetical": "\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "461 U.S. 138, 142", "parenthetical": "\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "461 U.S. 138, 142", "parenthetical": "\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.\"", "sentence": "See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (\"[A] government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment.”); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (\"For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "appellant's period of incarceration by foreign civil authorities was not accountable to the government", "sentence": "See also United States v. Smith, 5 M.J. 525 (N.C.M.R.1978), pet. denied, 5 M.J. 324 (C.M.A.1978) (appellant’s period of incarceration by foreign civil authorities was not accountable to the government)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "unauthorized absence tolled the statute but did not reset the clock to zero", "sentence": "But see United States v. Lilly, 22 M.J. 620 (N.M.C.M.R.1986) (unauthorized absence tolled the statute but did not reset the clock to zero)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "unauthorized absence tolled the statute but did not reset the clock to zero", "sentence": "But see United States v. Lilly, 22 M.J. 620 (N.M.C.M.R.1986) (unauthorized absence tolled the statute but did not reset the clock to zero)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "appellant's period of incarceration by foreign civil authorities was not accountable to the government", "sentence": "See also United States v. Smith, 5 M.J. 525 (N.C.M.R.1978), pet. denied, 5 M.J. 324 (C.M.A.1978) (appellant’s period of incarceration by foreign civil authorities was not accountable to the government)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "480 U.S. 235, 235", "parenthetical": "reading Martin to permit states to require the defendant to prove self-defense even where an element of the crime implies the absence of self-defense", "sentence": "But see Smart v. Leeke, 873 F.2d 1558 (4th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (reading Martin to permit states to require the defendant to prove self-defense even where an element of the crime implies the absence of self-defense). In Martin, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that because under Ohio law any murder must be unlawful, a valid claim of self-defense would negate an element of the crime. 480 U.S. at 235. However, the Court specifically relied on state court interpretations of Ohio law, which did not include the absence of self-defense in the definition of unlawfulness. Id." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "632 F.2d 605, 619-36", "parenthetical": "because Georgia defines voluntary manslaughter to include element of unlawfulness, jury instructions which required the defendant to prove self-defense contravened due process", "sentence": "See Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 619-36 (5th Cir. 1980) (because Georgia defines voluntary manslaughter to include element of unlawfulness, jury instructions which required the defendant to prove self-defense contravened due process), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "480 U.S. 235, 235", "parenthetical": "reading Martin to permit states to require the defendant to prove self-defense even where an element of the crime implies the absence of self-defense", "sentence": "But see Smart v. Leeke, 873 F.2d 1558 (4th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (reading Martin to permit states to require the defendant to prove self-defense even where an element of the crime implies the absence of self-defense). In Martin, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that because under Ohio law any murder must be unlawful, a valid claim of self-defense would negate an element of the crime. 480 U.S. at 235. However, the Court specifically relied on state court interpretations of Ohio law, which did not include the absence of self-defense in the definition of unlawfulness. Id." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "because Georgia defines voluntary manslaughter to include element of unlawfulness, jury instructions which required the defendant to prove self-defense contravened due process", "sentence": "See Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 619-36 (5th Cir. 1980) (because Georgia defines voluntary manslaughter to include element of unlawfulness, jury instructions which required the defendant to prove self-defense contravened due process), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1028 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "determining that Utah Construction's fairness standards were met \"at all levels of the administrative process\"", "sentence": "See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1038 (stating that preclusive effect may be given to an administrative decision where “the agency adjudication meets the requirements of due process, and de novo judicial review is available”) (emphasis added); see also Misischia, 60 F.3d 626 (determining that Utah Construction’s fairness standards were met “at all levels of the administrative process”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "39 F.3d 1038, 1038", "parenthetical": "stating that preclusive effect may be given to an administrative decision where \"the agency adjudication meets the requirements of due process, and de novo judicial review is available\"", "sentence": "See Miller, 39 F.3d at 1038 (stating that preclusive effect may be given to an administrative decision where “the agency adjudication meets the requirements of due process, and de novo judicial review is available”) (emphasis added); see also Misischia, 60 F.3d 626 (determining that Utah Construction’s fairness standards were met “at all levels of the administrative process”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "35 Conn. App. 566, 580", "parenthetical": "\"As we stated previously, the defendant's intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court's refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Wieler, 35 Conn. App. 566, 580, 645 A.2d 1032 (1994) (“As we stated previously, the defendant’s intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.”), aff'd, 233 Conn. 552, 660 A.2d 740 (1995) (per curiam); contra State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 568, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982) (discussing permanency element with regard to “deprive” prong of larceny statute)." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": "186 Conn. 555, 568", "parenthetical": "discussing permanency element with regard to \"deprive\" prong of larceny statute", "sentence": "See State v. Wieler, 35 Conn. App. 566, 580, 645 A.2d 1032 (1994) (“As we stated previously, the defendant’s intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.”), aff'd, 233 Conn. 552, 660 A.2d 740 (1995) (per curiam); contra State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 568, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982) (discussing permanency element with regard to “deprive” prong of larceny statute)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "35 Conn. App. 566, 580", "parenthetical": "\"As we stated previously, the defendant's intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court's refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Wieler, 35 Conn. App. 566, 580, 645 A.2d 1032 (1994) (“As we stated previously, the defendant’s intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.”), aff'd, 233 Conn. 552, 660 A.2d 740 (1995) (per curiam); contra State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 568, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982) (discussing permanency element with regard to “deprive” prong of larceny statute)." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing permanency element with regard to \"deprive\" prong of larceny statute", "sentence": "See State v. Wieler, 35 Conn. App. 566, 580, 645 A.2d 1032 (1994) (“As we stated previously, the defendant’s intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.”), aff'd, 233 Conn. 552, 660 A.2d 740 (1995) (per curiam); contra State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 568, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982) (discussing permanency element with regard to “deprive” prong of larceny statute)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"As we stated previously, the defendant's intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court's refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Wieler, 35 Conn. App. 566, 580, 645 A.2d 1032 (1994) (“As we stated previously, the defendant’s intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.”), aff'd, 233 Conn. 552, 660 A.2d 740 (1995) (per curiam); contra State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 568, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982) (discussing permanency element with regard to “deprive” prong of larceny statute)." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": "186 Conn. 555, 568", "parenthetical": "discussing permanency element with regard to \"deprive\" prong of larceny statute", "sentence": "See State v. Wieler, 35 Conn. App. 566, 580, 645 A.2d 1032 (1994) (“As we stated previously, the defendant’s intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.”), aff'd, 233 Conn. 552, 660 A.2d 740 (1995) (per curiam); contra State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 568, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982) (discussing permanency element with regard to “deprive” prong of larceny statute)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"As we stated previously, the defendant's intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court's refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Wieler, 35 Conn. App. 566, 580, 645 A.2d 1032 (1994) (“As we stated previously, the defendant’s intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.”), aff'd, 233 Conn. 552, 660 A.2d 740 (1995) (per curiam); contra State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 568, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982) (discussing permanency element with regard to “deprive” prong of larceny statute)." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing permanency element with regard to \"deprive\" prong of larceny statute", "sentence": "See State v. Wieler, 35 Conn. App. 566, 580, 645 A.2d 1032 (1994) (“As we stated previously, the defendant’s intent permanently to deprive the associations of their property is not an essential element of the offense of larceny by embezzlement. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on it misled the jury.”), aff'd, 233 Conn. 552, 660 A.2d 740 (1995) (per curiam); contra State v. Kurvin, 186 Conn. 555, 568, 442 A.2d 1327 (1982) (discussing permanency element with regard to “deprive” prong of larceny statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "316 F.3d 619, 619", "parenthetical": "\"The question of whether an alien was lawfully admitted is answered, not by the law at the time of naturalization, but by the law at the time of entry.\"", "sentence": "Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 514, 101 S.Ct. 737; Tittjung, 235 F.3d at 339 (“[Ljawful admission is based on the circumstances as they existed at the time of initial entry.”); see also Dailide, 316 F.3d at 619 (“The question of whether an alien was lawfully admitted is answered, not by the law at the time of naturalization, but by the law at the time of entry.”). Because they arrived at different times, the two men in his hypothetical would be treated differently: the immigrant who entered the country in 1950 would be subject to denaturalization, while the immigrant who entered after the effective date of the INA would not." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "235 F.3d 339, 339", "parenthetical": "\"[Ljawful admission is based on the circumstances as they existed at the time of initial entry.\"", "sentence": "Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 514, 101 S.Ct. 737; Tittjung, 235 F.3d at 339 (“[Ljawful admission is based on the circumstances as they existed at the time of initial entry.”); see also Dailide, 316 F.3d at 619 (“The question of whether an alien was lawfully admitted is answered, not by the law at the time of naturalization, but by the law at the time of entry.”). Because they arrived at different times, the two men in his hypothetical would be treated differently: the immigrant who entered the country in 1950 would be subject to denaturalization, while the immigrant who entered after the effective date of the INA would not." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "55 A.D.2d 668, 668", "parenthetical": "holding that an insolvent corporation's salary payments to a corporate officer did not lack fair consideration because there was \"no evidence that [the] salary was either excessive or unreasonable, or that the corporation did not receive full value in return\"", "sentence": "See Frank, 48 F.3d at 635 (holding that the exception for repayment of an insider’s antecedent debt did not apply to a debtor’s conveyance of two mortgages to a former officer, “regardless of whether she was a corporate insider, because each of her mortgages secured a contemporaneous advance of funds, not a pre-existing debt”); see also Cilco Cement Corp. v. White, 55 A.D.2d 668, 668, 390 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep’t 1976) (holding that an insolvent corporation’s salary payments to a corporate officer did not lack fair consideration because there was “no evidence that [the] salary was either excessive or unreasonable, or that the corporation did not receive full value in return”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "48 F.3d 635, 635", "parenthetical": "holding that the exception for repayment of an insider's antecedent debt did not apply to a debtor's conveyance of two mortgages to a former officer, \"regardless of whether she was a corporate insider, because each of her mortgages secured a contemporaneous advance of funds, not a pre-existing debt\"", "sentence": "See Frank, 48 F.3d at 635 (holding that the exception for repayment of an insider’s antecedent debt did not apply to a debtor’s conveyance of two mortgages to a former officer, “regardless of whether she was a corporate insider, because each of her mortgages secured a contemporaneous advance of funds, not a pre-existing debt”); see also Cilco Cement Corp. v. White, 55 A.D.2d 668, 668, 390 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep’t 1976) (holding that an insolvent corporation’s salary payments to a corporate officer did not lack fair consideration because there was “no evidence that [the] salary was either excessive or unreasonable, or that the corporation did not receive full value in return”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "48 F.3d 635, 635", "parenthetical": "holding that the exception for repayment of an insider's antecedent debt did not apply to a debtor's conveyance of two mortgages to a former officer, \"regardless of whether she was a corporate insider, because each of her mortgages secured a contemporaneous advance of funds, not a pre-existing debt\"", "sentence": "See Frank, 48 F.3d at 635 (holding that the exception for repayment of an insider’s antecedent debt did not apply to a debtor’s conveyance of two mortgages to a former officer, “regardless of whether she was a corporate insider, because each of her mortgages secured a contemporaneous advance of funds, not a pre-existing debt”); see also Cilco Cement Corp. v. White, 55 A.D.2d 668, 668, 390 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep’t 1976) (holding that an insolvent corporation’s salary payments to a corporate officer did not lack fair consideration because there was “no evidence that [the] salary was either excessive or unreasonable, or that the corporation did not receive full value in return”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that an insolvent corporation's salary payments to a corporate officer did not lack fair consideration because there was \"no evidence that [the] salary was either excessive or unreasonable, or that the corporation did not receive full value in return\"", "sentence": "See Frank, 48 F.3d at 635 (holding that the exception for repayment of an insider’s antecedent debt did not apply to a debtor’s conveyance of two mortgages to a former officer, “regardless of whether she was a corporate insider, because each of her mortgages secured a contemporaneous advance of funds, not a pre-existing debt”); see also Cilco Cement Corp. v. White, 55 A.D.2d 668, 668, 390 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep’t 1976) (holding that an insolvent corporation’s salary payments to a corporate officer did not lack fair consideration because there was “no evidence that [the] salary was either excessive or unreasonable, or that the corporation did not receive full value in return”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "421 F.3d 1119, 1123", "parenthetical": "\"We determine whether a defendant possesses the conditional intent necessary to support a carjacking conviction by considering the totality of the circumstances.\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir.2000) (“[I]t is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the words and actions of the defendants sufficiently demonstrate a conditional intent to cause serious bodily harm.” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Vallejos, 421 F.3d 1119, 1123 (10th Cir.2005) (“We determine whether a defendant possesses the conditional intent necessary to support a carjacking conviction by considering the totality of the circumstances.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "222 F.3d 1286, 1291", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the words and actions of the defendants sufficiently demonstrate a conditional intent to cause serious bodily harm.\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir.2000) (“[I]t is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the words and actions of the defendants sufficiently demonstrate a conditional intent to cause serious bodily harm.” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Vallejos, 421 F.3d 1119, 1123 (10th Cir.2005) (“We determine whether a defendant possesses the conditional intent necessary to support a carjacking conviction by considering the totality of the circumstances.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted))." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "759 F.2d 1113, 1113", "parenthetical": "\"Appellants' conclusory allegations of a spillover effect do not meet their burden for justifying a reversal.\"", "sentence": "Adams, 759 F.2d at 1113 (“Appellants’ conclusory allegations of a spillover effect do not meet their burden for justifying a reversal.”); see also United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir.1981) (“Mere allegations of prejudice are not enough[,] and it is not sufficient simply to establish that severance would improve the defendant’s chance of acquittal.”). The Government presented the evidence of Savage’s intimidation and retaliation in a separate portion of the trial, and it was clear from the indictment and the evidence that only Savage was involved in that conduct." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "647 F.2d 397, 400", "parenthetical": "\"Mere allegations of prejudice are not enough[,] and it is not sufficient simply to establish that severance would improve the defendant's chance of acquittal.\"", "sentence": "Adams, 759 F.2d at 1113 (“Appellants’ conclusory allegations of a spillover effect do not meet their burden for justifying a reversal.”); see also United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 400 (3d Cir.1981) (“Mere allegations of prejudice are not enough[,] and it is not sufficient simply to establish that severance would improve the defendant’s chance of acquittal.”). The Government presented the evidence of Savage’s intimidation and retaliation in a separate portion of the trial, and it was clear from the indictment and the evidence that only Savage was involved in that conduct." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "541 F.2d 601, 605", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "659 F.2d 293, 297", "parenthetical": "\"The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer's implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "541 F.2d 601, 605", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "659 F.2d 293, 297", "parenthetical": "\"The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer's implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "541 F.2d 601, 605", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "659 F.2d 293, 297", "parenthetical": "\"The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer's implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "541 F.2d 601, 605", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "659 F.2d 293, 297", "parenthetical": "\"The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer's implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held \"irreparably suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "652 F.2d 559, 570", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "541 F.2d 601, 605", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "652 F.2d 559, 570", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "652 F.2d 559, 570", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "652 F.2d 559, 570", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "659 F.2d 293, 297", "parenthetical": "\"The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer's implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "652 F.2d 559, 570", "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "541 F.2d 601, 605", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "659 F.2d 293, 297", "parenthetical": "\"The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer's implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "541 F.2d 601, 605", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "659 F.2d 293, 297", "parenthetical": "\"The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer's implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "541 F.2d 601, 605", "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held \"impermissi-bly suggestive\"", "sentence": "O’Brien v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1139, 1140-41 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918, 83 L.Ed.2d 931 (1985) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of five other subjects held “irreparably suggestive”); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 570 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982) (photographic line-up composed of a color photograph of the defendant and black and white photographs of eleven other subjects held “impermissi-bly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "659 F.2d 293, 297", "parenthetical": "\"The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer's implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Ayendes, 541 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063, 97 S.Ct. 789, 50 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977) (“It is clear that the procedure of using a display composed of three typical black and white mug shots, a single color picture of each of the defendants with no police information similar to that on the mug shots and a color group photo in which both of the defendants appeared was suggestive”); Styers v. Smith, 659 F.2d 293, 297 (2nd Cir.1981) (“The dramatic difference between the color shots and the black and white mug shots, combined with the officer’s implication that [the witness] was expected to choose a couple of photos, was highly suggestive”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "77 W.Va. 487, 490-91", "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "87 S.E. 862, 863", "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "77 W.Va. 487, 490-91", "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "87 S.E. 862, 863", "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.\"", "sentence": "See Syllabus Point 1, Foughty v. Ott, 80 W.Va. 88, 92 S.E. 143 (1917) (“An employee employed by any person, firm, association or corporation, in carrying on any form of industry or business in this state, and who is not employed wholly without the state, is an employee protected by the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, though his injuries or death be sustained while performing some of his duties in an adjoining state.”); Syllabus, Fausnet v. State Workers’ Compensation Comm’r, 174 W.Va. 489, 327 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (a West Virginia resident who is injured in another state in the course of and resulting from his employment is enti- tied to seek benefits under our workers’ compensation scheme if the employment in the other state is temporary or transitory in nature within the meaning of W. Va.Code 23-2-1, 1a." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "the Workers' Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that \"the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state\"", "sentence": "See also Gooding v. Ott, 77 W.Va. 487, 490-91, 87 S.E. 862, 863 (1916), overruled, on other grounds, by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978) (the Workers’ Compensation Act was not intended to deprive a West Virginia employee of protection based on the mere fortuity that the employee was injured in another state, and noting that it is well settled that “the legislature had the power to extend the benefits and privileges of the [Workers Compensation Act] to employers and employees outside the state”) overruled on other grounds by Lester v. State Workmen’s Compensation Comm’r, 161 W.Va. 299, 242 S.E.2d 443 (1978)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "83 Ga. 549, 550-551", "parenthetical": "convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }