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{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "83 Ga. 549, 550-551", "parenthetical": "convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "83 Ga. 549, 550-551", "parenthetical": "convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "10 S. E. 435, 435-436", "parenthetical": "convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "10 S. E. 435, 435-436", "parenthetical": "convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "10 S. E. 435, 435-436", "parenthetical": "convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "96 Ga. 521, 522-523", "parenthetical": "wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "96 Ga. 521, 522-523", "parenthetical": "wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "96 Ga. 521, 522-523", "parenthetical": "wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "23 S. E. 414, 415", "parenthetical": "wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "23 S. E. 414, 415", "parenthetical": "wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "23 S. E. 414, 415", "parenthetical": "wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement", "sentence": "See, e. g., Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549, 550-551, 10 S. E. 435, 435-436 (1889) (convict can recover from contractor for injuries sustained while on lease to private company); Boswell v. Barnhart, 96 Ga. 521, 522-523, 23 S. E. 414, 415 (1895) (wife can recover from contractor for chain- gang-related death of husband); Dahlheim v. Lemon, 45 F. 225, 228-230 (1891) (contractor liable for convict injuries); Tillar v. Reynolds, 96 Ark. 358, 360-361, 365-366, 131 S. W. 969, 970, 971-972 (1910) (work farm owner liable for inmate beating death); Weigel v. Brown, 194 F. 652 (CA8 1912) (prison contractor liable for unlawful whipping); see also Edwards v. Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (CC Va. 1891) (inmate can recover from municipal corporation for injuries caused by poor jail conditions); Hall v. O’Neil Turpentine Co., 56 Fla. 324, 47 So. 609 (1908) (private prison contractor and subcontractor liable to municipality for escaped prisoner under lease agreement); see generally Mancini, supra (discussing abuses of 19th-century private lease system)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "308 B.R. 596, 601", "parenthetical": "granting debtor's motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "granting debt- or's motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "266 B.R. 916, 921", "parenthetical": "granting debtor's motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that \"the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate\" and \"debt- or's good faith is irrelevant\"", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "308 B.R. 596, 601", "parenthetical": "granting debtor's motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "granting debt- or's motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "273 B.R. 739, 747", "parenthetical": "grant- ing debtor's motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "273 B.R. 739, 747", "parenthetical": "grant- ing debtor's motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "266 B.R. 916, 921", "parenthetical": "granting debtor's motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that \"the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate\" and \"debt- or's good faith is irrelevant\"", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "granting debt- or's motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "266 B.R. 916, 921", "parenthetical": "granting debtor's motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that \"the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate\" and \"debt- or's good faith is irrelevant\"", "sentence": "In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 601 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004)(granting debtor’s motion to reopen a Chapter 7 case to schedule undisclosed products liability claims, stating that the potential benefit to creditors appears to be the most important factor in the analysis); In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2001)(grant- ing debtor’s motion to reopen to administer an undisclosed interest in a wrongful death action); See also Daniel, 205 B.R. 346 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1997) (granting debt- or’s motion to reopen to add undisclosed personal injury claim); Cf. In re Dewberry, 266 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001) (granting debtor’s motion to reopen to add an age discrimination claim, stating that “the test for reopening to administer assets is simply whether the administrative expense and inconvenience outweighs the potential benefit to the estate” and “debt- or’s good faith is irrelevant”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "674 F.2d 768, 768", "parenthetical": "\"[I]n a few instances ... death does change the value of the property.\"", "sentence": "Ahmanson, 674 F.2d at 768 (“[I]n a few instances ... death does change the value of the property.”); see also Land, 303 F.2d at 172 (“It is only in the few cases where death alters value, as well as ownership, that it is necessary to determine whether the value at the time of death reflects the change caused by death____”). The majority resolves this case by relying on the familiar distinction between the estate tax (a tax on the passing of property) and the inheritance tax (a tax on the receipt of property by the decedent’s beneficiaries)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "303 F.2d 172, 172", "parenthetical": "\"It is only in the few cases where death alters value, as well as ownership, that it is necessary to determine whether the value at the time of death reflects the change caused by death____\"", "sentence": "Ahmanson, 674 F.2d at 768 (“[I]n a few instances ... death does change the value of the property.”); see also Land, 303 F.2d at 172 (“It is only in the few cases where death alters value, as well as ownership, that it is necessary to determine whether the value at the time of death reflects the change caused by death____”). The majority resolves this case by relying on the familiar distinction between the estate tax (a tax on the passing of property) and the inheritance tax (a tax on the receipt of property by the decedent’s beneficiaries)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "167 Ariz. 219, 221", "parenthetical": "\"A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.\"", "sentence": "Cohn v. Fisher, 167 Ariz. 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz.App.1990) (“A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.”); see also Parsons v. Cont’l Nat. Am. Grp., 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (1976) (A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "113 Ariz. 223, 227", "parenthetical": "A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.", "sentence": "Cohn v. Fisher, 167 Ariz. 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz.App.1990) (“A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.”); see also Parsons v. Cont’l Nat. Am. Grp., 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (1976) (A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "167 Ariz. 219, 221", "parenthetical": "\"A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.\"", "sentence": "Cohn v. Fisher, 167 Ariz. 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz.App.1990) (“A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.”); see also Parsons v. Cont’l Nat. Am. Grp., 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (1976) (A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "550 P.2d 94, 98", "parenthetical": "A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.", "sentence": "Cohn v. Fisher, 167 Ariz. 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz.App.1990) (“A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.”); see also Parsons v. Cont’l Nat. Am. Grp., 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (1976) (A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "805 P.2d 1040, 1042", "parenthetical": "\"A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.\"", "sentence": "Cohn v. Fisher, 167 Ariz. 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz.App.1990) (“A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.”); see also Parsons v. Cont’l Nat. Am. Grp., 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (1976) (A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "113 Ariz. 223, 227", "parenthetical": "A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.", "sentence": "Cohn v. Fisher, 167 Ariz. 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz.App.1990) (“A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.”); see also Parsons v. Cont’l Nat. Am. Grp., 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (1976) (A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "805 P.2d 1040, 1042", "parenthetical": "\"A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.\"", "sentence": "Cohn v. Fisher, 167 Ariz. 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz.App.1990) (“A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.”); see also Parsons v. Cont’l Nat. Am. Grp., 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (1976) (A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "550 P.2d 94, 98", "parenthetical": "A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.", "sentence": "Cohn v. Fisher, 167 Ariz. 219, 221, 805 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Ariz.App.1990) (“A lawyer is the agent of his client, and the rules of agency law generally apply to the attorney-client relationship.”); see also Parsons v. Cont’l Nat. Am. Grp., 113 Ariz. 223, 227, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (1976) (A lawyer retained by an insurer to defend an insured owes an undeviating and singular allegiance to the insured.)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "comparing plaintiff's deprivations in SHU with those of the general prison population within the Hala-wa Correctional facility where plaintiff was housed when the challenged disciplinary confinement was imposed", "sentence": "See Sandin, supra, at 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (comparing plaintiff’s deprivations in SHU with those of the general prison population within the Hala-wa Correctional facility where plaintiff was housed when the challenged disciplinary confinement was imposed); Brooks, supra, at 48 (district court erred in not comparing conditions of disciplinary confinement with those of administrative confinement or the \"prison at large\"); Frazier, supra, at 317 (it is the inmate’s burden to show that the conditions of confinement in SHU are dramatically different from the basic conditions of his indeterminate sentence)." }

{ "signal": "contra", "identifier": "128 F.3d 1173, 1175", "parenthetical": "relevant comparison to \"most restrictive confine ment found in any facility in entire state\"", "sentence": "Contra Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir.1997) (relevant comparison to \"most restrictive confine ment found in any facility in entire state”); McClary v. Kelly, 4 F.Supp.2d 195, 201 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (relevant comparison to maximum security facilities in entire state)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "547 F.2d 502, 506", "parenthetical": "criticizing Sosa for failing to follow the \"American Rule\" that attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of statutory authorization", "sentence": "Sosa, 498 F.2d at 121; see also Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir.1996) (plaintiff in a TILA ease need not prove that he or she suffered actual monetary damages in order to recover the statutory damages and attorney’s fees); but see Rachbach v. Cogswell, 547 F.2d 502, 506 (10th Cir.1976) (criticizing Sosa for failing to follow the “American Rule” that attorney’s fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of statutory authorization)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "91 F.3d 797, 800", "parenthetical": "plaintiff in a TILA ease need not prove that he or she suffered actual monetary damages in order to recover the statutory damages and attorney's fees", "sentence": "Sosa, 498 F.2d at 121; see also Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir.1996) (plaintiff in a TILA ease need not prove that he or she suffered actual monetary damages in order to recover the statutory damages and attorney’s fees); but see Rachbach v. Cogswell, 547 F.2d 502, 506 (10th Cir.1976) (criticizing Sosa for failing to follow the “American Rule” that attorney’s fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of statutory authorization)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "856 F.2d 985, 992-93", "parenthetical": "discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights", "sentence": "See Jones v. City of Chi, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights); see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (“As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.”) (citations and quotations omitted); McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2010) (under the Fourth Amendment, the injury or death of an individual does not affect the substance of a § 1983 claim for excessive force, but rather is relevant as evidence of the reasonableness of the force)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "436 U.S. 584, 589-90", "parenthetical": "\"As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under SS 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.\"", "sentence": "See Jones v. City of Chi, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights); see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (“As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.”) (citations and quotations omitted); McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2010) (under the Fourth Amendment, the injury or death of an individual does not affect the substance of a § 1983 claim for excessive force, but rather is relevant as evidence of the reasonableness of the force)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "856 F.2d 985, 992-93", "parenthetical": "discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights", "sentence": "See Jones v. City of Chi, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights); see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (“As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.”) (citations and quotations omitted); McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2010) (under the Fourth Amendment, the injury or death of an individual does not affect the substance of a § 1983 claim for excessive force, but rather is relevant as evidence of the reasonableness of the force)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under SS 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.\"", "sentence": "See Jones v. City of Chi, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights); see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (“As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.”) (citations and quotations omitted); McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2010) (under the Fourth Amendment, the injury or death of an individual does not affect the substance of a § 1983 claim for excessive force, but rather is relevant as evidence of the reasonableness of the force)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "856 F.2d 985, 992-93", "parenthetical": "discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights", "sentence": "See Jones v. City of Chi, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights); see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (“As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.”) (citations and quotations omitted); McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2010) (under the Fourth Amendment, the injury or death of an individual does not affect the substance of a § 1983 claim for excessive force, but rather is relevant as evidence of the reasonableness of the force)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under SS 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.\"", "sentence": "See Jones v. City of Chi, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights); see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (“As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.”) (citations and quotations omitted); McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2010) (under the Fourth Amendment, the injury or death of an individual does not affect the substance of a § 1983 claim for excessive force, but rather is relevant as evidence of the reasonableness of the force)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "856 F.2d 985, 992-93", "parenthetical": "discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights", "sentence": "See Jones v. City of Chi, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights); see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (“As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.”) (citations and quotations omitted); McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2010) (under the Fourth Amendment, the injury or death of an individual does not affect the substance of a § 1983 claim for excessive force, but rather is relevant as evidence of the reasonableness of the force)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "615 F.3d 877, 882", "parenthetical": "under the Fourth Amendment, the injury or death of an individual does not affect the substance of a SS 1983 claim for excessive force, but rather is relevant as evidence of the reasonableness of the force", "sentence": "See Jones v. City of Chi, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (discussing the liability of supervisors in the context of violations of constitutional rights); see also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (“As we noted ... one specific area not covered by federal law is that relating to the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.”) (citations and quotations omitted); McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.2010) (under the Fourth Amendment, the injury or death of an individual does not affect the substance of a § 1983 claim for excessive force, but rather is relevant as evidence of the reasonableness of the force)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "523 F.2d 689, 700", "parenthetical": "\"[P]roce-dural error does not warrant reversal unless it affects the substantial rights of the parties.\"", "sentence": "See Fed. R.Civ.P. 61; 28 U.S.C. § 2111; United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir.1988) (noting that the party asserting error has the burden of proving that the error prejudiced its substantial rights); see also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 700 (7th Cir.1975) (“[P]roce-dural error does not warrant reversal unless it affects the substantial rights of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "848 F.2d 1523, 1527", "parenthetical": "noting that the party asserting error has the burden of proving that the error prejudiced its substantial rights", "sentence": "See Fed. R.Civ.P. 61; 28 U.S.C. § 2111; United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir.1988) (noting that the party asserting error has the burden of proving that the error prejudiced its substantial rights); see also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 700 (7th Cir.1975) (“[P]roce-dural error does not warrant reversal unless it affects the substantial rights of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that physical abuse to support dependency adjudication was not shown by evidence that mother pulled child's hair and father slapped child's face, leaving a mark that did not require medical attention", "sentence": "See In re W.P., 534 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding that physical abuse to support dependency adjudication was not shown by evidence that mother pulled child’s hair and father slapped child’s face, leaving a mark that did not require medical attention); see also J.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 773 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that bruises inflicted with belt did not constitute excessive or abusive corporal discipline to support dependency)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that bruises inflicted with belt did not constitute excessive or abusive corporal discipline to support dependency", "sentence": "See In re W.P., 534 So.2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding that physical abuse to support dependency adjudication was not shown by evidence that mother pulled child’s hair and father slapped child’s face, leaving a mark that did not require medical attention); see also J.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 773 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that bruises inflicted with belt did not constitute excessive or abusive corporal discipline to support dependency)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "458 U.S. 261, 261", "parenthetical": "\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013; Labron, 518 U.S. at 939-40, 116 S.Ct. 2485; Carney, 471 U.S. at 388-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066; Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079 (\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added)); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-68, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. 280." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "403 U.S. 443, 478", "parenthetical": "holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key", "sentence": "Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "458 U.S. 261, 261", "parenthetical": "\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013; Labron, 518 U.S. at 939-40, 116 S.Ct. 2485; Carney, 471 U.S. at 388-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066; Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079 (\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added)); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-68, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. 280." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key", "sentence": "Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "458 U.S. 261, 261", "parenthetical": "\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013; Labron, 518 U.S. at 939-40, 116 S.Ct. 2485; Carney, 471 U.S. at 388-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066; Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079 (\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added)); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-68, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. 280." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key", "sentence": "Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "403 U.S. 443, 478", "parenthetical": "holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key", "sentence": "Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013; Labron, 518 U.S. at 939-40, 116 S.Ct. 2485; Carney, 471 U.S. at 388-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066; Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079 (\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added)); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-68, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. 280." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key", "sentence": "Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013; Labron, 518 U.S. at 939-40, 116 S.Ct. 2485; Carney, 471 U.S. at 388-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066; Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079 (\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added)); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-68, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. 280." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013; Labron, 518 U.S. at 939-40, 116 S.Ct. 2485; Carney, 471 U.S. at 388-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066; Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079 (\"[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ....\" (emphasis added)); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-68, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. 280." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key", "sentence": "Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "198 F.3d 787, 790", "parenthetical": "reviewing for plain error the district court's failure to depart sua sponte on a ground that was barred by law at the time of sentencing", "sentence": "United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to depart, when the record is silent on the issue of authority and sentence is imposed within the applicable guideline range, is not appealable); cf. United States v. Castillo-Casiano, 198 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1999), amended, 204 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir.2000) (reviewing for plain error the district court’s failure to depart sua sponte on a ground that was barred by law at the time of sentencing)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "failure to depart, when the record is silent on the issue of authority and sentence is imposed within the applicable guideline range, is not appealable", "sentence": "United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to depart, when the record is silent on the issue of authority and sentence is imposed within the applicable guideline range, is not appealable); cf. United States v. Castillo-Casiano, 198 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1999), amended, 204 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir.2000) (reviewing for plain error the district court’s failure to depart sua sponte on a ground that was barred by law at the time of sentencing)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reviewing for plain error the district court's failure to depart sua sponte on a ground that was barred by law at the time of sentencing", "sentence": "United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to depart, when the record is silent on the issue of authority and sentence is imposed within the applicable guideline range, is not appealable); cf. United States v. Castillo-Casiano, 198 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1999), amended, 204 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir.2000) (reviewing for plain error the district court’s failure to depart sua sponte on a ground that was barred by law at the time of sentencing)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "failure to depart, when the record is silent on the issue of authority and sentence is imposed within the applicable guideline range, is not appealable", "sentence": "United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.1991) (failure to depart, when the record is silent on the issue of authority and sentence is imposed within the applicable guideline range, is not appealable); cf. United States v. Castillo-Casiano, 198 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1999), amended, 204 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir.2000) (reviewing for plain error the district court’s failure to depart sua sponte on a ground that was barred by law at the time of sentencing)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "523 F.3d 200, 220", "parenthetical": "addressing substantive due process claim in the zoning context and noting that application of the conscience-shocking standard \"prevents us from being cast in the role of a 'zoning board of appeals.' \"", "sentence": "Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 220 (3d Cir. 2008) (addressing substantive due process claim in the zoning context and noting that application of the conscience-shocking standard “prevents us from being cast in the role of a ‘zoning board of appeals.’ ”) (citation omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "776 F.Supp.2d 95, 95", "parenthetical": "plaintiff failed to allege a substantive due process violation, despite claiming that defendant acted with \"gross negligence\"", "sentence": "See also Burns, 776 F.Supp.2d at 95 (plaintiff failed to allege a substantive due process violation, despite claiming that defendant acted with “gross negligence”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[S]tatements in motions are not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight.\"", "sentence": "See Hernandez-Velasquez, 611 F.3d at 1078 (“[T]he BIA enjoys a rebuttable ‘presumption of mailing’ when it issues a decision accompanied by a properly addressed and dated cover letter ..., [which] may be rebutted by affidavits of nonreceipt....”); see also Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir.2000) (“[S]tatements in motions are not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "611 F.3d 1078, 1078", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he BIA enjoys a rebuttable 'presumption of mailing' when it issues a decision accompanied by a properly addressed and dated cover letter ..., [which] may be rebutted by affidavits of nonreceipt....\"", "sentence": "See Hernandez-Velasquez, 611 F.3d at 1078 (“[T]he BIA enjoys a rebuttable ‘presumption of mailing’ when it issues a decision accompanied by a properly addressed and dated cover letter ..., [which] may be rebutted by affidavits of nonreceipt....”); see also Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir.2000) (“[S]tatements in motions are not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "440 F.3d 832, 843", "parenthetical": "holding that an unwitting declarant's secretly recorded statements to a close friend were nontestimonial", "sentence": "See United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 843 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that an unwitting declarant’s secretly recorded statements to a close friend were nontestimonial); see also United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 286-87 (6th Cir.2007) (stating that co-defendant’s out-of-court statements to an undercover officer whose status was unknown to the declarant were nontestimonial); United States v. Watson, 525 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir.2008) (“[A] statement unwittingly made to a confidential informant and recorded by the government is not ‘testimonial’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.”); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182 n. 9, 184 (3d Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir.2004) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "473 F.3d 280, 286-87", "parenthetical": "stating that co-defendant's out-of-court statements to an undercover officer whose status was unknown to the declarant were nontestimonial", "sentence": "See United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 843 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that an unwitting declarant’s secretly recorded statements to a close friend were nontestimonial); see also United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 286-87 (6th Cir.2007) (stating that co-defendant’s out-of-court statements to an undercover officer whose status was unknown to the declarant were nontestimonial); United States v. Watson, 525 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir.2008) (“[A] statement unwittingly made to a confidential informant and recorded by the government is not ‘testimonial’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.”); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182 n. 9, 184 (3d Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir.2004) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "440 F.3d 832, 843", "parenthetical": "holding that an unwitting declarant's secretly recorded statements to a close friend were nontestimonial", "sentence": "See United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 843 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that an unwitting declarant’s secretly recorded statements to a close friend were nontestimonial); see also United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 286-87 (6th Cir.2007) (stating that co-defendant’s out-of-court statements to an undercover officer whose status was unknown to the declarant were nontestimonial); United States v. Watson, 525 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir.2008) (“[A] statement unwittingly made to a confidential informant and recorded by the government is not ‘testimonial’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.”); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182 n. 9, 184 (3d Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir.2004) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "525 F.3d 583, 589", "parenthetical": "\"[A] statement unwittingly made to a confidential informant and recorded by the government is not 'testimonial' for Confrontation Clause purposes.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 843 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that an unwitting declarant’s secretly recorded statements to a close friend were nontestimonial); see also United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 286-87 (6th Cir.2007) (stating that co-defendant’s out-of-court statements to an undercover officer whose status was unknown to the declarant were nontestimonial); United States v. Watson, 525 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir.2008) (“[A] statement unwittingly made to a confidential informant and recorded by the government is not ‘testimonial’ for Confrontation Clause purposes.”); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182 n. 9, 184 (3d Cir.2005) (same); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir.2004) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "800 F.2d 235, 238", "parenthetical": "upholding in-court demonstration using estimate of length of deceased wife's arms to show she could not have shot herself as husband claimed", "sentence": "See Valdez, 776 S.W.2d at 168-69 (upholding in-court demonstration of six disarming techniques by which a person might take police officer’s weapon when sufficient evidence supported inference that defendant was able to disarm officer and use his weapon to shoot him); Stembridge v. State, 94 Tex.Crim. 207, 250 S.W. 180, 181 (1928) (upholding demonstration in which State re-created how husband’s body was found in bed and wife was asked to demonstrate how she claimed to have shot husband in self-defense); see also United States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.1986) (upholding in-court demonstration using estimate of length of deceased wife’s arms to show she could not have shot herself as husband claimed)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "776 S.W.2d 168, 168-69", "parenthetical": "upholding in-court demonstration of six disarming techniques by which a person might take police officer's weapon when sufficient evidence supported inference that defendant was able to disarm officer and use his weapon to shoot him", "sentence": "See Valdez, 776 S.W.2d at 168-69 (upholding in-court demonstration of six disarming techniques by which a person might take police officer’s weapon when sufficient evidence supported inference that defendant was able to disarm officer and use his weapon to shoot him); Stembridge v. State, 94 Tex.Crim. 207, 250 S.W. 180, 181 (1928) (upholding demonstration in which State re-created how husband’s body was found in bed and wife was asked to demonstrate how she claimed to have shot husband in self-defense); see also United States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.1986) (upholding in-court demonstration using estimate of length of deceased wife’s arms to show she could not have shot herself as husband claimed)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding demonstration in which State re-created how husband's body was found in bed and wife was asked to demonstrate how she claimed to have shot husband in self-defense", "sentence": "See Valdez, 776 S.W.2d at 168-69 (upholding in-court demonstration of six disarming techniques by which a person might take police officer’s weapon when sufficient evidence supported inference that defendant was able to disarm officer and use his weapon to shoot him); Stembridge v. State, 94 Tex.Crim. 207, 250 S.W. 180, 181 (1928) (upholding demonstration in which State re-created how husband’s body was found in bed and wife was asked to demonstrate how she claimed to have shot husband in self-defense); see also United States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.1986) (upholding in-court demonstration using estimate of length of deceased wife’s arms to show she could not have shot herself as husband claimed)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "800 F.2d 235, 238", "parenthetical": "upholding in-court demonstration using estimate of length of deceased wife's arms to show she could not have shot herself as husband claimed", "sentence": "See Valdez, 776 S.W.2d at 168-69 (upholding in-court demonstration of six disarming techniques by which a person might take police officer’s weapon when sufficient evidence supported inference that defendant was able to disarm officer and use his weapon to shoot him); Stembridge v. State, 94 Tex.Crim. 207, 250 S.W. 180, 181 (1928) (upholding demonstration in which State re-created how husband’s body was found in bed and wife was asked to demonstrate how she claimed to have shot husband in self-defense); see also United States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.1986) (upholding in-court demonstration using estimate of length of deceased wife’s arms to show she could not have shot herself as husband claimed)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "250 S.W. 180, 181", "parenthetical": "upholding demonstration in which State re-created how husband's body was found in bed and wife was asked to demonstrate how she claimed to have shot husband in self-defense", "sentence": "See Valdez, 776 S.W.2d at 168-69 (upholding in-court demonstration of six disarming techniques by which a person might take police officer’s weapon when sufficient evidence supported inference that defendant was able to disarm officer and use his weapon to shoot him); Stembridge v. State, 94 Tex.Crim. 207, 250 S.W. 180, 181 (1928) (upholding demonstration in which State re-created how husband’s body was found in bed and wife was asked to demonstrate how she claimed to have shot husband in self-defense); see also United States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.1986) (upholding in-court demonstration using estimate of length of deceased wife’s arms to show she could not have shot herself as husband claimed)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "800 F.2d 235, 238", "parenthetical": "upholding in-court demonstration using estimate of length of deceased wife's arms to show she could not have shot herself as husband claimed", "sentence": "See Valdez, 776 S.W.2d at 168-69 (upholding in-court demonstration of six disarming techniques by which a person might take police officer’s weapon when sufficient evidence supported inference that defendant was able to disarm officer and use his weapon to shoot him); Stembridge v. State, 94 Tex.Crim. 207, 250 S.W. 180, 181 (1928) (upholding demonstration in which State re-created how husband’s body was found in bed and wife was asked to demonstrate how she claimed to have shot husband in self-defense); see also United States v. Wanoskia, 800 F.2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.1986) (upholding in-court demonstration using estimate of length of deceased wife’s arms to show she could not have shot herself as husband claimed)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "purchaser charged with notice of all facts disclosed by an examination of the chain of title", "sentence": "See Hensley v. Ramsey, 283 N.C. 714, 199 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1973) (purchaser charged with notice of all facts disclosed by an examination of the chain of title); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burton, 599 F.Supp. 1313, 1318 & n. 9 (M.D.N.C.1984) (“[P]ublic record concerning the status of land titles” is established by recording in the Registration of Titles as required by North Carolina General Statutes §§ 47-18 & 47-20). Moreover, the North Carolina courts have clarified that the purpose of these North Carolina recording provisions is to establish a “single reliable means for purchasers to determine the state of the title to real estate,” and to impute constructive notice only of “all duly recorded documents that a proper examination of the title would reveal.”" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[P]ublic record concerning the status of land titles\" is established by recording in the Registration of Titles as required by North Carolina General Statutes SSSS 47-18 & 47-20", "sentence": "See Hensley v. Ramsey, 283 N.C. 714, 199 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1973) (purchaser charged with notice of all facts disclosed by an examination of the chain of title); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burton, 599 F.Supp. 1313, 1318 & n. 9 (M.D.N.C.1984) (“[P]ublic record concerning the status of land titles” is established by recording in the Registration of Titles as required by North Carolina General Statutes §§ 47-18 & 47-20). Moreover, the North Carolina courts have clarified that the purpose of these North Carolina recording provisions is to establish a “single reliable means for purchasers to determine the state of the title to real estate,” and to impute constructive notice only of “all duly recorded documents that a proper examination of the title would reveal.”" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[P]ublic record concerning the status of land titles\" is established by recording in the Registration of Titles as required by North Carolina General Statutes SSSS 47-18 & 47-20", "sentence": "See Hensley v. Ramsey, 283 N.C. 714, 199 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1973) (purchaser charged with notice of all facts disclosed by an examination of the chain of title); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burton, 599 F.Supp. 1313, 1318 & n. 9 (M.D.N.C.1984) (“[P]ublic record concerning the status of land titles” is established by recording in the Registration of Titles as required by North Carolina General Statutes §§ 47-18 & 47-20). Moreover, the North Carolina courts have clarified that the purpose of these North Carolina recording provisions is to establish a “single reliable means for purchasers to determine the state of the title to real estate,” and to impute constructive notice only of “all duly recorded documents that a proper examination of the title would reveal.”" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "199 S.E.2d 1, 10", "parenthetical": "purchaser charged with notice of all facts disclosed by an examination of the chain of title", "sentence": "See Hensley v. Ramsey, 283 N.C. 714, 199 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1973) (purchaser charged with notice of all facts disclosed by an examination of the chain of title); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burton, 599 F.Supp. 1313, 1318 & n. 9 (M.D.N.C.1984) (“[P]ublic record concerning the status of land titles” is established by recording in the Registration of Titles as required by North Carolina General Statutes §§ 47-18 & 47-20). Moreover, the North Carolina courts have clarified that the purpose of these North Carolina recording provisions is to establish a “single reliable means for purchasers to determine the state of the title to real estate,” and to impute constructive notice only of “all duly recorded documents that a proper examination of the title would reveal.”" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "411 Fed.Appx. 378, 384", "parenthetical": "\"The 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine does not apply to civil actions brought under SS 1983[.]\"", "sentence": "See Hargroves v. City of New York, 411 Fed.Appx. 378, 384 (2d Cir.2011) (“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine does not apply to civil actions brought under § 1983[.]”); see also Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F.Supp.2d 418, 433-34 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (“the Second Circuit has held ‘that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine may not be invoked to support a § 1983 civil action, because the doctrine ‘is an eviden-tiary rule that operates in the context of criminal procedure ... and as such has generally been held to apply only in criminal trials.’ ”) (citations omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "889 F.Supp.2d 418, 433-34", "parenthetical": "\"the Second Circuit has held 'that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine may not be invoked to support a SS 1983 civil action, because the doctrine 'is an eviden-tiary rule that operates in the context of criminal procedure ... and as such has generally been held to apply only in criminal trials.' \"", "sentence": "See Hargroves v. City of New York, 411 Fed.Appx. 378, 384 (2d Cir.2011) (“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine does not apply to civil actions brought under § 1983[.]”); see also Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F.Supp.2d 418, 433-34 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (“the Second Circuit has held ‘that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine may not be invoked to support a § 1983 civil action, because the doctrine ‘is an eviden-tiary rule that operates in the context of criminal procedure ... and as such has generally been held to apply only in criminal trials.’ ”) (citations omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting claim that jeopardy assessment preventing retention of counsel necessarily violates Sixth Amendment and rejecting as \"immaterial\" for purposes of a due process claim any distinction between indigency and \"government-imposed\" indigency", "sentence": "See United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.1957) (rejecting claim that jeopardy assessment preventing retention of counsel necessarily violates Sixth Amendment and rejecting as “immaterial” for purposes of a due process claim any distinction between indigency and “government-imposed” indigency); see also United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1976) (rejecting any requirement that alternative funds for counsel be made available to a defendant whose assets were under a tax levy absent a showing of prosecutorial misconduct); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 138 F.Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.1956) (rejecting corporation’s claim that funds must be released from tax levy so that it could pay for chosen counsel, stating that counsel could be appointed if necessary). We similarly reject Caplin & Drysdale’s claim that the Sixth Amendment forbids forfeiture proceedings that render a defendant indigent." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting any requirement that alternative funds for counsel be made available to a defendant whose assets were under a tax levy absent a showing of prosecutorial misconduct", "sentence": "See United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.1957) (rejecting claim that jeopardy assessment preventing retention of counsel necessarily violates Sixth Amendment and rejecting as “immaterial” for purposes of a due process claim any distinction between indigency and “government-imposed” indigency); see also United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1976) (rejecting any requirement that alternative funds for counsel be made available to a defendant whose assets were under a tax levy absent a showing of prosecutorial misconduct); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 138 F.Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.1956) (rejecting corporation’s claim that funds must be released from tax levy so that it could pay for chosen counsel, stating that counsel could be appointed if necessary). We similarly reject Caplin & Drysdale’s claim that the Sixth Amendment forbids forfeiture proceedings that render a defendant indigent." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting corporation's claim that funds must be released from tax levy so that it could pay for chosen counsel, stating that counsel could be appointed if necessary", "sentence": "See United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.1957) (rejecting claim that jeopardy assessment preventing retention of counsel necessarily violates Sixth Amendment and rejecting as “immaterial” for purposes of a due process claim any distinction between indigency and “government-imposed” indigency); see also United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1976) (rejecting any requirement that alternative funds for counsel be made available to a defendant whose assets were under a tax levy absent a showing of prosecutorial misconduct); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 138 F.Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.1956) (rejecting corporation’s claim that funds must be released from tax levy so that it could pay for chosen counsel, stating that counsel could be appointed if necessary). We similarly reject Caplin & Drysdale’s claim that the Sixth Amendment forbids forfeiture proceedings that render a defendant indigent." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "rejecting claim that jeopardy assessment preventing retention of counsel necessarily violates Sixth Amendment and rejecting as \"immaterial\" for purposes of a due process claim any distinction between indigency and \"government-imposed\" indigency", "sentence": "See United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.1957) (rejecting claim that jeopardy assessment preventing retention of counsel necessarily violates Sixth Amendment and rejecting as “immaterial” for purposes of a due process claim any distinction between indigency and “government-imposed” indigency); see also United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1976) (rejecting any requirement that alternative funds for counsel be made available to a defendant whose assets were under a tax levy absent a showing of prosecutorial misconduct); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 138 F.Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.1956) (rejecting corporation’s claim that funds must be released from tax levy so that it could pay for chosen counsel, stating that counsel could be appointed if necessary). We similarly reject Caplin & Drysdale’s claim that the Sixth Amendment forbids forfeiture proceedings that render a defendant indigent." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15", "parenthetical": "finding forfeiture under SS 13-2314 \"tied directly to ... criminal offenses\"", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "509 U.S. 620, 620", "parenthetical": "linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15", "parenthetical": "finding forfeiture under SS 13-2314 \"tied directly to ... criminal offenses\"", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "509 U.S. 620, 620", "parenthetical": "linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15", "parenthetical": "finding forfeiture under SS 13-2314 \"tied directly to ... criminal offenses\"", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2811, 2811", "parenthetical": "linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2811, 2811", "parenthetical": "linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15", "parenthetical": "finding forfeiture under SS 13-2314 \"tied directly to ... criminal offenses\"", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "125 L.Ed.2d 504, 504", "parenthetical": "linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15", "parenthetical": "finding forfeiture under SS 13-2314 \"tied directly to ... criminal offenses\"", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "125 L.Ed.2d 504, 504", "parenthetical": "linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15", "parenthetical": "finding forfeiture under SS 13-2314 \"tied directly to ... criminal offenses\"", "sentence": "See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, 125 L.Ed.2d at 504 (linking forfeiture to specific drug offenses evidence that Congress intended it as punishment); see also Leyva, 195 Ariz. 13, ¶ 15, 985 P.2d 498, ¶ 15 (finding forfeiture under § 13-2314 “tied directly to ... criminal offenses”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1365, 1368", "parenthetical": "6.7% confusion between marks insufficient to show actual confusion for purposes of preliminary injunction", "sentence": "Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir.1996) (holding 30-40% confusion between L’eggs and Leg Looks provided significant degree of actual confusion); see also Visa Int’l Service Ass’n v. Eastern Financial Credit Union, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1365, 1368, 1992 WL 138231 (9th Cir.1992) (6.7% confusion between marks insufficient to show actual confusion for purposes of preliminary injunction); Henri’s Food Products Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir.1983) (collecting cases and holding 7.6% confusion finding weighs against infringement)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "81 F.3d 455, 467", "parenthetical": "holding 30-40% confusion between L'eggs and Leg Looks provided significant degree of actual confusion", "sentence": "Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir.1996) (holding 30-40% confusion between L’eggs and Leg Looks provided significant degree of actual confusion); see also Visa Int’l Service Ass’n v. Eastern Financial Credit Union, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1365, 1368, 1992 WL 138231 (9th Cir.1992) (6.7% confusion between marks insufficient to show actual confusion for purposes of preliminary injunction); Henri’s Food Products Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir.1983) (collecting cases and holding 7.6% confusion finding weighs against infringement)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "81 F.3d 455, 467", "parenthetical": "holding 30-40% confusion between L'eggs and Leg Looks provided significant degree of actual confusion", "sentence": "Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir.1996) (holding 30-40% confusion between L’eggs and Leg Looks provided significant degree of actual confusion); see also Visa Int’l Service Ass’n v. Eastern Financial Credit Union, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1365, 1368, 1992 WL 138231 (9th Cir.1992) (6.7% confusion between marks insufficient to show actual confusion for purposes of preliminary injunction); Henri’s Food Products Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir.1983) (collecting cases and holding 7.6% confusion finding weighs against infringement)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "6.7% confusion between marks insufficient to show actual confusion for purposes of preliminary injunction", "sentence": "Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir.1996) (holding 30-40% confusion between L’eggs and Leg Looks provided significant degree of actual confusion); see also Visa Int’l Service Ass’n v. Eastern Financial Credit Union, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1365, 1368, 1992 WL 138231 (9th Cir.1992) (6.7% confusion between marks insufficient to show actual confusion for purposes of preliminary injunction); Henri’s Food Products Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir.1983) (collecting cases and holding 7.6% confusion finding weighs against infringement)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "717 F.2d 352, 358", "parenthetical": "collecting cases and holding 7.6% confusion finding weighs against infringement", "sentence": "Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir.1996) (holding 30-40% confusion between L’eggs and Leg Looks provided significant degree of actual confusion); see also Visa Int’l Service Ass’n v. Eastern Financial Credit Union, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1365, 1368, 1992 WL 138231 (9th Cir.1992) (6.7% confusion between marks insufficient to show actual confusion for purposes of preliminary injunction); Henri’s Food Products Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir.1983) (collecting cases and holding 7.6% confusion finding weighs against infringement)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "81 F.3d 455, 467", "parenthetical": "holding 30-40% confusion between L'eggs and Leg Looks provided significant degree of actual confusion", "sentence": "Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir.1996) (holding 30-40% confusion between L’eggs and Leg Looks provided significant degree of actual confusion); see also Visa Int’l Service Ass’n v. Eastern Financial Credit Union, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1365, 1368, 1992 WL 138231 (9th Cir.1992) (6.7% confusion between marks insufficient to show actual confusion for purposes of preliminary injunction); Henri’s Food Products Co., Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir.1983) (collecting cases and holding 7.6% confusion finding weighs against infringement)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "474 Pa. 480, 485", "parenthetical": "opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court", "sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199, 1210 (1977) (POMEROY, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Ford, 474 Pa. 480, 485, 378 A.2d 1215, 1218 (opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court); Commonwealth v. Gartner, 475 Pa. 512, 532, 381 A.2d 114, 124 (1977) (POMEROY, J., concurring)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "474 Pa. 430, 442", "parenthetical": "opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court", "sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 442, 378 A.2d 1189, 1196 (opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "378 A.2d 1215, 1218", "parenthetical": "opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court", "sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199, 1210 (1977) (POMEROY, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Ford, 474 Pa. 480, 485, 378 A.2d 1215, 1218 (opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court); Commonwealth v. Gartner, 475 Pa. 512, 532, 381 A.2d 114, 124 (1977) (POMEROY, J., concurring)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "474 Pa. 430, 442", "parenthetical": "opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court", "sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 442, 378 A.2d 1189, 1196 (opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "474 Pa. 480, 485", "parenthetical": "opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court", "sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199, 1210 (1977) (POMEROY, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Ford, 474 Pa. 480, 485, 378 A.2d 1215, 1218 (opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court); Commonwealth v. Gartner, 475 Pa. 512, 532, 381 A.2d 114, 124 (1977) (POMEROY, J., concurring)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "378 A.2d 1189, 1196", "parenthetical": "opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court", "sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 442, 378 A.2d 1189, 1196 (opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "378 A.2d 1215, 1218", "parenthetical": "opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court", "sentence": "See also Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199, 1210 (1977) (POMEROY, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Ford, 474 Pa. 480, 485, 378 A.2d 1215, 1218 (opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court); Commonwealth v. Gartner, 475 Pa. 512, 532, 381 A.2d 114, 124 (1977) (POMEROY, J., concurring)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "378 A.2d 1189, 1196", "parenthetical": "opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court", "sentence": "See Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 442, 378 A.2d 1189, 1196 (opinion of POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J., announcing the decision of the Court)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "9 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 872", "parenthetical": "applicability of art. 97 hinged on whether land had in fact been conveyed \"to the conservation commission ... to maintain and preserve it for the use of the public for conservation purposes\"", "sentence": "See also Toro v. Mayor of Revere, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 871, 872 (1980) (applicability of art. 97 hinged on whether land had in fact been conveyed “to the conservation commission ... to maintain and preserve it for the use of the public for conservation purposes”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "444 Mass. 502, 508-509", "parenthetical": "art. 97 protections may arise where subsequent to taking for purposes other than art. 97, land is \"specifically designated\" for art. 97 purpose by deed or other recorded restriction", "sentence": "See Selectmen of Hanson v. Lindsay, 444 Mass. 502, 508-509 (2005) (art. 97 protections may arise where subsequent to taking for purposes other than art. 97, land is “specifically designated” for art. 97 purpose by deed or other recorded restriction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "58 F.3d 328, 330", "parenthetical": "holding that a franchisor \"did not waive ... [his arbitrable] claims by prosecuting the unlawful detainer action in California state court because that action involved different issues\"", "sentence": "Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1165 (holding that franchisor who sued franchisees had not invoked the judicial process for purposes of a subsequent dispute); Distajo II, 107 F.3d at 132-33 (“only prior litigation of the same legal and factual issues as those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver of the right to arbitrate”); see also Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 330(holding that a franchisor “did not waive ... [his arbitrable] claims by prosecuting the unlawful detainer action in California state court because that action involved different issues”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "833 F.2d 1165, 1165", "parenthetical": "holding that franchisor who sued franchisees had not invoked the judicial process for purposes of a subsequent dispute", "sentence": "Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1165 (holding that franchisor who sued franchisees had not invoked the judicial process for purposes of a subsequent dispute); Distajo II, 107 F.3d at 132-33 (“only prior litigation of the same legal and factual issues as those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver of the right to arbitrate”); see also Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 330(holding that a franchisor “did not waive ... [his arbitrable] claims by prosecuting the unlawful detainer action in California state court because that action involved different issues”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "58 F.3d 328, 330", "parenthetical": "holding that a franchisor \"did not waive ... [his arbitrable] claims by prosecuting the unlawful detainer action in California state court because that action involved different issues\"", "sentence": "Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1165 (holding that franchisor who sued franchisees had not invoked the judicial process for purposes of a subsequent dispute); Distajo II, 107 F.3d at 132-33 (“only prior litigation of the same legal and factual issues as those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver of the right to arbitrate”); see also Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 330(holding that a franchisor “did not waive ... [his arbitrable] claims by prosecuting the unlawful detainer action in California state court because that action involved different issues”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "107 F.3d 132, 132-33", "parenthetical": "\"only prior litigation of the same legal and factual issues as those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver of the right to arbitrate\"", "sentence": "Lawrence, 833 F.2d at 1165 (holding that franchisor who sued franchisees had not invoked the judicial process for purposes of a subsequent dispute); Distajo II, 107 F.3d at 132-33 (“only prior litigation of the same legal and factual issues as those the party now wants to arbitrate results in waiver of the right to arbitrate”); see also Gingiss Int’l, Inc. v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 330(holding that a franchisor “did not waive ... [his arbitrable] claims by prosecuting the unlawful detainer action in California state court because that action involved different issues”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "1986 WL 53400, at *5, *7", "parenthetical": "finding impediments to personal jurisdiction weighing in favor of class action settlement", "sentence": "A.1:85-CV-172RLV, 1990 WL 105894, at *3 (N.D.Ga. May 23, 1990) (The fact that “[m]any potentially dispositive threshold issues might bar recovery by \"Class members” weighs heavily in favor of settlement.); see also Eltman v. Grandma Lee’s, Inc., No. 82 CIV.1912, 1986 WL 53400, at *5, *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1986) (finding impediments to personal jurisdiction weighing in favor of class action settlement)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "1990 WL 105894, at *3", "parenthetical": "The fact that \"[m]any potentially dispositive threshold issues might bar recovery by \"Class members\" weighs heavily in favor of settlement.", "sentence": "A.1:85-CV-172RLV, 1990 WL 105894, at *3 (N.D.Ga. May 23, 1990) (The fact that “[m]any potentially dispositive threshold issues might bar recovery by \"Class members” weighs heavily in favor of settlement.); see also Eltman v. Grandma Lee’s, Inc., No. 82 CIV.1912, 1986 WL 53400, at *5, *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1986) (finding impediments to personal jurisdiction weighing in favor of class action settlement)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "622 A.2d 667, 672", "parenthetical": "suspect was standing next to police car and police officers and was obviously in custody, but not in handcuffs", "sentence": "Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1069 (D.C.1978) (with suspects seated in police car, witnesses were told, “We got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about”); see Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 672 (D.C.1993) (suspect was standing next to police car and police officers and was obviously in custody, but not in handcuffs); Garris v. United States, 559 A.2d 323, 327 (D.C.1989); Fields v. United States, 484 A.2d 570, 574 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067, 105 S.Ct. 2144, 85 L.Ed.2d 501 (1985); Washington v. United States, 334 A.2d 185, 186 (D.C.1975) (detective told victim, “We got your man, we think”); Jones v. United States, 277 A.2d 95, 98 (D.C.1971) (suspect was seated in the back of a police car in handcuffs when witness identified him)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "383 A.2d 1064, 1069", "parenthetical": "with suspects seated in police car, witnesses were told, \"We got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about\"", "sentence": "Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1069 (D.C.1978) (with suspects seated in police car, witnesses were told, “We got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about”); see Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 672 (D.C.1993) (suspect was standing next to police car and police officers and was obviously in custody, but not in handcuffs); Garris v. United States, 559 A.2d 323, 327 (D.C.1989); Fields v. United States, 484 A.2d 570, 574 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067, 105 S.Ct. 2144, 85 L.Ed.2d 501 (1985); Washington v. United States, 334 A.2d 185, 186 (D.C.1975) (detective told victim, “We got your man, we think”); Jones v. United States, 277 A.2d 95, 98 (D.C.1971) (suspect was seated in the back of a police car in handcuffs when witness identified him)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "277 A.2d 95, 98", "parenthetical": "suspect was seated in the back of a police car in handcuffs when witness identified him", "sentence": "Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1069 (D.C.1978) (with suspects seated in police car, witnesses were told, “We got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about”); see Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 672 (D.C.1993) (suspect was standing next to police car and police officers and was obviously in custody, but not in handcuffs); Garris v. United States, 559 A.2d 323, 327 (D.C.1989); Fields v. United States, 484 A.2d 570, 574 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067, 105 S.Ct. 2144, 85 L.Ed.2d 501 (1985); Washington v. United States, 334 A.2d 185, 186 (D.C.1975) (detective told victim, “We got your man, we think”); Jones v. United States, 277 A.2d 95, 98 (D.C.1971) (suspect was seated in the back of a police car in handcuffs when witness identified him)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "383 A.2d 1064, 1069", "parenthetical": "with suspects seated in police car, witnesses were told, \"We got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about\"", "sentence": "Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1069 (D.C.1978) (with suspects seated in police car, witnesses were told, “We got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about”); see Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 672 (D.C.1993) (suspect was standing next to police car and police officers and was obviously in custody, but not in handcuffs); Garris v. United States, 559 A.2d 323, 327 (D.C.1989); Fields v. United States, 484 A.2d 570, 574 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067, 105 S.Ct. 2144, 85 L.Ed.2d 501 (1985); Washington v. United States, 334 A.2d 185, 186 (D.C.1975) (detective told victim, “We got your man, we think”); Jones v. United States, 277 A.2d 95, 98 (D.C.1971) (suspect was seated in the back of a police car in handcuffs when witness identified him)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "101 U.S. 337, 339", "parenthetical": "\"The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.\"", "sentence": "Woolsey v. Hunt, 932 F.2d 555, 564 (6th Cir.1991) (stating unless the state has expressly consented to be sued, sovereign immunity bars a court from entertaining any suit against the state); see also Memphis & C.R. Co. v. State of Tenn., 101 U.S. 337, 339, 25 L.Ed. 960 (1879) (“The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "932 F.2d 555, 564", "parenthetical": "stating unless the state has expressly consented to be sued, sovereign immunity bars a court from entertaining any suit against the state", "sentence": "Woolsey v. Hunt, 932 F.2d 555, 564 (6th Cir.1991) (stating unless the state has expressly consented to be sued, sovereign immunity bars a court from entertaining any suit against the state); see also Memphis & C.R. Co. v. State of Tenn., 101 U.S. 337, 339, 25 L.Ed. 960 (1879) (“The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "932 F.2d 555, 564", "parenthetical": "stating unless the state has expressly consented to be sued, sovereign immunity bars a court from entertaining any suit against the state", "sentence": "Woolsey v. Hunt, 932 F.2d 555, 564 (6th Cir.1991) (stating unless the state has expressly consented to be sued, sovereign immunity bars a court from entertaining any suit against the state); see also Memphis & C.R. Co. v. State of Tenn., 101 U.S. 337, 339, 25 L.Ed. 960 (1879) (“The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.\"", "sentence": "Woolsey v. Hunt, 932 F.2d 555, 564 (6th Cir.1991) (stating unless the state has expressly consented to be sued, sovereign immunity bars a court from entertaining any suit against the state); see also Memphis & C.R. Co. v. State of Tenn., 101 U.S. 337, 339, 25 L.Ed. 960 (1879) (“The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "876 N.E.2d 1139, 1141-42", "parenthetical": "concluding that jury was free to infer that the victim was in fear during robbery despite victim's testimony to the contrary given evidence that robbery happened quickly, victim did not register what was happening at the time, and victim was scared afterward", "sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1275, 1281 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (concluding evidence sufficient to support “bodily injury” element of battery where victim testified that the defendant’s actions caused her to “hurt” and “kinda see[] stars for a second”); see also Rickert v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1139, 1141-42 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (concluding that jury was free to infer that the victim was in fear during robbery despite victim’s testimony to the contrary given evidence that robbery happened quickly, victim did not register what was happening at the time, and victim was scared afterward)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "859 N.E.2d 1275, 1281", "parenthetical": "concluding evidence sufficient to support \"bodily injury\" element of battery where victim testified that the defendant's actions caused her to \"hurt\" and \"kinda see[] stars for a second\"", "sentence": "See Mathis v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1275, 1281 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (concluding evidence sufficient to support “bodily injury” element of battery where victim testified that the defendant’s actions caused her to “hurt” and “kinda see[] stars for a second”); see also Rickert v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1139, 1141-42 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (concluding that jury was free to infer that the victim was in fear during robbery despite victim’s testimony to the contrary given evidence that robbery happened quickly, victim did not register what was happening at the time, and victim was scared afterward)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "955 F.2d 996, 996", "parenthetical": "in the 5th Circuit, standard of review for a petition of writ of error coram nobis is more strict than that applicable to habeas corpus", "sentence": "Cf. Drobny, 955 F.2d at 996 (in the 5th Circuit, standard of review for a petition of writ of error coram nobis is more strict than that applicable to habeas corpus)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "474 F.2d 444, 451", "parenthetical": "in the D.C. Circuit, habeas corpus standards generally apply in reviewing writs of error coram nobis", "sentence": "United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 341 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S.Ct. 1656, 44 L.Ed.2d 87 (1975); see Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 451 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941, 93 S.Ct. 2784, 37 L.Ed.2d 402 (1973) (in the D.C. Circuit, habeas corpus standards generally apply in reviewing writs of error coram nobis)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "in the D.C. Circuit, habeas corpus standards generally apply in reviewing writs of error coram nobis", "sentence": "United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 341 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S.Ct. 1656, 44 L.Ed.2d 87 (1975); see Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 451 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941, 93 S.Ct. 2784, 37 L.Ed.2d 402 (1973) (in the D.C. Circuit, habeas corpus standards generally apply in reviewing writs of error coram nobis)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "955 F.2d 996, 996", "parenthetical": "in the 5th Circuit, standard of review for a petition of writ of error coram nobis is more strict than that applicable to habeas corpus", "sentence": "Cf. Drobny, 955 F.2d at 996 (in the 5th Circuit, standard of review for a petition of writ of error coram nobis is more strict than that applicable to habeas corpus)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "955 F.2d 996, 996", "parenthetical": "in the 5th Circuit, standard of review for a petition of writ of error coram nobis is more strict than that applicable to habeas corpus", "sentence": "Cf. Drobny, 955 F.2d at 996 (in the 5th Circuit, standard of review for a petition of writ of error coram nobis is more strict than that applicable to habeas corpus)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "in the D.C. Circuit, habeas corpus standards generally apply in reviewing writs of error coram nobis", "sentence": "United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 341 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S.Ct. 1656, 44 L.Ed.2d 87 (1975); see Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 451 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941, 93 S.Ct. 2784, 37 L.Ed.2d 402 (1973) (in the D.C. Circuit, habeas corpus standards generally apply in reviewing writs of error coram nobis)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "955 F.2d 996, 996", "parenthetical": "in the 5th Circuit, standard of review for a petition of writ of error coram nobis is more strict than that applicable to habeas corpus", "sentence": "Cf. Drobny, 955 F.2d at 996 (in the 5th Circuit, standard of review for a petition of writ of error coram nobis is more strict than that applicable to habeas corpus)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "in the D.C. Circuit, habeas corpus standards generally apply in reviewing writs of error coram nobis", "sentence": "United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 341 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S.Ct. 1656, 44 L.Ed.2d 87 (1975); see Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 451 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941, 93 S.Ct. 2784, 37 L.Ed.2d 402 (1973) (in the D.C. Circuit, habeas corpus standards generally apply in reviewing writs of error coram nobis)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "66 F.3d 1402, 1411", "parenthetical": "\"Simply put, White is responsible under SS 1983 for breaching her duty to report Siepert's abuse of Sarah only if state law also empowered her with a right of legal control over Siepert.\"", "sentence": "Therefore, the § 1983, failure-to-report claims against Defendants Palladino, Mr. Ducar, Ms. Ducar, and Prentice must be dismissed. See Reid v. Kayye, 885 F.2d 129, 131-32 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that defendants were not in control and, therefore, were not supervisors and not subject to liability under § 1983); see also Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1411 (5th Cir.1995) (“Simply put, White is responsible under § 1983 for breaching her duty to report Siepert’s abuse of Sarah only if state law also empowered her with a right of legal control over Siepert.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "885 F.2d 129, 131-32", "parenthetical": "holding that defendants were not in control and, therefore, were not supervisors and not subject to liability under SS 1983", "sentence": "Therefore, the § 1983, failure-to-report claims against Defendants Palladino, Mr. Ducar, Ms. Ducar, and Prentice must be dismissed. See Reid v. Kayye, 885 F.2d 129, 131-32 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that defendants were not in control and, therefore, were not supervisors and not subject to liability under § 1983); see also Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1411 (5th Cir.1995) (“Simply put, White is responsible under § 1983 for breaching her duty to report Siepert’s abuse of Sarah only if state law also empowered her with a right of legal control over Siepert.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "68 F.3d 642, 646", "parenthetical": "finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on \"extreme hardship,\" where BIA failed to note the \"most salient\" evidence presented by Blanco", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "404 F.3d 295, 304", "parenthetical": "BIA abused its discretion, and indeed \"erred egregiously,\" in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao's religious group", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "404 F.3d 295, 304", "parenthetical": "BIA abused its discretion, and indeed \"erred egregiously,\" in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao's religious group", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "395 F.3d 622, 625", "parenthetical": "vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA's opinion \"fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran\"", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "404 F.3d 295, 304", "parenthetical": "BIA abused its discretion, and indeed \"erred egregiously,\" in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao's religious group", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "230 F.3d 902, 907", "parenthetical": "reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA's \"silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State's Report (1998", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "68 F.3d 642, 646", "parenthetical": "finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on \"extreme hardship,\" where BIA failed to note the \"most salient\" evidence presented by Blanco", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "230 F.3d 902, 907", "parenthetical": "reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA's \"silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State's Report (1998", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "230 F.3d 902, 907", "parenthetical": "reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA's \"silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State's Report (1998", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "395 F.3d 622, 625", "parenthetical": "vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA's opinion \"fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran\"", "sentence": "See Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.2005) (BIA abused its discretion, and indeed “erred egregiously,” in denying motion to reopen based on Country Reports showing worsened situation in China for Zhao’s religious group); Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 907 (7th Cir.2000) (reversing BIA denial of motion to reopen in part because of BIA’s “silence with regard to the U.S. Department of State’s Report (1998) that suggests that the Iraqi government has engaged in abuses against [Mansour’s religious/ethnic group]”); cf. Blanco v. INS, 68 F.3d 642, 646 (2d Cir.1995) (finding BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen based on “extreme hardship,” where BIA failed to note the “most salient” evidence presented by Blanco); Yan Chen, 417 F.3d 268 (vacating and remanding denial of asylum for failure to consider country conditions report); Mostafa v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir.2005) (vacating and remanding denial of Convention Against Torture relief where BIA’s opinion “fail[ed] to give adequate consideration to the country conditions in Iran”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "864 F.2d 44, 46", "parenthetical": "\"Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty of reasonable investigation into the facts and the law prior to filing a document with a court.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Callahan v. Schoppe, 864 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1989) (\"Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty of reasonable investigation into the facts and the law prior to filing a document with a court.”); Mod. Rules Prof. Cond. § 3.1 (\"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”); In re Zohdy, 892 So.2d 1277 (La. 2005) (lawyer who sought to intervene in chemical products liability class action violated rules of professional conduct by failing to investigate whether his clients were exposed to chemical). Courts may wish to consider an attorney’s disregard for these duties in determining whether the attorney's acceptance of payment pursuant to his client’s fraudulent claim was in good faith." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an attorney's status as an officer of the court \"places him on a different legal footing,\" and the court could not approve the retention of an attorney's fees where the client was guilty of fraudulent conduct in procuring the judgment", "sentence": "Cf. Excel Corp. v. Jimenez, 269 Kan. 291, 7 P.3d 1118, 1126 (2000) (an attorney’s status as an officer of the court \"places him on a different legal footing,” and the court could not approve the retention of an attorney’s fees where the client was guilty of fraudulent conduct in procuring the judgment)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "7 P.3d 1118, 1126", "parenthetical": "an attorney's status as an officer of the court \"places him on a different legal footing,\" and the court could not approve the retention of an attorney's fees where the client was guilty of fraudulent conduct in procuring the judgment", "sentence": "Cf. Excel Corp. v. Jimenez, 269 Kan. 291, 7 P.3d 1118, 1126 (2000) (an attorney’s status as an officer of the court \"places him on a different legal footing,” and the court could not approve the retention of an attorney’s fees where the client was guilty of fraudulent conduct in procuring the judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "864 F.2d 44, 46", "parenthetical": "\"Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty of reasonable investigation into the facts and the law prior to filing a document with a court.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Callahan v. Schoppe, 864 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1989) (\"Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty of reasonable investigation into the facts and the law prior to filing a document with a court.”); Mod. Rules Prof. Cond. § 3.1 (\"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”); In re Zohdy, 892 So.2d 1277 (La. 2005) (lawyer who sought to intervene in chemical products liability class action violated rules of professional conduct by failing to investigate whether his clients were exposed to chemical). Courts may wish to consider an attorney’s disregard for these duties in determining whether the attorney's acceptance of payment pursuant to his client’s fraudulent claim was in good faith." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an attorney's status as an officer of the court \"places him on a different legal footing,\" and the court could not approve the retention of an attorney's fees where the client was guilty of fraudulent conduct in procuring the judgment", "sentence": "Cf. Excel Corp. v. Jimenez, 269 Kan. 291, 7 P.3d 1118, 1126 (2000) (an attorney’s status as an officer of the court \"places him on a different legal footing,” and the court could not approve the retention of an attorney’s fees where the client was guilty of fraudulent conduct in procuring the judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "lawyer who sought to intervene in chemical products liability class action violated rules of professional conduct by failing to investigate whether his clients were exposed to chemical", "sentence": "See, e.g., Callahan v. Schoppe, 864 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1989) (\"Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty of reasonable investigation into the facts and the law prior to filing a document with a court.”); Mod. Rules Prof. Cond. § 3.1 (\"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”); In re Zohdy, 892 So.2d 1277 (La. 2005) (lawyer who sought to intervene in chemical products liability class action violated rules of professional conduct by failing to investigate whether his clients were exposed to chemical). Courts may wish to consider an attorney’s disregard for these duties in determining whether the attorney's acceptance of payment pursuant to his client’s fraudulent claim was in good faith." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "lawyer who sought to intervene in chemical products liability class action violated rules of professional conduct by failing to investigate whether his clients were exposed to chemical", "sentence": "See, e.g., Callahan v. Schoppe, 864 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1989) (\"Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty of reasonable investigation into the facts and the law prior to filing a document with a court.”); Mod. Rules Prof. Cond. § 3.1 (\"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”); In re Zohdy, 892 So.2d 1277 (La. 2005) (lawyer who sought to intervene in chemical products liability class action violated rules of professional conduct by failing to investigate whether his clients were exposed to chemical). Courts may wish to consider an attorney’s disregard for these duties in determining whether the attorney's acceptance of payment pursuant to his client’s fraudulent claim was in good faith." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "7 P.3d 1118, 1126", "parenthetical": "an attorney's status as an officer of the court \"places him on a different legal footing,\" and the court could not approve the retention of an attorney's fees where the client was guilty of fraudulent conduct in procuring the judgment", "sentence": "Cf. Excel Corp. v. Jimenez, 269 Kan. 291, 7 P.3d 1118, 1126 (2000) (an attorney’s status as an officer of the court \"places him on a different legal footing,” and the court could not approve the retention of an attorney’s fees where the client was guilty of fraudulent conduct in procuring the judgment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "695 F.3d 577, 581-82", "parenthetical": "\"No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right to bear arms within state parks.\"", "sentence": "See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430-31 (3rd Cir.2013) (declining to “definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home”); see also Embody v. Ward, 695 F.3d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir.2012) (“No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right to bear arms within state parks.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.2011) (“On the question of Heller’s applicability outside of the home environment, we think it prudent to await direction from the Court itself.”); and Gonzalez v. Village of West Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir.2012) (“Whatever ..." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "724 F.3d 426, 430-31", "parenthetical": "declining to \"definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home\"", "sentence": "See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430-31 (3rd Cir.2013) (declining to “definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home”); see also Embody v. Ward, 695 F.3d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir.2012) (“No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right to bear arms within state parks.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.2011) (“On the question of Heller’s applicability outside of the home environment, we think it prudent to await direction from the Court itself.”); and Gonzalez v. Village of West Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir.2012) (“Whatever ..." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "638 F.3d 458, 475", "parenthetical": "\"On the question of Heller's applicability outside of the home environment, we think it prudent to await direction from the Court itself.\"", "sentence": "See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430-31 (3rd Cir.2013) (declining to “definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home”); see also Embody v. Ward, 695 F.3d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir.2012) (“No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right to bear arms within state parks.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.2011) (“On the question of Heller’s applicability outside of the home environment, we think it prudent to await direction from the Court itself.”); and Gonzalez v. Village of West Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir.2012) (“Whatever ..." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "724 F.3d 426, 430-31", "parenthetical": "declining to \"definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home\"", "sentence": "See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430-31 (3rd Cir.2013) (declining to “definitively declare that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home”); see also Embody v. Ward, 695 F.3d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir.2012) (“No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right to bear arms within state parks.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.2011) (“On the question of Heller’s applicability outside of the home environment, we think it prudent to await direction from the Court itself.”); and Gonzalez v. Village of West Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 659 (7th Cir.2012) (“Whatever ..." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "prior consistent statement admissible if made before prior inconsistent statement that was subject of cross-examination", "sentence": "See State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162 (Me.1994)(reeent fabrication and improper influence are wholly separate motives and each is an independent ground for admission of a prior consistent statement); see also State v. Sullivan, 925 S.W.2d 483 (Mo.App.1996)(prior consistent statement admissible if made before prior inconsistent statement that was subject of cross-examination); but see Commonwealth v. Lareau, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 679, 642 N.E.2d 308 (1994)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reeent fabrication and improper influence are wholly separate motives and each is an independent ground for admission of a prior consistent statement", "sentence": "See State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162 (Me.1994)(reeent fabrication and improper influence are wholly separate motives and each is an independent ground for admission of a prior consistent statement); see also State v. Sullivan, 925 S.W.2d 483 (Mo.App.1996)(prior consistent statement admissible if made before prior inconsistent statement that was subject of cross-examination); but see Commonwealth v. Lareau, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 679, 642 N.E.2d 308 (1994)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "451 U.S. 477, 485-86", "parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "384 U.S. 466, 466", "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "384 U.S. 466, 466", "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "384 U.S. 466, 466", "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "384 U.S. 466, 466", "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17", "parenthetical": "\"Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "384 U.S. 466, 466", "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "384 U.S. 466, 466", "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "384 U.S. 466, 466", "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "757 F.Supp. 259, 264", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "451 U.S. 477, 485-86", "parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17", "parenthetical": "\"Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"", "sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)." }