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{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile", "sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 1997) (fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile); cf. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension); Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.1958) (two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue). Accordingly, with the exception of plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the court must dismiss each of plaintiffs’ claims against GM without prejudice for their failure to exhaust." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension", "sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 1997) (fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile); cf. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension); Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.1958) (two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue). Accordingly, with the exception of plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the court must dismiss each of plaintiffs’ claims against GM without prejudice for their failure to exhaust." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile", "sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 1997) (fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile); cf. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension); Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.1958) (two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue). Accordingly, with the exception of plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the court must dismiss each of plaintiffs’ claims against GM without prejudice for their failure to exhaust." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension", "sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 1997) (fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile); cf. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension); Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.1958) (two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue). Accordingly, with the exception of plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the court must dismiss each of plaintiffs’ claims against GM without prejudice for their failure to exhaust." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue", "sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 1997) (fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile); cf. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension); Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.1958) (two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue). Accordingly, with the exception of plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the court must dismiss each of plaintiffs’ claims against GM without prejudice for their failure to exhaust." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile", "sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 1997) (fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile); cf. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension); Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.1958) (two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue). Accordingly, with the exception of plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the court must dismiss each of plaintiffs’ claims against GM without prejudice for their failure to exhaust." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001", "parenthetical": "\"If a party, knowing of an alteration that discharges his duty, .. manifests a willingness to remain subject to the original contract or to forgive the alteration, the original contract is revived\"", "sentence": "Popovich v. McDonald’s Corp., 189 F.Supp.2d 772, 779 (N.D.Ill.2002); see also Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284 n. 2 (refusing to consider employer’s unilateral offer to use less expensive private arbitration since such offer was rejected by employee, leaving agreement as originally signed); Flyer Printing Company, Inc. v. Hill, 805 So.2d 829, 833 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.2001) (refusing to remake parties’ contract when employee rejected employer’s offer to pay all costs of arbitration, contrary to agreement’s language); cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 287(2) (“If a party, knowing of an alteration that discharges his duty, .. manifests a willingness to remain subject to the original contract or to forgive the alteration, the original contract is revived”). “Principles of justice and fair play ... lead to the conclusion that one party cannot alter post litem mo-tam terms of an agreement so that a case is dismissed.” In re Managed Care Litigation, 132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001 (S.D.Fla.2000)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "refusing to consider employer's unilateral offer to use less expensive private arbitration since such offer was rejected by employee, leaving agreement as originally signed", "sentence": "Popovich v. McDonald’s Corp., 189 F.Supp.2d 772, 779 (N.D.Ill.2002); see also Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284 n. 2 (refusing to consider employer’s unilateral offer to use less expensive private arbitration since such offer was rejected by employee, leaving agreement as originally signed); Flyer Printing Company, Inc. v. Hill, 805 So.2d 829, 833 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.2001) (refusing to remake parties’ contract when employee rejected employer’s offer to pay all costs of arbitration, contrary to agreement’s language); cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 287(2) (“If a party, knowing of an alteration that discharges his duty, .. manifests a willingness to remain subject to the original contract or to forgive the alteration, the original contract is revived”). “Principles of justice and fair play ... lead to the conclusion that one party cannot alter post litem mo-tam terms of an agreement so that a case is dismissed.” In re Managed Care Litigation, 132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001 (S.D.Fla.2000)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "805 So.2d 829, 833", "parenthetical": "refusing to remake parties' contract when employee rejected employer's offer to pay all costs of arbitration, contrary to agreement's language", "sentence": "Popovich v. McDonald’s Corp., 189 F.Supp.2d 772, 779 (N.D.Ill.2002); see also Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284 n. 2 (refusing to consider employer’s unilateral offer to use less expensive private arbitration since such offer was rejected by employee, leaving agreement as originally signed); Flyer Printing Company, Inc. v. Hill, 805 So.2d 829, 833 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.2001) (refusing to remake parties’ contract when employee rejected employer’s offer to pay all costs of arbitration, contrary to agreement’s language); cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 287(2) (“If a party, knowing of an alteration that discharges his duty, .. manifests a willingness to remain subject to the original contract or to forgive the alteration, the original contract is revived”). “Principles of justice and fair play ... lead to the conclusion that one party cannot alter post litem mo-tam terms of an agreement so that a case is dismissed.” In re Managed Care Litigation, 132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001 (S.D.Fla.2000)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001", "parenthetical": "\"If a party, knowing of an alteration that discharges his duty, .. manifests a willingness to remain subject to the original contract or to forgive the alteration, the original contract is revived\"", "sentence": "Popovich v. McDonald’s Corp., 189 F.Supp.2d 772, 779 (N.D.Ill.2002); see also Perez, 253 F.3d at 1284 n. 2 (refusing to consider employer’s unilateral offer to use less expensive private arbitration since such offer was rejected by employee, leaving agreement as originally signed); Flyer Printing Company, Inc. v. Hill, 805 So.2d 829, 833 (Fla.App. 2 Dist.2001) (refusing to remake parties’ contract when employee rejected employer’s offer to pay all costs of arbitration, contrary to agreement’s language); cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 287(2) (“If a party, knowing of an alteration that discharges his duty, .. manifests a willingness to remain subject to the original contract or to forgive the alteration, the original contract is revived”). “Principles of justice and fair play ... lead to the conclusion that one party cannot alter post litem mo-tam terms of an agreement so that a case is dismissed.” In re Managed Care Litigation, 132 F.Supp.2d 989, 1001 (S.D.Fla.2000)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "financial inconvenience caused by a reinstatement of maintenance does not amount to prejudice", "sentence": "See In re Marriage of Nielsen, 794 P.2d 1097 (Colo.App.1990) (deviation from the guideline amount of support is not justified by hardship resulting solely from application of the guideline, absent other unusual or unique financial circumstances); see also In re Marriage of Cargill, 843 P.2d 1335 (Colo.1993) (financial inconvenience caused by a reinstatement of maintenance does not amount to prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "deviation from the guideline amount of support is not justified by hardship resulting solely from application of the guideline, absent other unusual or unique financial circumstances", "sentence": "See In re Marriage of Nielsen, 794 P.2d 1097 (Colo.App.1990) (deviation from the guideline amount of support is not justified by hardship resulting solely from application of the guideline, absent other unusual or unique financial circumstances); see also In re Marriage of Cargill, 843 P.2d 1335 (Colo.1993) (financial inconvenience caused by a reinstatement of maintenance does not amount to prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "enforcement action brought against governor, attorney general, secretary of state, and board of elections", "sentence": "See Bone Shirt, 200 F.Supp.2d at 1156 (holding that “[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the State of South Dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the Attorney General or bring a declaratory judgment action” for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties); see also Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410 (D.N.C.1985) (enforcement action brought against governor, attorney general, secretary of state, and board of elections); Clayton v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 317 F.Supp. 915, 919 (E.D.N.C.1970) (enjoining, in covered counties, an unprecleared state law in a partially covered state in a case filed against state actors)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "200 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1156", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the State of South Dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the Attorney General or bring a declaratory judgment action\" for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties", "sentence": "See Bone Shirt, 200 F.Supp.2d at 1156 (holding that “[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the State of South Dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the Attorney General or bring a declaratory judgment action” for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties); see also Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410 (D.N.C.1985) (enforcement action brought against governor, attorney general, secretary of state, and board of elections); Clayton v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 317 F.Supp. 915, 919 (E.D.N.C.1970) (enjoining, in covered counties, an unprecleared state law in a partially covered state in a case filed against state actors)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "200 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1156", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the State of South Dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the Attorney General or bring a declaratory judgment action\" for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties", "sentence": "See Bone Shirt, 200 F.Supp.2d at 1156 (holding that “[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the State of South Dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the Attorney General or bring a declaratory judgment action” for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties); see also Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410 (D.N.C.1985) (enforcement action brought against governor, attorney general, secretary of state, and board of elections); Clayton v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 317 F.Supp. 915, 919 (E.D.N.C.1970) (enjoining, in covered counties, an unprecleared state law in a partially covered state in a case filed against state actors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "317 F.Supp. 915, 919", "parenthetical": "enjoining, in covered counties, an unprecleared state law in a partially covered state in a case filed against state actors", "sentence": "See Bone Shirt, 200 F.Supp.2d at 1156 (holding that “[ujnder the plain meaning of the Voting Rights Act, the State of South Dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the Attorney General or bring a declaratory judgment action” for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties); see also Haith v. Martin, 618 F.Supp. 410 (D.N.C.1985) (enforcement action brought against governor, attorney general, secretary of state, and board of elections); Clayton v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 317 F.Supp. 915, 919 (E.D.N.C.1970) (enjoining, in covered counties, an unprecleared state law in a partially covered state in a case filed against state actors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that prior to the introduction of jet airplanes, propeller-driven airplanes operating at the same altitudes were not such a nuisance", "sentence": "See Branning, 654 F.2d at 101 (noting that “[t]he real source of interference with plaintiffs’ use of their property in Lacey was not the altitude of the flights, but the noise”); see also Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 142 Ct.Cl. 269, 161 F.Supp. 597, 600 (1958) (noting that prior to the introduction of jet airplanes, propeller-driven airplanes operating at the same altitudes were not such a nuisance). With sufficiently egregious factual showings, our predecessor court ordered compensation for the effects produced by jet aircraft, despite the claimant’s inability to allege any flights under 500 feet." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "654 F.2d 101, 101", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[t]he real source of interference with plaintiffs' use of their property in Lacey was not the altitude of the flights, but the noise\"", "sentence": "See Branning, 654 F.2d at 101 (noting that “[t]he real source of interference with plaintiffs’ use of their property in Lacey was not the altitude of the flights, but the noise”); see also Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 142 Ct.Cl. 269, 161 F.Supp. 597, 600 (1958) (noting that prior to the introduction of jet airplanes, propeller-driven airplanes operating at the same altitudes were not such a nuisance). With sufficiently egregious factual showings, our predecessor court ordered compensation for the effects produced by jet aircraft, despite the claimant’s inability to allege any flights under 500 feet." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "161 F.Supp. 597, 600", "parenthetical": "noting that prior to the introduction of jet airplanes, propeller-driven airplanes operating at the same altitudes were not such a nuisance", "sentence": "See Branning, 654 F.2d at 101 (noting that “[t]he real source of interference with plaintiffs’ use of their property in Lacey was not the altitude of the flights, but the noise”); see also Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 142 Ct.Cl. 269, 161 F.Supp. 597, 600 (1958) (noting that prior to the introduction of jet airplanes, propeller-driven airplanes operating at the same altitudes were not such a nuisance). With sufficiently egregious factual showings, our predecessor court ordered compensation for the effects produced by jet aircraft, despite the claimant’s inability to allege any flights under 500 feet." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "654 F.2d 101, 101", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[t]he real source of interference with plaintiffs' use of their property in Lacey was not the altitude of the flights, but the noise\"", "sentence": "See Branning, 654 F.2d at 101 (noting that “[t]he real source of interference with plaintiffs’ use of their property in Lacey was not the altitude of the flights, but the noise”); see also Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 142 Ct.Cl. 269, 161 F.Supp. 597, 600 (1958) (noting that prior to the introduction of jet airplanes, propeller-driven airplanes operating at the same altitudes were not such a nuisance). With sufficiently egregious factual showings, our predecessor court ordered compensation for the effects produced by jet aircraft, despite the claimant’s inability to allege any flights under 500 feet." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "752 F.3d 1271, 1286", "parenthetical": "\"It is enough [for SS 1591 liability] that [the defendant] 'recruited' the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.\"", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71", "parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "752 F.3d 1271, 1286", "parenthetical": "\"It is enough [for SS 1591 liability] that [the defendant] 'recruited' the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.\"", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "627 F.3d 334, 334", "parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71", "parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "702 F.3d 1066, 1073", "parenthetical": "\"In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of SS 1591.\"", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "702 F.3d 1066, 1073", "parenthetical": "\"In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of SS 1591.\"", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "627 F.3d 334, 334", "parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "627 F.3d 329, 334", "parenthetical": "\"The knowledge required of the defendant [for SS 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.\"", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71", "parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "627 F.3d 334, 334", "parenthetical": "adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate SS 1591 conviction", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "627 F.3d 329, 334", "parenthetical": "\"The knowledge required of the defendant [for SS 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.\"", "sentence": "Although § 1589 requires that labor or services be provided or obtained, the other provisions noted here do not. See § 1590(a) (prohibiting the “knowing[ ] ... harborpng] ... [of] any person for labor or services,” which is most obviously read as requiring only intent to produce the result described); § 1594(a), (b), and (c) (prohibiting attempt and conspiracy to violate §§ 1589, 1590, or 1591); United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is enough [for § 1591 liability] that [the defendant] ‘recruited’ the victims ... to engage in commercial sex acts even though they did not actually do so.”); United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) (“In many, if not all cases, the commercial sex act is still in the future at the time the purchaser ... [is] in violation of § 1591.”); United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The knowledge required of the defendant [for § 1591 liability] is such that if things go as he has planned, force, fraud or coercion will be employed to cause his victim to engage in a commercial sex transaction.”); see also United States v. Roy, 630 Fed.Appx. 169, 170-71 (4th Cir. 2015) (adopting the approach in Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, while reviewing a conspiracy to violate § 1591 conviction)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "52 F.3d 264, 265", "parenthetical": "stating that prisoners have \"a First Amendment right to send and receive mail\"", "sentence": "See Witherow v. Paff 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (stating that prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail”); cf. Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that temporary delay in delivery of mail did not violate First Amendment where prison officials had come forward with a legitimate penological reason for the delay); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (regarding leave to amend). In addition, we instruct the district court on remand to address Grigsby’s claim based on the alleged confiscation of stamps." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "170 F.3d 957, 961", "parenthetical": "concluding that temporary delay in delivery of mail did not violate First Amendment where prison officials had come forward with a legitimate penological reason for the delay", "sentence": "See Witherow v. Paff 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (stating that prisoners have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail”); cf. Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that temporary delay in delivery of mail did not violate First Amendment where prison officials had come forward with a legitimate penological reason for the delay); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (regarding leave to amend). In addition, we instruct the district court on remand to address Grigsby’s claim based on the alleged confiscation of stamps." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "7 Vet.App. 517, 527", "parenthetical": "Board's statement \"must be adequate to enable a claimant to understand the precise basis for the Board's decision, as well as to facilitate review in this Court\"", "sentence": "See Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 517, 527 (1995) (Board’s statement “must be adequate to enable a claimant to understand the precise basis for the Board’s decision, as well as to facilitate review in this Court”); see also Hatlestad v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 524, 529 (1993) (“[T]he central inquiry in determining whether a veteran is entitled to TDIU is whether that veteran’s service-connected disabilities alone are of sufficient severity to produce unemployability.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "5 Vet.App. 524, 529", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he central inquiry in determining whether a veteran is entitled to TDIU is whether that veteran's service-connected disabilities alone are of sufficient severity to produce unemployability.\"", "sentence": "See Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 517, 527 (1995) (Board’s statement “must be adequate to enable a claimant to understand the precise basis for the Board’s decision, as well as to facilitate review in this Court”); see also Hatlestad v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 524, 529 (1993) (“[T]he central inquiry in determining whether a veteran is entitled to TDIU is whether that veteran’s service-connected disabilities alone are of sufficient severity to produce unemployability.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "247 F.3d 29, 31", "parenthetical": "stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "14 F.3d 1398, 1403", "parenthetical": "concluding that parents' and school district's opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "874 F.2d 1041, 1041", "parenthetical": "\"Given the parties' irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "247 F.3d 29, 31", "parenthetical": "stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "14 F.3d 1398, 1403", "parenthetical": "concluding that parents' and school district's opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "874 F.2d 1041, 1041", "parenthetical": "\"Given the parties' irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "247 F.3d 29, 31", "parenthetical": "stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "14 F.3d 1398, 1403", "parenthetical": "concluding that parents' and school district's opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "874 F.2d 1041, 1041", "parenthetical": "\"Given the parties' irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that \"deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review\"", "sentence": "See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) (noting that “deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet evading review”); see also Rome Sch. Comm. v. Mrs. B., 247 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (stating dispute over the sendees due to a disabled child pursuant to IDEA is a controversy likely to recur as the school district proposes new IEPs); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that parents’ and school district’s opposing views regarding proper educational placement of disabled child is a continuing conflict that will arise frequently); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1041 (“Given the parties’ irreconcilable views on the issue, [the educational placement] will be an issue every time [the school district] prepares a new placement or IEP -”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "777 F.2d 1561, 1561", "parenthetical": "affirming the TTAB's determination that BUNDT is generic \"for a type of ring cake\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for a type of ring cake”); In re Analog Devices, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810, 1988 WL 252496, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (“There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.”), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir.1989) (unpublished); see also Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir.1999) (“Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "175 F.3d 266, 271", "parenthetical": "\"Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for a type of ring cake”); In re Analog Devices, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810, 1988 WL 252496, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (“There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.”), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir.1989) (unpublished); see also Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir.1999) (“Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810", "parenthetical": "\"There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for a type of ring cake”); In re Analog Devices, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810, 1988 WL 252496, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (“There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.”), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir.1989) (unpublished); see also Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir.1999) (“Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "175 F.3d 266, 271", "parenthetical": "\"Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for a type of ring cake”); In re Analog Devices, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810, 1988 WL 252496, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (“There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.”), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir.1989) (unpublished); see also Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir.1999) (“Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "1988 WL 252496, at *3", "parenthetical": "\"There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for a type of ring cake”); In re Analog Devices, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810, 1988 WL 252496, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (“There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.”), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir.1989) (unpublished); see also Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir.1999) (“Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "175 F.3d 266, 271", "parenthetical": "\"Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for a type of ring cake”); In re Analog Devices, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810, 1988 WL 252496, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (“There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.”), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir.1989) (unpublished); see also Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir.1999) (“Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "175 F.3d 266, 271", "parenthetical": "\"Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for a type of ring cake”); In re Analog Devices, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810, 1988 WL 252496, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (“There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.”), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir.1989) (unpublished); see also Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir.1999) (“Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1561 (affirming the TTAB’s determination that BUNDT is generic “for a type of ring cake”); In re Analog Devices, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1808, 1810, 1988 WL 252496, at *3 (TTAB 1988) (“There is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.”), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir.1989) (unpublished); see also Otokoyama Co., Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir.1999) (“Generic words for sub-classifications or varieties of a good are [ ] ineligible for trademark protection.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "521 F.2d 250, 250", "parenthetical": "A parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties", "sentence": "Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587; Latta, 521 F.2d at 250(A parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties); see 8289 also Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995) (Oregon statute requiring felons convicted of murder or specific sexual offenses to submit blood sample for DNA bank is reasonable and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.1997) (convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing the state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "Oregon statute requiring felons convicted of murder or specific sexual offenses to submit blood sample for DNA bank is reasonable and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment", "sentence": "Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587; Latta, 521 F.2d at 250(A parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties); see 8289 also Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995) (Oregon statute requiring felons convicted of murder or specific sexual offenses to submit blood sample for DNA bank is reasonable and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.1997) (convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing the state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing the state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences", "sentence": "Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587; Latta, 521 F.2d at 250(A parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties); see 8289 also Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995) (Oregon statute requiring felons convicted of murder or specific sexual offenses to submit blood sample for DNA bank is reasonable and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.1997) (convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing the state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "521 F.2d 250, 250", "parenthetical": "A parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties", "sentence": "Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587; Latta, 521 F.2d at 250(A parolee and his home are subject to search by the parole officer when the officer reasonably believes that such search is necessary in the performance of his duties); see 8289 also Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir.1995) (Oregon statute requiring felons convicted of murder or specific sexual offenses to submit blood sample for DNA bank is reasonable and therefore does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.1997) (convicted sex offenders have no right of privacy preventing the state from requiring them to register as such and be subject to community notification of their residences)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "415 U.S. 361, 367", "parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "422 U.S. 749, 762", "parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "415 U.S. 361, 367", "parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465", "parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "415 U.S. 361, 367", "parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "422 U.S. 749, 762", "parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66", "parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66", "parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465", "parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66", "parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "422 U.S. 749, 762", "parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465", "parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute", "sentence": "See also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 367, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-66, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) (holding that similar jurisdictional bar precluded review only of administration of statute, not of challenge to statute itself); cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 762, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2465, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (holding that more expansive language barred all challenges related to statute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding Hobbs Act conviction of antiabortion activists for threatening doctor to induce him to cease performing abortions", "sentence": "See United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir.1975) (“there is no exception to the Hobbs Act” permitting extortion “for a religious purpose”); see also United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir.1983) (upholding Hobbs Act conviction of antiabortion activists for threatening doctor to induce him to cease performing abortions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "515 F.2d 112, 124", "parenthetical": "\"there is no exception to the Hobbs Act\" permitting extortion \"for a religious purpose\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 124 (3d Cir.1975) (“there is no exception to the Hobbs Act” permitting extortion “for a religious purpose”); see also United States v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446 (7th Cir.1983) (upholding Hobbs Act conviction of antiabortion activists for threatening doctor to induce him to cease performing abortions)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72", "parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72", "parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72", "parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.\"", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing pretrial detainee's Constitutional right to be from excessive force", "sentence": "Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“It is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee form the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2471-72, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (recognizing pretrial detainee’s Constitutional right to be from excessive force); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "94 F.3d 1528, 1535", "parenthetical": "concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the record showed indisputable and sufficient lawful motivations", "sentence": "See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1284-85 (extending qualified immunity to defendant because undisputed evidence showed that his decisions were motivated at least in part by lawful justifications); Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1296 (11th Cir.2000) (finding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity when his actions were indisputably motivated by lawful considerations); see also Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir.1996) (concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the record showed indisputable and sufficient lawful motivations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "520 F.3d 1284, 1284-85", "parenthetical": "extending qualified immunity to defendant because undisputed evidence showed that his decisions were motivated at least in part by lawful justifications", "sentence": "See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1284-85 (extending qualified immunity to defendant because undisputed evidence showed that his decisions were motivated at least in part by lawful justifications); Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1296 (11th Cir.2000) (finding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity when his actions were indisputably motivated by lawful considerations); see also Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir.1996) (concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the record showed indisputable and sufficient lawful motivations)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "94 F.3d 1528, 1535", "parenthetical": "concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the record showed indisputable and sufficient lawful motivations", "sentence": "See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1284-85 (extending qualified immunity to defendant because undisputed evidence showed that his decisions were motivated at least in part by lawful justifications); Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1296 (11th Cir.2000) (finding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity when his actions were indisputably motivated by lawful considerations); see also Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir.1996) (concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the record showed indisputable and sufficient lawful motivations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "219 F.3d 1280, 1296", "parenthetical": "finding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity when his actions were indisputably motivated by lawful considerations", "sentence": "See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1284-85 (extending qualified immunity to defendant because undisputed evidence showed that his decisions were motivated at least in part by lawful justifications); Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1296 (11th Cir.2000) (finding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity when his actions were indisputably motivated by lawful considerations); see also Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir.1996) (concluding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the record showed indisputable and sufficient lawful motivations)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of all claims raised in habeas petitions in Fifth Circuit", "sentence": "See Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978) (requiring exhaustion of all claims raised in habeas petitions in Fifth Circuit)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "pro se petitioner's claim of conflict of interest considered by federal appellate court although nature of conflict not divulged to either state or federal district court", "sentence": "But see Brooks v. Hopper, 597 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1979) (pro se petitioner’s claim of conflict of interest considered by federal appellate court although nature of conflict not divulged to either state or federal district court)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "937 F.Supp. 507, 509", "parenthetical": "\"we will not consider Nesser's 'exceptional reasons' argument for bail ..., finding that Congress reserved this task for the court of appeals.\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Nesser, 937 F.Supp. 507, 509 (W.D.Pa.1996) (Cindrich, J.) (“we will not consider Nesser’s ‘exceptional reasons’ argument for bail ..., finding that Congress reserved this task for the court of appeals.”); U.S. v. Salome, 870 F.Supp. 648, 652 (W.D.Pa.1994) (Diamond, J.) (“the jurisdiction established by § 3145 is appellate jurisdiction”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "242 F.Supp.2d 489, 491", "parenthetical": "\"Congress has mandated that the United States Courts of Appeals are the only courts with the jurisdiction to override a SS 3143(a", "sentence": "See also In re Sealed Case, 242 F.Supp.2d 489, 491 (E.D.Mich.2003) (Gadola, J.) (“Congress has mandated that the United States Courts of Appeals are the only courts with the jurisdiction to override a § 3143(a)(2) mandatory detention and order the release of a defendant because of exceptional reasons, pursuant to § 3145(c).”); cf. U.S. v. Bloomer, 791 F.Supp. 100, 102 (D.Vt.1992) (Billings, J.) (“we think that § 3145(c) by its very provisions applies exclusively to reviewing courts and not to courts which initially ordered release or detention”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16", "parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not \"im-permissibly disproportionate 'to the conduct' or to the defendants' 'net worth' \"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356", "parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356", "parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not \"im-permissibly disproportionate 'to the conduct' or to the defendants' 'net worth' \"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16", "parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not \"im-permissibly disproportionate 'to the conduct' or to the defendants' 'net worth' \"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not \"im-permissibly disproportionate 'to the conduct' or to the defendants' 'net worth' \"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16", "parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not \"im-permissibly disproportionate 'to the conduct' or to the defendants' 'net worth' \"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was \"proportioned to the landlord's misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty's deterrent purposes\"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "conducting an \"as applied\" analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not \"im-permissibly disproportionate 'to the conduct' or to the defendants' 'net worth' \"", "sentence": "See Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal.3d 348, 353, 356, 165 Cal.Rptr. 787, 612 P.2d 877 (1980) (upholding a $36,000 penalty under section 789.3 of the California Civil Code because it was “proportioned to the landlord’s misconduct and necessary to achieve the penalty’s deterrent purposes”); see also City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez, 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1312-16, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 418 (2000) (conducting an “as applied” analysis to decide whether a statute authorizing a $1,000 per day penalty for violations of the Housing Code violated due process, and concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a $663,000 penalty because it was not “im-permissibly disproportionate ‘to the conduct’ or to the defendants’ ‘net worth’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining” term meaning); Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325 (“[dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises] may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology”); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“Sensibly enough, ... dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary meaning”); see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n. 6 (“Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "308 F.3d 1202, 1202", "parenthetical": "\"dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining\" term meaning", "sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining” term meaning); Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325 (“[dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises] may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology”); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“Sensibly enough, ... dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary meaning”); see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n. 6 (“Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "299 F.3d 1325, 1325", "parenthetical": "\"[dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises] may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining” term meaning); Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325 (“[dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises] may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology”); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“Sensibly enough, ... dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary meaning”); see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n. 6 (“Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining” term meaning); Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325 (“[dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises] may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology”); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“Sensibly enough, ... dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary meaning”); see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n. 6 (“Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining” term meaning); Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325 (“[dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises] may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology”); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“Sensibly enough, ... dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary meaning”); see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n. 6 (“Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "288 F.3d 1366, 1366", "parenthetical": "\"Sensibly enough, ... dictionary definitions may establish a claim term's ordinary meaning\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1202 (“dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to assist the court in determining” term meaning); Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325 (“[dictionaries, encyclopedias and treatises] may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology”); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“Sensibly enough, ... dictionary definitions may establish a claim term’s ordinary meaning”); see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n. 6 (“Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic evidence ... they are worthy of special note.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "467 U.S. 649, 658-59", "parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect", "sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "974 F.2d 845, 847", "parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992) (“[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer’s inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1326, 122 L.Ed.2d 711 (1993); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1990) (analyzing arrestee’s volunteered statement about weapons)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992) (“[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer’s inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1326, 122 L.Ed.2d 711 (1993); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1990) (analyzing arrestee’s volunteered statement about weapons)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "467 U.S. 649, 658-59", "parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect", "sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "467 U.S. 649, 658-59", "parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect", "sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992) (“[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer’s inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1326, 122 L.Ed.2d 711 (1993); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1990) (analyzing arrestee’s volunteered statement about weapons)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "974 F.2d 845, 847", "parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992) (“[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer’s inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1326, 122 L.Ed.2d 711 (1993); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1990) (analyzing arrestee’s volunteered statement about weapons)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633", "parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect", "sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633", "parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect", "sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992) (“[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer’s inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1326, 122 L.Ed.2d 711 (1993); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1990) (analyzing arrestee’s volunteered statement about weapons)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633", "parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect", "sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992) (“[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer’s inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1326, 122 L.Ed.2d 711 (1993); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1990) (analyzing arrestee’s volunteered statement about weapons)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "974 F.2d 845, 847", "parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992) (“[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer’s inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1326, 122 L.Ed.2d 711 (1993); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1990) (analyzing arrestee’s volunteered statement about weapons)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect", "sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992) (“[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer’s inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1326, 122 L.Ed.2d 711 (1993); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1990) (analyzing arrestee’s volunteered statement about weapons)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect", "sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect", "sentence": "See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (officers confronted with immediate necessity of ascertaining whereabouts of gun need not recite Miranda warnings before questioning suspect)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer's inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 847 (7th Cir.1992) (“[Cjonsiderations of safety to law enforcement officers and others nearby justify an officer’s inquiry about the location of a gun without first advising a suspect of his Miranda rights.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1326, 122 L.Ed.2d 711 (1993); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir.1990) (analyzing arrestee’s volunteered statement about weapons)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "797 F. Supp. 994, 994", "parenthetical": "stating \"[e]ven if Commerce possessed the personnel to identify errors Plaintiffs made in their data base within the statutory deadlines, Commerce would have no basis for deciding which portion of the submission was correct or erroneous.\"", "sentence": "See Sugiyama, 797 F. Supp. at 994 (stating “[e]ven if Commerce possessed the personnel to identify errors Plaintiffs made in their data base within the statutory deadlines, Commerce would have no basis for deciding which portion of the submission was correct or erroneous.”); Makita Corp. v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 770, 780 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997); see also Acciai Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 2d 969, 982 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (“It is respondent’s obligation to supply Commerce with accurate information. * * * In general, Commerce is not required to correct a respondent’s errors when erroneous data [are] reported and not timely corrected.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "142 F. Supp. 2d 969, 982", "parenthetical": "\"It is respondent's obligation to supply Commerce with accurate information. * * * In general, Commerce is not required to correct a respondent's errors when erroneous data [are] reported and not timely corrected.\"", "sentence": "See Sugiyama, 797 F. Supp. at 994 (stating “[e]ven if Commerce possessed the personnel to identify errors Plaintiffs made in their data base within the statutory deadlines, Commerce would have no basis for deciding which portion of the submission was correct or erroneous.”); Makita Corp. v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 770, 780 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997); see also Acciai Speciali Terni S.p.A. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 2d 969, 982 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (“It is respondent’s obligation to supply Commerce with accurate information. * * * In general, Commerce is not required to correct a respondent’s errors when erroneous data [are] reported and not timely corrected.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "595 F.3d 49, 49", "parenthetical": "concluding that the district court's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record \"evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors\"", "sentence": "See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court); United States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that “judgment calls” on the weight to be given various relevant factors “are for the sentencing court, not for this court”); see also Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d at 49 (concluding that the district court’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "552 U.S. 51, 51-52", "parenthetical": "noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court", "sentence": "See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court); United States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that “judgment calls” on the weight to be given various relevant factors “are for the sentencing court, not for this court”); see also Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d at 49 (concluding that the district court’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court", "sentence": "See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court); United States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that “judgment calls” on the weight to be given various relevant factors “are for the sentencing court, not for this court”); see also Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d at 49 (concluding that the district court’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "595 F.3d 49, 49", "parenthetical": "concluding that the district court's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record \"evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors\"", "sentence": "See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court); United States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that “judgment calls” on the weight to be given various relevant factors “are for the sentencing court, not for this court”); see also Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d at 49 (concluding that the district court’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "595 F.3d 49, 49", "parenthetical": "concluding that the district court's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record \"evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors\"", "sentence": "See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court); United States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that “judgment calls” on the weight to be given various relevant factors “are for the sentencing court, not for this court”); see also Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d at 49 (concluding that the district court’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "637 F.3d 26, 31", "parenthetical": "holding that \"judgment calls\" on the weight to be given various relevant factors \"are for the sentencing court, not for this court\"", "sentence": "See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586 (noting that sentencing judge has a judicial vantage point superior to that of the reviewing appellate court); United States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that “judgment calls” on the weight to be given various relevant factors “are for the sentencing court, not for this court”); see also Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d at 49 (concluding that the district court’s silence about a sentencing angle advocated by a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record “evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "76 F.3d 1011, 1011-12", "parenthetical": "holding that nonprofit corporations' sales of \"T-shirts imprinted with various philosophical messages\" were \"within the ambit of the First Amendment\"", "sentence": "Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 85 (quoting and citing Bery, 97 F.3d at 696). Moreover, some objects are otherwise utilitarian, but can become “inextricably intertwined” with “pure elements of speech” when they are sold to disseminate political, religious, or philosophical messages, Gaudiya, 952 F.2d at 1064-65 (holding that religious and political groups’ sale of merchandise and literature was fully protected); see also One World, 76 F.3d at 1011-12 (holding that nonprofit corporations’ sales of “T-shirts imprinted with various philosophical messages” were “within the ambit of the First Amendment”), or when they “serve a predominantly expressive purpose.”" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "952 F.2d 1064, 1064-65", "parenthetical": "holding that religious and political groups' sale of merchandise and literature was fully protected", "sentence": "Mastrovincenzo, 435 F.3d at 85 (quoting and citing Bery, 97 F.3d at 696). Moreover, some objects are otherwise utilitarian, but can become “inextricably intertwined” with “pure elements of speech” when they are sold to disseminate political, religious, or philosophical messages, Gaudiya, 952 F.2d at 1064-65 (holding that religious and political groups’ sale of merchandise and literature was fully protected); see also One World, 76 F.3d at 1011-12 (holding that nonprofit corporations’ sales of “T-shirts imprinted with various philosophical messages” were “within the ambit of the First Amendment”), or when they “serve a predominantly expressive purpose.”" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "122 So.3d 928, 930", "parenthetical": "finding E.A.R. did not apply to the trial court's initial decision to reject probation in favor of commitment, but error occurred when the trial court committed the juvenile before obtaining the Department's recommendation as to the appropriate restrictiveness level", "sentence": "Cf. B.K.A. v. State, 122 So.3d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (finding E.A.R. did not apply to the trial court’s initial decision to reject probation in favor of commitment, but error occurred when the trial court committed the juvenile before obtaining the Department’s recommendation as to the appropriate restrictiveness level); A.L.M. v. State, 176 So.3d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (affirming the disposition order that adjudicated the juvenile delinquent and found probation not appropriate, but reversing the trial court’s nonsecure placement and remanding to first get a recommendation of a restrictiveness level from the Department before committing the juvenile)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "90 So.3d 961, 967", "parenthetical": "holding the E.A.R. analysis did not apply to the trial court's initial determination made under section 985.433(6) to reject the Department's recommendation of probation in favor of commitment", "sentence": "J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d 961, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding the E.A.R. analysis did not apply to the trial court’s initial determination made under section 985.433(6) to reject the Department’s recommendation of probation in favor of commitment); B.K.A. v. State, 122 So.3d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“Probation is not a restrictiveness level because it is a limitation on the freedom of the child ⅛ lieu of commitment to the custody of the [Department.’ ”) (citing § 985.03(44), Fla. Stat.) (emphasis in original). Here, the trial court apparently advised the Department in advance that it intended to commit M.J. and requested an alternative commitment recommendation." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "90 So.3d 961, 967", "parenthetical": "holding the E.A.R. analysis did not apply to the trial court's initial determination made under section 985.433(6) to reject the Department's recommendation of probation in favor of commitment", "sentence": "J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d 961, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding the E.A.R. analysis did not apply to the trial court’s initial determination made under section 985.433(6) to reject the Department’s recommendation of probation in favor of commitment); B.K.A. v. State, 122 So.3d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“Probation is not a restrictiveness level because it is a limitation on the freedom of the child ⅛ lieu of commitment to the custody of the [Department.’ ”) (citing § 985.03(44), Fla. Stat.) (emphasis in original). Here, the trial court apparently advised the Department in advance that it intended to commit M.J. and requested an alternative commitment recommendation." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "affirming the disposition order that adjudicated the juvenile delinquent and found probation not appropriate, but reversing the trial court's nonsecure placement and remanding to first get a recommendation of a restrictiveness level from the Department before committing the juvenile", "sentence": "Cf. B.K.A. v. State, 122 So.3d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (finding E.A.R. did not apply to the trial court’s initial decision to reject probation in favor of commitment, but error occurred when the trial court committed the juvenile before obtaining the Department’s recommendation as to the appropriate restrictiveness level); A.L.M. v. State, 176 So.3d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (affirming the disposition order that adjudicated the juvenile delinquent and found probation not appropriate, but reversing the trial court’s nonsecure placement and remanding to first get a recommendation of a restrictiveness level from the Department before committing the juvenile)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "122 So.3d 928, 930", "parenthetical": "finding E.A.R. did not apply to the trial court's initial decision to reject probation in favor of commitment, but error occurred when the trial court committed the juvenile before obtaining the Department's recommendation as to the appropriate restrictiveness level", "sentence": "Cf. B.K.A. v. State, 122 So.3d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (finding E.A.R. did not apply to the trial court’s initial decision to reject probation in favor of commitment, but error occurred when the trial court committed the juvenile before obtaining the Department’s recommendation as to the appropriate restrictiveness level); A.L.M. v. State, 176 So.3d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (affirming the disposition order that adjudicated the juvenile delinquent and found probation not appropriate, but reversing the trial court’s nonsecure placement and remanding to first get a recommendation of a restrictiveness level from the Department before committing the juvenile)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "122 So.3d 928, 930", "parenthetical": "\"Probation is not a restrictiveness level because it is a limitation on the freedom of the child 1/8 lieu of commitment to the custody of the [Department.' \"", "sentence": "J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d 961, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding the E.A.R. analysis did not apply to the trial court’s initial determination made under section 985.433(6) to reject the Department’s recommendation of probation in favor of commitment); B.K.A. v. State, 122 So.3d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“Probation is not a restrictiveness level because it is a limitation on the freedom of the child ⅛ lieu of commitment to the custody of the [Department.’ ”) (citing § 985.03(44), Fla. Stat.) (emphasis in original). Here, the trial court apparently advised the Department in advance that it intended to commit M.J. and requested an alternative commitment recommendation." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "122 So.3d 928, 930", "parenthetical": "\"Probation is not a restrictiveness level because it is a limitation on the freedom of the child 1/8 lieu of commitment to the custody of the [Department.' \"", "sentence": "J.B.S. v. State, 90 So.3d 961, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding the E.A.R. analysis did not apply to the trial court’s initial determination made under section 985.433(6) to reject the Department’s recommendation of probation in favor of commitment); B.K.A. v. State, 122 So.3d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“Probation is not a restrictiveness level because it is a limitation on the freedom of the child ⅛ lieu of commitment to the custody of the [Department.’ ”) (citing § 985.03(44), Fla. Stat.) (emphasis in original). Here, the trial court apparently advised the Department in advance that it intended to commit M.J. and requested an alternative commitment recommendation." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "affirming the disposition order that adjudicated the juvenile delinquent and found probation not appropriate, but reversing the trial court's nonsecure placement and remanding to first get a recommendation of a restrictiveness level from the Department before committing the juvenile", "sentence": "Cf. B.K.A. v. State, 122 So.3d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (finding E.A.R. did not apply to the trial court’s initial decision to reject probation in favor of commitment, but error occurred when the trial court committed the juvenile before obtaining the Department’s recommendation as to the appropriate restrictiveness level); A.L.M. v. State, 176 So.3d 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (affirming the disposition order that adjudicated the juvenile delinquent and found probation not appropriate, but reversing the trial court’s nonsecure placement and remanding to first get a recommendation of a restrictiveness level from the Department before committing the juvenile)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "25 Cal.3d 860, 867", "parenthetical": "\"Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.\"", "sentence": "See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. The fact that the defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental publication a commercial use of the name or likeness. Thus a newspaper, although it is not a philanthropic institution, does not become liable under the rule stated in this Section to every person whose name or likeness it publishes.”); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23 (N.D.Cal.2002) (finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and promoted the protected expression); see also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 867, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454 (Cal.1979) (“Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23", "parenthetical": "finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and promoted the protected expression", "sentence": "See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. The fact that the defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental publication a commercial use of the name or likeness. Thus a newspaper, although it is not a philanthropic institution, does not become liable under the rule stated in this Section to every person whose name or likeness it publishes.”); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23 (N.D.Cal.2002) (finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and promoted the protected expression); see also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 867, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454 (Cal.1979) (“Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.\"", "sentence": "See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. The fact that the defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental publication a commercial use of the name or likeness. Thus a newspaper, although it is not a philanthropic institution, does not become liable under the rule stated in this Section to every person whose name or likeness it publishes.”); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23 (N.D.Cal.2002) (finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and promoted the protected expression); see also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 867, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454 (Cal.1979) (“Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23", "parenthetical": "finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and promoted the protected expression", "sentence": "See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. The fact that the defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental publication a commercial use of the name or likeness. Thus a newspaper, although it is not a philanthropic institution, does not become liable under the rule stated in this Section to every person whose name or likeness it publishes.”); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23 (N.D.Cal.2002) (finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and promoted the protected expression); see also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 867, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454 (Cal.1979) (“Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23", "parenthetical": "finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and promoted the protected expression", "sentence": "See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. The fact that the defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental publication a commercial use of the name or likeness. Thus a newspaper, although it is not a philanthropic institution, does not become liable under the rule stated in this Section to every person whose name or likeness it publishes.”); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23 (N.D.Cal.2002) (finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and promoted the protected expression); see also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 867, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454 (Cal.1979) (“Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.\"", "sentence": "See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977) (“It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. The fact that the defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental publication a commercial use of the name or likeness. Thus a newspaper, although it is not a philanthropic institution, does not become liable under the rule stated in this Section to every person whose name or likeness it publishes.”); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1122-23 (N.D.Cal.2002) (finding that the First Amendment protected use of the plaintiffs likeness in advertisements for a television show because the television show was an expressive work and the advertisements were an adjunct of the protected work and promoted the protected expression); see also Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 867, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d 454 (Cal.1979) (“Entertainment is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "411 F.Supp. 897, 902", "parenthetical": "\"It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys' fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.\"", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "553 F.2d 1365, 1365", "parenthetical": "\"The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.\"", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "411 F.Supp. 897, 902", "parenthetical": "\"It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys' fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.\"", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "443 F.Supp. 1353, 1353", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs \"dogged determination\" in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the \"government presented a very formidable opposition\" and \"[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,\" showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "546 F.2d 513, 513", "parenthetical": "\"Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.\"", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "553 F.2d 1365, 1365", "parenthetical": "\"The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.\"", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "546 F.2d 513, 513", "parenthetical": "\"Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.\"", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "443 F.Supp. 1353, 1353", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs \"dogged determination\" in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the \"government presented a very formidable opposition\" and \"[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,\" showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "553 F.2d 1365, 1365", "parenthetical": "\"The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.\"", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65", "parenthetical": "surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "443 F.Supp. 1353, 1353", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs \"dogged determination\" in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the \"government presented a very formidable opposition\" and \"[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,\" showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65", "parenthetical": "surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees", "sentence": "See Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 491; Kaye v. Burns, 411 F.Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (“It is inconceivable ... that the recovery of attorneys’ fees could be foreclosed whenever the government chooses to moot an action under the [FOIA] by supplying, during the pendency of the litigation, the material sought in the complaint.”); Vermont Low Income, 546 F.2d at 513 (“Congress clearly did not mean that where [a] FOIA suit had gone to trial and developments made it apparent that the judge was about to rule for the plaintiff, the Government could abort any award of attorney fees by an eleventh hour tender of the information requested.”); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (D.C.Cir.1977) (surveying cases that held that a surrender of documents before final judicial action did not preclude a grant of fees); see also Cuneo, 553 F.2d at 1365 (“The case would never have reached the status it did if appellant had not doggedly pursued the matter.”); Exner, 443 F.Supp. at 1353 (plaintiffs “dogged determination” in a vigorous and hard-fought litigation, where the “government presented a very formidable opposition” and “[v]irtually everything the plaintiff attempted to do was vigorously opposed,” showed that the lawsuit was the cause of the production)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Justice, common sense and the probable intention of the parties are guides to construction of a written instrument.\"", "sentence": "See Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1964) (“Justice, common sense and the probable intention of the parties are guides to construction of a written instrument.”); see also Fishman v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 247 F.3d 300, 302 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating, in interpreting a contract subject to Massachusetts law, that “[cjommon sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons”). We accordingly hold the terms of the Non-Contravention Agreement entitled to apply on the facts of this case, without nullification by the Loan Agreement’s non-re-, course clause." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "247 F.3d 300, 302", "parenthetical": "stating, in interpreting a contract subject to Massachusetts law, that \"[cjommon sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons\"", "sentence": "See Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1964) (“Justice, common sense and the probable intention of the parties are guides to construction of a written instrument.”); see also Fishman v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 247 F.3d 300, 302 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating, in interpreting a contract subject to Massachusetts law, that “[cjommon sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons”). We accordingly hold the terms of the Non-Contravention Agreement entitled to apply on the facts of this case, without nullification by the Loan Agreement’s non-re-, course clause." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "200 N.E.2d 248, 251", "parenthetical": "\"Justice, common sense and the probable intention of the parties are guides to construction of a written instrument.\"", "sentence": "See Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1964) (“Justice, common sense and the probable intention of the parties are guides to construction of a written instrument.”); see also Fishman v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 247 F.3d 300, 302 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating, in interpreting a contract subject to Massachusetts law, that “[cjommon sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons”). We accordingly hold the terms of the Non-Contravention Agreement entitled to apply on the facts of this case, without nullification by the Loan Agreement’s non-re-, course clause." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "247 F.3d 300, 302", "parenthetical": "stating, in interpreting a contract subject to Massachusetts law, that \"[cjommon sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons\"", "sentence": "See Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 347 Mass. 697, 200 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1964) (“Justice, common sense and the probable intention of the parties are guides to construction of a written instrument.”); see also Fishman v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 247 F.3d 300, 302 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating, in interpreting a contract subject to Massachusetts law, that “[cjommon sense is as much a part of contract interpretation as is the dictionary or the arsenal of canons”). We accordingly hold the terms of the Non-Contravention Agreement entitled to apply on the facts of this case, without nullification by the Loan Agreement’s non-re-, course clause." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "132 Ariz. 35, 37", "parenthetical": "difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion", "sentence": "Cf. State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); Quigley v. City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App.1982) (difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32", "parenthetical": "appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record", "sentence": "See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d 876, 883 (App.2004) (appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record). And we do not re-weigh those factors to determine whether we would reach the same decision as the trial court." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32", "parenthetical": "appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record", "sentence": "See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d 876, 883 (App.2004) (appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record). And we do not re-weigh those factors to determine whether we would reach the same decision as the trial court." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "643 P.2d 738, 740", "parenthetical": "difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion", "sentence": "Cf. State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); Quigley v. City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App.1982) (difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "97 P.3d 876, 883", "parenthetical": "appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record", "sentence": "See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d 876, 883 (App.2004) (appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record). And we do not re-weigh those factors to determine whether we would reach the same decision as the trial court." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "132 Ariz. 35, 37", "parenthetical": "difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion", "sentence": "Cf. State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); Quigley v. City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App.1982) (difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "643 P.2d 738, 740", "parenthetical": "difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion", "sentence": "Cf. State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432, 687 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1984); Quigley v. City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37, 643 P.2d 738, 740 (App.1982) (difference in judicial opinion not synonymous with abuse of discretion)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "97 P.3d 876, 883", "parenthetical": "appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record", "sentence": "See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, ¶ 32, 97 P.3d 876, 883 (App.2004) (appellate court presumes trial court knows law and applied correct standard unless presumption rebutted by record). And we do not re-weigh those factors to determine whether we would reach the same decision as the trial court." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2004 WL 628784, at *5", "parenthetical": "\"It is well-established that Hepatitis C qualifies as a serious condition for purposes of an Eighth Amendment analysis.\"", "sentence": "See Pabon v. Wright, 2004 WL 628784, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2004) (“It is well-established that Hepatitis C qualifies as a serious condition for purposes of an Eighth Amendment analysis.”); Johnson v. Wright, 234 F.Supp.2d 352, 360 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (holding that HCV constitutes an objectively serious medical condition)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "385 F.3d 1133, 1137", "parenthetical": "agreeing with district court's determination that although HCV infection was a serious medical need, the issue was whether inmate had serious medical need for immediate interferon treatment", "sentence": "Cf. Bender v. Regier, 385 F.3d 1133, 1137 (8th Cir.2004) (agreeing with district court’s determination that although HCV infection was a serious medical need, the issue was whether inmate had serious medical need for immediate interferon treatment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a person may become liable in tort for negligently failing to perform a voluntarily assumed undertaking even in the absence of a contract to do so.\"", "sentence": "See Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 215, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 (1991); Bloomberg v. Interinsurance Exchange, 162 Cal.App.3d 571, 575-576 (1984) (Auto club’s undertaking to send a tow truck, upon which victim relied, resulted in a duty to act with care.); See also Valdez v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1954) (“It is well established that a person may become liable in tort for negligently failing to perform a voluntarily assumed undertaking even in the absence of a contract to do so.”). It was reasonable for Western to believe Quechan would rely on its repeated promises to avoid eligible sites and cause no additional impacts." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "162 Cal.App.3d 571, 575-576", "parenthetical": "Auto club's undertaking to send a tow truck, upon which victim relied, resulted in a duty to act with care.", "sentence": "See Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 215, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 (1991); Bloomberg v. Interinsurance Exchange, 162 Cal.App.3d 571, 575-576 (1984) (Auto club’s undertaking to send a tow truck, upon which victim relied, resulted in a duty to act with care.); See also Valdez v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1954) (“It is well established that a person may become liable in tort for negligently failing to perform a voluntarily assumed undertaking even in the absence of a contract to do so.”). It was reasonable for Western to believe Quechan would rely on its repeated promises to avoid eligible sites and cause no additional impacts." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "162 Cal.App.3d 571, 575-576", "parenthetical": "Auto club's undertaking to send a tow truck, upon which victim relied, resulted in a duty to act with care.", "sentence": "See Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 215, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 (1991); Bloomberg v. Interinsurance Exchange, 162 Cal.App.3d 571, 575-576 (1984) (Auto club’s undertaking to send a tow truck, upon which victim relied, resulted in a duty to act with care.); See also Valdez v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1954) (“It is well established that a person may become liable in tort for negligently failing to perform a voluntarily assumed undertaking even in the absence of a contract to do so.”). It was reasonable for Western to believe Quechan would rely on its repeated promises to avoid eligible sites and cause no additional impacts." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is well established that a person may become liable in tort for negligently failing to perform a voluntarily assumed undertaking even in the absence of a contract to do so.\"", "sentence": "See Aim Insurance Co. v. Culcasi, 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 215, 280 Cal.Rptr. 766 (1991); Bloomberg v. Interinsurance Exchange, 162 Cal.App.3d 571, 575-576 (1984) (Auto club’s undertaking to send a tow truck, upon which victim relied, resulted in a duty to act with care.); See also Valdez v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810, 278 P.2d 91 (1954) (“It is well established that a person may become liable in tort for negligently failing to perform a voluntarily assumed undertaking even in the absence of a contract to do so.”). It was reasonable for Western to believe Quechan would rely on its repeated promises to avoid eligible sites and cause no additional impacts." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "213 F.3d 278, 286-87", "parenthetical": "employee's admitted knowledge of employer's policy prohibiting sexual harassment and complaint procedure and employer's prompt investigation of complaint showed that employer \"exercised reasonable care to prevent and, if not prevented, to correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior by supervisory personnel\"", "sentence": "Scrivner v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist, 169 F.3d 969, 971 (5th Cir.1999) (school district’s anti-discrimination policy, swift response to harassment complaints, and acceptance of harasser’s resignation was sufficient to establish first prong of affirmative defense); see also Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 286-87 (5th Cir.2000) (employee’s admitted knowledge of employer’s policy prohibiting sexual harassment and complaint procedure and employer’s prompt investigation of complaint showed that employer “exercised reasonable care to prevent and, if not prevented, to correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior by supervisory personnel”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "169 F.3d 969, 971", "parenthetical": "school district's anti-discrimination policy, swift response to harassment complaints, and acceptance of harasser's resignation was sufficient to establish first prong of affirmative defense", "sentence": "Scrivner v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist, 169 F.3d 969, 971 (5th Cir.1999) (school district’s anti-discrimination policy, swift response to harassment complaints, and acceptance of harasser’s resignation was sufficient to establish first prong of affirmative defense); see also Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 286-87 (5th Cir.2000) (employee’s admitted knowledge of employer’s policy prohibiting sexual harassment and complaint procedure and employer’s prompt investigation of complaint showed that employer “exercised reasonable care to prevent and, if not prevented, to correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior by supervisory personnel”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "explaining that we lack jurisdiction to review an issue an alien fails to raise before the BIA", "sentence": "See INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring an alien to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review); Fernandez-Bernal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 257 F.3d 1304, 1317 n. 13 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that we lack jurisdiction to review an issue an alien fails to raise before the BIA); see also Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir.2006) (explaining that to properly raise an issue before the BIA, the alien must mention the issue in his brief and discuss its merits or the basis for the IJ’s decision)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "446 F.3d 1239, 1253", "parenthetical": "explaining that to properly raise an issue before the BIA, the alien must mention the issue in his brief and discuss its merits or the basis for the IJ's decision", "sentence": "See INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring an alien to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review); Fernandez-Bernal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 257 F.3d 1304, 1317 n. 13 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that we lack jurisdiction to review an issue an alien fails to raise before the BIA); see also Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir.2006) (explaining that to properly raise an issue before the BIA, the alien must mention the issue in his brief and discuss its merits or the basis for the IJ’s decision)." }