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{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "832 F.2d 229, 237-38", "parenthetical": "distinguishing Perry as applying only when the defendant's testimo ny was required by a statutory presumption", "sentence": "Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393-94, 88 S.Ct. 967, 975-77, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 115-16 (3d Cir.1986) (availability of judicial grant of use immunity with respect to defendant’s testimony in rebutting the presumption of dangerousness sufficient to avoid violation of Fifth Amendment); cf. United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237-38 (1st Cir.1987) (distinguishing Perry as applying only when the defendant’s testimo ny was required by a statutory presumption)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "788 F.2d 100, 115-16", "parenthetical": "availability of judicial grant of use immunity with respect to defendant's testimony in rebutting the presumption of dangerousness sufficient to avoid violation of Fifth Amendment", "sentence": "Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 393-94, 88 S.Ct. 967, 975-77, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 115-16 (3d Cir.1986) (availability of judicial grant of use immunity with respect to defendant’s testimony in rebutting the presumption of dangerousness sufficient to avoid violation of Fifth Amendment); cf. United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237-38 (1st Cir.1987) (distinguishing Perry as applying only when the defendant’s testimo ny was required by a statutory presumption)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "545 S.E.2d 848, 848", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"no [meaningful] offer was made\" when UIM form was presented to and signed by spouse' of named insured who was not authorized to reject UIM coverage", "sentence": "Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d at 556; see Estate of Hancock, 545 S.E.2d at 848 (concluding that “no [meaningful] offer was made” when UIM form was presented to and signed by spouse' of named insured who was not authorized to reject UIM coverage); see also McDonald v. S.C. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 336 S.C. 120, 518 S.E.2d 624, 626 (S.C.Ct.App.1999) (noting “legislature’s intent that all named insured be offered UIM coverage”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting \"legislature's intent that all named insured be offered UIM coverage\"", "sentence": "Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d at 556; see Estate of Hancock, 545 S.E.2d at 848 (concluding that “no [meaningful] offer was made” when UIM form was presented to and signed by spouse' of named insured who was not authorized to reject UIM coverage); see also McDonald v. S.C. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 336 S.C. 120, 518 S.E.2d 624, 626 (S.C.Ct.App.1999) (noting “legislature’s intent that all named insured be offered UIM coverage”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "545 S.E.2d 848, 848", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"no [meaningful] offer was made\" when UIM form was presented to and signed by spouse' of named insured who was not authorized to reject UIM coverage", "sentence": "Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d at 556; see Estate of Hancock, 545 S.E.2d at 848 (concluding that “no [meaningful] offer was made” when UIM form was presented to and signed by spouse' of named insured who was not authorized to reject UIM coverage); see also McDonald v. S.C. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 336 S.C. 120, 518 S.E.2d 624, 626 (S.C.Ct.App.1999) (noting “legislature’s intent that all named insured be offered UIM coverage”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "518 S.E.2d 624, 626", "parenthetical": "noting \"legislature's intent that all named insured be offered UIM coverage\"", "sentence": "Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d at 556; see Estate of Hancock, 545 S.E.2d at 848 (concluding that “no [meaningful] offer was made” when UIM form was presented to and signed by spouse' of named insured who was not authorized to reject UIM coverage); see also McDonald v. S.C. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 336 S.C. 120, 518 S.E.2d 624, 626 (S.C.Ct.App.1999) (noting “legislature’s intent that all named insured be offered UIM coverage”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reviewing merits of Commission order establishing just and reasonable rates where wholesale customers of the utilities complained that the rates were based on an unfairly discriminatory demand allocation methodology", "sentence": "See Papago Tribal Utility Authority, 628 F.2d at 239 (describing an order establishing just and reasonable rates as “[t]he quintessential reviewable order.”); see also Cities of Bethany, et al. v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131 (D.C.Cir.1984) (reviewing merits of Commission order establishing just and reasonable rates where wholesale customers of the utilities complained that the rates were based on an unfairly discriminatory demand allocation methodology)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "628 F.2d 239, 239", "parenthetical": "describing an order establishing just and reasonable rates as \"[t]he quintessential reviewable order.\"", "sentence": "See Papago Tribal Utility Authority, 628 F.2d at 239 (describing an order establishing just and reasonable rates as “[t]he quintessential reviewable order.”); see also Cities of Bethany, et al. v. FERC, 727 F.2d 1131 (D.C.Cir.1984) (reviewing merits of Commission order establishing just and reasonable rates where wholesale customers of the utilities complained that the rates were based on an unfairly discriminatory demand allocation methodology)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2003 WL 1807148, at *4", "parenthetical": "holding that a foreign defendant was not present in New York for the purposes of jurisdiction simply because it engaged in financing transactions there", "sentence": "See, e.g., Fan-del, 345 F.2d at 89 (“Washington presents many business organizations with special needs for a continuous and ponderable physical presence there, ... and that the purpose of Congress was not to make that presence in every case a base for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.”); see also In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on November 11, 2000, No. 1428 (SAS), 01 Civ. 7342, 2003 WL 1807148, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.4, 2003) (holding that a foreign defendant was not present in New York for the purposes of jurisdiction simply because it engaged in financing transactions there) (citing Clarke v. Fonix Corp., No. 98 Civ. 6116 (RPP), 1999 WL 105031, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.1, 1999) (reasoning that “[r]aising financing is not a form of ‘doing business’ for the purpose of" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "345 F.2d 89, 89", "parenthetical": "\"Washington presents many business organizations with special needs for a continuous and ponderable physical presence there, ... and that the purpose of Congress was not to make that presence in every case a base for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Fan-del, 345 F.2d at 89 (“Washington presents many business organizations with special needs for a continuous and ponderable physical presence there, ... and that the purpose of Congress was not to make that presence in every case a base for the assertion of personal jurisdiction.”); see also In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on November 11, 2000, No. 1428 (SAS), 01 Civ. 7342, 2003 WL 1807148, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.4, 2003) (holding that a foreign defendant was not present in New York for the purposes of jurisdiction simply because it engaged in financing transactions there) (citing Clarke v. Fonix Corp., No. 98 Civ. 6116 (RPP), 1999 WL 105031, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.1, 1999) (reasoning that “[r]aising financing is not a form of ‘doing business’ for the purpose of" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "affirming award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.A. SS 1988 even though the underlying action was barred by the Tax Injunction Act, noting that Werch was a \"similar case\"", "sentence": "See Werch v. City of Berlin, 673 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir.1982) (“Clearly, Werch should have known that his claim for injunctive relief would be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction [due to the Tax Injunction Act], Under these circumstances, Werch’s claim for injunctive relief was meritless.”); cf. Hutcherson v. Board of Supervisors, 742 F.2d 142, 146 & n. 4 (4th Cir.1984) (affirming award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 even though the underlying action was barred by the Tax Injunction Act, noting that Werch was a “similar case”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "673 F.2d 192, 195", "parenthetical": "\"Clearly, Werch should have known that his claim for injunctive relief would be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction [due to the Tax Injunction Act], Under these circumstances, Werch's claim for injunctive relief was meritless.\"", "sentence": "See Werch v. City of Berlin, 673 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir.1982) (“Clearly, Werch should have known that his claim for injunctive relief would be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction [due to the Tax Injunction Act], Under these circumstances, Werch’s claim for injunctive relief was meritless.”); cf. Hutcherson v. Board of Supervisors, 742 F.2d 142, 146 & n. 4 (4th Cir.1984) (affirming award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 even though the underlying action was barred by the Tax Injunction Act, noting that Werch was a “similar case”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "use of name other than that of actual person involved in transaction is ground for conviction", "sentence": "See also United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400 (5 Cir.1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977) (use of name other than that of actual person involved in transaction is ground for conviction); United States v. Metcalf, 388 F.2d 440 (4 Cir.1968) (check on individual account opened in fictitious name)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an otherwise valid security, but with a forged endorsement is not a \"falsely made security\"", "sentence": "Cf. United States v. Tyson, 690 F.2d 9 (1 Cir.1982) (an otherwise valid security, but with a forged endorsement is not a “falsely made security”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an otherwise valid security, but with a forged endorsement is not a \"falsely made security\"", "sentence": "Cf. United States v. Tyson, 690 F.2d 9 (1 Cir.1982) (an otherwise valid security, but with a forged endorsement is not a “falsely made security”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "use of name other than that of actual person involved in transaction is ground for conviction", "sentence": "See also United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400 (5 Cir.1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977) (use of name other than that of actual person involved in transaction is ground for conviction); United States v. Metcalf, 388 F.2d 440 (4 Cir.1968) (check on individual account opened in fictitious name)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that failing to warn the caretaker of the dangerous condition of a potentially rabid animal and give proper confinement instructions can constitute negligence", "sentence": "See McNew v. Decatur Veterinary Hosp., 85 Ga. App. 54 (68 SE2d 221) (1951) (recognizing that failing to warn the caretaker of the dangerous condition of a potentially rabid animal and give proper confinement instructions can constitute negligence)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "246 Ga. App. 436, 438-439", "parenthetical": "holding that knowing but failing to communicate a correct diagnosis may constitute a separate act of negligence", "sentence": "Oliver v. Sutton, 246 Ga. App. 436, 438-439 (540 SE2d 645) (2000) (holding that knowing but failing to communicate a correct diagnosis may constitute a separate act of negligence). Third, the disputed facts indicate that Shannon may have negligently “failed to warn” the Langleys of the risk associated with caring for a potentially rabid animal." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "533 F.3d 594, 599-600", "parenthetical": "Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court decision that had found equitable estoppel to be applicable to negate an FMLA eligibility defense, concluding that it was not necessary for the lower court to apply equitable estoppel wherein a state law promissory estoppel or contract claim might have otherwise been applicable", "sentence": "See also Peters v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 533 F.3d 594, 599-600 (7th Cir.2008) (Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court decision that had found equitable estoppel to be applicable to negate an FMLA eligibility defense, concluding that it was not necessary for the lower court to apply equitable estoppel wherein a state law promissory estoppel or contract claim might have otherwise been applicable)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2001 WL 290382, at *8", "parenthetical": "noting that, although the Seventh Circuit had previously discussed potential applicability of estoppel to an FMLA claim, the Circuit had never actually applied it to any particular case", "sentence": "See Niese, 2001 WL 290382 at *8 (noting that, although the Seventh Circuit had previously discussed potential applicability of estoppel to an FMLA claim, the Circuit had never actually applied it to any particular case)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "380 F.3d 1308, 1310", "parenthetical": "noting the \"long-standing rule in this circuit\" that issues not raised in initial briefs on appeal are waived", "sentence": "See United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.2004) (noting the \"long-standing rule in this circuit” that issues not raised in initial briefs on appeal are waived); see also United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir.2006) (stating that if a party fails to provide arguments on the merits of an issue and makes only passing reference to the issue in its briefs, the argument is waived), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2446, 167 L.Ed.2d 1132 (2007)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "463 F.3d 1182, 1195", "parenthetical": "stating that if a party fails to provide arguments on the merits of an issue and makes only passing reference to the issue in its briefs, the argument is waived", "sentence": "See United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.2004) (noting the \"long-standing rule in this circuit” that issues not raised in initial briefs on appeal are waived); see also United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir.2006) (stating that if a party fails to provide arguments on the merits of an issue and makes only passing reference to the issue in its briefs, the argument is waived), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2446, 167 L.Ed.2d 1132 (2007)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "380 F.3d 1308, 1310", "parenthetical": "noting the \"long-standing rule in this circuit\" that issues not raised in initial briefs on appeal are waived", "sentence": "See United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.2004) (noting the \"long-standing rule in this circuit” that issues not raised in initial briefs on appeal are waived); see also United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir.2006) (stating that if a party fails to provide arguments on the merits of an issue and makes only passing reference to the issue in its briefs, the argument is waived), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2446, 167 L.Ed.2d 1132 (2007)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that if a party fails to provide arguments on the merits of an issue and makes only passing reference to the issue in its briefs, the argument is waived", "sentence": "See United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.2004) (noting the \"long-standing rule in this circuit” that issues not raised in initial briefs on appeal are waived); see also United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir.2006) (stating that if a party fails to provide arguments on the merits of an issue and makes only passing reference to the issue in its briefs, the argument is waived), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2446, 167 L.Ed.2d 1132 (2007)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that if a party fails to provide arguments on the merits of an issue and makes only passing reference to the issue in its briefs, the argument is waived", "sentence": "See United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.2004) (noting the \"long-standing rule in this circuit” that issues not raised in initial briefs on appeal are waived); see also United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir.2006) (stating that if a party fails to provide arguments on the merits of an issue and makes only passing reference to the issue in its briefs, the argument is waived), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2446, 167 L.Ed.2d 1132 (2007)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "380 F.3d 1308, 1310", "parenthetical": "noting the \"long-standing rule in this circuit\" that issues not raised in initial briefs on appeal are waived", "sentence": "See United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.2004) (noting the \"long-standing rule in this circuit” that issues not raised in initial briefs on appeal are waived); see also United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir.2006) (stating that if a party fails to provide arguments on the merits of an issue and makes only passing reference to the issue in its briefs, the argument is waived), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2446, 167 L.Ed.2d 1132 (2007)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n. 6, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (“According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "415 U.S. 352, 352", "parenthetical": "incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150", "sentence": "New England Power, 415 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 1155 (Marshall, J., concurring) (incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150). While a lower court is not free to depart from a holding of the Supreme Court and will pay close attention even to dicta therein, we know of no principle that requires us to accept the characterization of the majority’s holding put forth in a dissent. In some instances the majority may choose to add comments to answer specifically a mischaracterization of its ruling." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n. 6, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (“According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "415 U.S. 352, 352", "parenthetical": "incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150", "sentence": "New England Power, 415 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 1155 (Marshall, J., concurring) (incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150). While a lower court is not free to depart from a holding of the Supreme Court and will pay close attention even to dicta therein, we know of no principle that requires us to accept the characterization of the majority’s holding put forth in a dissent. In some instances the majority may choose to add comments to answer specifically a mischaracterization of its ruling." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "415 U.S. 344, 344", "parenthetical": "incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150", "sentence": "New England Power, 415 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 1155 (Marshall, J., concurring) (incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150). While a lower court is not free to depart from a holding of the Supreme Court and will pay close attention even to dicta therein, we know of no principle that requires us to accept the characterization of the majority’s holding put forth in a dissent. In some instances the majority may choose to add comments to answer specifically a mischaracterization of its ruling." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n. 6, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (“According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n. 6, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (“According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "415 U.S. 344, 344", "parenthetical": "incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150", "sentence": "New England Power, 415 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 1155 (Marshall, J., concurring) (incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150). While a lower court is not free to depart from a holding of the Supreme Court and will pay close attention even to dicta therein, we know of no principle that requires us to accept the characterization of the majority’s holding put forth in a dissent. In some instances the majority may choose to add comments to answer specifically a mischaracterization of its ruling." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n. 6, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (“According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1150, 1150", "parenthetical": "incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150", "sentence": "New England Power, 415 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 1155 (Marshall, J., concurring) (incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150). While a lower court is not free to depart from a holding of the Supreme Court and will pay close attention even to dicta therein, we know of no principle that requires us to accept the characterization of the majority’s holding put forth in a dissent. In some instances the majority may choose to add comments to answer specifically a mischaracterization of its ruling." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "94 S.Ct. 1150, 1150", "parenthetical": "incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150", "sentence": "New England Power, 415 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 1155 (Marshall, J., concurring) (incorporated by reference as dissent to National Cable, 415 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 1150). While a lower court is not free to depart from a holding of the Supreme Court and will pay close attention even to dicta therein, we know of no principle that requires us to accept the characterization of the majority’s holding put forth in a dissent. In some instances the majority may choose to add comments to answer specifically a mischaracterization of its ruling." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n. 6, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (“According to the dissent our opinion implies that the Secretary has unlimited authority to deny meritorious claims____ It hardly needs saying that our opinion carries no such implication.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.\"", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683", "parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.\"", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034", "parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.\"", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.\"", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683", "parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.\"", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034", "parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.\"", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents", "sentence": "See Jung v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 38, 770 P.2d 342 (1989); Delony v. Rucker, 227 Ark. 869, 302 S.W.2d 287 (1957) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 42 Cal.3d 1172, 233 Cal.Rptr. 22, 729 P.2d 186 (1986); Barr v. First Taxing Dist., 151 Conn. 53, 192 A.2d 872 (1963); Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 328 So.2d 422 (Fla.1976); Cooper v. Tampa Elec. Co., 154 Fla. 410, 17 So.2d 785 (1944); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Palatine, 146 Ill.App.3d 92, 99 Ill.Dec. 906, 496 N.E.2d 998 (1986); Usher v. City of Pittsburg, 196 Kan. 86, 410 P.2d 419 (1966); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413, 211 S.W.2d 122 (1948); City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958) (based on statute requiring PSC to fix reasonable rate for service to nonresidents); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 81 Mich.App. 308, 265 N.W.2d 130 (1978); Borough of Ambridge v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 137 Pa.Super. 50, 8 A.2d 429 (1939) (interpreting statute requiring reasonable rates); Town of Terrell Hills v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Handy v. City of Rutland, 156 Vt. 397, 598 A.2d 114 (1990); Faxe v. City of Grandview, 48 Wash.2d 342, 294 P.2d 402 (1956) (holding that state constitution required reasonable nonresident rates); cf. Mayor & Council of Dover v. Delmarva Enterprises, Inc., 301 A.2d 276 (Del.1973); Schroeder v. City of Grayville, 166 Ill.App.3d 814, 117 Ill.Dec. 681, 683, 520 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1988) (“[A]l-though not obligated to serve non-residents in the absence of a contractual relationship, a municipality is prohibited from discriminating unreasonably in rates or manner of service when it elects to serve non-residents.”); Mayor & City Council of Cumberland v. Powles, 255 Md. 574, 258 A.2d 410 (1969)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "512 U.S. 622, 642-43", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.\"", "sentence": "See Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“[T]he mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.”). While Defendants articulate the correct standard which emphasizes the purpose behind the regulation’s adoption, (ECF No. 17-1 at 6-7), Defendants have not presented any evidence of the legislature’s intent in adopting § 16-17-446’s ban on political robocalls." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "706 F.3d 302, 302", "parenthetical": "\"In our view ... such an approach imputes a censorial purpose to every content distinction, and thereby applies the highest judicial scrutiny to laws that do not always imperil the preeminent First Amendment values that such scrutiny serves to safeguard.\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d at 302 (“In our view ... such an approach imputes a censorial purpose to every content distinction, and thereby applies the highest judicial scrutiny to laws that do not always imperil the preeminent First Amendment values that such scrutiny serves to safeguard.”). However, the court understands the Fourth Circuit’s guidance to indicate that a law, which distinguishes on the basis of content, will be classified as content-based unless the state can show that the law was adopted without a censorial purpose." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.\"", "sentence": "See Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“[T]he mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.”). While Defendants articulate the correct standard which emphasizes the purpose behind the regulation’s adoption, (ECF No. 17-1 at 6-7), Defendants have not presented any evidence of the legislature’s intent in adopting § 16-17-446’s ban on political robocalls." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "706 F.3d 302, 302", "parenthetical": "\"In our view ... such an approach imputes a censorial purpose to every content distinction, and thereby applies the highest judicial scrutiny to laws that do not always imperil the preeminent First Amendment values that such scrutiny serves to safeguard.\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d at 302 (“In our view ... such an approach imputes a censorial purpose to every content distinction, and thereby applies the highest judicial scrutiny to laws that do not always imperil the preeminent First Amendment values that such scrutiny serves to safeguard.”). However, the court understands the Fourth Circuit’s guidance to indicate that a law, which distinguishes on the basis of content, will be classified as content-based unless the state can show that the law was adopted without a censorial purpose." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "706 F.3d 302, 302", "parenthetical": "\"In our view ... such an approach imputes a censorial purpose to every content distinction, and thereby applies the highest judicial scrutiny to laws that do not always imperil the preeminent First Amendment values that such scrutiny serves to safeguard.\"", "sentence": "See Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d at 302 (“In our view ... such an approach imputes a censorial purpose to every content distinction, and thereby applies the highest judicial scrutiny to laws that do not always imperil the preeminent First Amendment values that such scrutiny serves to safeguard.”). However, the court understands the Fourth Circuit’s guidance to indicate that a law, which distinguishes on the basis of content, will be classified as content-based unless the state can show that the law was adopted without a censorial purpose." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.\"", "sentence": "See Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 556; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (“[T]he mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [is not] enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.”). While Defendants articulate the correct standard which emphasizes the purpose behind the regulation’s adoption, (ECF No. 17-1 at 6-7), Defendants have not presented any evidence of the legislature’s intent in adopting § 16-17-446’s ban on political robocalls." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "45 F.3d 577, 580", "parenthetical": "determining that the phrase \"at the time of the manufacture or production,\" as used in the authorized-use exception to SS 2320, is not unconstitutionally vague", "sentence": "See United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that § 2320, as a whole, is not unconstitutionally vague); see also United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 580 (1st Cir.1995) (determining that the phrase “at the time of the manufacture or production,” as used in the authorized-use exception to § 2320, is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 44 (8th Cir.1987) (‘We have considered Gantos’ argumentf] that § 2320 is unconstitutional ... and find [it] to be without merit.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73", "parenthetical": "holding that SS 2320, as a whole, is not unconstitutionally vague", "sentence": "See United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that § 2320, as a whole, is not unconstitutionally vague); see also United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 580 (1st Cir.1995) (determining that the phrase “at the time of the manufacture or production,” as used in the authorized-use exception to § 2320, is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 44 (8th Cir.1987) (‘We have considered Gantos’ argumentf] that § 2320 is unconstitutional ... and find [it] to be without merit.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "817 F.2d 41, 44", "parenthetical": "'We have considered Gantos' argumentf] that SS 2320 is unconstitutional ... and find [it] to be without merit.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that § 2320, as a whole, is not unconstitutionally vague); see also United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 580 (1st Cir.1995) (determining that the phrase “at the time of the manufacture or production,” as used in the authorized-use exception to § 2320, is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 44 (8th Cir.1987) (‘We have considered Gantos’ argumentf] that § 2320 is unconstitutional ... and find [it] to be without merit.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73", "parenthetical": "holding that SS 2320, as a whole, is not unconstitutionally vague", "sentence": "See United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that § 2320, as a whole, is not unconstitutionally vague); see also United States v. Bohai Trading Co., 45 F.3d 577, 580 (1st Cir.1995) (determining that the phrase “at the time of the manufacture or production,” as used in the authorized-use exception to § 2320, is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 44 (8th Cir.1987) (‘We have considered Gantos’ argumentf] that § 2320 is unconstitutional ... and find [it] to be without merit.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head", "sentence": "See Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 152 W.Va. 274, 163 S.E.2d 672 (1968) (beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head); see also Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga.App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951) (Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position", "sentence": "See Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 152 W.Va. 274, 163 S.E.2d 672 (1968) (beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head); see also Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga.App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951) (Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head", "sentence": "See Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 152 W.Va. 274, 163 S.E.2d 672 (1968) (beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head); see also Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga.App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951) (Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position", "sentence": "See Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 152 W.Va. 274, 163 S.E.2d 672 (1968) (beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head); see also Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga.App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951) (Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position", "sentence": "See Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 152 W.Va. 274, 163 S.E.2d 672 (1968) (beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head); see also Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga.App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951) (Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head", "sentence": "See Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 152 W.Va. 274, 163 S.E.2d 672 (1968) (beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head); see also Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga.App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951) (Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head", "sentence": "See Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 152 W.Va. 274, 163 S.E.2d 672 (1968) (beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head); see also Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga.App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951) (Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position", "sentence": "See Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 152 W.Va. 274, 163 S.E.2d 672 (1968) (beneficiary under policy covering death resulting from accidental bodily injury could not recover under evidence that immediately previous to shooting, insured had suggested playing Russian Roulette and had taken certain steps conforming to that design and died as a result of gunshot wound in the head); see also Thompson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 84 Ga.App. 214, 66 S.E.2d 119 (1951) (Russian Roulette death no less intentional than had gun been fully loaded and cannot be result of accident, but rather it should be presumed that the participant intended that he should be killed or injured should fate stop cartridge in spinning cylinder in the firing position)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "87 F.3d 26, 33", "parenthetical": "allowing \"regarded as\" plaintiff to proceed, concluding that whether plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable accommodation was an issue for the jury", "sentence": "But see Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.1996) (allowing “regarded as” plaintiff to proceed, concluding that whether plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable accommodation was an issue for the jury) ; Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 163 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (recognizing that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide the issue but concluding that employers have a duty to accommodate in “regarded as” cases)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "186 F.3d 907, 916-17", "parenthetical": "holding that \"regarded as\" disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation", "sentence": "See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that “regarded as” disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.1999) (same); Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir.1998) (same); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n. 12 (3d Cir.1998) (en banc) (declining to rule on this issue but noting that the argument that employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities has “considerable force”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "200 F.Supp.2d 151, 163", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide the issue but concluding that employers have a duty to accommodate in \"regarded as\" cases", "sentence": "But see Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.1996) (allowing “regarded as” plaintiff to proceed, concluding that whether plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable accommodation was an issue for the jury) ; Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 163 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (recognizing that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide the issue but concluding that employers have a duty to accommodate in “regarded as” cases)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "186 F.3d 907, 916-17", "parenthetical": "holding that \"regarded as\" disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation", "sentence": "See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that “regarded as” disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.1999) (same); Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir.1998) (same); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n. 12 (3d Cir.1998) (en banc) (declining to rule on this issue but noting that the argument that employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities has “considerable force”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "declining to rule on this issue but noting that the argument that employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities has \"considerable force\"", "sentence": "See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that “regarded as” disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.1999) (same); Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir.1998) (same); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n. 12 (3d Cir.1998) (en banc) (declining to rule on this issue but noting that the argument that employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities has “considerable force”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "87 F.3d 26, 33", "parenthetical": "allowing \"regarded as\" plaintiff to proceed, concluding that whether plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable accommodation was an issue for the jury", "sentence": "But see Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.1996) (allowing “regarded as” plaintiff to proceed, concluding that whether plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable accommodation was an issue for the jury) ; Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 163 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (recognizing that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide the issue but concluding that employers have a duty to accommodate in “regarded as” cases)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "200 F.Supp.2d 151, 163", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide the issue but concluding that employers have a duty to accommodate in \"regarded as\" cases", "sentence": "But see Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.1996) (allowing “regarded as” plaintiff to proceed, concluding that whether plaintiff could have performed his job with reasonable accommodation was an issue for the jury) ; Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 163 (E.D.N.Y.2002) (recognizing that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide the issue but concluding that employers have a duty to accommodate in “regarded as” cases)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "declining to rule on this issue but noting that the argument that employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities has \"considerable force\"", "sentence": "See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that “regarded as” disabled plaintiffs are not entitled to reasonable accommodation); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.1999) (same); Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir.1998) (same); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n. 12 (3d Cir.1998) (en banc) (declining to rule on this issue but noting that the argument that employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodation for perceived disabilities has “considerable force”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "66 Fed.Cl. 736, 743", "parenthetical": "When a contract is \"ambiguous, necessitating a review of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent,\" summary judgment is not appropriate \"if material facts are genuinely in dispute.\"", "sentence": "See Beta Sys., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d at 1183 (“To the extent that the contract terms are ambiguous, requiring weighing of external evidence, the matter is not amenable to summary resolution.”); see also Mata v. United States, 114 Fed.Cl. at 746; Marquardt Co. v. United States, 101 Fed.Cl. at 268; Tecom, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed.Cl. 736, 743 (2005) (When a contract is “ambiguous, necessitating a review of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent,” summary judgment is not appropriate “if material facts are genuinely in dispute.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "838 F.2d 1183, 1183", "parenthetical": "\"To the extent that the contract terms are ambiguous, requiring weighing of external evidence, the matter is not amenable to summary resolution.\"", "sentence": "See Beta Sys., Inc. v. United States, 838 F.2d at 1183 (“To the extent that the contract terms are ambiguous, requiring weighing of external evidence, the matter is not amenable to summary resolution.”); see also Mata v. United States, 114 Fed.Cl. at 746; Marquardt Co. v. United States, 101 Fed.Cl. at 268; Tecom, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed.Cl. 736, 743 (2005) (When a contract is “ambiguous, necessitating a review of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent,” summary judgment is not appropriate “if material facts are genuinely in dispute.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding the union liable for the unlawful picketing of its members, and deeming it significant that the union made no effort to disavow either the union hall statements of its agents or the picket line incidents", "sentence": "See BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 23 F.3d 1459, 1466-67 (8th Cir.1994) (defining ratification as the affir-mance by a person of a prior act that did not bind him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him) (citations omitted); see also Nat’l Cash Register Co. v. N.L.R.B., 466 F.2d 945 (6th Cir.1972) (finding the union liable for the unlawful picketing of its members, and deeming it significant that the union made no effort to disavow either the union hall statements of its agents or the picket line incidents)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "23 F.3d 1459, 1466-67", "parenthetical": "defining ratification as the affir-mance by a person of a prior act that did not bind him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him", "sentence": "See BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 23 F.3d 1459, 1466-67 (8th Cir.1994) (defining ratification as the affir-mance by a person of a prior act that did not bind him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him) (citations omitted); see also Nat’l Cash Register Co. v. N.L.R.B., 466 F.2d 945 (6th Cir.1972) (finding the union liable for the unlawful picketing of its members, and deeming it significant that the union made no effort to disavow either the union hall statements of its agents or the picket line incidents)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72", "parenthetical": "the offer of court-appointed counsel satisfies the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts, even where detainee is denied pretrial access to a law library", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (9th Cir.1982) (the offer of court-appointed counsel satisfies the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts, even where detainee is denied pretrial access to a law library); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (prisoners have no per se right to a law library)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "518 U.S. 343, 350-51", "parenthetical": "prisoners have no per se right to a law library", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (9th Cir.1982) (the offer of court-appointed counsel satisfies the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts, even where detainee is denied pretrial access to a law library); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (prisoners have no per se right to a law library)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72", "parenthetical": "the offer of court-appointed counsel satisfies the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts, even where detainee is denied pretrial access to a law library", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (9th Cir.1982) (the offer of court-appointed counsel satisfies the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts, even where detainee is denied pretrial access to a law library); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (prisoners have no per se right to a law library)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "prisoners have no per se right to a law library", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (9th Cir.1982) (the offer of court-appointed counsel satisfies the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts, even where detainee is denied pretrial access to a law library); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (prisoners have no per se right to a law library)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72", "parenthetical": "the offer of court-appointed counsel satisfies the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts, even where detainee is denied pretrial access to a law library", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (9th Cir.1982) (the offer of court-appointed counsel satisfies the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts, even where detainee is denied pretrial access to a law library); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (prisoners have no per se right to a law library)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "prisoners have no per se right to a law library", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (9th Cir.1982) (the offer of court-appointed counsel satisfies the Fifth Amendment obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts, even where detainee is denied pretrial access to a law library); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (prisoners have no per se right to a law library)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "114 F.3d 1410, 1426", "parenthetical": "stating that even if a \"[cjomplaint does not explicitly refer to or cite [a document] ... the critical [issue] is whether the claims in the complaint are 'based' on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly cited\"", "sentence": "See Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776 (stating, under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, “[w]e consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents”) (citation omitted); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that even if a “[cjomplaint does not explicitly refer to or cite [a document] ... the critical [issue] is whether the claims in the complaint are ‘based’ on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly cited”); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A] court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "716 F.3d 776, 776", "parenthetical": "stating, under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, \"[w]e consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents\"", "sentence": "See Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776 (stating, under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, “[w]e consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents”) (citation omitted); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that even if a “[cjomplaint does not explicitly refer to or cite [a document] ... the critical [issue] is whether the claims in the complaint are ‘based’ on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly cited”); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A] court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "308 U.S. 147, 160", "parenthetical": "\"Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated,.\"", "sentence": "See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (“Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated,.”) (emphasis added); see also Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89 (acknowledging that Port Authority bus terminal is “designed for precisely the purpose of transit,” but nevertheless finding it to be a public forum)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "392 F.2d 89, 89", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that Port Authority bus terminal is \"designed for precisely the purpose of transit,\" but nevertheless finding it to be a public forum", "sentence": "See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (“Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated,.”) (emphasis added); see also Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89 (acknowledging that Port Authority bus terminal is “designed for precisely the purpose of transit,” but nevertheless finding it to be a public forum)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "60 S.Ct. 146, 150", "parenthetical": "\"Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated,.\"", "sentence": "See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (“Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated,.”) (emphasis added); see also Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89 (acknowledging that Port Authority bus terminal is “designed for precisely the purpose of transit,” but nevertheless finding it to be a public forum)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "392 F.2d 89, 89", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that Port Authority bus terminal is \"designed for precisely the purpose of transit,\" but nevertheless finding it to be a public forum", "sentence": "See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (“Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated,.”) (emphasis added); see also Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89 (acknowledging that Port Authority bus terminal is “designed for precisely the purpose of transit,” but nevertheless finding it to be a public forum)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities' streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated,.\"", "sentence": "See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (“Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated,.”) (emphasis added); see also Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89 (acknowledging that Port Authority bus terminal is “designed for precisely the purpose of transit,” but nevertheless finding it to be a public forum)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "392 F.2d 89, 89", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that Port Authority bus terminal is \"designed for precisely the purpose of transit,\" but nevertheless finding it to be a public forum", "sentence": "See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (“Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated,.”) (emphasis added); see also Wolin, 392 F.2d at 89 (acknowledging that Port Authority bus terminal is “designed for precisely the purpose of transit,” but nevertheless finding it to be a public forum)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"We have repeatedly recognized that because the wrongful death act alleviates the harshness of the common law, it is to be given a liberal construction to achieve its beneficent purposes.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Soulsby, 210 W.Va. 682, 558 S.E.2d 681, 686 (2001) (“We have repeatedly recognized that because the wrongful death act alleviates the harshness of the common law, it is to be given a liberal construction to achieve its beneficent purposes.”); see also Hanebuth, 694 P.2d at 147 (observing that “[it] is profoundly unfair to deprive a litigant of his right to bring a lawsuit before he has had any reasonable opportunity to do so”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "694 P.2d 147, 147", "parenthetical": "observing that \"[it] is profoundly unfair to deprive a litigant of his right to bring a lawsuit before he has had any reasonable opportunity to do so\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Soulsby, 210 W.Va. 682, 558 S.E.2d 681, 686 (2001) (“We have repeatedly recognized that because the wrongful death act alleviates the harshness of the common law, it is to be given a liberal construction to achieve its beneficent purposes.”); see also Hanebuth, 694 P.2d at 147 (observing that “[it] is profoundly unfair to deprive a litigant of his right to bring a lawsuit before he has had any reasonable opportunity to do so”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "558 S.E.2d 681, 686", "parenthetical": "\"We have repeatedly recognized that because the wrongful death act alleviates the harshness of the common law, it is to be given a liberal construction to achieve its beneficent purposes.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Soulsby, 210 W.Va. 682, 558 S.E.2d 681, 686 (2001) (“We have repeatedly recognized that because the wrongful death act alleviates the harshness of the common law, it is to be given a liberal construction to achieve its beneficent purposes.”); see also Hanebuth, 694 P.2d at 147 (observing that “[it] is profoundly unfair to deprive a litigant of his right to bring a lawsuit before he has had any reasonable opportunity to do so”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "694 P.2d 147, 147", "parenthetical": "observing that \"[it] is profoundly unfair to deprive a litigant of his right to bring a lawsuit before he has had any reasonable opportunity to do so\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Soulsby, 210 W.Va. 682, 558 S.E.2d 681, 686 (2001) (“We have repeatedly recognized that because the wrongful death act alleviates the harshness of the common law, it is to be given a liberal construction to achieve its beneficent purposes.”); see also Hanebuth, 694 P.2d at 147 (observing that “[it] is profoundly unfair to deprive a litigant of his right to bring a lawsuit before he has had any reasonable opportunity to do so”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "639 F.3d 1250, 1257-58", "parenthetical": "finding reasonable suspicion based on an early-morning detention in an area known for criminal activity, information from an armed private security officer and a police dispatcher that the defendants were suspected of having a weapon in their vehicle, and a report from the security guard about the defendants' suspicious behavior prior to the detention", "sentence": "See United States v. Brewer, 561 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir.2009) (finding the timing of a stop suspicious because it “reinforced the suspicion [that the vehicle was connected to reported gunfire] since few people are on the road at 2:30 a.m. and ... there was no other traffic” leaving the apartment complex immediately after the gunfire); see also United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2011) (finding reasonable suspicion based on an early-morning detention in an area known for criminal activity, information from an armed private security officer and a police dispatcher that the defendants were suspected of having a weapon in their vehicle, and a report from the security guard about the defendants’ suspicious behavior prior to the detention); United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1993) (finding reasonable suspicion when officers observed the defendant appearing to engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction in a known drug area at 1:00 a.m.)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "561 F.3d 676, 678", "parenthetical": "finding the timing of a stop suspicious because it \"reinforced the suspicion [that the vehicle was connected to reported gunfire] since few people are on the road at 2:30 a.m. and ... there was no other traffic\" leaving the apartment complex immediately after the gunfire", "sentence": "See United States v. Brewer, 561 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir.2009) (finding the timing of a stop suspicious because it “reinforced the suspicion [that the vehicle was connected to reported gunfire] since few people are on the road at 2:30 a.m. and ... there was no other traffic” leaving the apartment complex immediately after the gunfire); see also United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2011) (finding reasonable suspicion based on an early-morning detention in an area known for criminal activity, information from an armed private security officer and a police dispatcher that the defendants were suspected of having a weapon in their vehicle, and a report from the security guard about the defendants’ suspicious behavior prior to the detention); United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1993) (finding reasonable suspicion when officers observed the defendant appearing to engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction in a known drug area at 1:00 a.m.)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "985 F.2d 151, 154", "parenthetical": "finding reasonable suspicion when officers observed the defendant appearing to engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction in a known drug area at 1:00 a.m.", "sentence": "See United States v. Brewer, 561 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir.2009) (finding the timing of a stop suspicious because it “reinforced the suspicion [that the vehicle was connected to reported gunfire] since few people are on the road at 2:30 a.m. and ... there was no other traffic” leaving the apartment complex immediately after the gunfire); see also United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2011) (finding reasonable suspicion based on an early-morning detention in an area known for criminal activity, information from an armed private security officer and a police dispatcher that the defendants were suspected of having a weapon in their vehicle, and a report from the security guard about the defendants’ suspicious behavior prior to the detention); United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1993) (finding reasonable suspicion when officers observed the defendant appearing to engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction in a known drug area at 1:00 a.m.)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "561 F.3d 676, 678", "parenthetical": "finding the timing of a stop suspicious because it \"reinforced the suspicion [that the vehicle was connected to reported gunfire] since few people are on the road at 2:30 a.m. and ... there was no other traffic\" leaving the apartment complex immediately after the gunfire", "sentence": "See United States v. Brewer, 561 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir.2009) (finding the timing of a stop suspicious because it “reinforced the suspicion [that the vehicle was connected to reported gunfire] since few people are on the road at 2:30 a.m. and ... there was no other traffic” leaving the apartment complex immediately after the gunfire); see also United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (10th Cir.2011) (finding reasonable suspicion based on an early-morning detention in an area known for criminal activity, information from an armed private security officer and a police dispatcher that the defendants were suspected of having a weapon in their vehicle, and a report from the security guard about the defendants’ suspicious behavior prior to the detention); United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1993) (finding reasonable suspicion when officers observed the defendant appearing to engage in a hand-to-hand drug transaction in a known drug area at 1:00 a.m.)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "733 F.2d 1047, 1051", "parenthetical": "\"garden variety\" federal diversity case applying well-settled state law principles", "sentence": "Cf. Giardina v. Fontana, 733 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir.1984) (“garden variety” federal diversity case applying well-settled state law principles)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "762 F.2d 205, 211", "parenthetical": "case raises \"serious questions of state law, which include whether a party may recover in tort for a purely economic loss, absent physical injury ... and the construction of state and municipal building, safety, and fire codes\"", "sentence": "Mutual v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir.1985) (case raises “serious questions of state law, which include whether a party may recover in tort for a purely economic loss, absent physical injury ... and the construction of state and municipal building, safety, and fire codes”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "51 F.Supp.3d 414, 417-19", "parenthetical": "finding statements \"lackfing] citations to admissible evidence\" to violate these rules", "sentence": "See Baity v. Kralik, 51 F.Supp.3d 414, 417-19 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (finding statements \"lackfing] citations to admissible evidence” to violate these rules); id. at 421 (disregarding facts \"not supported by citations to admissible evidence in the record”); see also Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73-74 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that where there are no citations to admissible evidence, or the cited materials do not support the purported undisputed facts in a party’s Rule 56.1 statement, those assertions may be disregarded)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "258 F.3d 62, 73-74", "parenthetical": "explaining that where there are no citations to admissible evidence, or the cited materials do not support the purported undisputed facts in a party's Rule 56.1 statement, those assertions may be disregarded", "sentence": "See Baity v. Kralik, 51 F.Supp.3d 414, 417-19 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (finding statements \"lackfing] citations to admissible evidence” to violate these rules); id. at 421 (disregarding facts \"not supported by citations to admissible evidence in the record”); see also Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73-74 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that where there are no citations to admissible evidence, or the cited materials do not support the purported undisputed facts in a party’s Rule 56.1 statement, those assertions may be disregarded)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "790 F.2d 464, 469", "parenthetical": "holding that accused's waiver of Miranda rights was unknowing and unintelligent where accused spoke broken English, had a deficient understanding of the English language and knew nothing about the American criminal justice system", "sentence": "See also U.S. v. Short, 790 F.2d 464, 469 (6th Cir.1986) (holding that accused’s waiver of Miranda rights was unknowing and unintelligent where accused spoke broken English, had a deficient understanding of the English language and knew nothing about the American criminal justice system)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "6 F.3d 1360, 1365-66", "parenthetical": "concluding that an accused who received Miranda warnings in Spanish and who then stated that he understood those rights knowingly and intelligently waived them", "sentence": "But see U.S. v. Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d 1360, 1365-66 (9th Cir.1993) (concluding that an accused who received Miranda warnings in Spanish and who then stated that he understood those rights knowingly and intelligently waived them)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that the significance of a criminal history in sentencing \"varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 n. 4 (Ind.1999) (recognizing that the significance of a criminal history in sentencing “varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "818 N.E.2d 927, 929", "parenthetical": "concluding that history of four alcohol-related misdemeanors did not support aggravation of sentence for Class B felony child molesting even though alcohol was involved in the instant offense", "sentence": "See also Ruiz v. State, 818 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind.2004) (concluding that history of four alcohol-related misdemeanors did not support aggravation of sentence for Class B felony child molesting even though alcohol was involved in the instant offense)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that the significance of a criminal history in sentencing \"varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 929 n. 4 (Ind.1999) (recognizing that the significance of a criminal history in sentencing “varies based on the gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "762 N.E.2d 92, 97", "parenthetical": "affirming enhanced sentence for murder where criminal history reflected an escalation of violence", "sentence": "Cf. Vasquez v. State, 762 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind.2001) (affirming enhanced sentence for murder where criminal history reflected an escalation of violence)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "818 N.E.2d 927, 929", "parenthetical": "concluding that history of four alcohol-related misdemeanors did not support aggravation of sentence for Class B felony child molesting even though alcohol was involved in the instant offense", "sentence": "See also Ruiz v. State, 818 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind.2004) (concluding that history of four alcohol-related misdemeanors did not support aggravation of sentence for Class B felony child molesting even though alcohol was involved in the instant offense)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "762 N.E.2d 92, 97", "parenthetical": "affirming enhanced sentence for murder where criminal history reflected an escalation of violence", "sentence": "Cf. Vasquez v. State, 762 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind.2001) (affirming enhanced sentence for murder where criminal history reflected an escalation of violence)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "120 Vt. 138, 141", "parenthetical": "\"a special provision will be held to override a general provision. . . where the two cannot stand together\"", "sentence": "Parkhurst v. Gibson, 573 A.2d 454, 458 (N.H. 1990) (“generally accepted interpretive rule is that a general, preliminary clause should not ordinarily take precedence over specific provisions of a contract”) (citing 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 619 (3d ed. 1961)); cf. Jackson v. Rogers, 120 Vt. 138, 141, 134 A.2d 620, 622 (1957) (“a special provision will be held to override a general provision. . . where the two cannot stand together”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "573 A.2d 454, 458", "parenthetical": "\"generally accepted interpretive rule is that a general, preliminary clause should not ordinarily take precedence over specific provisions of a contract\"", "sentence": "Parkhurst v. Gibson, 573 A.2d 454, 458 (N.H. 1990) (“generally accepted interpretive rule is that a general, preliminary clause should not ordinarily take precedence over specific provisions of a contract”) (citing 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 619 (3d ed. 1961)); cf. Jackson v. Rogers, 120 Vt. 138, 141, 134 A.2d 620, 622 (1957) (“a special provision will be held to override a general provision. . . where the two cannot stand together”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "134 A.2d 620, 622", "parenthetical": "\"a special provision will be held to override a general provision. . . where the two cannot stand together\"", "sentence": "Parkhurst v. Gibson, 573 A.2d 454, 458 (N.H. 1990) (“generally accepted interpretive rule is that a general, preliminary clause should not ordinarily take precedence over specific provisions of a contract”) (citing 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 619 (3d ed. 1961)); cf. Jackson v. Rogers, 120 Vt. 138, 141, 134 A.2d 620, 622 (1957) (“a special provision will be held to override a general provision. . . where the two cannot stand together”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "573 A.2d 454, 458", "parenthetical": "\"generally accepted interpretive rule is that a general, preliminary clause should not ordinarily take precedence over specific provisions of a contract\"", "sentence": "Parkhurst v. Gibson, 573 A.2d 454, 458 (N.H. 1990) (“generally accepted interpretive rule is that a general, preliminary clause should not ordinarily take precedence over specific provisions of a contract”) (citing 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 619 (3d ed. 1961)); cf. Jackson v. Rogers, 120 Vt. 138, 141, 134 A.2d 620, 622 (1957) (“a special provision will be held to override a general provision. . . where the two cannot stand together”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "97 F.3d 1345, 1350", "parenthetical": "finding that counsel's failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58", "parenthetical": "holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in SS 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in SS 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "97 F.3d 1345, 1350", "parenthetical": "finding that counsel's failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "97 F.3d 1345, 1350", "parenthetical": "finding that counsel's failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in SS 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "97 F.3d 1074, 1077", "parenthetical": "finding that petitioner \"ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine''", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "97 F.3d 1345, 1350", "parenthetical": "finding that counsel's failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "97 F.3d 750, 751", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "97 F.3d 1345, 1350", "parenthetical": "finding that counsel's failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "97 F.3d 1345, 1350", "parenthetical": "finding that counsel's failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "97 F.3d 1345, 1350", "parenthetical": "finding that counsel's failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine", "sentence": "See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that petitioner, who did not raise the methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing or on direct appeal, was barred from raising that issue for the first time in § 2255 motion, and that petitioner did not satisfy either the performance prong or prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel standard), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2444, 138 L.Ed.2d 203 (1997); United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that petitioner “ha[d] not met his heavy burden of showing a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if his counsel had required the government to prove that the offense involved d-methamphetamine’'); United States v. Acklen, 97 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice from counsel's failure to argue at sentencing that drug involved was L-methamphetamine and not D-methamphetamine), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1017, 136 L.Ed.2d 893 (1997); but see United States v. Glover, 97 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that counsel’s failure to raise methamphetamine-type issue at sentencing satisfied prejudice prong of Strickland, and ordering the vacation of sentence if the government, on remand to the district court, could not establish that the substance was in fact D-methamphetamine)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "114 F.3d 1484, 1494-97", "parenthetical": "holding that the first stage of Landgraf analysis is conclusive, and that only the Act's habeas amendments for death penalty cases may be applied retrospectively", "sentence": "Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 679 (2d Cir.1996); see also Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc) (\"The fairest inference from the variety of applicability provisions throughout the [Act] is that Congress was quite capable of and willing to express its intent about prospective or retrospective application when it had such an intent.”); but see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1494-97 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that the first stage of Landgraf analysis is conclusive, and that only the Act’s habeas amendments for death penalty cases may be applied retrospectively)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "101 F.3d 1565, 1570", "parenthetical": "\"The fairest inference from the variety of applicability provisions throughout the [Act] is that Congress was quite capable of and willing to express its intent about prospective or retrospective application when it had such an intent.\"", "sentence": "Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 679 (2d Cir.1996); see also Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc) (\"The fairest inference from the variety of applicability provisions throughout the [Act] is that Congress was quite capable of and willing to express its intent about prospective or retrospective application when it had such an intent.”); but see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1494-97 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that the first stage of Landgraf analysis is conclusive, and that only the Act’s habeas amendments for death penalty cases may be applied retrospectively)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "15 F.3d 635, 641", "parenthetical": "a jury is presumed to have followed the district court's instructions", "sentence": "Cf. United States v. Kreiser, 15 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir.1994) (a jury is presumed to have followed the district court’s instructions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "28 F.3d 604, 608", "parenthetical": "finding that the district court's limiting instruction dispelled any potential prejudice against the plaintiff", "sentence": "See Berry v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir.1994) (finding that the district court’s limiting instruction dispelled any potential prejudice against the plaintiff)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "480 U.S. 522, 524", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.\"", "sentence": "See also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) (\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "348 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1145", "parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiff could bring a claim for extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA and ATCA because \"the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish the scope of the ATCA in any way\"", "sentence": "See Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1145 (finding that the plaintiff could bring a claim for extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA and ATCA because \"the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish the scope of the ATCA in any way”); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *4 (finding that \"the TVPA did not preempt torture and summary execution claims under the ATCA”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.\"", "sentence": "See also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) (\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "348 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1145", "parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiff could bring a claim for extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA and ATCA because \"the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish the scope of the ATCA in any way\"", "sentence": "See Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1145 (finding that the plaintiff could bring a claim for extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA and ATCA because \"the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish the scope of the ATCA in any way”); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *4 (finding that \"the TVPA did not preempt torture and summary execution claims under the ATCA”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "348 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1145", "parenthetical": "finding that the plaintiff could bring a claim for extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA and ATCA because \"the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish the scope of the ATCA in any way\"", "sentence": "See Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1145 (finding that the plaintiff could bring a claim for extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA and ATCA because \"the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish the scope of the ATCA in any way”); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *4 (finding that \"the TVPA did not preempt torture and summary execution claims under the ATCA”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.\"", "sentence": "See also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) (\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2002 WL 319887, at *4", "parenthetical": "finding that \"the TVPA did not preempt torture and summary execution claims under the ATCA\"", "sentence": "See Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1145 (finding that the plaintiff could bring a claim for extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA and ATCA because \"the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish the scope of the ATCA in any way”); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *4 (finding that \"the TVPA did not preempt torture and summary execution claims under the ATCA”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "480 U.S. 522, 524", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.\"", "sentence": "See also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) (\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.\"", "sentence": "See also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) (\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2002 WL 319887, at *4", "parenthetical": "finding that \"the TVPA did not preempt torture and summary execution claims under the ATCA\"", "sentence": "See Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1145 (finding that the plaintiff could bring a claim for extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA and ATCA because \"the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish the scope of the ATCA in any way”); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *4 (finding that \"the TVPA did not preempt torture and summary execution claims under the ATCA”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.\"", "sentence": "See also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) (\"It is well settled ... that repeals by implication are not favored.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "2002 WL 319887, at *4", "parenthetical": "finding that \"the TVPA did not preempt torture and summary execution claims under the ATCA\"", "sentence": "See Saravia, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1145 (finding that the plaintiff could bring a claim for extrajudicial killing under both the TVPA and ATCA because \"the enactment of the TVPA did not diminish the scope of the ATCA in any way”); Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *4 (finding that \"the TVPA did not preempt torture and summary execution claims under the ATCA”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "476 F.2d 1211, 1213-15", "parenthetical": "disapproving of any reference to balancing test in reasonable doubt instruction", "sentence": "United States v. Anglada, 524 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir.1975) (while not reversible error, “characterization of the standard as quantitative rather than qualitative ... might better have been omitted”); United States v. Clay, 476 F.2d 1211, 1213-15 (9th Cir.1973) (disapproving of any reference to balancing test in reasonable doubt instruction)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "202 F.2d 592, 594", "parenthetical": "jury instruction encouraging jury to \"balance\" the evidence and acquit if the evidence was \"as equally consistent with innocence\" as with guilt, improperly suggested a preponderance of the evidence standard", "sentence": "Cf. United States v. Link, 202 F.2d 592, 594 (3d Cir.1953) (jury instruction encouraging jury to “balance” the evidence and acquit if the evidence was “as equally consistent with innocence” as with guilt, improperly suggested a preponderance of the evidence standard)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "182 F.Supp.2d 278, 290-291", "parenthetical": "\"employment discrimination claims [brought] against municipal as opposed to county defendants are exempt from the notice of claim requirement\"", "sentence": "See Keating v. Gaffney, 182 F.Supp.2d 278, 290-291 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (“employment discrimination claims [brought] against municipal as opposed to county defendants are exempt from the notice of claim requirement”); see also Pustilnik v. Hynes, No. 99 Civ. 4087, 2000 WL 914629, at * 7 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2000) (describing distinction between claims brought against municipal defendants and claims against county defendants)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2000 WL 914629, at * 7", "parenthetical": "describing distinction between claims brought against municipal defendants and claims against county defendants", "sentence": "See Keating v. Gaffney, 182 F.Supp.2d 278, 290-291 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (“employment discrimination claims [brought] against municipal as opposed to county defendants are exempt from the notice of claim requirement”); see also Pustilnik v. Hynes, No. 99 Civ. 4087, 2000 WL 914629, at * 7 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2000) (describing distinction between claims brought against municipal defendants and claims against county defendants)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36", "parenthetical": "court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state's waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996", "sentence": "See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "488 F.3d 187, 194", "parenthetical": "applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth's manner of handling the matter", "sentence": "See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "488 F.3d 187, 194", "parenthetical": "applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth's manner of handling the matter", "sentence": "See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state's waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996", "sentence": "See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "520 F.3d 997, 1002", "parenthetical": "judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner's procedural default", "sentence": "See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36", "parenthetical": "court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state's waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996", "sentence": "See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state's waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996", "sentence": "See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "520 F.3d 997, 1002", "parenthetical": "judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner's procedural default", "sentence": "See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (applying forfeiture rule in habeas case due in part to the Commonwealth’s manner of handling the matter); Whaley v. Belleque, 520 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2008) (judicially es-topping Oregon from taking inconsistent positions in state and federal courts with respect to habeas petitioner’s procedural default); cf. Wood v. Milyard, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1834-36, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (court of appeals abused its discretion by ignoring state’s waiver of statute of limitations defense under Anti-terrorism ánd Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "352 F.3d 994, 1007", "parenthetical": "holding that detaining club patrons in handcuffs for three hours after subjecting them to strip searches and warrant checks was unlawful", "sentence": "Cf. Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1007 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that detaining club patrons in handcuffs for three hours after subjecting them to strip searches and warrant checks was unlawful)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "544 U.S. 93, 98-99", "parenthetical": "holding that a two-hour detention in handcuffs of a person present at an address being searched for weapons related to gang activity was reasonable", "sentence": "Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-99, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (holding that a two-hour detention in handcuffs of a person present at an address being searched for weapons related to gang activity was reasonable)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "352 F.3d 994, 1007", "parenthetical": "holding that detaining club patrons in handcuffs for three hours after subjecting them to strip searches and warrant checks was unlawful", "sentence": "Cf. Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1007 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that detaining club patrons in handcuffs for three hours after subjecting them to strip searches and warrant checks was unlawful)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a two-hour detention in handcuffs of a person present at an address being searched for weapons related to gang activity was reasonable", "sentence": "Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-99, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (holding that a two-hour detention in handcuffs of a person present at an address being searched for weapons related to gang activity was reasonable)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "352 F.3d 994, 1007", "parenthetical": "holding that detaining club patrons in handcuffs for three hours after subjecting them to strip searches and warrant checks was unlawful", "sentence": "Cf. Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1007 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that detaining club patrons in handcuffs for three hours after subjecting them to strip searches and warrant checks was unlawful)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a two-hour detention in handcuffs of a person present at an address being searched for weapons related to gang activity was reasonable", "sentence": "Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-99, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (holding that a two-hour detention in handcuffs of a person present at an address being searched for weapons related to gang activity was reasonable)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "503 F.3d 544, 548", "parenthetical": "\"We do not address the order denying [the] motion for reconsideration, as our decision as to the first order renders that issue moot.\"", "sentence": "In re L.O.F., 62 V.I. 655, 659 n.5 (V.I. 2015); Judi’s of St. Croix Car Rental v. Weston, 49 V.I. 396, 407-08 (V.I. 2008) (declining to address arguments regarding the denial of a motion to reconsider after reversing the underlying order); see also Air Products & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (“We do not address the order denying [the] motion for reconsideration, as our decision as to the first order renders that issue moot.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "49 V.I. 396, 407-08", "parenthetical": "declining to address arguments regarding the denial of a motion to reconsider after reversing the underlying order", "sentence": "In re L.O.F., 62 V.I. 655, 659 n.5 (V.I. 2015); Judi’s of St. Croix Car Rental v. Weston, 49 V.I. 396, 407-08 (V.I. 2008) (declining to address arguments regarding the denial of a motion to reconsider after reversing the underlying order); see also Air Products & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (“We do not address the order denying [the] motion for reconsideration, as our decision as to the first order renders that issue moot.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365", "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "379 U.S. 536, 551-552", "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" offense defined as \"to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "379 U.S. 536, 551-552", "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" offense defined as \"to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365", "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483", "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" offense defined as \"to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483", "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" offense defined as \"to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" offense defined as \"to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365", "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" offense defined as \"to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "372 U.S. 229, 234-236", "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" defined as \"a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365", "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "372 U.S. 229, 234-236", "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" defined as \"a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702", "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" defined as \"a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365", "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702", "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" defined as \"a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365", "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" defined as \"a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"breach of peace\" defined as \"a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365", "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "280 F.Supp. 968, 969", "parenthetical": "\"disorderly conduct\" ordinance proscribing, inter alia, \"mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "280 F.Supp. 968, 969", "parenthetical": "\"disorderly conduct\" ordinance proscribing, inter alia, \"mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"disturbance of the peace\" violation encompassing \"any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community\"", "sentence": "(E.g., Ashton v. Kentucky (1966) 384 U.S. 195, 198 [16 L.Ed.2d 469, 471, 86 S.Ct. 1407] (common law crime of criminal libel, defined by trial court as including “any writing calculated to create disturbances of the peace”); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 482-483, 85 S.Ct. 453] (“breach of peace” offense defined as “to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet”); Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, 372 U.S. 229, 234-236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 701-702, 83 S.Ct. 680] (“breach of peace” defined as “a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquility . . .”); Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 308 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1220, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] (“breach of the peace” statute covering “acts and words”); Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F.Supp. 968, 969 (“disorderly conduct” ordinance proscribing, inter alia, “mak[ing], aid[ing], countenancing], or assisting] in making any . . . disturbance”); cf. People v. Huss (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 361, 365 [51 Cal.Rptr. 56] (“disturbance of the peace” violation encompassing “any act . . . which by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community”).)" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "536 F.2d 406, 406-07", "parenthetical": "operator may obtain review of proposed ventilation plan in citation proceeding after failing to adopt proposed plan", "sentence": "Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 7 FMSHRC 1367, 1371 (1985) (review of operator’s challenge to ventilation plan “may be obtained by the operator’s refusal to adopt the disputed provision, thus triggering litigation before the Commission” pursuant to section 109, 30 U.S.C. § 820); see also Zeigler Coal, 536 F.2d at 406-07 (operator may obtain review of proposed ventilation plan in citation proceeding after failing to adopt proposed plan)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "7 FMSHRC 1367, 1371", "parenthetical": "review of operator's challenge to ventilation plan \"may be obtained by the operator's refusal to adopt the disputed provision, thus triggering litigation before the Commission\" pursuant to section 109, 30 U.S.C. SS 820", "sentence": "Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 7 FMSHRC 1367, 1371 (1985) (review of operator’s challenge to ventilation plan “may be obtained by the operator’s refusal to adopt the disputed provision, thus triggering litigation before the Commission” pursuant to section 109, 30 U.S.C. § 820); see also Zeigler Coal, 536 F.2d at 406-07 (operator may obtain review of proposed ventilation plan in citation proceeding after failing to adopt proposed plan)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"there is no logical or legal inconsistency involved in the recognition of attempted reckless manslaughter as a crime\"", "sentence": "But see People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d 972 (Colo.1986) (en banc) (“there is no logical or legal inconsistency involved in the recognition of attempted reckless manslaughter as a crime”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no such offense as attempted manslaughter because recklessness required for manslaughter", "sentence": "See, e.g., Stennet v. State, 564 So.2d 95 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (no such offense as attempted manslaughter because recklessness required for manslaughter); People v. Hernandez, 44 Colo.App. 161, 614 P.2d 900, 901 (1980) (offense of “attempted criminally negligent homicide” does not exist); State v. Hemmer, 3 Neb.App. 769, 531 N.W.2d 559, 564 (1995) (no such crime as attempted reckless assault); State v. Smith, 21 Or.App. 270, 534 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1975) (no such crime as attempted reckless murder); State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 848 (Utah 1992) (crime of attempted depraved indifferent homicide does not exist); see also Hull v. State, 553 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tenn.Crim.App.1977) (no such crime as attempted involuntary manslaughter; “no such crime as would require proof that one intended a result that accidentally occurred”)." }