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{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing Board's denial of a motion to reopen, based on adverse credibility finding, in light of a new translation of a sterilization certificate and an affidavit by Dr. Aird", "sentence": "See, e.g., Cai v. Ashcroft, 63 Fed. Appx. 625 (3d Cir.2003) (remanding to the Board for reconsideration of a denial of asylum based on China’s family planning policy where the petitioner, whom the IJ found lacked credibility, had two children at the time of filing and four at the time of her motion for reconsideration); cf. Lin v. INS, 78 Fed.Appx. 784 (2d Cir.2003) (reversing Board’s denial of a motion to reopen, based on adverse credibility finding, in light of a new translation of a sterilization certificate and an affidavit by Dr. Aird)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "remanding to the Board for reconsideration of a denial of asylum based on China's family planning policy where the petitioner, whom the IJ found lacked credibility, had two children at the time of filing and four at the time of her motion for reconsideration", "sentence": "See, e.g., Cai v. Ashcroft, 63 Fed. Appx. 625 (3d Cir.2003) (remanding to the Board for reconsideration of a denial of asylum based on China’s family planning policy where the petitioner, whom the IJ found lacked credibility, had two children at the time of filing and four at the time of her motion for reconsideration); cf. Lin v. INS, 78 Fed.Appx. 784 (2d Cir.2003) (reversing Board’s denial of a motion to reopen, based on adverse credibility finding, in light of a new translation of a sterilization certificate and an affidavit by Dr. Aird)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "440 U.S. 332, 350", "parenthetical": "holding that SS 1983 does not override a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity", "sentence": "See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 350, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)(holding that § 1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.1999)(recognizing that claims against a State under § 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "183 F.3d 506, 512", "parenthetical": "recognizing that claims against a State under SS 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment", "sentence": "See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 350, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)(holding that § 1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.1999)(recognizing that claims against a State under § 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that SS 1983 does not override a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity", "sentence": "See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 350, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)(holding that § 1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.1999)(recognizing that claims against a State under § 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "183 F.3d 506, 512", "parenthetical": "recognizing that claims against a State under SS 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment", "sentence": "See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 350, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)(holding that § 1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.1999)(recognizing that claims against a State under § 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that SS 1983 does not override a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity", "sentence": "See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 350, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)(holding that § 1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.1999)(recognizing that claims against a State under § 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "183 F.3d 506, 512", "parenthetical": "recognizing that claims against a State under SS 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment", "sentence": "See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 350, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)(holding that § 1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.1999)(recognizing that claims against a State under § 1981 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "301 Or 129, 133-34", "parenthetical": "challenge to expired agency rule dismissed as moot even though agency could readopt the rule at \" 'any time it chooses' \"", "sentence": "See Hay v. Dept. of Transportation, 301 Or 129, 133-34, 719 P2d 860 (1986) (challenge to expired agency rule dismissed as moot even though agency could readopt the rule at “ ‘any time it chooses’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "315 Or 406, 406-07", "parenthetical": "challenge to PSRB order keeping petitioner confined in Oregon State Hospital moot after petitioner released from supervision even though state might later attempt to assess costs for his care during the time petitioner claimed he was wrongfully hospitalized", "sentence": "See also Brumnett v. PSRB, supra, 315 Or at 406-07 (challenge to PSRB order keeping petitioner confined in Oregon State Hospital moot after petitioner released from supervision even though state might later attempt to assess costs for his care during the time petitioner claimed he was wrongfully hospitalized); State ex rel Van Hoomissen v. Burke, 236 Or 366, 368, 388 P2d 467 (1964) (mandamus proceeding that prosecutor brought to force judge to impose five-year sentence on defendant rather than two-year probation dismissed as moot after defendant violated terms of probation and judge imposed five-year sentence)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "301 Or 129, 133-34", "parenthetical": "challenge to expired agency rule dismissed as moot even though agency could readopt the rule at \" 'any time it chooses' \"", "sentence": "See Hay v. Dept. of Transportation, 301 Or 129, 133-34, 719 P2d 860 (1986) (challenge to expired agency rule dismissed as moot even though agency could readopt the rule at “ ‘any time it chooses’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "236 Or 366, 368", "parenthetical": "mandamus proceeding that prosecutor brought to force judge to impose five-year sentence on defendant rather than two-year probation dismissed as moot after defendant violated terms of probation and judge imposed five-year sentence", "sentence": "See also Brumnett v. PSRB, supra, 315 Or at 406-07 (challenge to PSRB order keeping petitioner confined in Oregon State Hospital moot after petitioner released from supervision even though state might later attempt to assess costs for his care during the time petitioner claimed he was wrongfully hospitalized); State ex rel Van Hoomissen v. Burke, 236 Or 366, 368, 388 P2d 467 (1964) (mandamus proceeding that prosecutor brought to force judge to impose five-year sentence on defendant rather than two-year probation dismissed as moot after defendant violated terms of probation and judge imposed five-year sentence)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "968 F.2d 1430, 1434", "parenthetical": "rejecting a claim that the Air Force violated the Good Samaritan Rule when it negligently waited four hours to send a helicopter to rescue a drowning swimmer because there was no evidence that the negligence worsened his position, but suggesting that such a claim would fly if there was evidence that the Air Force had assured other would-be rescuers of an imminent rescue", "sentence": "Rodrigue v. United States, 968 F.2d 1430, 1434 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting a claim that the Air Force violated the Good Samaritan Rule when it negligently waited four hours to send a helicopter to rescue a drowning swimmer because there was no evidence that the negligence worsened his position, but suggesting that such a claim would fly if there was evidence that the Air Force had assured other would-be rescuers of an imminent rescue); see DeVane, 306 F.2d at 186 (holding that the worsening test was met where a fateful error of a Coast Guard message center lulled a would-be rescuer into believing a fishing vessel was safe)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "306 F.2d 186, 186", "parenthetical": "holding that the worsening test was met where a fateful error of a Coast Guard message center lulled a would-be rescuer into believing a fishing vessel was safe", "sentence": "Rodrigue v. United States, 968 F.2d 1430, 1434 (1st Cir.1992) (rejecting a claim that the Air Force violated the Good Samaritan Rule when it negligently waited four hours to send a helicopter to rescue a drowning swimmer because there was no evidence that the negligence worsened his position, but suggesting that such a claim would fly if there was evidence that the Air Force had assured other would-be rescuers of an imminent rescue); see DeVane, 306 F.2d at 186 (holding that the worsening test was met where a fateful error of a Coast Guard message center lulled a would-be rescuer into believing a fishing vessel was safe)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "690 F.2d 704, 708-09", "parenthetical": "finding evidence of prior sexual acts between victim and defendant to be admissible as motive evidence for kidnapping", "sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 880 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.1989) (finding evidence of \"thrill from creating violence” to be inadmissible as motive evidence for murder charge); cf. United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708-09 (9th Cir.1982) (finding evidence of prior sexual acts between victim and defendant to be admissible as motive evidence for kidnapping)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "880 F.2d 1012, 1015", "parenthetical": "finding evidence of \"thrill from creating violence\" to be inadmissible as motive evidence for murder charge", "sentence": "See United States v. Brown, 880 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir.1989) (finding evidence of \"thrill from creating violence” to be inadmissible as motive evidence for murder charge); cf. United States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708-09 (9th Cir.1982) (finding evidence of prior sexual acts between victim and defendant to be admissible as motive evidence for kidnapping)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "245 F.3d 1232, 1238-39", "parenthetical": "noting that courts have talked about materiality in different ways but noting that to qualify as a change to \"terms, conditions, or privileges\" of employment within Title VII's meaning requires an impact on plaintiffs job \"in a real and demonstrable way\"", "sentence": "Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir.2004); see also Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (11th Cir.2001) (noting that courts have talked about materiality in different ways but noting that to qualify as a change to “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment within Title VII’s meaning requires an impact on plaintiffs job “in a real and demonstrable way”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "581 F.3d 575, 578", "parenthetical": "burden-shifting analysis generally works the same under Title VII and SS 1981", "sentence": "McGowan v. Deere & Co., 581 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir.2009) (burden-shifting analysis generally works the same under Title VII and § 1981). To qualify as adverse means materially adverse, “not merely an inconvenience or a change in job responsibilities.”" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "327 F.3d 887, 889", "parenthetical": "\"[cjancellation of removal ... is based on statutory predicates that must first be met\"", "sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l); Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir.2003) (“[cjancellation of removal ... is based on statutory predicates that must first be met”); cf. Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that where requirements for relief “are conjunctive, failure to meet any one of them is fatal”). We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that Vasquez-Rivera did not merit voluntary departure." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "287 F.3d 758, 760", "parenthetical": "holding that where requirements for relief \"are conjunctive, failure to meet any one of them is fatal\"", "sentence": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l); Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir.2003) (“[cjancellation of removal ... is based on statutory predicates that must first be met”); cf. Matus-Leva v. United States, 287 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that where requirements for relief “are conjunctive, failure to meet any one of them is fatal”). We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that Vasquez-Rivera did not merit voluntary departure." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "986 F.2d 1521, 1524", "parenthetical": "\"The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches, and its protections are not extinguished upon incarceration.\"", "sentence": "Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir.1988) (“We recognize that incarcerated prisoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy.”); see also Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (“Notwithstanding the language in Hudson, our circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment right of people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to incarcerated prisoners; however, the reasonableness of a particular search is determined by reference to the prison context,”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Michenfelder)-, Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc) (“The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches, and its protections are not extinguished upon incarceration.”) (citing Michenfelder)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "860 F.2d 328, 333-34", "parenthetical": "\"We recognize that incarcerated prisoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy.\"", "sentence": "Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir.1988) (“We recognize that incarcerated prisoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy.”); see also Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir.1997) (“Notwithstanding the language in Hudson, our circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment right of people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to incarcerated prisoners; however, the reasonableness of a particular search is determined by reference to the prison context,”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Michenfelder)-, Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc) (“The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches, and its protections are not extinguished upon incarceration.”) (citing Michenfelder)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting hypothetical instance of impermissible \"double counting\" to add points to criminal history calculus", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cervantes, 878 F.2d 50, 55 n. 3 (2d Cir.1989) (noting hypothetical instance of impermissible “double counting” to add points to criminal history calculus); cf. Alessi v. Quinlan, 711 F.2d 497, 500 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1983) (noting, without considering validity of, several Connecticut district courts holding that due process is violated by Parole Commission decisions that “confine a prisoner beyond the applicable guideline for the same reason used to select the prisoner’s guideline in the first place”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting, without considering validity of, several Connecticut district courts holding that due process is violated by Parole Commission decisions that \"confine a prisoner beyond the applicable guideline for the same reason used to select the prisoner's guideline in the first place\"", "sentence": "See U.S. v. Cervantes, 878 F.2d 50, 55 n. 3 (2d Cir.1989) (noting hypothetical instance of impermissible “double counting” to add points to criminal history calculus); cf. Alessi v. Quinlan, 711 F.2d 497, 500 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1983) (noting, without considering validity of, several Connecticut district courts holding that due process is violated by Parole Commission decisions that “confine a prisoner beyond the applicable guideline for the same reason used to select the prisoner’s guideline in the first place”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "280 Ga. 693, 694", "parenthetical": "husband in a divorce proceeding waived his right to be present and to be heard at trial where he \"was properly informed and had actual knowledge of the trial date, but... chose not to participate\"", "sentence": "See also Cormier v. Cormier, 280 Ga. 693, 694 (1) (631 SE2d 663) (2006) (husband in a divorce proceeding waived his right to be present and to be heard at trial where he “was properly informed and had actual knowledge of the trial date, but... chose not to participate”); In the Interest of A. G. I., 246 Ga. App. 85, 86 (1) (539 SE2d 584) (2000) (despite the fact that the mother was a party to the proceeding to terminate her parental rights, she could nevertheless “waive the right to be present during trial proceedings by voluntarily absenting herself from the court”) (footnote omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "291 Ga. 380, 385", "parenthetical": "\"[l]ike most other rights, the right to be present may be waived or forfeited by a party\"", "sentence": "See Kesterson v. Jarrett, 291 Ga. 380, 385 (2) (b) (728 SE2d 557) (2012) (“[l]ike most other rights, the right to be present may be waived or forfeited by a party”); In the Interest of I. W., 304 Ga. App. 225, 227 (1) (695 SE2d 739) (2010) (father could not assert error based on fact that juvenile court proceeded with a deprivation hearing despite the father’s absence; the father “knew of the impending hearing and was afforded an opportunity to present his evidence and objections, but he chose not to participate” and thereby waived his right to be heard). A waiver of such rights occurs where, as here, a legal guardian who has received notice of a delinquency hearing elects not to appear at that proceeding." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "291 Ga. 380, 385", "parenthetical": "\"[l]ike most other rights, the right to be present may be waived or forfeited by a party\"", "sentence": "See Kesterson v. Jarrett, 291 Ga. 380, 385 (2) (b) (728 SE2d 557) (2012) (“[l]ike most other rights, the right to be present may be waived or forfeited by a party”); In the Interest of I. W., 304 Ga. App. 225, 227 (1) (695 SE2d 739) (2010) (father could not assert error based on fact that juvenile court proceeded with a deprivation hearing despite the father’s absence; the father “knew of the impending hearing and was afforded an opportunity to present his evidence and objections, but he chose not to participate” and thereby waived his right to be heard). A waiver of such rights occurs where, as here, a legal guardian who has received notice of a delinquency hearing elects not to appear at that proceeding." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "246 Ga. App. 85, 86", "parenthetical": "despite the fact that the mother was a party to the proceeding to terminate her parental rights, she could nevertheless \"waive the right to be present during trial proceedings by voluntarily absenting herself from the court\"", "sentence": "See also Cormier v. Cormier, 280 Ga. 693, 694 (1) (631 SE2d 663) (2006) (husband in a divorce proceeding waived his right to be present and to be heard at trial where he “was properly informed and had actual knowledge of the trial date, but... chose not to participate”); In the Interest of A. G. I., 246 Ga. App. 85, 86 (1) (539 SE2d 584) (2000) (despite the fact that the mother was a party to the proceeding to terminate her parental rights, she could nevertheless “waive the right to be present during trial proceedings by voluntarily absenting herself from the court”) (footnote omitted)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "255 F.3d 1, 4", "parenthetical": "\"We nonetheless wish to note that aliens arrested for status offenses are not without protection from excessively long detentions.\"", "sentence": "Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 578 (7th Cir.1998) (“In a consti tutional sense, how much more basic could it get — jails cannot confine people without authority to do so.”); cf. United States v. Tejada, 255 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2001) (“We nonetheless wish to note that aliens arrested for status offenses are not without protection from excessively long detentions.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "152 F.3d 564, 578", "parenthetical": "\"In a consti tutional sense, how much more basic could it get -- jails cannot confine people without authority to do so.\"", "sentence": "Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 578 (7th Cir.1998) (“In a consti tutional sense, how much more basic could it get — jails cannot confine people without authority to do so.”); cf. United States v. Tejada, 255 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2001) (“We nonetheless wish to note that aliens arrested for status offenses are not without protection from excessively long detentions.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "340 N.W.2d 866, 869", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a receiver's powers are defined by the orders of the court and include authority as may reasonably or necessarily be implied for such orders\"", "sentence": "Shadewald v. White, 74 Minn. 208, 208, 77 N.W. 42, 42 (1898) (stating that “a receiver occupies a fiduciary relation, and is trustee for all parties interested in the property [entrusted to his charge by the court”); see also In re Telesports Prod., Inc., 476 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn.App.1991) (“A receiver is a representative of the court.”); Hancock-Nelson Mercantile v. Weisman, 340 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Minn.App.1983) (stating that “a receiver’s powers are defined by the orders of the court and include authority as may reasonably or necessarily be implied for such orders”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "74 Minn. 208, 208", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a receiver occupies a fiduciary relation, and is trustee for all parties interested in the property [entrusted to his charge by the court\"", "sentence": "Shadewald v. White, 74 Minn. 208, 208, 77 N.W. 42, 42 (1898) (stating that “a receiver occupies a fiduciary relation, and is trustee for all parties interested in the property [entrusted to his charge by the court”); see also In re Telesports Prod., Inc., 476 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn.App.1991) (“A receiver is a representative of the court.”); Hancock-Nelson Mercantile v. Weisman, 340 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Minn.App.1983) (stating that “a receiver’s powers are defined by the orders of the court and include authority as may reasonably or necessarily be implied for such orders”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "77 N.W. 42, 42", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a receiver occupies a fiduciary relation, and is trustee for all parties interested in the property [entrusted to his charge by the court\"", "sentence": "Shadewald v. White, 74 Minn. 208, 208, 77 N.W. 42, 42 (1898) (stating that “a receiver occupies a fiduciary relation, and is trustee for all parties interested in the property [entrusted to his charge by the court”); see also In re Telesports Prod., Inc., 476 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn.App.1991) (“A receiver is a representative of the court.”); Hancock-Nelson Mercantile v. Weisman, 340 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Minn.App.1983) (stating that “a receiver’s powers are defined by the orders of the court and include authority as may reasonably or necessarily be implied for such orders”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "340 N.W.2d 866, 869", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a receiver's powers are defined by the orders of the court and include authority as may reasonably or necessarily be implied for such orders\"", "sentence": "Shadewald v. White, 74 Minn. 208, 208, 77 N.W. 42, 42 (1898) (stating that “a receiver occupies a fiduciary relation, and is trustee for all parties interested in the property [entrusted to his charge by the court”); see also In re Telesports Prod., Inc., 476 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Minn.App.1991) (“A receiver is a representative of the court.”); Hancock-Nelson Mercantile v. Weisman, 340 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Minn.App.1983) (stating that “a receiver’s powers are defined by the orders of the court and include authority as may reasonably or necessarily be implied for such orders”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "41 F.3d 389, 389", "parenthetical": "\"In determining the amount in controversy ..., answers to interrogatories serve as the equivalent of affidavits to either support or defeat diversity jurisdiction.\"", "sentence": "See Frevert v. Ford Motor Co., 614 F.3d 466, 474 (8th Cir.2010) (affidavit contradicting prior response to interrogatories is “self-serving” and need not be considered); One-Point, 486 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he existence of the required amount in controversy ... must ... be supported by competent proof.”) (emphasis added); see also Larkin, 41 F.3d at 389 (“In determining the amount in controversy ..., answers to interrogatories serve as the equivalent of affidavits to either support or defeat diversity jurisdiction.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "614 F.3d 466, 474", "parenthetical": "affidavit contradicting prior response to interrogatories is \"self-serving\" and need not be considered", "sentence": "See Frevert v. Ford Motor Co., 614 F.3d 466, 474 (8th Cir.2010) (affidavit contradicting prior response to interrogatories is “self-serving” and need not be considered); One-Point, 486 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he existence of the required amount in controversy ... must ... be supported by competent proof.”) (emphasis added); see also Larkin, 41 F.3d at 389 (“In determining the amount in controversy ..., answers to interrogatories serve as the equivalent of affidavits to either support or defeat diversity jurisdiction.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "41 F.3d 389, 389", "parenthetical": "\"In determining the amount in controversy ..., answers to interrogatories serve as the equivalent of affidavits to either support or defeat diversity jurisdiction.\"", "sentence": "See Frevert v. Ford Motor Co., 614 F.3d 466, 474 (8th Cir.2010) (affidavit contradicting prior response to interrogatories is “self-serving” and need not be considered); One-Point, 486 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he existence of the required amount in controversy ... must ... be supported by competent proof.”) (emphasis added); see also Larkin, 41 F.3d at 389 (“In determining the amount in controversy ..., answers to interrogatories serve as the equivalent of affidavits to either support or defeat diversity jurisdiction.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "486 F.3d 349, 349", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he existence of the required amount in controversy ... must ... be supported by competent proof.\"", "sentence": "See Frevert v. Ford Motor Co., 614 F.3d 466, 474 (8th Cir.2010) (affidavit contradicting prior response to interrogatories is “self-serving” and need not be considered); One-Point, 486 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he existence of the required amount in controversy ... must ... be supported by competent proof.”) (emphasis added); see also Larkin, 41 F.3d at 389 (“In determining the amount in controversy ..., answers to interrogatories serve as the equivalent of affidavits to either support or defeat diversity jurisdiction.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "866 S.W.2d 210, 215", "parenthetical": "\"Intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner\"", "sentence": "See Threadgill, 146 S.W.3d at 665 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was no evidence that would permit a jury rationally to find that appellant did not intend to kill his victim where the evidence showed that defendant ran up to a car, leaned in, and fired two shots, the second of which was into the backseat where the victim was seated); cf. Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (“Intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "146 S.W.3d 665, 665", "parenthetical": "trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was no evidence that would permit a jury rationally to find that appellant did not intend to kill his victim where the evidence showed that defendant ran up to a car, leaned in, and fired two shots, the second of which was into the backseat where the victim was seated", "sentence": "See Threadgill, 146 S.W.3d at 665 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was no evidence that would permit a jury rationally to find that appellant did not intend to kill his victim where the evidence showed that defendant ran up to a car, leaned in, and fired two shots, the second of which was into the backseat where the victim was seated); cf. Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (“Intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.\"", "sentence": "See Rizk v. Jones, 148 Ga.App. 473, 251 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978) (“The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 243 Ga. 545, 255 S.E.2d 19 (1979); Health Serv. Ctrs. v. Boddy, 257 Ga. 378, 359 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1987) (“Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.”); American Viking Contractors, Inc. v. Scribner Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 1365, 1371 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Georgia law); see also In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir.1981) (“Ordinarily, we should glean the contract’s meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "635 F.2d 365, 368", "parenthetical": "\"Ordinarily, we should glean the contract's meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.\"", "sentence": "See Rizk v. Jones, 148 Ga.App. 473, 251 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978) (“The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 243 Ga. 545, 255 S.E.2d 19 (1979); Health Serv. Ctrs. v. Boddy, 257 Ga. 378, 359 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1987) (“Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.”); American Viking Contractors, Inc. v. Scribner Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 1365, 1371 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Georgia law); see also In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir.1981) (“Ordinarily, we should glean the contract’s meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "251 S.E.2d 360, 361", "parenthetical": "\"The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.\"", "sentence": "See Rizk v. Jones, 148 Ga.App. 473, 251 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978) (“The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 243 Ga. 545, 255 S.E.2d 19 (1979); Health Serv. Ctrs. v. Boddy, 257 Ga. 378, 359 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1987) (“Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.”); American Viking Contractors, Inc. v. Scribner Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 1365, 1371 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Georgia law); see also In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir.1981) (“Ordinarily, we should glean the contract’s meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "635 F.2d 365, 368", "parenthetical": "\"Ordinarily, we should glean the contract's meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.\"", "sentence": "See Rizk v. Jones, 148 Ga.App. 473, 251 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978) (“The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 243 Ga. 545, 255 S.E.2d 19 (1979); Health Serv. Ctrs. v. Boddy, 257 Ga. 378, 359 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1987) (“Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.”); American Viking Contractors, Inc. v. Scribner Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 1365, 1371 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Georgia law); see also In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir.1981) (“Ordinarily, we should glean the contract’s meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "635 F.2d 365, 368", "parenthetical": "\"Ordinarily, we should glean the contract's meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.\"", "sentence": "See Rizk v. Jones, 148 Ga.App. 473, 251 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978) (“The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 243 Ga. 545, 255 S.E.2d 19 (1979); Health Serv. Ctrs. v. Boddy, 257 Ga. 378, 359 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1987) (“Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.”); American Viking Contractors, Inc. v. Scribner Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 1365, 1371 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Georgia law); see also In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir.1981) (“Ordinarily, we should glean the contract’s meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.\"", "sentence": "See Rizk v. Jones, 148 Ga.App. 473, 251 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978) (“The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 243 Ga. 545, 255 S.E.2d 19 (1979); Health Serv. Ctrs. v. Boddy, 257 Ga. 378, 359 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1987) (“Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.”); American Viking Contractors, Inc. v. Scribner Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 1365, 1371 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Georgia law); see also In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir.1981) (“Ordinarily, we should glean the contract’s meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "359 S.E.2d 659, 661", "parenthetical": "\"Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.\"", "sentence": "See Rizk v. Jones, 148 Ga.App. 473, 251 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978) (“The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 243 Ga. 545, 255 S.E.2d 19 (1979); Health Serv. Ctrs. v. Boddy, 257 Ga. 378, 359 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1987) (“Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.”); American Viking Contractors, Inc. v. Scribner Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 1365, 1371 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Georgia law); see also In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir.1981) (“Ordinarily, we should glean the contract’s meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "635 F.2d 365, 368", "parenthetical": "\"Ordinarily, we should glean the contract's meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.\"", "sentence": "See Rizk v. Jones, 148 Ga.App. 473, 251 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1978) (“The cases are legion that a complete and unambiguous instrument cannot be varied or. contradicted by reliance upon inconsistent parol statements.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd, 243 Ga. 545, 255 S.E.2d 19 (1979); Health Serv. Ctrs. v. Boddy, 257 Ga. 378, 359 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1987) (“Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court will look to the contract alone to the find the intention of the parties.”); American Viking Contractors, Inc. v. Scribner Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 1365, 1371 (11th Cir.1984) (applying Georgia law); see also In re Stratford of Texas, Inc., 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir.1981) (“Ordinarily, we should glean the contract’s meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence in accordance with the principle that the language of an agreement, unless ambiguous, best represents the intention of the parties.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "171 F.3d 757, 761", "parenthetical": "\"[Pjarole board officials, like judges, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages when they serve a quasi-adjudicative function in deciding whether to ... revoke parole.\"", "sentence": "See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.1999) (“[Pjarole board officials, like judges, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages when they serve a quasi-adjudicative function in deciding whether to ... revoke parole.”); see also Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir.1994) (explaining that absolute immunity often bars due process damages claims by individuals serving invalidated sentences)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "23 F.3d 652, 658", "parenthetical": "explaining that absolute immunity often bars due process damages claims by individuals serving invalidated sentences", "sentence": "See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.1999) (“[Pjarole board officials, like judges, are entitled to absolute immunity from suit for damages when they serve a quasi-adjudicative function in deciding whether to ... revoke parole.”); see also Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir.1994) (explaining that absolute immunity often bars due process damages claims by individuals serving invalidated sentences)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "49 V.I. 826, 834", "parenthetical": "Section 3 applicable where Plaintiffs were unable to prove that water was defective", "sentence": "Mendez v. Hovensa, L.L.C., 49 V.I. 826, 834 (D.V.I. 2008) (Section 3 applicable where Plaintiffs were unable to prove that water was defective); see also Bodley v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45006, at *9 (D.V.I. Apr. 26, 2011) (citing Ocean Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that plaintiff, through the use of circumstantial evidence, may establish the defect “by showing an unexplained occurrence and eliminating all reasonable explanations for the occurrence other than the existence of a defect”))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "726 F.2d 121, 124", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that plaintiff, through the use of circumstantial evidence, may establish the defect \"by showing an unexplained occurrence and eliminating all reasonable explanations for the occurrence other than the existence of a defect\"", "sentence": "Mendez v. Hovensa, L.L.C., 49 V.I. 826, 834 (D.V.I. 2008) (Section 3 applicable where Plaintiffs were unable to prove that water was defective); see also Bodley v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45006, at *9 (D.V.I. Apr. 26, 2011) (citing Ocean Barge Transport Co. v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 726 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that plaintiff, through the use of circumstantial evidence, may establish the defect “by showing an unexplained occurrence and eliminating all reasonable explanations for the occurrence other than the existence of a defect”))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "874 F.2d 669, 675", "parenthetical": "noting that if the \"request [to proceed pro se] is part of a pattern of dilatory activity, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial on the scheduled date either with the counsel designated or pro se\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that if the “request [to proceed pro se] is part of a pattern of dilatory activity, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial on the scheduled date either with the counsel designated or pro se”); see also Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990) (holding the request to represent oneself to be untimely because it was made only after a motion for substitute counsel and new trial was denied)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "921 F.2d 882, 888", "parenthetical": "holding the request to represent oneself to be untimely because it was made only after a motion for substitute counsel and new trial was denied", "sentence": "See United States v. Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 675 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that if the “request [to proceed pro se] is part of a pattern of dilatory activity, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial on the scheduled date either with the counsel designated or pro se”); see also Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.1990) (holding the request to represent oneself to be untimely because it was made only after a motion for substitute counsel and new trial was denied)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "534 F.3d 931, 939", "parenthetical": "DOC prohibition on sweat lodge was in furtherance of compelling government interest", "sentence": "See Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 939 (8th Cir. 2008) (DOC prohibition on sweat lodge was in furtherance of compelling government interest); see also Ventura v. Felts, 2008 WL 5412264 at *4 (N.D.Tex. 2008) (denying prisoner request for sweat lodge based on legitimate penological interests in maintaining security and safety)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2008 WL 5412264, at *4", "parenthetical": "denying prisoner request for sweat lodge based on legitimate penological interests in maintaining security and safety", "sentence": "See Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 939 (8th Cir. 2008) (DOC prohibition on sweat lodge was in furtherance of compelling government interest); see also Ventura v. Felts, 2008 WL 5412264 at *4 (N.D.Tex. 2008) (denying prisoner request for sweat lodge based on legitimate penological interests in maintaining security and safety)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "601 F.3d 1319, 1326", "parenthetical": "holding that the contractual language \"employee assigns [his inventions]\" has the effect of \"expressly granting] rights with no further action needed on the part of the employee[ ]\"", "sentence": "See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed.Cir.2000) (holding agreement stating inventions' “shall belong,” and that employee “hereby conveys, transfers and assigns” to its employer, constitutes an automatic assignment); see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2010) (holding that the contractual language “employee assigns [his inventions]” has the effect of “expressly granting] rights with no further action needed on the part of the employee[ ]”). '" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "211 F.3d 1245, 1253", "parenthetical": "holding agreement stating inventions' \"shall belong,\" and that employee \"hereby conveys, transfers and assigns\" to its employer, constitutes an automatic assignment", "sentence": "See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed.Cir.2000) (holding agreement stating inventions' “shall belong,” and that employee “hereby conveys, transfers and assigns” to its employer, constitutes an automatic assignment); see also SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2010) (holding that the contractual language “employee assigns [his inventions]” has the effect of “expressly granting] rights with no further action needed on the part of the employee[ ]”). '" }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "189 Ariz. 212, 212", "parenthetical": "holding summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant knew of gang incursions involving drugs and other criminal acts and could have taken reasonable precautions against harm", "sentence": "Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 n. 1, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 230 n. 1; cf. Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 212, 941 P.2d at 224 (holding summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant knew of gang incursions involving drugs and other criminal acts and could have taken reasonable precautions against harm)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 Ariz. 210, 210-11", "parenthetical": "stating premises owner must only do what is reasonable and is not an insurer of safety", "sentence": "Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 210-11, 941 P.2d at 222-23 (stating premises owner must only do what is reasonable and is not an insurer of safety). Under the circumstances of this case, where there was no evidence that prior crimes had occurred at the Bus Stop, a reasonable jury could not find that the City breached the duty of care it owed Tiana because it did not install a $10,000 shelter and lighting at the Bus Stop." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "941 P.2d 224, 224", "parenthetical": "holding summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant knew of gang incursions involving drugs and other criminal acts and could have taken reasonable precautions against harm", "sentence": "Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 n. 1, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 230 n. 1; cf. Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 212, 941 P.2d at 224 (holding summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant knew of gang incursions involving drugs and other criminal acts and could have taken reasonable precautions against harm)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 Ariz. 210, 210-11", "parenthetical": "stating premises owner must only do what is reasonable and is not an insurer of safety", "sentence": "Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 210-11, 941 P.2d at 222-23 (stating premises owner must only do what is reasonable and is not an insurer of safety). Under the circumstances of this case, where there was no evidence that prior crimes had occurred at the Bus Stop, a reasonable jury could not find that the City breached the duty of care it owed Tiana because it did not install a $10,000 shelter and lighting at the Bus Stop." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "189 Ariz. 212, 212", "parenthetical": "holding summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant knew of gang incursions involving drugs and other criminal acts and could have taken reasonable precautions against harm", "sentence": "Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 n. 1, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 230 n. 1; cf. Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 212, 941 P.2d at 224 (holding summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant knew of gang incursions involving drugs and other criminal acts and could have taken reasonable precautions against harm)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "941 P.2d 222, 222-23", "parenthetical": "stating premises owner must only do what is reasonable and is not an insurer of safety", "sentence": "Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 210-11, 941 P.2d at 222-23 (stating premises owner must only do what is reasonable and is not an insurer of safety). Under the circumstances of this case, where there was no evidence that prior crimes had occurred at the Bus Stop, a reasonable jury could not find that the City breached the duty of care it owed Tiana because it did not install a $10,000 shelter and lighting at the Bus Stop." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "941 P.2d 224, 224", "parenthetical": "holding summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant knew of gang incursions involving drugs and other criminal acts and could have taken reasonable precautions against harm", "sentence": "Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 143 n. 1, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d at 230 n. 1; cf. Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 212, 941 P.2d at 224 (holding summary judgment was inappropriate because defendant knew of gang incursions involving drugs and other criminal acts and could have taken reasonable precautions against harm)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "941 P.2d 222, 222-23", "parenthetical": "stating premises owner must only do what is reasonable and is not an insurer of safety", "sentence": "Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 210-11, 941 P.2d at 222-23 (stating premises owner must only do what is reasonable and is not an insurer of safety). Under the circumstances of this case, where there was no evidence that prior crimes had occurred at the Bus Stop, a reasonable jury could not find that the City breached the duty of care it owed Tiana because it did not install a $10,000 shelter and lighting at the Bus Stop." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "826 F.2d 213, 213", "parenthetical": "wide discretion in planning board to reject site plan on the basis of the planning board's assessment of the plan's effect on public health, safety and general welfare prevented expectation of success from rising to the level of a property right meriting protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments", "sentence": "Dean Tarry, 826 F.2d at 213 (wide discretion in planning board to reject site plan on the basis of the planning board’s assessment of the plan’s effect on public health, safety and general welfare prevented expectation of success from rising to the level of a property right meriting protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "570 F.2d 414, 429", "parenthetical": "\"Under New York law ... a landowner has no vested interest in the existing classification of his property.\"", "sentence": "See also RRI Realty, 870 F.2d at 919 (where Village officials have wide discretion to deny housing application, there can be no certainty or very strong likelihood that Village officials, absent alleged due process violation, would have approved the permit; therefore, the applicant did not have an entitlement sufficient to invoke the protection of the due process clause); Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 429 (2d Cir.1978) (“Under New York law ... a landowner has no vested interest in the existing classification of his property.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "362 U.S. 145, 154", "parenthetical": "a taxpayer must pay the full amount of income tax deficiency assessed before challenging its correctness in a refund forum", "sentence": "See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 154, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (a taxpayer must pay the full amount of income tax deficiency assessed before challenging its correctness in a refund forum); see also Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1526 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“The full payment requirement of [26 U.S.C. § ] 1346(a)(1) and Flora applies equally to tax refund suits brought in the Court of Federal Claims[.]”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "9 F.3d 1524, 1526", "parenthetical": "\"The full payment requirement of [26 U.S.C. SS ] 1346(a", "sentence": "See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 154, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (a taxpayer must pay the full amount of income tax deficiency assessed before challenging its correctness in a refund forum); see also Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1526 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“The full payment requirement of [26 U.S.C. § ] 1346(a)(1) and Flora applies equally to tax refund suits brought in the Court of Federal Claims[.]”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "a taxpayer must pay the full amount of income tax deficiency assessed before challenging its correctness in a refund forum", "sentence": "See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 154, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (a taxpayer must pay the full amount of income tax deficiency assessed before challenging its correctness in a refund forum); see also Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1526 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“The full payment requirement of [26 U.S.C. § ] 1346(a)(1) and Flora applies equally to tax refund suits brought in the Court of Federal Claims[.]”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "9 F.3d 1524, 1526", "parenthetical": "\"The full payment requirement of [26 U.S.C. SS ] 1346(a", "sentence": "See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 154, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (a taxpayer must pay the full amount of income tax deficiency assessed before challenging its correctness in a refund forum); see also Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1526 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“The full payment requirement of [26 U.S.C. § ] 1346(a)(1) and Flora applies equally to tax refund suits brought in the Court of Federal Claims[.]”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "9 F.3d 1524, 1526", "parenthetical": "\"The full payment requirement of [26 U.S.C. SS ] 1346(a", "sentence": "See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 154, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (a taxpayer must pay the full amount of income tax deficiency assessed before challenging its correctness in a refund forum); see also Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1526 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“The full payment requirement of [26 U.S.C. § ] 1346(a)(1) and Flora applies equally to tax refund suits brought in the Court of Federal Claims[.]”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "a taxpayer must pay the full amount of income tax deficiency assessed before challenging its correctness in a refund forum", "sentence": "See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 154, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (a taxpayer must pay the full amount of income tax deficiency assessed before challenging its correctness in a refund forum); see also Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1526 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“The full payment requirement of [26 U.S.C. § ] 1346(a)(1) and Flora applies equally to tax refund suits brought in the Court of Federal Claims[.]”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "63 F.3d 429, 436", "parenthetical": "plaintiff alleging retaliation must prove that \"but for\" his complaints of discrimination, he would not have been discharged", "sentence": "See Thornton v. Neiman Marcus, 850 F.Supp. 538, 544 (N.D.Tex.1994) (to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer more than the subjective belief of himself and others that he was a victim of discrimination); see also Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 436 (5th Cir.1995) (plaintiff alleging retaliation must prove that “but for” his complaints of discrimination, he would not have been discharged); Jack v. Texaco Research Center, 743 F.2d 1129, 1131(5th Cir.1984) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "850 F.Supp. 538, 544", "parenthetical": "to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer more than the subjective belief of himself and others that he was a victim of discrimination", "sentence": "See Thornton v. Neiman Marcus, 850 F.Supp. 538, 544 (N.D.Tex.1994) (to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer more than the subjective belief of himself and others that he was a victim of discrimination); see also Ray v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 436 (5th Cir.1995) (plaintiff alleging retaliation must prove that “but for” his complaints of discrimination, he would not have been discharged); Jack v. Texaco Research Center, 743 F.2d 1129, 1131(5th Cir.1984) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "789 F.2d 1289, 1297", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere fact that one has taken drugs, or is intoxicated, or mentally agitated, does not render consent involuntary____ In each case, '[t]he question is one of mental awareness so that the act of consent was the consensual act of one who knew what he was doing and had a reasonable appreciation of the nature and significance of his actions.' \"", "sentence": "See United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir.1986) (“[T]he mere fact that one has taken drugs, or is intoxicated, or mentally agitated, does not render consent involuntary____ In each case, ‘[t]he question is one of mental awareness so that the act of consent was the consensual act of one who knew what he was doing and had a reasonable appreciation of the nature and significance of his actions.’ ”), quoting United States v. Elrod, 441 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir.1971); see also United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 376-77 (10th Cir.1985) (suspect who “staggered and swayed” under intoxication was still capable of giving consent to search glove box)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "774 F.2d 368, 376-77", "parenthetical": "suspect who \"staggered and swayed\" under intoxication was still capable of giving consent to search glove box", "sentence": "See United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir.1986) (“[T]he mere fact that one has taken drugs, or is intoxicated, or mentally agitated, does not render consent involuntary____ In each case, ‘[t]he question is one of mental awareness so that the act of consent was the consensual act of one who knew what he was doing and had a reasonable appreciation of the nature and significance of his actions.’ ”), quoting United States v. Elrod, 441 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir.1971); see also United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 376-77 (10th Cir.1985) (suspect who “staggered and swayed” under intoxication was still capable of giving consent to search glove box)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "774 F.2d 368, 376-77", "parenthetical": "suspect who \"staggered and swayed\" under intoxication was still capable of giving consent to search glove box", "sentence": "See United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir.1986) (“[T]he mere fact that one has taken drugs, or is intoxicated, or mentally agitated, does not render consent involuntary____ In each case, ‘[t]he question is one of mental awareness so that the act of consent was the consensual act of one who knew what he was doing and had a reasonable appreciation of the nature and significance of his actions.’ ”), quoting United States v. Elrod, 441 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir.1971); see also United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 376-77 (10th Cir.1985) (suspect who “staggered and swayed” under intoxication was still capable of giving consent to search glove box)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "441 F.2d 353, 355", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere fact that one has taken drugs, or is intoxicated, or mentally agitated, does not render consent involuntary____ In each case, '[t]he question is one of mental awareness so that the act of consent was the consensual act of one who knew what he was doing and had a reasonable appreciation of the nature and significance of his actions.' \"", "sentence": "See United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir.1986) (“[T]he mere fact that one has taken drugs, or is intoxicated, or mentally agitated, does not render consent involuntary____ In each case, ‘[t]he question is one of mental awareness so that the act of consent was the consensual act of one who knew what he was doing and had a reasonable appreciation of the nature and significance of his actions.’ ”), quoting United States v. Elrod, 441 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir.1971); see also United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 376-77 (10th Cir.1985) (suspect who “staggered and swayed” under intoxication was still capable of giving consent to search glove box)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "550 F.2d 47, 51, 57", "parenthetical": "allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with \"knowledge\" of automatic stay and \"deliberate[ ]\" disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "113 B.R. 279, 279", "parenthetical": "recognizing power of bankruptcy court under SS 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "99 B.R. 18, 18", "parenthetical": "finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where SS 362(h", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "550 F.2d 47, 51, 57", "parenthetical": "allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with \"knowledge\" of automatic stay and \"deliberate[ ]\" disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "113 B.R. 279, 279", "parenthetical": "recognizing power of bankruptcy court under SS 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with \"knowledge\" of automatic stay and \"deliberate[ ]\" disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "99 B.R. 18, 18", "parenthetical": "finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where SS 362(h", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with \"knowledge\" of automatic stay and \"deliberate[ ]\" disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with \"knowledge\" of automatic stay and \"deliberate[ ]\" disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "113 B.R. 279, 279", "parenthetical": "recognizing power of bankruptcy court under SS 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "99 B.R. 18, 18", "parenthetical": "finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where SS 362(h", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with \"knowledge\" of automatic stay and \"deliberate[ ]\" disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "113 B.R. 279, 279", "parenthetical": "recognizing power of bankruptcy court under SS 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with \"knowledge\" of automatic stay and \"deliberate[ ]\" disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with \"knowledge\" of automatic stay and \"deliberate[ ]\" disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "99 B.R. 18, 18", "parenthetical": "finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where SS 362(h", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "889 F.2d 389, 394-95", "parenthetical": "knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "113 B.R. 279, 279", "parenthetical": "recognizing power of bankruptcy court under SS 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "99 B.R. 18, 18", "parenthetical": "finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where SS 362(h", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "889 F.2d 389, 394-95", "parenthetical": "knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "113 B.R. 279, 279", "parenthetical": "recognizing power of bankruptcy court under SS 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "99 B.R. 18, 18", "parenthetical": "finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where SS 362(h", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "113 B.R. 279, 279", "parenthetical": "recognizing power of bankruptcy court under SS 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "99 B.R. 18, 18", "parenthetical": "finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where SS 362(h", "sentence": "Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 51, 57 (2d Cir.1976) (allowing imposition of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees under civil contempt powers for acts which bankruptcy judge found were done with “knowledge” of automatic stay and “deliberate[ ]” disregard of bankruptcy rules regarding requirements for relief), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093, 97 S.Ct. 1107, 51 L.Ed.2d 540 (1977); Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889 F.2d 389, 394-95 (2d Cir.1989) (knowledge of violation and terms of injunction required to hold party in civil contempt), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1478, 108 L.Ed.2d 615 (1990); see also In re First RepublicBank Corp., 113 B.R. at 279 (recognizing power of bankruptcy court under § 105 of the code and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to impose contempt sanctions for violations of automatic stay); In re Brilliant Glass, Inc., 99 B.R. at 18 (finding contempt an appropriate remedy for violation of the automatic stay where § 362(h) by its words only benefits individual debtors)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "389 N.W.2d 872, 876", "parenthetical": "concluding that a lay witness's letter stating that the witness believed defendant's actions did not fall within statutory definition of crimi nal sexual conduct was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 701", "sentence": "See State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994) (stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense); see also State v. Larson, 389 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Minn.1986) (concluding that a lay witness’s letter stating that the witness believed defendant’s actions did not fall within statutory definition of crimi nal sexual conduct was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 701); Pierson v. Edstrom, 281 Minn. 102, 106, 160 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1968) (concluding that police officer’s opinion regarding fault in an accident was an improper invasion of jury’s province and that the officer’s opinion testimony regarding speed was improper because the officer did not witness the accident)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "512 N.W.2d 99, 102", "parenthetical": "stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense", "sentence": "See State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994) (stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense); see also State v. Larson, 389 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Minn.1986) (concluding that a lay witness’s letter stating that the witness believed defendant’s actions did not fall within statutory definition of crimi nal sexual conduct was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 701); Pierson v. Edstrom, 281 Minn. 102, 106, 160 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1968) (concluding that police officer’s opinion regarding fault in an accident was an improper invasion of jury’s province and that the officer’s opinion testimony regarding speed was improper because the officer did not witness the accident)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "281 Minn. 102, 106", "parenthetical": "concluding that police officer's opinion regarding fault in an accident was an improper invasion of jury's province and that the officer's opinion testimony regarding speed was improper because the officer did not witness the accident", "sentence": "See State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994) (stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense); see also State v. Larson, 389 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Minn.1986) (concluding that a lay witness’s letter stating that the witness believed defendant’s actions did not fall within statutory definition of crimi nal sexual conduct was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 701); Pierson v. Edstrom, 281 Minn. 102, 106, 160 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1968) (concluding that police officer’s opinion regarding fault in an accident was an improper invasion of jury’s province and that the officer’s opinion testimony regarding speed was improper because the officer did not witness the accident)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "512 N.W.2d 99, 102", "parenthetical": "stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense", "sentence": "See State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994) (stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense); see also State v. Larson, 389 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Minn.1986) (concluding that a lay witness’s letter stating that the witness believed defendant’s actions did not fall within statutory definition of crimi nal sexual conduct was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 701); Pierson v. Edstrom, 281 Minn. 102, 106, 160 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1968) (concluding that police officer’s opinion regarding fault in an accident was an improper invasion of jury’s province and that the officer’s opinion testimony regarding speed was improper because the officer did not witness the accident)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "512 N.W.2d 99, 102", "parenthetical": "stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense", "sentence": "See State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994) (stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense); see also State v. Larson, 389 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Minn.1986) (concluding that a lay witness’s letter stating that the witness believed defendant’s actions did not fall within statutory definition of crimi nal sexual conduct was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 701); Pierson v. Edstrom, 281 Minn. 102, 106, 160 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1968) (concluding that police officer’s opinion regarding fault in an accident was an improper invasion of jury’s province and that the officer’s opinion testimony regarding speed was improper because the officer did not witness the accident)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "160 N.W.2d 563, 565", "parenthetical": "concluding that police officer's opinion regarding fault in an accident was an improper invasion of jury's province and that the officer's opinion testimony regarding speed was improper because the officer did not witness the accident", "sentence": "See State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994) (stating that a witness would not be allowed to offer an opinion as to whether or not a defendant acted in self-defense); see also State v. Larson, 389 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Minn.1986) (concluding that a lay witness’s letter stating that the witness believed defendant’s actions did not fall within statutory definition of crimi nal sexual conduct was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 701); Pierson v. Edstrom, 281 Minn. 102, 106, 160 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1968) (concluding that police officer’s opinion regarding fault in an accident was an improper invasion of jury’s province and that the officer’s opinion testimony regarding speed was improper because the officer did not witness the accident)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "2009 WL 6496484, at *2", "parenthetical": "noting the absence of a \"policy similarly affecting each plaintiffs case\"", "sentence": "See Disparte, 223 F.R.D. at 16 (finding the first prong of Rule 20(a) satisfied in the context of an employment discrimination claim where plaintiffs alleged that they were subject to a common policy of the defendant); cf. Battle, 2009 WL 6496484, at *2 (noting the absence of a “policy similarly affecting each plaintiffs case”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "223 F.R.D. 16, 16", "parenthetical": "finding the first prong of Rule 20(a) satisfied in the context of an employment discrimination claim where plaintiffs alleged that they were subject to a common policy of the defendant", "sentence": "See Disparte, 223 F.R.D. at 16 (finding the first prong of Rule 20(a) satisfied in the context of an employment discrimination claim where plaintiffs alleged that they were subject to a common policy of the defendant); cf. Battle, 2009 WL 6496484, at *2 (noting the absence of a “policy similarly affecting each plaintiffs case”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "635 F.2d 342, 348-49", "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "771 F.2d 1527, 1531", "parenthetical": "where district sought to change child's IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "771 F.2d 1527, 1531", "parenthetical": "where district sought to change child's IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "771 F.2d 1527, 1531", "parenthetical": "where district sought to change child's IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "771 F.2d 1527, 1531", "parenthetical": "where district sought to change child's IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "771 F.2d 1527, 1531", "parenthetical": "where district sought to change child's IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "771 F.2d 1527, 1531", "parenthetical": "where district sought to change child's IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "771 F.2d 1527, 1531", "parenthetical": "where district sought to change child's IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "635 F.2d 342, 348-49", "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "672 F.2d 321, 322", "parenthetical": "affirming district court's decision that the district had \"failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed\"", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "672 F.2d 321, 322", "parenthetical": "affirming district court's decision that the district had \"failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed\"", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "672 F.2d 321, 322", "parenthetical": "affirming district court's decision that the district had \"failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed\"", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "672 F.2d 321, 322", "parenthetical": "affirming district court's decision that the district had \"failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed\"", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "672 F.2d 321, 322", "parenthetical": "affirming district court's decision that the district had \"failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed\"", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "672 F.2d 321, 322", "parenthetical": "affirming district court's decision that the district had \"failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed\"", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "burden on district to question whether student's misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "672 F.2d 321, 322", "parenthetical": "affirming district court's decision that the district had \"failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed\"", "sentence": "See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C.Cir.1985) (where district sought to change child’s IEP, it had the burden of proving that the proposed placement complied with the requirements of the Act); Grymes v. Madden, 672 F.2d 321, 322 (3d Cir.1982) (affirming district court’s decision that the district had “failed to sustain its burden of proof that an appropriate public program existed”); Cf. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir.) (burden on district to question whether student’s misconduct is due to handicap because parents lack expertise to develop an appropriate IEP for their child), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1030, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "518 U.S. 81, 100", "parenthetical": "\"A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "448 F.3d 436, 456-57", "parenthetical": "reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "448 F.3d 436, 456-57", "parenthetical": "reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "448 F.3d 436, 456-57", "parenthetical": "reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "518 U.S. 81, 100", "parenthetical": "\"A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "131 F.3d 158, 160", "parenthetical": "reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court's decision was premised on legal error", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "131 F.3d 158, 160", "parenthetical": "reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court's decision was premised on legal error", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "131 F.3d 158, 160", "parenthetical": "reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court's decision was premised on legal error", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 456-57 (D.C.Cir.2006) (reviewing issuance of protective order de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court applied incorrect legal standard); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reviewing decision to unseal guilty plea de novo rather than for abuse of discretion because court’s decision was premised on legal error); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Here, the district court’s explanations indicate de novo review is appropriate." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "435 S.W.3d 234, 235", "parenthetical": "\"In actions for unintentional torts, the common law has long restricted recovery of purely economic damages unaccompanied by injury to the plaintiff or his property!.]\"", "sentence": "Eby Constr. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 235 (Tex.2014) (“In actions for unintentional torts, the common law has long restricted recovery of purely economic damages unaccompanied by injury to the plaintiff or his property!.]”); see also Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 415 (Tex.2011) (“[Pferties may be barred from recovering in negligence or strict liability for purely economic losses.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "354 S.W.3d 407, 415", "parenthetical": "\"[Pferties may be barred from recovering in negligence or strict liability for purely economic losses.\"", "sentence": "Eby Constr. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 235 (Tex.2014) (“In actions for unintentional torts, the common law has long restricted recovery of purely economic damages unaccompanied by injury to the plaintiff or his property!.]”); see also Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 415 (Tex.2011) (“[Pferties may be barred from recovering in negligence or strict liability for purely economic losses.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "111 S.Ct. 1264, 1264", "parenthetical": "holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that \" 'the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence' \"", "sentence": "Cf Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264 (holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that “ ‘the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence’ ”) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)); see also Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir.1990) (Trott, J., dissenting) (warning against the dangers of expansive judicial applications of the Miranda rules and urging the judiciary “to monitor carefully the costs of these rules as they are applied to the cases that come before us”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "918 F.2d 1387, 1394", "parenthetical": "warning against the dangers of expansive judicial applications of the Miranda rules and urging the judiciary \"to monitor carefully the costs of these rules as they are applied to the cases that come before us\"", "sentence": "Cf Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1264 (holding that even the admission of a coerced confession may be harmless error and noting that “ ‘the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence’ ”) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)); see also Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir.1990) (Trott, J., dissenting) (warning against the dangers of expansive judicial applications of the Miranda rules and urging the judiciary “to monitor carefully the costs of these rules as they are applied to the cases that come before us”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "210 Wis. 2d 597, 604", "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "210 Wis. 2d 597, 604", "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "210 Wis. 2d 597, 604", "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "196 Wis. 2d 817, 829", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "196 Wis. 2d 817, 829", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "196 Wis. 2d 817, 829", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"", "sentence": "See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 (1997) (\"The general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.\"); State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1995) (\"[T]he appellant [must] articulate each of its theories to the trial court to preserve its right to' appeal.\"); see also State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶ 11 n.2, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727 (noting that the rule requiring issue preservation, previously referred to as the \"waiver rule\" is more precisely labeled the \"forfeiture rule\")." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "683 F.3d 1378, 1378", "parenthetical": "holding that the plain meaning of the term \"the cost\" referred to in section 1722A(a)(2) of title 38, U.S.Code, was ambiguous", "sentence": "See Heino, 683 F.3d at 1378 (holding that the plain meaning of the term “the cost” referred to in section 1722A(a)(2) of title 38, U.S.Code, was ambiguous); see also Fountain v. Shinseki, 27 Vet.App. 258, 268 (2015) (holding that the phrase “[o]r~ ganic diseases of the nervous system,” contained in 38 U.S.C. § 1101(3) was ambiguous because the statute did not define the phrase)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "27 Vet.App. 258, 268", "parenthetical": "holding that the phrase \"[o]r~ ganic diseases of the nervous system,\" contained in 38 U.S.C. SS 1101(3) was ambiguous because the statute did not define the phrase", "sentence": "See Heino, 683 F.3d at 1378 (holding that the plain meaning of the term “the cost” referred to in section 1722A(a)(2) of title 38, U.S.Code, was ambiguous); see also Fountain v. Shinseki, 27 Vet.App. 258, 268 (2015) (holding that the phrase “[o]r~ ganic diseases of the nervous system,” contained in 38 U.S.C. § 1101(3) was ambiguous because the statute did not define the phrase)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.3d 649, 649", "parenthetical": "distinguishing cases where there was \"no information or evidence that suggested the vehicles in question contained contraband\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Mack v. City of Abilene, 461 F.3d 547, 553 (5th Cir.2006) (warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the vehicle, even though informant gave police probable cause to believe that there was contraband in. defendant’s other vehicle and apartment); United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 502 (1st Cir.1994) (warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no particular information indicating defendant was transporting drugs or. weapons at the time of the stop); see also Smith, 510 F.3d at 649 (distinguishing cases where there was “no information or evidence that suggested the vehicles in question contained contraband”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "461 F.3d 547, 553", "parenthetical": "warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the vehicle, even though informant gave police probable cause to believe that there was contraband in. defendant's other vehicle and apartment", "sentence": "See, e.g., Mack v. City of Abilene, 461 F.3d 547, 553 (5th Cir.2006) (warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the vehicle, even though informant gave police probable cause to believe that there was contraband in. defendant’s other vehicle and apartment); United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 502 (1st Cir.1994) (warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no particular information indicating defendant was transporting drugs or. weapons at the time of the stop); see also Smith, 510 F.3d at 649 (distinguishing cases where there was “no information or evidence that suggested the vehicles in question contained contraband”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "510 F.3d 649, 649", "parenthetical": "distinguishing cases where there was \"no information or evidence that suggested the vehicles in question contained contraband\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Mack v. City of Abilene, 461 F.3d 547, 553 (5th Cir.2006) (warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the vehicle, even though informant gave police probable cause to believe that there was contraband in. defendant’s other vehicle and apartment); United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 502 (1st Cir.1994) (warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no particular information indicating defendant was transporting drugs or. weapons at the time of the stop); see also Smith, 510 F.3d at 649 (distinguishing cases where there was “no information or evidence that suggested the vehicles in question contained contraband”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "13 F.3d 498, 502", "parenthetical": "warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no particular information indicating defendant was transporting drugs or. weapons at the time of the stop", "sentence": "See, e.g., Mack v. City of Abilene, 461 F.3d 547, 553 (5th Cir.2006) (warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the vehicle, even though informant gave police probable cause to believe that there was contraband in. defendant’s other vehicle and apartment); United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 502 (1st Cir.1994) (warrantless automobile search invalid because officers had no particular information indicating defendant was transporting drugs or. weapons at the time of the stop); see also Smith, 510 F.3d at 649 (distinguishing cases where there was “no information or evidence that suggested the vehicles in question contained contraband”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "431 So.2d 468, 473", "parenthetical": "recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach", "sentence": "Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) (recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975) (finding that witness who denied that defendant made incriminating statements could be impeached by showing that witness told third party that defendant made such statement; however, such statement was found to be admissible only for impeachment purposes); see also Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1076, 97 S.Ct. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 795 (1977) (defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "336 So.2d 213, 216-17", "parenthetical": "defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt", "sentence": "Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) (recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975) (finding that witness who denied that defendant made incriminating statements could be impeached by showing that witness told third party that defendant made such statement; however, such statement was found to be admissible only for impeachment purposes); see also Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1076, 97 S.Ct. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 795 (1977) (defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "431 So.2d 468, 473", "parenthetical": "recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach", "sentence": "Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) (recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975) (finding that witness who denied that defendant made incriminating statements could be impeached by showing that witness told third party that defendant made such statement; however, such statement was found to be admissible only for impeachment purposes); see also Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1076, 97 S.Ct. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 795 (1977) (defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt", "sentence": "Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) (recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975) (finding that witness who denied that defendant made incriminating statements could be impeached by showing that witness told third party that defendant made such statement; however, such statement was found to be admissible only for impeachment purposes); see also Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1076, 97 S.Ct. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 795 (1977) (defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt", "sentence": "Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) (recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975) (finding that witness who denied that defendant made incriminating statements could be impeached by showing that witness told third party that defendant made such statement; however, such statement was found to be admissible only for impeachment purposes); see also Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1076, 97 S.Ct. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 795 (1977) (defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "431 So.2d 468, 473", "parenthetical": "recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach", "sentence": "Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) (recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975) (finding that witness who denied that defendant made incriminating statements could be impeached by showing that witness told third party that defendant made such statement; however, such statement was found to be admissible only for impeachment purposes); see also Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1076, 97 S.Ct. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 795 (1977) (defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt", "sentence": "Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) (recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975) (finding that witness who denied that defendant made incriminating statements could be impeached by showing that witness told third party that defendant made such statement; however, such statement was found to be admissible only for impeachment purposes); see also Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1076, 97 S.Ct. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 795 (1977) (defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "431 So.2d 468, 473", "parenthetical": "recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach", "sentence": "Id.; see Davis v. State, 431 So.2d 468, 473 (Miss.1983) (recognizing that evidence of extra judicial statements by nonparty witness was admissable only to impeach); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1975) (finding that witness who denied that defendant made incriminating statements could be impeached by showing that witness told third party that defendant made such statement; however, such statement was found to be admissible only for impeachment purposes); see also Murphy v. State, 336 So.2d 213, 216-17 (Miss.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1076, 97 S.Ct. 819, 50 L.Ed.2d 795 (1977) (defendant entitled to instruction that prior inconsistent statement was not to be used as proof of guilt)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension", "sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 1997) (fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile); cf. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension); Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.1958) (two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue). Accordingly, with the exception of plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the court must dismiss each of plaintiffs’ claims against GM without prejudice for their failure to exhaust." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile", "sentence": "See Janik v. Buhrke Tech Int'l, 1997 WL 285763, Slip op. at 5 (N.D.Ill. May 22, 1997) (fact that union representative stated. to employee that union could do nothing did not establish that any attempt by employee to file grievance would have been futile); cf. Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (exhaustion not required where employees complained to representatives of union and called upon union to process grievance on her behalf yet union representatives refused and treated plaintiff-employees with condescension); Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.1958) (two employees excused from exhaustion where one filed grievance which union voted not to pursue). Accordingly, with the exception of plaintiffs’ fraud claim, the court must dismiss each of plaintiffs’ claims against GM without prejudice for their failure to exhaust." }