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The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that effective safeguards other than the Miranda warnings may be constitutionally permissible. In particular, it concluded that the presence of counsel at Mr. Vos's interrogation adequately substituted for Miranda warnings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative\"",
"sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"",
"sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)."
} | 3,997,938 | b |
The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that effective safeguards other than the Miranda warnings may be constitutionally permissible. In particular, it concluded that the presence of counsel at Mr. Vos's interrogation adequately substituted for Miranda warnings. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative\"",
"sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"",
"sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)."
} | 3,997,938 | b |
The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that effective safeguards other than the Miranda warnings may be constitutionally permissible. In particular, it concluded that the presence of counsel at Mr. Vos's interrogation adequately substituted for Miranda warnings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].\"",
"sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "757 F.Supp. 259, 264",
"parenthetical": "\"[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.\"",
"sentence": "Vos, 164 P.3d at 1263; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The presence of counsel ... would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination].”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 112-13, 116-17, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (“Miranda held that any confession obtained when not preceded by the required warnings or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence.... [L]anguage in Miranda suggests that the presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative”); United States v. Guariglia, 757 F.Supp. 259, 264 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (“[I]f Miranda warnings are meant to protect a defendant until he can consult counsel, ... they are not necessary when counsel is present.”); Com. v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 923 N.E.2d 58, 67 (2010), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 181, 178 L.Ed.2d 108 (2010)."
} | 3,997,938 | a |
Third, because the factual basis for ACCA sentencing enhancements was used to raise the statutory maximum sentence applicable to him, Hoover asserts these facts must be charged in the indictment and either proved to a jury or admitted by him. Hoover concedes this claim is foreclosed, and raises it only to preserve it for possible further review. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "550 U.S. 192, 213-14, n. 8",
"parenthetical": "holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes \"raises no Sixth Amendment issue\"",
"sentence": "See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 213-14, n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes “raises no Sixth Amendment issue”); see also United States v. White, 465 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir.2006) (“ ‘[Njeither the [ACCA] nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement’ ”.) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 F.3d 250, 254",
"parenthetical": "\" '[Njeither the [ACCA] nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement' \".",
"sentence": "See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 213-14, n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes “raises no Sixth Amendment issue”); see also United States v. White, 465 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir.2006) (“ ‘[Njeither the [ACCA] nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement’ ”.) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,821,019 | a |
Third, because the factual basis for ACCA sentencing enhancements was used to raise the statutory maximum sentence applicable to him, Hoover asserts these facts must be charged in the indictment and either proved to a jury or admitted by him. Hoover concedes this claim is foreclosed, and raises it only to preserve it for possible further review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 F.3d 250, 254",
"parenthetical": "\" '[Njeither the [ACCA] nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement' \".",
"sentence": "See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 213-14, n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes “raises no Sixth Amendment issue”); see also United States v. White, 465 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir.2006) (“ ‘[Njeither the [ACCA] nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement’ ”.) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes \"raises no Sixth Amendment issue\"",
"sentence": "See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 213-14, n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes “raises no Sixth Amendment issue”); see also United States v. White, 465 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir.2006) (“ ‘[Njeither the [ACCA] nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement’ ”.) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,821,019 | b |
Third, because the factual basis for ACCA sentencing enhancements was used to raise the statutory maximum sentence applicable to him, Hoover asserts these facts must be charged in the indictment and either proved to a jury or admitted by him. Hoover concedes this claim is foreclosed, and raises it only to preserve it for possible further review. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "465 F.3d 250, 254",
"parenthetical": "\" '[Njeither the [ACCA] nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement' \".",
"sentence": "See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 213-14, n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes “raises no Sixth Amendment issue”); see also United States v. White, 465 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir.2006) (“ ‘[Njeither the [ACCA] nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement’ ”.) (citation omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes \"raises no Sixth Amendment issue\"",
"sentence": "See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 213-14, n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding categorical approach to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony for ACCA purposes “raises no Sixth Amendment issue”); see also United States v. White, 465 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir.2006) (“ ‘[Njeither the [ACCA] nor the Constitution requires a jury finding on the existence of the three previous felony convictions required for the enhancement’ ”.) (citation omitted)."
} | 3,821,019 | b |
Defendant's Motion-I at 8. Mr. Douglas' argument makes an unwarranted logical leap from "innocuous" to "exculpatory"; the two words are not synonymous. Although the audiotape does not incriminate Mr. Douglas, it contains nothing which is favorable to or would exculpate him, as Brady requires. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "473 U.S. 667, 677",
"parenthetical": "interpreting \"exculpatory evidence\" as that which, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3381, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (interpreting \"exculpatory evidence\" as that which, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "794 F.Supp. 520, 520-21",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an audiotape which only corroborated witness' testimony did not automatically exculpate the defendant",
"sentence": "See also D’Ottavio v. United States, 794 F.Supp. 520, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (concluding that an audiotape which only corroborated witness’ testimony did not automatically exculpate the defendant)."
} | 7,848,905 | a |
Defendant's Motion-I at 8. Mr. Douglas' argument makes an unwarranted logical leap from "innocuous" to "exculpatory"; the two words are not synonymous. Although the audiotape does not incriminate Mr. Douglas, it contains nothing which is favorable to or would exculpate him, as Brady requires. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "794 F.Supp. 520, 520-21",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an audiotape which only corroborated witness' testimony did not automatically exculpate the defendant",
"sentence": "See also D’Ottavio v. United States, 794 F.Supp. 520, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (concluding that an audiotape which only corroborated witness’ testimony did not automatically exculpate the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 3375, 3381",
"parenthetical": "interpreting \"exculpatory evidence\" as that which, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3381, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (interpreting \"exculpatory evidence\" as that which, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial)."
} | 7,848,905 | b |
Defendant's Motion-I at 8. Mr. Douglas' argument makes an unwarranted logical leap from "innocuous" to "exculpatory"; the two words are not synonymous. Although the audiotape does not incriminate Mr. Douglas, it contains nothing which is favorable to or would exculpate him, as Brady requires. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "794 F.Supp. 520, 520-21",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an audiotape which only corroborated witness' testimony did not automatically exculpate the defendant",
"sentence": "See also D’Ottavio v. United States, 794 F.Supp. 520, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (concluding that an audiotape which only corroborated witness’ testimony did not automatically exculpate the defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interpreting \"exculpatory evidence\" as that which, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial",
"sentence": "See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3381, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (interpreting \"exculpatory evidence\" as that which, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial)."
} | 7,848,905 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "205 N.J. 438, 463",
"parenthetical": "barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "195 N.J. 493, 510",
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "205 N.J. 438, 463",
"parenthetical": "barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 N.J. 1, 81",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "205 N.J. 438, 463",
"parenthetical": "barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "205 N.J. 438, 463",
"parenthetical": "barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "195 N.J. 493, 510",
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 N.J. 1, 81",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "187 N.J. 24, 43",
"parenthetical": "declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "195 N.J. 493, 510",
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "187 N.J. 24, 43",
"parenthetical": "declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "187 N.J. 24, 43",
"parenthetical": "declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 N.J. 1, 81",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "187 N.J. 24, 43",
"parenthetical": "declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "195 N.J. 493, 510",
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 N.J. 1, 81",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "174 N.J. 583, 595",
"parenthetical": "noting that expert opinion on a witness' credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "195 N.J. 493, 510",
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "174 N.J. 583, 595",
"parenthetical": "noting that expert opinion on a witness' credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "174 N.J. 583, 595",
"parenthetical": "noting that expert opinion on a witness' credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 N.J. 1, 81",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "174 N.J. 583, 595",
"parenthetical": "noting that expert opinion on a witness' credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "195 N.J. 493, 510",
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that expert opinion on a witness' credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that expert opinion on a witness' credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that expert opinion on a witness' credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 N.J. 1, 81",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that expert opinion on a witness' credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 N.J. 13, 44",
"parenthetical": "noting that a judge's comments on the evidence \"must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "195 N.J. 493, 510",
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 N.J. 13, 44",
"parenthetical": "noting that a judge's comments on the evidence \"must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 N.J. 1, 81",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 N.J. 13, 44",
"parenthetical": "noting that a judge's comments on the evidence \"must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "106 N.J. 13, 44",
"parenthetical": "noting that a judge's comments on the evidence \"must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a judge's comments on the evidence \"must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "195 N.J. 493, 510",
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "directing that \"[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a judge's comments on the evidence \"must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "156 N.J. 1, 81",
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a judge's comments on the evidence \"must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | b |
Our Supreme Court has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State's evidence establishes guilt. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that a judge's comments on the evidence \"must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "explaining that \"[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness\"",
"sentence": "State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 463, 16 A.3d 332 (2011) (barring expert and lay opinion testimony on ultimate issues, which are the province of the jury); State v. Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 43, 898 A.2d 523 (2006) (declaring resolution of factual disputes about territorial jurisdiction, an element of a crime, to be within the province of the jury not the court); State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595, 811 A.2d 414 (2002) (noting that expert opinion on a witness’ credibility encroaches upon the province of the jury); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44, 524 A.2d 130 (1987) (noting that a judge’s comments on the evidence “must be designed to avoid unduly influencing or otherwise invading the province of the jury”); see also State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 510, 950 A.2d 889 (2008) (directing that “[a] prosecutor should neither argue facts that are not in the record, nor expressly or implicitly vouch for the credibility of the victim”); State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 81, 716 A.2d 395 (1998) (explaining that “[b]ecause it is exclusively within the province of the jury to find fact and evaluate witness credibility, a trial court may not vouch for the credibility of a witness”)."
} | 4,245,971 | a |
Majority Op. at 263. This might very well be true. Indeed, we might guess as to whether the court would have concluded that Watkins's conduct did in fact qualify for the enhancement. But I do not think we should affirm a defendant's sentence based on a hunch, even a strong one. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "647 F.3d 450, 459",
"parenthetical": "\"[Tjhis Court cannot assume, without unambiguous indication to the contrary, that the sentence would be the same absent the error.\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Feldman, 647 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir.2011) (“[Tjhis Court cannot assume, without unambiguous indication to the contrary, that the sentence would be the same absent the error.”); cf. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117-18 (2d Cir.2005) (“Perhaps in some cases an appellate court could make an educated guess as to the likely outcome of a remand, but that guess might be wrong____”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "397 F.3d 103, 117-18",
"parenthetical": "\"Perhaps in some cases an appellate court could make an educated guess as to the likely outcome of a remand, but that guess might be wrong____\"",
"sentence": "See United States v. Feldman, 647 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir.2011) (“[Tjhis Court cannot assume, without unambiguous indication to the contrary, that the sentence would be the same absent the error.”); cf. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117-18 (2d Cir.2005) (“Perhaps in some cases an appellate court could make an educated guess as to the likely outcome of a remand, but that guess might be wrong____”)."
} | 3,715,344 | a |
Subsequent appellate authority, however, excludes businesses from the definition of "consumer," stating unequivocally that a consumer is an individual who "purchases goods and services for personal, family or household use." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under SS 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents",
"sentence": "Sheth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 A.D.2d 72, 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000) (holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under § 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents); see also Cruz v. NYNEX Info. Res., 263 A.D.2d 285, 703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“In New York law, the term ‘consumer’ is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for ‘personal, family or household purposes.’”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In New York law, the term 'consumer' is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for 'personal, family or household purposes.'\"",
"sentence": "Sheth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 A.D.2d 72, 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000) (holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under § 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents); see also Cruz v. NYNEX Info. Res., 263 A.D.2d 285, 703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“In New York law, the term ‘consumer’ is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for ‘personal, family or household purposes.’”)."
} | 4,026,914 | a |
Subsequent appellate authority, however, excludes businesses from the definition of "consumer," stating unequivocally that a consumer is an individual who "purchases goods and services for personal, family or household use." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under SS 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents",
"sentence": "Sheth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 A.D.2d 72, 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000) (holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under § 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents); see also Cruz v. NYNEX Info. Res., 263 A.D.2d 285, 703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“In New York law, the term ‘consumer’ is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for ‘personal, family or household purposes.’”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107",
"parenthetical": "\"In New York law, the term 'consumer' is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for 'personal, family or household purposes.'\"",
"sentence": "Sheth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 A.D.2d 72, 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000) (holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under § 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents); see also Cruz v. NYNEX Info. Res., 263 A.D.2d 285, 703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“In New York law, the term ‘consumer’ is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for ‘personal, family or household purposes.’”)."
} | 4,026,914 | a |
Subsequent appellate authority, however, excludes businesses from the definition of "consumer," stating unequivocally that a consumer is an individual who "purchases goods and services for personal, family or household use." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75",
"parenthetical": "holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under SS 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents",
"sentence": "Sheth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 A.D.2d 72, 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000) (holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under § 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents); see also Cruz v. NYNEX Info. Res., 263 A.D.2d 285, 703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“In New York law, the term ‘consumer’ is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for ‘personal, family or household purposes.’”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"In New York law, the term 'consumer' is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for 'personal, family or household purposes.'\"",
"sentence": "Sheth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 A.D.2d 72, 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000) (holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under § 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents); see also Cruz v. NYNEX Info. Res., 263 A.D.2d 285, 703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“In New York law, the term ‘consumer’ is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for ‘personal, family or household purposes.’”)."
} | 4,026,914 | a |
Subsequent appellate authority, however, excludes businesses from the definition of "consumer," stating unequivocally that a consumer is an individual who "purchases goods and services for personal, family or household use." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107",
"parenthetical": "\"In New York law, the term 'consumer' is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for 'personal, family or household purposes.'\"",
"sentence": "Sheth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 A.D.2d 72, 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000) (holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under § 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents); see also Cruz v. NYNEX Info. Res., 263 A.D.2d 285, 703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“In New York law, the term ‘consumer’ is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for ‘personal, family or household purposes.’”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75",
"parenthetical": "holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under SS 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents",
"sentence": "Sheth v. New York Life Ins. Co., 273 A.D.2d 72, 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000) (holding that the challenged practices were not consumer-oriented under § 349 because they were directed only at prospective insurance agents); see also Cruz v. NYNEX Info. Res., 263 A.D.2d 285, 703 N.Y.S.2d 103, 107 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“In New York law, the term ‘consumer’ is consistently associated with an individual or natural person who purchases goods, services or property primarily for ‘personal, family or household purposes.’”)."
} | 4,026,914 | b |
Consequently, Coder has "no constitutional right to a clemency hearing." Likewise, given the absence of any protected interest in obtaining clemency, the failure to respond to a request for remission under Article 74 does not give rise to a due process violation or otherwise provide a valid basis for habeas corpus relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "519 F.2d 669, 673-675",
"parenthetical": "explaining that, to obtain habeas corpus relief, a petitioner must establish a violation of his constitutional or statutory rights and resulting prejudice",
"sentence": "See Ward v. Province, 283 Fed. Appx. 615, 617-618 (10th Cir.2008) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that his procedural due process rights were violated when the state parole board failed to respond to his clemency request, since the board “has discretion to decide whether to consider an offender for clemency” and, thus, “there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest”); see also Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669, 673-675 (4th Cir.1975) (explaining that, to obtain habeas corpus relief, a petitioner must establish a violation of his constitutional or statutory rights and resulting prejudice)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "283 Fed. Appx. 615, 617-618",
"parenthetical": "rejecting the petitioner's claim that his procedural due process rights were violated when the state parole board failed to respond to his clemency request, since the board \"has discretion to decide whether to consider an offender for clemency\" and, thus, \"there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest\"",
"sentence": "See Ward v. Province, 283 Fed. Appx. 615, 617-618 (10th Cir.2008) (rejecting the petitioner’s claim that his procedural due process rights were violated when the state parole board failed to respond to his clemency request, since the board “has discretion to decide whether to consider an offender for clemency” and, thus, “there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest”); see also Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669, 673-675 (4th Cir.1975) (explaining that, to obtain habeas corpus relief, a petitioner must establish a violation of his constitutional or statutory rights and resulting prejudice)."
} | 4,082,801 | b |
This is not to say that a compensation carrier is immune from all intentional torts. The workers' compensation scheme does not immunize a compensation carrier from wrongdoing which occurs independently of its claims handling. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "adjuster who fraudulently edited the statement of a claimant which results in the denial of benefits constitutes an intentional act independent of the handling of a workers' compensation claim",
"sentence": "Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So.2d 1048 (Fla.1992) (adjuster who fraudulently edited the statement of a claimant which results in the denial of benefits constitutes an intentional act independent of the handling of a workers’ compensation claim); cf. Associated Indus. of Fla. Prop. & Cas. Trust v. Smith, 633 So.2d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (it is not an independent tort for a work ers’ compensation carrier to withdraw benefits, as a wrongful termination can be remedied under the statute)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "it is not an independent tort for a work ers' compensation carrier to withdraw benefits, as a wrongful termination can be remedied under the statute",
"sentence": "Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So.2d 1048 (Fla.1992) (adjuster who fraudulently edited the statement of a claimant which results in the denial of benefits constitutes an intentional act independent of the handling of a workers’ compensation claim); cf. Associated Indus. of Fla. Prop. & Cas. Trust v. Smith, 633 So.2d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (it is not an independent tort for a work ers’ compensation carrier to withdraw benefits, as a wrongful termination can be remedied under the statute)."
} | 9,360,763 | a |
In reliance on Ingraham, the Ninth Circuit, as well as a number of other circuits, held that excessive and unreasonable corporal punishment of public school students violates the students' constitutional rights. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "841 F.2d 518, 520",
"parenthetical": "holding excessive force in public school context is a violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment",
"sentence": "See Koch, 96 F.3d at 1304 (concluding that teacher’s use of excessive force with high school students in 1990 and 1991 violated plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights); see also Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir.1988) (holding excessive force in public school context is a violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir.1988) (same); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir.1987) (same); Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir.1987) (same); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir.1980) (same)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "96 F.3d 1304, 1304",
"parenthetical": "concluding that teacher's use of excessive force with high school students in 1990 and 1991 violated plaintiffs' substantive due process rights",
"sentence": "See Koch, 96 F.3d at 1304 (concluding that teacher’s use of excessive force with high school students in 1990 and 1991 violated plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights); see also Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir.1988) (holding excessive force in public school context is a violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir.1988) (same); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir.1987) (same); Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir.1987) (same); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir.1980) (same)."
} | 3,843,088 | b |
Nevertheless, our appellate courts have not applied the Zerbst standard to the waiver of a defendant's right to raise a double jeopardy defense. Defendants have, therefore, been deemed to have waived the right to assert the defense . simply by failing to do so at various stages in the trial and appellate process. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "390 Mass. 472, 479",
"parenthetical": "waiver for failing to assert defense at de novo jury trial following bench trial",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dunnington, 390 Mass. 472, 479 (1983) (waiver for failing to assert defense at de novo jury trial following bench trial); Commonwealth v. Deeran, 397 Mass, at 142 (waiver for failing to assert defense in first motion for a new trial)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "27 Mass. App. Ct. 87, 87-88",
"parenthetical": "finding no waiver, but distinguishing the case on the ground that it involved successive prosecutions in different courts, thereby implicating issues similar to jurisdiction, which may be challenged at any time",
"sentence": "See also Poretta v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 763, 769 (1991) (permissibility of reprosecution following the defendant’s “successful motion for mistrial does not depend on whether the motion satisfied the ‘knowing, intelligent, and voluntary’ standard of Johnson v. Zerbst”). Cf. Commonwealth v. Norman, 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 87-88 (finding no waiver, but distinguishing the case on the ground that it involved successive prosecutions in different courts, thereby implicating issues similar to jurisdiction, which may be challenged at any time)."
} | 382,297 | a |
Where elaborate administrative enforcement is provided by the statute it is deemed unlikely that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." The enforcement of the statute thus is vested in the FCC. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 F.2d 393, 397",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. SS 315(a",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "667 F.2d 102, 116",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts \"may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.\"",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | 553,206 | b |
Where elaborate administrative enforcement is provided by the statute it is deemed unlikely that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." The enforcement of the statute thus is vested in the FCC. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "667 F.2d 102, 116",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts \"may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.\"",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 F.2d 83, 86",
"parenthetical": "no private cause of action under SS 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | 553,206 | a |
Where elaborate administrative enforcement is provided by the statute it is deemed unlikely that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." The enforcement of the statute thus is vested in the FCC. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "323 F.Supp. 799, 802",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under SS 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "667 F.2d 102, 116",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts \"may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.\"",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | 553,206 | b |
Where elaborate administrative enforcement is provided by the statute it is deemed unlikely that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." The enforcement of the statute thus is vested in the FCC. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 F.2d 393, 397",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. SS 315(a",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts \"may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.\"",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | 553,206 | b |
Where elaborate administrative enforcement is provided by the statute it is deemed unlikely that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." The enforcement of the statute thus is vested in the FCC. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts \"may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.\"",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 F.2d 83, 86",
"parenthetical": "no private cause of action under SS 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | 553,206 | a |
Where elaborate administrative enforcement is provided by the statute it is deemed unlikely that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." The enforcement of the statute thus is vested in the FCC. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "323 F.Supp. 799, 802",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under SS 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts \"may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.\"",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | 553,206 | b |
Where elaborate administrative enforcement is provided by the statute it is deemed unlikely that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." The enforcement of the statute thus is vested in the FCC. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts \"may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.\"",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 F.2d 393, 397",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. SS 315(a",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | 553,206 | a |
Where elaborate administrative enforcement is provided by the statute it is deemed unlikely that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." The enforcement of the statute thus is vested in the FCC. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "309 F.2d 83, 86",
"parenthetical": "no private cause of action under SS 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts \"may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.\"",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | 553,206 | b |
Where elaborate administrative enforcement is provided by the statute it is deemed unlikely that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." The enforcement of the statute thus is vested in the FCC. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "323 F.Supp. 799, 802",
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under SS 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts \"may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.\"",
"sentence": "See Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 116 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1448, 71 L.Ed.2d 661 (1982) (no private right of action under Public Broadcasting and Communications Acts because the courts “may not determine the disposition of controversies that Congress has committed to the discretion of the F.C.C.”); see also, Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (no private right of action may be implied under the fairness doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)); Daly v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 309 F.2d 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1962) (no private cause of action under § 315(a) of the Act providing for equal time for political candidates); Ahmad v. Levi, 414 F.Supp. 597, 603 (E.D.Pa.1976) (no private right of action under § 315(a) providing for equal time for conflicting opinions because the F.C.C. is the exclusive primary forum in which alleged violations of the Act may be vindicated); Post v. Payton, 323 F.Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.Y.1971) (no private right of action under § 312 of the Act because the Act did not confer any private rights); Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 301 F.Supp. 628, 631 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no private right of action under § 315(a) because no new rights created and no authorization for suit in federal courts); Gordon v. National Broadcasting Co., 287 F.Supp. 452, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.1968) (F.C.C. is exclusive forum for remedy)."
} | 553,206 | b |
Under section 39-11-128, C.R.S$.2015, a county treasurer must make "diligent inquiry" into information available in county records. Neither Siddoway nor White Cap Mining Co. say that a treasurer has no duty to search county records; they merely state that a treasurer need not search beyond county records to ascertain taxpayers' addresses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 P.2d 447, 450",
"parenthetical": "interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way",
"sentence": "See Siddoway, 189 Colo. at 176, 538 P.2d at 113 (holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records); White Cap Mining Co., 115 Colo. at 408, 174 P.2d at 733 (stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records); see also Schmidt v. Langel, 874 P.2d 447, 450 (Colo.App.1993) (interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "189 Colo. 176, 176",
"parenthetical": "holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records",
"sentence": "See Siddoway, 189 Colo. at 176, 538 P.2d at 113 (holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records); White Cap Mining Co., 115 Colo. at 408, 174 P.2d at 733 (stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records); see also Schmidt v. Langel, 874 P.2d 447, 450 (Colo.App.1993) (interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way)."
} | 6,835,561 | b |
Under section 39-11-128, C.R.S$.2015, a county treasurer must make "diligent inquiry" into information available in county records. Neither Siddoway nor White Cap Mining Co. say that a treasurer has no duty to search county records; they merely state that a treasurer need not search beyond county records to ascertain taxpayers' addresses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 P.2d 447, 450",
"parenthetical": "interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way",
"sentence": "See Siddoway, 189 Colo. at 176, 538 P.2d at 113 (holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records); White Cap Mining Co., 115 Colo. at 408, 174 P.2d at 733 (stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records); see also Schmidt v. Langel, 874 P.2d 447, 450 (Colo.App.1993) (interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "538 P.2d 113, 113",
"parenthetical": "holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records",
"sentence": "See Siddoway, 189 Colo. at 176, 538 P.2d at 113 (holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records); White Cap Mining Co., 115 Colo. at 408, 174 P.2d at 733 (stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records); see also Schmidt v. Langel, 874 P.2d 447, 450 (Colo.App.1993) (interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way)."
} | 6,835,561 | b |
Under section 39-11-128, C.R.S$.2015, a county treasurer must make "diligent inquiry" into information available in county records. Neither Siddoway nor White Cap Mining Co. say that a treasurer has no duty to search county records; they merely state that a treasurer need not search beyond county records to ascertain taxpayers' addresses. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 P.2d 447, 450",
"parenthetical": "interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way",
"sentence": "See Siddoway, 189 Colo. at 176, 538 P.2d at 113 (holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records); White Cap Mining Co., 115 Colo. at 408, 174 P.2d at 733 (stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records); see also Schmidt v. Langel, 874 P.2d 447, 450 (Colo.App.1993) (interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "115 Colo. 408, 408",
"parenthetical": "stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records",
"sentence": "See Siddoway, 189 Colo. at 176, 538 P.2d at 113 (holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records); White Cap Mining Co., 115 Colo. at 408, 174 P.2d at 733 (stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records); see also Schmidt v. Langel, 874 P.2d 447, 450 (Colo.App.1993) (interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way)."
} | 6,835,561 | b |
Under section 39-11-128, C.R.S$.2015, a county treasurer must make "diligent inquiry" into information available in county records. Neither Siddoway nor White Cap Mining Co. say that a treasurer has no duty to search county records; they merely state that a treasurer need not search beyond county records to ascertain taxpayers' addresses. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "174 P.2d 733, 733",
"parenthetical": "stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records",
"sentence": "See Siddoway, 189 Colo. at 176, 538 P.2d at 113 (holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records); White Cap Mining Co., 115 Colo. at 408, 174 P.2d at 733 (stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records); see also Schmidt v. Langel, 874 P.2d 447, 450 (Colo.App.1993) (interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "874 P.2d 447, 450",
"parenthetical": "interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way",
"sentence": "See Siddoway, 189 Colo. at 176, 538 P.2d at 113 (holding that a treasurer need not search miscellaneous personal correspondence after an address had been found in the county's records); White Cap Mining Co., 115 Colo. at 408, 174 P.2d at 733 (stating that a treasurer need not search secretary of state records upon failure to locate an address in county records); see also Schmidt v. Langel, 874 P.2d 447, 450 (Colo.App.1993) (interpreting Siddoway and White Cap Mining Co. in this way)."
} | 6,835,561 | a |
The relevant record thus contains and consists of Nosa's own assertion that no promises or inducements led to his guilty plea, and thus his bare allegation to the contrary neither meets a minimum threshold of credibility nor overcomes the presumption the record truly reflects the facts. Therefore, and assuming Nosa has preserved error on this claim, we find it to be without merit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "708 N.W.2d 66, 70-71",
"parenthetical": "stating district court could have summarily dismissed application for postconviction relief where applicant's allegation directly contradicted the overwhelming record",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Foster v. State, 395 N.W.2d 637, 638 (Iowa 1986) (holding applicant for postconviction relief not entitled to hearing where allegation directly contradicted record and minimum threshold of credibility not met); State v. Boge, 252 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Iowa 1977) (same); see also Wise v. State, 708 N.W.2d 66, 70-71 (Iowa 2006) (stating district court could have summarily dismissed application for postconviction relief where applicant’s allegation directly contradicted the overwhelming record)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "395 N.W.2d 637, 638",
"parenthetical": "holding applicant for postconviction relief not entitled to hearing where allegation directly contradicted record and minimum threshold of credibility not met",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Foster v. State, 395 N.W.2d 637, 638 (Iowa 1986) (holding applicant for postconviction relief not entitled to hearing where allegation directly contradicted record and minimum threshold of credibility not met); State v. Boge, 252 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Iowa 1977) (same); see also Wise v. State, 708 N.W.2d 66, 70-71 (Iowa 2006) (stating district court could have summarily dismissed application for postconviction relief where applicant’s allegation directly contradicted the overwhelming record)."
} | 8,352,825 | b |
P44 Furthermore, the trial court erred when it relied on the Golladay standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting alternative means applicable in a criminal case to the jury's verdict in a civil case. In a criminal case, proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy due process; in a civil case, a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. It is frequently said that a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 Wn.2d 276, 284",
"parenthetical": "a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 284, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007) (a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard); Gillett v. Conner, 132 Wn."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law",
"sentence": "But see State v. Hatley, 41 Wn. App. 789, 793 n.2, 706 P.2d 1083 (abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1024 (1985)."
} | 5,739,293 | a |
P44 Furthermore, the trial court erred when it relied on the Golladay standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting alternative means applicable in a criminal case to the jury's verdict in a civil case. In a criminal case, proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy due process; in a civil case, a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. It is frequently said that a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong law. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law",
"sentence": "But see State v. Hatley, 41 Wn. App. 789, 793 n.2, 706 P.2d 1083 (abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1024 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 Wn.2d 276, 284",
"parenthetical": "a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 284, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007) (a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard); Gillett v. Conner, 132 Wn."
} | 5,739,293 | b |
P44 Furthermore, the trial court erred when it relied on the Golladay standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting alternative means applicable in a criminal case to the jury's verdict in a civil case. In a criminal case, proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy due process; in a civil case, a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. It is frequently said that a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "161 Wn.2d 276, 284",
"parenthetical": "a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 284, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007) (a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard); Gillett v. Conner, 132 Wn."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law",
"sentence": "But see State v. Hatley, 41 Wn. App. 789, 793 n.2, 706 P.2d 1083 (abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1024 (1985)."
} | 5,739,293 | a |
P44 Furthermore, the trial court erred when it relied on the Golladay standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting alternative means applicable in a criminal case to the jury's verdict in a civil case. In a criminal case, proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy due process; in a civil case, a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. It is frequently said that a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong law. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law",
"sentence": "But see State v. Hatley, 41 Wn. App. 789, 793 n.2, 706 P.2d 1083 (abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1024 (1985)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 284, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007) (a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard); Gillett v. Conner, 132 Wn."
} | 5,739,293 | b |
P44 Furthermore, the trial court erred when it relied on the Golladay standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting alternative means applicable in a criminal case to the jury's verdict in a civil case. In a criminal case, proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy due process; in a civil case, a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. It is frequently said that a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 284, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007) (a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard); Gillett v. Conner, 132 Wn."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law",
"sentence": "But see State v. Hatley, 41 Wn. App. 789, 793 n.2, 706 P.2d 1083 (abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1024 (1985)."
} | 5,739,293 | a |
P44 Furthermore, the trial court erred when it relied on the Golladay standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting alternative means applicable in a criminal case to the jury's verdict in a civil case. In a criminal case, proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy due process; in a civil case, a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. It is frequently said that a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 284, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007) (a trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard); Gillett v. Conner, 132 Wn."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law",
"sentence": "But see State v. Hatley, 41 Wn. App. 789, 793 n.2, 706 P.2d 1083 (abuse of discretion standard does not apply when the trial court erred in applying the law), review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1024 (1985)."
} | 5,739,293 | a |
The Court finds that these disclosures, following the SEC's initiation of its enforcement action, potentially revealed new information "addressed to," and "revealing to the market the truth regarding," the alleged misstatements and omissions. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "731 F.Supp.2d 710, 710",
"parenthetical": "\"Where a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is based on an affirmative defense, the complaint must show on its face that the claim is barred by the defense.\"",
"sentence": "See, Azzolini, 2005 WL 3448053, at *6 (noting that “the lapse of time between the behavior complained, of and the loss is a factor to consider in determining whether the loss causation requirement has been met” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)); In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 634 F.Supp.2d 419, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that an assessment of defendants’ negative causation arguments was best left for summary judgment); see also Local 295, 731 F.Supp.2d at 710 (“Where a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is based on an affirmative defense, the complaint must show on its face that the claim is barred by the defense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2005 WL 3448053, at *6",
"parenthetical": "noting that \"the lapse of time between the behavior complained, of and the loss is a factor to consider in determining whether the loss causation requirement has been met\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See, Azzolini, 2005 WL 3448053, at *6 (noting that “the lapse of time between the behavior complained, of and the loss is a factor to consider in determining whether the loss causation requirement has been met” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)); In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 634 F.Supp.2d 419, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that an assessment of defendants’ negative causation arguments was best left for summary judgment); see also Local 295, 731 F.Supp.2d at 710 (“Where a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is based on an affirmative defense, the complaint must show on its face that the claim is barred by the defense.”)."
} | 12,418,377 | b |
The Court finds that these disclosures, following the SEC's initiation of its enforcement action, potentially revealed new information "addressed to," and "revealing to the market the truth regarding," the alleged misstatements and omissions. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "634 F.Supp.2d 419, 444",
"parenthetical": "concluding that an assessment of defendants' negative causation arguments was best left for summary judgment",
"sentence": "See, Azzolini, 2005 WL 3448053, at *6 (noting that “the lapse of time between the behavior complained, of and the loss is a factor to consider in determining whether the loss causation requirement has been met” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)); In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 634 F.Supp.2d 419, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that an assessment of defendants’ negative causation arguments was best left for summary judgment); see also Local 295, 731 F.Supp.2d at 710 (“Where a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is based on an affirmative defense, the complaint must show on its face that the claim is barred by the defense.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "731 F.Supp.2d 710, 710",
"parenthetical": "\"Where a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is based on an affirmative defense, the complaint must show on its face that the claim is barred by the defense.\"",
"sentence": "See, Azzolini, 2005 WL 3448053, at *6 (noting that “the lapse of time between the behavior complained, of and the loss is a factor to consider in determining whether the loss causation requirement has been met” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)); In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 634 F.Supp.2d 419, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that an assessment of defendants’ negative causation arguments was best left for summary judgment); see also Local 295, 731 F.Supp.2d at 710 (“Where a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is based on an affirmative defense, the complaint must show on its face that the claim is barred by the defense.”)."
} | 12,418,377 | a |
We also reject Singh's contention that the BIA did not adequately consider his evidence. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "597 F.3d 983, 990",
"parenthetical": "the BIA \"does not have to write an exegesis on every contention\"",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir.2006) (finding petitioner had not overcome the presumption that the BIA reviewed the record); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.2010) (the BIA “does not have to write an exegesis on every contention”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 592, 603",
"parenthetical": "finding petitioner had not overcome the presumption that the BIA reviewed the record",
"sentence": "See Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir.2006) (finding petitioner had not overcome the presumption that the BIA reviewed the record); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.2010) (the BIA “does not have to write an exegesis on every contention”)."
} | 3,985,876 | b |
Even after the MMS served Plaintiffs with an administrative subpoena, Plaintiffs still did not suffer any immediate or substantial effect for refusing to comply with it. Any "consequences" Plaintiffs claim to have suffered or to be suffering as a result of their procedural wrangling with Defendants do not constitute direct and immediate impacts because they do not impose any appreciable obligations upon their daily business. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 1110, 1110-11",
"parenthetical": "stating that agency's action determining jurisdiction only imposed obligation to respond to agency's further inquiries",
"sentence": "See CEC Energy, 891 F.2d at 1110-11 (stating that agency’s action determining jurisdiction only imposed obligation to respond to agency’s further inquiries); cf. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 243, 101 S.Ct. 488 (determining that agency’s issuance of complaint had no impact “other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "449 U.S. 243, 243",
"parenthetical": "determining that agency's issuance of complaint had no impact \"other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation\"",
"sentence": "See CEC Energy, 891 F.2d at 1110-11 (stating that agency’s action determining jurisdiction only imposed obligation to respond to agency’s further inquiries); cf. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 243, 101 S.Ct. 488 (determining that agency’s issuance of complaint had no impact “other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation”)."
} | 11,670,189 | a |
Even after the MMS served Plaintiffs with an administrative subpoena, Plaintiffs still did not suffer any immediate or substantial effect for refusing to comply with it. Any "consequences" Plaintiffs claim to have suffered or to be suffering as a result of their procedural wrangling with Defendants do not constitute direct and immediate impacts because they do not impose any appreciable obligations upon their daily business. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "891 F.2d 1110, 1110-11",
"parenthetical": "stating that agency's action determining jurisdiction only imposed obligation to respond to agency's further inquiries",
"sentence": "See CEC Energy, 891 F.2d at 1110-11 (stating that agency’s action determining jurisdiction only imposed obligation to respond to agency’s further inquiries); cf. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 243, 101 S.Ct. 488 (determining that agency’s issuance of complaint had no impact “other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determining that agency's issuance of complaint had no impact \"other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation\"",
"sentence": "See CEC Energy, 891 F.2d at 1110-11 (stating that agency’s action determining jurisdiction only imposed obligation to respond to agency’s further inquiries); cf. Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 243, 101 S.Ct. 488 (determining that agency’s issuance of complaint had no impact “other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation”)."
} | 11,670,189 | a |
Second, to be considered an alternative, the alternative design must simply provide "the same or similar functional capabilities." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "190 F.3d 1360, 1368",
"parenthetical": "explaining that to be patentable, there cannot only be one \"possible [ornamental] form of the article that could perform its function\"",
"sentence": "Rosco, 304 F.3d at 1378 (reversing functionality finding because alternative mirror designs could still provide a similar level of performance); see also Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Intern., Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed.Cir.1999) (explaining that to be patentable, there cannot only be one “possible [ornamental] form of the article that could perform its function”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "304 F.3d 1378, 1378",
"parenthetical": "reversing functionality finding because alternative mirror designs could still provide a similar level of performance",
"sentence": "Rosco, 304 F.3d at 1378 (reversing functionality finding because alternative mirror designs could still provide a similar level of performance); see also Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Intern., Inc., 190 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed.Cir.1999) (explaining that to be patentable, there cannot only be one “possible [ornamental] form of the article that could perform its function”)."
} | 5,769,009 | b |
P 21 In providing all parties with full disclosure, the fiduciary meets its obligation to act with the utmost loyalty and integrity. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "23 Ariz.App. 318, 321",
"parenthetical": "holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without seller's knowledge and consent",
"sentence": "Id. at 502, 573 P.2d at 902 (“The undertaking of such a dual representation of conflicting interests, without the knowledge or approval of the competing principals, would, of course, not be countenanced.”); see also Warren v. Mangels Realty, 23 Ariz.App. 318, 321, 533 P.2d 78, 81 (1975) (holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without seller’s knowledge and consent)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "573 P.2d 902, 902",
"parenthetical": "\"The undertaking of such a dual representation of conflicting interests, without the knowledge or approval of the competing principals, would, of course, not be countenanced.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 502, 573 P.2d at 902 (“The undertaking of such a dual representation of conflicting interests, without the knowledge or approval of the competing principals, would, of course, not be countenanced.”); see also Warren v. Mangels Realty, 23 Ariz.App. 318, 321, 533 P.2d 78, 81 (1975) (holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without seller’s knowledge and consent)."
} | 208,648 | b |
P 21 In providing all parties with full disclosure, the fiduciary meets its obligation to act with the utmost loyalty and integrity. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "573 P.2d 902, 902",
"parenthetical": "\"The undertaking of such a dual representation of conflicting interests, without the knowledge or approval of the competing principals, would, of course, not be countenanced.\"",
"sentence": "Id. at 502, 573 P.2d at 902 (“The undertaking of such a dual representation of conflicting interests, without the knowledge or approval of the competing principals, would, of course, not be countenanced.”); see also Warren v. Mangels Realty, 23 Ariz.App. 318, 321, 533 P.2d 78, 81 (1975) (holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without seller’s knowledge and consent)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "533 P.2d 78, 81",
"parenthetical": "holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without seller's knowledge and consent",
"sentence": "Id. at 502, 573 P.2d at 902 (“The undertaking of such a dual representation of conflicting interests, without the knowledge or approval of the competing principals, would, of course, not be countenanced.”); see also Warren v. Mangels Realty, 23 Ariz.App. 318, 321, 533 P.2d 78, 81 (1975) (holding that broker who represents seller cannot represent buyer in purchase of property from seller without seller’s knowledge and consent)."
} | 208,648 | a |
Because the FDIC concedes Jencks's applicability in this case, Landry has established a prima facie violation if the documents in question cover the same territory as the examiners' testimony. After examining the documents and the examiners' testimony we find that several of them do so. Even so, a privilege might beat the Jencks claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that, in a license revocation hearing in which the agency had adopted the Jencks Act, a witness's opinions in a report that formed part of the deliberative process would be protected from Jencks Act disclosure",
"sentence": "See Norinsberg Corp. v. USDA, 47 F.3d 1224, 1229 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1995) (presuming that, in a license revocation hearing in which the agency had adopted the Jencks Act, a witness’s opinions in a report that formed part of the deliberative process would be protected from Jencks Act disclosure); see also Communist Party, 254 F.2d at 327. But see Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (noting that criminal actions must be dismissed when the government chooses not to comply with a court order to produce relevant statements or' reports on the ground of privilege). But the FDIC here makes no claim that privilege defeats its Jencks obligations— though the ALJ did."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "254 F.2d 327, 327",
"parenthetical": "noting that criminal actions must be dismissed when the government chooses not to comply with a court order to produce relevant statements or' reports on the ground of privilege",
"sentence": "See Norinsberg Corp. v. USDA, 47 F.3d 1224, 1229 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1995) (presuming that, in a license revocation hearing in which the agency had adopted the Jencks Act, a witness’s opinions in a report that formed part of the deliberative process would be protected from Jencks Act disclosure); see also Communist Party, 254 F.2d at 327. But see Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (noting that criminal actions must be dismissed when the government chooses not to comply with a court order to produce relevant statements or' reports on the ground of privilege). But the FDIC here makes no claim that privilege defeats its Jencks obligations— though the ALJ did."
} | 3,672,907 | a |
Because the FDIC concedes Jencks's applicability in this case, Landry has established a prima facie violation if the documents in question cover the same territory as the examiners' testimony. After examining the documents and the examiners' testimony we find that several of them do so. Even so, a privilege might beat the Jencks claim. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that, in a license revocation hearing in which the agency had adopted the Jencks Act, a witness's opinions in a report that formed part of the deliberative process would be protected from Jencks Act disclosure",
"sentence": "See Norinsberg Corp. v. USDA, 47 F.3d 1224, 1229 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1995) (presuming that, in a license revocation hearing in which the agency had adopted the Jencks Act, a witness’s opinions in a report that formed part of the deliberative process would be protected from Jencks Act disclosure); see also Communist Party, 254 F.2d at 327. But see Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (noting that criminal actions must be dismissed when the government chooses not to comply with a court order to produce relevant statements or' reports on the ground of privilege). But the FDIC here makes no claim that privilege defeats its Jencks obligations— though the ALJ did."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 U.S. 671, 671-72",
"parenthetical": "noting that criminal actions must be dismissed when the government chooses not to comply with a court order to produce relevant statements or' reports on the ground of privilege",
"sentence": "See Norinsberg Corp. v. USDA, 47 F.3d 1224, 1229 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1995) (presuming that, in a license revocation hearing in which the agency had adopted the Jencks Act, a witness’s opinions in a report that formed part of the deliberative process would be protected from Jencks Act disclosure); see also Communist Party, 254 F.2d at 327. But see Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (noting that criminal actions must be dismissed when the government chooses not to comply with a court order to produce relevant statements or' reports on the ground of privilege). But the FDIC here makes no claim that privilege defeats its Jencks obligations— though the ALJ did."
} | 3,672,907 | a |
Because the FDIC concedes Jencks's applicability in this case, Landry has established a prima facie violation if the documents in question cover the same territory as the examiners' testimony. After examining the documents and the examiners' testimony we find that several of them do so. Even so, a privilege might beat the Jencks claim. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that criminal actions must be dismissed when the government chooses not to comply with a court order to produce relevant statements or' reports on the ground of privilege",
"sentence": "See Norinsberg Corp. v. USDA, 47 F.3d 1224, 1229 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1995) (presuming that, in a license revocation hearing in which the agency had adopted the Jencks Act, a witness’s opinions in a report that formed part of the deliberative process would be protected from Jencks Act disclosure); see also Communist Party, 254 F.2d at 327. But see Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (noting that criminal actions must be dismissed when the government chooses not to comply with a court order to produce relevant statements or' reports on the ground of privilege). But the FDIC here makes no claim that privilege defeats its Jencks obligations— though the ALJ did."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "presuming that, in a license revocation hearing in which the agency had adopted the Jencks Act, a witness's opinions in a report that formed part of the deliberative process would be protected from Jencks Act disclosure",
"sentence": "See Norinsberg Corp. v. USDA, 47 F.3d 1224, 1229 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1995) (presuming that, in a license revocation hearing in which the agency had adopted the Jencks Act, a witness’s opinions in a report that formed part of the deliberative process would be protected from Jencks Act disclosure); see also Communist Party, 254 F.2d at 327. But see Jencks, 353 U.S. at 671-72, 77 S.Ct. 1007 (noting that criminal actions must be dismissed when the government chooses not to comply with a court order to produce relevant statements or' reports on the ground of privilege). But the FDIC here makes no claim that privilege defeats its Jencks obligations— though the ALJ did."
} | 3,672,907 | b |
. In assault cases, the Court and the Court of Appeals have held that indictments were not defective even where words from both the simple and aggravated assault subsections were used. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "349 So.2d 1066, 1067",
"parenthetical": "defendant need only compare the indictment with the statute to know he was charged with aggravated assault rather than simple assault",
"sentence": "See Anthony v. State, 349 So.2d 1066, 1067 (Miss.1977) (defendant need only compare the indictment with the statute to know he was charged with aggravated assault rather than simple assault); Toliver v. State, 337 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss.1976) (it was clear that defendant was charged only with simple assault, even though indictment included language from both simple and aggravated assault subsections)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "910 So.2d 1174, 1179",
"parenthetical": "indictment that used \"phraseology from both subsections\" was not defective",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. State, 910 So.2d 1174, 1179 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (indictment that used “phraseology from both subsections” was not defective)."
} | 6,926,298 | a |
. In assault cases, the Court and the Court of Appeals have held that indictments were not defective even where words from both the simple and aggravated assault subsections were used. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "910 So.2d 1174, 1179",
"parenthetical": "indictment that used \"phraseology from both subsections\" was not defective",
"sentence": "See also Johnson v. State, 910 So.2d 1174, 1179 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (indictment that used “phraseology from both subsections” was not defective)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "337 So.2d 1274, 1276",
"parenthetical": "it was clear that defendant was charged only with simple assault, even though indictment included language from both simple and aggravated assault subsections",
"sentence": "See Anthony v. State, 349 So.2d 1066, 1067 (Miss.1977) (defendant need only compare the indictment with the statute to know he was charged with aggravated assault rather than simple assault); Toliver v. State, 337 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss.1976) (it was clear that defendant was charged only with simple assault, even though indictment included language from both simple and aggravated assault subsections)."
} | 6,926,298 | b |
Appellate courts have been quite careful to distinguish between the types of state action which are affirmative or official and those which are passive or dormant. The second district held in First Federal that where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue to collect taxes was the sending of a "formal notice assessment and demand" for delinquent taxes specifying the amount and date due, that such "notice" was a mere naked demand rather than "official action" and the "threat" was contingent and anticipatory rather than real and imminent. Accordingly, the First Federal court determined that in the absence of affirmative or official action to enforce the demand, venue would lie only in the county where the state agency maintains its. official headquarters. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where Department of Revenue gave taxpayers written notice that a tax warrant and execution had been issued against them and delivered to area supervisor, and warrant was subsequently recorded in official records of county in which taxpayers resided, Department of Revenue's actions were of such nature as to require that taxpayers be allowed to bring suit in county of their residence against the Department of Revenue",
"sentence": "Cf. Swinscoe v. State, 320 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 337 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1976) (where Department of Revenue gave taxpayers written notice that a tax warrant and execution had been issued against them and delivered to area supervisor, and warrant was subsequently recorded in official records of county in which taxpayers resided, Department of Revenue’s actions were of such nature as to require that taxpayers be allowed to bring suit in county of their residence against the Department of Revenue); Department of Revenue v. Arvida Corp., 315 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 336 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1976) (Department of Revenue efforts to collect allegedly past due intangible taxes included a notice assessment which stated that “tax warrant and execution had in truth and in fact already issued,” constituted official action that was both real and imminent, justifying suit in a county other than situs of Department’s official headquarters)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department",
"sentence": "See also Straughn v. G.J.M., Inc., 344 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department); Department of Revenue v. Crisp, 337 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 346 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1977) (notice of assessment of additional documentary stamp taxes and demand for payment, unaccompanied by further action, did not imminently threaten taxpayers’ due process and equal protection rights and was not an imminent “attempt” to seize and sell property of taxpayer; thus, proper venue of taxpayer’s action for declaratory judgment against Department of Revenue was Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department)."
} | 12,023,034 | b |
Appellate courts have been quite careful to distinguish between the types of state action which are affirmative or official and those which are passive or dormant. The second district held in First Federal that where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue to collect taxes was the sending of a "formal notice assessment and demand" for delinquent taxes specifying the amount and date due, that such "notice" was a mere naked demand rather than "official action" and the "threat" was contingent and anticipatory rather than real and imminent. Accordingly, the First Federal court determined that in the absence of affirmative or official action to enforce the demand, venue would lie only in the county where the state agency maintains its. official headquarters. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department",
"sentence": "See also Straughn v. G.J.M., Inc., 344 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department); Department of Revenue v. Crisp, 337 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 346 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1977) (notice of assessment of additional documentary stamp taxes and demand for payment, unaccompanied by further action, did not imminently threaten taxpayers’ due process and equal protection rights and was not an imminent “attempt” to seize and sell property of taxpayer; thus, proper venue of taxpayer’s action for declaratory judgment against Department of Revenue was Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where Department of Revenue gave taxpayers written notice that a tax warrant and execution had been issued against them and delivered to area supervisor, and warrant was subsequently recorded in official records of county in which taxpayers resided, Department of Revenue's actions were of such nature as to require that taxpayers be allowed to bring suit in county of their residence against the Department of Revenue",
"sentence": "Cf. Swinscoe v. State, 320 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 337 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1976) (where Department of Revenue gave taxpayers written notice that a tax warrant and execution had been issued against them and delivered to area supervisor, and warrant was subsequently recorded in official records of county in which taxpayers resided, Department of Revenue’s actions were of such nature as to require that taxpayers be allowed to bring suit in county of their residence against the Department of Revenue); Department of Revenue v. Arvida Corp., 315 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 336 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1976) (Department of Revenue efforts to collect allegedly past due intangible taxes included a notice assessment which stated that “tax warrant and execution had in truth and in fact already issued,” constituted official action that was both real and imminent, justifying suit in a county other than situs of Department’s official headquarters)."
} | 12,023,034 | a |
Appellate courts have been quite careful to distinguish between the types of state action which are affirmative or official and those which are passive or dormant. The second district held in First Federal that where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue to collect taxes was the sending of a "formal notice assessment and demand" for delinquent taxes specifying the amount and date due, that such "notice" was a mere naked demand rather than "official action" and the "threat" was contingent and anticipatory rather than real and imminent. Accordingly, the First Federal court determined that in the absence of affirmative or official action to enforce the demand, venue would lie only in the county where the state agency maintains its. official headquarters. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Department of Revenue efforts to collect allegedly past due intangible taxes included a notice assessment which stated that \"tax warrant and execution had in truth and in fact already issued,\" constituted official action that was both real and imminent, justifying suit in a county other than situs of Department's official headquarters",
"sentence": "Cf. Swinscoe v. State, 320 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 337 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1976) (where Department of Revenue gave taxpayers written notice that a tax warrant and execution had been issued against them and delivered to area supervisor, and warrant was subsequently recorded in official records of county in which taxpayers resided, Department of Revenue’s actions were of such nature as to require that taxpayers be allowed to bring suit in county of their residence against the Department of Revenue); Department of Revenue v. Arvida Corp., 315 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 336 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1976) (Department of Revenue efforts to collect allegedly past due intangible taxes included a notice assessment which stated that “tax warrant and execution had in truth and in fact already issued,” constituted official action that was both real and imminent, justifying suit in a county other than situs of Department’s official headquarters)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department",
"sentence": "See also Straughn v. G.J.M., Inc., 344 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department); Department of Revenue v. Crisp, 337 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 346 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1977) (notice of assessment of additional documentary stamp taxes and demand for payment, unaccompanied by further action, did not imminently threaten taxpayers’ due process and equal protection rights and was not an imminent “attempt” to seize and sell property of taxpayer; thus, proper venue of taxpayer’s action for declaratory judgment against Department of Revenue was Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department)."
} | 12,023,034 | b |
Appellate courts have been quite careful to distinguish between the types of state action which are affirmative or official and those which are passive or dormant. The second district held in First Federal that where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue to collect taxes was the sending of a "formal notice assessment and demand" for delinquent taxes specifying the amount and date due, that such "notice" was a mere naked demand rather than "official action" and the "threat" was contingent and anticipatory rather than real and imminent. Accordingly, the First Federal court determined that in the absence of affirmative or official action to enforce the demand, venue would lie only in the county where the state agency maintains its. official headquarters. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department",
"sentence": "See also Straughn v. G.J.M., Inc., 344 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (where the only action taken by the Department of Revenue in relation to documentary stamp tax assessment imposed upon assignment of lease had been a request for information and issuance of proposed notice of assessment and penalty, the action by the Department did not constitute an attempt to seize and sell property to enforce collection of the disputed tax so that venue did not lay in the county in which the land was located but rather in Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department); Department of Revenue v. Crisp, 337 So.2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 346 So.2d 1248 (Fla.1977) (notice of assessment of additional documentary stamp taxes and demand for payment, unaccompanied by further action, did not imminently threaten taxpayers’ due process and equal protection rights and was not an imminent “attempt” to seize and sell property of taxpayer; thus, proper venue of taxpayer’s action for declaratory judgment against Department of Revenue was Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "Department of Revenue efforts to collect allegedly past due intangible taxes included a notice assessment which stated that \"tax warrant and execution had in truth and in fact already issued,\" constituted official action that was both real and imminent, justifying suit in a county other than situs of Department's official headquarters",
"sentence": "Cf. Swinscoe v. State, 320 So.2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 337 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1976) (where Department of Revenue gave taxpayers written notice that a tax warrant and execution had been issued against them and delivered to area supervisor, and warrant was subsequently recorded in official records of county in which taxpayers resided, Department of Revenue’s actions were of such nature as to require that taxpayers be allowed to bring suit in county of their residence against the Department of Revenue); Department of Revenue v. Arvida Corp., 315 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 336 So.2d 1181 (Fla.1976) (Department of Revenue efforts to collect allegedly past due intangible taxes included a notice assessment which stated that “tax warrant and execution had in truth and in fact already issued,” constituted official action that was both real and imminent, justifying suit in a county other than situs of Department’s official headquarters)."
} | 12,023,034 | a |
Two courts of appeals have explicitly considered under the First Amendment a claim that state action unlawfully burdened a marital relationship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "133 F.3d 631, 635",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that discharge of at-will police employee violated his First Amendment right of intimate association where wife plotted to have police chief arrested",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Cecil, 133 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (rejecting claim that discharge of at-will police employee violated his First Amendment right of intimate association where wife plotted to have police chief arrested), aff'd on this point, 176 F.3d 419, 423-24 (8th Cir.1999) (in banc); Adkins v. Board of Education, 982 F.2d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir.1993) (upholding claim that denial of continued employment because of school superintendent’s dislike of employee’s husband violated her First Amendment right of intimate association); cf. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir.1997) (in banc) (rejecting claim that withdrawal of job offer for position of state prosecutor because of her same-sex “wedding” violated her First Amendment right of intimate association)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "114 F.3d 1097, 1110",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that withdrawal of job offer for position of state prosecutor because of her same-sex \"wedding\" violated her First Amendment right of intimate association",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Cecil, 133 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (rejecting claim that discharge of at-will police employee violated his First Amendment right of intimate association where wife plotted to have police chief arrested), aff'd on this point, 176 F.3d 419, 423-24 (8th Cir.1999) (in banc); Adkins v. Board of Education, 982 F.2d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir.1993) (upholding claim that denial of continued employment because of school superintendent’s dislike of employee’s husband violated her First Amendment right of intimate association); cf. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir.1997) (in banc) (rejecting claim that withdrawal of job offer for position of state prosecutor because of her same-sex “wedding” violated her First Amendment right of intimate association)."
} | 11,583,073 | a |
Two courts of appeals have explicitly considered under the First Amendment a claim that state action unlawfully burdened a marital relationship. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "114 F.3d 1097, 1110",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that withdrawal of job offer for position of state prosecutor because of her same-sex \"wedding\" violated her First Amendment right of intimate association",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Cecil, 133 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (rejecting claim that discharge of at-will police employee violated his First Amendment right of intimate association where wife plotted to have police chief arrested), aff'd on this point, 176 F.3d 419, 423-24 (8th Cir.1999) (in banc); Adkins v. Board of Education, 982 F.2d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir.1993) (upholding claim that denial of continued employment because of school superintendent’s dislike of employee’s husband violated her First Amendment right of intimate association); cf. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir.1997) (in banc) (rejecting claim that withdrawal of job offer for position of state prosecutor because of her same-sex “wedding” violated her First Amendment right of intimate association)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "176 F.3d 419, 423-24",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that discharge of at-will police employee violated his First Amendment right of intimate association where wife plotted to have police chief arrested",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Cecil, 133 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (rejecting claim that discharge of at-will police employee violated his First Amendment right of intimate association where wife plotted to have police chief arrested), aff'd on this point, 176 F.3d 419, 423-24 (8th Cir.1999) (in banc); Adkins v. Board of Education, 982 F.2d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir.1993) (upholding claim that denial of continued employment because of school superintendent’s dislike of employee’s husband violated her First Amendment right of intimate association); cf. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir.1997) (in banc) (rejecting claim that withdrawal of job offer for position of state prosecutor because of her same-sex “wedding” violated her First Amendment right of intimate association)."
} | 11,583,073 | b |
Two courts of appeals have explicitly considered under the First Amendment a claim that state action unlawfully burdened a marital relationship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "982 F.2d 952, 955-56",
"parenthetical": "upholding claim that denial of continued employment because of school superintendent's dislike of employee's husband violated her First Amendment right of intimate association",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Cecil, 133 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (rejecting claim that discharge of at-will police employee violated his First Amendment right of intimate association where wife plotted to have police chief arrested), aff'd on this point, 176 F.3d 419, 423-24 (8th Cir.1999) (in banc); Adkins v. Board of Education, 982 F.2d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir.1993) (upholding claim that denial of continued employment because of school superintendent’s dislike of employee’s husband violated her First Amendment right of intimate association); cf. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir.1997) (in banc) (rejecting claim that withdrawal of job offer for position of state prosecutor because of her same-sex “wedding” violated her First Amendment right of intimate association)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "114 F.3d 1097, 1110",
"parenthetical": "rejecting claim that withdrawal of job offer for position of state prosecutor because of her same-sex \"wedding\" violated her First Amendment right of intimate association",
"sentence": "See Singleton v. Cecil, 133 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (rejecting claim that discharge of at-will police employee violated his First Amendment right of intimate association where wife plotted to have police chief arrested), aff'd on this point, 176 F.3d 419, 423-24 (8th Cir.1999) (in banc); Adkins v. Board of Education, 982 F.2d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir.1993) (upholding claim that denial of continued employment because of school superintendent’s dislike of employee’s husband violated her First Amendment right of intimate association); cf. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir.1997) (in banc) (rejecting claim that withdrawal of job offer for position of state prosecutor because of her same-sex “wedding” violated her First Amendment right of intimate association)."
} | 11,583,073 | a |
Furthermore, Mrs. Jones's argument that, because a remand was ordered, the decision of the Court of Veterans Appeals is not final for purposes of review by an Article III appellate court is similarly without merit. As we have previously held, decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals rendering an interpretation of a statutory provision and remanding for further proceedings in accordance with that interpretation constitute final and appealable decisions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 1244, 1248",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Court of Veterans Appeals decision interpreting 38 U.S.C. SS 8713, overruling the Secretary's prior interpretation and remanding back to the Board was a final and appealable decision",
"sentence": "Travelstead v. Derwinski 978 F.2d 1244, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1992) (holding that a Court of Veterans Appeals decision interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 8713, overruling the Secretary’s prior interpretation and remanding back to the Board was a final and appealable decision); see also Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (holding that a district court’s remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services was an immediately appealable order)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "496 U.S. 617, 625",
"parenthetical": "holding that a district court's remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services was an immediately appealable order",
"sentence": "Travelstead v. Derwinski 978 F.2d 1244, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1992) (holding that a Court of Veterans Appeals decision interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 8713, overruling the Secretary’s prior interpretation and remanding back to the Board was a final and appealable decision); see also Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (holding that a district court’s remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services was an immediately appealable order)."
} | 1,590,060 | a |
Furthermore, Mrs. Jones's argument that, because a remand was ordered, the decision of the Court of Veterans Appeals is not final for purposes of review by an Article III appellate court is similarly without merit. As we have previously held, decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals rendering an interpretation of a statutory provision and remanding for further proceedings in accordance with that interpretation constitute final and appealable decisions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 1244, 1248",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Court of Veterans Appeals decision interpreting 38 U.S.C. SS 8713, overruling the Secretary's prior interpretation and remanding back to the Board was a final and appealable decision",
"sentence": "Travelstead v. Derwinski 978 F.2d 1244, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1992) (holding that a Court of Veterans Appeals decision interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 8713, overruling the Secretary’s prior interpretation and remanding back to the Board was a final and appealable decision); see also Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (holding that a district court’s remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services was an immediately appealable order)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64",
"parenthetical": "holding that a district court's remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services was an immediately appealable order",
"sentence": "Travelstead v. Derwinski 978 F.2d 1244, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1992) (holding that a Court of Veterans Appeals decision interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 8713, overruling the Secretary’s prior interpretation and remanding back to the Board was a final and appealable decision); see also Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (holding that a district court’s remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services was an immediately appealable order)."
} | 1,590,060 | a |
Furthermore, Mrs. Jones's argument that, because a remand was ordered, the decision of the Court of Veterans Appeals is not final for purposes of review by an Article III appellate court is similarly without merit. As we have previously held, decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals rendering an interpretation of a statutory provision and remanding for further proceedings in accordance with that interpretation constitute final and appealable decisions. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "978 F.2d 1244, 1248",
"parenthetical": "holding that a Court of Veterans Appeals decision interpreting 38 U.S.C. SS 8713, overruling the Secretary's prior interpretation and remanding back to the Board was a final and appealable decision",
"sentence": "Travelstead v. Derwinski 978 F.2d 1244, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1992) (holding that a Court of Veterans Appeals decision interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 8713, overruling the Secretary’s prior interpretation and remanding back to the Board was a final and appealable decision); see also Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (holding that a district court’s remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services was an immediately appealable order)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a district court's remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services was an immediately appealable order",
"sentence": "Travelstead v. Derwinski 978 F.2d 1244, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1992) (holding that a Court of Veterans Appeals decision interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 8713, overruling the Secretary’s prior interpretation and remanding back to the Board was a final and appealable decision); see also Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (holding that a district court’s remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services was an immediately appealable order)."
} | 1,590,060 | a |
The Kurzets ignore the record evidence of phone calls Allen received from Mr. Kurzet, as well as numerous phone calls Allen made "concerning the job." Because the Kurzets fail to marshal the evidence in favor of finding number fifteen, we do not address this challenge. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"We decline to address this issue because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Mincy, 888 P.2d 648, 652 n. 1 (Utah.Ct.App.1992) (“We decline to address this issue because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence.”); cf. State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah.Ct.App.1989) (“We have consistently held that if counsel on appeal does not provide citations to the record, we need not reach the merits of his or her substantive claims.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "782 P.2d 959, 962",
"parenthetical": "\"We have consistently held that if counsel on appeal does not provide citations to the record, we need not reach the merits of his or her substantive claims.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Mincy, 888 P.2d 648, 652 n. 1 (Utah.Ct.App.1992) (“We decline to address this issue because defendant has failed to marshal the evidence.”); cf. State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah.Ct.App.1989) (“We have consistently held that if counsel on appeal does not provide citations to the record, we need not reach the merits of his or her substantive claims.”)."
} | 11,895,203 | a |
Plaintiff has not contested DOJ's work product assertion and therefore has conceded the issue. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had contested the issue, as the courts concluded in Wright and Dorsey, the work product privilege covers the withheld materials. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "672 F.Supp.2d 20, 30",
"parenthetical": "finding that memoranda recommending continued wiretap authorization were protected by attorney work-product privilege",
"sentence": "See Wright, 121 F.Supp.3d at 184-86, 2015 WL 4910502, at *10-11; Dorsey, 85 F.Supp.3d at 217, 2015 WL 1431707, at *4 (holding that Title III authorization memoranda were covered by the work product privilege); see also Wolfson v. United States, 672 F.Supp.2d 20, 30 (D.D.C.2009) (finding that memoranda recommending continued wiretap authorization were protected by attorney work-product privilege)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "85 F.Supp.3d 217, 217",
"parenthetical": "holding that Title III authorization memoranda were covered by the work product privilege",
"sentence": "See Wright, 121 F.Supp.3d at 184-86, 2015 WL 4910502, at *10-11; Dorsey, 85 F.Supp.3d at 217, 2015 WL 1431707, at *4 (holding that Title III authorization memoranda were covered by the work product privilege); see also Wolfson v. United States, 672 F.Supp.2d 20, 30 (D.D.C.2009) (finding that memoranda recommending continued wiretap authorization were protected by attorney work-product privilege)."
} | 5,758,811 | b |
Plaintiff has not contested DOJ's work product assertion and therefore has conceded the issue. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had contested the issue, as the courts concluded in Wright and Dorsey, the work product privilege covers the withheld materials. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2015 WL 1431707, at *4",
"parenthetical": "holding that Title III authorization memoranda were covered by the work product privilege",
"sentence": "See Wright, 121 F.Supp.3d at 184-86, 2015 WL 4910502, at *10-11; Dorsey, 85 F.Supp.3d at 217, 2015 WL 1431707, at *4 (holding that Title III authorization memoranda were covered by the work product privilege); see also Wolfson v. United States, 672 F.Supp.2d 20, 30 (D.D.C.2009) (finding that memoranda recommending continued wiretap authorization were protected by attorney work-product privilege)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "672 F.Supp.2d 20, 30",
"parenthetical": "finding that memoranda recommending continued wiretap authorization were protected by attorney work-product privilege",
"sentence": "See Wright, 121 F.Supp.3d at 184-86, 2015 WL 4910502, at *10-11; Dorsey, 85 F.Supp.3d at 217, 2015 WL 1431707, at *4 (holding that Title III authorization memoranda were covered by the work product privilege); see also Wolfson v. United States, 672 F.Supp.2d 20, 30 (D.D.C.2009) (finding that memoranda recommending continued wiretap authorization were protected by attorney work-product privilege)."
} | 5,758,811 | a |
P54 In addition, and fundamental to this case, requiring an insurer to compensate the insured for diminished value is completely at odds with the precise disjunctive terms used in the automobile insurance policy at issue, regardless of whether this diminished value results from stigma or tangible imperfections. Indeed, a number of jurisdictions have declined to hold insurers liable for diminished value attributable to irreparable physical damage. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "157 Ariz. 1, 2",
"parenthetical": "upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both",
"sentence": "See, e.g., O’Brien, 785 A.2d at 290 (“[u]nder the ‘repair or replace’ limitations on the policy,” the insurer’s “obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a ‘market psychology’ nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair”); Wildin, 249 Wis. 2d at 486 (affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage); cf. Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 2, 754 P.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "785 A.2d 290, 290",
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nder the 'repair or replace' limitations on the policy,\" the insurer's \"obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a 'market psychology' nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., O’Brien, 785 A.2d at 290 (“[u]nder the ‘repair or replace’ limitations on the policy,” the insurer’s “obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a ‘market psychology’ nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair”); Wildin, 249 Wis. 2d at 486 (affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage); cf. Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 2, 754 P.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both)."
} | 4,020,295 | b |
P54 In addition, and fundamental to this case, requiring an insurer to compensate the insured for diminished value is completely at odds with the precise disjunctive terms used in the automobile insurance policy at issue, regardless of whether this diminished value results from stigma or tangible imperfections. Indeed, a number of jurisdictions have declined to hold insurers liable for diminished value attributable to irreparable physical damage. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both",
"sentence": "See, e.g., O’Brien, 785 A.2d at 290 (“[u]nder the ‘repair or replace’ limitations on the policy,” the insurer’s “obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a ‘market psychology’ nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair”); Wildin, 249 Wis. 2d at 486 (affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage); cf. Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 2, 754 P.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "785 A.2d 290, 290",
"parenthetical": "\"[u]nder the 'repair or replace' limitations on the policy,\" the insurer's \"obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a 'market psychology' nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., O’Brien, 785 A.2d at 290 (“[u]nder the ‘repair or replace’ limitations on the policy,” the insurer’s “obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a ‘market psychology’ nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair”); Wildin, 249 Wis. 2d at 486 (affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage); cf. Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 2, 754 P.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both)."
} | 4,020,295 | b |
P54 In addition, and fundamental to this case, requiring an insurer to compensate the insured for diminished value is completely at odds with the precise disjunctive terms used in the automobile insurance policy at issue, regardless of whether this diminished value results from stigma or tangible imperfections. Indeed, a number of jurisdictions have declined to hold insurers liable for diminished value attributable to irreparable physical damage. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "249 Wis. 2d 486, 486",
"parenthetical": "affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., O’Brien, 785 A.2d at 290 (“[u]nder the ‘repair or replace’ limitations on the policy,” the insurer’s “obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a ‘market psychology’ nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair”); Wildin, 249 Wis. 2d at 486 (affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage); cf. Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 2, 754 P.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "157 Ariz. 1, 2",
"parenthetical": "upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both",
"sentence": "See, e.g., O’Brien, 785 A.2d at 290 (“[u]nder the ‘repair or replace’ limitations on the policy,” the insurer’s “obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a ‘market psychology’ nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair”); Wildin, 249 Wis. 2d at 486 (affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage); cf. Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 2, 754 P.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both)."
} | 4,020,295 | a |
P54 In addition, and fundamental to this case, requiring an insurer to compensate the insured for diminished value is completely at odds with the precise disjunctive terms used in the automobile insurance policy at issue, regardless of whether this diminished value results from stigma or tangible imperfections. Indeed, a number of jurisdictions have declined to hold insurers liable for diminished value attributable to irreparable physical damage. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "249 Wis. 2d 486, 486",
"parenthetical": "affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., O’Brien, 785 A.2d at 290 (“[u]nder the ‘repair or replace’ limitations on the policy,” the insurer’s “obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a ‘market psychology’ nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair”); Wildin, 249 Wis. 2d at 486 (affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage); cf. Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 2, 754 P.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both",
"sentence": "See, e.g., O’Brien, 785 A.2d at 290 (“[u]nder the ‘repair or replace’ limitations on the policy,” the insurer’s “obligation includes neither diminution in value resulting from a ‘market psychology’ nor that resulting from the minute physical imperfections that are inherent to any repair”); Wildin, 249 Wis. 2d at 486 (affirming lower court decision denying compensation for diminished value due to irreparable structural damage); cf. Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 1, 2, 754 P.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding trial court ruling denying compensation for diminished value where it was unknown whether the decrease in market value was due to physical imperfections, stigma, or both)."
} | 4,020,295 | a |