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{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA", "sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA", "sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA", "sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts", "sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA", "sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA", "sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that as an individual with a probationary position in the competitive service, the petitioner was not an \"employee\" and, therefore, the Board had no jurisdiction at all over her appeal", "sentence": "See Pervez v. Dep’t of the Navy, 193 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir.1999) (holding that as an individual with a probationary position in the competitive service, the petitioner was not an “employee” and, therefore, the Board had no jurisdiction at all over her appeal)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the protections of 5 U.S.C. SSSS 7511(a", "sentence": "Specifically, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7513, for purposes of appealing a removal action, a petitioner must be included in one of several possible categories in order to meet the definition of “employee.” As a preference eligible individual in the excepted service who had completed less than one year of current continuous service, Vernon is not covered by any of the categories in § 7511(a)(1). Vernon is, thus, not an “employee” under § 7511 and he has no right to appeal. See Horner v. Lucas, 832 F.2d 596 (Fed.Cir.1987) (holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the protections of 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1) and 7513 because under § 7511(a)(1)(A) the temporary status of his position in the competitive service prevented him from qualifying as an employee). The Board correctly concluded that it had no jurisdiction to reach the merits of any of Vernon’s claims, including both the claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the claims based on collective bargaining agreements." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial", "sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial); see also Weber v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 169 Or.App. 24, 7 P.3d 714, 716 (2000) (noting that an insurer’s duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify", "sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial); see also Weber v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 169 Or.App. 24, 7 P.3d 714, 716 (2000) (noting that an insurer’s duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "7 P.3d 714, 716", "parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify", "sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial); see also Weber v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 169 Or.App. 24, 7 P.3d 714, 716 (2000) (noting that an insurer’s duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial", "sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial); see also Weber v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 169 Or.App. 24, 7 P.3d 714, 716 (2000) (noting that an insurer’s duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "877 P.2d 80, 84", "parenthetical": "noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial", "sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial); see also Weber v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 169 Or.App. 24, 7 P.3d 714, 716 (2000) (noting that an insurer’s duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify", "sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial); see also Weber v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 169 Or.App. 24, 7 P.3d 714, 716 (2000) (noting that an insurer’s duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "877 P.2d 80, 84", "parenthetical": "noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial", "sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial); see also Weber v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 169 Or.App. 24, 7 P.3d 714, 716 (2000) (noting that an insurer’s duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "7 P.3d 714, 716", "parenthetical": "noting that an insurer's duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify", "sentence": "See Ledford v. Gutoski, 319 Or. 397, 877 P.2d 80, 84 (1994) (noting that, where an insurer does not have a duty to defend based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it may still be possible to demonstrate a duty to indemnify based on the facts proven at trial); see also Weber v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. of Oregon, 169 Or.App. 24, 7 P.3d 714, 716 (2000) (noting that an insurer’s duty to defend generally is broader than its duty to indemnify)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "390 Fed.Appx. 849, 852", "parenthetical": "acknowledging that a \"persuasive case has been made that the commentary [of application note 4] is at odds with the plain language of the [Subsection 3(B", "sentence": "United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.2012) (declining to decide whether the plain language is inconsistent with the application note and upholding the enhancement on the ground that the district court did not commit plain error); see also United States v. Madkins, 390 Fed.Appx. 849, 852 (11th Cir.2010) (acknowledging that a \"persuasive case has been made that the commentary [of application note 4] is at odds with the plain language of the [Subsection 3(B) ] enhancement” but declining to reach the issue on plain error review)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "697 F.3d 1141, 1145", "parenthetical": "declining to decide whether the plain language is inconsistent with the application note and upholding the enhancement on the ground that the district court did not commit plain error", "sentence": "United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.2012) (declining to decide whether the plain language is inconsistent with the application note and upholding the enhancement on the ground that the district court did not commit plain error); see also United States v. Madkins, 390 Fed.Appx. 849, 852 (11th Cir.2010) (acknowledging that a \"persuasive case has been made that the commentary [of application note 4] is at odds with the plain language of the [Subsection 3(B) ] enhancement” but declining to reach the issue on plain error review)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "756 S.W.2d 299, 302", "parenthetical": "liability in Stowers action accrued when final judgment was rendered in underlying suit regardless of pending appeals because final judgment placed insured at risk for paying it", "sentence": "Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 158 (Tex.1967) (holding that cause of action for malpractice “did not arise until the tax deficiency was assessed” because “[p]rior to assessment the plaintiff had not been injured.”); see also Street v. Honorable Second Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex.1988) (liability in Stowers action accrued when final judgment was rendered in underlying suit regardless of pending appeals because final judgment placed insured at risk for paying it)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "417 S.W.2d 150, 158", "parenthetical": "holding that cause of action for malpractice \"did not arise until the tax deficiency was assessed\" because \"[p]rior to assessment the plaintiff had not been injured.\"", "sentence": "Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 158 (Tex.1967) (holding that cause of action for malpractice “did not arise until the tax deficiency was assessed” because “[p]rior to assessment the plaintiff had not been injured.”); see also Street v. Honorable Second Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex.1988) (liability in Stowers action accrued when final judgment was rendered in underlying suit regardless of pending appeals because final judgment placed insured at risk for paying it)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "829 F.2d 828, 831", "parenthetical": "summarizing Cohan as standing for the proposition that \"a court should allow the taxpayer some deductions if the taxpayer proves he is entitled to the deduction but cannot establish the full amount claimed\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See Edelson v. Comm’r, 829 F.2d 828, 831 (9th Cir.1987) (summarizing Cohan as standing for the proposition that “a court should allow the taxpayer some deductions if the taxpayer proves he is entitled to the deduction but cannot establish the full amount claimed” (emphasis added)); see also Norgaard v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that, under the Cohan rule, the trial court “may not be compelled to guess or estimate ... even though such an estimate, if made, might have been affirmed”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "939 F.2d 874, 879", "parenthetical": "noting that, under the Cohan rule, the trial court \"may not be compelled to guess or estimate ... even though such an estimate, if made, might have been affirmed\"", "sentence": "See Edelson v. Comm’r, 829 F.2d 828, 831 (9th Cir.1987) (summarizing Cohan as standing for the proposition that “a court should allow the taxpayer some deductions if the taxpayer proves he is entitled to the deduction but cannot establish the full amount claimed” (emphasis added)); see also Norgaard v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 874, 879 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that, under the Cohan rule, the trial court “may not be compelled to guess or estimate ... even though such an estimate, if made, might have been affirmed”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2002 WL 356760, at *2", "parenthetical": "refusing to designate a movant group of three individuals lead plaintiff because \"their decision making requires either (a) levels of coordination, negotiation, and collective action which far exceed that which would be necessary of an individual litigant or (b", "sentence": "In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F.Supp.2d 803, 815-16 (N.D.Ohio 1999) (denying lead plaintiff status to the Alsin Group, which contained eighteen investors who had no relation to one another, and deeming such an amalgamation of random people “inconsistent with the definition of group intended by the PSLRA, as revealed by the statute’s language, context, overall scheme, and purpose”); see also Crawford v. Onyx Software Corp., No. C01-1346L, 2002 WL 356760, at *2 (W-D.Wash. Jan.10, 2002) (refusing to designate a movant group of three individuals lead plaintiff because “their decision making requires either (a) levels of coordination, negotiation, and collective action which far exceed that which would be necessary of an individual litigant or (b) undue control by their lawyer-representatives”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "67 F.Supp.2d 803, 815-16", "parenthetical": "denying lead plaintiff status to the Alsin Group, which contained eighteen investors who had no relation to one another, and deeming such an amalgamation of random people \"inconsistent with the definition of group intended by the PSLRA, as revealed by the statute's language, context, overall scheme, and purpose\"", "sentence": "In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F.Supp.2d 803, 815-16 (N.D.Ohio 1999) (denying lead plaintiff status to the Alsin Group, which contained eighteen investors who had no relation to one another, and deeming such an amalgamation of random people “inconsistent with the definition of group intended by the PSLRA, as revealed by the statute’s language, context, overall scheme, and purpose”); see also Crawford v. Onyx Software Corp., No. C01-1346L, 2002 WL 356760, at *2 (W-D.Wash. Jan.10, 2002) (refusing to designate a movant group of three individuals lead plaintiff because “their decision making requires either (a) levels of coordination, negotiation, and collective action which far exceed that which would be necessary of an individual litigant or (b) undue control by their lawyer-representatives”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "571 S.W.2d 110, 112", "parenthetical": "\"Narcotics investigations are fraught with dangers and the officers had a right and duty to check [a person arriving on the premises] for weapons to protect themselves and others * * *.\"", "sentence": "State v. Bitterman, 304 Minn. 481, 485, 232 N.W.2d 91, 94 (1975) (upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived at an apartment that was being searched for narcotics); see also Johantgen v. Com., 571 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Ky.Ct.App.1978) (“Narcotics investigations are fraught with dangers and the officers had a right and duty to check [a person arriving on the premises] for weapons to protect themselves and others * * *.”). The majority attempts to distinguish Bitterman by stating that somehow officers “knew” that the circumstances of that drug search were more dangerous than the circumstances here." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "304 Minn. 481, 485", "parenthetical": "upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived at an apartment that was being searched for narcotics", "sentence": "State v. Bitterman, 304 Minn. 481, 485, 232 N.W.2d 91, 94 (1975) (upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived at an apartment that was being searched for narcotics); see also Johantgen v. Com., 571 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Ky.Ct.App.1978) (“Narcotics investigations are fraught with dangers and the officers had a right and duty to check [a person arriving on the premises] for weapons to protect themselves and others * * *.”). The majority attempts to distinguish Bitterman by stating that somehow officers “knew” that the circumstances of that drug search were more dangerous than the circumstances here." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "571 S.W.2d 110, 112", "parenthetical": "\"Narcotics investigations are fraught with dangers and the officers had a right and duty to check [a person arriving on the premises] for weapons to protect themselves and others * * *.\"", "sentence": "State v. Bitterman, 304 Minn. 481, 485, 232 N.W.2d 91, 94 (1975) (upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived at an apartment that was being searched for narcotics); see also Johantgen v. Com., 571 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Ky.Ct.App.1978) (“Narcotics investigations are fraught with dangers and the officers had a right and duty to check [a person arriving on the premises] for weapons to protect themselves and others * * *.”). The majority attempts to distinguish Bitterman by stating that somehow officers “knew” that the circumstances of that drug search were more dangerous than the circumstances here." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "232 N.W.2d 91, 94", "parenthetical": "upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived at an apartment that was being searched for narcotics", "sentence": "State v. Bitterman, 304 Minn. 481, 485, 232 N.W.2d 91, 94 (1975) (upholding a Terry search of a person who arrived at an apartment that was being searched for narcotics); see also Johantgen v. Com., 571 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Ky.Ct.App.1978) (“Narcotics investigations are fraught with dangers and the officers had a right and duty to check [a person arriving on the premises] for weapons to protect themselves and others * * *.”). The majority attempts to distinguish Bitterman by stating that somehow officers “knew” that the circumstances of that drug search were more dangerous than the circumstances here." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "416 F.2d 874, 877-78", "parenthetical": "holding that the crime of \"knowingly and willfully\" threatening the President required only that the threat be made under circumstances where \"a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom\" it is addressed as a serious threat and not be the result of mistake, duress or coercion", "sentence": "See Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir.1969) (holding that the crime of “knowingly and willfully” threatening the President required only that the threat be made under circumstances where “a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom” it is addressed as a serious threat and not be the result of mistake, duress or coercion); see also United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (9th Cir.2002) (applying objective reasonableness standard to presidential threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 871, and re-affirming Roy)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "293 F.3d 1080, 1084-85", "parenthetical": "applying objective reasonableness standard to presidential threat statute, 18 U.S.C. SS 871, and re-affirming Roy", "sentence": "See Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877-78 (9th Cir.1969) (holding that the crime of “knowingly and willfully” threatening the President required only that the threat be made under circumstances where “a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom” it is addressed as a serious threat and not be the result of mistake, duress or coercion); see also United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (9th Cir.2002) (applying objective reasonableness standard to presidential threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 871, and re-affirming Roy)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638", "parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "830 F.2d 628, 634", "parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638", "parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638", "parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638", "parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "830 F.2d 628, 634", "parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that courts should have \" 'a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment' \"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that in construing a legislative enactment, \"we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage\"", "sentence": "See Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, -, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (noting that courts should have “ ‘a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment’ ”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir.1987) (stating that in construing a legislative enactment, “we presume that the legislature intended that each section was a necessary component of the statutory scheme and not surplusage”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "94 U.S. 389, 389", "parenthetical": "requiring a \"mutual agreement between the pax*ties\" to extinguish the leasehold interest", "sentence": "See Beall, 94 U.S. at 389 (requiring a “mutual agreement between the pax*ties” to extinguish the leasehold interest); see also Checkers, Simon & Rosner, 864 F.2d at 1346 (stating that surrender requires “an agreement ... whereby the lessee surrendered the premises and the lessor accepted the premises back, both intending thereby to terminate the lease and cancel all the covenants and obligations thereunder.”) (emphasis added and citation omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "864 F.2d 1346, 1346", "parenthetical": "stating that surrender requires \"an agreement ... whereby the lessee surrendered the premises and the lessor accepted the premises back, both intending thereby to terminate the lease and cancel all the covenants and obligations thereunder.\"", "sentence": "See Beall, 94 U.S. at 389 (requiring a “mutual agreement between the pax*ties” to extinguish the leasehold interest); see also Checkers, Simon & Rosner, 864 F.2d at 1346 (stating that surrender requires “an agreement ... whereby the lessee surrendered the premises and the lessor accepted the premises back, both intending thereby to terminate the lease and cancel all the covenants and obligations thereunder.”) (emphasis added and citation omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "568 F.2d 830, 840", "parenthetical": "noting that petitioner had full and fair opportunity to raise claim in state court, on appeal, and through coram nobis procedure", "sentence": "See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1977) (noting that petitioner had full and fair opportunity to raise claim in state court, on appeal, and through coram nobis procedure); see also Graham v. Costello, 299 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2002) (“[0]nce it is established that a petitioner has had an opportunity to litigate his or her Fourth Amendment claim (whether or not he or she took advantage of the states procedure) ... the claim will never present a valid basis for federal habeas relief.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "299 F.3d 129, 134", "parenthetical": "\"[0]nce it is established that a petitioner has had an opportunity to litigate his or her Fourth Amendment claim (whether or not he or she took advantage of the states procedure", "sentence": "See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir.1977) (noting that petitioner had full and fair opportunity to raise claim in state court, on appeal, and through coram nobis procedure); see also Graham v. Costello, 299 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2002) (“[0]nce it is established that a petitioner has had an opportunity to litigate his or her Fourth Amendment claim (whether or not he or she took advantage of the states procedure) ... the claim will never present a valid basis for federal habeas relief.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "640 F.3d 358, 366", "parenthetical": "agent's improper lay testimony was harmless error where agent would have qualified as an expert", "sentence": "See Moore, 651 F.3d at 61 (that Agent Sparks “might have qualified as an expert” ameliorated prejudice from improper opinion testimony); see also United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 358, 366 (D.C.Cir.2011) (agent’s improper lay testimony was harmless error where agent would have qualified as an expert)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "651 F.3d 61, 61", "parenthetical": "that Agent Sparks \"might have qualified as an expert\" ameliorated prejudice from improper opinion testimony", "sentence": "See Moore, 651 F.3d at 61 (that Agent Sparks “might have qualified as an expert” ameliorated prejudice from improper opinion testimony); see also United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 358, 366 (D.C.Cir.2011) (agent’s improper lay testimony was harmless error where agent would have qualified as an expert)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "375 B.R. 549, 556", "parenthetical": "a surcharge should be calculated to compensate the estate for the actual monetary costs imposed by the debtor's misconduct", "sentence": "See Latman, 366 F.3d at 786 (recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surcharge a debtor’s exemption to protect integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that debtor does not exempt amount greater than allowed under Bankruptcy Code); see also Onubah v. Zamora (In re Onubah), 375 B.R. 549, 556 (9th Cir.BAP2007) (a surcharge should be calculated to compensate the estate for the actual monetary costs imposed by the debtor’s misconduct)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "366 F.3d 786, 786", "parenthetical": "recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surcharge a debtor's exemption to protect integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that debtor does not exempt amount greater than allowed under Bankruptcy Code", "sentence": "See Latman, 366 F.3d at 786 (recognizing inherent power of bankruptcy courts to equitably surcharge a debtor’s exemption to protect integrity of the bankruptcy process and to ensure that debtor does not exempt amount greater than allowed under Bankruptcy Code); see also Onubah v. Zamora (In re Onubah), 375 B.R. 549, 556 (9th Cir.BAP2007) (a surcharge should be calculated to compensate the estate for the actual monetary costs imposed by the debtor’s misconduct)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "1998 WL 233750, at *2", "parenthetical": "failure to follow guidelines in IRS manuals does not constitute a violation of a provision or regulation of the Tax Code and is not actionable under SS 7433", "sentence": "See, e.g., Gonsalves v. IRS, 975 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (§ 7433 does not permit taxpayers to sue the government for violations of internal IRS policies like those in the Internal Revenue Manual); see also Kachougian v. United States, No. C.A. 96-508T, 1998 WL 233750 at *2 (D.R.I. 1998) (failure to follow guidelines in IRS manuals does not constitute a violation of a provision or regulation of the Tax Code and is not actionable under § 7433). In any event, a complaint cannot be cured by a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion to dismiss. See Natale v. Town of Darien, No. Civ. 3:97cv583 (AHN), 1998 WL 91073 at *4, n. 2 (D.Conn.1998) (plaintiff may not amend complaint in a memorandum of law), citing Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 15-16 (1st Cir.1988); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 723 F.Supp. 976, 987 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "975 F.2d 13, 16", "parenthetical": "SS 7433 does not permit taxpayers to sue the government for violations of internal IRS policies like those in the Internal Revenue Manual", "sentence": "See, e.g., Gonsalves v. IRS, 975 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (§ 7433 does not permit taxpayers to sue the government for violations of internal IRS policies like those in the Internal Revenue Manual); see also Kachougian v. United States, No. C.A. 96-508T, 1998 WL 233750 at *2 (D.R.I. 1998) (failure to follow guidelines in IRS manuals does not constitute a violation of a provision or regulation of the Tax Code and is not actionable under § 7433). In any event, a complaint cannot be cured by a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion to dismiss. See Natale v. Town of Darien, No. Civ. 3:97cv583 (AHN), 1998 WL 91073 at *4, n. 2 (D.Conn.1998) (plaintiff may not amend complaint in a memorandum of law), citing Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 15-16 (1st Cir.1988); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 723 F.Supp. 976, 987 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "101 S.Ct. 668, 668", "parenthetical": "requiring a showing of \"demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof\"", "sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.Unit A Mar.1981) (no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "639 F.2d 206, 210", "parenthetical": "no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial", "sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.Unit A Mar.1981) (no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial", "sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.Unit A Mar.1981) (no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "101 S.Ct. 668, 668", "parenthetical": "requiring a showing of \"demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof\"", "sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.Unit A Mar.1981) (no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "101 S.Ct. 668, 668", "parenthetical": "requiring a showing of \"demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof\"", "sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.Unit A Mar.1981) (no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial", "sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.Unit A Mar.1981) (no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "101 S.Ct. 668, 668", "parenthetical": "requiring a showing of \"demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof\"", "sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.Unit A Mar.1981) (no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial", "sentence": "See id. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668 (requiring a showing of “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof”); see also United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir.Unit A Mar.1981) (no prejudice shown where statements obtained without counsel were not used at trial), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021, 101 S.Ct. 3014, 69 L.Ed.2d 394 (1981)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "734 F.2d 905, 913", "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "109 U.S. 556, 568", "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "109 U.S. 556, 568", "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "109 U.S. 556, 568", "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "109 U.S. 556, 568", "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "734 F.2d 905, 913", "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "734 F.2d 905, 913", "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., \"the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "reversing district court's dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria's New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity", "sentence": "See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (holding federal government could not prosecute an American Indian who, on Indian territory, had murdered another member of his tribe, as federal statute excluded such crime from federal criminal jurisdiction in favor of allowing the Indians to engage in self-government, i.e., “the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the administration of their own laws and customs”); See also United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.) (reversing district court’s dismissal, after a pretrial hearing, based on diplomatic immunity, of indictment charging defendant with espionage for lack of jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant, who had served as assistant commercial counselor in Bulgaria’s New York City trade office failed to establish he was a member of the Bulgaria mission entitled to such diplomatic immunity), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "31 P.3d 180, 182", "parenthetical": "\"we must be mindful of the effects of our interpretation and should avoid statutory constructions that lead to absurd results\"", "sentence": "See People v. Haghshenas, 31 P.3d 180, 182 (Colo.App.2001) (“we must be mindful of the effects of our interpretation and should avoid statutory constructions that lead to absurd results”); see also People v. Wortham, 928 P.2d 771, 774 (Colo.App.1996) (although trial court’s noneompliance with mandatory deadlines in special sentencing statute deprived court of authority to impose sentence pursuant to that statute, the noncompliance did not result in a divestiture of jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "928 P.2d 771, 774", "parenthetical": "although trial court's noneompliance with mandatory deadlines in special sentencing statute deprived court of authority to impose sentence pursuant to that statute, the noncompliance did not result in a divestiture of jurisdiction", "sentence": "See People v. Haghshenas, 31 P.3d 180, 182 (Colo.App.2001) (“we must be mindful of the effects of our interpretation and should avoid statutory constructions that lead to absurd results”); see also People v. Wortham, 928 P.2d 771, 774 (Colo.App.1996) (although trial court’s noneompliance with mandatory deadlines in special sentencing statute deprived court of authority to impose sentence pursuant to that statute, the noncompliance did not result in a divestiture of jurisdiction)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "715 F.3d 284, 296", "parenthetical": "\"A sentence is not a conviction for an 'underlying offense.'\"", "sentence": "See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1346 (“[H]e is asserting only legal innocence: that his burglary convictions should not have been considered violent felonies under the [Armed Career Criminal Act].”); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1199 (11th Cir.2011) (“McKay does not even suggest, because he cannot, that he did not actually commit the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.”); see also In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284, 296 (11th Cir.2013) (“A sentence is not a conviction for an ‘underlying offense.’”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "713 F.3d 1346, 1346", "parenthetical": "\"[H]e is asserting only legal innocence: that his burglary convictions should not have been considered violent felonies under the [Armed Career Criminal Act].\"", "sentence": "See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1346 (“[H]e is asserting only legal innocence: that his burglary convictions should not have been considered violent felonies under the [Armed Career Criminal Act].”); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1199 (11th Cir.2011) (“McKay does not even suggest, because he cannot, that he did not actually commit the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.”); see also In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284, 296 (11th Cir.2013) (“A sentence is not a conviction for an ‘underlying offense.’”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "715 F.3d 284, 296", "parenthetical": "\"A sentence is not a conviction for an 'underlying offense.'\"", "sentence": "See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1346 (“[H]e is asserting only legal innocence: that his burglary convictions should not have been considered violent felonies under the [Armed Career Criminal Act].”); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1199 (11th Cir.2011) (“McKay does not even suggest, because he cannot, that he did not actually commit the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.”); see also In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284, 296 (11th Cir.2013) (“A sentence is not a conviction for an ‘underlying offense.’”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "657 F.3d 1190, 1199", "parenthetical": "\"McKay does not even suggest, because he cannot, that he did not actually commit the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.\"", "sentence": "See Williams, 713 F.3d at 1346 (“[H]e is asserting only legal innocence: that his burglary convictions should not have been considered violent felonies under the [Armed Career Criminal Act].”); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1199 (11th Cir.2011) (“McKay does not even suggest, because he cannot, that he did not actually commit the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.”); see also In re Hill, 715 F.3d 284, 296 (11th Cir.2013) (“A sentence is not a conviction for an ‘underlying offense.’”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65", "parenthetical": "distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is \"directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,\" from costs and disbursements, which \"are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury\"", "sentence": "See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn.1988) (distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is “directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,” from costs and disbursements, which “are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury”); see also State ex rel. Burnquist v. Miller Home Dev., 243 Minn. 1, 7, 65 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1954) (holding that “costs and disbursements” are a “procedural element” separate from the concept of “just compensation” under the Minnesota Constitution).\"" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "243 Minn. 1, 7", "parenthetical": "holding that \"costs and disbursements\" are a \"procedural element\" separate from the concept of \"just compensation\" under the Minnesota Constitution", "sentence": "See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn.1988) (distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is “directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,” from costs and disbursements, which “are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury”); see also State ex rel. Burnquist v. Miller Home Dev., 243 Minn. 1, 7, 65 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1954) (holding that “costs and disbursements” are a “procedural element” separate from the concept of “just compensation” under the Minnesota Constitution).\"" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "65 N.W.2d 900, 904", "parenthetical": "holding that \"costs and disbursements\" are a \"procedural element\" separate from the concept of \"just compensation\" under the Minnesota Constitution", "sentence": "See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn.1988) (distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is “directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,” from costs and disbursements, which “are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury”); see also State ex rel. Burnquist v. Miller Home Dev., 243 Minn. 1, 7, 65 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1954) (holding that “costs and disbursements” are a “procedural element” separate from the concept of “just compensation” under the Minnesota Constitution).\"" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65", "parenthetical": "distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is \"directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,\" from costs and disbursements, which \"are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury\"", "sentence": "See Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 864-65 (Minn.1988) (distinguishing prejudgment interest, which is “directly proportional to the magnitude of damages sustained by the claimant,” from costs and disbursements, which “are not part of the claim for compensation of personal injury”); see also State ex rel. Burnquist v. Miller Home Dev., 243 Minn. 1, 7, 65 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1954) (holding that “costs and disbursements” are a “procedural element” separate from the concept of “just compensation” under the Minnesota Constitution).\"" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "522 F.2d 1157, 1165", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal's property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent's conduct\"", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "522 F.2d 1157, 1165", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal's property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent's conduct\"", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "522 F.2d 1157, 1165", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal's property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent's conduct\"", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal's instructions", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent's fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller's instructions, the seller ratified the agent's acts when the seller read and signed the agreement", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent's misrepresentations because the principal was not \"blameless\" in the misrepresentations made to the third parties", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller's instructions, the seller ratified the agent's acts when the seller read and signed the agreement", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing", "sentence": "Cf., Putnam v. DeRosa, 963 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that a principal does not have an action against his agent for indemnification based on the agent’s misrepresentations because the principal was not “blameless” in the misrepresentations made to the third parties); Warner v. Reagan Buick, 240 Neb. 668, 483 N.W.2d 764 (1992); City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Constr. Co., 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305 (1989) (discussing indemnification actions and stating that a party seeking indemnification must have been free from any wrongdoing); Hiway 20 Terminal, Inc. v. Tri-County Agri-Supply, Inc., 232 Neb. 763, 443 N.W.2d 872 (1989); Restatement, supra, § 411, comments c. and d. (stating that if both the principal and the agent are aware that the performance of an act is wrongful, ordinarily the agent is not liable to indemnify the principal for damages arising from the performance of that act)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller's instructions, the seller ratified the agent's acts when the seller read and signed the agreement", "sentence": "See, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1165 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that “as between agent and principal, an agent cannot be held liable for the use of the principal’s property in an unlawful manner when it is reasonable to infer that the principal authorized the agent’s conduct”); Olson v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 152, 140 N.W.2d 321 (1966) (stating that although the actions of the agent constituted a tort, the agent is not liable to the principal for damages arising from such actions because the agent was acting in accordance with the principal’s instructions); Gutting v. Jacobson, 184 Neb. 402, 167 N.W.2d 762 (1969) (stating that an agent is liable to the principal for violations of the agent’s fiduciary duties, but that a principal may by acquiescence release the agent from such liability); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461 (Utah 1984) (finding that although the agent completed an earnest money agreement contrary to the principal-seller’s instructions, the seller ratified the agent’s acts when the seller read and signed the agreement); Restatement, supra, § 401, comment d." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "345 U.S. 582, 582", "parenthetical": "\"to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose com1 peting laws are involved\"", "sentence": "See 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S.Ct. at 928 (“to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose com1 peting laws are involved”); see also Phillips, 632 F.2d at 86 (“Lauritzen requires that we compare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other nations.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "632 F.2d 86, 86", "parenthetical": "\"Lauritzen requires that we compare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other nations.\"", "sentence": "See 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S.Ct. at 928 (“to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose com1 peting laws are involved”); see also Phillips, 632 F.2d at 86 (“Lauritzen requires that we compare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other nations.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "632 F.2d 86, 86", "parenthetical": "\"Lauritzen requires that we compare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other nations.\"", "sentence": "See 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S.Ct. at 928 (“to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose com1 peting laws are involved”); see also Phillips, 632 F.2d at 86 (“Lauritzen requires that we compare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other nations.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "73 S.Ct. 928, 928", "parenthetical": "\"to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose com1 peting laws are involved\"", "sentence": "See 345 U.S. at 582, 73 S.Ct. at 928 (“to avoid or resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states or governments whose com1 peting laws are involved”); see also Phillips, 632 F.2d at 86 (“Lauritzen requires that we compare the substantiality of our interest in a given transaction with that of other nations.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "464 A.2d 419, 422-23", "parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "464 A.2d 419, 422-23", "parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "464 A.2d 419, 422-23", "parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "464 A.2d 419, 422-23", "parenthetical": "affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds", "sentence": "See Weber v. Lynch, 237 Pa.Super. 48, 346 A.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (1975) (noting that we may uphold a decision below if there exists any proper basis for the result reached), aff'd, 473 Pa. 599, 375 A.2d 1278 (1977); In re Damon B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1983) (affirming visitation order on grounds other than those relied on by trial court); cf. In re F.L.D., 317 Pa.Super. 473, 464 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1983) (affirming termination order on one set of grounds despite asserted constitutional infirmity on other grounds)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "235 F.3d 763, 768", "parenthetical": "\"[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC stands as an essential element of Title VII's statutory scheme, and one with which defendants are entitled to insist that plaintiffs comply.\"", "sentence": "See Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir.2000) (“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC stands as an essential element of Title VII’s statutory scheme, and one with which defendants are entitled to insist that plaintiffs comply.”); see also Joseph v. America Works, Inc., 2002 WL 1033833, at * 5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2002) (claimant must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing ADA claim in federal court)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2002 WL 1033833, at * 5", "parenthetical": "claimant must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing ADA claim in federal court", "sentence": "See Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir.2000) (“[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC stands as an essential element of Title VII’s statutory scheme, and one with which defendants are entitled to insist that plaintiffs comply.”); see also Joseph v. America Works, Inc., 2002 WL 1033833, at * 5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2002) (claimant must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing ADA claim in federal court)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "614 F.3d 227, 227", "parenthetical": "noting that the presentence report and other materials \"typically paint an accurate picture of the defendant and his crime\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Labbe, 588 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir.2009) (“No doubt most sentencing judges have formulated a tentative sentence after reading a [presentence report].”); see also Wilson, 614 F.3d at 227 (noting that the presentence report and other materials “typically paint an accurate picture of the defendant and his crime”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "588 F.3d 139, 143", "parenthetical": "\"No doubt most sentencing judges have formulated a tentative sentence after reading a [presentence report].\"", "sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Labbe, 588 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir.2009) (“No doubt most sentencing judges have formulated a tentative sentence after reading a [presentence report].”); see also Wilson, 614 F.3d at 227 (noting that the presentence report and other materials “typically paint an accurate picture of the defendant and his crime”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "338 F.Supp.2d 113, 122", "parenthetical": "noting that bundling fee applications would \"reduce the number of individual lawsuits and ultimately save the parties and the Court time and energy\"", "sentence": "See Abraham v. Dist. of Columbia, 338 F.Supp.2d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting that bundling fee applications would “reduce the number of individual lawsuits and ultimately save the parties and the Court time and energy”); Armstrong v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 50, 55-56 (D.D.C.2004) (endorsing “actions that include multiple fee requests” because “while each fee petition will be considered separately, combining them in one complaint avoids burdening the Court with multiple actions”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though the plaintiffs point out that some courts in this district have expressed in dicta a preference for joining multiple IDEA fee litigation claims in a single case, nothing in those decisions suggests that such a preference permits the joinder of unrelated claims that do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 20(a", "sentence": "But see Davidson, 736 F.Supp.2d at 121 n. 4 (“[A]l-though the plaintiffs point out that some courts in this district have expressed in dicta a preference for joining multiple IDEA fee litigation claims in a single case, nothing in those decisions suggests that such a preference permits the joinder of unrelated claims that do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 20(a).”)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A]l-though the plaintiffs point out that some courts in this district have expressed in dicta a preference for joining multiple IDEA fee litigation claims in a single case, nothing in those decisions suggests that such a preference permits the joinder of unrelated claims that do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 20(a", "sentence": "But see Davidson, 736 F.Supp.2d at 121 n. 4 (“[A]l-though the plaintiffs point out that some courts in this district have expressed in dicta a preference for joining multiple IDEA fee litigation claims in a single case, nothing in those decisions suggests that such a preference permits the joinder of unrelated claims that do not satisfy the requirements of Rule 20(a).”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "328 F.Supp.2d 50, 55-56", "parenthetical": "endorsing \"actions that include multiple fee requests\" because \"while each fee petition will be considered separately, combining them in one complaint avoids burdening the Court with multiple actions\"", "sentence": "See Abraham v. Dist. of Columbia, 338 F.Supp.2d 113, 122 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting that bundling fee applications would “reduce the number of individual lawsuits and ultimately save the parties and the Court time and energy”); Armstrong v. Vance, 328 F.Supp.2d 50, 55-56 (D.D.C.2004) (endorsing “actions that include multiple fee requests” because “while each fee petition will be considered separately, combining them in one complaint avoids burdening the Court with multiple actions”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21", "parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87", "parenthetical": "discussing interpretations of \"wilful misconduct\" for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing interpretations of \"wilful misconduct\" for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21", "parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21", "parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing interpretations of \"wilful misconduct\" for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21", "parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "discussing interpretations of \"wilful misconduct\" for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21", "parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10", "parenthetical": "relying on Ninth Circuit definition of \"wilful misconduct\" in affirming district court, which \"applied] U.S. federal law\" and found that the airline crew's \"wilful misconduct\" caused the plane to crash", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "78 F.3d 664, 667-69", "parenthetical": "relying on federal standard of \"willful misconduct\" in determining whether Article 25 applied", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "189 F.3d 919, 919-21", "parenthetical": "disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply", "sentence": "Ins. Co. of N. Am., 189 F.3d at 919-21. But see id. at 923-29 (W.Fletcher, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the conclusion that California law applied and discussing why federal common law should apply); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1284-87 (11th Cir.1999) (discussing interpretations of “wilful misconduct” for Article 25 purposes in federal circuit courts, none of which applied state law), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1136, 120 S.Ct. 980, 145 L.Ed.2d 930 (2000); Koirala v. Thai Airways Int’l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1208-10 (9th Cir.1997) (relying on Ninth Circuit definition of “wilful misconduct” in affirming district court, which “applied] U.S. federal law” and found that the airline crew’s “wilful misconduct” caused the plane to crash); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667-69 (D.C.Cir.1996) (relying on federal standard of “willful misconduct” in determining whether Article 25 applied). Under either California law or federal common law, Dazo’s allegations do not establish wilful misconduct for Article 25 purposes." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "275 S.C. 537, 538", "parenthetical": "finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "273 S.E.2d 765, 767", "parenthetical": "finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "275 S.C. 537, 538", "parenthetical": "finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "273 S.E.2d 765, 767", "parenthetical": "finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity", "sentence": "Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE; State v. Hicks, 330 S.C. 207, 499 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, the objection must be timely made, which usually requires it be made at the earliest possible opportunity); see also State v. Kelly, 331 S.C. 132, 502 S.E.2d 99 (1998) (a new trial motion may not be used to raise an evidentiary issue for the first time); McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Syst., 321 S.C. 340, 468 S.E.2d 633 (1996) (an issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial); State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1981) (finding appellant waived the issue where he did not make a motion for a mistrial until after the verdict)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "584 N.W.2d 301, 301-02", "parenthetical": "stating high causation standard for tortious discharge and comparing to Hulme, a retaliatory discharge case under the ICRA", "sentence": "See Teachout, 584 N.W.2d at 301-02 (stating high causation standard for tortious discharge and comparing to Hulme, a retaliatory discharge case under the ICRA); see also Brown v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 961, 979 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (“[T]he Iowa Supreme Court has consistently sought guidance in its common-law retaliatory discharge cases from its decisions involving claims of statutory retaliation, which further demonstrates that the Iowa Supreme Court would analyze these distinct causes of action in a similar manner.”); cf. Scott Rosenberg & Jeffrey Lipman, Developing a Consistent Standard for Evaluating a Retaliation Case Under Federal and State Civil Rights Statutes and State Common Law Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53 Drake L. Rev. 359, 414-15 (2005) (“The federal courts have used the same approach in defining actionable employment conduct in both statutory and common law cases.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "178 F.Supp.2d 961, 979", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he Iowa Supreme Court has consistently sought guidance in its common-law retaliatory discharge cases from its decisions involving claims of statutory retaliation, which further demonstrates that the Iowa Supreme Court would analyze these distinct causes of action in a similar manner.\"", "sentence": "See Teachout, 584 N.W.2d at 301-02 (stating high causation standard for tortious discharge and comparing to Hulme, a retaliatory discharge case under the ICRA); see also Brown v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 961, 979 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (“[T]he Iowa Supreme Court has consistently sought guidance in its common-law retaliatory discharge cases from its decisions involving claims of statutory retaliation, which further demonstrates that the Iowa Supreme Court would analyze these distinct causes of action in a similar manner.”); cf. Scott Rosenberg & Jeffrey Lipman, Developing a Consistent Standard for Evaluating a Retaliation Case Under Federal and State Civil Rights Statutes and State Common Law Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53 Drake L. Rev. 359, 414-15 (2005) (“The federal courts have used the same approach in defining actionable employment conduct in both statutory and common law cases.”)." }