Datasets:

lighteval

/

LegalSupport

like 1

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "431 F.3d 744, 749", "parenthetical": "holding that, \"whether a previous conviction is a 'crime of violence' is a question of law, not of fact, as it must be determined by interpreting [SS 4B1.2]\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that, “whether a previous conviction is a ‘crime of violence’ is a question of law, not of fact, as it must be determined by interpreting [§ 4B1.2]”); see also United States v. Gallegos-Aguero, 409 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the defendant’s argument that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, must determine whether his prior conviction is within the category of offenses specified in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) was without merit)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "409 F.3d 1274, 1277", "parenthetical": "holding that the defendant's argument that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, must determine whether his prior conviction is within the category of offenses specified in SS 2L1.2(b", "sentence": "See United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that, “whether a previous conviction is a ‘crime of violence’ is a question of law, not of fact, as it must be determined by interpreting [§ 4B1.2]”); see also United States v. Gallegos-Aguero, 409 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that the defendant’s argument that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, must determine whether his prior conviction is within the category of offenses specified in § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) was without merit)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "452 U.S. 89, 99", "parenthetical": "\"prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.\"", "sentence": "Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (internal citation and punctuation omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.\"", "sentence": "Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (internal citation and punctuation omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.\"", "sentence": "Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (internal citation and punctuation omitted)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.\"", "sentence": "Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (internal citation and punctuation omitted)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.\"", "sentence": "Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (internal citation and punctuation omitted)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.\"", "sentence": "Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981) (“prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.”); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (internal citation and punctuation omitted)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "90 F.3d 255, 259", "parenthetical": "holding that it was not error to deny a motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding a defense motion to compel the government to file a departure motion where, among other things, \"the FBI questioned [the defendant's] candor____\"", "sentence": "United States v. Nicolace, 90 F.3d 255, 259 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that it was not error to deny a motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding a defense motion to compel the government to file a departure motion where, among other things, “the FBI questioned [the defendant’s] candor____”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "90 F.3d 1332, 1339", "parenthetical": "the defendant was not entitled to reduction of the sentence for substantial assistance where, among other things, the prosecutor told the district judge that \"the assistance ... turned, out to be unreliable.\"", "sentence": "See also United States v. Johnigan, 90 F.3d 1332, 1339 (8th Cir.1996) (the defendant was not entitled to reduction of the sentence for substantial assistance where, among other things, the prosecutor told the district judge that “the assistance ... turned, out to be unreliable.”)" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "503 U.S. 140, 149", "parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "457 U.S. 508, 508", "parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "457 U.S. 508, 508", "parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "457 U.S. 508, 508", "parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "503 U.S. 140, 149", "parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "refusing to require exhaustion for SS 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "declining to extend SS 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions", "sentence": "Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRI-PA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "168 Ariz. 169, 173-74", "parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "118 Ariz. 357, 359", "parenthetical": "indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "168 Ariz. 169, 173-74", "parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "576 P.2d 1357, 1359", "parenthetical": "indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "168 Ariz. 169, 173-74", "parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "177 Ariz. 94, 100", "parenthetical": "invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating \"adult live entertainment establishments\"", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "865 P.2d 138, 144", "parenthetical": "invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating \"adult live entertainment establishments\"", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "168 Ariz. 169, 173-74", "parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "812 P.2d 987, 991-92", "parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "118 Ariz. 357, 359", "parenthetical": "indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "812 P.2d 987, 991-92", "parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "576 P.2d 1357, 1359", "parenthetical": "indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "812 P.2d 987, 991-92", "parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "177 Ariz. 94, 100", "parenthetical": "invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating \"adult live entertainment establishments\"", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "865 P.2d 138, 144", "parenthetical": "invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating \"adult live entertainment establishments\"", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "812 P.2d 987, 991-92", "parenthetical": "prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds", "sentence": "See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 173-74, 812 P.2d 987, 991-92 (1991) (prior Scottsdale city ordinance banning certain striptease performances held void on First Amendment grounds); cf. State v. Gates, 118 Ariz. 357, 359, 576 P.2d 1357, 1359 (1978) (indecent exposure statute may not under the First Amendment be applied to theater and dance); State v. Jones, 177 Ariz. 94, 100, 865 P.2d 138, 144 (App.1993) (invalidating Maricopa County zoning ordinance regulating “adult live entertainment establishments”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "139 Vt. 485, 485-86", "parenthetical": "noting \"[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage\"", "sentence": "Sidway, 139 Vt. at 485-86, 431 A.2d at 1239-40 (noting “[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage”). Thus, the trial court’s instruction on constructive knowledge, allowing the jury to impute to defendant knowledge that a reasonable investigation of the circumstances of the accident would reveal, was consistent with the spirit and doctrine of our decision in Sidway, and did not constitute reversible error." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "154 Vt. 76, 81", "parenthetical": "we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the \"true spirit and doctrine of the law\" to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused", "sentence": "See State v. Williams, 154 Vt. 76, 81, 574 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1990) (we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the “true spirit and doctrine of the law” to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "574 A.2d 1264, 1267", "parenthetical": "we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the \"true spirit and doctrine of the law\" to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused", "sentence": "See State v. Williams, 154 Vt. 76, 81, 574 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1990) (we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the “true spirit and doctrine of the law” to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "139 Vt. 485, 485-86", "parenthetical": "noting \"[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage\"", "sentence": "Sidway, 139 Vt. at 485-86, 431 A.2d at 1239-40 (noting “[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage”). Thus, the trial court’s instruction on constructive knowledge, allowing the jury to impute to defendant knowledge that a reasonable investigation of the circumstances of the accident would reveal, was consistent with the spirit and doctrine of our decision in Sidway, and did not constitute reversible error." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "154 Vt. 76, 81", "parenthetical": "we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the \"true spirit and doctrine of the law\" to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused", "sentence": "See State v. Williams, 154 Vt. 76, 81, 574 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1990) (we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the “true spirit and doctrine of the law” to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "431 A.2d 1239, 1239-40", "parenthetical": "noting \"[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage\"", "sentence": "Sidway, 139 Vt. at 485-86, 431 A.2d at 1239-40 (noting “[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage”). Thus, the trial court’s instruction on constructive knowledge, allowing the jury to impute to defendant knowledge that a reasonable investigation of the circumstances of the accident would reveal, was consistent with the spirit and doctrine of our decision in Sidway, and did not constitute reversible error." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "574 A.2d 1264, 1267", "parenthetical": "we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the \"true spirit and doctrine of the law\" to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused", "sentence": "See State v. Williams, 154 Vt. 76, 81, 574 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1990) (we review substance of jury instructions to determine if the challenged instruction captures the “true spirit and doctrine of the law” to ensure that the jury has not been misled or confused)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "431 A.2d 1239, 1239-40", "parenthetical": "noting \"[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage\"", "sentence": "Sidway, 139 Vt. at 485-86, 431 A.2d at 1239-40 (noting “[i]t is not necessary to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had actual knowledge of any resultant injury or damage”). Thus, the trial court’s instruction on constructive knowledge, allowing the jury to impute to defendant knowledge that a reasonable investigation of the circumstances of the accident would reveal, was consistent with the spirit and doctrine of our decision in Sidway, and did not constitute reversible error." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "witness, who was subpoenaed to appear before prosecuting attorney, was put under oath and required to testify before court reporter in nonadversarial setting", "sentence": "See also Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991 (Fla.1993) (witness, who was subpoenaed to appear before prosecuting attorney, was put under oath and required to testify before court reporter in nonadversarial setting)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "prior statement made under oath to prosecutor and deputy in presence of court reporter", "sentence": "See State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306 (Fla.1990) (prior statement made under oath to prosecutor and deputy in presence of court reporter)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice where definition of \"premeditation\" was not substantively different from court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice where definition of \"premeditation\" was not substantively different from court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice where definition of \"premeditation\" was not substantively different from court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice where definition of \"premeditation\" was not substantively different from court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice where definitions of \"keep\" and \"control\" did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court's instructions", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice where definitions of \"keep\" and \"control\" did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court's instructions", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice where definitions of \"keep\" and \"control\" did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court's instructions", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "no prejudice where definitions of \"keep\" and \"control\" did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court's instructions", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "new trial warranted where dictionary definition of \"proximate cause\" did not contain foreseeability element contained in court's instruction", "sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Messenger, 221 Mich.App. 171, 561 N.W.2d 463 (1997) (no prejudice where definition of “premeditation” was not substantively different from court’s instruction); State v. Melton, 102 N.M. 120, 692 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1984) (no prejudice where definitions of “keep” and “control” did not vary from usual ordinary meaning or from trial court’s instructions); see also Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (new trial warranted where dictionary definition of “proximate cause” did not contain foreseeability element contained in court’s instruction) (two justices dissented and would have upheld trial court’s denial of mistrial motion based on lack of prejudice)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "2008 WL 5412782, *2", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave\" where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. SS 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "454 F.3d 549, 554-55", "parenthetical": "termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA\"", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "2007 WL 1026954, *5", "parenthetical": "finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference\" where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "454 F.3d 549, 554-55", "parenthetical": "termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA\"", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "458 F.3d 1282, 1286", "parenthetical": "termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "2008 WL 5412782, *2", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave\" where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. SS 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "458 F.3d 1282, 1286", "parenthetical": "termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "2007 WL 1026954, *5", "parenthetical": "finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference\" where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "2008 WL 5412782, *2", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave\" where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. SS 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553", "parenthetical": "describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553", "parenthetical": "describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "2007 WL 1026954, *5", "parenthetical": "finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference\" where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "257 F.3d 373, 383", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "2008 WL 5412782, *2", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave\" where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. SS 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "2007 WL 1026954, *5", "parenthetical": "finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference\" where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "257 F.3d 373, 383", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].\" (emphasis added", "sentence": "See Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir.2006) (stating that 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) \"requires” that the employer allow the employee at least 15 days to respond to the medical certification request); see also Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tenn., Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.2006) (termination of employee six days into 15-day compliance period \"was clearly a violation of the FMLA”); Cooper v. Fulton County, 458 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (termination of employee before the lapse of the 15-day compliance period deemed impermissible under FMLA); Muhammad v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 182 Fed.Appx. 551, 553 (7th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (describing the 15-day compliance period as a prerequisite to adverse employment action); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 383 (4th Cir.2001) (\"[T]he employer must allow the employee at least fifteen calendar days to submit [certification].” (emphasis added)); but see Young v. Russell Corp., No. 2:08-CV-148, 2008 WL 5412782, *2 (M.D.Ala. Dec. 29, 2008) (noting that “[i]f the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA leave” where employee was afforded full 15-day period and failed to comply (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.311(b) (2003)) (alteration in original)); Tippens v. Airnet Sys., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-421, 2007 WL 1026954, *5 (S.D.Ohio Mar.30, 2007) (finding that failure to submit medical certification was \"fatal to a claim of FMLA interference” where employer granted temporary approval until lapse of 15-day period)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "149 F.3d 931, 931", "parenthetical": "affirming the district court's conclusion that petitioner did not have an available state court remedy for claim that had never before been presented to the state courts despite opportunity", "sentence": "See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (finding no available state court remedies and noting that petitioner did not raise any exceptions to Rule 32.2(a)); see also Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931 (affirming the district court’s conclusion that petitioner did not have an available state court remedy for claim that had never before been presented to the state courts despite opportunity)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding no available state court remedies and noting that petitioner did not raise any exceptions to Rule 32.2(a", "sentence": "See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 & n. 5 (9th Cir.2002) (finding no available state court remedies and noting that petitioner did not raise any exceptions to Rule 32.2(a)); see also Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 931 (affirming the district court’s conclusion that petitioner did not have an available state court remedy for claim that had never before been presented to the state courts despite opportunity)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "170 F.3d 734, 742", "parenthetical": "sandbagging problem identified in Thomas may be cured with adequate notice to the district judge of the contested issues", "sentence": "See Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d at 598 (citing Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985)); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-18 (7th Cir.1988) (holding the rationale of Thomas requires waiver to apply to each issue not included in an objection); see also Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 742 (7th Cir.1999) (sandbagging problem identified in Thomas may be cured with adequate notice to the district judge of the contested issues)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "843 F.2d 1015, 1017-18", "parenthetical": "holding the rationale of Thomas requires waiver to apply to each issue not included in an objection", "sentence": "See Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d at 598 (citing Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985)); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-18 (7th Cir.1988) (holding the rationale of Thomas requires waiver to apply to each issue not included in an objection); see also Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 742 (7th Cir.1999) (sandbagging problem identified in Thomas may be cured with adequate notice to the district judge of the contested issues)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "175 Ariz. 14, 14", "parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "142 Ariz. 332, 335", "parenthetical": "holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure \"is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "175 Ariz. 14, 14", "parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "690 P.2d 51, 54", "parenthetical": "holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure \"is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "175 Ariz. 14, 14", "parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting \"as soon as practicable\" under the federal Freedom of Information Act's (\"FOIA\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "852 P.2d 1198, 1198", "parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "142 Ariz. 332, 335", "parenthetical": "holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure \"is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "690 P.2d 51, 54", "parenthetical": "holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure \"is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "852 P.2d 1198, 1198", "parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting \"as soon as practicable\" under the federal Freedom of Information Act's (\"FOIA\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "852 P.2d 1198, 1198", "parenthetical": "holding that the \"burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.\"", "sentence": "See Cox, 175 Ariz. at 14, 852 P.2d at 1198 (holding that the “burden fell squarely upon [the Maricopa County Attorney], as a public official, to overcome the legal presumption favoring disclosure.”); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 142 Ariz. 332, 335, 690 P.2d 51, 54 (1984) (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure “is on the party that seeks non-disclosure rather than on the party that seeks access”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.Supp.2d 30, 40 n. 8 (D.D.C.2006) (placing the burden of proof on the government agency to show that it is acting “as soon as practicable” under the federal Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) expedited processing provision)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2667, 2667-71", "parenthetical": "applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors' prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "561 U.S. 1, 28", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2667, 2667-71", "parenthetical": "applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors' prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "131 S.Ct. 2667, 2667-71", "parenthetical": "applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors' prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "561 U.S. 1, 28", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24", "parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24", "parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24", "parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "561 U.S. 1, 28", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76", "parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76", "parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76", "parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "561 U.S. 1, 28", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724", "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that when \"conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,\" First Amendment scrutiny still applies", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny", "sentence": "See Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2667-71 (applying intermediate First Amendment scrutiny to a law prohibiting pharmacies from selling records of doctors’ prescribing patterns to pharmaceutical salespeople); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 623-24, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2374, 2375-76, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (subjecting a regulation prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain forms of direct advertising to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (recognizing that when “conduct triggering coverage under the statute consists of communicating a message,” First Amendment scrutiny still applies)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "145 F.3d 657, 657", "parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "434 F.3d 733, 748", "parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "145 F.3d 657, 657", "parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "145 F.3d 657, 657", "parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "411 F.3d 474, 501", "parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "434 F.3d 733, 748", "parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "411 F.3d 474, 501", "parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "411 F.3d 474, 501", "parenthetical": "addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that a plaintiff \"must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred\"", "sentence": "Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. Therefore, “by definition,” id., “a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of [him] engaging in protected activity,” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir.2005) (addressing the causal connection prong in a retaliation claim in a First Amendment context); see also Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 748 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a plaintiff “must be able to show that the relevant [employer] officials [be] aware of [the protected activity] at the time the alleged retaliation occurred”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 659, 166 L.Ed.2d 512 (2006); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803-04 (4th Cir.1998) (same)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "387 F.3d 201, 209", "parenthetical": "recognizing that defendant's attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent", "sentence": "See United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 906-07 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that defendant’s knowledge of and intent to participate in a criminal conspiracy may be established through circumstantial evidence, “including] acts that exhibit a consciousness of guilt”); see also United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing that defendant’s attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "987 F.2d 902, 906-07", "parenthetical": "holding that defendant's knowledge of and intent to participate in a criminal conspiracy may be established through circumstantial evidence, \"including] acts that exhibit a consciousness of guilt\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Gordon, 987 F.2d 902, 906-07 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that defendant’s knowledge of and intent to participate in a criminal conspiracy may be established through circumstantial evidence, “including] acts that exhibit a consciousness of guilt”); see also United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing that defendant’s attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "505 N.W.2d 299, 312", "parenthetical": "standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "508 U.S. 640, 640", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "492 N.W.2d 539, 547", "parenthetical": "constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "505 N.W.2d 299, 312", "parenthetical": "standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "492 N.W.2d 539, 547", "parenthetical": "constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2289, 2289", "parenthetical": "given that employer's due process arguments are unavailing, \"it would be surprising indeed to discover\" that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause", "sentence": "See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer’s due process arguments are unavailing, “it would be surprising indeed to discover” that legislation nonetheless violates takings clause); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does not violate equal protection, it does not violate substantive due process either); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (standard applied to claims brought under state equal protection clause same as that applied to claims brought under federal equal protection clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d 539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional challenge under either due process or equal protection of federal or state constitutions raise similar questions)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "417 U.S. 333, 342", "parenthetical": "holding that a SS 2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law", "sentence": "Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974) (holding that a § 2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "901 F.2d 5, 6", "parenthetical": "\"We note that certain other claims raised in the SS 2255 motion were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated under a different label on collateral review.\"", "sentence": "Cf. Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir.1993) (“‘[Ijssues disposed of in a prior appeal will not be reviewed again by way of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.’ ”) (quoting Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862, 864 (1st Cir.1967)); United States v. Michaud, 901 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir.1990)(“We note that certain other claims raised in the § 2255 motion were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated under a different label on collateral review.”)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "901 F.2d 5, 6", "parenthetical": "\"We note that certain other claims raised in the SS 2255 motion were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated under a different label on collateral review.\"", "sentence": "Cf. Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir.1993) (“‘[Ijssues disposed of in a prior appeal will not be reviewed again by way of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.’ ”) (quoting Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862, 864 (1st Cir.1967)); United States v. Michaud, 901 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir.1990)(“We note that certain other claims raised in the § 2255 motion were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated under a different label on collateral review.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a SS 2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law", "sentence": "Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974) (holding that a § 2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "901 F.2d 5, 6", "parenthetical": "\"We note that certain other claims raised in the SS 2255 motion were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated under a different label on collateral review.\"", "sentence": "Cf. Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240 (1st Cir.1993) (“‘[Ijssues disposed of in a prior appeal will not be reviewed again by way of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.’ ”) (quoting Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862, 864 (1st Cir.1967)); United States v. Michaud, 901 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir.1990)(“We note that certain other claims raised in the § 2255 motion were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated under a different label on collateral review.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "holding that a SS 2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law", "sentence": "Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974) (holding that a § 2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in the law)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "154 F.3d 29, 29", "parenthetical": "relying on \"the affidavits and other material submitted by the parties\"", "sentence": "See 154 F.3d at 29 (relying on \"the affidavits and other material submitted by the parties\"); cf. Jacobs v. Patent Enforcement Fund, Inc., 230 F.3d 565, 567 (2d Cir.2000) (relying on briefs and affidavits that the parties submitted in response to the Court's request for supplemental briefing)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "230 F.3d 565, 567", "parenthetical": "relying on briefs and affidavits that the parties submitted in response to the Court's request for supplemental briefing", "sentence": "See 154 F.3d at 29 (relying on \"the affidavits and other material submitted by the parties\"); cf. Jacobs v. Patent Enforcement Fund, Inc., 230 F.3d 565, 567 (2d Cir.2000) (relying on briefs and affidavits that the parties submitted in response to the Court's request for supplemental briefing)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "534 F.2d 719, 731", "parenthetical": "where client makes his attorney a witness to the crime by giving him money, the client may not invoke the sixth amendment to bar the attorney's testimony at trial", "sentence": "United States v. Wilson, 571 F.Supp. 1417, 1422 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (not an infringement of sixth amendment unless legal strategy would be disclosed); see In re Grand Jury Witness (Waxman), 695 F.2d 359, 363 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam); In re Grand Jury Proc., Des Moines, Iowa, 568 F.2d 555, 558 (8th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999, 98 S.Ct. 1656, 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 65-66 (2d Cir.1977); see also In re January 1976 Grand Jury (Gensen), 534 F.2d 719, 731 (7th Cir.1976) (where client makes his attorney a witness to the crime by giving him money, the client may not invoke the sixth amendment to bar the attorney’s testimony at trial)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "571 F.Supp. 1417, 1422", "parenthetical": "not an infringement of sixth amendment unless legal strategy would be disclosed", "sentence": "United States v. Wilson, 571 F.Supp. 1417, 1422 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (not an infringement of sixth amendment unless legal strategy would be disclosed); see In re Grand Jury Witness (Waxman), 695 F.2d 359, 363 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam); In re Grand Jury Proc., Des Moines, Iowa, 568 F.2d 555, 558 (8th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999, 98 S.Ct. 1656, 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978); United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 65-66 (2d Cir.1977); see also In re January 1976 Grand Jury (Gensen), 534 F.2d 719, 731 (7th Cir.1976) (where client makes his attorney a witness to the crime by giving him money, the client may not invoke the sixth amendment to bar the attorney’s testimony at trial)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "564 F.3d 943, 943", "parenthetical": "treating physician's opinion that claimant was disabled was not inconsistent with the fact that her \"schizoaffective disorder was in remission,\" because physician's notes \"do not indicate that [physician] believed she was sufficiently stable to return to work, even if she was compliant with recommended treatment and medication.\"", "sentence": "See Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 943 (treating physician’s opinion that claimant was disabled was not inconsistent with the fact that her “schizoaffective disorder was in remission,” because physician’s notes “do not indicate that [physician] believed she was sufficiently stable to return to work, even if she was compliant with recommended treatment and medication.”); see also Hutsell v. Massanari, 259 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir.2001) (“We also believe the Commissioner erroneously relied too heavily on indications in the medical record that Hutsel was ‘doing well,’ because doing well for the purposes of a treatment program has no necessary relation to a claimant’s ability to work or to her work-related functional capacity.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "259 F.3d 707, 712", "parenthetical": "\"We also believe the Commissioner erroneously relied too heavily on indications in the medical record that Hutsel was 'doing well,' because doing well for the purposes of a treatment program has no necessary relation to a claimant's ability to work or to her work-related functional capacity.\"", "sentence": "See Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 943 (treating physician’s opinion that claimant was disabled was not inconsistent with the fact that her “schizoaffective disorder was in remission,” because physician’s notes “do not indicate that [physician] believed she was sufficiently stable to return to work, even if she was compliant with recommended treatment and medication.”); see also Hutsell v. Massanari, 259 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir.2001) (“We also believe the Commissioner erroneously relied too heavily on indications in the medical record that Hutsel was ‘doing well,’ because doing well for the purposes of a treatment program has no necessary relation to a claimant’s ability to work or to her work-related functional capacity.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "166 P.3d 55, 60", "parenthetical": "records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "726 N.W.2d 176, 184", "parenthetical": "document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "166 P.3d 55, 60", "parenthetical": "records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "166 P.3d 55, 60", "parenthetical": "records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "900 So.2d 615, 617", "parenthetical": "a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "900 So.2d 615, 617", "parenthetical": "a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "726 N.W.2d 176, 184", "parenthetical": "document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "900 So.2d 615, 617", "parenthetical": "a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial", "sentence": "See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct.App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P.3d 471, 480 (Ct.App.2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 278 Ga.App. 162, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2006) (same); State v. Marshall, 114 Hawai'i 396, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Ct.App.2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 149-50 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (same); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (same); State v. Carter, 326 Mont. 427, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (Law Div.2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 136 N.M. 561, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (2004) (same); People v. Kanhai, 8 Misc.3d 447, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.2005) (same); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P.3d 15, 18 (2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct.App.2006) (same); but see Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (a record of the date that maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "345 Md. 469, 469", "parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868", "sentence": "Smith, supra, 345 Md. at 469, 693 A.2d 749 (“Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "88 Md.App. 276, 287", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"", "sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "345 Md. 469, 469", "parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868", "sentence": "Smith, supra, 345 Md. at 469, 693 A.2d 749 (“Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"", "sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "88 Md.App. 276, 287", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"", "sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868", "sentence": "Smith, supra, 345 Md. at 469, 693 A.2d 749 (“Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"", "sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868", "sentence": "Smith, supra, 345 Md. at 469, 693 A.2d 749 (“Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "88 Md.App. 276, 287", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"", "sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "392 U.S. 30, 30-31", "parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868", "sentence": "Smith, supra, 345 Md. at 469, 693 A.2d 749 (“Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"", "sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "392 U.S. 30, 30-31", "parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868", "sentence": "Smith, supra, 345 Md. at 469, 693 A.2d 749 (“Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868))." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868", "sentence": "Smith, supra, 345 Md. at 469, 693 A.2d 749 (“Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "88 Md.App. 276, 287", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"", "sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.\" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868", "sentence": "Smith, supra, 345 Md. at 469, 693 A.2d 749 (“Where the pat-down reveals a hard object that the police officer reasonably believes may be a weapon, the officer may further intrude upon the individual to the extent necessary to seize the suspected weapon.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.\"", "sentence": "See also Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 287, 594 A.2d 1167 (1991) (“[I]f the pat-down reveals a hard object which could be a weapon, a further search is allowed.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to 'contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,' 9 U.S.C. SS 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that SS 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. SS 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern '[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization\" under the federal labor laws.\"", "sentence": "Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2008); 9 U.S.C. § 1; 29 U.S.C. § 185. Yet, federal courts enforcing labor arbitration awards look to the FAA “to guide the development of rules of federal common law to govern such disputes pursuant to the authority to develop such rules granted under 29 U.S.C. § 185.” Supreme Oil, 568 F.Supp.2d at 406; United Paperworkers Int’l v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 n. 9, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (stating that “[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to ‘contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,’ 9 U.S.C. § 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” under the federal labor laws.”); see also Teamsters Local 814 Welfare Fund v. Dahill Moving & Storage Co., No. 07-CV-2005, 2007 WL 1580085, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2007 WL 1580085, at *1", "parenthetical": "confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA", "sentence": "Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2008); 9 U.S.C. § 1; 29 U.S.C. § 185. Yet, federal courts enforcing labor arbitration awards look to the FAA “to guide the development of rules of federal common law to govern such disputes pursuant to the authority to develop such rules granted under 29 U.S.C. § 185.” Supreme Oil, 568 F.Supp.2d at 406; United Paperworkers Int’l v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 n. 9, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (stating that “[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to ‘contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,’ 9 U.S.C. § 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” under the federal labor laws.”); see also Teamsters Local 814 Welfare Fund v. Dahill Moving & Storage Co., No. 07-CV-2005, 2007 WL 1580085, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to 'contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,' 9 U.S.C. SS 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that SS 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. SS 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern '[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization\" under the federal labor laws.\"", "sentence": "Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2008); 9 U.S.C. § 1; 29 U.S.C. § 185. Yet, federal courts enforcing labor arbitration awards look to the FAA “to guide the development of rules of federal common law to govern such disputes pursuant to the authority to develop such rules granted under 29 U.S.C. § 185.” Supreme Oil, 568 F.Supp.2d at 406; United Paperworkers Int’l v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 n. 9, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (stating that “[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to ‘contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,’ 9 U.S.C. § 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” under the federal labor laws.”); see also Teamsters Local 814 Welfare Fund v. Dahill Moving & Storage Co., No. 07-CV-2005, 2007 WL 1580085, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2007 WL 1580085, at *1", "parenthetical": "confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA", "sentence": "Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2008); 9 U.S.C. § 1; 29 U.S.C. § 185. Yet, federal courts enforcing labor arbitration awards look to the FAA “to guide the development of rules of federal common law to govern such disputes pursuant to the authority to develop such rules granted under 29 U.S.C. § 185.” Supreme Oil, 568 F.Supp.2d at 406; United Paperworkers Int’l v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 n. 9, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (stating that “[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to ‘contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,’ 9 U.S.C. § 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” under the federal labor laws.”); see also Teamsters Local 814 Welfare Fund v. Dahill Moving & Storage Co., No. 07-CV-2005, 2007 WL 1580085, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "2007 WL 1580085, at *1", "parenthetical": "confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA", "sentence": "Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2008); 9 U.S.C. § 1; 29 U.S.C. § 185. Yet, federal courts enforcing labor arbitration awards look to the FAA “to guide the development of rules of federal common law to govern such disputes pursuant to the authority to develop such rules granted under 29 U.S.C. § 185.” Supreme Oil, 568 F.Supp.2d at 406; United Paperworkers Int’l v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 n. 9, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (stating that “[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to ‘contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,’ 9 U.S.C. § 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” under the federal labor laws.”); see also Teamsters Local 814 Welfare Fund v. Dahill Moving & Storage Co., No. 07-CV-2005, 2007 WL 1580085, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to 'contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,' 9 U.S.C. SS 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that SS 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. SS 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern '[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization\" under the federal labor laws.\"", "sentence": "Supreme Oil Co. v. Abondolo, 568 F.Supp.2d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2008); 9 U.S.C. § 1; 29 U.S.C. § 185. Yet, federal courts enforcing labor arbitration awards look to the FAA “to guide the development of rules of federal common law to govern such disputes pursuant to the authority to develop such rules granted under 29 U.S.C. § 185.” Supreme Oil, 568 F.Supp.2d at 406; United Paperworkers Int’l v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 n. 9, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (stating that “[t]he [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply to ‘contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,’ 9 U.S.C. § 1, but the federal courts have often looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases, especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185, empowers the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common law to govern ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” under the federal labor laws.”); see also Teamsters Local 814 Welfare Fund v. Dahill Moving & Storage Co., No. 07-CV-2005, 2007 WL 1580085, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2007) (confirming an arbitration award under the LMRA and explicitly looking to the procedure for confirming an arbitration award under the FAA)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "114 B.R. 794, 797", "parenthetical": "Undervaluation of assets which are otherwise properly listed in a debtor's schedules is not sufficient to warrant a denial of discharge", "sentence": "See also In re Wines, 114 B.R. 794, 797 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1990)(Undervaluation of assets which are otherwise properly listed in a debtor’s schedules is not sufficient to warrant a denial of discharge). This argument is not applicable to the facts of this case." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "41 B.R. 816, 819", "parenthetical": "Failure of the debtor to properly value two automobiles on his schedules was an insufficient ground for discharge since the automobiles were disclosed on debt- or's schedules to the Trustee who was afforded an opportunity to make an independent appraisal of their value", "sentence": "See In re Blum, 41 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1984)(Failure of the debtor to properly value two automobiles on his schedules was an insufficient ground for discharge since the automobiles were disclosed on debt- or’s schedules to the Trustee who was afforded an opportunity to make an independent appraisal of their value)." }