pwm: atmel-tcb: add missing clk source config

Clock source changes are never applied to the CMR register.
This may lead to wrong period/duty cycle configuration.

Signed-off-by: Boris BREZILLON <b.brezillon@overkiz.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@atmel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
pwm: atmel-tcb: fix max time computation for slow clk source

Use the the tcb counter width to compute the maximum time that can be
represented using the slow clock source instead of the static 16 bit width.

Signed-off-by: Boris BREZILLON <b.brezillon@overkiz.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@atmel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
nfsd: switch to %p[dD]

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
pwm: imx: Include linux/of.h header

'of_match_ptr' is defined in linux/of.h. Include it explicitly.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
pwm: samsung: Include linux/of.h header

'of_match_ptr' is defined in linux/of.h. Include it explicitly.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
pwm: twl-led: Include linux/of.h header

'of_match_ptr' is defined in linux/of.h. Include it explicitly.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
pwm: twl: Include linux/of.h header

'of_match_ptr' is defined in linux/of.h. Include it explicitly.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
pwm: mxs: Remove redundant of_match_ptr

The data structure of_match_ptr() protects is always compiled in.
Hence of_match_ptr() is not needed.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
pwm: lpc32xx: Remove redundant of_match_ptr

The data structure of_match_ptr() protects is always compiled in.
Hence of_match_ptr() is not needed.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexandre Pereira da Silva <aletes.xgr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
pwm: imx: Remove redundant of_match_ptr

The data structure of_match_ptr() protects is always compiled in.
Hence of_match_ptr() is not needed.

Signed-off-by: Sachin Kamat <sachin.kamat@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <thierry.reding@gmail.com>
svcrpc: fix gss-proxy NULL dereference in some error cases

We depend on the xdr decoder to set this pointer, but if we error out
before we decode this piece it could be left NULL.

I think this is probably tough to hit without a buggy gss-proxy.

Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
svcrpc: fix error-handling on badd gssproxy downcall

For every other problem here we bail out with an error, but here for
some reason we're setting a negative cache entry (with, note, an
undefined expiry).

It seems simplest just to bail out in the same way as we do in other
cases.

Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
tracing: Show more exact help information about snapshot

The current "help" that comes out of the snapshot file when it is
not allocated looks like this:

 # * Snapshot is freed *
 #
 # Snapshot commands:
 # echo 0 > snapshot : Clears and frees snapshot buffer
 # echo 1 > snapshot : Allocates snapshot buffer, if not already allocated.
 #                      Takes a snapshot of the main buffer.
 # echo 2 > snapshot : Clears snapshot buffer (but does not allocate)
 #                      (Doesn't have to be '2' works with any number that
 #                       is not a '0' or '1')

Echo 2 says that it does not allocate the buffer, which is correct,
but to be more consistent with "echo 0" it should also state
that it does not free.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130914045916.GA4243@udknight

Signed-off-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
svcrpc: handle some gssproxy encoding errors

Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
gss_krb5: document that we ignore sequence number

A couple times recently somebody has noticed that we're ignoring a
sequence number here and wondered whether there's a bug.

In fact, there's not.  Thanks to Andy Adamson for pointing out a useful
explanation in rfc 2203.  Add comments citing that rfc, and remove
"seqnum" to prevent static checkers complaining about unused variables.

Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
random: mix in architectural randomness earlier in extract_buf()

Previously if CPU chip had a built-in random number generator (i.e.,
RDRAND on newer x86 chips), we mixed it in at the very end of
extract_buf() using an XOR operation.

We now mix it in right after the calculate a hash across the entire
pool.  This has the advantage that any contribution of entropy from
the CPU's HWRNG will get mixed back into the pool.  In addition, it
means that if the HWRNG has any defects (either accidentally or
maliciously introduced), this will be mitigated via the non-linear
transform of the SHA-1 hash function before we hand out generated
output.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
random: statically compute poolbitshift, poolbytes, poolbits

Use a macro to statically compute poolbitshift (will be used in a
subsequent patch), poolbytes, and poolbits.  On virtually all
architectures the cost of a memory load with an offset is the same as
the one of a memory load.

It is still possible for this to generate worse code since the C
compiler doesn't know the fixed relationship between these fields, but
that is somewhat unlikely.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
random: allow fractional bits to be tracked

Allow fractional bits of entropy to be tracked by scaling the entropy
counter (fixed point).  This will be used in a subsequent patch that
accounts for entropy lost due to overwrites.

[ Modified by tytso to fix up a few missing places where the
  entropy_count wasn't properly converted from fractional bits to
  bits. ]

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
random: account for entropy loss due to overwrites

When we write entropy into a non-empty pool, we currently don't
account at all for the fact that we will probabilistically overwrite
some of the entropy in that pool.  This means that unless the pool is
fully empty, we are currently *guaranteed* to overestimate the amount
of entropy in the pool!

Assuming Shannon entropy with zero correlations we end up with an
exponentally decaying value of new entropy added:

	entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) *
		(1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size))

However, calculations involving fractional exponentials are not
practical in the kernel, so apply a piecewise linearization:

	  For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then

	  (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >= (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869...

	  ... so we can approximate the exponential with
	  3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the
	  safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time.

In order for the loop not to take arbitrary amounts of time if a bad
ioctl is received, terminate if we are within one bit of full.  This
way the loop is guaranteed to terminate after no more than
log2(poolsize) iterations, no matter what the input value is.  The
vast majority of the time the loop will be executed exactly once.

The piecewise linearization is very conservative, approaching 3/4 of
the usable input value for small inputs, however, our entropy
estimation is pretty weak at best, especially for small values; we
have no handle on correlation; and the Shannon entropy measure (Rényi
entropy of order 1) is not the correct one to use in the first place,
but rather the correct entropy measure is the min-entropy, the Rényi
entropy of infinite order.

As such, this conservatism seems more than justified.

This does introduce fractional bit values.  I have left it to have 3
bits of fraction, so that with a pool of 2^12 bits the multiply in
credit_entropy_bits() can still fit into an int, as 2*(3+12) < 31.  It
is definitely possible to allow for more fractional accounting, but
that multiply then would have to be turned into a 32*32 -> 64 multiply.

Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: DJ Johnston <dj.johnston@intel.com>
random: fix the tracepoint for get_random_bytes(_arch)

Fix a problem where get_random_bytes_arch() was calling the tracepoint
get_random_bytes().  So add a new tracepoint for
get_random_bytes_arch(), and make get_random_bytes() and
get_random_bytes_arch() call their correct tracepoint.

Also, add a new tracepoint for add_device_randomness()

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>