erikanesse/great_books · Datasets at Hugging Face

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in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of
soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions, As on the other hand
it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that
we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near
resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different,
that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and
assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.[1]

[1] I here make use of these terms, _impression and idea_, in a
sense different from what is usual, and I hope this liberty will be
allowed me. Perhaps I rather restore the word, idea, to its
original sense, from which Mr Locke had perverted it, in making it
stand for all our perceptions. By the terms of impression I would
not be understood to express the manner, in which our lively
perceptions are produced in the soul, but merely the perceptions
themselves; for which there is no particular name either in the
_English_ or any other language, that I know of.

There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be
convenient to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions
and ideas. This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions
or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor
separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be
distinguished into parts. Though a particular colour, taste, and smell,
are qualities all united together in this apple, it is easy to perceive
they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.

Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects,
we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their
qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is
the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other
particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one seem to
be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions
of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. When
I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact
representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance
of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my
other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation.
Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. This
circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a
moment.

Upon a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by
the first appearance, and that I must make use of the distinction of
perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision,
that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe, that many
of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them,
and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in
ideas. I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose
pavement is gold and walls are rubies, though I never saw any such.
I have seen Paris; but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that
city, as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their
real and just proportions?

I perceive, therefore, that though there is in general a great,
resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is
not universally true, that they are exact copies of each other. We may
next consider how the case stands with our simple, perceptions. After
the most accurate examination, of which I am capable, I venture to
affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception, and that every
simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it, and every
simple impression a correspondent idea. That idea of red, which we form
in the dark, and that impression which strikes our eyes in sun-shine,
differ only in degree, not in nature. That the case is the same with
all our simple impressions and ideas, it is impossible to prove by a
particular enumeration of them. Every one may satisfy himself in this
point by running over as many as he pleases. But if any one should deny
this universal resemblance, I know no way of convincing him, but by
desiring him to shew a simple impression, that has not a correspondent
idea, or a simple idea, that has not a correspondent impression. If he
does not answer this challenge, as it is certain he cannot, we may from
his silence and our own observation establish our conclusion.

Thus we find, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other;
and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm in general,
that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent. Having
discovered this relation, which requires no farther examination, I am
curious to find some other of their qualities. Let us consider how they
stand with regard to their existence, and which of the impressions and
ideas are causes, and which effects.

The full examination of this question is the subject of the present
treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with
establishing one general proposition, THAT ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS IN
THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE ARE DERIVED FROM SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS, WHICH ARE
CORRESPONDENT TO THEM, AND WHICH THEY EXACTLY REPRESENT.

In seeking for phenomena to prove this proposition, I find only those
of two kinds; but in each kind the phenomena are obvious, numerous, and
conclusive. I first make myself certain, by a new, review, of what I
have already asserted, that every simple impression is attended with
a correspondent idea, and every simple idea with a correspondent
impression. From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions
I immediately conclude, that there is a great connexion betwixt our
correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the one
has a considerable influence upon that of the other. Such a constant
conjunction, in such an infinite number of instances, can never arise
from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the
ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions. That I may know on which side
this dependence lies, I consider the order of their first appearance;

in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of

soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions, As on the other hand

it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that

we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near

resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different,

that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and

assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.[1]

[1] I here make use of these terms, _impression and idea_, in a

sense different from what is usual, and I hope this liberty will be

allowed me. Perhaps I rather restore the word, idea, to its

original sense, from which Mr Locke had perverted it, in making it

stand for all our perceptions. By the terms of impression I would

not be understood to express the manner, in which our lively

perceptions are produced in the soul, but merely the perceptions

themselves; for which there is no particular name either in the

_English_ or any other language, that I know of.

There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be

convenient to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions

and ideas. This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions

or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor

separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be

distinguished into parts. Though a particular colour, taste, and smell,

are qualities all united together in this apple, it is easy to perceive

they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.

Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects,

we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their

qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is

the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other

particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one seem to

be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions

of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. When

I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact

representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance

of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my

other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation.

Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. This

circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a

moment.

Upon a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by

the first appearance, and that I must make use of the distinction of

perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision,

that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe, that many

of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them,

and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in

ideas. I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose

pavement is gold and walls are rubies, though I never saw any such.

I have seen Paris; but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that

city, as will perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their

real and just proportions?

I perceive, therefore, that though there is in general a great,

resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is

not universally true, that they are exact copies of each other. We may

next consider how the case stands with our simple, perceptions. After

the most accurate examination, of which I am capable, I venture to

affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception, and that every

simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it, and every

simple impression a correspondent idea. That idea of red, which we form

in the dark, and that impression which strikes our eyes in sun-shine,

differ only in degree, not in nature. That the case is the same with

all our simple impressions and ideas, it is impossible to prove by a

particular enumeration of them. Every one may satisfy himself in this

point by running over as many as he pleases. But if any one should deny

this universal resemblance, I know no way of convincing him, but by

desiring him to shew a simple impression, that has not a correspondent

idea, or a simple idea, that has not a correspondent impression. If he

does not answer this challenge, as it is certain he cannot, we may from

his silence and our own observation establish our conclusion.

Thus we find, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other;

and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm in general,

that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent. Having

discovered this relation, which requires no farther examination, I am

curious to find some other of their qualities. Let us consider how they

stand with regard to their existence, and which of the impressions and

ideas are causes, and which effects.

The full examination of this question is the subject of the present

treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with

establishing one general proposition, THAT ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS IN

THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE ARE DERIVED FROM SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS, WHICH ARE

CORRESPONDENT TO THEM, AND WHICH THEY EXACTLY REPRESENT.

In seeking for phenomena to prove this proposition, I find only those

of two kinds; but in each kind the phenomena are obvious, numerous, and

conclusive. I first make myself certain, by a new, review, of what I

have already asserted, that every simple impression is attended with

a correspondent idea, and every simple idea with a correspondent

impression. From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions

I immediately conclude, that there is a great connexion betwixt our

correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the one

has a considerable influence upon that of the other. Such a constant

conjunction, in such an infinite number of instances, can never arise

from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the

ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions. That I may know on which side

this dependence lies, I consider the order of their first appearance;