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Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of
man will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural
philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account
of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it
lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the
essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external
bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers
and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the
observation of those particular effects, which result from its different
circumstances and situations. And though we must endeavour to render all
our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments
to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest
causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any
hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities
of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and
chimerical.

I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to
the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a
great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to
explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind
of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the
same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted
with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself
vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of
human reason, we sit down contented, though we be perfectly satisfied in
the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for
our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience
of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it
required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular
and most extraordinary phænomenon. And as this impossibility of making
any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer
may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his
ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so
many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the
world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and
satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not
what more we can require of our philosophy.

But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be
esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that
it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in
which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated
in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the
meanest artizans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish
any principles which are not founded on that authority. Moral philosophy
has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural,
that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with
premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning
every particular difficulty which may be. When I am at a loss to know
the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put
them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should
I endeavour to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral
philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I
consider, it is evident this reflection and premeditation would so
disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it
impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must
therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious
observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common
course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and
in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously
collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which
will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility
to any other of human comprehension.





BOOK I. OF THE UNDERSTANDING




PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION,
ETC.




SECT. I. OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.


All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two
distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference
betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with
which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought
or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and
violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend
all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first
appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in
thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions
excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from
the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness
it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many
words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily
perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees
of these are easily distinguished; though it is not impossible but in
particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus

Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of

man will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural

philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account

of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it

lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the

essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external

bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers

and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the

observation of those particular effects, which result from its different

circumstances and situations. And though we must endeavour to render all

our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments

to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest

causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any

hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities

of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and

chimerical.

I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to

the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a

great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to

explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind

of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the

same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted

with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself

vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of

human reason, we sit down contented, though we be perfectly satisfied in

the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for

our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience

of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it

required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular

and most extraordinary phænomenon. And as this impossibility of making

any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer

may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his

ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so

many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the

world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and

satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not

what more we can require of our philosophy.

But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be

esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that

it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in

which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated

in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the

meanest artizans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish

any principles which are not founded on that authority. Moral philosophy

has, indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural,

that in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with

premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning

every particular difficulty which may be. When I am at a loss to know

the effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put

them in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should

I endeavour to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral

philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I

consider, it is evident this reflection and premeditation would so

disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it

impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must

therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious

observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common

course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and

in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously

collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which

will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility

to any other of human comprehension.

BOOK I. OF THE UNDERSTANDING

PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION,

ETC.

SECT. I. OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two

distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference

betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with

which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought

or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and

violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend

all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first

appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in

thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions

excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from

the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness

it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many

words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily

perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees

of these are easily distinguished; though it is not impossible but in

particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus