erikanesse/great_books · Datasets at Hugging Face

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and find by constant experience, that the simple impressions always take
the precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the
contrary order. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet
or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these
impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce
the impressions by exciting the ideas. Our ideas upon their appearance
produce not their correspondent impressions, nor do we perceive any
colour, or feel any sensation merely upon thinking of them. On the
other hand we find, that any impression either of the mind or body
is constantly followed by an idea, which resembles it, and is only
different in the degrees of force and liveliness. The constant
conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof,
that the one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the
impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of
our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions.

To confirm this I consider Another plain and convincing phænomenon;
which is, that, where-ever by any accident the faculties, which give
rise to any impressions, are obstructed in their operations, as when one
is born blind or deaf; not only the impressions are lost, but also their
correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the mind the least
traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where the organs of
sensation are entirely destroyed, but likewise where they have never
been put in action to produce a particular impression. We cannot form
to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine apple, without having
actually tasted it.

There is however one contradictory phænomenon, which may prove, that it
is not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent
impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed that the several
distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, or those of sounds,
which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from each other,
though at the same time resembling. Now if this be true of different
colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same
colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea, independent of the
rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual
gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote
from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different,
you cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose
therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and
to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds,
excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never
has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of
that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending
gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he will
perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, said will be sensible,
that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous
colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him,
from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to
himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been
conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be
of opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple
ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions; though
the instance is so particular and singular, that it is scarce worth
our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our
general maxim.

But besides this exception, it may not be amiss to remark on this head,
that the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be
understood with another limitation, viz., that as our ideas are images
of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are images of
the primary; as appears from this very reasoning concerning them.
This is not, properly speaking, an exception to the rule so much as
an explanation of it. Ideas produce the images of themselves in
new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from
impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed
either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions.

This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human
nature; nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its
appearance. For it is remarkable, that the present question concerning
the precedency of our impressions or ideas, is the same with what has
made so much noise in other terms, when it has been disputed whether
there be any INNATE IDEAS, or whether all ideas be derived from
sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the
ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing
but shew that they are conveyed by our senses. To prove the ideas
of passion and desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a
preceding experience of these emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully
examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that
ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which the
are derived, and which they represent. I hope this clear stating of the
question will remove all disputes concerning it, and win render this
principle of more use in our reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have
been.




SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.


Since it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their
correspondent ideas, and that the exceptions are very rare, method seems
to require we should examine our impressions, before we consider our
ideas. Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those Of SENSATION and
those of REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from
unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas,
and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the
senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure

and find by constant experience, that the simple impressions always take

the precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the

contrary order. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet

or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these

impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce

the impressions by exciting the ideas. Our ideas upon their appearance

produce not their correspondent impressions, nor do we perceive any

colour, or feel any sensation merely upon thinking of them. On the

other hand we find, that any impression either of the mind or body

is constantly followed by an idea, which resembles it, and is only

different in the degrees of force and liveliness. The constant

conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof,

that the one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the

impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of

our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions.

To confirm this I consider Another plain and convincing phænomenon;

which is, that, where-ever by any accident the faculties, which give

rise to any impressions, are obstructed in their operations, as when one

is born blind or deaf; not only the impressions are lost, but also their

correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the mind the least

traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where the organs of

sensation are entirely destroyed, but likewise where they have never

been put in action to produce a particular impression. We cannot form

to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine apple, without having

actually tasted it.

There is however one contradictory phænomenon, which may prove, that it

is not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent

impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed that the several

distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, or those of sounds,

which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different from each other,

though at the same time resembling. Now if this be true of different

colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same

colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea, independent of the

rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual

gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote

from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different,

you cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose

therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and

to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds,

excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never

has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of

that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending

gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he will

perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, said will be sensible,

that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous

colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him,

from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to

himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been

conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be

of opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple

ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions; though

the instance is so particular and singular, that it is scarce worth

our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our

general maxim.

But besides this exception, it may not be amiss to remark on this head,

that the principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be

understood with another limitation, viz., that as our ideas are images

of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are images of

the primary; as appears from this very reasoning concerning them.

This is not, properly speaking, an exception to the rule so much as

an explanation of it. Ideas produce the images of themselves in

new ideas; but as the first ideas are supposed to be derived from

impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed

either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions.

This then is the first principle I establish in the science of human

nature; nor ought we to despise it because of the simplicity of its

appearance. For it is remarkable, that the present question concerning

the precedency of our impressions or ideas, is the same with what has

made so much noise in other terms, when it has been disputed whether

there be any INNATE IDEAS, or whether all ideas be derived from

sensation and reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the

ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing

but shew that they are conveyed by our senses. To prove the ideas

of passion and desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a

preceding experience of these emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully

examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that

ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which the

are derived, and which they represent. I hope this clear stating of the

question will remove all disputes concerning it, and win render this

principle of more use in our reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have

been.

SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

Since it appears, that our simple impressions are prior to their

correspondent ideas, and that the exceptions are very rare, method seems

to require we should examine our impressions, before we consider our

ideas. Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those Of SENSATION and

those of REFLEXION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from

unknown causes. The second is derived in a great measure from our ideas,

and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the

senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure