erikanesse/great_books · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 247
Britain, which, unless prevented by a union of this kind, seems very
likely to take place, those factions would be ten times more virulent than
ever. Before the commencement of the present disturbances, the coercive
power of the mother-country had always been able to restrain those
factions from breaking out into any thing worse than gross brutality and
insult. If that coercive power were entirely taken away, they would
probably soon break out into open violence and bloodshed. In all great
countries which are united under one uniform government, the spirit of
party commonly prevails less in the remote provinces than in the centre of
the empire. The distance of those provinces from the capital, from the
principal seat of the great scramble of faction and ambition, makes them
enter less into the views of any of the contending parties, and renders
them more indifferent and impartial spectators of the conduct of all. The
spirit of party prevails less in Scotland than in England. In the case of
a union, it would probably prevail less in Ireland than in Scotland; and
the colonies would probably soon enjoy a degree of concord and unanimity,
at present unknown in any part of the British empire. Both Ireland and the
colonies, indeed, would be subjected to heavier taxes than any which they
at present pay. In consequence, however, of a diligent and faithful
application of the public revenue towards the discharge of the national
debt, the greater part of those taxes might not be of long continuance,
and the public revenue of Great Britain might soon be reduced to what was
necessary for maintaining a moderate peace-establishment.

The territorial acquisitions of the East India Company, the undoubted
right of the Crown, that is, of the state and people of Great Britain,
might be rendered another source of revenue, more abundant, perhaps, than
all those already mentioned. Those countries are represented as more
fertile, more extensive, and, in proportion to their extent, much richer
and more populous than Great Britain. In order to draw a great revenue
from them, it would not probably be necessary to introduce any new system
of taxation into countries which are already sufficiently, and more than
sufficiently, taxed. It might, perhaps, be more proper to lighten than to
aggravate the burden of those unfortunate countries, and to endeavour to
draw a revenue from them, not by imposing new taxes, but by preventing the
embezzlement and misapplication of the greater part of those which they
already pay.

If it should be found impracticable for Great Britain to draw any
considerable augmentation of revenue from any of the resources above
mentioned, the only resource which can remain to her, is a diminution of
her expense. In the mode of collecting and in that of expending the public
revenue, though in both there may be still room for improvement, Great
Britain seems to be at least as economical as any of her neighbours. The
military establishment which she maintains for her own defence in time of
peace, is more moderate than that of any European state, which can pretend
to rival her either in wealth or in power. None of these articles,
therefore, seem to admit of any considerable reduction of expense. The
expense of the peace-establishment of the colonies was, before the
commencement of the present disturbances, very considerable, and is an
expense which may, and, if no revenue can be drawn from them, ought
certainly to be saved altogether. This constant expense in time of peace,
though very great, is insignificant in comparison with what the defence of
the colonies has cost us in time of war. The last war, which was
undertaken altogether on account of the colonies, cost Great Britain, it
has already been observed, upwards of ninety millions. The Spanish war of
1739 was principally undertaken on their account; in which, and in the
French war that was the consequence of it, Great Britain, spent upwards of
forty millions; a great part of which ought justly to be charged to the
colonies. In those two wars, the colonies cost Great Britain much more
than double the sum which the national debt amounted to before the
commencement of the first of them. Had it not been for those wars, that
debt might, and probably would by this time, have been completely paid;
and had it not been for the colonies, the former of those wars might not,
and the latter certainly would not, have been undertaken. It was because
the colonies were supposed to be provinces of the British Empire, that
this expense was laid out upon them. But countries which contribute
neither revenue nor military force towards the support of the empire,
cannot be considered as provinces. They may, perhaps, be considered as
appendages, as a sort of splendid and shewy equipage of the empire. But if
the empire can no longer support the expense of keeping up this equipage,
it ought certainly to lay it down; and if it cannot raise its revenue in
proportion to its expense, it ought at least to accommodate its expense to
its revenue. If the colonies, notwithstanding their refusal to submit to
British taxes, are still to be considered as provinces of the British
empire, their defence, in some future war, may cost Great Britain as great
an expense as it ever has done in any former war. The rulers of Great
Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people with the
imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the
Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only.
It has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a
gold mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which
continues to cost, and which, if pursued in the same way as it has been
hitherto, is likely to cost, immense expense, without being likely to
bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, it
has been shewn, are to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of
profit. It is surely now time that our rulers should either realize this
golden dream, in which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as
well as the people; or that they should awake from it themselves, and
endeavour to awaken the people. If the project cannot be completed, it
ought to be given up. If any of the provinces of the British empire cannot
be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire, it is
surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of
defending those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of
their civil or military establishment in time of peace; and endeavour to
accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her
circumstances.

Britain, which, unless prevented by a union of this kind, seems very

likely to take place, those factions would be ten times more virulent than

ever. Before the commencement of the present disturbances, the coercive

power of the mother-country had always been able to restrain those

factions from breaking out into any thing worse than gross brutality and

insult. If that coercive power were entirely taken away, they would

probably soon break out into open violence and bloodshed. In all great

countries which are united under one uniform government, the spirit of

party commonly prevails less in the remote provinces than in the centre of

the empire. The distance of those provinces from the capital, from the

principal seat of the great scramble of faction and ambition, makes them

enter less into the views of any of the contending parties, and renders

them more indifferent and impartial spectators of the conduct of all. The

spirit of party prevails less in Scotland than in England. In the case of

a union, it would probably prevail less in Ireland than in Scotland; and

the colonies would probably soon enjoy a degree of concord and unanimity,

at present unknown in any part of the British empire. Both Ireland and the

colonies, indeed, would be subjected to heavier taxes than any which they

at present pay. In consequence, however, of a diligent and faithful

application of the public revenue towards the discharge of the national

debt, the greater part of those taxes might not be of long continuance,

and the public revenue of Great Britain might soon be reduced to what was

necessary for maintaining a moderate peace-establishment.

The territorial acquisitions of the East India Company, the undoubted

right of the Crown, that is, of the state and people of Great Britain,

might be rendered another source of revenue, more abundant, perhaps, than

all those already mentioned. Those countries are represented as more

fertile, more extensive, and, in proportion to their extent, much richer

and more populous than Great Britain. In order to draw a great revenue

from them, it would not probably be necessary to introduce any new system

of taxation into countries which are already sufficiently, and more than

sufficiently, taxed. It might, perhaps, be more proper to lighten than to

aggravate the burden of those unfortunate countries, and to endeavour to

draw a revenue from them, not by imposing new taxes, but by preventing the

embezzlement and misapplication of the greater part of those which they

already pay.

If it should be found impracticable for Great Britain to draw any

considerable augmentation of revenue from any of the resources above

mentioned, the only resource which can remain to her, is a diminution of

her expense. In the mode of collecting and in that of expending the public

revenue, though in both there may be still room for improvement, Great

Britain seems to be at least as economical as any of her neighbours. The

military establishment which she maintains for her own defence in time of

peace, is more moderate than that of any European state, which can pretend

to rival her either in wealth or in power. None of these articles,

therefore, seem to admit of any considerable reduction of expense. The

expense of the peace-establishment of the colonies was, before the

commencement of the present disturbances, very considerable, and is an

expense which may, and, if no revenue can be drawn from them, ought

certainly to be saved altogether. This constant expense in time of peace,

though very great, is insignificant in comparison with what the defence of

the colonies has cost us in time of war. The last war, which was

undertaken altogether on account of the colonies, cost Great Britain, it

has already been observed, upwards of ninety millions. The Spanish war of

1739 was principally undertaken on their account; in which, and in the

French war that was the consequence of it, Great Britain, spent upwards of

forty millions; a great part of which ought justly to be charged to the

colonies. In those two wars, the colonies cost Great Britain much more

than double the sum which the national debt amounted to before the

commencement of the first of them. Had it not been for those wars, that

debt might, and probably would by this time, have been completely paid;

and had it not been for the colonies, the former of those wars might not,

and the latter certainly would not, have been undertaken. It was because

the colonies were supposed to be provinces of the British Empire, that

this expense was laid out upon them. But countries which contribute

neither revenue nor military force towards the support of the empire,

cannot be considered as provinces. They may, perhaps, be considered as

appendages, as a sort of splendid and shewy equipage of the empire. But if

the empire can no longer support the expense of keeping up this equipage,

it ought certainly to lay it down; and if it cannot raise its revenue in

proportion to its expense, it ought at least to accommodate its expense to

its revenue. If the colonies, notwithstanding their refusal to submit to

British taxes, are still to be considered as provinces of the British

empire, their defence, in some future war, may cost Great Britain as great

an expense as it ever has done in any former war. The rulers of Great

Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people with the

imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the

Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only.

It has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a

gold mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which

continues to cost, and which, if pursued in the same way as it has been

hitherto, is likely to cost, immense expense, without being likely to

bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, it

has been shewn, are to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of

profit. It is surely now time that our rulers should either realize this

golden dream, in which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as

well as the people; or that they should awake from it themselves, and

endeavour to awaken the people. If the project cannot be completed, it

ought to be given up. If any of the provinces of the British empire cannot

be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire, it is

surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of

defending those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of

their civil or military establishment in time of peace; and endeavour to

accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her

circumstances.