erikanesse/great_books · Datasets at Hugging Face

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the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn
disgrace upon philosophy itself.

Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present
imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors
may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes
not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate,
and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most
trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous
we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied,
as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the
greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle
it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no
man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant
hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable
colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the
pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of
the army.

From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against
metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess
themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of
literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on
any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is
any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We
have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly
reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a
prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and
entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism,
along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to
metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity,
it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall
arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed
with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain
and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am
going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it,
were it so very easy and obvious.

It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less,
to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from
it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics,
Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent
on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and
are judged of by their powers and faculties. It is impossible to tell
what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we
thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding,
and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the
operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are
the more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with
instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views
farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them;
and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but
also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.

If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and
Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what
may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature
is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the
principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of
our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and
politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other.
In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is
comprehended almost everything, which it can any way import us to be
acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament
of the human mind.

Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in
our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method,
which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a
castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital
or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once
masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this
station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more
intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure
to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pore curiosity.
There is no question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in
the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any
certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending,
therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect
propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost
entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any
security.

And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other
sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science
itself must be laid on experience and observation. It is no astonishing
reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy
to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of
above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the
same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning
from THALES to SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to that
betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers in England,[1] who
have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged
the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is,
that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some
other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can
only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty.

[1] Mr. _Locke_, my Lord _Shaftesbury_, Dr. _Mandeville_, Mr.
_Hutchinson_, Dr. _Butler_, etc.

the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn

disgrace upon philosophy itself.

Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present

imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors

may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes

not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate,

and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most

trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous

we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied,

as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the

greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle

it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no

man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant

hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable

colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the

pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of

the army.

From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against

metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess

themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of

literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on

any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is

any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We

have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly

reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a

prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and

entertaining. And indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism,

along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to

metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity,

it is certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall

arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed

with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain

and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am

going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption against it,

were it so very easy and obvious.

It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less,

to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from

it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics,

Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent

on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and

are judged of by their powers and faculties. It is impossible to tell

what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we

thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding,

and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the

operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are

the more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with

instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views

farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them;

and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but

also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.

If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and

Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what

may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature

is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the

principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of

our ideas: morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and

politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other.

In these four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is

comprehended almost everything, which it can any way import us to be

acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament

of the human mind.

Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in

our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method,

which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a

castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital

or center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once

masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this

station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more

intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure

to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pore curiosity.

There is no question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in

the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any

certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending,

therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect

propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost

entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any

security.

And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other

sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science

itself must be laid on experience and observation. It is no astonishing

reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy

to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of

above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the

same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning

from THALES to SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to that

betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers in England,[1] who

have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged

the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is,

that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some

other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can

only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty.

[1] Mr. _Locke_, my Lord _Shaftesbury_, Dr. _Mandeville_, Mr.

_Hutchinson_, Dr. _Butler_, etc.