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[ "5. The applicant is a journalist for DN.no, a Norwegian Internet-based version of the newspaper Dagens Næringsliv (“DN”), published by the company DN Nye Medier AS.", "6. On 23 June 2010 Mr X was indicted for market manipulation and insider trading under the 1997 Act on the Trade of Financial Assets (verdipapirhandelloven). He was accused of having requested Mr Y, an attorney, to draft a letter concerning the Norwegian Oil Company (“DNO”), a limited liability company quoted on the stock exchange. The letter, addressed to a trustee company representing the interests of bond holders in DNO (“the bond trustee company”), gave the impression that it had been written on behalf of a number of bond holders who were seriously concerned about the company’s liquidity, finances and future. In fact, it had been written only on Mr X’s behalf. He had owned only one bond, which he had acquired the same day as he had asked attorney Y to draft the letter.", "7. Mr X had sent a copy of the above-mentioned letter by fax to the applicant on Friday 24 August 2007, and in this connection he had a telephone conversation with her. The following day, on Saturday 25 August 2007, the applicant wrote an article entitled “Fears of DNO collapse” (“Frykter at DNO rakner”), in which she expressed strong concerns about the content of Attorney Y’s letter, a central feature in the article.", "8. The price of DNO stock fell by 4.1% on Monday 27 August 2007, the first trading day after the content of the letter had become known in the press. On the same day, a new article on the topic was published in DN. Other media also reported on the first article, including an online newspaper (Hegnar online) which on 28 August 2007 reported that an analyst had stated that he would not be surprised if the letter had been sent by a person with a short-position or who wanted cheap stocks. The Oslo stock exchange (Oslo børs) suspected market manipulation and, having looked into the matter, forwarded the case to the Financial Supervisory Authority (Kredittilsynet) with suspicions that Mr X had infringed the Act on the Trade of Financial Assets. During subsequent questioning by the Financial Supervisory Authority, Mr X confirmed that he had initiated the letter and been the source of the article in DN.", "9. The applicant was questioned by the police on 19 June 2008. They informed her that Mr X had told the police that he had given her the letter. She was handed a signed statement from Mr X in which he confirmed this. The applicant was willing to say that she had received the letter on which the article was based by fax on Friday 24 August 2007, at 5.35 p.m. She also stated that the article had been published on DN.no at 3 a.m. on 25 August 2007. The applicant further explained that she had considered the information in the letter as price-sensitive. She had no particular thoughts as to how many persons were behind the letter, beyond the fact that it had been signed on behalf of several bond holders. The applicant refused to give additional information, referring to the journalistic principles on protection of sources.", "10. During the criminal case against Mr X in February 2011 before the Oslo City Court (tingrett), the applicant was summoned as a witness. She refused to answer questions about possible contacts between her and Mr X and other sources, if any, related to the publication by DN.no on 25 August 2007. Relying on Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 10 of the Convention, she argued that she was under no obligation to give evidence on those points.", "11. The prosecutor requested that the court impose on the applicant an order to testify. In the court records (“rettsboken”), his arguments in favour of issuing such an order are restated as having included the following:\n“The prosecutor rose to speak and argued that the witness had an obligation to give testimony about her contact with the defendant in connection with the letter to [the bond trustee company] of 24 August 2007 and asked the court to make a decision on the matter. The prosecutor further justified the obligation of the witness to make a statement and argued that undoubtedly in this case it was desirable to hear her explanation, even if the prosecuting authority found the case adequately disclosed (fullgodt opplyst) without her statement. The press was sometimes abused by investors to take actions liable to affect the share price. The element of abuse should suggest that in a case like this the press would also have an interest in making a statement in order to avoid being abused in this way. Whether or not consent had been given by the source to the witness making her statement had no bearing on the obligation to give evidence. ...”", "12. From the same records, it appears that Mr X, through his counsel and co‑counsel, had submitted that he had described his contact with the applicant and that she could contribute nothing further of interest.", "13. By a decision of 15 February 2011, the City Court held that the applicant had a duty to give evidence about her contacts with Mr X in relation to the letter of 24 August 2007 from Attorney Y to the bond trustee company. As to the scope of that duty, the City Court held:\n“The obligation to make a statement is, however, limited to the contact with the defendant as a source and not her communication with possible other unknown sources with whom she has been in contact and who may be protected by the protection of sources.”", "14. The prosecutor then stated, according to the hearing protocol, “that he would not ask for postponement of the case as the prosecuting authority considers the case to be sufficiently disclosed (“tilstrekkelig opplyst”) even without the statement of the witness [the applicant]”. It was then clarified that the applicant’s appeal against the order would not be forwarded to the High Court until after the City Court’s judgment in the case against Mr X had been delivered.", "15. On 3 March 2011 the City Court convicted Mr X in accordance with the indictment and sentenced him to one year and six months’ imprisonment, of which nine months were suspended for a probationary period of two years.", "16. The judgment contains the following passage:\n“One of the witnesses pleaded, as a journalist, the protection of sources under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was not willing to explain about her potential contact with the accused. The court held that the witness had an obligation to explain about her contact with the accused since he, as the source of the DN.no article, was known and the court ruled accordingly. An appeal was immediately made against the decision. No motion for extension was made (pending a final decision) as according to the prosecutor the case was sufficiently disclosed (tilstrekkelig opplyst) even without the statement by [the applicant] and this was used as a basis by the court.”", "17. On 28 March 2011 Mr X appealed to the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett) against the City Court’s assessment of the evidence and application of the law in relation to the issue of guilt, its procedure and the sentence (see paragraphs 34-36 below).", "18. The applicant appealed to the Borgarting High Court against the City Court’s order of 15 February 2011. It rejected the appeal by a decision of 28 April 2011, finding it generally decisive whether the source was known. In this case, it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Mr X had been the applicant’s source.", "19. An appeal by the applicant to the Supreme Court was rejected by three votes to two on 30 September 2011 (Norsk Retstidende – Rt. 2011 page 1266). The appeal had been directed at the High Court’s assessment of evidence as well as its application of the law. The disagreement in the Supreme Court concerned primarily the interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which, inter alia, journalists may refuse to answer questions as to who is the source of information confided to them for use in their work (see paragraph 37 below). The two factions of the Supreme Court disagreed, in particular, as to whether this provision was applicable if the source had stepped forward or the identity of the source had otherwise been established.", "20. The majority observed that it did not appear from the wording of Article 125 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that it was relevant whether the source had disclosed his or her role or that this role had in other ways become known. However, the wording could not be given decisive weight. It emerged from the preparatory work that the legislature had not, with the chosen formulation, taken a stance on the issue at stake in the present case. There was therefore greater reason to assess whether the rationale underpinning the main rule, namely the right not to answer questions concerning the identity of the source, could also be given significant weight when the person, who had been the source of the information, had given evidence concerning his or her role and had confirmed being the source. It was difficult to see that this should be the case.", "21. If the imposition of an obligation on the press to give evidence were limited to cases where the source had come forward, the person who was considering giving information to the press would know that it was up to him or her to determine whether the person who received the information would have an obligation to give evidence. There was thus no cogent reason why such a conditional obligation to give evidence should lead to increased scepticism towards providing information to the press. The same would, to a great extent, be true if the obligation to give evidence also applied when the identity of the source had become known in some other way. While the possibility that the identity of the source might be disclosed could well constitute a deterrent, it would hardly make much difference if information already known was also confirmed by the recipient of the information.", "22. An obligation on the press to give evidence in such cases was not thought likely to weaken the public’s general trust that the press would protect its sources. The situation under review did not concern the disclosure of sources but rather whether the person’s role had become known by other means.", "23. The majority further disagreed with the applicant’s view that there was no reason to treat a situation, where the informant had identified himself or herself as the source, differently from those cases where the source had consented to being identified. A person who so consented could do so, trusting that the recipient of the information would respect the protection of sources as long as the identity of the source was unknown. Once an informant had confirmed that he was the source, this fact would become known. Should the recipient of the information then refuse to give evidence, this would normally appear futile. In such a situation, an exemption from the obligation to give evidence would in reality not constitute a protection against having to disclose the source, but rather a right to avoid contributing to the elucidation of a criminal case.", "24. Interpreting Article 125 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the light of certain statements made in the preparatory work (Ot.prp. nr. 55 (1997-1998), pp. 17 and 18) as followed up in the Supreme Court’s case‑law (Rt. 1995 page 1166 and 2003 page 28), the majority held that this provision did not apply when the source had come forward and had confirmed his or her role. The same ought probably to apply when the identity of the source had been established beyond reasonable doubt by other means. If the state of the evidence was such that confirmation by the journalist of the identity of the source could not be said to assist in identifying the source, it seemed unquestionable to maintain the obligation to testify.", "25. As to whether a more wide-reaching protection of journalistic sources followed from Article 10 of the Convention, the majority had regard to the Strasbourg Court’s case-law, including Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II), Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom (no. 821/03, 15 December 2009) and the Chamber judgment in Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands (no. 38224/03, 31 March 2009 – noting that the Grand Chamber had decided the latter case on a different ground). They observed that in the two British cases, a violation had been found under the necessity test even though strong countervailing arguments had been present. The majority further noted that there was no decision where the Court had examined the situation where the source had come forward and where in this sense there was no source to protect (“ingen kilde å beskytte”). The principal justification for source protection, as elaborated by the Court in its case-law, was based on the consequences that the disclosure of a source’s identity might have for the free flow of information. However, these considerations did not apply where the source had confirmed his or her participation.", "26. Against this background, one could safely assume that no violation of the Convention would arise where a source had come forward and the obligation of the witness to give evidence had been expressly limited so as not to include questions that might lead to other sources being revealed. Also, the charge in this case had been based on the fact that the journalist had allowed herself to be used by the source in his efforts to manipulate the bonds market in a criminal manner. It was a serious criminal case, where it seemed likely that the applicant’s evidence might significantly assist in elucidating the concrete circumstances of the defendant’s contact with her.", "27. The minority observed that, should the applicant be ordered to testify concerning her possible contact with Mr X about Attorney Y’s letter of 24 August 2007 to the trustee company, she would have to confirm or deny that Mr X was the source for her article on DN.no on 25 August 2007. By making a statement on this matter, she might also inadvertently reveal other potential sources. The legal question at hand was whether a journalist might rely on source protection if the source, without the journalist having revealed it, could be identified with more or less certainty by other evidence.", "28. The wording of Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was absolute and granted members of the press, broadcasting and other media the right to “refuse to answer questions concerning who is ... the source”. The provision made no exception for cases where the identity could be established with more or less certainty in some other way.", "29. The protection of sources by journalists was, according to the European Court’s case-law, “one of the basic conditions for press freedom” (Goodwin, cited above, § 39). The purpose was not to protect the source, but rather the public interest in free communication of news and opinions (Rt. 2010 page 1381). If journalists were allowed to protect their sources, they would obtain information enabling them to uncover matters in society that were worthy of criticism more easily than they would otherwise. The fact that it was for the journalist to decide to what extent he or she would rely on such protection reflected that it was not the source who was protected. If the journalist was willing to reveal the source, the source could not prevent it.", "30. If it were a precondition for the protection of journalistic sources that no other proof of the source had been presented, such protection would be undermined. This would enable a source to be tracked down, even if a requirement for waiver of source protection was that the source be identified with a criminal standard of proof. If the hearing of evidence on the identity of a source were to be allowed, the media’s working conditions would become considerably more constricted and society’s interest in free communication of information and opinions would suffer.", "31. If consent to source disclosure by a potential source should have the effect of removing source protection, the actual source might easily be identified and source protection would be undermined. In the present case Mr X had stated that he was the source. A situation where someone claimed to be the source ought to be considered in the same way as where the source consented to disclosure of his or her identity. A person might incorrectly claim to be the source so that the actual source might be identified by a process of elimination. And even if it were true that this person was the source, it would erode the journalist’s right to source protection should the person who was the source be able to cancel the journalist’s right. In addition, journalists often had several sources. If a journalist could be ordered to describe his or her contact with a person who claimed to be the source, his or her contact with other sources might also be revealed.", "32. Equally, a combination of someone claiming to be the source and other evidence confirming this, should not lead to source protection being removed. Effective source protection was necessary in order to ensure free communication of information and opinions. It should not be permissible for press journalists to confirm or deny that a person claiming to be the source was in fact the source, even where there was weighty evidence to this effect. As mentioned above, it was not the source, but society’s interest in free communication of news and opinions, which was to be protected.", "33. The prosecutor had argued that Mr X had used the applicant as a tool to commit serious crimes, and this would have constituted a relevant argument, had the case been one concerning a possible individual exception to the right to non-disclosure of sources made under the third paragraph of Article 125. However, the prosecutor had not relied on that paragraph of the provision, and the source’s motive could not render the principle of source protection as such inapplicable. Within the ambit of Article 10 of the Convention, freedom of speech did not protect only information and views that were positively received, but also those which offended, shocked or disturbed the State or parts of the population. Therefore, the fundamental right of journalists to protect their sources could not be dependent on the sources’ motives.", "34. Mr X’s appeal against the City Court’s judgment of 3 March 2011 (see paragraph 17 above) was examined by the High Court, which summoned and heard the applicant as a witness on 13 January 2012. She answered certain questions but affirmed that she still would not reply to questions about her contacts with Mr X. The court records contain the following passage:\n“When heard as a witness [the applicant] stated that she had received Attorney [Y]’s letter by fax on 24 August 2007 at 5.35 p.m. She does not wish to answer questions about who she had received the letter from or on her possible contact with Mr [X] during the period before or after this point in time. The presiding judge pointed out to the witness that after a legally enforceable decision by the Supreme Court she was obliged to give evidence about her contacts with Mr [X]. The presiding judge underlined that an omission to reply to such questions could constitute a ground for the imposition of a fine for an offence against the good order of court proceedings [“rettergangsbot”]. It was emphasised that the duty to reply lay on the witness personally and that a possible fine would be imposed on her personally.”", "35. On account of her refusal to comply, the High Court, by a decision of 25 January 2012, ordered the applicant to pay a fine of 30,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK), approximately 3,700 euro (EUR) for an offence against the good order of court proceedings, failing which she would be liable to ten days’ imprisonment. The applicant did not appeal against that decision.", "36. By a judgment of the same date, the High Court convicted Mr X on the charges and sentenced him to one year and six months’ imprisonment.", "37. The relevant articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 22 May 1981 (straffeprosessloven) read as follows:\n“Article 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court.\nArticle 125. The editor of a printed publication may refuse to answer questions as to who is the author of an article or report in the publication or the source of any information contained in it. The same applies to questions as to who is the source of other information that has been confided to the editor for use in his work.\nOther persons who have acquired knowledge of the author or the source through their work for the publishers, editors, press agency or printers in question have the same right as the editor.\nWhen important social interests indicate that the information should be given and it is of substantial significance for the clarification of the case, the court may, however, on an overall evaluation, order the witness to reveal the name. If the author or source has revealed matters that it was socially important to disclose, the witness may be ordered to reveal the name only when this is found to be particularly necessary.\nWhen an answer is given, the court may decide that it shall only be given to the court and the parties at a sitting in camera and under an order to observe a duty of secrecy.\nThe provisions of this section apply correspondingly to any director or employee of any broadcasting agency.”\nThere is extensive Supreme Court case-law concerning the main rule in Article 125 § 1 about the protection of journalists’ sources and the exception clause in Article 125 § 3 (see, for instance, paragraph 24 above). The Supreme Court interprets the provision in the light of Article 10 of the Convention.", "38. Section 205 § 1 of the Act Relating to the Courts of Justice of 13 August 1915 (domstolloven) reads:\n“Where a witness refuses to give evidence or give affirmation and provides no grounds or provides only those grounds that are dismissed by a legally enforceable ruling, said witness may be penalised by fines and ordered to compensate, in whole or in part, for the costs incurred. A party may also be penalised by fines in cases concerning attachment or garnishment of earnings, where he/she wilfully fails to provide the enforcement authority with the information said party is obligated to provide pursuant to the Enforcement Act, §§ 7-12.”", "39. In 2011 the UN Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment no. 34 concerning Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR/C/GC/34), which reads, inter alia, (footnote omitted):\n“States parties should recognize and respect that element of the right of freedom of expression that embraces the limited journalistic privilege not to disclose information sources.”", "40. On 8 September 2015 the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression submitted a report to the UN General Assembly (A/70/361), which stated, inter alia (footnotes omitted):\n“C. Nature and scope of protection 21. Some authorities refer to a journalistic ‘privilege’ not to disclose a source’s identity, but both reporter and source enjoy rights that may be limited only according to article 19 (3). Revealing or coercing the revelation of the identity of a source creates disincentives for disclosure, dries up further sources to report a story accurately and damages an important tool of accountability. In the light of the importance attached to source confidentiality, any restrictions must be genuinely exceptional and subject to the highest standards, implemented by judicial authorities only. Such situations should be limited to investigations of the most serious crimes or the protection of the life of other individuals. 22. National laws should ensure that protections apply strictly, with extremely limited exceptions. Under Belgian law, journalists and editorial staff may be compelled by a judge to disclose information sources only if they are of a nature to prevent crimes that pose a serious threat to the physical integrity of one or more persons, and upon a finding of the following two cumulative conditions: (a) the information is of crucial importance for preventing such crimes; and (b) the information cannot be obtained by any other means. The same conditions apply to investigative measures, such as searches, seizures and telephone tapping, with respect to journalistic sources.”", "41. Other international instruments concerning the protection of journalistic sources include the Resolution on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights, adopted at the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (Prague, 7-8 December 1994), and Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 8 March 2000. Relevant parts of the Recommendation, with the explanatory report, are quoted in Voskuil v. the Netherlands, no. 64752/01, §§ 43-44, 22 November 2007, inter alia:\n“Principle 3 (Limits to the right of non-disclosure)\na. The right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source must not be subject to other restrictions than those mentioned in Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention. In determining whether a legitimate interest in a disclosure falling within the scope of Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention outweighs the public interest in not disclosing information identifying a source, competent authorities of member States shall pay particular regard to the importance of the right of non-disclosure and the pre-eminence given to it in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and may only order a disclosure if, subject to paragraph b, there exists an overriding requirement in the public interest and if circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature.\nb. The disclosure of information identifying a source should not be deemed necessary unless it can be convincingly established that:\ni. reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not exist or have been exhausted by the persons or public authorities that seek the disclosure, and\nii. the legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in the non-disclosure, bearing in mind that:\n- an overriding requirement of the need for disclosure is proved,\n- the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature,\n- the necessity of the disclosure is identified as responding to a pressing social need, and\n- member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing this need, but this margin goes hand in hand with the supervision by the European Court of Human Rights.\nc. The above requirements should be applied at all stages of any proceedings where the right of non-disclosure might be invoked.”\nIn the present case, the following paragraphs of the explanatory report are also of relevance:\n“d. Information identifying a source 18. In order to protect the identity of a source adequately, it is necessary to protect all kinds of information which are likely to lead to the identification of a source. The potential to identify a source therefore determines the type of protected information and the range of such protection. As far as its disclosure may lead to an identification of a source, the following information shall be protected by this Recommendation:\ni. the name of a source and his or her address, telephone and telefax number, employer’s name and other personal data as well as the voice of the source and pictures showing a source;\nii. ’the factual circumstances of acquiring this information’, for example the time and place of a meeting with a source, the means of correspondence used or the particularities agreed between a source and a journalist;\n...”" ]
[ "10" ]
[ 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Odesa.", "6. At the time of the events the applicant was the director general of a joint venture V. (“company V.”), which had its office in the premises belonging to a joint stock company Y. (“company Y.”).", "7. In March 2001 the owner of company Y. changed. The new management questioned the legality of the use of its premises by company V. More specifically, they challenged the lease contract of 12 January 1999 in respect of those premises, which had been signed by the applicant, on the one side, and N., the chairman of the board of directors of company Y. at the time, on the other side. Under that contract, company V. could use the office space in question from 12 January 1999 to 12 January 2020 without any payment, but in exchange for certain services for company Y.", "8. Starting from April 2001, company Y. no longer allowed access to its premises to company V. As a result, the applicant transformed his flat in a temporary office of company V.", "9. In June 2001 company V. brought commercial proceedings against company Y. seeking compliance with the lease contract. Company Y., in turn, lodged a counter-claim seeking invalidation of that contract. By a final decision of the Supreme Court of 25 September 2003, the national courts rejected the claim of company V. and discontinued the proceedings as regards company Y.’s counter-claim. It was concluded that “there [was] no subject matter of the dispute”, given that the impugned contract failed to stipulate basic terms inherent in a lease contract and could not therefore be regarded as a lease contract.", "10. On 3 October 2001 a criminal case was opened in respect of suspected forgery of the lease contract of 12 January 1999, without being targeted against any particular persons.", "11. On 8 October 2001 the Odesa Prymorskyy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the Prymorskyy Prosecutor’s Office”) issued a warrant for seizure of fifteen documents relevant for the investigation, such as the original of the lease contract itself, related correspondence and several statements of acceptance of the services indicated in the contract (see paragraph 7 above). The seizure was to be carried out in company V.’s office.", "12. On 11 October 2001 the seizure took place in the applicant’s flat, in the presence of his wife. It appears that the applicant was not present. Eleven of the fifteen documents listed in the warrant were seized. The seizure report did not contain any information as to whether it had been handed to any person occupying the premises. The applicant did not specify in the domestic proceedings, or in the present proceedings, how the seizure of the documents had taken place.", "13. On 15 October 2001 the seizure warrant of 8 October 2001 was served on the applicant.", "14. On 22 October 2001 the investigator decided that a forensic expert examination of the signatures on the contract of 12 January 1999 was required in order to establish their real date.", "15. On 7 November 2001 the Odesa Prymorskyy District Court (“the Prymorskyy Court”) ordered a search of the applicant’s flat, which was also company V.’s office, with a view to collecting samples of his handwriting and signatures. As stated in the court’s ruling, “notebooks, correspondence and other personal records with [the applicant’s] handwriting” were required for the above-mentioned expert evaluation. That decision was not amenable to appeal.", "16. On the following day the search took place in the applicant’s flat in his presence and resulted in a seizure of eleven documents. The applicant did not provide any description, be it in the domestic proceedings or in the present proceedings, as to how the search had been carried out.", "17. On 24 December 2001 the investigator ordered a seizure of company V.’s constituent documents from the company’s office. It appears that the seizure was carried out on the same day in the applicant’s flat.", "18. On 9 January 2002 the above seizure warrant was served on the applicant.", "19. On 6 May 2002 company V. founders’ meeting decided to suspend the applicant from the exercise of his duties as its director general pending the ongoing criminal proceedings.", "20. On 20 August 2002 the prosecutor discontinued the proceedings for the absence of unequivocal evidence of a criminal offence. Although a forensic expert examination had established that the signatures on the impugned contract had been antedated (namely, it was established that they had been made no earlier than in February 2001), the official approval of the technical methods used by the expert was previewed only for the autumn of 2002.", "21. On 1 September 2002 the applicant resumed his duties in company V.", "22. On 28 August 2002 the applicant brought proceedings against the Prymorskyy Prosecutor’s Office claiming compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage allegedly caused by its unlawful actions. The applicant based his lawsuit on the fact that the criminal proceedings had been terminated, without raising any specific complaints about the search and seizures. He contended that the institution of the criminal proceedings had been arbitrary, which had led, inter alia, to the unlawful search of his flat and the seizure of documents.", "23. On 9 December 2002 the Prymorskyy Court rejected the applicant’s claim as unfounded. The case file does not contain a copy of that decision. It appears that the court’s conclusion was that the applicant had not suffered any non-pecuniary damage.", "24. The applicant appealed. He argued, in particular, that the impugned measures had been devoid of any legitimate purpose given the impossibility at the time to carry out the forensic handwriting examination ordered by the investigator. He further submitted that, in ordering the seizure of documents, no differentiation had been made between the company’s premises and his home. The applicant maintained that the first-instance court had left those matters without consideration.", "25. On 11 September 2003 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. It held, in particular, that the company’s office had de facto been located in the applicant’s flat. As regards his complaint about the court’s failure to assess all the circumstances of the case, the appellate court dismissed it as ungrounded.", "26. On 3 February 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions." ]
[ "13", "8" ]
[ 17 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Smědčice.", "6. On 9 November 2006 the applicant requested a building permit for temporary stables for horses. On 6 January 2011 the Rokycany Planning Office (stavební úřad) dismissed his request and on 26 May 2011 the Plzeň Regional Office (krajský úřad) upheld that decision.", "7. On 29 March 2013 the Plzeň Regional Court (krajský soud) dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant against the decision of the Plzeň Regional Office.", "8. On 31 July 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvyšší správní soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. The decision was served on the applicant on 28 August 2013.", "9. On 29 October 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint (ústavní stížnost).", "10. On 31 March 2014 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) rejected the applicant’s appeal as being lodged out of time. It held that as the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision had been served on him on 28 August 2013, the last day of the two-month time-limit for lodging a constitutional appeal was 28 October 2013.", "11. On 8 April 2014 the applicant wrote to the Constitutional Court urging it to set aside its decision. He argued that as 28 October 2013 had been a national holiday, domestic procedural rules provided that the last day for lodging his appeal had been the following day, namely 29 October 2013.", "12. By a letter of 11 April 2014 the Registrar (generální sekretář) of the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the judge-rapporteur had undoubtedly overlooked the fact that the time-limit had been complied with. However, as the Constitutional Court did not have the power to set aside its own decision, he advised the applicant to lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 7 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Kyiv.", "6. At the time of the events he was the director of a private company.", "7. In August 2002 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of tax evasion and forgery in office. Subsequently, the tax-evasion charge was dropped.", "8. On 7 December 2004 the Kyiv Dniprovskyy District Court (“the Dniprovskyy Court”) found the applicant guilty of forgery in office. It held that he had entered knowingly false data in the company’s tax returns. More specifically, instead of applying a straight-line depreciation method in respect of the company’s intangible assets, the applicant calculated their depreciation costs as the difference between the company’s gross revenues and expenses. As a result, the documents showed the absence of any profit or loss in the company’s activity, whereas in the reality it had had losses. The applicant was sentenced to one year’s restriction of liberty (namely detention in a semi-open penal institution by the place of his residence) with a ban on holding administrative posts for one year. The sentence was suspended on probation for one year. The applicant was under an undertaking not to leave the town until the judgment became final.", "9. The applicant appealed. He submitted that the activity of the company had been subject to numerous tax inspections, which had not found any violations of the tax legislation. He therefore contended that he had not done anything criminal and that that fact had not received due attention of the first-instance court. Furthermore, the applicant considered that the expert questioned in the trial did not have adequate qualification. Lastly, he argued that the tax police investigator, who had also been questioned, was not impartial and that his statements should not have been relied on. Accordingly, the applicant requested the appellate court to quash the first‑instance court’s judgment and to pronounce a new one, acquitting him for the lack of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions.", "10. On 10 February 2005 the Dniprovskyy Court sent a letter to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) stating as follows:\n“The [Dniprovskyy Court] is sending you the criminal case regarding [the applicant] convicted under Article 366 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [forgery in office], for the appellate examination at 10.35 a.m. on 17 March 2005.”", "11. In addition to the president of the Court of Appeal, the above letter was also addressed to the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer. There is no evidence in the case file as to whether the applicant and/or his lawyer received it. According to the applicant, they were unaware of its existence.", "12. On 17 March 2005, following a hearing held with the prosecutor’s participation, but in the absence of both the applicant and his lawyer, the appellate court rejected the applicant’s appeal. It delivered its ruling “having heard the report of the judge-rapporteur of the appellate court and the explanations of the prosecutor, the latter considering the judgment lawful and [the applicant’s] appeal groundless, having checked the case-file materials and having discussed the arguments advanced in the appeal”. The issue of the applicant’s and his lawyer’s absence from the hearing was not mentioned in the appellate court’s ruling.", "13. The applicant appealed on points of law, challenging, among other things, the examination of his case on appeal in his and his lawyer’s absence as being in breach of his defence rights.", "14. On 23 January 2007 the Supreme Court, in written proceedings, upheld the decisions of the lower courts. Referring to the case-file materials, it noted that the first-instance court had informed the applicant and his lawyer about the scheduled appellate hearing, without further details." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 4, 5, 6, 7 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Staro Oryahovo.", "6. The applicant was driving his car along a road in the region of Varna on the evening of 10 March 2014. As established subsequently by the prosecution and the domestic courts in criminal proceedings opened into the incident that took place that evening, his car was weaving in an unsteady manner and he was spotted by patrolling police officers parked on the side of the road. They signalled for him to pull over, but instead of complying he sped away. According to the applicant’s own statements given in the context of those proceedings, he was afraid that the police would charge him or take his licence away as he had consumed alcohol earlier that evening. The prosecution and the courts established that the officers chased after him in their car, using flashing police lights and their siren. He only stopped when his car reached a field and could not go further. The police car stopped too.", "7. The parties have presented differing accounts of the circumstances in which the applicant was arrested.", "8. According to the applicant, one of the officers kicked him in the left leg and then pushed him violently to the ground as he was trying to get out of his vehicle. The applicant fell on his back and then three officers continued to kick him. The assault lasted a few minutes, after which they handcuffed him. One of the officers hit him on the head with a rubber truncheon before they drove him to the police station.", "9. According to the police officers, the applicant had jumped out of his car after it had come to a halt and had started running through the field in an attempt to escape. The officers had run after him, the applicant had slipped and fallen and the police had caught up with him. As he had resisted arrest, wriggling and struggling, they had used force which had consisted in twisting his arms in order to handcuff him. Once they had managed to handcuff him, the officers had driven him to the police station.", "10. According to written statements made during the criminal proceedings by several police officers present at the police station when the applicant was taken there, he told everyone present at the time that his clothes were muddy because he had tripped and fallen, which was also why he had a limp. As stated by the officers and by the applicant himself in the course of those proceedings, he made no complaints at that point in time. According to police records of the evening when the applicant was arrested, he refused to take an alcohol test or to sign the arrest report and was given a fine for refusing the alcohol test. As it emerges from the officers’ statements, they discovered that he had no identity documents on him and called his brother, who brought them to the police station accompanied by a friend. The records indicate that the officers released the applicant immediately after checking his papers.", "11. According to a written statement made on 11 March 2014 by the applicant’s brother to the police in the context of an official follow-up conducted into the events, on leaving the station, he asked him what had happened but the applicant stated that he did not wish to speak about it and preferred to be left alone in his home. Instead, his brother drove him to the local medical centre as he had noticed that the applicant was having difficulties breathing. On examination, a doctor noted a suspected broken left ankle and told the applicant to go to hospital. No ambulance was provided and the applicant’s brother drove him there. It follows from medical documents that the doctors operated on him immediately as they had established that he had a broken rib which had pierced one of his lungs.", "12. The applicant’s hospital record, signed by the doctor who had treated him and the head of the unit, stated that the applicant had been in hospital between 11 and 14 March 2014 and that he had a broken rib and a broken ankle. Upon his discharge on 14 March 2014, a different doctor examined the applicant and issued him with a medical certificate which recorded that he had a broken rib, a bruise of about 8 mm on his right eyebrow, and a fracture of the fibula close to the ankle that was in a cast. It also contained the phrase that it was not excluded that the injuries had been sustained in the manner suggested by the applicant, namely as a result of being hit or kicked. The certificate stated that no other traumatic injuries were present.", "13. On 11 March 2014 the police officer in charge of radio communications between patrolling officers and who was on duty on the night of the incident produced a written report to provide information for his superior and to receive whatever orders were deemed necessary. As well as repeating the account of the two arresting officers, he stated that he personally had seen the applicant at the station and that the applicant had told him that he had fallen while running and that his back was hurting. The officer had offered to call in medical staff from the local medical centre to check the applicant on the spot, but he had refused, saying that he did not need a doctor and wished to be released instead.", "14. A different police officer was sent to the local medical centre. In a written report he drew up on 11 March 2014 on his visit, he confirmed the existence of a record there that the applicant had visited it the previous evening and had been checked by a doctor who had directed him to the hospital for treatment of a suspected fractured ankle. Another officer visited the hospital the same day. In a written report he listed his findings, namely that the applicant had been admitted and treated for a broken rib and broken leg the previous night. The report indicated that in a conversation with the applicant conducted during that visit, the latter had told the officer that he could not remember the events in detail, but that he was certain that after the car chase two police officers had beaten and then handcuffed him before taking him to the police station. The applicant also gave a handwritten statement to an officer that day. In it he referred to the car chase, stated that he had wanted to escape as he had felt drunk, that when he had got out of his car the policemen had grabbed him, that one of them had pulled him to the ground and that the other one had handcuffed him. He concluded by saying that the injuries had most likely been caused during his arrest, given that immediately beforehand he had only been driving his car and did not remember breaking his leg and rib when he had brought the car to a stop.", "15. On the same day the applicant’s brother also gave a written statement to the police (see paragraph 11 above).", "16. The two police officers involved in the car chase and the arrest also gave written statements on 11 March 2014. In addition to the description above (see paragraph 9), the officers stated that once the applicant had been handcuffed and put inside the police car, he had leaned on one of them and moaned. When asked if he had a problem and wished to be taken to a medical centre, he had refused and said, “It’s nothing”. At the police station the applicant had refused to be tested for alcohol or to sign the arrest report.", "17. On 13 March 2014 the Varna District Prosecutor, acting on his own initiative, opened criminal proceedings in relation to the conduct of the two officers who had arrested the applicant. The order for the opening of those proceedings indicated that it was “against the guilty official from the Ministry of the Interior who, acting in the context of his professional functions, had caused bodily harm to the applicant on 10 March 2014 in Varna”. A number of investigative steps were carried out. The investigating authorities questioned several police officers as witnesses, including the two involved in the applicant’s arrest and those who had been at the police station on the night of the incident. The latter all stated that they had seen the applicant at the police station on the night in question. He had been calm, had smelt of alcohol and been visibly intoxicated, his clothes had been muddy and he had limped. The applicant, his brother and the friend of the brother who had accompanied him to collect the applicant from the police station, were also interviewed. The brother and his friend stated that the applicant had not told them anything about the circumstances of his arrest and that the brother had learned that the applicant had been beaten by the police from the doctors at the hospital.", "18. A forensic medical expert was appointed on 30 May 2014 to establish the nature of the injuries sustained by the applicant and the type of instrument used. The expert was given a list of specific questions that needed to be answered. The forensic medical report, containing a comprehensive and independent assessment, concluded that the three injuries recorded in the medical certificates drawn up in the immediate aftermath of the events (see paragraph 12 above) were incompatible with the applicant’s allegations that the officers had hit him all over his body for a few minutes. In particular, being kicked by someone wearing boots or being hit for several minutes would have left the applicant with many more traces on different parts of his body, not just the three strictly localised injuries mentioned above. The report further indicated that the injuries could have been received as a result of falling over while moving in accelerated fashion, for example by running and falling.", "19. In a decree of 31 October 2014 for terminating the criminal proceedings, the prosecution established that the version of events given by the applicant at different stages of his questioning were not consistent. In particular, he had stated initially that he had sprained his ankle after tripping and falling, but had later changed his story and said that the injury had been the result of an intentional and prolonged beating by police officers. Furthermore, when questioned on 27 March 2014, the applicant had stated that the police officers had started hitting and kicking him after he had left his car voluntarily. When interviewed again on 28 May 2014, he had asserted that the officers had brutally pulled him out of the car and had thereafter only kicked him rather than hit him. He had tried to use his arms to protect his head from the kicks. He had stated that he could not remember or recognise the police officers who had beaten him, whether in a personal confrontation or from pictures. He had also complained that three officers had beaten him, while it had been unequivocally established that there had only been two patrolling officers. In addition, when on 6 October 2014 the investigator had handed the investigation file over to the applicant, he had signed the related acknowledgement, indicating that he did not wish to acquaint himself with the evidence, read the documents in the file, which was voluminous, and that he had no requests, comments or objections to the investigation.", "20. The prosecutor concluded in the decree for termination of the proceedings that the applicant’s complaints were not supported by the evidence. The force used by the officers had been necessary for neutralising and detaining him in the circumstances, given that he had effectively been running away from the police and actively disobeying their orders to stop. The force had involved one officer holding the applicant on the ground, using one knee to press on his body, while the second officer had helped by handcuffing him. There was no evidence pointing to the officers having used violence or undue force when apprehending the applicant. The applicant challenged the prosecutor’s decision in court.", "21. The prosecutor’s decision to terminate the proceedings was confirmed at two levels of jurisdiction. In particular, the first-instance court, the Varna District Court, observed in its decision of 24 November 2014 that two officers had arrested the applicant after a long car chase, when he had tried to escape despite clear orders to the contrary. The officers had worn police uniforms that had been clearly visible and identifiable and had been driving a police car with flashing police lights and a siren while chasing the applicant. He had not only refused to stop but had actively avoided being caught. As to the differing versions of the events thereafter, the court found that the applicant’s submissions were inconsistent and not supported by the evidence. As a consequence, the court gave no weight to his testimony, finding that it was incompatible with the rest of the evidence.", "22. The second-instance court, the Varna Regional Court, upheld those findings in a final decision on 9 January 2015." ]
[ "13", "3", "6" ]
[ 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 13 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1983 and is currently in detention in Rzeszów.", "6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "7. On 19 April 2005 the applicant was arrested and placed in detention in Chełm Prison. He was later held in several other detention facilities.", "8. On 4 August 2010 the Lublin Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder, rape, assault, robbery, fraud and handling stolen goods. On 8 February 2011 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment.", "9. Previously, on 21 November 2008 the governor of Chełm Prison requested that the Lublin Regional Court order the applicant to take part in a rehabilitation programme for convicted drug addicts while he served his sentence.", "10. On 15 December 2008 the Lublin Regional Court granted the request.", "11. On 27 June 2010 the applicant complained to the Lublin Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service that he had not in fact been taking part in the drug rehabilitation programme while serving his sentence.", "12. On 24 September 2010 the head of the Lublin Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service replied that the applicant’s programme had been planned to start on 6 January 2010. However, owing to his anti-social behaviour, which might have been dangerous for other inmates, he had been classified as a dangerous detainee and had therefore not been able to participate in the programme, which, as a rule, involved group sessions and treatment.", "13. On 14 September 2009 the Chełm Prison Penitentiary Commission (“the commission”) classified the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. The commission made its decision after a request from the governor of Chełm Prison, which stated that the applicant had beaten another prisoner at the Lublin Detention Centre in 2002 (this event was not a subject matter of the above criminal proceedings). Additionally, the applicant had apparently behaved in an aggressive and unpredictable manner by, in particular, threatening prison guards, refusing to accept meals and trying to self-harm. He was frequently punished for disciplinary breaches. He did not appeal against the commission’s decision.", "14. The decision to impose the dangerous detainee regime on the applicant was subsequently upheld, inter alia, by decisions of the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission of 10 December 2009; of 4 March, 2 June, 2 September and 2 December 2010; of 2 March, 2 June, 1 September and 1 December 2011; and of 1 March, 30 May, 29 August and 28 November 2012. The reasoning of all these decisions was similar and read as follows:\n“The Commission, having noted the proposals made by the Head of the Protection Division (Kierownik Działu Ochrony) and the Head of the Penitentiary Division (Kierownik Działu Penitencjarnego) and having heard the applicant held, in his presence, that the reasons justifying his classification as a dangerous detainee have not ceased to exist. It has been unanimously decided to extend the applicant’s classification for further three months because he still poses a danger to the security of the society and the prison.”", "15. The applicant appealed against most of the decisions issued in 2010 and 2011. The appeals were dismissed by the Lublin Regional Court on 9 April and 15 October 2010, and on 28 February and 27 April 2011.", "16. The court held that the commission’s decisions had been lawful and justified as the dangerous detainee regime had been imposed on the applicant in accordance with Article 88a § 2, sub-paragraph 2(c) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences.", "17. On 27 February 2013 the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission extended the period of the imposition of the dangerous detainee regime on the applicant. The commission based its decision on the fact that the applicant had ill-treated another prisoner. It also made reference to the request for an extension of the regime made by the director of the remand centre, according to which the applicant had destroyed some objects in the penitentiary unit and had behaved in an aggressive and unpredictable manner. On 9 July 2013 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the commission’s decision holding that the extension of the dangerous detainee regime was justified by the applicant’s unpredictable behaviour, his interference with the peaceful functioning of the penitentiary unit, acts of self-mutilation and refusal to accept meals.", "18. The dangerous detainee regime was further extended on 22 May 2013. The Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission again based its decision on the fact that the applicant had ill-treated another prisoner. It also referred to the request for an extension of the regime made by the director of the remand centre, who relied on the fact that in February 2013 the applicant had been punished for destroying some objects in the penitentiary unit and that his behavior was still unpredictable. On 2 September 2013 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the commission’s decision, holding that it had been given in accordance with the law.", "19. On 13 August and 13 November 2013 the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission again extended the period of the dangerous detainee regime imposed on the applicant. In the decision of 13 August 2013 the commission relied on the request made by the director of the remand centre of 12 August 2013, according to which the applicant had been disciplinary punished on 4, 18 and 28 June 2013. In the decision of 13 November the commission made reference to the request of 12 November 2013 which was justified by the applicant’s “emotional instability” and “unpredictable behaviour”. The applicant appealed, but the latter decision was upheld by the Lublin Regional Court on 30 December 2013. The court found, among other things, that the applicant could not control his aggressive behaviour and was a threat and danger to order in the prison. It referred to the applicant’s aggressive behaviour on 5 June 2013 when he had tried to push out a guard from his cell and tear out shackles from him. He had also broken a support of his bed and used vulgar language. He had committed a further unspecified disciplinary offence on 21 June 2013. The decision of 13 November 2013 was upheld by the Lublin Regional Court on 30 December 2013. The court referred to the reasons relied on previously in its decision of 9 July 2013 (see paragraph 17 above).", "20. On 12 February 2014, owing to an improvement in the applicant’s behaviour and his progress in understanding the need to undergo therapy for drug addicts, the dangerous detainee regime was lifted. The applicant appealed and the challenged decision was upheld by the Lublin Regional Court on 15 April 2014.", "21. The regime was applied to the applicant for four years and almost five months.", "22. The applicant was detained in several detention facilities - Chełm Prison, Radom Remand Centre, Lublin Remand Centre and Potulice Prison.", "23. The cells, in which the applicant was kept, including the sanitary facilities, were constantly monitored via closed-circuit television.", "24. The applicant had to wear a red uniform, designated for dangerous detainees, which, as he alleged, was not warm enough in the winter. He was subjected to a strip search every time he left or entered his cell, which in practice meant that he had to strip naked in front of prison officers and bend over in order to enable the examination of his anus. The applicant had to wear handcuffs whenever he was outside his cell, including for appearances in court.", "25. The windows were covered by a plastic blind which limited access to daylight and fresh air in the cells.", "26. In Chełm and Potulice prisons the cells were equipped with a sanitary facility which was partially separated from the rest of the cell.", "27. On 28 September 2009 the applicant was transferred from Chełm to the Radom Remand Centre. According to the applicant, the cell there was equipped with a noisy ventilator and he could not sleep.", "28. On 27 November 2009 the applicant was transferred to the Lublin Remand Centre, where he was placed in solitary confinement.", "29. The applicant was detained in a single cell where the sanitary facility was not separated from the rest of the cell. He was also detained in cells in Lublin where the sanitary facility was separated.", "30. In the cell he had no access to hot running water. According to the Government, there was a boiler in the cell so the applicant could heat water. The applicant submitted that he had had the boiler for six months and that it had then been taken away. He was allowed to have a shower once a week.", "31. The applicant was not allowed to go to mass in the Lublin Remand Centre. He lodged a complaint about this with the Lublin Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service. In response, on 26 August 2010, the authorities decided that the applicant could listen to mass on the radio or have a private service with a priest. The applicant could go to the day room, which had sport facilities, a laptop, television, a computer game console and a DVD player, three times a week. He had access to press publications and could use the library. He could also participate in sports and art competitions. After the dangerous detainee regime was lifted, the applicant refused to participate in any sports and cultural activities because his cell was equipped with a television and a computer game console.", "32. On 20 March 2013 the applicant was transferred to Potulice Prison.", "33. The applicant had to wear joined shackles (kajdanki zespolone) on his hands and feet whenever he was outside the prison, including for appearances at court hearings or while on medical visits. The shackles consisted of handcuffs and fetters joined by chains. The Government submitted that outside his cell and within the prison the applicant only had to wear handcuffs. According to the applicant, he had to wear the joined shackles in the rest of the prison, including when he was going to attend visits by members of his family.", "34. On an unspecified day in April or May 2013 the applicant was transferred back to the Lublin Remand Centre." ]
[ "3" ]
[ 8, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Rīga.", "6. She worked as an accountant in a building management company (namu pārvalde) from 1989. From the beginning of 1997 she also fulfilled the duties of a cashier and she was fully responsible for any shortfall in the material assets (materiālās vērtības) entrusted to her.", "7. On 9 December 1997 the applicant’s colleagues reported to the police that illicit cash withdrawals from the company’s cash registers had been made. Allegedly, the withdrawals had been made by the applicant and her colleague, B.E., by means of annulling the records of cash transactions and then taking the money received in respect of those transactions from the cash register.", "8. Internal and external audits were carried out and it was discovered that certain data in the company’s cash registers had been manipulated. Specific amounts of cash and dates were noted in the audits, as well as the customer numbers in respect of which this manipulation had been executed. It was later established that the data had been manipulated in order to conceal illicit cash withdrawals. Further internal and external audits were carried out in 1999 and 2001.", "9. On 15 January 1998 the applicant gave a written explanation (paskaidrojums) to a police inspector. The applicant testified that she had annulled three cash transactions and made three cash withdrawals in the amount of 1,228 Latvian lati (LVL – approximately 1,747 euros (EUR)). She had done so at the request of the deputy head of the company and had handed the cash over to him. As concerns the remainder of the missing cash, she stated that she had not taken it. Nor had she annulled any other cash transactions.", "10. On 16 January 1998 the police inspector issued a decision to institute criminal proceedings (lēmums par krimināllietas ierosināšanu) in respect of “the misappropriation of funds in the amount of LVL 7,559 [approximately EUR 10,756] carried out by the applicant and B.E. by annulling records of cash transactions”. The applicant was not informed of this decision at that time. Instead, she was issued a summons to talks (pārrunas) and she was interviewed on 16 January 1998. A witness statement record (liecinieka nopratināšanas protokols) was drawn up. The applicant was informed of the rights and obligations of witnesses, as stipulated by Article 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Kriminālprocesa kodekss, see paragraph 24 below); she was also informed that if she refused to testify or gave false testimony she would incur criminal liability. The applicant repeated that she had annulled only three cash transactions and had made only three cash withdrawals. She had handed the cash over to the deputy head.", "11. According to the applicant she appeared at the police station on 16 January 1998, accompanied by a lawyer whom she had authorised to represent her. Her request to be represented by the lawyer was refused – she was told that her status was that of a witness and that witnesses were not entitled to legal assistance. The Government contested the applicant’s submission, as there was no mention of this in the witness statement record; the Government stated that the applicant had signed the record and had made no remarks.", "12. In the following years the applicant was interviewed as a witness five more times: on 21 January and 14 December 1999, 13 February 2002, and 6 January and 11 November 2004. Her rights and obligations as a witness – as well as the fact that she would render herself criminally liable if she refused to testify or gave false testimony – were explained to her (reference was made to Article 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code, see paragraph 24 below); no mention of any right to legal assistance was made. She reiterated that she had annulled only three cash transactions and had made only three cash withdrawals. She had handed the cash over to the deputy head of the company. She furthermore added that she had already repaid to the company approximately LVL 1,228 (approximately EUR 1,747).", "13. A confrontation (konfrontācija) was also held between the applicant and B.E. on 27 January 1999 and with the deputy head of the company on 28 January 1999, who were also considered witnesses. Another confrontation between the applicant and the chief accountant was scheduled to take place on 24 May and 20 June 2002, but neither of them attended.", "14. In 2000, 2001 and 2002 the police considered the case material to be sufficient for bringing charges against the applicant and referred the case to the prosecutor’s office. However, several prosecutors identified various shortcomings in the investigation and transferred the case back to the police for additional investigation.", "15. The identified shortcomings included the following aspects.\nFirst, the criminal case material was found to be insufficient to establish guilt and therefore no charges could be brought. Serious breaches of the Criminal Procedure Code and other regulations were found. The criminal case material had contained uncertified copies of documents, missing pages of explanations and incomplete procedural records. In addition, the audits had not been carried out in accordance with law. Another audit had to be commissioned and more witnesses had to be questioned.\nSecond, there had been discrepancies in the total amount of missing cash and it was impossible to establish that a crime had been committed or to bring charges against anyone. The audit had to be carried out by a certified auditor.\nA conclusion was made that the pre-trial investigation had been deficient, chaotic and had been carried out aimlessly. Moreover, the role of the chief accountant and the deputy head of the company in the cash withdrawals had not been properly investigated.", "16. The police carried out further investigative measures – they commissioned another audit, collected further evidence, and questioned more witnesses (including the head, the deputy head, and the chief accountant of the company, as well as some of its customers).", "17. On 20 January 2005 the police referred the case to the prosecutor’s office for the fourth time. This time the case material was deemed sufficient for charges to be brought and, on 27 January 2005, the applicant was officially charged with nineteen episodes of misappropriation of funds. She thus became an accused person (apsūdzētā persona) in the criminal proceedings against her and was informed of her right to have a lawyer. A preventive measure – a prohibition on her changing her place of residence, which she had to acknowledge by giving her signature (paraksts par dzīves vietas nemainīšanu) – was imposed on her. On 26 May 2005 the charges were slightly amended in respect of the total amount of misappropriated funds.", "18. On 27 January, 3 February, 26 May and 5 September 2005 the applicant was questioned as an accused person. On two occasions (on 27 January and on 26 May 2005) the applicant stated that a lawyer’s presence was not necessary. On another occasion (on 3 February 2005) she stated that she would continue giving testimony without the presence of a lawyer. No remarks were made regarding the absence of a lawyer during the questioning of 5 September 2005. The applicant was given access to the criminal case file in order that she could acquaint herself with its contents. She subsequently requested that further investigative measures be taken. Some requests for further investigative measures were granted and some were refused.", "19. On 5 September 2005 the final bill of indictment was served on the applicant (uzrādīta galīgā apsūdzība) in the presence of a lawyer. The total amount of misappropriated funds was again slightly amended. On 21 October 2005 other preventive measures – a prohibition on leaving the country and the obligation to reside at a particular place of residence (uzturēšanās noteiktā dzīvesvietā) – were imposed on the applicant. On the same date the prosecutor’s office forwarded the case file to the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa).", "20. On 23 October 2006 the first hearing was held. On 20 November 2006 the Riga Regional Court convicted the applicant of nineteen episodes of misappropriation of property that had been entrusted to her. The applicant did not admit her guilt. She agreed that she had annulled three cash transactions and made three cash withdrawals in the amount of LVL 1,228 (approximately EUR 1,747), but stated that she had done so at the request of the chief accountant and the deputy head of the company with a view to paying out salaries. As concerns other cash transactions, she had not annulled those. The court, relying on witness testimony and other case material (the results of three audits, the electronic cash register records, the relevant bills and receipts, the respective employment agreements etc.), convicted the applicant. The court did not rely on the applicant’s statements made during the pre-trial investigation.", "21. The applicant was given a three-year suspended prison sentence, with three years’ probation (a more lenient sentence than the minimum provided by law). In setting the sentence the court took into account her state of health, the fact that she had partly compensated the company for the damage in question, and the fact that she had committed the crime nine years previously and that since then she had not committed any other crimes. The applicant lodged an appeal on 2 December 2006.", "22. The first appellate hearing was scheduled for 15 August 2007. On 17 August 2007 the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Krimināllietu tiesu palāta) quashed the applicant’s conviction for lack of evidence in respect of five episodes of misappropriation of property. The applicant’s sentence was reduced to a two-year suspended prison sentence, with one year’s probation. In setting the sentence the court took into account the significantly lower number of episodes for which the applicant had been convicted, the fact that a particularly long period of time had elapsed since the commission of the crime, and the fact that there was no indication that she had committed any other crimes since then. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law on 18 October 2007.", "23. On 29 November 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The Senate indicated that the former Criminal Procedure Code (which had been in force in January 2005, when the charges had been brought against the applicant) had not excluded that a person could have the procedural status of a witness while a pre-trial investigation was in progress and could only be officially charged once there was sufficient evidence concerning that person’s guilt." ]
[ "6", "34" ]
[ 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 15 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in Jēkabpils Prison. He is a person with special needs. The applicant is deaf and mute since birth and his knowledge of sign language is poor.", "6. At least as of 2 March 2001, when his disability was certified as permanent, the applicant has been recognised as being category 3 disabled (the least severe level of disability). On an unspecified date his disability was re-categorised as category 2 (medium level of disability).", "7. On 7 May 2008 the applicant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to fifteen years and six months’ imprisonment. That judgment became final on 24 February 2009. He started serving his sentence in the most restrictive “lower” regime in Liepāja Prison.", "8. On 23 December 2011 the applicant was transferred to Brasa Prison. He was placed in the medium regime as he had served one quarter of his sentence. He was held in cell no. 301 (from 1 January 2012 to 26 February 2013) and cell no. 303 (from 26 February to 30 October 2013).", "9. On 30 October 2013 the applicant was placed in the most restrictive “lower” regime. He was held in cell no. 203 (from 30 October 2013 until 16 February 2015).", "10. On 24 February 2016 the applicant was placed in the least restrictive “higher” regime. It appears that as of that date he was held in three different multi-occupancy cells. The number of his cellmates varied from two to fourteen. Each inmate had no less than 4 sq. m of living space in those cells.", "11. According to the applicant, he was held in dormitory‑type cells nos. 301, 303 and 203 together with other inmates, all of whom were in good health except for the applicant. The applicant’s submissions as to the overall surface area in those cells as well as the size of the sanitary facilities were consistent with the Government’s submissions (see paragraph 13 below). His account of the number of inmates was slightly different – he alleged that he had been held together with ten to twenty inmates in cells nos. 301 and 303. However, as concerns cell no. 203 he agreed with the Government – six inmates had been held in that cell.", "12. The applicant submitted that the heating had not been sufficient in those cells. He had been neither able to communicate with other inmates, nor with the prison management due to his disability. He had been in social isolation and had not received any special assistance.", "13. According to the Government, the applicant was held in three different cells, the conditions of which are detailed in the table below. The calculation of personal space (overall surface area with the in-cell sanitary facility deducted, divided by number of inmates held therein) is based on an approximate measurement of the sanitary facility according to the floor plans of Brasa Prison.\nCell no.\nPeriod of detention\nTotal number of inmates\nOverall surface area in sq. m\nSanitary facility sq. m\nPersonal space in sq. m\n301", "14. As regards out-of-cell activities, the Government indicated that while being held in the medium regime – in cells nos. 301 and 303 – the applicant had been able to freely leave those cells in daytime and to use the common area. The Government further submitted that cell no. 301 had been equipped with one window. That window had been fitted with bars and had been placed in a wall (adjacent to a corridor) facing another window (in the corridor). This cell had had three fluorescent lamps, including one night lamp located above the door. Heating had been provided by one heating pipe of 5 cm in diameter and the heaters located in the adjacent corridor and in the hallway. A new automatic boiler had been installed in Brasa Prison, which had ensured a temperature of 18˚C. Heating arrangements in cell no. 303 had been the same as in cell no. 301.", "15. While being held in the most restrictive “lower” regime – in cell no. 203 – the applicant had been able to leave this cell only for a daily walk (one hour), to take a shower or for appointments with a doctor, a prison chaplain or a social worker when necessary.", "16. Overall, inmates in Brasa Prison had had access to a psychologist, but the applicant had never availed himself of this possibility. He had, however, met with a prison chaplain and a social worker on several occasions. The Government provided records of three conversations between the applicant and a social worker in 2016, including a meeting on 11 April 2016 where the latter had called a non-governmental organisation (Latvijas Nedzirdīgo Savienība) concerning the applicant’s hearing aid. Lastly, the applicant had visited a psychiatrist at least on six occasions in the time period from 1 April 2015 to 7 September 2016.", "17. On 27 December 2011 the state of the applicant’s health was examined for the first time in Brasa Prison. It was noted that the applicant was deaf and mute and that he suffered from spondylosis.", "18. The applicant submitted an extract of his medical record in Brasa Prison. According to that document (dated 26 July 2016), he had been deaf since birth. On 13 August 2009 a psychiatrist had detected a psychiatric health condition (psihiskas veselības problēmas), namely, “reaction to situations with anxiety” (situācijas reakcija ar trauksmi). On 21 January 2010 the same psychiatrist had detected another sleep-related condition. On 10 December 2015 another psychiatrist diagnosed the applicant as having “organic personality disorder” (organiski personības traucējumi).", "19. The Government submitted another extract of the applicant’s medical record in Brasa Prison. According to that document (dated 7 April 2015), upon admission to Brasa Prison the applicant had been diagnosed as being deaf and mute and having spondylosis. During the above-mentioned period the applicant had consulted prison medical staff on thirty‑nine occasions. He had been examined, treated and provided with medication when necessary. No serious health conditions, which would have required an in‑depth examination, had been diagnosed. There had been no indications that outpatient examination or treatment had been necessary. The applicant had most often complained of colds, headache, poor sleep, gastritis and back pain related to spondylosis. Those complaints had not concerned his disability. In 2013 and 2014 the prison medical staff had organised an outpatient medical examination (in relation to tuberculosis) and a consultation by an ophthalmologist to obtain glasses. On 1 April 2015, upon the request of the Prisons Administration (Ieslodzījuma vietu pārvalde), the applicant’s state of health had been examined. It had been satisfactory, he had not had any complaints and he had gained weight while in prison. In sum, his health had not deteriorated.", "20. Over the course of two years (2012-14) the applicant lodged some twenty‑five handwritten complaints with various institutions (the management of Brasa Prison, the Prisons Administration, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior).", "21. He informed the authorities that he had been deaf and mute since birth and complained as follows:\n1) he had communication problems and conflicts with other inmates (he referred to “conflicts”, having been “influenced”, “offended” and “laughed about” by other inmates);\n2) he wished to be transferred to a single or dual-occupancy cell;\n3) he wished to be transferred to another prison;\n4) he wished to have his prison regime changed;\n5) his conditions of detention were inadequate and\n6) his medical care was inadequate.", "22. His complaints were examined by the Prisons Administration, save for three of them that were examined by the management of Brasa Prison.", "23. The following conclusions were made:\n(1) There had been no real threat to the applicant’s life or health in Brasa Prison. He had not been subjected to psychological harassment. His complaints to the management of Brasa Prison had not concerned any threats from other inmates.\n(2) The applicant did not have a subjective right to choose his cell or cellmates. It fell within the competence of the management of Brasa Prison. There was a limited number of cells with a capacity of four inmates and those inmates could not be moved for security reasons.\n(3) The decision concerning the applicant’s transfer to another prison had to be taken by the Prisons Administration. Taking into account that the applicant’s state of health had permitted his placement in any prison, there had been no grounds to transfer him to another prison; he had had to continue serving his sentence in Brasa Prison.\n(4) The possibility of his transfer to the most lenient prison regime could not be examined before 10 June 2015, when he would have served the relevant proportion of his prison sentence. As to the possibility of his transfer back to the more restrictive prison regime such actions could only be taken in cases of serious or systematic breaches of the prison regime.\n(5) The conditions in cell no. 301 had been adequate. It had measured 36 sq. m. Natural and artificial lighting as well as heating had been sufficient. The temperature in cell had been 18˚C.\nThe conditions in cell no. 303 had been similar to cell no. 301 – lighting and heating had been adequate.\nThe conditions in cell no. 203 had been adequate. According to the Prisons Administration and the relevant floor plans that cell had measured 19.86 sq. m (including 1.87 sq. m for sanitation facilities). Besides the applicant, it had accommodated five other inmates. A reference was made to the Court’s case-law and the applicable domestic standard of 2.5 sq. m per male inmate. The temperature in the cell had been 18˚C.\n(6) The applicant’s medical care had been carried out in accordance with domestic law. He had received the necessary medication in response to his complaints. He had never complained to prison doctors of “neurological diseases”, “noises” or “fears”, but he had had at least one consultation with a psychiatrist. In any event, he had been able to complain of the quality of medical care in prison to the Health Inspectorate.", "24. On 1 October 2012 a judge of a first-instance court refused to allow the applicant’s application to be transferred to another prison and to have his prison regime changed to a more restrictive one, a request made by the applicant in order to allow him to be held in a cell with a smaller number of inmates. Those issues fell within the realm of criminal law and could not be examined by the administrative courts.", "25. On 25 October 2012 another judge refused to allow the applicant’s application to be transferred to another prison and to be relieved from the obligation to continue serving his sentence. As concerns his transfer, reference was made to the decision by the Prisons Administration whereby a conclusion had been drawn that the Administrative Procedure Law had not applied. As concerns judicial review of that decision, such a complaint had already been examined (see paragraph 24 above). As concerns the release application, it fell within the realm of criminal law; this issue could thus not be examined by the administrative courts.", "26. The applicant attempted to appeal against the above-mentioned refusals, but his appeal did not appear sufficiently clear. Accordingly, on 21 November 2012 another judge decided not to proceed with his appeal (atstāt bez virzības), asking the applicant to render it more precise.", "27. On 10 December 2013 another judge examined further complaints by the applicant. His application to be transferred to a more lenient prison regime and another prison were refused because such complaints had already been examined (see paragraphs 24-25 above). His complaint about insufficient heating in Brasa Prison did not appear sufficiently clear; the judge decided not to proceed with it, asking the applicant to render it more precise. As the applicant did not provide further information, the latter complaint was considered as not submitted (uzskatīt par neiesniegtu).", "28. On 2 April 2014 the applicant complained to the administrative courts that the Prisons Administration had extended the time-limit for its last reply. On 29 May 2014 a judge terminated the administrative proceedings in this connection since the Prisons Administration had issued its decision in the meantime.", "29. On 31 August 2016 a panel in Brasa Prison examined the possibility of the applicant’s transfer to a more lenient prison regime. The applicant and a sign-language interpreter were present. It was established that the applicant had been working in prison until 18 December 2015; he had stopped working owing to his state of health. He had a category 2 disability. He had completed secondary education but had not pursued his education further owing to being deaf and mute and needing a specialised learning programme. He had been working with an officer and a social worker for rehabilitation purposes. He had regularly visited a chaplain in prison; however, he had not met with a psychologist. He had participated in addiction recovery meetings. He had dedicated his free time to himself. He had received three positive citations (pamudinājums) from the prison management.", "30. A conclusion was drawn that the applicant had participated in nearly all the rehabilitation activities provided in the prison taking into account his capabilities. Therefore it was possible to transfer him to a more lenient prison regime in a partly closed prison.", "31. On 7 September 2016 the applicant was transferred to a partly closed prison in Jēkabpils, where he was held in a cell with two other inmates. One of them had a similar hearing impairment.", "32. The relevant parts of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified by Latvia on 1 March 2010, have been outlined in Grimailovs v. Latvia (no. 6087/03, § 78, 25 June 2013).", "33. The relevant parts of the Interim Report of 28 July 2008 (A/63/175) by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment have been outlined in the above-cited Grimailovs case (ibid., § 79)." ]
[ "13", "3" ]
[ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicants were born in 1971, 1953 and 1976 respectively and live in Bergama, İzmir.", "6. On 16 August 1989 the public limited company E.M. Eurogold Madencilik (“the company”), subsequently renamed Normandy Madencilik A.Ş., received an authorisation to begin prospecting for gold. Subsequently, the company was authorised to use cyanide leaching in the gold extraction process by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.", "7. On 19 October 1994 the Ministry of the Environment decided to issue an operating permit to the company for the Ovacık gold mine.", "8. On 2 July 1996 the İzmir Administrative Court dismissed a case brought before it for the annulment of the permit of 19 October 1994. On 13 May 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the first-instance judgment and decided that the permit should be annulled. It referred to the State’s obligation to protect the right to life and to a healthy environment and assessed the physical, ecological, aesthetic, social and cultural effects of the mining activity in question as described in the environmental impact report and the various expert reports which had been submitted to it. It held that those reports demonstrated the risk posed to the local ecosystem and to human health and safety by sodium cyanide use. It concluded that the operating permit in issue did not serve the public interest and that the safety measures which the company had undertaken to implement did not suffice to eliminate the risks involved in such an activity. On 15 October 1997, in compliance with the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment, the Administrative Court annulled the Ministry of the Environment’s decision to issue a permit for the mine. On 27 February 1998 the İzmir provisional governor’s office ordered that the mine be closed. On 1 April 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 15 October 1997.", "9. On 5 April 2000 the Prime Minister’s office drew up a report on the mine. It concluded that operations at the mine could be authorised, having regard to the additional measures taken by the company, the conclusions of a report by the Turkish Institute of Scientific and Technical Research (“TÜBİTAK”), the Ministry of the Environment’s favourable opinion and an opinion of the President’s Administration, which had emphasised the economic importance of an investment of that type.", "10. On 1 June 2001 the İzmir Administrative Court delivered a judgment on an application for judicial review of the report of the Prime Minister’s office, brought by twenty-five residents of Bergama, including the second and third applicants, Mr Mustafa Demirgan (Demircan) and Mr Yılmaz Acar. The administrative court decided to set aside the report, which, in its opinion, constituted an enforceable administrative decision giving rise to the issuing of permits. Notwithstanding the measures taken by the company, the court held that judicial decisions which had become final had found that the “risk and threat” in question resulted from the use of sodium cyanide in the gold mine and that it was impossible to conclude that those risks could be avoided by implementing new measures. Equally, it had been established that the risk connected with the accumulation of heavy elements or cyanide could persist for twenty to fifty years and was likely to infringe the right of the area’s inhabitants to a healthy environment. Accordingly, it was appropriate to conclude that the decision at issue could lead to the circumvention of a final judicial decision and was incompatible with the principle of the rule of law.", "11. On 29 March 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 1 June 2001 in so far as it had been brought by nineteen of the plaintiffs, including the second and third applicants and dismissed a rectification application by the Prime Minister’s office on an unspecified date.", "12. In the meantime, on 22 December 2000 the Ministry of Health decided to authorise the continued use of the cyanidation process at the mine for an experimental period of one year. The company re-started mining operations on 13 April 2001.", "13. In a judgment of 27 May 2004, the İzmir Administrative Court set aside the provisional permit issued by the Ministry of Health on 22 December 2000 in a case brought by fourteen people, including the first applicant, Ms Feride Genç. In particular, it considered that the risks highlighted in the judgment of 13 May 1997 were, inter alia, linked to the use of sodium cyanide in the gold mine and to the climatic conditions and features of the region, which was situated in an earthquake zone. It held that those risks and threats could not be eliminated by supplementary measures which continued to be based on the same leaching process. It also concluded that the issuing of the permit in question had been incompatible with the principle of the rule of law as that administrative decision had in reality been intended to amend a judicial decision that had become final.", "14. On 2 February 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 27 May 2004 and dismissed a rectification application by the Ministry of Health on 3 April 2006.", "15. On 29 March 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers took a “decision of principle”, stating that the gold mine situated in the area of Ovacık and Çamköy, in the district of Bergama (İzmir) and belonging to the Normandy Madencilik A.Ş. company, could continue operations. The decision was not made public.", "16. On 23 June 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of the Cabinet decision in a case brought by twenty-four plaintiffs, including the second and third applicants. The Supreme Administrative Court found that the Prime Minister’s decision had been unlawful as the environmental impact assessment report which had allowed for the operating of the gold mine had been previously annulled. The Prime Minister’s office objected.", "17. On 18 August 2004 referring to the decision of 23 June 2004, the İzmir governor’s office ordered the closure of mine.", "18. On 7 October 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the stay of execution of 23 June 2004.", "19. On 20 May 2005 the goldmine began operating again under a permit of the same date issued by the İzmir governor’s office.", "20. On 22 March 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court annulled the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers a decision which was upheld on 21 February 2008 by the Supreme Administrative Court.", "21. According to the documents in the case file, various sets of other proceedings were brought between 2006 and 2012 by other residents of Bergama against various administrative authorities and Normandy Madencilik A.Ş. before the administrative courts, some of which are still ongoing. The gold mine was in operation until at least 2014." ]
[ "6", "8" ]
[ 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicant, S.S. Yeniköy Konut Yapı Kooperatifi, is a housing construction cooperative under Turkish law operating in İzmir.", "5. In 1993, a third party cooperative bought a plot of land measuring 12,000 square metres and the title deed of the land was registered in its name. In 1995, construction works started on the land in question.", "6. In 2000, the forest administration initiated proceedings before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance for the annulment of the title deed to the land, alleging that it was part of the public forest area. In the meantime, the third party cooperative had merged with the applicant cooperative and the land had been registered in the Land Registry in the name of the latter.", "7. On 26 December 2002 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance ordered that 9,322 square metres of the land be registered in the name of the Treasury as it was part of the public forest area. It also ordered that the buildings constructed on this part of the land be demolished.", "8. Subsequently, the applicant brought a case before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and sought pecuniary damages from the Treasury under Article 1007 of the Civil Code which provided for the State’s responsibility for any damage resulting from the keeping of the land registry records.", "9. On 4 February 2005 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance awarded 138,917,600,000 Turkish Liras (TRL – approximately 81,716 euros (EUR) at the time) to the applicant.", "10. On 7 February 2006 the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance on the ground that there was no illegal act or action on the part of the land registry officials that might have had a causal link with the applicant’s loss.", "11. On 6 July 2006 the applicant submitted a further petition to the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and indicated that there was a decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation which was in contradiction with the decision of the Fourth Civil Division. In this context, the applicant alleged that its case should be accepted according to that decision of the First Civil Division issued on 7 May 2002 and numbered E.2002/3549 K.2002/5807.", "12. On 20 October 2006 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance followed the decision of the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation and dismissed the applicant’s claim.", "13. The applicant appealed. Reiterating its allegations and referring to the decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation of 7 May 2002, it repeated its compensation request.", "14. On 1 May 2007 the applicant’s appeal was rejected by the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation. This decision became final.", "15. In their decisions, neither the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance nor the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation expressed any reason about why they had reached a different conclusion from the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation." ]
[ "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "4. The applicant, who was born in 1989, lives in Istanbul.", "5. On 14 January 2009 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation.", "6. On 17 January 2009 the investigating judge at the Istanbul Assize Court, after questioning the applicant, ordered his pre-trial detention.", "7. On 24 June 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court.", "8. The trial commenced before the Istanbul Assize Court and the first preparatory hearing was held on 4 November 2009.", "9. In the subsequent hearings held between 17 February 2010 and 3 November 2010, the applicant appeared before the court and the judges ordered his continued detention.", "10. The applicant filed an objection against the decision of 3 November 2010. On 29 November 2010 the 12th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding an oral hearing, and based on the public prosecutor’s written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative.", "11. On 13 February 2013 the applicant was released from detention on remand.", "12. According to the latest information in the case-file, the proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the first-instance court." ]
[ "5" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Turkey.", "6. On 22 August 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The following day, on 23 August 2004, he was questioned by the gendarmerie, at which time he was reminded of his rights, including the right to benefit from legal assistance. He refused the assistance of a lawyer and gave a statement of forty-nine pages in length in which he admitted his membership of the PKK and gave detailed information about the organisation and its members. According to transcripts of that statement, the applicant read its content and signed every page of it.", "7. On 26 August 2004 the applicant was brought before the Tunceli public prosecutor and he was again reminded of his right to benefit from legal assistance. He indicated that he did not wish to be assigned a lawyer and that he would make a statement without assistance. He confirmed his membership of the PKK and his support for that illegal organisation, however maintaining that he had never been involved in an armed operation. The applicant was placed in detention pending trial on the same day.", "8. On 3 December 2004 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with seeking to destroy the constitutional order and unity of the Turkish State and to remove part of the country from the State’s control. The public prosecutor claimed that the applicant:\n- had exploded a remote-controlled land mine in Ovacık province in November 2003 that had caused the injury of one soldier,\n- had exploded a time bomb in Ovacık province on 28 October 2003 that had caused the injury of two soldiers.\nIn its assessment report (tensip zaptı) dated 10 December 2004 the Malatya Assize Court ordered a copy of the police statements of D.T., M.A., A.Ç., S.G., H.B. and V.D. The trial court further ordered that the whereabouts of D.T. be ascertained.", "9. M.A. was tried in another set of criminal proceedings concerning the same organisation. On 17 February 2004 M.A. lodged an application to benefit from the Reintegration of Offenders into Society Act (Law no. 4959), which had come into force on 6 August 2003.", "10. On 30 December 2004, at the first hearing, the applicant gave evidence in the presence of his lawyer and accepted the contents of his police statement. In other words, the applicant once again admitted his membership of the PKK while insisting that he had not been involved in any armed activity. He further stated that his statement had not been read back to him by the police and asked the trial court not to take it into consideration in case it had any incriminatory remarks in respect of himself or third persons in so far as they concerned participation in armed activities. When asked about his statement before the public prosecutor, the applicant essentially confirmed it, whilst insisting that he had not given any statement concerning the attacks in Tunceli, a city in the east of Turkey, and adding that he had signed it without reading it. Lastly, the applicant stated that he had received training in bomb-making and that he had been planning to carry out bomb attacks in major cities in accordance with the instructions of the PKK. His lawyer submitted that he had nothing to add to the applicant’s statements.", "11. During the same hearing the trial court questioned several witnesses, namely A.Ç., M.A. and K.A. A.Ç. testified that he knew the applicant but that they had not carried out any armed attack together. M.A. stated that he had not known the applicant’s real name, but he had known him as “Hamza”. M.A. further testified that he had no knowledge of the applicant’s position and activities within the illegal organisation. K.A. testified that he did not know the applicant.", "12. At a hearing on 25 November 2005 the trial court noted that D.T. was in Kırklareli Prison and it issued a letter of request to the Kırklareli Assize Court, requesting that the latter obtain his statements.", "13. On 14 December 2005 D.T.’s statement was taken by the Kırklareli Assize Court, pursuant to the letter of request by the trial court. According to the transcript of the hearing at the Kırklareli Assize Court, D.T. was detained in Kırklareli E-type Prison at the time his statement was taken. D.T. stated that he had known the applicant as “Zafer” and that he had knowledge of the attack in Ovacık province, adding that he had heard such information from the member with the code name “Serhildan”.", "14. On 15 March 2006 the applicant asked the trial court to hear evidence from D.T. in person. The trial court rejected this request on the basis that hearing D.T.’s testimony in person would not contribute to its assessment since his statement given before another court had been considered sufficient for a conviction.", "15. On 10 May 2006 the Malatya Assize Court found the applicant guilty pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court took account of the variety of evidence and witness statements, including those of D.T., which had been taken by the Kırklareli Assize Court at the trial court’s request. The relevant parts of the trial court’s reasoned judgment read as follows:\n“...\nEVIDENCE, EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE AND REASONING\n...\na) Evidence H.B., who is being tried for the offence of membership of an illegal armed organisation, stated on page 18 of his police statement that N.I. [the co-accused] had been involved in the killings of two soldiers in May 2003 around the River Hiran in Tunceli.\n...\nWitness A.Ç. stated on page 52 of his police statement that the members of the [illegal] organisation [PKK] with the code names ‘Zana’ and ‘Fırat’, who had been acting under the leadership of a member with the code name ‘Dilhas’, had infiltrated the security forces’ cordon in May 2003 around the Ziyaret river at Güleç village in Malazgirt.\n...\nWitness M.A. stated on page forty-four of his statement that the attack on the public-order commando unit at the location known as Göktepe in Malazgirt province in May 2003, that resulted in two soldiers being killed, had been carried out by the members of the [illegal] organisation [PKK] with the code names ‘Zana’ and ‘Fırat’, who were acting under the leadership of ... ‘Dilhas’. On page forty-four [of his statement], he stated that the bomb had been planted at the road checkpoint at the location known as Efkartepe in Ovacık province on 28 October 2003 by ... ‘Hamza’ and that he was an expert in explosives and was from a unit whose leader was the member with the code name ‘Diyar’.\n...\nWitness V.D. stated on page 20 of his police statement that ... ‘Dilhas’ had placed the explosives on the highway between Tunceli and Pülümür and that ... he had heard this from ‘Dilhas’. D.T., who was being tried for the offence of membership of an illegal armed organisation, stated on page 15 of his police statement that the decision to attack the military unit had been taken in October or November 2003 and that the mines had been placed and set off ... by Suat Daştan [the applicant], who had the code name ‘Zafer’. D.T., who gave evidence as a witness before the Kırklareli Assize Court, acting on letters of request, stated that his pre-trial statements had been correct and that he had knowledge concerning [the applicant]’s actions [under the code name “Zafer”] in Ovacık province and at the guard post and that he had received that information from ... ‘Serhildan’.\nWitness A.Ç., in his statement before the [trial] court, stated that his pre-trial statements had not been correct and that the member with the code name ‘Nurhak’ mentioned by the applicant had been himself [A.Ç.] and that they had not committed any attacks together.\nWitness M.A., in his statement before the [trial] court, stated that he had known the applicant’s code name as ‘Hamza’ and that he had no knowledge concerning the applicant’s illegal activities within the organisation [the PKK].\n...\nb) Examination of evidence, admission of our court and reasons\n...\nAlthough it was stated in the indictment that the applicant had been responsible for the attacks of 28 October and November 2003 in Ovacık province, it was understood that the attack which was mentioned by the witness D.T. was the one of 28 October 2003 and that the two attacks mentioned in the indictment were one and the same. And although [the applicant’s] code name was revealed as ‘Zafer’, it came to light as a result of the confrontation [between the applicant and the witness M.A.] conducted during the trial that ... ‘Hamza’, who had been mentioned by the witness M.A. on page forty-four of his [police] statement as the perpetrator of the attack on 28 October 2003 and who had received special training in explosives, had [in fact] been [the applicant].\n...\nAlthough the accused [the applicant] denied any involvement in any armed activity throughout the proceedings, the statements of S.G., A.Ç., H.B., V.D., M.A. and D.T. as well as the evidence given by M.A. and D.T. during the trial and the fact that M.A. had identified the applicant as ... ‘Hamza’ were consistent with each other and the admitted witness statements [showed] that ... the applicant, who was known as ‘Hamza’ by the witness M.A., had sprung the trap and had placed the mines on 28 October 2003.\n...”", "16. On 6 February 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court." ]
[ "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Manisa.", "6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "7. On 7 July 2009 the applicant was dismissed from the Expert Gendarmerie School due to non-compliance with disciplinary rules.", "8. On 28 July 2009 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court and requested the annulment of the decision to dismiss him.", "9. On 6 January 2010 the Supreme Military Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s case, taking into account the “secret documents” submitted by the Ministry of Defence. These documents were not disclosed to the applicant.", "10. On 5 May 2010 the applicant’s request for rectification was rejected by the same court." ]
[ "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicants were born in 1981 and 1966 respectively and live in Ecemiş village near the town of Lice, located with the administrative jurisdiction of the province of Diyarbakır.", "6. The facts of the case as submitted by the parties, and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows.", "7. At the time of the events the first applicant’s brother and the second applicant’s nephew Murat Tekdal was thirty years old and lived in Ecemiş village.", "8. On 12 September 2008 Murat Tekdal returned to his village of Ecemiş after having visited his uncle, the second applicant. Later the same day he left his home to walk to the nearby Şenlik village.", "9. Between 5 and 7 p.m. the same day, villagers in Ecemiş village heard gunfire. The following day the headman of the village (“muhtar”) was informed that a person had been killed. The headman, accompanied by 20‑30 villagers, went to Lice, where he was handed the body of the applicants’ relative, Murat Tekdal.", "10. According to a report drawn up on 13 September 2008 by seven members of the military, a military operation was being carried out in the area near the applicants’ village on 12 September 2008 when at 11.15 p.m. soldiers encountered 3-4 persons in the area whom they considered to be members of the PKK. The soldiers asked the persons to stop and surrender, but the persons opened fire on the soldiers. The soldiers returned fire and a clash ensued which continued for a period of approximately five minutes.", "11. At 5 a.m. the following morning the soldiers conducted a search in the area and noticed the footsteps of four persons. The footsteps disappeared some two kilometres away, next to a little brook in a valley. At that location the soldiers also found supplies of food. The soldiers continued their search to the north of the brook, and found the body of Murat Tekdal in Karaçay hill area. Next to the body was a hunting rifle still loaded with two unexploded cartridges.", "12. The soldiers concluded in their report that there had been five PKK members in the area the previous evening who had either been planning to attack the security forces or transporting food supplies to PKK bases. Having regard to the particular brand of the glue which some people used for sniffing, as well as to the hunting rifle, the seven soldiers concluded in their report that the applicant’s relative had been a “terrorist posing as an ordinary citizen”.", "13. The Lice prosecutor and a crime scene officer arrived at the scene at 10.45 a.m. on 13 September 2008 and searched Murat Tekdal’s pockets, where they found his identity card and a tube of glue. The body was then taken to the Lice State Hospital. They then took the body to the Diyarbakır State Hospital and subsequently drew up their own reports pertaining to the incident.", "14. According to the crime scene officer’s report, a bullet had entered Murat Tekdal’s abdomen. A cursory examination of the barrel of the hunting rifle found next to the body did not reveal any smell of gunpowder. There were also no fingerprints on the rifle. In a small bag found next to the body there were personal effects such as toothpaste, a toothbrush, a flick-knife, a packet of cigarettes, two sim cards, gloves, a tax‑payer’s identity card and a bank card. Swabs were taken from Murat Tekdal’s hands and face and from the barrel of the hunting rifle, in order to verify the existence or otherwise of gunpowder residue. He was fingerprinted and his jacket through which the bullet had gone was sent for forensic analysis. The body was photographed and taken to the hospital. It was subsequently established by a police laboratory that there was gunpowder residue on the outside of his left hand. It was also established that he had been shot at close range.", "15. It appears from the report prepared by the prosecutor that an autopsy was carried out at the hospital. The prosecutor stated in his report that he had gone to the scene after having been informed by the military that “a terrorist had been killed”. The headman of the applicant’s village formally identified the body as that of Murat Tekdal, and told the prosecutor that Murat lived in Ecemiş village.", "16. During the autopsy the doctor observed two bullet holes on Murat Tekdal’s lower left abdomen. He also noted that bullets had skimmed both hands and the lower right side of the abdomen and caused superficial injuries. There was also a superficial injury on the front of the right axilla. The internal examination of the body revealed injuries to the stomach, liver, diaphragm, spleen, intestines and lungs, all caused by bullets. A bullet measuring approximately 0.7 centimetres was found inside the body. Samples taken from the body were sent for further forensic analyses. An x‑ray of the body showed a large number of metallic objects inside the abdomen. The doctor concluded that death had been caused by bullets which had either entered or exited from the lower left abdomen. He also recommended that the clothes with bullet holes in them be sent to the forensic authorities with a view to determining the distance and the direction from which he had been shot.", "17. On 16 September 2008 the second applicant applied to the Diyarbakır branch of the Human Rights Association of Turkey, and asked for assistance in bringing the perpetrators of the killing of his nephew to justice. He also stated that since the killing, soldiers had been setting fire to the area where his nephew had been killed, and deliberately destroying the evidence.", "18. On 6 October 2008 the Lice prosecutor sent the investigation file to the Diyarbakır prosecutor who had jurisdiction to investigate incidents perpetrated by illegal organisations. In his letter accompanying the file the Lice prosecutor named the first applicant Fatma Güler as the “victim of a crime”, and her deceased brother Murat Tekdal as the “deceased/suspect”. The offence in question was stated as the “destruction of the unity and integrity of the State and the country”. The Lice prosecutor stated in his letter that on the evening of 12 September 2008 a number of soldiers from the Lice Infantry Brigade had had an armed clash with a group of five PKK members and that the body of Murat Tekdal had been found in the search conducted by the soldiers the following morning.", "19. On 22 October 2008 the Diyarbakır prosecutor decided not to bring any criminal proceedings against Murat Tekdal for the above-mentioned offence, because he was dead.", "20. On 24 November 2008 the applicants sent a letter to the Diyarbakır prosecutor and stated that the Lice prosecutor had started an investigation into the killing of their relative, but had subsequently decided that he had no jurisdiction to continue the investigation because the deceased had been a member of a terrorist organisation. In their letter the applicants denied that their relative had been a member of the PKK, and informed the Diyarbakır prosecutor that their relative had been living in the village of Ecemiş for the previous seven years and that all his fellow villagers knew him. They argued that there was no evidence to show that an armed clash had taken place prior to his killing. Indeed, the fact that his hunting rifle had been found loaded with unfired cartridges showed that there had been no armed clash. They asked the prosecutor to identify and prosecute those responsible for the killing of their relative.", "21. On 5 October 2009 the applicants lodged an objection against the prosecutor’s above-mentioned decision of 22 October 2008. In their objection petition they repeated their arguments of 24 November 2008 and referred to, inter alia, Article 2 of the Convention. They alleged that no effective investigation had been conducted into the killing, and urged the Assize Court to order the investigating authorities to carry out an investigation.", "22. The applicants’ objection was rejected by the Malatya Assize Court on 9 April 2010. The Assize Court stated that the prosecutor’s decision had concerned an offence which the applicants’ deceased relative was suspected of having committed. The objection lodged by the applicants, on the other hand, concerned the killing of their relative. The Assize Court stated that there was no on-going investigation into the killing of Murat Tekdal and that there had not been a decision not to prosecute anyone in respect of his killing. As there was no on-going investigation into the killing, the applicants had no standing to bring an objection against the Diyarbakır prosecutor’s decision. The Assize Court’s decision was communicated to the applicants on 30 April 2010." ]
[ "2" ]
[ 17 ]
[ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16 ]
[ "5. The applicants alleged principally that their twenty-one relatives (spouses, children, brothers and an uncle) had been killed by State servicemen on 5 February 2000 in the Novye Aldy settlement on the outskirts of Grozny (see Appendix for details).", "6. A criminal investigation into the murders was opened on 5 March 2000 by the Grozny town prosecutor’s office. Over the years, the applicants or close members of their families were granted victim status in the proceedings. Those proceedings are still ongoing.", "7. The documents indicate that only one applicant, Olga Soltykhanova (application no. 22304/10), was in the Novye Aldy at the time of the events; the other applicants were out of the district or out of Chechnya, owing to heavy fighting in the preceding months.", "8. In support of their claims, the applicants submitted copies of the death certificates issued in respect of their relatives, copies of some documents from the criminal investigation file, decisions granting them or their close relatives victim status in the criminal proceedings, statements which they had made, statements from witnesses to the events, and press and NGO reports. Several applicants also submitted documents issued in 2000 and 2001 by the local administration or “neighbourhood committees” confirming that the houses in which they had lived had been destroyed or damaged in 2000.", "9. Some applicants complained that their state of health had deteriorated due to the stress and anguish which they had suffered in the aftermath of the Novye Aldy killings, and particularly in view of the inadequate and callous response of the authorities to their plight.", "10. The facts of the present case are connected to the case of Musayev and Others v. Russia (nos. 57941/00 and 2 others, 26 July 2007) in so far as the applicants claimed that their relatives had been killed by the same people and in the same circumstances as the relatives of the applicants in that case.", "11. The applicants in Musayev and Others complained that eleven of their relatives had been killed by unidentified servicemen on 5 February 2000 in the Novye Aldy. The first applicant had witnessed the deaths of his seven distant relatives (cousins and nephews). Other applicants in Musayev and Others were more closely connected to the victims, and were their husband, sister or brothers. The first applicant had been granted victim status in the domestic criminal proceedings and had participated in those proceedings (see Musayev and Others, cited above, §§ 68, 81, 94). It appeared that in the domestic criminal proceedings the proximity of the relationships between the victims and the deceased had not been fully ascertained, and, as noted in the Musayev and Others judgment, no single list existed of the victims and the people who had been granted victim status in the proceedings (ibid., §§ 74, 80, 162). The Government did not challenge the first applicant’s victim status under Article 2 of the Convention.", "12. On the basis of the parties’ submissions and inferences drawn by the Court, it was established that on 5 February 2000 eleven relatives of the applicants had been killed by State servicemen in the Novye Aldy settlement on the outskirts of Grozny, during a special operation (a “sweeping” operation) carried out by, amongst others, servicemen from the Police Special Task Unit (Отдел милиции особого назначения (ОМОН)) from St Petersburg (hereinafter the St Petersburg OMON).", "13. According to the documents examined by the Court, more than fifty people had been killed on that day in the Novye Aldy by unidentified servicemen wearing camouflaged uniforms and using automatic weapons, equipped with portable radio sets, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and military Ural trucks. The same servicemen had also looted and burnt down a number of houses.", "14. In April 2006, when the parties exchanged observations in Musayev and Others, the criminal investigation was still ongoing. Although the investigation file reflected some attempts to identify the servicemen involved, there was no information that anyone had been charged with the crimes. The Court concluded that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the deaths.", "15. In addition, the first applicant, who had witnessed the deaths of his relatives and had himself been held at gunpoint, was found to be a victim of inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Lastly, a breach of Article 13 of the Convention was found, since the criminal investigation into the deaths had been inefficient, rendering any other remedy equally futile.", "16. On 5 March 2000 the Grozny town prosecutor’s office opened criminal investigation no. 12011 into the murder of several inhabitants of the Novye Aldy settlement in Grozny by “unidentified men armed with guns” under Article 105 § 2 of the Criminal Code (the murder of two or more persons with aggravating circumstances); the decision also referred to the looting of residents’ property. In response to the Court’s request in the present case, the Government submitted copies of eight volumes of documents from criminal case no. 12011, produced after the judgment issued in Musayev and Others. Those documents can be summarised as follows.", "17. The applicants submitted that, prior to the Musayev and Others judgment in July 2007, they had not been aware that another group of victims had applied to the Court. They also submitted that, prior to that date, they had had no reasons to doubt the effectiveness of the domestic investigation, even if no regular updates from the prosecutor’s office had been forthcoming. Some of the applicants also referred to their previous contact with lawyers whom they had instructed to apply to the Court in 2005, but one lawyer had died, and either their instructions to other lawyers had not been complied with or the applicants had not kept any written proof of those instructions. As the documents in the Court’s possession indicate, in March 2005 thirty-one families of victims of the Aldy events sent a letter to the Court stating their intention to apply to the Court. That letter included at least ten applicants in the present case. The signatories failed to submit proper applications or otherwise pursue that complaint, which was eventually discontinued.", "18. The deaths of eleven people were found to be in breach of Article 2 of the Convention in the Musayev and Others judgment (cited above), and the family members of five of those people are applicants in the present complaint (see Appendix). While the first applicant in the Musayev and Others case was a cousin and a nephew of the deceased, the applicants in the present group are the deceased’s spouses, children and brothers.", "19. The applicants in the present case (or their close relatives) were granted victim status in criminal investigation file no. 12011 on various dates between March 2000 and June 2012 (see Appendix). Eight applicants were questioned and received victim status in March and April 2000. Six were granted victim status in April and May 2004, and one in March 2005. The other five received such status between December 2007 and July 2012. On 19 April 2004 the investigator of the Chechnya prosecutor’s office granted an application made by a lawyer, Mr A. Khamzayev. The application was for thirty-two people to have victim status. The list included fourteen applicants in the present case, twelve of whom later obtained and countersigned proper individual decisions as indicated above. There is no information that any other procedural acts involving the applicants’ participation occurred between April 2000 and December 2007 (see the following paragraph).", "20. The investigation was adjourned and resumed a number of times (see subsection 5. Various procedural steps below); on 5 December 2007 the investigation was resumed. As of 2008 the applicants in the present case and in Musayev and Others and their close relatives were regularly questioned about the events of 5 February 2000. Thus, in December 2008 the following applicants were questioned: Zoya Musayeva (no. 21200/09), Malika Ganayeva (no. 30538/09), Ruslan Khadzhimuradov (no. 21194/09), Birland Tasuyeva (no. 27064/09), Ibragim Musayev (no. 21200/09), Aset Khakimova (no. 32851/09), Osman Kudozov (no. 30578/09), Manshura Sugaipova (no. 27259/09), Birlant Beterakhmadova (no. 24693/09), Baret Shamsatova (no. 27159/09), Abulkhasan Khaydayev (no. 30531/09), Alpatu Khirikhanova (no. 24700/09), Yakhita Bishayeva (no. 32855/09), and Yakhita Dzhabrailova (no. 32992/09). In November 2012 the investigators questioned Elina Umarkhadzhiyeva and Madina Dzhamoldayeva[1] (no. 30538/09); in December 2013 they questioned Rashid Gerikhanov (no. 27063/09), Aysest Musostova (no. 32862/09), Abulkhasan Khaydayev (no. 30531/09), and Birlant Beterakhmadova (no. 24693/09). During questioning, the investigators informed the applicants about forensic expert reports on the bodies that had been carried out in 2000. The applicants were also asked questions about the loss of property and were asked to estimate the pecuniary damage which they had sustained. While they provided some estimates, no documents were provided, and all applicants stated that they intended to seek pecuniary damages as civil parties during the trial.", "21. Additional questioning of the applicants, their relatives and other local residents continued into 2009 and the years which followed. New victims of the events were identified as late as 2014, and their relatives were granted victim status in the proceedings. The questioning of other local residents continued until 2014, when they were granted victim status in the proceedings, notably in respect of the loss of property.", "22. On 9 February 2009 Mrs Birlant Beterakhmadova (application no. 24693/09) complained to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny regarding the decision of 24 November 2008 to adjourn the investigation and the prosecutor’s failure to conduct an efficient investigation into the murders.", "23. On 3 April 2009 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court noted that the decision of 24 November 2008 had been quashed on 15 March 2009 by the Chechnya Investigative Committee, and dismissed Mrs Beterakhmadova’s complaint. She did not appeal against that decision.", "24. The decision of 10 April 2006 to adjourn the investigation (and subsequent similar documents) indicates that in May 2005 the investigation identified S.B. as a suspect. He was charged with aggravated murder and robbery. In February 2000 S.B. had been a police technician with the sapper battalion of the St Petersburg OMON. The charges stated that on 5 February 2000 he, along with three other unidentified persons, had killed Mr Sultan Dzhabrailov (the husband of Mrs Yakhita Dzhabrailova, applicant in case no. 32992/09) by shooting him with a Kalashnikov machine gun. S.B. was also charged with robbing two other people of money and jewellery, A.M and B.M. In October 2005 S.B. escaped to Belarus and his name was put on the international wanted list. In February 2006 the Zavodskoy District Court in Grozny ruled that S.B. should be arrested. The decision of 10 April 2006 states that the investigator informed the victims of that decision, but the case file contains no relevant correspondence. Copies of letters submitted by the parties indicate that a copy of that decision was sent to the victims on 14 November 2007.", "25. In April 2011 the investigators asked the prosecutor’s office in St Petersburg to question S.B.’s civil partner about his whereabouts. In November 2012 she stated that she had had no information about S.B.’s whereabouts since 2006, although she had seen him in 2008 in St Petersburg.", "26. In November 2012 the investigators examined a social network page belonging to S.B. and noted that the latest photographs on it had been uploaded in 2007. In May 2013 the investigators sought to obtain additional information about S.B.’s whereabouts by questioning his other relatives, locating his mobile phone, and so on.", "27. During the questioning of victims and witnesses the investigators collected additional information about the suspects. Thus, in February 2009 Mr Ibragim Musayev (application no. 21200/09) referred to servicemen from the 245th motorised rifle regiment, the commander of that regiment, and the commander of company no. 6 (see Musayev and Others, cited above, § 107) as possible suspects.", "28. In April 2010 the investigation produced a list of over 170 servicemen of the St Petersburg OMON who had been posted in Chechnya in February 2000, and asked for verification of whether one of them had a tattoo in the shape of a snake on his neck, mentioned by one of the witnesses. Dozens of servicemen were inspected, but no one with a snake-shaped tattoo was identified. When questioned in February 2011, the servicemen, in brief statements, confirmed that they had served in Chechnya in February 2000 but had no knowledge of the civilians killed in the Novye Aldy.", "29. In April 2010 the investigators sent a letter asking the prosecutor of the Northern Caucasus military circuit to identify and question the servicemen and commanders of the 245th motorised rifle regiment (see Musayev and Others, cited above, §§ 105-07). The letter contained detailed information and questions about the events of 5 February 2000, and asked the prosecutor to identify and question the people who had used known radio call signs and to identify the commanders of the operation. In June 2010 an officer of the military unit concerned stated, as a witness, that all details about the use of radio equipment and the assignment of calls were stored as secret information for five years. Several reminders followed in 2011 asking, in particular, for the former commander of the 245th regiment, Major-General S.L., to be questioned.", "30. In June 2010 the investigator in charge sought similar information from another military unit (the 15th motorised rifle regiment), including the names of the unit commanders who had taken part in the operation on 5 February 2000. In particular, the letter referred to the commander of company no. 6 of the regiment, who, the investigators suggested, had written a note left by the servicemen for the local residents.", "31. In May 2011 the investigators asked the military investigators to submit information about the commanders of the 245th motorised rifle regiment and to ask them a number of specific questions about the events of 5 February 2000.", "32. In April 2011 the investigators asked the investigator of St Petersburg to carry out additional ballistic reports on 357 guns used by the St Petersburg OMON in February 2000.", "33. In May 2011 the investigator in charge informed the military prosecutor of the Southern military circuit that the special operation on 5 February 2000 in the south of Grozny had been under the command of Colonel Ye.K., the head of the operative headquarters of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior. He reminded the military prosecutors of his previous requests for the commanders of that operation to be identified and questioned. It does not appear that any progress was achieved in this respect.", "34. During additional questioning in the period 2009-2013, local residents were asked about the damage to their property caused in 2000. They explained that many houses had been burnt down by the servicemen, and that those who had stayed in the district had been forced to give up their jewellery and valuables as a result of threats. Others estimated the amount of pecuniary damage caused (see Appendix). No one was granted victim status in relation to any property offence and no additional documents were requested from the residents. The victims stated that they would seek damages in the course of a criminal trial, as civil parties.", "35. On 18 January 2014 the investigator ruled that no criminal proceedings should be opened in connection to the crimes relating to property, due to the expiration of the statutory limits for those crimes. It does not appear that that decision was challenged. In December 2014 decisions according civil party status in criminal proceedings with regard to property claims were issued in respect of the following applicants: Ayset Musostova (no. 32862/090), Birlant Beterakhmadova (no. 24693) and Zoya Musayeva (no. 21200/09). Osman Kudozov (application no. 30578/09) submitted documents which indicated that the house for which he claimed compensation had been owned by M.K., his sister. In his written statement to the Court he stated that at some point M.K. had received compensation from the State for the lost property, but he submitted no relevant documents.", "36. On 5 December 2007 the investigation of criminal case file no. 12011 into the events of 5 February 2000 was resumed, and the victims were informed accordingly.", "37. On 5 January 2008 the investigation was adjourned.", "38. The investigation was then resumed, but on 18 August 2008 was adjourned again, and the applicants were informed accordingly.", "39. The investigation was then resumed, but adjourned again on 24 November 2008. A letter informing the victims of the adjournment was dated 24 October 2008.", "40. It appears that the investigation was reopened and then adjourned again on 11 January 2009.", "41. It was then reopened in March 20009, and on 16 April 2009 adjourned again, for similar reasons as those stated in the decision of 10 April 2006 (see paragraph 24 above).", "42. On 22 March 2010 the Chechnya Investigative Committee gave an order for an investigating group to be set up which would include investigators from the military prosecutor’s office, in view of information about the possible implication of military servicemen in the crimes.", "43. In June 2010 the investigators watched a video filmed in the Novye Aldy on 9 February 2000 (see Musayev and Others, cited above, § 25) and produced the video’s transcript for the file.", "44. In November 2012 the investigators compiled a table of people who had been killed on 5 February 2000, indicating their places of burial, the next-of-kin granted victim status in the proceedings, and the dates of such decisions. The table contains information about forty-seven deaths, including the deaths of twenty people about which the applicants in the present case complain; the one exception is Isa Akhmadov, born in 1964 (the brother of Aysest Musostova, application no. 32862/09). At the same time, the table contains information about the death of a certain Isa Akhmatov, born in 1959, in respect of whose death another person (his brother) was questioned and granted victim status in June 2012.", "45. In December 2014 the investigation recognised civil party status of three applicants in connection with the destruction and theft of property during the events of 5 February 2000.", "46. It does not appear that the applicants were informed of any other developments, or that they sought further information from the investigating authorities." ]
[ "13", "P1-1", "2" ]
[ 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 39 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Budapest.", "6. On 20 July 2015 a quarrel broke out between the applicant and his common-law wife, H.M. The latter called an ambulance because the applicant was under the influence of alcohol and was behaving oddly, and had a violent outburst.", "7. At about 4.40 p.m., instead of an ambulance, police officers E.Sz. and T.Z. appeared at the applicant’s flat, handcuffed the applicant and took him to the Orosháza police department, arriving there at about 5.10 p.m.", "8. According to the applicant he had no injuries when he was put into the police car. He was allegedly assaulted at the police station. While he was handcuffed and in the room for short-term arrestees, one of the three police officers present either kicked or pushed him from behind onto the floor. He hit his face and nose, which started to bleed. He also suffered injuries to his teeth. He fainted and when he regained consciousness, about fifteen minutes later, he found himself handcuffed to a bench, his knees hurting. His request for help was allegedly disregarded by the police officers at first, but when it became apparent that he could not walk, he was taken to hospital.", "9. At 7.45 p.m. the applicant was examined by Dr CS.H. at Orosháza Hospital. He had bruises on the bridge of his nose and around his two wrists, abrasions on his right thigh, scratches below his left knee, and his left tibia was broken. He was hospitalised following the examination.", "10. On 22 July 2015 the applicant was examined by Dr CS.H. of the Department of Traumatology, and further injuries were noted on his body: bruises on his upper left arm, an abrasion around the right side of his collar‑bone, scratches around the left side of his collar-bone, bruises on both sides of his hips, two loose teeth, one broken and one missing tooth in the upper jaw.", "11. The head of Orosháza police station of his own motion filed a criminal complaint against unknown perpetrators alleging “ill-treatment committed in the course of official proceedings”. The Central Investigation Office opened an investigation into ill-treatment committed in the course of official proceedings, assault causing actual bodily harm, and grievous bodily harm.", "12. In his testimony the applicant stated that he had been kicked from behind when taken into custody. At that time he had been handcuffed and had fallen onto his face on the floor, as a consequence of which his nose had started to bleed. He explained that he had remained unconscious for 15‑20 minutes and when he had regained consciousness, his nose had been bleeding and he had felt pain in his knee. He had asked for help, but only when the police officers realised that he was unable to stand unaided had he been taken to hospital.", "13. H.M. was questioned as a witness. Describing the circumstances of the incident before the police arrived she stated that the applicant had not mentioned to her before the incident that he had hurt his leg. She also stated that on the day of the incident the applicant had been found by her daughter lying on the kitchen floor. She confirmed the applicant’s version of events in so far as she maintained that she had seen no injuries on the applicant when he was put into the police car.", "14. K.B., the daughter of H.M., also questioned as a witness, stated that on 20 July 2015 at around 12.30 p.m. she had found the applicant lying on the kitchen floor and not breathing. She proceeded to wake him up and could tell that he had been drinking alcohol. She had also seen the applicant earlier that day falling over in the yard, but he had sustained only minor injuries to his arm and leg.", "15. According to the police report, when the police officers arrived at the applicant’s flat, the applicant was sitting on the floor and was unable to communicate. He did not identify himself, despite the officers’ order. When the police officers tried to handcuff him, he resisted, swinging his head from side to side. He fell to the ground and his nose started bleeding. He could only be put in the police car with the use of force, and when inside it he kept insulting the police officers. At the police station he continued to behave aggressively and tried to hit his head against the floor. He therefore had to be handcuffed and laid on the floor. He was not injured during these measures and his handcuffs were removed when he calmed down at around 7 p.m. He refused to be examined by a doctor.", "16. The Central Investigation Office also questioned E.Sz. and T.Z. and two other police officers who had been on duty at the police station at the time of the applicant’s placement in the room for short-term arrestees, and a third officer who had come on duty at around 6 p.m. the same day. E.Sz. and T.Z. confirmed what was in the police report and the other three witnesses denied any knowledge of ill-treatment having been inflicted on the applicant. They all stated that the applicant had been drunk and had been handcuffed to prevent him causing harm to himself.", "17. The two members of the medical staff of Orosháza Hospital who had been present during the applicant’s treatment could not recall the event in detail but remembered that the applicant had not complained about ill‑treatment by the police officers and, although limping, was able to walk unaided to the x-ray examination room.", "18. On 1 November 2015 the medical expert appointed by the Central Investigation Office expressed the opinion that the applicant’s leg had been broken one or two weeks prior to the incident and that it could not be determined whether the injuries to his teeth had been caused before or during his detention for questioning at the police station. According to the expert opinion, it was implausible that the applicant would have been capable of reconstructing the events of the day, owing to his drunkenness.", "19. On 17 December 2015 the Central Investigation Office discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of any conclusive evidence (as regards ill‑treatment committed in the course of official proceedings and assault causing actual bodily harm) and for the absence of a crime (as regards causing grievous bodily harm). According to the Investigation Office, it could not be established which injuries occurred during the police measures and whether they were caused by ill-treatment or the applicant’s own behaviour. The decision also stated that the applicant’s tibia could not have been broken during the incident and that the applicant’s credibility was questionable due to his drunkenness.", "20. The applicant filed a complaint against the discontinuation order. He maintained that his colleagues and supervisors, as well as the members of his household could have confirmed that he had no leg injury before the incident if they were heard as witnesses or if specific questions were put to them in this regard. He also submitted that Dr CS.H. (see paragraph 9 above) had been biased and questioned the credibility of the statement in the expert opinion of 1 November 2015 concerning his drunkenness (see paragraph 18 in fine above).", "21. On 18 February 2016 the chief prosecutor’s office dismissed the complaint. It endorsed the first-instance decision concerning the assessment of evidence and the legal classification thereof, informing the applicant of the possibility of pursuing substitute private prosecution proceedings." ]
[ "3" ]
[ 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16 ]
[ 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 ]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. He was the owner and the editor-in-chief of a publishing house, Aram Basım ve Yayıncılık, which published a periodical, Vesta.", "5. In 2004 an article written by Mr M.Ş. entitled “On the Kurdish Intellectual” was published in Vesta.", "6. On 29 December 2004 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, certain passages of the article depicted the PKK[1] as part of the Kurdish intellectual movement and hence constituted propaganda of the organisation, known for employing violence and terror.", "7. On 23 September 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 as he had published the article in question in Vesta.", "8. In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court cited the following passages from the article:\n“In Kurdish history, there have been moments, in certain periods, during which Kurdish literature and culture developed and shone. In those moments, sparks of thought appeared. However, objectively and without renouncing the past, the conditions of the birth of Kurdish intellectualism are based on the 1970s. In earlier periods, there had only been individual and temporary developments not creating traditions. The political nature of the 20th century, the existence and rise of national liberation movements, the emergence of modern currents in Kurdish politics and, most importantly, the creation of a mass movement, served as the basis for the birth of the Kurdish intellectual. This process was manifested in the figure of the PKK. All political movements before the PKK were rebellious, devoid of political depth, tactical unity, stable path and permanence. The ideological and intellectual superficiality of these revolts and their fierce repression led to the loss of existing knowledge and to falling behind. From this point of view, through political and thoughtful analysis, while being free from the system and alienation, and bearing within it its own cultural identity based on the impoverished Kurdish rustics, [the PKK] allowed the beginning of a permanent and stable political enlightenment process.\n...\nAnother characteristic of the PKK movement at the beginning was that it realised that [the previous] abstract and theoretical movements had not led to a solution but deepened the problem.\n...\nThe fact that the PKK movement was based on the impoverished Kurdish rustics who were intact and preserved their national identity paved the way for a start favourable for a confident, militant and revolutionary tradition. Yet, the progress of the movement was accompanied by the downfall of the level of quality.”", "9. The court considered that the aforementioned passages and the article in its entirety constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK. It hence sentenced the applicant to ten months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of 375 Turkish liras (TRY). Taking into account his good behaviour during the trial and his character, the court suspended the pronouncement of his conviction on condition that he did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması).", "10. On 22 October 2008 the court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned decision." ]
[ "10" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Podgorica.", "6. On 6 September 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Commission for Restitution (Komisija za restituciju nepokretnosti) in Berane requesting restitution of the property expropriated from his father in 1969.", "7. Following the adoption of a new Restitution Act (Zakon o povraćaju oduzetih imovinskih prava i obeštećenju), on 28 December 2005, the applicant submitted another application to the newly established Commission for Restitution and Compensation in Berane (Komisija za povraćaj oduzetih imovinskih prava i obeštećenja) requesting compensation.", "8. In 2008 all the Commissions for Restitution and Compensation were consolidated into three regional Commissions in Bar, Bijelo Polje and Podgorica. Due to the location of the expropriated property, the applicant’s request was assigned to the Commission with its seat in Bijelo Polje (hereinafter “the Commission”).", "9. On 19 February 2009 the applicant sought opinion from an independent expert regarding the expropriated property.", "10. On 21 July 2009 the Commission also requested an assessment report on the expropriated property. The report was submitted to the Commission on 24 July 2009.", "11. Due to Commission’s inactivity, on 4 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal (žalba zbog ćutanja uprave) with the Appeals Commission (Komisija za žalbe u postupku za povraćaj imovinskog prava ili obeštećenja).", "12. On 23 October 2009 and 5 December 2013 the applicant filed complaints with the Ministry of Finance and the Administrative Court, respectively, about the Appeals Commission’s inactivity.", "13. On 24 December 2013 the Appeals Commission ordered the Commission to decide on the applicant’s request within a period of 30 days.", "14. On 13 October 2014 the Commission ruled against the applicant.", "15. On 23 December 2014 the Appeals Commission upheld that decision on appeal.", "16. The applicant filed and action with the Administrative Court seeking redress.", "17. On 17 April 2015 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s claim as unfounded. This decision was served on the applicant on 23 April 2015.", "18. On 23 June 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 24 July 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal for failure to make proper use of other available domestic remedies. According to the Constitutional Court, the applicant should first have made use of an additional request for the judicial review of his case (zahtjev za vanredno preispitivanje sudske odluke)." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 6, 12, 13 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in the village of Bajorai in Vilnius Region.", "6. On 29 December 1999, 28 March 2000, 2 May 2000, 4 May 2000, 16 August 2000 and 18 September 2000 the national authorities allocated plots of land to S.J., I.T., E.G., A.G., J.T. and A.I. and E.Š. (thus compensating them for their or their parents’ property nationalised by the Soviet regime (see paragraph 25 below)), who later transferred their property rights to Ž.S. in accordance with requests they had lodged on 28 October 1991, 10 October 1991, 22 November 1991, 8 August 1991 and 9 December 1991 respectively. The land allocated to these third parties was located in the same area as where the applicant’s father’s land was situated before nationalisation following the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940.", "7. On 29 July 2000 the applicant asked the Lithuanian authorities to restore his property rights to 9.5705 hectares of his father’s land by giving him a new plot of land.", "8. On 22 January 2001 the national authorities established that part of the land was unoccupied and could have been returned to the heirs.", "9. On 15 March 2002 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the restoration of property rights of I.T. had been unlawful. As a result, a plot of land of 0.18 hectares was returned to the State.", "10. On 30 July 2002 the applicant changed his initial request (see paragraph 7 above) and asked for his property rights to be restored in natura. The authorities asked the applicant to provide them with some documents necessary to proceed with the restoration of his property rights. In January 2003 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) asked the Vilnius City Municipality (hereinafter “the VCM”) to determine whether or not the land in question was State redeemable. In February 2003 the VCM found that the land was State redeemable and that the question of restitution had to be dealt with by the other means provided for by law. Accordingly, the applicant was asked to express his intentions regarding the form in which he wanted his ownership rights to the property to be restored.", "11. As the plot of land previously owned by the applicant’s father was State redeemable, in March 2003 the applicant asked to be provided with a new plot of land of equal value in Vilnius.", "12. In May 2006 the VCA asked the VCM to demarcate a plot of land, previously owned by the applicant’s father, for the applicant. However, the VCM confirmed that the land was State redeemable because part of it was already being owned by third parties and was a State forest.", "13. In December 2007 the VCA informed the applicant that his father’s land was State redeemable and that the question of restitution had to be dealt with by the other means provided for by law. The applicant was also informed that he was included in the list of persons waiting to have their property rights restored, and was 4,055th in line.", "14. On 5 February 2009 the authorities adopted a decision restoring the applicant’s property rights to 0.18 hectares of his father’s land and informed him that his property rights to the remaining 9.3905 hectares would be restored at a later date.", "15. The applicant lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court and asked it to (i) annul the decisions of the authorities to restore property rights to his father’s land to third parties on the grounds that they were unlawful, (ii) award him 1,422,791 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 412,069 euros (EUR)) in compensation in respect of pecuniary damage and (iii) oblige the authorities to restore his property rights to a specific plot of land. The latter request was later withdrawn. The applicant claimed that the decisions to restore property rights to his father’s land to third parties were unlawful because he had submitted his request when the land had not yet been State redeemable. His property rights therefore had to be restored.", "16. The VCA explained that the applicant had submitted the request to have his property rights restored in 2000, while the third parties had done so in 1991 (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). The VCA also stated that the applicant had not provided any evidence that the requirements of the domestic law had been breached in restoring property rights to third parties.", "17. On 10 April 2009 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the legislation in force at the time did not allow for the return of the land in natura to the applicant because he did not have any buildings on that land as property (see paragraph 24 below). In 2001 the provision in question was declared unconstitutional (see paragraph 23 below). The court also held that the applicant had not lost the opportunity to have his property rights restored. It was also possible that he would be given a more valuable plot of land, therefore it was decided that he had not suffered pecuniary damage.", "18. The applicant appealed. On 15 March 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. It held that the applicant had not asked for the land to be returned in natura until after the property rights to it had already been restored to third parties (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). The court also held that 29 October 2002 was the date when the specific location and borders of the land which the applicant asked to have returned in natura had been established. Furthermore, it did not consider that the domestic authorities had acted unlawfully, which was a precondition for compensation in respect of pecuniary damage.", "19. In February 2012 the National Land Service informed the applicant that in order to accelerate the process of restoring property rights to citizens, the domestic law had been amended and it had become possible for him to receive monetary compensation for the land. He was also informed that if he wished to use that opportunity, he had until 1 June 2012 to provide the authorities with a written request (see paragraph 25 below). The applicant replied in May 2012 that he had not changed his mind and still wanted to receive the land in natura or, if that was not possible, a plot of land of equal value in Vilnius.", "20. In August 2014 the National Land Service asked the VCM whether it was possible to demarcate any vacant land that was not State redeemable and could have been returned to the heirs of the applicant’s father.", "21. In November 2014 the applicant was informed that he could change his mind about the form of restitution and receive a plot of forest of equal value. He was asked by letter to make a decision by 1 March 2015, but it appears that he did not respond." ]
[ "P1-1" ]
[ 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicants, whose names, dates of birth and places of residence are shown in the Appendix, were all individual small shareholders of Demirbank, a private bank in Turkey. On different dates they purchased different amounts of Turkish and German share certificates in Demirbank through the German stock market.", "6. By a decision dated 6 December 2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu – hereinafter “the Board”) decided to transfer the management and control of Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu – hereinafter “the Fund”). In its decision the Board held that the assets of Demirbank were insufficient to cover its liabilities and that the continuation of its activities would threaten the security and stability of the financial system. Accordingly, Demirbank’s management and control, and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends, were transferred to the Fund. The Fund also confiscated all properties belonging to Demirbank.", "7. On 6 December 2000 the Board of Directors of the Fund decided to take over the shares of Demirbank in exchange for paying Demirbank’s loss corresponding to its paid-up capital, namely 275,000,000 Turkish liras (TRY).", "8. On 31 January 2001 all equities of Demirbank were removed from its account at the Istanbul Stock Exchange and were transferred to the account of the Fund.", "9. On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter “the Agency”) before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 5 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the Board’s decision of 6 December 2000, holding that the takeover had been illegal. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively.", "10. On 20 September 2001 the Fund entered into an agreement with HSBC Bank, and sold Demirbank to the latter. Accordingly, Demirbank’s legal personality was extinguished and it was struck off the commercial register on 14 December 2001.", "11. On 20 September 2001 Ms S. Cıngıllıoğlu, the main shareholder of Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. On 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement on the ground that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected and the decision became final on 24 February 2006.", "12. On different dates the applicants applied to the Board and claimed compensation arguing that they had lost their shares in Demirbank, as a result of its transfer to the Fund. The Board did not respond to the applicants’ claims within the statutory period. The applicants therefore applied to the administrative courts and requested the annulment of the Board’s implied rejection of their compensation claims. However, the administrative courts dismissed the applicants’ cases as out of time on the ground that they should have initiated proceedings at the latest within sixty days following 31 January 2001, the date on which Demirbank’s equities had been transferred to the Fund’s account at the Stock Exchange. The administrative courts’ decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court and thus became final.", "13. Following the annulment of the decision concerning the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund by the domestic courts in 2005, the applicants applied to the administrative courts. Relying on the restitutio in integrum principle, the applicants argued that the judgment of the court which annulled the Board’s decision dated 6 December 2000 had to be enforced and their rights as shareholders of Demirbank should be reinstated. On different dates the applicants’ requests were rejected by the administrative courts and the administrative courts’ decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the judgment regarding the annulment of the Board’s decision of 6 December 2000 could be secured by the return of the supervisory and executive rights to Demirbank’s shareholders, and did not require the restitution of the actual shares. It also maintained that even if that was the case, the judgment could not be executed, as Demirbank’s shares had ceased to exist as a result of the loss of its legal personality following its sale to HSBC.", "14. Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC, the applicants in the applications followed by an asterisk (*) in the annexed list, brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund and claimed compensation for their lost shares in Demirbank. The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ compensation claims for being out of time on the ground that they should have brought their claims within sixty-day statutory time-limit after Demirbank’s equities had been transferred to the Fund’s account at the Stock Exchange on 31 January 2001. The decisions of the administrative courts were upheld, and the applicants’ requests for rectification of the decision were rejected." ]
[ "P1-1", "6" ]
[ 4, 6, 9 ]
[]
[ "6. Mr Adyan (“the first applicant”) was born in 1991, while Mr Avetisyan, Mr Khachatryan and Mr Margaryan (“the second, third and fourth applicants”) were born in 1993. The first and second applicants live in Yerevan, while the third and fourth applicants live in Tsaghkavan and Kapan respectively.", "7. The applicants are four Jehovah’s Witnesses who were found to be fit for military service.", "8. In May and June 2011 the applicants were called up for military service. They failed to appear, and instead addressed letters to the local military commissariat (զինվորական կոմիսարիատ) and the regional prosecutor’s office, refusing to perform either military or alternative service. They stated that they were Jehovah’s Witnesses and that, having studied the Alternative Service Act, they had come to the conclusion that, by European standards, the service proposed was not of a genuinely civilian nature since it was supervised by the military authorities. Their conscience did not allow them to work directly or indirectly for the military system. The alternative labour service was known to be organised and supervised by the military authorities because the alternative labour serviceman’s record booklet was marked “Armed Forces of Armenia”, and alternative servicemen were subject to military discipline and penalties and had to register with the military subdivisions of the Armed Forces of Armenia. Furthermore, the law required that they remain at their place of service around the clock, seven days a week, which was akin to house arrest and was unacceptable to the applicants. The requirement to perform military service or the available alternative service violated their rights guaranteed by, inter alia, Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. For the reasons stated above, their conscience did not allow them to perform the alternative service available in Armenia. The applicants added that they were willing to perform alternative service as long as it was not in any way connected with the military authorities and did not violate their religious beliefs.", "9. On 15 June 2011 charges were brought against the second applicant under Article 327 § 1 of the Criminal Code (evasion of regular conscription for military or alternative service).", "10. On 6 July 2011 the first and fourth applicants were arrested.", "11. On 7 July 2011 the same charges were brought against the first and fourth applicants. Finding the investigator’s applications for their detention substantiated, the Syunik Regional Court decided to detain them.", "12. On 28 July 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed appeals lodged by the first and fourth applicants against the detention orders, finding, inter alia, that as the alleged offence carried a sentence of more than one year’s imprisonment, that increased the probability that the first and fourth applicants would commit a new offence or evade punishment if they remained at large.", "13. On 27 July 2011 the same charges were brought against the third applicant and the Tavush Regional Court decided to detain him at the investigator’s request, finding that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he was charged.", "14. On an unspecified date his criminal case was sent to court.", "15. On 19 August 2011 the Tavush Regional Court decided to set the case down for trial, finding that the “detention was to remain unchanged”.", "16. On 24 August 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal examined an appeal lodged by the third applicant against the detention order of 27 July 2011 and decided to dismiss it, finding, inter alia, that the offence with which he was charged carried a sentence of more than one year’s imprisonment, which increased the probability that he would commit a new offence or evade punishment if he remained at large.", "17. In the course of the proceedings before their respective trial courts, the applicants submitted that their opposition to military and alternative service was based on their religious beliefs. The alternative service provided for under domestic law was not of a genuinely civilian nature, as it was supervised by the military authorities. The right to conscientious objection was protected by, inter alia, Article 9 of the Convention. The applicants were willing to perform alternative service as long as it was not supervised by the military and was of a genuinely civilian nature.", "18. On 19 July 2011 the Kotayk Regional Court found the second applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years and six months in prison. He was taken into custody on the same day.", "19. On 27 July 2011 the Syunik Regional Court imposed similar sentences on the first and fourth applicants.", "20. On 25 November 2011 the Tavush Regional Court imposed a similar sentence on the third applicant.", "21. The applicants lodged appeals against their convictions, arguing that they violated the requirements of Article 9 of the Convention. Their opposition to the alternative service available in Armenia was based on their religious beliefs, as that service was not of a genuinely civilian nature and failed to comply with European standards. It was organised and supervised by the military authorities (section 14 of the Alternative Service Act (see paragraph 28 below)) and was equivalent to non-armed military service, whereas their conscience did not allow them to perform any service supervised by the military authorities. Furthermore, section 17(3) of the Act authorised a military authority to order the transfer of an alternative labour serviceman to another institution, while certain aspects of the service were organised in accordance with military rules (section 18(2) of the Act). Alternative labour servicemen were also required to wear a uniform that resembled a military uniform and to follow orders, and were not allowed to leave their place of service without authorisation. The cover of the alternative labour serviceman’s record booklet (այլընտրանքային աշխատանքային ծառայողի գրքույկ) bore the coat of arms and the words “The Armed Forces of Armenia”, and the monthly allowance paid was the same as that of military servicemen. Moreover, alternative service was punitive in nature as it lasted forty-two months and alternative servicemen were required to stay at their place of service around the clock. They reiterated their readiness to perform a genuinely civilian alternative service and argued that, in the absence of alternative service that complied with European standards and was of a truly civilian nature, their sentences did not pursue a pressing social need and were not necessary in a democratic society.", "22. On 2 December 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the judgments of the Regional Courts in the cases of the first and second applicants.\nIn the first applicant’s case, the Court of Appeal found as follows:\n“Having examined the arguments of the defence that the alternative labour service in Armenia does not comply with European standards, is of a military nature and is supervised by the military, the Court of Appeal finds that [the State] ... is taking appropriate measures in respect of the obligations assumed before the Council of Europe as regards, in particular, the enactment and continuous improvement of the legislation concerning alternative service.\nThe Court of Appeal finds it necessary to point out that the Alternative Service Act, the [relevant] Government decrees and [other executive orders] are based on the Armenian Constitution and must therefore be applied in the present case with the following considerations.\n[Citation of sections 2 and 3(1) of the Act (see paragraph 28 below)]\nIt follows from the above-mentioned provisions that [the State] has made a clear distinction between alternative military service and alternative labour service, and has guaranteed by law the civilian nature of the latter.\n[Citation of sections 17 and 18(3) of the Act (see paragraph 28 below)]\nBased on an analysis of the above-mentioned provisions, the Court of Appeal finds it necessary to point out that the fact that the head of the institution [where alternative service is performed] notifies [the local military commissariat] regarding the alternative labour service to be performed by the serviceman, the fact that the serviceman can be transferred to another institution or place and the fact that alternative labour servicemen are discharged from service to the reserve and are registered in the reserve in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, are not sufficient to conclude that the alternative labour service in Armenia is of a military nature, since ... the type, procedures and conditions of such labour are determined by the heads of the relevant institutions without any interference by the military authorities or their representatives.\nFurthermore, it is the head of [the relevant] institution who is responsible for the organisation and implementation of the alternative labour service and not the subdivisions of the Armed Forces of Armenia.\nThe argument put forward by the defence that the alternative labour service is supervised by a public authority in the field of defence authorised by the Government of Armenia similarly does not suggest that there is no alternative labour service in Armenia. It must be noted that in reality, servicemen perform the labour service outside the Armed Forces of Armenia and it does not contain elements of military service.\nThe Court of Appeal also finds it necessary to note that an analysis of the Alternative Service Act shows that the specifics of the legal status of alternative labour servicemen are set out in the said Act and the labour legislation of Armenia and they are subjects ... of labour rather than military relations.\nThe preceding conclusion is evidenced also by a number of other provisions of the Act, in particular, the fact that alternative labour servicemen are subordinate only to the heads of the relevant civilian institutions, are obliged to follow only their orders and instructions, and must abide by the internal disciplinary rules of such institutions, while questions relating to the social security of servicemen and their family members are regulated by the legislation on State pensions rather than military laws (sections 19 and 20).\nIt must be noted that Government Decree no. 940-N of 25 June 2004 established the list of institutions where alternative service is performed and the form and the manner of wearing the alternative serviceman’s uniform.\nParagraph 2(b) of the Decree stipulates that ‘alternative labour servicemen perform their service in the institutions under the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs’.\nPursuant to [Annex 1] to the Decree, ‘the tasks performed by alternative labour servicemen in the said bodies are those of an orderly’.\nThe Government have entrusted the ministers of the bodies in question, as well as the Minister of Defence, with certain responsibilities, such as the provision of clothing, food and financial means to servicemen and other organisational work (paragraph 3 of the Decree).\nThe fact that the Minister of Defence is also involved in the organisation of the alternative service does not suggest that the labour service transforms into military service, since, firstly, the Minister of Defence and certain subdivisions of the Armed Forces are called upon to participate in the organisation of the alternative military service.\nAs regards the fact that the military authorities carry out supervision of labour servicemen together with the heads of the relevant institutions, the Court of Appeal considers that this still does not change the nature of the service performed. Moreover, as already noted above, the type, procedures and conditions of the civilian labour are determined and may be changed only by the head of the relevant institution.\n...\nIt must be noted that performing the tasks of an orderly at the relevant medical institutions of Armenia is not only not demeaning, but on the contrary is humanitarian, serves the interests of society and is aimed at preservation of human health and life.\nThe argument put forward by the defence that the alternative labour service is punitive in nature is also unsubstantiated.\n...\nIn the light of the above, the Court of Appeal, based on the concrete facts of the case, namely that [the first applicant] has categorically refused to be conscripted to perform alternative labour service, concludes that he has been found criminally liable and sentenced in a justified and fair manner for such actions, and this fact does not contradict ... the case-law of the European Court regarding Article 9 of the Convention.”\nIn the second applicant’s case, the Court of Appeal found that his conviction had been lawful, well-founded and reasoned.", "23. On 9 December 2011 and 6 March 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal adopted judgments in the cases of the third and fourth applicants similar to its judgment in the case of the first applicant.", "24. The applicants lodged appeals on points of law, raising the same arguments as in their appeals.", "25. On 7, 8 and 17 February and 7 May 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants’ appeals inadmissible for lack of merit.", "26. On 8 and 9 October 2013 the applicants were released from prison following a general amnesty, after having served between twenty-six and twenty-seven months of their sentences.", "27. Article 327 § 1 provides that evasion of regular conscription for fixed-term military or alternative service, in the absence of legal grounds for exemption from such service, is punishable by detention (defined in this context as imprisonment under conditions of strict isolation) for a period not exceeding two months or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years.", "28. The relevant provisions of the Alternative Service Act of 17 December 2003, which entered into force on 1 July 2004, read as follows:\nSection 2. Concept and types of alternative service\n“1. Within the meaning of this Act alternative service is the service that replaces compulsory fixed-term military service. It does not involve the bearing, keeping, maintenance and use of arms, and is performed in both military and civilian institutions. 2. There are two types of alternative service:\n(a) Alternative military service, namely military service performed in the armed forces of Armenia which does not involve being on combat duty or the bearing, keeping, maintenance and use of arms; and\n(b) Alternative labour service, namely labour service performed outside the armed forces of Armenia. 3. The purpose of alternative service is to ensure the fulfilment of a civic obligation towards the motherland and society, and it does not have a punitive, demeaning or degrading nature.”\nSection 3. Grounds for performing alternative service\n“1. An Armenian citizen whose creed or religious beliefs contradict the performance of military service in a military unit, including the bearing, keeping, maintenance and use of arms, may perform alternative service. ...”\nSection 5. Duration of alternative service\n“The duration of alternative military service is 36 months.\nThe duration of alternative labour service is 42 months.”\nSection 14. Ensuring the implementation of alternative service\n“Conscription for alternative service is organised and its implementation is supervised by a public authority in the field of defence authorised by the Government of Armenia. ...”\nSection 17. Procedure for performing alternative labour service\n“1. A citizen conscripted to perform alternative labour service shall be sent, in accordance with the prescribed procedure, to the institution where he is to perform his alternative labour service. 2. The head of the local institution where the alternative labour service is to be performed shall include the alternative labour serviceman in the institution’s personnel list, decide on the type, procedures and conditions of work, ensuring that he is fully occupied, and notify the local military commissariat thereof in writing within three days. 3. The alternative labour serviceman may be transferred to perform his service in another institution or place upon the order or initiative of the authorised public authority in the field of defence. 4. The alternative labour serviceman shall remain at his place of service around the clock. The place of service is considered to be the area which the institution has the authority to be in charge of, to possess and to use. 5. The alternative labour serviceman may not be appointed to managerial posts or be involved in other activities during his service. 6. The alternative labour servicemen shall be discharged from service to the reserve and registered in the reserve in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”\nSection 18. Responsibilities of the head of the institution where alternative labour service is performed\n“1. The head of the institution where alternative labour service is performed shall provide the alternative labour serviceman with food, a prescribed uniform, underwear, a sleeping facility, and bedding and personal hygiene items; shall familiarise [the alternative labour serviceman] with the internal rules of work discipline and the specifics of the work to be performed. 2. The head of the institution shall guarantee the alternative labour serviceman’s security at the place of service, oversee the implementation of the service and create the necessary conditions for the serviceman’s rest and family visits, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act Establishing the Internal Regulations for Service in the Armed Forces. 3. The head of the institution is responsible for the organisation and implementation of alternative labour service at the institution.”\nSection 19. Rights and obligations of alternative servicemen\n“1. An alternative serviceman shall receive the same monthly allowance as that established for a private in compulsory military service. ...\n... 4. During their service, alternative servicemen shall uphold the internal rules of service discipline, fulfil their responsibilities and follow the orders or instructions of the relevant head (or commander), wear the prescribed uniform and not leave the place of service without authorisation. ...”\nSection 20. Social security cover for alternative servicemen and their family members\n“1. Questions related to social security cover for alternative military servicemen and their family members are regulated by the Social Security of Military Servicemen and their Family Members Act. 2. Social security ... of alternative labour servicemen and their family members shall be implemented in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the State Pensions Act. ...”", "29. On 28 April 2011 amendments were proposed to the Alternative Service Act. In the Explanatory Report on the proposed amendments, it was indicated that the Act – introduced for the purpose of fulfilling the obligations assumed by Armenia upon joining the Council of Europe – fell short of international standards. Its main shortcomings included the following:\n(a) the fact that those performing alternative labour service were under military supervision, which contradicted their religious beliefs. Moreover, military supervision was prescribed in the case not only of alternative military service but also of alternative labour service. It deprived those whose religious beliefs contradicted not only the bearing and use of arms but also any kind of service under military supervision, of an alternative to compulsory military service; and\n(b) the duration of the alternative service.", "30. The amendments in question were eventually passed on 2 May 2013 and entered into force on 8 June 2013. They included the following changes:\n- section 5 was amended, reducing the duration of alternative military service to thirty months and that of alternative labour service to thirty-six months;\n- in section 14 a distinction was made between alternative military service, which was to be organised and supervised by a public authority in the field of defence, and alternative labour service, which was to be organised and supervised by a public authority authorised by the Government. The new section 14 further specified that alternative labour service could not be supervised by the military;\n- section 17 no longer required the head of the institution where alternative labour service was to be performed to ensure that the serviceman was fully occupied. The serviceman’s transfer could be ordered or initiated by the National Commission (see paragraphs 35 and 36 below) as opposed to an “authorised public authority in the field of defence” and he was no longer to be required to stay at his place of service around the clock;\n- section 18(1) no longer required the head of the alternative service institution to provide the serviceman with food, uniform and other items. In the new section 18(2) the reference to the Internal Regulations for Service in the Armed Forces was removed, and the new text required the head of the institution to ensure that the serviceman’s conditions of work were the same as those of other temporary or permanent employees.\nPursuant to the new section 19, an alternative labour serviceman was no longer to receive the same monthly allowance as that established for a private in compulsory military service, but an allowance of up to 30,000 Armenian drams. The obligation to wear a uniform was also removed.", "31. Section 4 provides that the term of compulsory military service for privates is twenty-four months.", "32. On 2 May 2013 a number of amendments to the Act were passed. They entered into force on 8 June 2013 and included the following amendment:\n“A person who has committed an offence under [, inter alia, Article 327 of the Criminal Code] motivated by his religious beliefs or views and who is serving a sentence ..., may apply to a court for review of the sentence. The court shall discontinue any criminal proceedings and exempt the person concerned from serving the remainder of the sentence, provided that he applies for alternative service before 1 August 2013 and the authorised body decides to grant the application in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Alternative Service Act.”", "33. Pursuant to paragraph 2(b), alternative labour servicemen were to perform their service in various institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, such as orphanages, retirement homes, mental health institutions, institutions for disabled persons and hospitals. They were to perform the functions of an orderly. Pursuant to paragraph 3, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs and the Minister of Health were entrusted with providing alternative labour servicemen with clothing, food and financial means. The decree also set out the rules on the uniforms to be worn by both alternative military servicemen and alternative labour servicemen.", "34. On 1 August 2013 the decree was amended and made applicable only to alternative military servicemen.", "35. The decree established a National Commission to examine applications for alternative service. The commission was composed of the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Armenia, as its president, the Military Commissar of Armenia (ՀՀ զինվորական կոմիսար) as its vice-president, the Deputy Minister of Health, the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, the head of the Governmental Department for National Minorities and Religious Affairs, and the head of the Governmental Department for Administrative Bodies.", "36. On 25 July 2013 the decree was repealed and replaced with Decree No. 797-A, which modified the composition of the National Commission to include the First Deputy Minister of Territorial Administration as its president, the Deputy Minister of Health, the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Education and Science, the Deputy Minister of Defence, the Deputy Chief of Police and the head of the Governmental Department for National Minorities and Religious Affairs.", "37. For the purpose of supervising the work discipline of persons conscripted to perform alternative labour service, the Military Commissar of Armenia and the head of the Military Police Division of the Ministry of Defence were ordered: (a) to carry out weekly joint spot checks to verify the presence of persons performing alternative labour service at the institutions located within the territory of the regional military commissariats and their sub-divisions; (b) to report the results of such checks to the head of the General Staff at the end of each month; and (c) to report immediately to the head of the General Staff in the event that any alternative labour servicemen were absent and to take necessary measures to find them.", "38. On 28 March 2014 and 27 March 2015 the Court of Cassation examined appeals by two conscientious objectors against their convictions by the lower courts under Article 327 of the Criminal Code (criminal cases nos. KD1/0053/01/12 and GD1/0006/01/13). It found that since their cases met the conditions specified in the Criminal Code Implementation Act, as amended on 8 June 2013, the provisions of that Act were applicable and hence their sentences were to be quashed and the criminal proceedings discontinued for lack of corpus delicti.", "39. In his 2008 Annual Report, the Human Rights Defender noted:\n“The draftees who belong to the Jehovah’s Witnesses explain their refusal to sign up for alternative labour service by the fact that the service is managed and supervised by divisions of the ... Ministry of Defence. For example, the conscription to alternative labour service is conducted by military commissariats, or the ... Defence Ministry’s Military Police [Division] pays regular inspection visits to the institutions where the alternative labour service is being performed, requesting the alternative service personnel to line up and so on. In addition, some recruits expressed complaints that uniforms for alternative labour service personnel had been supplied by the ... Ministry of Defence.\nAccording to [section 18 of the Alternative Service Act], the party responsible for the implementation and supervision of alternative labour service shall be the head of the institution where the alternative labour service is ... performed. However, [section 14 of the same Act] states that conscription to alternative service shall be organised and supervised by [an authorised public authority in the field of defence]. Indeed, the ... Ministry of Defence justifies its regular inspection visits [by] the Military Police as [being in] implementation of [section 14] and claims that the purpose of such visits is to verify that alternative service personnel are actually at the places where alternative labour service is ... conducted.\nTaking this into account, the Human Rights Defender’s Office recommends that changes be made to the legislation so that the responsibility for processing alternative service applications and the subsequent implementation and supervision of alternative service be given to an authorised ... labour and social security body. Thus, rather than registering alternative servicemen in the registries of the military reserve force, which is the current requirement of the ... [Military Liability Act], it is possible to envisage [a register] for citizens who have performed alternative service that is accompanied by a new type of [record booklet] to be established by law (in contrast to the regular military [record booklet]).”", "40. The Committee of Ministers noted that “alternative service shall not be of a punitive nature. Its duration shall, in comparison to that of military service, remain within reasonable limits”.", "41. The Committee of Ministers recommended that member States should ensure that any limitations on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion of members of the armed forces complied with the requirements of Article 9 § 2 of the Convention, that conscripts should have the right to be granted conscientious objector status and that alternative service of a civilian nature should be proposed to them. The Explanatory Memorandum to this Recommendation noted, in particular, that the length of any alternative service to be performed by objectors should be reasonable in comparison with the length of ordinary military service. It further noted that the European Committee of Social Rights had deemed alternative service exceeding one‑and‑a‑half times the length of military service to be excessive. 1. General documents\nRecommendation 1518 (2001): Exercise of the right of conscientious objection to military service in Council of Europe member States", "42. PACE recommended that the Committee of Ministers invite those member States that had not yet done so to introduce into their legislation a genuine alternative service of a clearly civilian nature, which should be neither deterrent nor punitive in character.", "43. PACE noted that Armenia had undertaken to honour the following commitment:\n“to adopt, within three years of accession, a law on alternative service in compliance with European standards and, in the meantime, to pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms or service in disciplinary battalions, allowing them instead to choose, when the law on alternative service had come into force, to perform non-armed military service or alternative civilian service.”\n(b) Resolution 1532 (2007): Honouring of obligations and commitments by Armenia", "44. As regards Armenia’s commitment to enact legislation on alternative service “in compliance with European standards” and “pardon all conscientious objectors sentenced to prison terms”, PACE noted with disappointment that the current law, as amended in 2005 and subsequently in June 2006, still did not offer conscientious objectors any guarantee of “genuine alternative service of a clearly civilian nature, which should be neither deterrent nor punitive in character”, as provided for by Council of Europe standards. It was deeply concerned that, for lack of a genuine form of civilian service, dozens of conscientious objectors, most of whom were Jehovah’s Witnesses, continued to be imprisoned, since they preferred prison to an alternative service which was not of a truly civilian nature. PACE urged the Armenian authorities to amend the law on alternative service in accordance with the recommendations made by the Council of Europe experts and, in the meantime, to pardon the young conscientious objectors serving prison sentences.", "45. In its Second Report on Armenia, adopted on 30 June 2006, ECRI noted:\n“The overwhelming majority of conscientious objectors in Armenia are Jehovah’s Witnesses. They are thus disproportionately affected by the issue of alternative service. On this point, the Armenian Parliament passed, on 1 December 2003, the [Alternative Service Act] which took effect on 1 July 2004. This law provides for alternative military service of 36 months and an alternative civilian service of 42 months. ECRI notes that alternative civilian service, which lasts longer than actual military service, is carried out under military supervision. ECRI has further been informed that directors of institutions (which include hospitals) where conscientious objectors carry out their duty receive their instructions about the conditions and modalities of their service from the military. Moreover, conscientious objectors are sent to military hospitals for medical treatment, they are largely confined to their place of service and required to wear military uniform. They also receive assignments and changes of assignments which are determined by the military. ... ECRI wishes to point out that the aim of the [Alternative Service Act] was to prevent conscientious objectors from being imprisoned for refusing to carry out military service. However, as a number of people are currently in prison for leaving or refusing to join the alternative civilian service due to the military influence on this service, the aim of the [Alternative Service Act] has unfortunately not been met.”", "46. In his report of 9 May 2011 following his visit to Armenia from 18 to 21 January 2011, the Commissioner stated:\n“The issue of imprisoned conscientious objectors – currently, all of whom are members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community – has been on the table for many years. Conscientious objectors are not willing to perform an alternative service option which is under the supervision of the military. There is still no alternative to military service available in Armenia which can be qualified as genuinely civilian in nature. The Commissioner strongly believes that conscientious objectors should not be imprisoned and urges the authorities to put in place an alternative civilian service.\n...\nThe right to conscientious objection remains an open issue in Armenia. Those asking to perform civilian service on the basis of conscientious objection are mainly members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community. Over 70 persons are currently imprisoned for their refusal to serve in the army or to perform alternative military service. The conscientious objectors have all been sentenced under [Article] 327.1 of the Criminal Code to imprisonment ranging from 24 to 36 months.\nThe Law on Alternative service was adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2004. The performance of alternative service remains under the supervision of the military, which constitutes a major obstacle for members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses community on the basis of their religious beliefs. Another issue is the potentially punitive length of the civilian service, which currently amounts to 42 months, while regular military service is 24 months. In this respect, the European Committee of Social Rights of the Council of Europe has found that a period of alternative service which is double the duration of military service is excessively lengthy and contrary to Article 1.2 of the European Social Charter. Under this article, alternative service may not exceed one and a half times the length of armed military service.\nAt their meeting with the Commissioner, officials from the Ministry of Defence expressed readiness to amend the [Alternative Service Act]. In particular, the Minister indicated that on the basis of the amendments, supervision will be exercised by a ministry designated for the implementation of alternative service (labour, health, defence, etc.), thereby suggesting that a genuinely civilian service would be available. The draft Law on Amendments to the [Alternative Service Act] was adopted by the government in April 2011.\nConclusions and recommendations\n...\nThe Commissioner finds that there is an urgent need to review the [Alternative Service Act] and to develop appropriate mechanisms in order to create a genuinely civilian service option in Armenia. It is also important that the length of the alternative service be adjusted – taking into consideration the duration of military service - in a way that it is not perceived as punitive, deterrent or discriminatory.”", "47. In their formal response to the Commissioner’s report, the Government admitted that the exercise of the right to conscientious objection was still flawed in Armenia, and that they intended to introduce further legislative amendments to promote civilian control over alternative service and completely to withdraw military control over such service. That function was to be assigned to a new body composed of representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and strictly civil service officers of the Ministry of Defence.", "48. In its Conclusions XIX-1 of 24 October 2008 regarding compliance by Greece with Article 1 § 2 of the European Social Charter (The right to work: effective protection of the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon), the European Committee of Social Rights noted:\n“The Committee notes that [the periods of alternative service to replace armed military service] are nearly double the length of armed military service. Admittedly, recognised conscientious objectors are in a better position than they are in countries that do no grant them special status or where refusal to serve is punishable by imprisonment. But even if the state acknowledges the principle of conscientious objection and institutes alternative service instead, it cannot make the latter longer than is necessary to ensure that refusal to serve on grounds of conscience is genuine and the choice of alternative service is not seen as advantageous rather than duty. Under Article 1 § 2 of the Charter, alternative service may not exceed one and a half times the length of armed military service.”" ]
[ "9" ]
[ 15, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 38, 40, 41, 42 ]
[]
[ "8. The applications in the present case concern prolonged non‑enforcement of domestic final judicial decisions. They raise issues similar to those examined in the pilot judgment in the case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine (no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009; hereinafter “Ivanov” or “the Ivanov judgment”). They are part of a group of 12,143 Ivanov-type follow-up applications (hereinafter also referred to as “Ivanov‑type cases”).", "9. Accordingly, before providing a description of the relevant facts and proceeding to the examination of the applicants’ Convention grievances in the present case, the Court considers it necessary to present the procedure hitherto adopted in applications concerning non‑enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic court decisions in Ukraine.", "10. Prior to the adoption of the Ivanov pilot judgment the Court had dealt with a number of cases concerning the non-enforcement of domestic court decisions in Ukraine. The first decision on this issue was rendered in the case of Kaysin and Others v. Ukraine ((friendly settlement), no. 46144/99, 3 May 2001). Even though the case was settled by the parties and the applicants received the sums indicated in the friendly settlement agreement, the general issue of non‑enforcement remained unresolved largely owing to the lack of funds of the State entities, State-owned or State‑controlled debtors (hereinafter “State debtors”). Subsequent cases concerning non‑enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic court decisions related to payments of salaries and allowances to military servicemen, employees of the mining companies, judges, school teachers, debts of municipalities or State hospitals, State-owned banks, State-owned enterprises and the Cabinet of Ministers (see, among many other examples, the judgments in the cases of Voytenko v. Ukraine, no. 18966/02, 29 June 2004, Romashov v. Ukraine, no. 67534/01, 27 July 2004, Zubko and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 3955/04 and 3 others, ECHR 2006‑VI (extracts), Belanova v. Ukraine, no. 1093/02, 29 November 2005, Kucherenko v. Ukraine, no. 27347/02, 15 December 2005, Shmalko v. Ukraine, no. 60750/00, 20 July 2004, and Poltorachenko v. Ukraine, no. 77317/01, 18 January 2005).", "11. As a result of an increasing number of applications concerning prolonged non-enforcement of domestic decisions in Ukraine, the Court decided to have recourse to the pilot judgment procedure and selected the case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine (see paragraph 8 above) as representative of this problem. For the facts of this case reference is made to paragraphs 8-20 of the pilot judgment.", "12. In its Interim Resolution of 6 March 2008, the Committee of Ministers had already recognised the existence of a structural problem (see Ivanov, cited above, § 38, see also paragraph 124 below).", "13. In its pilot judgment of 15 October 2009 the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because of the non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of final judicial decisions. The Court noted that the delays had been caused by a combination of factors, including the lack of budgetary funds, the bailiffs’ omissions and shortcomings in the national legislation, as a result of which Mr Ivanov and other applicants in a similar situation were unable to have the judgments enforced (see Ivanov, cited above, §§ 83-84). All those factors had been within the control of the Ukrainian authorities, and thus Ukraine was fully responsible for such non-enforcement (ibid. § 85). The Court further found that there had been no remedy at national level satisfying the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention in respect of Mr Ivanov’s complaints about the non‑enforcement of the judgment in his favour (ibid. §§ 66-70).", "14. Under Article 46, the Court held that the Ivanov case concerned two recurring problems: (a) the prolonged non-enforcement of final domestic decisions and (b) the lack of an effective domestic remedy to deal with it. These problems lay behind the violations of the Convention found by the Court since 2004 in over 300 cases concerning Ukraine. The Ivanov case demonstrated that these problems had remained without a solution despite the Court’s clear rulings urging Ukraine to take appropriate measures to resolve those issues (see Ivanov, cited above, §§ 73, 74 and 83).", "15. In view of the fact that approximately 1,400 similar applications against Ukraine were pending before the Court at that time (ibid. § 86), the Court held in the relevant operative provisions of its judgment as follows:\n“... 4. ... that the [violations of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention found in the case] originated in a practice incompatible with the Convention which consists in the respondent State’s recurrent failure to comply in due time with domestic decisions for the enforcement of which it is responsible and in respect of which aggrieved parties have no effective domestic remedy; 5. ... that the respondent State must set up without delay, and at the latest within one year from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, an effective domestic remedy or combination of such remedies capable of securing adequate and sufficient redress for the non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic decisions, in line with the Convention principles as established in the Court’s case-law; 6. ... that the respondent State must grant such redress, within one year from the date on which the judgment becomes final, to all applicants whose applications pending before the Court were communicated to the Government under Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court before the delivery of the present judgment or will be communicated further to this judgment and concern arguable complaints relating solely to the prolonged non-enforcement of domestic decisions for which the State was responsible, including where complaints alleging a lack of effective remedies in respect of such non-enforcement are also raised; 7. ... that pending the adoption of the above measures, the Court will adjourn, for one year from the date on which the judgment becomes final, the proceedings in all cases in which the applicants raise arguable complaints relating solely to the prolonged non-enforcement of domestic decisions for which the State is responsible, including cases in which complaints alleging a lack of effective remedies in respect of such non-enforcement are also raised, without prejudice to the Court’s power at any moment to declare any such case inadmissible or to strike it out of its list following a friendly settlement between the parties or the resolution of the matter by other means in accordance with Articles 37 or 39 of the Convention;\n...”\nIn the event of the State’s failure to adopt general remedial measures, the Court stated that it “will have no choice but to resume the examination of all similar applications pending before it and to take them to judgment so as to ensure effective observance of the Convention” (ibid. § 100). The Court decided to adjourn proceedings in respect of all new applications lodged after delivery of the pilot judgment (ibid. § 97). As regards applications lodged prior to the delivery of the judgment, it decided that it would give notice of them to the Government and adjourn adversarial proceedings in them. Cases already communicated but undecided on the merits would likewise be adjourned for one year from the date on which the judgment had become final (ibid. § 98). Finally, as regards the application of Article 41 in the case, the Court held that the respondent State was to pay the applicant the outstanding debt under the domestic judgments and 174 euros (EUR) to cover inflation linked adjustments in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage (ibid. §§ 106‑107 and the eighth operative provision).", "16. In a letter of 27 January 2010 the Court informed the Ukrainian Government of its intention to communicate under Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court all Ivanov-type cases pending before the Court on the date of delivery of the Ivanov pilot judgment of 15 October 2009 which became final on 15 January 2010 (see point of the 6 operative provision and paragraph 15 above).", "17. On 11 February 2010 the President of the Fifth Section accordingly decided, under the aforementioned Rule, to communicate the cases concerned to the respondent Government for information and possible action and, at the same time, to adjourn them formally for a period of one year from the date on which the judgment had become final (i.e. until 15 January 2011).", "18. By December 2010 the Government had submitted friendly settlement proposals and unilateral declarations in 372 cases. These cases were struck out of the Court’s list of cases under Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention, following the applicants’ acceptance of friendly settlement proposals or the Court’s acceptance of the Government’s unilateral declarations.", "19. On 10 December 2010 the Government requested a one-year extension of the time-limit fixed in the pilot judgment in order to settle pending cases and to adopt the required general measures at domestic level.", "20. On 18 January 2011 the Court decided to grant the Government’s request in part and to extend the time limit until 15 July 2011.", "21. On 13 July 2011 the Government requested a further extension of six months. They also submitted friendly settlement proposals and unilateral declarations in nearly 1,000 cases. The Court eventually decided to strike 347 of these cases out of its list of cases.", "22. On 6 September 2011 the Government’s second request for an extension of the time-limit was refused. The Court considered that it fell to the Committee of Ministers to find the most appropriate and expedient means to bring about the necessary reforms in Ukraine as part of the process of supervising the execution of the pilot judgment. The question of further procedure in cases raising similar issues was adjourned and all such cases were put on hold.", "23. On 21 February 2012 the Court examined the situation in about 2,500 follow-up cases pending before it. While a number of cases had been struck out of its list following either a friendly settlement agreement or acceptance of a unilateral declaration, no settlement had been proposed in some 700 communicated cases. In the meantime, since 1 January 2011, approximately 1,000 further similar applications had been lodged with the Court.", "24. Referring to its warning in the pilot judgment (see Ivanov, § 100 and paragraph 15 above) that in the event of a failure to adopt the necessary general remedial measures at national level it would have no choice but to take pending applications to judgment, the Court decided to resume its examination of follow-up applications. It further expressed the hope that the Ukrainian authorities would continue cooperating with the Committee of Ministers in order to implement the pilot judgment without delay and with due regard to the relevant recommendations, resolutions and decisions of that body.", "25. On 5 June 2012, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted new legislation, namely “the Act on State Guarantees concerning execution of judicial decisions with amendments” (Закон України “Про гарантії держави щодо виконання судових рішень”; “the 2012 Act”). The 2012 Act, which was amended on two occasions, namely on 15 May 2013 and 19 September 2013, introduced a procedure whereby the debts due under the domestic court judgments were to be paid by the State Treasury of Ukraine. It required applicants to apply to the State Treasury for such payments (see also paragraphs 103-104 below).", "26. Despite the introduction of a new remedy under the 2012 Act, as from the end of 2013 the influx of Ivanov type cases significantly increased.", "27. On 3 February 2015 the Court gave notice to the Ukrainian Government of Filipov and 3 other applications (no. 35660/13), where the applicants complained that the remedy introduced by the 2012 Act was ineffective.", "28. In the meantime, on 3 July 2012, the Court had adopted its judgment in Kharuk and Others v. Ukraine, ([Committee] no. 703/05, 26 July 2012), whereby it found a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention on account of prolonged non‑enforcement of final judicial decisions in Ukraine in respect of a group of applicants for the first time. That judgment concerned 116 applications. Ruling under Article 41 of the Convention on just satisfaction, the Court awarded the applicants, in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, EUR 1,500 for delays of up to three years and EUR 3,000 for delays exceeding three years.", "29. In accordance with the Court’s decision to resume examination of pending cases (see paragraphs 23-24 above), follow-up applications were communicated to the Government in groups. The Government were invited to submit grouped unilateral declarations acknowledging the violations of the Convention and proposing just satisfaction for any pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage in line with the awards in Kharuk and Others. They were informed that if they failed to submit such unilateral declarations, the cases would be processed by way of similar grouped judgments.", "30. In 2013 the Court communicated 2,750 Ivanov-type applications to the Ukrainian Government and rendered judgments or decisions in 2,459 Ivanov‑type cases.", "31. In sum, the majority of the Ivanov-type cases which had been lodged with the Court before 2013 had been processed by way of judgments or decisions.", "32. As from 20 June 2013 the Court adopted a policy in Ivanov-type cases of awarding fixed-rate sums of EUR 2,000 for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage. As regards pecuniary damage, it also held that “the respondent State has an outstanding obligation to enforce the judgments which remain enforceable” (see, among other authorities, Pysarskyy and Others v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 20397/07 and 163 other applications, §§ 24-25 and the sixth operative provision, 20 June 2013).", "33. On 3 June 2014 the Court declared inadmissible the application in Velikoda v. Ukraine (no. 43331/12). The applicant alleged a violation of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, on account of the fact that, following a final judgment in the applicant’s favour ordering the national authorities to pay a social benefit, legislation had entered into force drastically reducing the amounts of the social payments in question (Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers’ Resolution no. 745).", "34. The Court held, among other things, that the relevant legislative measures were not unreasonably disproportionate having been adopted as a result of economic policy considerations and the financial difficulties faced by the State.", "35. Following the Velikoda leading decision, approximately 5,600 cases that had previously been classified as Ivanov-type were declared inadmissible.", "36. On 2 September 2014 the Court adjourned its examination of Ivanov-type cases for one year as a result of the sharp increase in the number of new applications lodged (in January 2014 approximately 6,000 such applications were pending and by September the number had increased to 8,200). The Court decided to reconsider the situation within a period of six months.", "37. On 20 January 2015 the Court revisited its decision of 2 September 2014 to adjourn the Ivanov-type cases, and decided to resume its examination of these applications. In January 2015 the Court communicated a group of 5,000 such cases to the Ukrainian Government (see Samoylenko and 4,999 Others, nos. 11212/08 - 2803/15).", "38. In view of the large number of communicated cases, the Government asked the Court to allow them to submit observations in groups of 250 cases or a maximum of 500 cases per month starting from 23 May 2015.", "39. On 14 April 2015 the Court allowed the Government to submit observations in 250 cases per month, starting from 23 May 2015.", "40. Between 22 May 2015 and 26 February 2016 the Government submitted unilateral declarations proposing to pay applicants EUR 1,000 for non-pecuniary damage, together with an undertaking to enforce the domestic judgments, in 2,234 cases which had been communicated in January 2015 as part of the Samoylenko and 4,999 others group.", "41. On 16 June 2015 the Court examined the terms of the unilateral declarations submitted by the Government on 22 May 2015 in a group of 340 applications and decided that the above amount was sufficient taken together with the Government’s undertaking. Subsequent to this decision, 2,041 applications were struck out of the Court’s list of cases.\nFollowing the Chamber’s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber in the present applications (see paragraph 5 above), the Government were informed that the Court would not deliver further judgments in the Ivanov-type cases pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Grand Chamber. Consequently, the Government ceased submitting unilateral declarations.", "42. The Court has received letters from some applicants complaining that the Government had failed to honour their undertakings in the unilateral declarations on the basis of which the Court had struck the applications in question out of its list of cases. Moreover, in a significant number of cases which the Court had disposed of by means of a judgment, the applicants wrote back complaining that the Government had failed to enforce those judgments. Such complaints were transmitted to the Department for the Execution of Judgments (the Council of Europe’s Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law) for action.", "43. According to the statistical information in the Court’s possession on the date of delivery of the present judgment, there are 12,143 Ivanov-type cases pending before the Court, 7,641 of which have already been communicated to the Government. The available data shows that since 3 July 2012, when the Court introduced the fast-track procedure for grouped judgments and decisions, the Court has examined and disposed of 14,430 Ivanov-type cases, in particular:\n– Judgments were delivered in 3,491 cases;\n– Inadmissibility decisions were given in 289 cases;\n– Strike out decisions following friendly settlement were adopted in 1,103 cases;\n– Strike out decisions following unilateral declarations were adopted in 1,233 cases;\n– Strike out decisions for other grounds were adopted in 40 cases;\n– Inadmissibility decisions were rendered by Single Judge in 8,274 cases.", "44. A total of about 29,000 Ivanov-type applications have been submitted to the Court since the first application in 1999.\nSince the beginning of 2016 the Court has continued to receive a large number of such applications - over 200 per month.", "45. The applicant lives in the village of Olenychi, Ovruch District, Zhytomyr Region, Ukraine. She resides and works in an area of radioactive contamination and is entitled under the national law to various special social welfare benefits for persons who suffered from the Chernobyl disaster.", "46. In 2009 she instituted proceedings in the Ovruch Local Court of Zhytomyr Region (the Ovruch Court) against the Ovruch Labour and Social Welfare Department claiming arrears in social payments under the Chernobyl Victims’ Status and Social Security Act.", "47. On 24 June 2009 the Ovruch Court ruled partly in her favour. This judgment was not appealed against and became final on 6 July 2009. On the same day the Ovruch Court issued a writ of execution.", "48. On 10 August 2009 the State Bailiffs Service of the Zhytomyr Regional Department of Justice instituted enforcement proceedings. Despite a number of actions undertaken by the bailiffs the judgment remains unenforced.", "49. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained of the national authorities’ failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in her case. She further complained under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of effective remedies to speed up the enforcement of the above judgment.", "50. The applicant, who lives in Zhytomyr, is a former Chernobyl relief worker. Since March 2010 he has a second degree disability related to this work.", "51. In October 2010 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Bogunskyy District Court of Zhytomyr (the Bogunskyy Court) against the Bogunskyy District Department of the Pension Fund, seeking a higher pension.", "52. On 20 June 2011 the Bogunskyy Court ruled in the applicant’s favour. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 1 July 2011.", "55. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained of the State’s failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in his case.", "56. The applicant, who lives in Kremenchuk, is a former Chernobyl relief worker. Since July 2009 he has a second degree disability related to this relief work.", "57. On 16 August 2010 the Kryukivskyy District Court of Kremenchuk (the Kryukivskyy Court) ordered the Kryukivskyy Labour and Social Welfare Department to recalculate the amount owed in respect of his participation in the Chernobyl relief work and to pay the applicant a lump sum.", "58. On 7 February 2011 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 16 August 2010. The judgment became final.", "59. On 16 September 2011 the Poltava Bailiffs’ Service terminated the enforcement proceedings in the applicant’s case. This decision was challenged by the applicant.", "60. By decision of 15 March 2012 the Kryukivskyy Court ruled in his favour and ordered the Bailiffs’ Service to resume the enforcement proceedings. This decision was confirmed on appeal on 25 April 2012.", "61. On 19 July 2012 the Poltava Bailiffs’ Service once again terminated the enforcement proceedings. On 5 October 2012 they rejected the applicant’s request to renew them.", "62. On 28 February 2013, on the applicant’s complaint, the Kryukivskyy Court quashed the bailiffs’ decisions and ordered them to resume the enforcement proceedings", "64. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained of the national authorities’ failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in his case.", "66. On an unknown date the applicant’s father instituted proceedings in the Zhytomyr Circuit Administrative Court (the Zhytomyr Court) against the Zhytomyr Labour and Social Welfare Department (the Labour Department), seeking recalculation of benefits and payment of a lump sum due to him. The applicant continued the proceedings after his father’s death on 21 November 2007.", "67. On 24 January 2008 the Zhytomyr Circuit Administrative Court (the Zhytomyr Court) ordered the Zhytomyr Labour and Social Welfare Department (the Labour Department) to pay the applicant the outstanding debt owed to his late father. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 4 February 2008.", "68. The execution writ was issued by the Zhytomyr Court on 24 April 2008 and referred to the Zhytomyr Bailiffs’ Service.", "69. On several occasions the Bailiffs’ Service returned the execution writ without enforcement for lack of funds on the part of the debtor department. The judgment of 24 January 2008 remains unenforced.", "70. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained of the national authorities’ failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in his case.", "72. On 13 December 2007 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Commercial Court (the Dnipropetrovsk Court) allowed the applicant company’s claim for restitution of precious metals against the State Enterprise “Prydniprovskyy Zavod Kolyorovykh Metaliv” (the State Enterprise). It also awarded the applicant costs and expenses. This judgment was not appealed against and became final on 25 December 2007. The same day the court issued a writ of execution.", "73. On 30 January 2008 the Bagliyskyy Bailiffs’ Service in Dniprodzerzhynsk started enforcement proceedings.", "74. On 11 March 2008 the enforcement proceedings were transferred to the Dnipropetrovsk Bailiffs’ Service.", "75. On 4 April 2008, the Dnipropetrovsk Bailiffs’ Service established that part of the metals had been returned by the debtor to the applicant company and the other part could not be found.", "76. On 6 June 2008 the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine ordered the liquidation of the State Enterprise. A liquidation commission was created. On 28 July 2008 the same Ministry issued another decree concerning liquidation of the State Enterprise.", "77. On 5 September 2008 the Dnipropetrovsk Bailiffs’ Service closed the enforcement proceedings in respect of the award for costs and expenses under the judgment of 13 December 2007.", "78. Having been notified about the impossibility of finding the remainder of the metals to be restituted under the judgment of 13 December 2007, the applicant company requested the Dnipropetrovsk Court to vary the mode of execution of the judgment in that part and to award it the monetary equivalent of missing metals.", "79. On 22 September 2008 the Dnipropetrovsk Court amended the procedure for enforcement of the judgment of 13 December 2007 and ordered the State Enterprise to pay the applicant company compensation.", "80. On 27 October 2008 and 25 February 2009, that decision was upheld by the Dnipropetrovsk Commercial Court of Appeal and the Higher Commercial Court respectively.", "81. On 9 April 2009 the Dnipropetrovsk Bailiffs’ Service terminated the enforcement proceedings owing to the liquidation of the debtor.", "82. Following the applicant company’s complaint, on 21 September 2009 the Donetsk Circuit Administrative Court quashed the decisions of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of 6 June and 28 July 2008 concerning the liquidation of the State Enterprise. This decision was overruled on appeal by the Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeal on 23 December 2009, but ultimately upheld by the Higher Administrative Court on 6 July 2010.", "83. On 10 April 2010 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Commercial Court initiated insolvency proceedings in respect of the State Enterprise on the applicant’s request. On 9 July 2013 the same court declared the State Enterprise insolvent and ordered its liquidation.", "84. The judgment of 13 December 2007 as varied by the ruling of 22 September 2008 remains unenforced.", "85. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant company complained of the national authorities’ failure to enforce the final judgment delivered in its case. It further complained under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of effective remedies to speed up the enforcement of the above judgment." ]
[ "13", "P1-1", "46", "6" ]
[ 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 27 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Benevento.", "6. On 2 April 2013, between 1 and 1.15 p.m., the applicant was stopped by two officers of the Benevento municipal police while she was driving her car.", "7. According to the applicant, the police officers checked her driver’s licence and her vehicle documents. An argument broke out between the applicant and the officers. In the applicant’s view, her nervous and hostile attitude led the police officers to suspect that she was intoxicated, which she denied. As the officers did not have the necessary equipment to perform a breathalyser test, they requested the assistance of the road police (Polizia Stradale). The applicant returned to her car. Once she had got back into the vehicle, one of the police officers pulled the car door open and dragged her out by the arm.", "8. As recorded in the municipal police officers’ report of 3 April 2013, the applicant had been stopped because she had been driving in an erratic manner, braking suddenly and changing lanes abruptly. The applicant did not seem to be able to exit the vehicle by herself and had had to be assisted by one of the officers. The officers reported that they had smelt alcohol on her breath and that she had been unsteady on her feet. The applicant had insulted and threatened them.", "9. At 1.30 p.m. traffic police officers arrived on the scene with the breathalyser equipment.", "10. According to the applicant, she was not able to take the test because she was in a state of anxiety that had been exacerbated by one of the officers shouting at her that she was drunk. That had caused her to tremble and had meant she could not keep the breathalyser tube in her mouth. The applicant requested that carabinieri be called to the scene, but the request was denied.", "11. According to the traffic police report (annotazione di servizio della Polizia Stradale), the applicant agreed to be breathalysed, but did not blow into the device in the manner she had been told to do by the officers and refused to cooperate. At one point she had thrown the device’s mouthpiece into the face of one of the officers. The applicant was described as being in a “clearly altered” state, smelling strongly of alcohol and staggering.", "12. The applicant was taken to the municipal police station (Comando di Polizia Municipale), where she arrived at approximately 1.50 p.m.", "13. According to the applicant, once at the station the lieutenant on duty started drafting an offence report (verbale di contestazione) for driving under the influence of alcohol. The two officers who had stopped her in the street and escorted her to the station and another officer were also present. She repeatedly requested that she be allowed to use a telephone to let her family and her lawyer know of her whereabouts but her requests were denied. When she tried to pick up a telephone, one of the officers hit her in order to make her sit down. The same officer twisted her arms behind her back and handcuffed her, hurting her wrists. He then squeezed her buttocks and asked her if the handcuffs were tight enough. The applicant started screaming loudly and the officer removed the handcuffs in a violent manner. In doing so, he fractured the applicant’s right thumb and caused other injuries to her wrists. He then warned her not to cause further trouble and threatened her. The applicant left the station between 2.15 and 2.30 p.m. and proceeded further on foot as her car had been seized.", "14. As recorded in the joint report issued on 3 April 2013 by the two municipal police officers who had stopped her in the street and the lieutenant on duty at the municipal police station, upon her arrival at the station the applicant had started threatening and insulting them. When the lieutenant started drafting the offence report, she grabbed a telephone from a desk and ran into the corridor. When the lieutenant tried to stop her, the applicant pushed him violently, causing him to fall. She then threw the telephone out of the window. The applicant, who was in an extremely agitated state, pushed and kicked the other two officers, and they eventually handcuffed her. When the applicant calmed down, the handcuffs were removed. The applicant ran out of the station, leaving her bag and personal belongings behind. Her vehicle and driver’s licence had been seized under road traffic legislation. The same account of the events is recorded in the offence notification (informativa di reato) filed by the directing commander of the Benevento municipal police with the Benevento public prosecutor on 3 April 2013.", "15. According to the applicant, once she had left the station she got a lift to the emergency department of a local hospital, where she was examined.", "16. At approximately 8 p.m. the applicant went to the State Police and attempted, unsuccessfully, to lodge a criminal complaint against the municipal police officers. According to the report of the officer on duty, the applicant complained that she had been assaulted by Benevento municipal police officers and that her finger had been fractured. When the officer informed her that the she could not file a criminal complaint because the station was closed, the applicant started speaking incoherently in a loud voice. Given her nervous and agitated state, the officer called the local questura (police headquarters) for backup. The applicant requested that an ambulance be called. The ambulance arrived at 8.30 p.m. and the applicant was examined by the ambulance medics. She was taken home by ambulance at approximately 9 p.m.", "17. On 4 April 2013 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the two police officers who had stopped her in the street on 2 April 2013 and the other two officers who had been present at the municipal police station, but whose names she did not know, alleging assault and battery, infliction of bodily harm, abuse of office, and threats.", "18. An investigation into the applicant’s allegations was initiated. Seven people identified by the applicant as witnesses (persone informate sui fatti) were interviewed. Two were people who stated they had seen one of the officers dragging the applicant out of her vehicle. One was the owner of a bar where the applicant had gone in order to call her former spouse once she had left the hospital on 2 April 2013. Another was the applicant’s former spouse, who stated that her alcohol intake was limited to consumption during meals. He further stated that because of a traumatic event in her life the applicant became agitated, trembled and had trouble expressing herself when subjected to stress. The other three were colleagues, who stated that the applicant had not appeared to be intoxicated when she had left her office on 2 April 2013. The police officers who had allegedly been involved in the ill-treatment were not interviewed, and neither was the applicant.", "19. On 17 January 2014 the public prosecutor requested that the proceedings be discontinued. The basis of the request was that “the allegations in the criminal complaint are not confirmed by the statements made by the witnesses identified by the victim”.", "20. On 27 February 2014 the applicant lodged an objection against the prosecutor’s request to discontinue the proceedings. She complained about the lack of reasoning in the prosecutor’s request and alleged that the investigation had not been thorough. In that connection, she complained about the “total absence” of investigative measures with respect to the events that had occurred at the municipal police station and requested that the investigating judge order such measures without delay. Moreover, the applicant complained that she had not been questioned and requested that she be interviewed immediately. She also requested that officials interview the person who had taken her to the hospital when she had left the police station and other individuals. She also challenged the credibility of the official police reports, as they were in stark contrast with her account of the impugned events.", "21. At a hearing on 22 September 2014 the applicant’s lawyer repeated the complaints and requests contained in the objection against the prosecutor’s request to discontinue the proceedings and reiterated, in particular, the request to conduct an investigation into the events that had occurred at the municipal police station.", "22. By an order of 3 October 2014, served on the applicant on 27 October 2014, the Benevento District Court preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) decided to discontinue the proceedings. The order stated that the evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation had not been sufficient to warrant indicting the officers. It stated that the victim’s allegations had not been corroborated by evidence and that further investigative measures, as requested by the victim, would have “no influence whatsoever”.", "23. On 25 October 2013 the applicant was charged with a number of offences in connection with the events of 2 April 2013, including resisting a police officer, insulting a public official, and driving under the influence of alcohol. The applicant was also charged with causing bodily harm to a police officer.", "24. On an unspecified date, the public prosecutor and the applicant reached a plea agreement with respect to the offence of bodily harm and requested that the judge proceed with the imposition of a sentence (applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti).", "25. On 21 November 2014 the Benevento preliminary hearings judge took note of the plea agreement and gave the applicant a suspended sentence of twenty-eight days’ imprisonment. On the same day, the preliminary hearings judge suspended the proceedings against the applicant in connection with the charges of resisting a police officer, insulting a public official and driving under the influence of alcohol. The applicant was placed on probation with a requirement that she perform community service.", "26. On 2 April 2013, the applicant went to the emergency department of a local hospital. At 6.42 p.m. she was examined by a radiologist, who established that her right thumb was fractured.", "27. On 3 April 2013 the applicant returned to the emergency department. According to the medical report, the applicant arrived at the hospital in an agitated state, complaining about pain in several parts of her body. She was examined by a doctor who noted the presence of a splint on her right hand to treat a fracture. The doctor further noted the presence of bruising resulting from traumatic injury (trauma contusivo con ecchimosi) to the right thigh, right shoulder and left wrist.", "28. On 4 April 2013 the applicant went to a different hospital. She was examined by an orthopaedist, who confirmed the fracture of the thumb and the presence of bruises on her left thigh and on her back. The doctor recommended surgery to treat the fracture.", "29. Owing to a traumatic event in her life, the applicant suffers from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, which has evolved into a major depressive disorder. She also suffers from a disorder which is characterised by mood swings which are exacerbated in times of particular stress, by the consumption of alcohol or sleep deprivation. The disorder in question includes peaks of manic behaviour when the applicant loses contact with reality and experiences a sense of impending threat to her own safety and that of those around her. The applicant was prescribed drugs for insomnia in February 2013. Combining the drugs with even moderate amounts of alcohol can have the same consequences as excessive alcohol consumption." ]
[ "3" ]
[ 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24 ]
[ 9, 11, 13, 15, 21, 22, 23 ]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Batumi.", "6. He was a judge at the Khulo District Court. On 12 November 2004 the Supreme Council of Justice initiated disciplinary proceedings against him on the grounds set out in section 2(2)-(a) Act of 22 February 2000 on Disciplinary Proceedings against Judges of Ordinary Courts (hereinafter, “the Disciplinary Proceedings Act” – see paragraphs 16 and 17 below). He was accused in particular of having kept a defendant in a criminal case under his consideration in unlawful detention for the period of fourteen days in September 2004, which fact was qualified as a “manifest breach of the law” within the meaning of the above-mentioned provision of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act.", "7. On 18 November 2004 a Panel of the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, “the Panel”), composed of Mr K.K. (the President of the Panel and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr D.S. and Mr I.K., considered the case at an oral hearing. According to the transcript of the hearing, the applicant admitted to the act he had been accused of. After examining the circumstances of the case, the Panel found the applicant guilty of the misconduct in question. Describing the mistake at issue as unacceptable, the Panel decided, despite his lack of prior disciplinary sanctions and his good professional reputation, to remove the applicant from judicial office.", "8. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, “the Disciplinary Council”) on points of fact and law. He questioned the assessment of the circumstances of the case and the application of the legal provisions to the established facts in the decision of 18 November 2004.", "9. By a decision of 27 January 2005, the Disciplinary Council unanimously upheld the Panel’s decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety.", "10. The applicant appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia. In a judgment of 11 July 2005, the Supreme Court quashed the Disciplinary Council’s decision of 27 January 2005 for lack of reasoning and legal assessment of the facts, and remitted the case for re-examination.", "11. On 4 August 2005 the Disciplinary Council, composed of six members, including three members, Mr K.K. (President and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr I.K, who had sat at the first hearing, re-considered the applicant’s case; another member of the Disciplinary Council who participated in the examination of the applicant’s case was Ms N.K. During the oral hearing, the applicant challenged the above-mentioned three members of the bench – Mr K.K., Mr G.Ch. and Mr I.K – on the ground that they had considered his case when it had come before the Panel on 18 November 2004. The request was dismissed.", "12. After re-considering all the factual circumstances of the case, the Disciplinary Council found, in its decision of 4 August 2005, that the applicant had committed “a manifest breach of the law” and upheld the Panel’s decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety.", "13. In his appeal on points of law, the applicant complained that Mr K.K. had presided over all of the benches of both the Disciplinary Council and the Panel, and three of the members sitting on the Disciplinary Council when it ruled on 4 August 2005 had already dealt with the case at first instance on 18 November 2004. He also complained about his request for their withdrawal being rejected. Finally, the applicant criticised the haste with which the case had been considered by the Disciplinary Council.", "14. On 14 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, finding that the case had been objectively and exhaustively examined by the disciplinary bodies and that the punishment imposed had been appropriate. As for the rest, noting that the Disciplinary Proceedings Act had instituted a system whereby members of the disciplinary panel could also sit on the Disciplinary Council, the Supreme Court concluded that the composition of the benches complained of by the applicant had been perfectly legal. Moreover, in the court’s opinion, the fact that the persons concerned had previously participated in the examination of the case was not in itself sufficient to prove that the Disciplinary Council, in its ruling on 4 August 2005, had not been impartial.", "15. According to the materials available in the case file, the applicant did not voice, even in remote terms, either before the Panel, the Disciplinary Council or the Supreme Court any complaint about the lack of professional qualifications by any of the individual members of the Disciplinary Council who had participated in the examination of his case." ]
[ "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kraljevo.", "6. Between June 2003 and December 2004 the applicant, as an entrepreneur, was providing heating installation services to AD Fabrika za proizvodnju konfekcije i trikotaže Raška, a socially-owned company based in Novi Pazar (hereinafter “the debtor company”).", "7. On 2 December 2010 the Kraljevo Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 31/2010).", "8. The applicant duly submitted his claim.", "9. On 15 March 2011 the Commercial Court rejected his claim and instructed him to initiate a regular civil suit and request determination of his claim. The applicant lodged a separate civil claim.", "10. On 1 December 2011 the Commercial Court ruled in favour of the applicant by recognizing his claim and ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant the costs of the civil proceedings.", "11. On an unspecified date thereafter, the said judgment having become final, was acknowledged within the insolvency proceedings.", "12. On 22 July 2013 the Commercial Court issued a decision ordering payment of approximately 10 % of the total debt to the applicant. The applicant received this payment on an unspecified date.", "13. The debtor company was ultimately struck from the relevant public register on 9 July 2014.", "14. On 16 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining against the Commercial Court’s decision of 22 July 2013 and that his right to work and right to compensation for work and providing services were infringed, because he received only 10 % of the total debt. He asked further the Constitutional Court to order the payment of the rest of the debt.", "15. On 2 March 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal finding that it is not vested with the power to order such a payment. That decision was delivered to the applicant after 24 April 2015." ]
[ "P1-1", "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "6. The applicant was born in 1954. He lived in the Republic of Dagestan and was the mayor of Makhachkala between 1998 and 2013. He is currently detained in correctional colony no. 6 in Orenburg Region (“the correctional colony”).", "7. In June 2013 the applicant was arrested and placed in custody pending criminal proceedings against him. He suffered from several illnesses, including a urinary condition, a rectal prolapse, hepatitis C, and type 2 diabetes. He was confined to a wheelchair and had to use catheters and enemas to urinate and defecate.", "8. On 12 August 2013 he lodged an application with the Court complaining that he was not receiving adequate medical assistance in detention. Four days later the Court indicated to the Russian Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that he should be examined by medical experts.", "9. On 27 November 2014 the Court delivered a judgment in the case, finding, inter alia, that there had been violations of Articles 3 and 34 of the Convention on account of the authorities’ failure to provide the applicant with adequate medical care or to comply with the interim measure indicated (see Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857/13, §§ 75, 93, and 94, 27 November 2014).", "10. Relying on Article 46 of the Convention the Court held that the authorities should admit the applicant, at that time detained in remand prison no. 4 in Rostov-on-Don, to a specialised medical facility where he should remain under constant medical supervision and should be provided with adequate medical services corresponding to his needs; alternatively, the authorities could place him in a specialised prison medical facility, if the facility could guarantee the requisite level of medical supervision and care. (see Amirov, cited above, § 118).", "11. After 27 November 2014, the date of the Court’s judgment in the applicant’s first case, he continued being detained in the remand prison pending the completion of his trial.", "12. According to the information from the Government, in 2014 the applicant’s cell was re-equipped to take account of his needs as a wheelchair user. Handrails were installed near his bed and the toilet, and the furniture was put at a lower level in order to be accessible. Wheelchair ramps and a lift were installed in the detention facility. A room for personal-hygiene procedures needed by the applicant was located opposite his cell with all the necessary equipment.", "13. In 2015 he was examined by various doctors, such as a general practitioner, a neurologist, a surgeon, a urologist, and a proctologist. He underwent basic medical tests and received the treatment he had been prescribed. The prison doctors found his overall condition to be satisfactory.", "14. The applicant’s lawyers noticed, however, that his state of health had worsened. They solicited medical opinions on the treatment required.", "15. On 14 July 2015 Dr W., a specialist in neurology, examined the applicant. He noted progressive muscular dystrophy, the development of leg convulsions, and urinary problems. An immediate admission to a specialised hospital for long-term treatment and urological surgery was recommended. The doctor said that further detention in prison would put the applicant’s life at risk.", "16. On 30 October 2015 the applicant was examined by a forensic expert, Dr N., who confirmed the deterioration of his medical condition, and noted the development of bedsores. The doctor suggested that the applicant’s state of health might warrant early release on medical grounds and stated that he needed constant medical care.", "17. On 22 January 2016 Dr N. assessed the quality of the medical care in the remand prison. He noted the absence of exercise therapy, physiotherapy, and massage, and was concerned that the prison premises were not sterile enough for hygienic procedures.", "18. In the meantime, on 27 August 2015 the Military Court of the North‑Caucasus Circuit found the applicant guilty of having organised an act of terrorism and an attempt to murder an investigator in his case. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony. The Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction and sentence on 24 March 2016.", "19. On 1 April 2016 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in the correctional colony.", "20. He spent the first two weeks of his detention in an ordinary cell in the quarantine wing. According to a letter from the chairman of the Committee for Civil Rights sent to the applicant’s lawyer on 20 April 2016, the cell was not adapted to the needs of a wheelchair prisoner. The applicant depended on his fellow inmates, who assisted him in his daily needs, including helping him to perform enemas on himself.", "21. Every day the applicant was taken, handcuffed and blindfolded, to the prison yard for exercise.", "22. On 2 April 2016 he was examined by several prison doctors: a tuberculosis specialist, an infectious-diseases specialist, a dentist and a general practitioner. The latter recorded his illnesses, ordered blood and urine tests, and prescribed treatment, comprising of a special diet and drugs. He noted that the applicant needed regular catheterisation and enemas. Examinations by specialists in endocrinology, ophthalmology, gastroenterology, neurology, cardiology, urology, and surgery, and exercise therapy were recommended.", "23. The applicant was regularly visited by the prison general practitioner in the quarantine wing and underwent blood and urine tests. The doctor was satisfied with his medical condition and the results of his treatment.", "24. On 14 April 2016 the applicant was moved to medical unit no. 56 and placed in cell no. 12. He shared its space of 14 sq. m with one cellmate. The applicant was provided with a wide bed, a sink installed at a low level, and a medical couch, which he used during self-catheterisation procedures. Enemas were carried out in a separate room twice a week with the assistance of the medical unit staff. The custodial authorities continued handcuffing and blindfolding him while he was escorted to the yard.", "25. On 11 May 2016 he was examined by several doctors: a general practitioner, an endocrinologist, a neurologist, and a urologist from the civilian hospital in Sol-Iletsk. According to the medical records kept by the doctors, his medical condition was acute. No recommendations for inpatient treatment or urgent medical measures were made. The endocrinologist ordered tests of his thyroid-gland hormones, which were carried out on the same day. The neurologist prescribed exercise. The latter prescription was endorsed by a prison doctor on 19 May 2016.", "26. On 23 May 2016 the applicant was again examined by the endocrinologist, who noted, inter alia, the risk due to a low level of thyroid hormones. Another hormone test was prescribed for August 2016.", "27. The applicant was examined by a medical board to establish whether he was entitled to early release on medical grounds. The board concluded that his medical condition did not warrant it.", "28. From 6 to 8 June 2016 a commission of officials from the Russian Ombudsman’s Office, the Orenburg Ombudsman’s Office, the Orenburg prosecutor’s office, the Federal Service of the Execution for Sentences in Orenburg Region and medical unit no. 56 came to the applicant’s detention facility and examined the quality of his medical care. The commission concluded that it was adequate.", "29. On 8 June 2016 the applicant was visited by an exercise-therapy specialist, who taught him exercises to support his health. It appears that this visit was a follow-up to previous visits by the specialist, in April and May 2016. However, the medical record does not disclose particular details of the recommendations made on those two previous occasions.", "30. On 4 July 2016 two members of the Orenburg Regional Public Commission for Monitoring the Protection of Human Rights in Detention (Общественная наблюдательная комиссия Оренбургской области) inspected the colony. It appears that by the time of the inspection the applicant had been moved to another cell. The inspectors noted in particular, that the cell was divided into three sections by metal bars and housed six inmates. The applicant’s section measured 10.8 sq. m; it had a bath, a medical couch, a sink, and a bedside table with television set. The toilet was not partitioned from the rest of the cell and the applicant could be observed by his cellmate while using it. The correctional colony lacked wheelchair ramps, so the applicant could not freely access the yard or meeting rooms. He complained that the necessary drugs had had to be supplied by his relatives, owing to a lack of funds, which were to be allocated in the near future. Medical supervision was carried out by the general practitioner as regular examinations by other specialists had not been considered necessary. Allegedly owing to the applicant not having received medical massages, the applicant’s legs started convulsing. He was assisted by his cellmate, who helped him to get into bed. The applicant was not given a special diet.", "31. On 11 August 25 October and 16 December 2016, and 19 April 2017 a special medical board of highly qualified civilian and prison doctors, and specialists in cardiology, endocrinology, neurology, and urology examined the applicant. They concluded that there was no need to admit the applicant to a specialist medical facility and that he could continue receiving treatment in the medical unit. The doctors were satisfied with the quality of medical care given to the applicant.", "32. In the meantime the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation of the applicant’s detention conditions and the poor quality of his medical treatment. The complaint was forwarded to the prosecutor’s office for the supervision of detention facilities in Orenburg Region. Having carried out enquiries, on 5 July 2016 the Office replied as follows:\n“It has been established that on admission to [the correctional colony the applicant] was placed in [a cell of the quarantine wing]. It was designed for two persons and measured 12 sq. m, which satisfied the requirements of the Execution of Sentences Act ... [The applicant’s] cellmate assisted him in his daily needs, which included hygienic procedures and moving around the cell. Accordingly, [the applicant] was not restricted in his rights ...\nThe allegation that [the applicant] was not provided with special conditions [needed in his situation] is not true. His cell in the medical unit is furnished with a specially designed table, a bed and a sink, so he can easily access them and move freely about the cell.\n[The applicant] is assisted by the medical unit staff members and inmates in his movements within the medical unit, in particular when entering/leaving buildings in a wheelchair, and in his daily needs.\nAs called for by [the applicant’s] disability and illnesses, he is examined by the prison doctors on a daily basis, he receives medical treatment as prescribed to the relevant medical standards, and he is provided with dietary nutrition.\nIn May 2016 [the custodial authorities] provided him with a mattress [to prevent] bedsores.\n[The applicant] urinates with the help of a catheter which he inserts six to seven times per day (as recommended by [a urologist]). He defecates with the help of enemas performed every three days by medical staff from the medical unit. Detainees, who work in the medical unit, escort [the applicant] to a special room for that procedure and clean it afterwards.\nThe regional medical standard “Procedures for simple medical procedures, desmurgy and immobilisation”, approved by an Order of the Ministry of the Health Care and Social Development of Orenburg Region on 5 March 2010 does not require catheterisation or enemas to be carried out in a sterile room. Sterile catheters and enemas tips are used by [the applicant].\nIn breach of Article 30 of the Penal Institutions Act (Federal Law no. 5473-1 of 21 June 1993), [the applicant] was escorted for walks handcuffed and blindfolded until 24 May 2016.\nMoreover, the inquiry, which had been performed earlier, revealed breaches of Article 101 § 7 of the Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences and Articles 10, 11, and 11.1 of the Social Protection of the Disabled in the Russian Federation Act (Federal Law of 24 November 1995 No. 181-FZ). [In accordance with the aforementioned Regulation, the applicant] should have been given the necessary devices (a wheelchair for mobility, an indoor wheelchair, a gel pillow to prevent bedsores, nappies for adults, and urinals). However, the custodial authorities have not provided him with those items. [Moreover,] the detention facility did not take measures to provide the exercise and sport therapy [for the applicant] indicated in his rehabilitation programme.\nIn the light of the above, on 2 June 2016 the prosecutor’s office for supervision of detention facilities in Orenburg issued a formal order to the head of the correctional colony to rectify the identified shortcomings. The order has been ... complied with ...\nThere are no grounds for a further intervention by the prosecutor ...”" ]
[ "3" ]
[ 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 18, 24, 26 ]
[ 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 26 ]
[ "6. The applicant was born in 1975 in Vladikavkaz, the Republic of North Ossetia‑Alania. He is currently detained in correctional colony no. 1 in Vladikavkaz (“the correctional colony”).", "7. On 21 January 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and taken to remand prison no. 20/1 in Grozny, the Chechen Republic (“the remand prison”).", "8. On 17 July 2014 the Gudermes Town Court of the Chechen Republic convicted him as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment.", "9. During a medical check-up upon his admission to the remand prison, a doctor noted an area of pigmentation on the applicant’s face and ordered a biopsy. The test, performed on 27 February 2013 at the Regional Cancer Hospital in Grozny, revealed melanoma, a type of skin cancer. Radiotherapy and surgery were prescribed.", "10. Such treatment was considered advanced medical care, which could only be provided under a special programme in limited numbers. On 16 September 2013 a medical panel of the Ministry of Healthcare of the Chechen Republic offered that programme to the applicant.", "11. In October and November 2013 he was transferred to the Regional Cancer Hospital in Rostov (“the cancer hospital”). He was examined and informed that the cancerous tumour could be removed, but he refused the treatment.", "12. On 3 June 2014 the applicant was examined at the Rostov Institute of Cancer Research (“the cancer institute”). Surgical removal of the melanoma was recommended. It appears that several further consultations had been planned to take place at the facility, but the detention authorities failed to ensure his presence.", "13. On 20 June and 5 September 2014 a panel of doctors from the сancer hospital repeatedly recommended surgical removal of the melanoma. The applicant agreed to the treatment, but several days later withdrew his consent, saying that he had no confidence in the doctors practising in the Chechen Republic.", "14. On 22 September 2014 the applicant was admitted to the Town Hospital in Groznyy for cancer surgery, but refused it the next day as he had no confidence in the doctors.", "15. At the end of December 2014 he was moved from the remand prison to the correctional colony, where he had to serve his sentence.", "16. On 2 April 2015 a further biopsy showed that the applicant’s tumour showed a moderate-stage basal cell carcinoma, another type of skin cancer. Given the extent to which the tumour had spread, reconstructive facial surgery was recommended.", "17. Several days later, after realising that the tumour had grown, the applicant gave his written consent to the prescribed surgery.", "18. The detention authorities contacted the cancer hospital with a view to arranging the treatment.", "19. On 6 April 2015 the head of the cancer hospital informed the detention authorities that the medical institution was unable to perform such complex surgery.", "20. On 27 October 2015 the applicant applied for early release from detention on medical grounds. On 23 November 2015 the Promyshlenniy District Court of Vladikavkaz refused to examine the application on the merits, because his illness was not included in Government Decree no. 54 of 6 February 2004 setting out a list of illnesses warranting early release. Under the Decree, only patients with end-stage cancer could apply for early release on health grounds.", "21. On 11 January 2016 the applicant lodged a request for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, complaining of his inability to undergo the complex cancer surgery vitally needed in his situation.", "22. On 25 January 2016 the Court indicated to the Russian Government, under Rule 39, that it was desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant be immediately examined by medical experts independent from the penal system with a view to determining: (i) whether he had been receiving adequate medical care; (ii) whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in the correctional colony; and (iii) whether his state of health called for urgent surgery and/or for a transfer to an appropriate civilian or prison hospital. Furthermore, the Government were also asked to ensure the applicant’s transfer to such a relevant hospital for surgery, should the medical experts conclude that urgent surgery in a hospital was required.", "23. On 4 March 2016 the Government responded to a letter from the Court dated 25 January 2016, stating that the applicant’s transfer to a hospital for surgery was scheduled for 10 March 2016. They also submitted the following: a document setting out the periods of the applicant’s detention in custody, a document concerning the conditions of his detention, a report issued by the detention authorities on his current state of health, original and typed copies of his medical file, and copies of correspondence between the medical and detention authorities discussing surgery for the applicant.", "24. Ten days later the applicant was transferred to prison medical unit no. 61 in Rostov-on-Don (“the prison medical unit”) for surgery. In that facility he was examined by a civilian oncologist, who confirmed that facial surgery was required. According to a letter from the head of the medical unit dated 14 April 2016, the facility was unable to carry any surgery out as its surgical unit was undergoing renovation.", "25. Having learned of the inability of the medical unit to provide the applicant with the required treatment, the detention authorities asked the cancer institute to perform the surgery. The request was refused due to a lack of appropriate security measures at the institution. However, the hospital was ready to sign an agreement with the detention authorities and send a surgeon to a prison medical unit to operate on the applicant.", "26. It appears that in response to the steps taken by the detention authorities to ensure surgery for the applicant by a civilian cancer surgeon, on 31 May 2016 he refused the treatment. The following day he was discharged from the medical unit and returned to the correctional colony.", "27. On 6 October 2016 the applicant agreed to the treatment in a cancer hospital. The detention authorities started organising his transfer to a hospital in the Krasnodar Region. The parties have not submitted information about any further developments in the case." ]
[ "3", "34" ]
[ 5, 7, 8, 20 ]
[]
[ "4. The first applicant, Mr Stemplys, was born in 1963 and lives in Marijampolė. The second applicant, Mr Debesys, was born in 1954 and lives in Vilnius.", "5. The first applicant was detained in the Pravieniškės Correctional Facility from 6 April 2005 to 28 August 2015.", "6. On 19 December 2012 he submitted a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells and that his health had deteriorated as a result. He claimed 250,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 72,400 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.", "7. On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant’s claim concerning the period before 19 December 2009 as time‑barred. The court then found that from 19 December 2009 to 19 December 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had between 1.98 and 2.74 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also dismissed as unproven the applicant’s claim that his health had deteriorated. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.", "8. On 7 October 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment in its entirety.", "9. On an unspecified date the applicant submitted a new civil claim against the State concerning the conditions of his detention after 19 December 2012, claiming LTL 63,750 (approximately EUR 18,500) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.", "10. On 21 October 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It found that from 19 December 2012 to 21 October 2013 (the day the court issued its decision) the applicant had had 1.98 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m, and that during that period for fourteen days he had been placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure, where he had had 3.47 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms, and dismissed as unproven the applicant’s claims that his health had deteriorated. He was awarded LTL 400 (approximately EUR 116) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.", "11. On 25 August 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment in its entirety.", "12. The second applicant was detained in the Pravieniškės Correctional Facility from 19 May 2001 to 20 December 2013.", "13. On 28 June 2012 he submitted a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells and that his health had deteriorated as a result. He claimed LTL 125,000 (approximately EUR 36,200) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.", "14. On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant’s claim concerning the period before 28 June 2009 as time‑barred. The court then found that from 28 June 2009 to 28 June 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had around 2.55 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also held that the deterioration in the applicant’s state of health was not related to the conditions of his detention. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.", "15. On 15 October 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment in its entirety.", "16. On 15 May 2013 the applicant submitted a new civil claim against the State concerning the conditions of his detention after 28 June 2012, claiming LTL 33,875 (approximately EUR 9,800) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.", "17. On 16 September 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It found that from 28 June 2012 to 15 May 2013 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) the applicant had had between 1.59 and 2.77 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms and found no causal link between the deterioration in the applicant’s state of health and the conditions of his detention. The applicant was awarded LTL 500 (approximately EUR 145) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.", "18. On 18 September 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment in its entirety." ]
[ "3" ]
[ 3, 6, 10, 13 ]
[ 2 ]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow.", "6. On 24 January 2011 a bomb attack at the Domodedovo airport killed 37 people and injured more than 160. It was later established that the explosion was caused by a suicide bomber and organised by a militant group operating in the North Caucasus. The applicant, who was present at the airport at the time of explosion, sustained multiple injuries to her body (wounds, contusions and fractures) which provoked further complications (cerebral oedema, coma, respiratory and cardiac insufficiency and a traumatic shock). The applicant’s injuries were life-threatening and caused serious harm to her health.", "7. Within the framework of the criminal investigation into the bombing, the investigative authorities arrested four persons. On 11 November 2013 the Moscow Regional Court found them guilty of multiple charges, including commission of an act of terror, organisation of a criminal gang and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Three defendants received life sentence and the fourth one was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.", "8. On 25 November 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 11 November 2013 in substance on appeal.", "9. According to the Government, the applicant was granted a victim status. She did not bring a civil action for damages against the convicted persons.", "10. On 25 January 2011 the Russian authorities opened criminal investigation on the charges of negligence against the airport managers and employees and the policemen deployed at the airport. On 22 March 2011 the applicant was granted a victim status in the proceedings. On 5 March 2012 the investigator decided to recall it. On 26 March 2012 the investigator discontinued the proceedings.", "11. On 22 May 2012 the Deputy President of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation quashed the decision of 26 March 2012 and re-opened the case. The proceedings are pending to date.", "12. On 3 June 2013 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the decision of 5 March 2012.", "13. On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil claim against the airport seeking damages resulting from the failure of the airport security to prevent the bombing.", "14. On 27 August 2013 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s claims for damages. On 16 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 August 2013 on appeal. The City Court dismissed, inter alia, as unsubstantiated the applicant’s allegation that the suicide bomber had been able to enter the airport owing to the lack of a metal detector at one of the airport entrances noting that such fact should have been established in the course of the relevant criminal investigation." ]
[ "13", "2" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Râbniţa.", "6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "7. On 28 July 1999, the applicant was arrested in Râbniţa by virtue of a decision of a prosecutor from the self-proclaimed “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (the “MRT”; for further details about the “MRT”, see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). He was charged with fraud and incitement to bribery.", "8. On 17 May 2000, the Camenca District Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the “MRT”, convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. According to the applicant, he appealed, but his appeal was rejected by the “MRT” Supreme Court on an unspecified date.", "9. The applicant initially served his sentence in Tiraspol Prison no. 2. On 25 October 2001, he was transferred to Pruncul Prison Hospital, which was under the control of the Moldovan authorities. On 30 October 2001, he signed a form of authority authorising the Chişinău-based non-governmental organisation Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to represent him before this Court. That form of authority, together with the application form, reached the Court on 19 November 2001.", "10. On 20 November 2001, a lawyer from LHR informed the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office that the applicant and seven other people were being held in Pruncul Prison Hospital on the basis that they had been convicted by “MRT” courts. He asked for their immediate release, in view of the fact that they had been convicted by unlawful courts. He also submitted that some of those eight detainees had already lodged applications with the Court, and that a failure to immediately release them or any attempt to transfer them back to the “MRT” authorities would result in the Republic of Moldova incurring responsibility. A similar letter was sent on the same day to the Minister of Justice.", "11. On 21 November 2001, members of LHR organised a press conference, during which they informed the media of the circumstances of the case and of the letter sent to the Prosecutor General’s Office on the previous day.", "12. Also on 21 November 2001, all eight detainees, including the applicant, were allegedly transferred back to “MRT” prisons.", "13. On 23 November 2001, LHR informed the media of the detainees’ transfer back to the “MRT” authorities on 21 November 2001.", "14. On 26 November 2001, the Head of the Penal Institutions Department of the Ministry of Justice informed LHR that the detainees mentioned in their request of 20 November 2001 were not being held at Pruncul Prison Hospital.", "15. On 7 December 2001, the lawyer from LHR wrote to the “MRT” Ministry of Justice, asking for permission to see the applicant and stating that he was planning to lodge in the applicant’s name an application before the Court. He never received a reply to that letter.", "16. On 22 January 2002, the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act.", "17. The applicant described the conditions of his detention in the “MRT” in the following manner. He was allegedly detained in a cell with several people suffering from tuberculosis, and risked contracting that disease himself. During his detention in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, approximately 100 detainees there died of tuberculosis. He was also affected by parasitic insects. The applicant is a person with a category 3 disability, but he was not given any medication during his detention. Food was served only once a day and was of very poor quality." ]
[ "5", "3", "34" ]
[ 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was employed by HK Komgrap and Komgrap-Makiš doo, a company based in Belgrade (hereinafter “the debtor”). At the relevant time, the company was predominantly socially-owned (see Stoković and Others v. Serbia, nos. 75879/14 and seq. §§ 10-14, 8 March 2016)", "6. Since the debtor had failed to fulfil its obligations towards its employees, the applicant brought a civil claim seeking payment of salary arrears and various social security contributions.", "7. On 23 June 2003 the Belgrade Second Municipal Court (Drugi opštinski sud u Beogradu) ordered the debtor to pay to the applicant certain sums in respect of salary arrears and the various social security contributions. This judgment became final and enforceable on 25 July 2005.", "8. On 26 September 2005 the applicant applied to the Belgrade Fourth Municipal Court (Četvrti opštinski sud u Beogradu) for enforcement of the judgment of 23 June 2003.", "9. On 18 January 2006 the said court ordered the enforcement of the judgment and awarded the applicant the costs incurred in the enforcement proceedings.", "10. On 27 October 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, seeking redress for the non-enforcement of the judgment in question.", "11. On 27 November 2013 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of the “right to a trial within a reasonable time” with regard to the enforcement proceedings. The court ordered the acceleration of these proceedings and declared that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in the amount of 800 euros (EUR) converted into the national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement.", "12. The Constitutional Court held that since the enforcement proceedings in question had not yet been completed, the constitutional appeals were premature in so far as they concerned the pecuniary damage, and dismissed the appeal in that regard." ]
[ "P1-1", "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicants were born in 1976 and 1983 respectively.", "6. The first applicant, Aleksey Navalnyy, is a political activist, opposition leader, anti-corruption campaigner and popular blogger. He lives in Moscow. The second applicant, Oleg Navalnyy, is the first applicant’s brother; he is an entrepreneur and a former employee of the Federal State unitary enterprise Russian Post. He is currently serving a three-and-a-half year sentence in a correctional colony in the Oryol Region.", "7. From 2005 the second applicant worked at the Main Centre for Long Distance Mail, a subsidiary of Russian Post. On 1 December 2007 he became head of its Internal Mail department and then worked in other managerial posts in various departments and divisions of Russian Post.", "8. On 17 October 2006 Russian Post concluded a contract with the limited liability company Multidisciplinary Processing (OOO Многопрофильная процессинговая компания – hereinafter “MPK”) and the telecommunications company Rostelekom, whereby MPK undertook to print Rostelekom’s telephone bills and deliver them through Russian Post to Rostelekom’s customers.", "9. On 1 February 2007, under a separate contract, Russian Post leased electronic equipment from MPK. On 10 April 2007 MPK subcontracted the sorting, packing and the transfer of the equipment leased to Russian Post to a private joint-stock company, the Interregional Mail Centre (OAO Межрегиональный специализированный почтовый центр – hereinafter “MSPT”).", "10. On 3 December 2007 the applicants and their parents acquired the limited liability company Alortag Management Limited, incorporated in Cyprus.", "11. On 7 May 2008 MPK subcontracted the printing of the Rostelekom telephone bills to the limited liability company IPS M-City (OOO ИПС М‑Сити – hereinafter “M‑City”).", "12. On 19 May 2008 Alortag Management Limited set up a Russian limited liability company, Chief Subscription Agency (ООО Главное подписное агентство – hereinafter “GPA”). Neither of the applicants held formal positions in GPA, but it appears that the second applicant was actively involved in its functioning.", "13. On 16 July 2008 the chief of Russian Post’s Mail Service Directorate informed its client, the Russian subsidiary of French company Yves Rocher, the limited liability company Yves Rocher Vostok (OOO Ив Роше Восток), that from 1 October 2008 it would terminate the practice of collecting the client’s parcels from a specific distribution centre and that this service would henceforth be subject to a separate contract. Subsequently, Ms B., a manager at Yves Rocher Vostok, asked the second applicant for advice on handling the transfer of parcels from the distribution centre and he suggested that she use a private contractor, GPA.", "14. On 2 August 2008 the financial director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr K.M., signed a freight forwarding agreement with GPA for the collection and transfer of parcels from the distribution centre at 23,600 Russian roubles (RUB) per shipment. On 10 August 2008 GPA subcontracted the freight forwarding services under that agreement to two specialist courier companies. GPA paid the couriers RUB 14,000 per shipment. GPA and its contractors provided those services to Yves Rocher Vostok until the end of 2012.", "15. On 7 November 2008 the general director of MPK, Mr Sh., signed an agreement with GPA whereby the latter undertook to provide overall logistical services to MPK related to the printing, sorting, packing and distribution of telephone bills as well as the sorting, packing and transfer of electronic equipment to Russian Post. Subsequently, GPA subcontracted those services to seventeen specialist companies, including M-City. GPA and its contractors rendered the services to MPK until March 2013.", "16. In the same period, the first applicant ran an increasingly public anti-corruption campaign targeting high-ranking public officials (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, § 15, 23 February 2016). In 2011-2012 he organised and led a number of rallies, including an assembly at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow on 6 May 2012 (see, among other sources, Frumkin v. Russia, no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).", "17. At the beginning of 2012 the first applicant investigated the off-duty activities of the chief of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (“the Investigative Committee”), Mr Bastrykin. On 25 April 2012 the Investigative Committee, at the direct order of Mr Bastrykin, instituted criminal proceedings in embezzlement case against the first applicant (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov, cited above, hereinafter “the Kirovles case”). On 5 July 2012 Mr Bastrykin made a public statement expressing his determination to have the first applicant prosecuted. On 26 July 2012 the first applicant published an article about Mr Bastrykin, alleging in particular that his business activities and residence status were incompatible with the office he held (ibid., §§ 30-31 and 118).", "18. On 4 December 2012 the general director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr B.L., lodged a complaint with the Investigative Committee, alleging that in 2008 unidentified persons had misled his company’s employees and had persuaded them to conclude a contract with GPA, thus depriving the company of a free choice of contractor. He stated that it was possible that the company had suffered significant damage as a result.", "19. On 10 December 2012 the first applicant made a public plea for people to participate in the Freedom March, an opposition rally at Lubyanskaya Square on 15 December 2012, in defiance of a ban by the Moscow authorities.", "20. On the same day the Investigative Committee decided to open a criminal file on the basis of material severed from the Kirovles case. The new file concerned suspicions of fraud by the applicants against Yves Rocher Vostok and the laundering of the proceeds of illegal transactions, offences set out in Articles 159.4 and 174.1 § 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.", "21. On 20 December 2012 charges of fraud and money laundering were brought against the applicants under Articles 159.4 and 174.1 § 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code in connection with acts allegedly committed against MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok.", "22. On 13 February 2013 the second applicant requested that five Yves Rocher Vostok employees be questioned as witnesses, including the general director Mr B.L. and the manager Ms B., but the investigator rejected the request on 18 February 2013. It appears that the witnesses were questioned during the investigation, but the applicants were not informed of that fact or given the opportunity to have a formal face‑to-face confrontation with them.", "23. On 18 July 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Kirov found the first applicant guilty of organising large-scale embezzlement in the Kirovles case and gave him a suspended prison sentence of five years. The Court subsequently found that those proceedings had been conducted in violation of Article 6 of the Convention (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov, cited above, §§ 102-21).", "24. On 11 February 2013 the financial director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr K.M., submitted an internal audit report to the investigator stating that the company had not sustained any damage or loss of profits due to its agreement with GPA; it had been established by the auditors that GPA had charged the market price for its services.", "25. On 28 February 2014 the Basmannyy District Court ordered that the first applicant be placed under house arrest. This preventive measure was maintained until 5 January 2015.", "26. On 14 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court began hearing the applicants’ criminal case.", "27. On 14 November 2014 the applicants requested that the court call and examine the general director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr B.L., the manager, Ms B. and several employees of Russian Post as witnesses. They also asked the court to obtain certain internal documents relating to the structure and functioning of Russian Post. The court dismissed those requests.", "28. On 9 December 2014 the applicants asked the court to summon six witnesses, again including Mr B.L. and Ms B.", "29. On 15 December 2014 the court, at the request of the prosecutor, issued a warrant compelling Mr B.L. to appear, however, it was not executed. The court subsequently allowed statements that he and Ms B. had given during the investigation to be read out.", "30. On 19 December 2014 the court concluded the trial and said it would deliver a judgment on 15 January 2015.", "31. At about 4 p.m. on 29 December 2014 the applicants and their defence counsel were summoned by telephone to appear in court at 9 a.m. on 30 December 2014 for delivery of the judgment, which had been brought forward from 15 January 2015 for unknown reasons.", "32. On 30 December 2014 the court delivered the introductory and operative parts of the judgment. The applicants were found guilty of money laundering and of defrauding MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok and were convicted under Articles 159.4 §§ 2 and 3 and 174.1 § 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. The first applicant received a suspended sentence of three and a half years and the second applicant a prison sentence of the same duration, to be served in a correctional colony. They were also fined RUB 500,000 each and had to pay jointly RUB 4,498,546 in damages to MPK. The court ordered that the first applicant should remain under house arrest and that the second applicant be placed in “pre-trial detention”, with his term of imprisonment running from that day. Delivery of the judgment in full was adjourned until 12 January 2015.", "33. The second applicant appealed against his detention the same day.", "34. The first applicant appealed against the extension of his house arrest on 31 December 2014.", "35. On 12 January 2015 the applicants appealed against the judgment of 30 December 2014 on the merits. They received the full text of the judgment on the same day, which included the reasons for finding the applicants guilty of fraud. The court found that the applicants had set up a “fake company”, GPA, with the intention to use it as an intermediary to offer services to two clients of Russian Post, MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok. It held that the second applicant had taken advantage of insider information that Russian Post had ceased to provide the companies with certain services for lack of operational capacity and had convinced those clients to use GPA as a substitute; that he had misled the clients about GPA’s pricing policy and its relationship with Russian Post, thus depriving them of the freedom of choice of service providers; that he had promoted his company’s services while knowing that it would have to subcontract the work to other companies; and that GPA had retained the difference in price between what MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok paid for its services and what GPA paid to its subcontractors. The court concluded that the latter margin had been stolen from MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok by the applicants through GPA. The court further established that the amounts in question constituted the proceeds of crime, and that using that money to pay GPA’s office rent, legal services, dividends to the applicants and for transfers to affiliated companies had constituted money laundering.", "36. On 19 January 2015 the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office appealed against the first-instance judgment on the grounds that the sentence given to both applicants had been too lenient.", "37. On 28 January 2015 the applicants challenged the accuracy of the verbatim records of the first-instance hearing. Only a few of their corrections were accepted.", "38. On 11 February 2015 the applicants lodged additional points of appeal and a request that six witnesses be called and examined, including Mr B.L. and Ms B.", "39. On 17 February 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the first‑instance judgment, except for the part imposing a fine and awarding damages to MPK, which was reversed.", "40. On 27 April 2015 the applicants lodged a cassation appeal.", "41. On 26 June 2015 the Moscow City Court refused leave to lodge a cassation appeal." ]
[ "7", "6" ]
[ 4, 6, 19, 30 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in İzmir.", "5. On 18 June 1998 the applicant started working for a company owned by İzmir City Council (“the City Council”). On 19 March 2007 he resigned from his job to perform his military service.", "6. On 12 April 2007 the applicant was paid 16,985 Turkish liras (TRY ‑ approximately 9,200 euros (EUR)) in respect of severance pay and he signed a release (ibraname) discharging the City Council from all liability.", "7. Following his discharge from the military on health grounds shortly after he was enlisted, on 20 April and 31 May 2007 the applicant requested his reinstatement in his previous job. However, his requests were rejected by the City Council.", "8. On 28 June 2007 the applicant initiated proceedings before the İzmir Labour Court, seeking reinstatement. He relied on clause 19 of the collective bargaining agreement in force at the company (“the collective agreement”), which provided for the reinstatement of employees who had quit their jobs to perform their military service, provided that they applied within three months of their discharge from the armed forces.", "9. On 12 September 2007, in a decision rendered orally in the presence of the parties, the İzmir Labour Court found in favour of the applicant. The Labour Court held that the applicant’s discharge from the military shortly after he had been enlisted fell under the provision of the collective agreement, which called for the suspension of the employment contract when an employee was conscripted (silah altına alınma) for reasons other than compulsory military service, such as being recalled to the armed forces in times of war. Therefore it held that the applicant was entitled to be reinstated in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement. The court informed the parties that they could appeal against this decision within the time-limits set out in the applicable procedure.", "10. On 18 September 2007 the City Council appealed against the decision and reserved its right to submit additional observations once the reasoned judgment of the first-instance court had been served on it. That appeal was not communicated to the applicant.", "11. On 15 October 2007, the registry of the first-instance court forwarded the file to the Court of Cassation for appeal on points of law.", "12. On 23 October 2007 the City Council submitted its additional observations. It argued, inter alia, that the first-instance court’s interpretation of the collective agreement had been erroneous. These observations were also not communicated to the applicant.", "13. On 21 July 2008, following an examination based on the case file and without holding a hearing, the Court of Cassation quashed the first‑instance court’s judgment and found in favour of the City Council. The Court of Cassation found it established that the applicant had resigned from his job to perform his military service and that he had been paid severance pay. It held that a rejection of the applicant’s request for reinstatement could not be regarded as the termination of the applicant’s employment contract; therefore, the applicant could not technically ask to be reinstated. The Court of Cassation further held that clause 19 of the collective agreement was not directly applicable in the case before it. No appeal was possible against this decision.", "14. This decision was served on the applicant on 22 September 2008." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 6, 8 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Forráskút. At the time of lodging the application, he was detained at Márianosztra Prison.", "5. On 29 January 2014 the applicant was convicted of possession of narcotics and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, on 14 October 2014 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the judgment.", "6. The applicant began serving his sentence at Szeged Prison on 15 January 2015 and was transferred to Márianosztra Prison on 26 January 2015. He was released on parole on 8 September 2015.", "7. While the applicant was held at Szeged Prison, the per capita space available to him was about 3.2 sq. m; the gross ground surface of the cell was 16 sq. m for five occupants but included the in-cell sanitary facility. He was allowed to spend one hour per day in the open air and could take part in various sports and other activities, thus reducing the time spent in the cell. He was provided with basic standard meals and was able to take a shower twice a week.", "8. At Márianosztra Prison, the per capita cell space available to the applicant was about 2.67 sq. m; the gross ground surface of the cell was 8 sq. m for three occupants but included the in-cell sanitary facility. Only between 26 and 29 January and 11 and 15 May 2015 he was held in a cell where a wall separated the toilet from the rest of the space. He could take a shower twice a week and pursue certain free-time activities. At his request, he was provided with vegetarian meals but very often consisting only of soya beans.", "9. The applicant submitted that he suffered from epilepsy and a personality disorder. In his own submissions he stated that prior to his conviction he had cultivated and consumed cannabis partly because it alleviated his symptoms.", "10. As regards the medical care in prison, the Government submitted that, during the first examination at Szeged Prison, the applicant had stated that he suffered from epilepsy without presenting any relevant documentation. The doctor referred him for a psychiatric examination, which took place on 22 January 2015; but the applicant refused the treatment prescribed by the specialist.", "11. During his first medical examination at Márianosztra Prison, the doctor noted that the applicant’s aptitude for work could be assessed only after external medical records concerning his illness had been obtained.", "12. The applicant suffered an epileptic seizure on 24 April 2015, whilst in his cell. Following medication, his condition improved but he refused the neurological examination recommended by the doctor and any further treatment. He suffered further fits on 4 May and 8 July 2015, following which a neurologist prescribed him anti-epileptic drugs, but he agreed to take them only after suffering yet another seizure." ]
[ "3" ]
[ 2, 3 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Smederevo.", "6. On 26 March 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Žabari Municipal Court against his employer, the Ministry of Interior, seeking payment of certain benefits.", "7. On 23 April 2012 the Požarevac First Instance Court the Žabari Court Unit ruled in favour of the applicant.", "8. On 4 October 2012 the Belgrade Appellate Court revised the First Instance Court’s judgment and rejected the applicant’s claim. The applicant received the said judgment on 5 November 2012.", "9. On 12 November 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal." ]
[ "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Százhalombatta.", "5. On 11 April 2009, quoting the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Pest Central District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention on charges of terrorist acts and other related offences involving abuse of firearms and explosives on the grounds that he might abscond for fear of a severe punishment, might frustrate the on-going investigation by colluding with accomplices still at large, or might execute the planned offences or re-offend.", "6. The detention measure was extended on 8 May and again on 7 August 2009. The court reiterated its earlier reasons, adding that the risk of collusion was serious, since certain other suspects had not yet been apprehended.", "7. A further extension was ordered on 9 November 2009. The court stated that the applicant was being prosecuted for terrorist acts committed as an associate of an organised criminal group whose plans entailed a real risk of loss of life. It was of note that the group had existed for quite some time and had been committed to carrying out terrorist acts. Moreover, the volume of evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion, as weighed individually against the applicant, was increasing.", "8. On 9 February 2010 the applicant’s detention was again extended, the court noting that, in view of the grounds for his detention, not even his clean criminal record, family ties and settled background could provide adequate justification for a less strict measure.", "9. On 7 April 2010 the measure was renewed, with special reference to the fact that the case was concerned with a series of crimes committed over a long period of time by a criminal organisation.", "10. On 9 June 2010 the Budapest Regional Court ordered that the applicant be held under house arrest, holding that the danger of his re-offending was not of a degree that justified his continued detention, noting also that the investigation was about to be wrapped up and that, in any case, some accomplices in the case had already been released pending trial.\nThe applicant was released from detention the next day. During the ensuing period he complied with the rules of house arrest.", "11. On 7 July 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal again ordered the applicant’s detention. It held that the charges of several very serious offences committed over a long time in an organised group were of such gravity that they could not be addressed merely by house arrest.", "12. The measure was extended on 4 August 2010. In addition to the previously cited reasons, the court considered that there was no reason to assume that the applicant’s political motivation behind the incriminated acts had subsided, which meant that the risk of re-offending was real.", "13. On 24 November 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s house arrest, observing that the applicant had abided by the previous house arrest (see paragraph 10 above) and holding that the risk of re-offending was slight.", "14. On 20 September 2012 the applicant’s house arrest was replaced by a restraining order, which was eventually lifted on 6 July 2014.", "15. On 22 April 2015 the applicant was again detained on remand for the purposes of prosecution for a new offence allegedly committed during the on-going proceedings. He was accused of having threatened and harassed a relative of one of the witnesses in the main case. For want of evidence, this new investigation was discontinued on 30 October 2015.", "16. On 18 December 2015 the applicant was released from detention and put under house arrest, which lasted until 27 July 2016.", "17. On 30 August 2016 the applicant and his accomplices were convicted. He was sentenced to 12 years in a strict-regime prison.", "18. Both the defendants and the prosecution appealed. The outcome of the ensuing proceedings is unknown." ]
[ "5" ]
[ 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 ]
[ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 ]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budenovsk, the Stavropol Region of the Russian Federation. He is a former military officer.", "6. On an unspecified date the applicant sued his former employer military unit.", "7. On 3 May 2001 the Military Court of the Pyatigorsk Garrison (“the military court”) ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military unit to re-calculate the period of the applicant’s service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for the time when the applicant had participated in a military operation. The military court obliged the head of the military unit to issue the relevant orders, to calculate and to pay the applicant some additional payments and field allowance for the periods specified in the judgment. The judgment contained information on the indexes and other parameters that should be applied for the awarded amounts to be calculated.", "8. On 14 May 2001 the judgment came into force.", "9. In March 2002 the applicant obtained the writ of execution and submitted it to the Department of the Federal Treasury in Budenovsk.", "10. On 19 March 2002 the Department of the Federal Treasury returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there, and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant.", "11. On 21 March 2002 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs’ service. On the same day the enforcement proceedings were initiated.", "12. On 19 February 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ.", "13. In 2004-2005 the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him. The applicant’s requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time. The courts noted that, in any case, the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment, and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment.", "14. It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of 3 May 2001 remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment.", "15. On 24 March 2016, after communication of the present case, the Ministry of Finance of Russia calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 3 May 2001. According to this calculation, the main debt amounted to 80,220.74 Russian roubles." ]
[ "P1-1", "6" ]
[ 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Lisichansk-18, the Lugansk region of Ukraine.", "5. In 1972 the applicant suffered 100 per cent disability as a result of a traffic accident. In 1994 the Lisichansk Town Court of the Lugansk Region of Ukraine found the State Health Care Institution of the Sanitary and Epidemiology Monitoring of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation (“the institution”) responsible for the accident and ordered it to pay to the applicant compensation and to reimburse his medical expenses. Since that time, the applicant has been involved in several sets of proceedings concerning various types of allowances and compensation due to him.", "6. On 17 July 1995 by the Lisichansk Town Court ordered the increase of the monthly payments due to the applicant in respect of compensation, allowances and medical expenses. It appears that the debtor institution complied with the judgment in part and in May 2000 discontinued payments due under the judgment.", "7. On 31 March 2006 the Perm Regional Court of Russia allowed the applicant’s request for compulsory execution of the above judgment in Russia as from May 2000. It was enforced on 30 March 2007.", "8. The applicant sued the defendant institution for medical expenses, various types of allowances and compensation, as well as index-linking and arrears in the respective payments, and acquired several judgments by Russian courts in his favour listed in Appendixes I and II.", "9. In course of the proceedings the defendant institution was replaced by the Federal Health Care Institution “Hygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region and the Komi-Perm Autonomous Region” and subsequently by Federal Health Care Institution “Hygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region”, its legal successors.", "10. He complained about non-enforcement to the Ministry of Finance, the prosecutor’s office and various other authorities, but to no avail.", "11. The judgments were enforced fully or in part on dates listed in Appendixes I and II. Some of them have not been enforced, as shown in the tables below." ]
[ "P1-1", "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "6. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Toronto, Canada.", "7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "8. The applicant was the director of a company (D.) registered in Ukraine. In 1996, in the name of D., he concluded a contract with a collective farm (N.), situated in the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria” (the “MRT” – for further details about the “MRT”, see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). Under the contract, N. undertook to send D. 15 tonnes of paprika and 5 tonnes of butter, while D. undertook to send N. 275 tonnes of diesel fuel as payment.", "9. Subsequently, N. sent the paprika, but according to the applicant some of it was of poor quality and D. suffered financial losses as a result. Consequently, D. refused to send the diesel fuel.", "10. On 22 December 1996 the applicant was summoned to the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime in Crivoi Rog, Ukraine, and asked to give an explanation for his refusal to send the diesel fuel. On 24 January 1997 he was summoned again. After the second interview he was taken, allegedly against his will and without his passport, to the “MRT”.", "11. The applicant was accused of fraud by the “MRT” authorities. On 30 December 1999 he was convicted and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment by the Ribnita People’s Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the “MRT”. He did not appeal against that judgment, which then became final.", "12. On 2 March 2002 the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act.", "13. While in detention pending trial and after his conviction, the applicant was initially held in solitary confinement for more than two years. The cell was a concrete box with no windows or ventilation, and no natural light, toilet or tap water.", "14. According to the applicant, after his transfer to an ordinary cell and until his release, he was detained in cells with persons who were ill with tuberculosis. During his detention several detainees died from tuberculosis. He was given food once a day – some 250 grams of soup (containing no protein or vitamins), 100 grams of porridge of the same quality, and 250 grams of bread. As a result of the lack of food the applicant developed constant hunger pains, which he viewed as tantamount to torture. The cell was infested with blood-sucking parasites. Their bites caused him discomfort and itching, which in turn created wounds that bled after being scratched. As a result, he caught the skin disease streptodermia. The lack of medical treatment left him suffering and he was only able to cure himself by taking medication borrowed from another detainee. The lack of medication caused him to constantly fear that he might fall ill with no possibility of being treated.", "15. On an unknown date in 1997 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office of the unlawful detention of his client ordered by the “MRT” authorities. In a letter dated 21 January 1998 the Office replied that the complaint had been accepted and that an action had been brought in the Supreme Court of Justice for the annulment of any “MRT” court sentence that might be imposed in respect of the applicant.", "16. On 14 November 2000, in reply to a complaint by the applicant’s lawyer, the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office informed him that it had initiated a criminal investigation into his client’s abduction. It noted that the investigation was aimed at establishing whether the applicant had indeed been abducted, and if so by whom and precisely from where.", "17. On 19 February 2001, the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicant’s lawyer that on 17 January 2001 a previously adopted decision to discontinue the investigation had been annulled; the documents relevant to the investigation of the complaint of kidnapping from Ukrainian territory had been sent to Ukrainian prosecutors.", "18. In reply to a complaint concerning his client lodged on an unknown date with the Russian President, on 25 September 2002 the applicant’s lawyer was informed that the complaint had been forwarded to the Moldovan Supreme Court of Justice." ]
[ "5", "3" ]
[ 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 ]
[]
[ "5. The first applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Vranje.", "6. On 19 January 2004 the Vladičin Han Municipal Court ordered a socially-owned company DP PK Delišes (hereinafter “the debtor company”), based in Vladičin Han, to pay the first applicant specified amounts on account of debt, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final on 15 March 2004.", "7. On 27 May 2004, upon the first applicant’s request to that effect, the Vladičin Han Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor company to pay the first applicant the enforcement costs.", "8. On 30 January 2014 the Leskovac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 1/14).", "9. As a result, the ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor company were stayed by the Municipal Court’s decision of 12 March 2014.", "10. The first applicant duly submitted his respective claim.", "11. The insolvency proceedings against the debtor company are still ongoing.", "12. On 23 January 2013 the first applicant lodged a constitutional appeal.", "13. On 28 May 2015 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the first applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. It further awarded him 500 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage. The Constitutional Court dismissed the first applicant’s complaint concerning his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions as well as his request for pecuniary damages, since the insolvency proceedings were still pending. That decision was delivered to the first applicant on 13 July 2015.", "14. The second applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Niš.", "15. He was employed by DOO EI-7 Oktobar, a socially-owned company based in Niš (hereinafter “the debtor company”).", "16. On 22 December 2005 the second applicant concluded the settlement with the debtor company before the Niš Municipal Court, by which the debtor company was obliged to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This settlement became final on an unspecified date.", "17. On 17 December 2010, upon the second applicant’s request to that effect, the Niš Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said settlement and further ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs.", "18. On 5 September 2008 the Niš Municipal Court ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This judgment became final by 23 December 2008.", "19. On 28 December 2010, upon the second applicant’s request to that effect, the Niš Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs.", "20. On 30 June 2007 and 15 October 2007 respectively, the Republic Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labour Disputes ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears and social insurance contributions. These decisions became final on unspecified dates.", "21. On 27 December 2010 and 28 December 2010 respectively, upon the second applicant’s request to that effect, the Niš Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said decisions and further ordered the debtor company to pay the second applicant the enforcement costs.", "22. On 23 May 2012 the Niš Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 115/12). As a result, the ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor company were stayed.", "23. The second applicant duly submitted his respective claims.", "24. On 24 December 2015 the second applicant’s claims were formally recognised.", "25. The insolvency proceedings against the debtor company are still ongoing.", "26. On 11 February 2013 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal.", "27. On 18 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal as lodged out of time. It found that the second applicant failed to lodge his appeal within thirty days as of the date when the decisions on the staying of the enforcement proceedings as a result of opening of the insolvency proceedings had been delivered to him. That decision was delivered to the second applicant after 16 July 2015.", "28. The third applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Kragujevac.", "29. He was employed by DP Industrija Filip Kljajić, a socially-owned company based in Kragujevac (hereinafter “the debtor company”).", "30. On 13 May 2002 the third applicant concluded the settlement with the debtor company before the Kragujevac Municipal Court, by which the debtor company was obliged to pay the third applicant specified amounts on account of salary arrears, plus the costs of the civil proceedings. This settlement became final on an unspecified date.", "31. On 27 August 2002, upon the third applicant’s request to that effect, the Kragujevac Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said settlement and further ordered the debtor company to pay the third applicant the enforcement costs.", "32. On 5 March 2010 the Kragujevac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 45/10).", "33. The third applicant duly submitted his respective claim.", "34. On 25 October 2010 the third applicant’s claim was formally recognised.", "35. On 2 August 2012 the third applicant was paid 13.12 % of his recognized claim.", "36. The insolvency proceedings against the debtor company are still ongoing.", "37. On 10 May 2013 the third applicant lodged a constitutional appeal.", "38. On 28 December 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed his appeal as lodged out of time. It found that the third applicant failed to lodge his appeal within thirty days as of the date when the decision on opening of the insolvency proceedings had been rendered or as of the date when he had submitted his claim in the insolvency proceedings. That decision was delivered to the third applicant on 29 January 2016." ]
[ "P1-1", "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Afidnes Attikis.", "6. On 2 November 2001 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against C.T. for breach of duty and extortion concerning acts he had allegedly committed as mayor of Kifissia Municipality. The applicant gave a statement under oath on the same day, repeating the allegations in his criminal complaint. He made a further statement under oath related to his criminal complaint on 21 December 2001.", "7. At the time the complaint was lodged C.T. was a member of the Greek Parliament. In accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution, the public prosecutor asked Parliament to lift C.T.’s immunity from prosecution for breach of duty, extortion and bribery. That request was rejected on 20 March 2002.", "8. On 5 August 2003 the applicant, relying on the Court’s judgments in Cordova v. Italy (no. 1) (no. 40877/98, ECHR 2003‑I) and Cordova v. Italy (no. 2) (no. 45649/99, ECHR 2003‑I (extracts)) resubmitted his criminal complaint, arguing that Parliament’s rejection of the request to lift C.T.’s immunity had violated his right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. On 21 October 2003 the criminal complaint was submitted to Parliament. On 2 February 2004 the President of Parliament rejected the request to lift C.T.’s immunity, relying on Article 83 § 8 of Parliament’s Regulation, according to which a request to lift a member’s immunity for a criminal complaint based on the same facts as a previous request was inadmissible.", "9. On 18 March 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that Parliament’s refusal to lift C.T.’s immunity had violated his right of access to a court. On 16 November 2006 the Court delivered a judgment concluding that the refusal by the President of Parliament to lift C.T.’s immunity for acts that had allegedly been committed prior to his election had violated the applicant’s right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (Tsalkitzis v. Greece, no. 11801/04, 16 November 2006). To date, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has not yet concluded the supervision of the execution of the judgment under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention.", "10. In the meantime, on 4 April 2004 the applicant appeared on a television show on the nationwide ALTER Channel and reiterated the allegations made in his criminal complaint.", "11. On 2 July 2004 C.T. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant for false accusation, perjury and slander. Following a preliminary examination, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant. On 15 November 2007 the applicant was convicted in absentia by a three‑member panel of the Athens Court of First Instance. He was sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment and deprivation of his political rights (decision no. 63131/07). C.T. joined the proceedings as a civil party. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision.", "12. Before the three-member panel of the Athens Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”), the applicant submitted that his trial for slander should have been suspended pursuant to Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code or, in any event, that it should have been adjourned in respect of all the charges, pursuant to Article 59 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At a hearing on 25 May 2009 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s application to suspend or adjourn the trial and proceeded to examine C.T.’s criminal complaint. In particular, it held the following:\n“... Following this, the party who had filed the criminal complaint, Vasileios Tsalkitzis, lodged application no. 11801/04 with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, complaining that Greece had not lifted C.T.’s parliamentary immunity and that criminal proceedings had not been initiated against him. That Court ... held that the refusal of the President of the Greek Parliament had violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ... Therefore, the following issues have been identified concerning: a) the relation of international conventions to current constitutional provisions; b) the act in question of the President of the Greek Parliament and whether it breaches constitutional provisions and the above-mentioned international convention; and c) the question of whether or not it is possible to suspend the current criminal case being tried following the criminal complaint dated 2.11.2001 by the defendant Vasileios Tsalkitzis against ... C.T ... The matter of the supremacy of the Constitution does not appear to be contradicted by the above-mentioned European Court of Human Rights judgment, which identifies the issue as the act of the President of Parliament of not putting the request to the Plenary of the Greek Parliament, which resulted, according to the judgment, in impeding the applicant’s and the case’s access to the competent criminal court ... It is noted that the President of Parliament’s act was based on Article 82 of Parliament’s Regulations...\nAccording to the foregoing, it is clear that the Greek Parliament has irrevocably dismissed the request of the public prosecutor of the Athens Court of First Instance, thus refusing to lift the immunity of the member of Parliament against whom the criminal complaint was lodged ... on the basis of a legitimate procedure foreseen by the above-mentioned constitutional provisions. Therefore, according to the legislation, there is absolutely no possibility of reconsidering the issue and, eventually, of instituting a criminal prosecution. During the ... Plenary meetings of the Greek Parliament, the issue of the well-foundedness of the accusation was examined as a whole, as were all aspects of the case, securing the work of the deputy and at the same time protecting him from malicious acts. In addition, and this is important, the whole case file which had been created following the preliminary examination was taken into account, as was the opinion of the competent public prosecutor who, following a review of the case, considered that there was no reason to initiate criminal proceedings against C.T. for the offences of which he had been accused ...”", "13. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal proceeded to examine witnesses. The trial record shows that the applicant left the building following a short break after the examination of the first three witnesses for the prosecution. His lawyer then contacted him to find out his whereabouts and informed the court that he was not feeling well and had thus left the building. The hearing continued in the presence of his lawyer. In total, five prosecution witnesses were heard, including C.T., who joined the proceedings as a civil party, and one defence witness. It does not transpire from the information provided that the applicant or his representative requested the examination of any other defence witness and that such a request was refused. In view of the applicant’s absence, the Court of Appeal asked his representative to express the applicant’s views on the accusations. The applicant’s representative stated that his client denied all the charges and insisted on the truthfulness of his allegations against C.T.", "14. The Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance verdict, including the sentence of twenty months’ imprisonment and the deprivation of political rights (decision no. 4512/2009).", "15. On 9 November 2009 the applicant appealed on points of law. He stated, inter alia, that the proceedings should have been suspended or adjourned pursuant to Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 59 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 5 May 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law (decision no. 912/2010). In particular, it held the following:\n“... It is clear from this new provision (Article 59 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) ... that in order to adjourn a trial owing to an interlocutory criminal issue (ποινικό προδικαστικό ζήτημα) concerning Articles 224, 229, 362, 363 of the Criminal Code, a criminal prosecution must have been instituted for an act attested to on oath or for which a legal complaint has been submitted or one which a defendant has alleged or disseminated information about. As regards Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code ... the suspension of criminal proceedings is obligatory, but also requires a prior criminal prosecution for the act that a defendant has alleged or disseminated information about ... In the present case ... the court dismissed the above requests, providing full and correct reasoning, in particular because the immunity of the person against whom the criminal complaint had been lodged, who is now a civil party and member of Parliament, had not been lifted. Hence, a criminal prosecution had not been instituted, which is a prerequisite for the suspension and adjournment of criminal proceedings against a defendant who requests them. It can be concluded from the above-mentioned considerations that the court correctly interpreted and implemented the above-mentioned provisions, and did not violate them, when it proceeded to examine the allegations of false accusation, perjury and slander against the defendant-appellant on points of law and dismissed the defendant’s request on the grounds that a criminal prosecution had not been instituted against the current civil party, former mayor and now member of Parliament, without suspending and adjourning the proceedings until the end of the previously instituted proceedings against him ...”", "16. The decision was finalised on 4 June 2010 (καθαρογραφή) and the applicant was able to receive a copy on 7 June 2010. The applicant was imprisoned from 13 May 2010 to 21 May 2010 as he was not able to pay the fine to which his sentence had been commuted. On 21 May 2010 his sentence was commuted to community service and he was released. Finally, on 31 May 2010 the applicant paid 5,799.94 euros in lieu of serving his sentence." ]
[ "46", "6" ]
[ 7, 10 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Sofia, Bulgaria, where he apparently moved from France in November 2013.", "6. At 12.40 a.m. on 24 January 2014 he was arrested in Sofia while breaking into cars with a view to stealing items from them. He was taken to the First District Police Station and placed under police detention. According to the applicant, he was not put in a cell, but handcuffed to a bench in the station’s corridor.", "7. According to the applicant, throughout the whole time that he spent in the police station he was not given any food or drink, allowed to go to the toilet, or allowed to use a telephone. He was visited by an ex officio lawyer appointed for him by the authorities. However, the lawyer spoke no French and very little English – a language that the applicant is apparently familiar with – and did not explain to him anything about the procedure in his case.", "8. In the late afternoon or the evening of 24 January 2014 the applicant was taken to a hospital for a medical examination, and then, at about 10 p.m. the same day, taken to a pre-trial detention facility in Sofia.", "9. It appears that the next day, or one of the following days, the applicant was brought before the Sofia District Court with a view to a decision on whether he should be remanded in detention, and that it was decided that he should remain in custody pending trial. A subsequent request for release apparently made by his counsel in the end of February 2014 was rejected as well.", "10. According to the applicant, upon his arrival in the pre-trial detention facility on the evening of 24 January 2014 (see paragraph 8 above), he was given a dirty mattress, pillow and blanket, but no bedlinen. Since he had arrived in the facility after suppertime, he could not eat or drink anything until lunchtime the following day, 25 January 2014.", "11. According to the applicant, the cell in which he had been placed had been dirty, cold, poorly ventilated, infested with cockroaches, overcrowded, and with a toilet which was not properly separated from the rest of the cell.", "12. According to the applicant, he was not able to maintain his personal hygiene, as he was not provided with toilet paper or other toiletries, and had had no money to purchase them. As a result, it had been impossible for him to go to the shower for two weeks. On the third day of his stay in the facility, he had seen spots erupt on his skin and had asked to be examined by a medical doctor. The doctor had come to see him three days later, and had only examined him from a distance, without entering the cell. On an unspecified date in March 2014, the applicant was given a blood test which revealed that he had a staphylococcus infection. He was given antibiotics for it but was not taken to a hospital.", "13. According to the applicant, food had also been so poor and served so unhygienically that he had lost twenty-three kilogrammes during his stay in the detention facility. The space for out-of-cell exercise had also been so small that on many occasions he had chosen not to take his daily exercise.", "14. In the detention facility, there was a cardphone which inmates could use to call outside numbers. It was located in the space where they could take their daily one-hour out-of-cell exercise. Since it had to be shared among them, each inmate had about six minutes to use it. As the applicant had had no money on him when arrested, he could not however purchase a phonecard. With the help of a co-detainee who spoke some English, about two weeks after his arrival in the facility he managed to obtain one minute of call time free of charge, and on 5 February 2014 contacted the consulate of France in Sofia. The consulate immediately informed the applicant’s Bulgarian girlfriend, a Bulgarian friend of his and his parents, who resided in France, that he had been arrested and detained, and the consul came to visit him. The same day the applicant’s mother, who lived in France, wired money to the consul so that she could purchase food and clothes for the applicant. The consulate also arranged for a lawyer to represent the applicant in the criminal case against him.", "15. With the money that he received via the consulate, the applicant was able to purchase a phonecard. According to him, he had made many requests to that effect in the days after 5 February 2017, which the Government had not provided. The Government insisted that they had made available to the Court all documents in the applicant’s detention file. They submitted a declaration by him dated 24 February 2014 whereby he had asked the detention facility’s head to issue him a phonecard preloaded with 20 Bulgarian levs of credit and, as required under the relevant regulations (see paragraph 30 below), had submitted for approval a list of the persons – his Bulgarian girlfriend, a Bulgarian friend, his lawyer, and his mother and father in France – whom he wished to call. The same day the facility’s head approved the list. The applicant was apparently able to call his mother in France for the first time two days later, on 26 February 2014.", "16. According to the applicant, the relevant order (see paragraph 31 below) had provided that detainees could purchase phonecards or recharge them twice a month. The Government did not comment on that point or submit a copy of the order. According to the official form used by the applicant to make his above-mentioned declaration, phonecards could be recharged once a month. The applicant alleged that the facility’s staff had often not complied with the recharging schedule and that on one occasion he had been unable to recharge his phonecard for five weeks. He did not provide further details in that respect, but from the documents submitted by him it appears that between 24 March and 14 April 2014, a period of three weeks, he had not spoken on the telephone to his mother in France.", "17. Detainees in the facility could get two visits a month, each lasting up to twenty minutes. According to the Government, the applicant had received such visits on 5, 8 and 9 February and 23 March 2014. However, on one occasion on 22 March 2014 the applicant’s Bulgarian girlfriend, who had come to visit him, was turned away with the explanation that the same day he had been moved to a different wing, detainees in which could be visited on another date according to the schedule of visits. She was apparently able to visit him the next day. It appears that a Bulgarian friend of the applicant who had also come to visit him on 22 March 2014 was likewise turned away.", "18. According to the Government, during his stay in the detention facility the applicant had been visited by his lawyer on twelve occasions in February and March 2014, and by consular staff on two occasions. He had also received parcels with food and other items on twenty-one occasions.", "19. Throughout his stay in the detention facility, the applicant was able to correspond with his parents in France with letters passed via his lawyer or the staff of the consulate of France in Sofia.", "20. On 17 April 2014 the applicant and the prosecution entered into an agreement whereby he pleaded guilty and accepted to serve a sentence of three months’ imprisonment. The same day the Sofia District Court approved the agreement, and the next day, 18 April 2014, the applicant was moved to Sofia Prison. Since his pre-trial detention was taken into account in calculating the amount of time that he had to serve under his sentence of imprisonment, he spent there only six days, until 24 April 2014, when he was released. According to the applicant, conditions in Sofia Prison were nearly identical to, or even worse than, those in the detention facility.", "21. The applicant’s parents came from France to Bulgaria to see him on 25 April 2014, the day after his release. It appears that they could not do so earlier because it was not possible for his mother to take leave from work." ]
[ "3", "8" ]
[ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1981 and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in Nysa Prison.", "6. On 28 May 2001 the Kielce Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. The sentence was amended by the Cracow Court of Appeal on 5 December 2001. The applicant has been serving this sentence since 3 September 2000, with interruptions between 13 January 2003 and 13 January 2005; 31 May 2005 and 17 August 2005; and 13 May 2008 and 30 May 2014.", "7. In August 2005 the applicant was charged with murdering an Italian citizen, a certain P.A on 9 August 2005. Allegedly, he had repeatedly hit P.A. on the head, causing brain haemorrhages, swelling of the brain, and consequently P.A.’s death. He was also charged with one count of robbery committed on 8 August 2005 and possession of 0.2327gr of MDMA (commonly known as extasy) on 17 August 2005.", "8. On 20 March 2006, after examining the applicant and analysing his medical file from 2000, psychiatrists concluded that he should undergo a psychiatric assessment, in order to determine whether he could be held criminally responsible for this offence.", "9. On 27 March 2006 the Katowice Regional Court ordered that the applicant should undergo a psychiatric assessment in a psychiatric facility. The applicant underwent this assessment in the psychiatric ward of Cracow Detention Centre between 12 April and 30 June 2006. In an opinion dated 18 July 2006 (“the 2006 opinion”), two psychiatrists and a psychologist confirmed that he had been suffering from a chronic psychotic disorder of a delusional type related to organic lesions in his central nervous system, and also from a personality disorder (przewlekłe psychotyczne zaburzenia psychiczne o obrazie zespołu urojeniowego u osoby ze zmianami organicznymi o.u.n.; zaburzenia rozwoju osobowości), at the time the offences had been committed, and that he would not have been aware of and could not have controlled his actions. They further recommended that he be placed in a psychiatric hospital, as there was a risk that he could commit similar offences again. In an additional opinion of 12 January 2007 they confirmed their previous findings.", "10. On 2 April 2007 the Katowice Regional Court decided to discontinue the proceedings against the applicant, on the basis that he could not be held criminally responsible. It further ordered that he be placed in a psychiatric hospital.", "11. On 25 May 2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case.", "12. The Katowice Regional Court examined the case at two hearings on 5 and 25 September 2007. On the former date the court heard evidence from the experts who had prepared the opinions. They confirmed their previous findings. T., an expert who spoke on behalf of the team, stated in particular that the experts had excluded the possibility that the applicant was simulating a mental illness. In support of this statement, he noted that the applicant had been medicated and subjected to a psychological personality test, the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory). The results of the test had confirmed that he could not be feigning the symptoms of a mental illness, as a healthy person would have had a very different reaction to those specific medications. The applicant’s lawyer supported the prosecutor’s application for the proceedings to be discontinued.", "13. On 25 September 2007 the Katowice Regional Court discontinued the proceedings against the applicant. On the basis of available evidence, the court established that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. However, as he had been suffering from a mental disorder at the time, he could not be held criminally responsible. The court referred to the experts’ opinions and the evidence which they had given during the trial. It also noted that the applicant had undergone psychiatric treatment since 2000.", "14. The applicant did not appeal against that decision, and it became final on 10 October 2007.", "15. On 14 March 2012 the Katowice Court of Appeal refused an application by the applicant to reopen the proceedings in the case. The court admitted that, in view of new evidence (see paragraphs 44 and 46 below), it appeared that the applicant had not murdered P.A., and that he had only participated in the robbery. However, even if the proceedings were reopened, they would have to be discontinued in any event, in view of the applicant’s insanity.", "16. On 12 December 2007 the Psychiatric Commission on Security Measures (Komisja Psychiatryczna ds. środków zabezpieczająych – “the Commission”) recommended that the applicant be placed in Branice Hospital. The applicant could not be transferred there immediately, as he was serving a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment imposed in the first set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 6 above). The Katowice Regional Court asked the penitentiary division of the court to change the order in which the sentences would be served, and to apply the security measure first. On 25 April 2008 the court decided that the applicant should first be placed in a psychiatric facility.", "17. The applicant was admitted to Branice Hospital on 13 May 2008.", "18. A hospital psychologist, in opinions of 23 June and 15 December 2008, 20 May and 5 November 2009, confirmed that the applicant should continue treatment in hospital. In her opinion of 20 April 2010 the expert noted that the applicant could be moved to a less secure hospital.", "19. Psychiatrists from Branice Hospital, in opinions of 14 June and 9 December 2008, 19 May and 9 November 2009 and 20 April 2010, also confirmed that the applicant should continue treatment in a psychiatric hospital. In particular, in the opinion of 9 November 2009 the doctors concluded that the applicant was suffering from a delusional disorder related to organic lesions in his central nervous system (zaburzenia omamowo-urojeniowe na podłożu organicznego uszkodzenia o.u.n.). There had been an improvement in his condition following the treatment, however there had been no complete recovery. Accordingly, the applicant’s detention was extended by the Katowice Regional Court on 21 July 2008, 19 January, 22 June and 7 December 2009. Neither the applicant nor his representative appealed against those decisions.", "20. On 4 May 2010 the applicant was transferred to Lubliniec Hospital, a less secure institution.", "21. On 29 October 2010 experts from Lubliniec Hospital gave an opinion following a periodic review of the applicant’s condition. They noted that the applicant should continue treatment in a more secure facility. Consequently, on 15 November 2010 the Katowice Regional Court again extended the applicant’s detention.", "22. In a joint opinion of 26 August 2011, Lubliniec Hospital psychiatrists confirmed that the applicant should continue treatment in a secure facility, as he still posed a serious threat to public order.", "23. Between 28 March and 22 May 2012 the applicant underwent a psychiatric assessment in Pruszków Hospital, pursuant to an order made in the course of the third set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 45 below). The relevant experts were asked to assess his mental state when he had allegedly committed other robberies between June and August 2005 (see paragraph 44 below).", "24. On 17 June 2012 two psychiatrists and a psychologist gave a joint opinion (“the Pruszków opinion”), which disagreed with the 2006 opinion (see paragraph 9 above). They concluded that the applicant had not been suffering from any mental illness at the time when the offences had been committed (tempore criminis). In their view, the applicant did not have any organic lesions in his central nervous system. Nor did he have a learning difficulty. They agreed that he had a dissocial personality disorder. They noted that, from an early age, the applicant had disregarded the rights and feelings of others, as well as social norms. He also failed to learn from his actions and repeated dysfunctional behaviour. However, they were of the opinion that his condition had significantly improved in recent years. While the risk that he would commit a similar offence was not very high, it could not be excluded that, in difficult situations, he might suffer from reactive disorders. It was therefore recommended that any prison sentence served by the applicant should be served in therapeutic conditions. The opinion was submitted to the Katowice Regional Court on 11 September 2012.", "25. Meanwhile, on 20 July 2012 psychiatrists from Lubliniec Hospital, in an opinion following a periodic review of the applicant’s condition (“the Lubliniec opinion”), had noted that the applicant had been diagnosed with delusional disorders related to organic lesions in his central nervous system. During his stay in Lubliniec Hospital, no acute psychotic symptoms had been observed. However, in view of the initial diagnosis and his lifestyle, it was felt that the applicant should continue treatment at a psychiatric hospital, as there was still a risk that he might commit criminal offences of significant harm to the community.", "26. At hearings held on 28 August and 24 September 2012 the Katowice Regional Court examined the applicant’s application for release of 24 July 2012. The court heard evidence from Lubliniec experts who had given the opinion of 20 July 2012 (see paragraph 25 above). One of the experts clarified that, in assessing the possible risk of the applicant committing criminal offences, she had relied on the initial diagnosis and his lifestyle (his multiple convictions and the fact that he was young and single with no children). She further agreed with the Pruszków experts’ opinion (see paragraph 24 above) that the applicant suffered from a personality disorder. His personality disorder was characterised by a tendency to manipulate and dominate others, and he was self-centred. These elements constituted a risk that the applicant might commit a criminal offence. The expert was not able to answer the court’s question as to whether the applicant could have simulated a mental illness.", "27. On 24 September 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s application to be released from hospital. With reference to the discrepancies between the two expert opinions, the court held that the Pruszków opinion concerned the applicant’s capacity tempore criminis, while the Lubliniec opinion related to his general progress in treatment and his future prognosis. Moreover, the Pruszków opinion had been given with reference to different offences. The court also noted that both sets of experts agreed that the applicant had suffered from a dissocial personality disorder. In view of the above, the court decided to base its conclusion on the Lubliniec opinion and refused to release the applicant from detention. It also held that he should continue treatment in a less secure institution. The applicant did not appeal against that decision.", "28. On 28 November 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed a further application by the applicant to be released from detention. It noted that his situation had not changed since the last decision had been given. It further decided to place him in a facility with enhanced security. It referred to a letter in which he had informed the authorities that he had been considering an escape from the psychiatric facility. That decision was upheld by the Katowice Court of Appeal on 22 January 2013.", "29. On 31 January 2013 the applicant attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on his medication.", "30. On 13 February 2013, the applicant was transferred to Cracow Psychiatric Hospital (a hospital with enhanced security).", "31. On 19 May 2013 the applicant sent a letter to the Katowice Regional Court, claiming that he had been simulating mental illness. He submitted that he owned a medical book on psychiatry and had also seen the film “A Beautiful Mind”, which had helped him to act out the symptoms of mental illness. He also informed the director of Lubliniec Hospital that he had been pretending to have a mental illness. However, she told him that many patients made the same claim.", "32. Meanwhile, on 19 March 2013, in the context of periodic review proceedings, the Katowice Regional Court had decided to continue the applicant’s detention in a psychiatric facility. The court relied on an expert opinion of 15 March 2013, in which experts from Cracow Psychiatric Hospital had confirmed that the applicant suffered from a dissocial personality and had suffered from a psychotic disorder in the past. They had stressed that there was a risk that the applicant would commit a similar offence of significant harm to the community as a result of his psychiatric condition. In particular, the experts had referred to the fact that the applicant was not critical of the offences he had committed or his medical condition. That decision was upheld by the Katowice Court of Appeal on 16 April 2013.", "33. On 27 August 2013, pursuant to Article 203 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 55 below), psychiatrists from Cracow Psychiatric Hospital submitted an opinion concerning the applicant following a periodic review. They confirmed that he had not been suffering from a mental illness, but had a severe dissocial personality disorder. They also noted that the applicant claimed to have suffered from a brief psychotic disorder in the past. They were convinced that, between June and August 2005, the applicant had been able to recognise the significance of his actions and control his behaviour. However, the experts considered that it was still likely that he would commit similar offences of significant harm to the community again as a result of his psychiatric condition. This risk was not related to a mental illness, but to a severe personality disorder. The applicant was still in need of complex therapy for personality disorders. They experts left the decision as to whether security measures should be continued to the court’s discretion.", "34. On 12 September 2013 the experts supplemented their opinion with regard to further questions put by the court. They confirmed that, at the time when the offences had been committed, the applicant had not been suffering from any delusional disorders which could have resulted in a conclusion that he had acted in a state of insanity. They also considered that it was highly likely that he would commit similar offences again. This risk was related to the applicant’s lifestyle, his multiple convictions and his inability to learn social skills, but not to a mental illness. They stated that they could not recommend the applicant’s release. Even if he had not been insane at the time when the offences had been committed, there was still a risk that he would commit further offences in view of his dissocial personality disorder. They further concluded that it was not a medical but a legal issue as to whether the applicant’s detention should be lifted.", "35. Subsequently, on an unknown date the applicant lodged an application for release. It was examined by the Katowice Regional Court at two hearings: on 17 October and 8 November 2013. The applicant’s representative and psychiatrists were present. The court heard evidence from experts from Cracow Psychiatric Hospital. They disagreed with the 2006 opinion and confirmed that the applicant was suffering from a dissocial personality disorder. The experts stated before the court that they had not recommended the applicant’s release, as they were aware that they could have been wrong in their assessment. The experts were also not in a position to give a clear answer to the question of whether the applicant could have simulated a mental illness. They submitted a supplementary opinion in which they noted that on 18 October 2013 the applicant had attempted to commit suicide (see paragraph 39 below). In their opinion, in view of the applicant’s fragile state, it was necessary to place him in a hospital with enhanced security.", "36. On 8 November 2013 the court refused to release the applicant from detention. The court thoroughly examined diverging psychiatric opinions, in particular the 2006 opinion (see paragraph 9 above) and the opinions of 27 August and 12 September 2013 (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). Relying on the testimonies obtained from experts, it concluded that there were no grounds to doubt the correctness of the 2006 opinion, especially after such a long lapse of time. The court also examined the question of whether the applicant could have simulated a psychotic disorder, and noted the experts’ diverging views in this respect. It referred to T.’s expert testimony on 5 September 2007 (see paragraph 12 above) and to the testimony given by the Cracow experts on 17 October 2013 (see paragraph 35 above). It also held that the applicant had been detained in several hospitals, and none of the experts who had examined him there had challenged the initial diagnosis. Lastly, it referred to the applicant’s recent suicide attempt. In conclusion, the court held that there was still a risk that the applicant might commit an offence of significant social harm.", "37. On 22 November 2013 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against that decision. He referred to the divergent expert opinions. He also stressed that the applicant had recently been indicted for offences committed in 2005, and that his sanity was not being questioned in those proceedings (see paragraph 45 below). On 25 November 2013 the applicant lodged his own appeal, submitting in particular that he had been simulating a mental illness.", "38. The Katowice Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s appeal at two hearings: on 21 January and 11 March 2014. On the latter date, relying on the evidence gathered by the Regional Court, it upheld the decision of 8 November 2013 (see paragraph 36 above). The court referred to the reasons given by the Regional Court and considered that it was still likely that the applicant would commit similar offences again.", "39. Meanwhile, on 18 October 2013, the applicant had attempted to commit suicide by injecting himself with a significant dose of insulin. He was transferred to the toxicology ward of Cracow University Hospital, where he was treated for two days.", "40. On 20 January 2014 the applicant was transferred to Toszek Psychiatric Hospital.", "41. On 30 April 2014, pursuant to Article 203 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 55 below), psychiatrists from Toszek Hospital submitted an opinion concerning the applicant following a periodic review. They confirmed that he only had a dissocial personality disorder and it was unlikely that he would commit similar offences of significant harm to the community again as a result of his psychiatric condition. They further recommended his release from the psychiatric facility.", "42. On 15 May 2014 the Katowice Regional Court appointed a new defence lawyer for the applicant, to replace the one who had resigned, and set a hearing date for 28 May 2014. On the latter date it heard evidence from the experts from the Toszek Hospital. The experts confirmed the findings they had made in the opinion of 30 April 2014.", "43. On 30 May 2014 the Katowice Regional Court gave a decision and ordered the applicant’s release from the psychiatric facility. The applicant was released on that date and transferred to Wojkowice Prison in order to serve the remainder of the sentence of imprisonment which had been imposed following the first set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraph 6 above).", "44. On 8 December 2010 the Katowice District Prosecutor charged the applicant with several counts of robbery (carjacking) committed between June and August 2005 (on 23 June, 27 June, 4 July, 5 July and 17 August 2005). Allegedly, the applicant, together with a certain A.I. and one other person, had stolen five cars by using force and intimidating the cars’ drivers (by hitting, kicking and using tear gas). During his questioning, the applicant informed the prosecutor that A.I. had been involved in P.A.’s killing.", "45. On 30 January 2012 the Katowice Regional Court ordered the applicant to undergo a psychiatric medical examination at Pruszków Hospital in order to assess his mental state at the time when the alleged offences had been committed. As indicated in paragraph 24 above, the medical opinion given by experts from Pruszków Hospital on 17 June 2012 stated that the applicant had had full mental capacity in 2005.", "46. On 25 October 2013 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Katowice Regional Court. A.I. was charged with murdering P.A., and the applicant and a certain T.K. were only charged with theft and several counts of robbery committed in 2005. The trial before the Katowice Regional Court began in 2014.", "47. During a hearing on 14 January 2015 the court heard evidence from the Cracow Hospital experts who had prepared the opinion of 27 August 2013. As indicated in paragraph 33 above, they confirmed that the applicant had not been suffering from a mental illness, but had a personality disorder. They were also convinced that, between June and August 2005, the applicant had been able to recognise the significance of his actions and control his behaviour. The experts disagreed with the opinion of 2006 (see paragraph 9 above).", "48. On 22 April 2015 the court heard evidence from psychiatrists from Pruszków Hospital who had prepared the opinion of 17 June 2012 (see paragraph 24 above). They confirmed that, in their opinion, the applicant had not been suffering from a mental illness. They further agreed that it was very likely that the applicant had pretended to have symptoms of a mental illness.", "49. On 22 May 2015 the court heard evidence from the psychologist who, together with two psychiatrists, had prepared the opinion of 18 July 2006 (see paragraph 9 above). He stated that the applicant could have simulated a brief psychotic disorder (zaburzenia psychotyczne) during the psychological tests.", "50. On 20 July 2015 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. The court established that the applicant, together with A.I. and a certain T.K. had participated in the assault on P.A.. The criminal proceedings against the applicant were subsequently discontinued due to his insanity. The court further thoroughly examined the applicant’s mental capacity and found that the applicant had had full mental capacity in the relevant period. It convicted A.I. of P.A.’s murder, T.K. of robbery and assault on P.A. and the applicant of several counts of robbery committed on 23 June, 27 June, 4 July, 5 July and 17 August 2005. It also sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for seven years.", "51. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that judgment." ]
[ "5" ]
[ 21, 23, 30, 31, 32, 33 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Split.", "6. On 19 May 2011 the applicant and several other individuals (see, for further information, Šoš v. Croatia, no. 26211/13, § 17, 1 December 2015) were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and detained under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges).", "7. During the investigation, an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) several times extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the case of Šoš (cited above, §§ 20 and 23).", "8. On 18 August 2011 the investigating judge extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). He found that all the relevant witnesses had been questioned and that there was no further possibility of remanding the suspects in detention on the grounds of the risk of collusion. As to the other grounds relied upon for the pre-trial detention, the investigating judge reiterated his previous findings.", "9. The investigating judge relied on the same reasons extending the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects in the further course of the investigation. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 28, 31, 36 and 41).", "10. On 16 May 2012 the applicant and nine other individuals were indicted on charges of drug trafficking in the Split County Court.", "11. Following the submission of the indictment, on 18 May 2012 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused relying on Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). His pre-trial detention was extended several times on the same grounds. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 44, 47 and 52).", "12. On 20 February 2013 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), acting as a court of appeal, found that the applicant’s detention should be extended only under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending). It explained that the 2013 amendments to the Criminal Code provided that the offence at issue was punishable by a prison sentence of between three and fifteen years and no longer by long-term imprisonment. It was therefore not possible to remand the applicant on the grounds of the seriousness of the charges since the possibility of imposing a sentence of long-term imprisonment was one of the conditions for extending pre-trial detention under Article 123 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (seriousness of charges).", "13. On 20 April 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), without changing its previous reasoning.", "14. On 17 May 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the maximum two-year statutory time-limit for the applicant’s pre-trial detention under Article 133 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a further six months (until 19 November 2013) relying on section 35(2) of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime Act (hereinafter “the OSCOCA”).", "15. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that section 35(2) of the OSCOCA was inapplicable to his case since he was not detained during the investigation.", "16. On 7 June 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that the said provision of the OSCOCA made a mistaken reference to Article 130 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It also considered that the cited provision was incomprehensible since, if understood as provided in that Act, it merely repeated paragraph 1 of section 35 of the OSCOCA, which would be obsolete. Instead it should be interpreted in line with the previous abrogated version of the OSCOCA, which in its section 28(3) had provided for a possibility of extension of the overall maximum period of detention for a further six months, which was in the applicant’s case until 19 November 2013.", "17. On 18 June 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) reiterating his previous arguments.", "18. On 11 July 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court.", "19. The applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended, under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), until the maximum period expired on 19 November 2013, when he was released." ]
[ "5" ]
[ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 ]
[ 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14 ]
[ "5. The applicant company was ordered to pay EUR 10,000 in damages to a person referred to as a presumed member of the mafia on one page of a book published by it. The domestic court considered that the applicant company, which had based the impugned passage of the book on, inter alia, an internal report of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (Bundeskriminalamt), had not complied with its duty to carry out thorough research and had seriously interfered with the personality rights of the person referred to.", "6. The applicant company is a prominent German book-publishing house with its registered office in Munich. In 2015 it was ranked among the ten publishing firms generating the highest turnover in the German publishing sector.", "7. In September 2008 the applicant company published a book entitled “Mafia” written by Petra Reski, an author internationally renowned for her anti-Mafia publications. The book was reprinted in several editions and also published in Italy. It deals, in its 352 pages, with the Mafia’s ties to Germany, its inner structures and its various branches. The book also recounts an event which took place in 2007 in Duisburg where six people of Italian nationality were killed by fifty-six bullets in front of the Italian restaurant “Da Bruno”. The killings were supposed to be the culmination of a vendetta between two ‘Ndrangheta families which had started in 1991 in Italy. The incident received national and international media attention.", "8. On pages 157 and 158 the book referred, by his full name, to a person called S.P., an Italian national residing in Germany. The relevant part reads as follows (translated, names abbreviated and emphasises added by the Court):\n“... The public prosecutor’s office of Stuttgart investigated the Calabrian [L] for drug dealing and money laundering – he is said to have contributed to financing the electoral campaign of [O] with his funds. This was not to remain the sole link existing between a presumed member of the ʽNdrangheta and a German politician: in the city of Erfurt, the Calabrian [S.P.], who had been mentioned already in 2000 in a report prepared by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation, gained notoriety. [S.P.] runs the restaurant ‘[Pa]’ in Erfurt: a restaurant seating 400 guests, not a bad rise for someone like [S.P.], who, according to statements of the investigators, had started out as a pizza baker in the pizza restaurant ‘Da Bruno’. After all, having contacts can be very helpful, even if, following the massacre of Duisburg, the pizza restaurant ‘Da Bruno’ no longer serves as that great a reference. In any case, [S.P.] continued to maintain his network of relationships in Erfurt by generously sponsoring the local golf club. When the police performed a search of the restaurant ‘[Pa]’ because of [S.P.]’s alleged involvement in a murder, it ran into the then Prime Minister of Thuringia, [B.V.], and his Secretary of the Interior, [R.D.] – both of whom had been dining there purely as a matter of chance, as [S.P.] asserted. He, by the way, had excellent relations with the police: when a further search was performed, the police found an identity card in his premises, which had been issued to him in his purported capacity as interpreter for the Uzbek delegation at an Interpol conference in Rome. The identity card, it was stated, had been issued by the Secretary of the Interior of the Saarland. ...”", "9. As regards S.P.’s presumed membership of the ‘Ndrangheta, the applicant company relied on, inter alia, reports by the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation of 2000 and 2008. Neither report had been made public.", "10. The relevant passage in the report of 2000 reads:\n“If one takes account of the enormous reputation that [S.P.] has and the esteem in which he is held by the Italian community, one forms the opinion that [S.P.] is a de‑facto fully-fledged member of the ‘Ndrangheta clan.”", "11. The relevant parts of the report of 2008 read:\n“According to Italian colleagues from Calabria and Bianco, this connection could have contributed to [S.P.] becoming a member of the Romeo alias ‘Staccu’ clan. Owing to the prestigious reputation [S.P.] enjoys in the ‘Italian milieu’, he has to be a full member of the ‘Ndrangheta.\n...\nDirect relatives of the clan live in Germany and run pizza restaurants. Their main bases are in the cities of Duisburg, Erfurt, and Leipzig. These bases are led by [A.M.], [D.G.] and [S.P.], with [D.G.] taking the role of the so-called ‘capo locale’.\n...\n[D.G.] and [S.P.] could be in charge of investing the proceeds of drug trafficking. This theory is corroborated by the high number of good restaurants and statements from various sources that [S.P.] is said to have invested in several restaurants and acquired real estate in Dresden and the surrounding areas.”", "12. In 1997 S.P. had already been mentioned by name in the context of organised crime. He had been interviewed in a television report regarding the ‘Ndrangheta in Thuringia and had denied any membership of or connection to the ‘Ndrangheta.", "13. After publication of the book, S.P. applied to a court for an injunction against the dissemination of the passages highlighted in the above excerpt of the book (see paragraph 8 above). On 13 November 2008, the Munich Regional Court issued the injunction and confirmed it on 15 December 2008 after hearing both parties. It held that even though there was a public interest in reporting about organised crime, the author had acted in breach of her journalistic duties. The internal reports of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation constituted an insufficient source for the allegations made in the book, since the reports were not intended for publication. The investigating authorities themselves had not come to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence of an offence having been committed by the plaintiff. Moreover, the Regional Court stated, a report on a suspicion also had to include the circumstances exonerating the party affected. Accordingly, the book should have stated that the investigating authorities had not obtained any indications which would have served as a basis for filing an indictment, much less a sentence, and that in fact the investigations pursued against the plaintiff had not resulted in any such bringing of charges or in any sentencing. In addition, the court held, the publication had not made it clear that the pizza restaurant “Da Bruno”, in which the murders had been perpetrated, was not identical to the pizza restaurant of the same name in which the plaintiff had worked as a pizza baker many years prior to those deeds. Lastly, the court continued, the book had been published unlawfully because the plaintiff had not been given any opportunity to make a statement regarding the suspicion prior to publication.", "14. On 7 April 2009 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s appeal against the Regional Court’s judgment of 15 December 2008. It held that the book expressed a serious allegation that the plaintiff was a member of a criminal organisation and therefore seriously interfered with his personality rights. The section of the book dealing with the plaintiff did not allow an average reader to infer that the plaintiff’s membership of the criminal organisation ‘Ndrangheta could only be assumed vaguely. Rather, the court continued, the interplay of the many individual statements in the book created the impression that there was a very strong suspicion that the plaintiff was a member of the ‘Ndrangheta. The evidentiary facts researched by the author and published by the applicant company did not constitute sufficient proof of the exceptionally grave suspicion raised in the book. The court established that even the internal report by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation only mentioned a number of vague suspicious circumstances, for the most part without providing any details or naming any specific sources. For example, it said that because of the high respect in which the plaintiff was held in the “Italian milieu”, he must be a fully fledged member of the ‘Ndrangheta. The internal reports only showed that owing to certain information compiled in them, some of which had not been corroborated by evidence, assumptions had been made as to the existence of certain connections. This did not seem to be a sufficient basis for publicly branding the plaintiff as a presumed ʽNdranghetista. Moreover, the court continued, certain statements in the book were incorrect, such as the region in which the plaintiff had been born. Other statements were fragmentary, as the investigation during which the plaintiff’s restaurant was searched by the police had been discontinued. In that regard, the court held that the book had failed to report exonerating circumstances. Even though authors did not have to await the outcome of an investigation before reporting on a corresponding suspicion, if the reporting on a suspicion was reliant on investigations that had been carried out six or seven years previously, the author could not ignore the fact that the investigation proceedings had come to an end without any charges having been brought.", "15. In the main proceedings, in addition to his request that the injunction be upheld, S.P. applied for damages in the amount of EUR 20,000.", "16. On 22 June 2011, the Munich Regional Court upheld the injunction, but dismissed the plaintiff’s application for damages. The Regional Court reiterated the reasoning it had given in the judgment of 15 December 2008 and that given by the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 7 April 2009 (see paragraphs 13-14 above). The court further reiterated that the author had not sufficiently researched the basis for the allegation that S.P. was a member of the ʽNdrangheta, since all the sources only indicated vague suspicious circumstances pointing at S.P. Secondly, the author had not complied with the “absolute requirement” of presenting exonerating circumstances. Lastly, the court held that the publication was unlawful as the author had not given the plaintiff the possibility to comment on the allegation prior to publication.", "17. The Regional Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for damages as being ill-founded. It held that even though the applicant company had breached the permissible boundaries of reporting on suspicions as well as its journalistic diligence, it had not done so in a serious manner. Accordingly, it sufficed to stop the dissemination of the impugned statements but did not require a payment of damages.", "18. During the proceedings before the Regional Court the applicant company offered to furnish certain evidence supporting the suspicion published in the book. In particular, it offered to provide the names of witnesses who could allegedly confirm the statements made in the internal report of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation and the suspicion published in the book. The Regional Court refused to hear the witnesses as it found that they would be unable to give evidence regarding the alleged membership and that the applicant company had failed to identify the specific issues on which the witnesses could testify.", "19. The applicant company did not appeal against the judgment of the Regional Court. The plaintiff, however, appealed against the dismissal of his claim for damages. Consequently, in so far as the judgment ordered the injunction, it became final.", "20. On 29 November 2011, the Munich Court of Appeal, in addition to the injunction, sentenced the applicant company to pay damages in the amount of EUR 10,000 and dismissed the plaintiff’s further claim for damages. The court stated that the prerequisite for any entitlement to pecuniary compensation was a serious violation of personality rights which could not be compensated in any other way. It found that that prerequisite had been met in the plaintiff’s case. As far as the violation of the plaintiff’s personality right was concerned, the Court of Appeal endorsed the reasoning of the Regional Court. It expressly conceded to the applicant company that there was great public interest in obtaining information about criminal organisations and “that the motivation of the author and of the defendant [in the instant case: applicant company] for informing the public on the activities pursued by the ‘Ndrangheta in Germany was commendable and honest”. However, the Court of Appeal continued, the applicant company had acted culpably to a significant extent. It had been grossly negligent on the part of the applicant company to disseminate an allegation based on a suspicion which seriously interfered with the plaintiff’s personality right in spite of the fact that the plaintiff had obviously not been given an opportunity to be heard and that the allegation had been disseminated without including the necessary information that the murder investigation addressed by the book subsequently had been discontinued. This charge of gross negligence could not be put aside because the author had tackled a subject of strong public interest. The applicant company should have realised that the information compiled about the plaintiff was not corroborated by evidence and that there were insufficient evidentiary facts to support the allegation reported in the book. The applicant company could not argue that it had not acted culpably, as it had based its publication on information obtained from a governmental authority. That principle, the court held, had been developed by the courts in adjudicating for official press releases issued by German authorities. However, the author had relied solely on internal analyses prepared by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation as well as evaluation reports and documents generated in the course of intra-agency communications between Italian government authorities.", "21. The Court of Appeal further reasoned that the injunction was not sufficient redress for the plaintiff, as it was not an adequate means of reaching the readers of a book that had already been published. Consequently, it found that the payment of damages was required. The court held that compensation in the amount of EUR 10,000, instead of the EUR 20,000 claimed by the plaintiff, was both sufficient and adequate.", "22. On 28 March 2012 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed as ill‑founded a complaint lodged by the applicant company that it had been denied the right to be heard.", "23. On 19 November 2013, the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a constitutional complaint (1 BvR 82/12) lodged by the applicant company, without providing reasons." ]
[ "10", "3", "8" ]
[ 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 18 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sofia.", "6. The applicant is a former police officer. Criminal proceedings were brought against him in 1996.", "7. By a decision of the competent prosecutor of 6 March 1996, as provided under domestic law at the time, the applicant was placed under house arrest. The period of arrest continued until 3 April 1996, when the applicant was remanded in custody. He was once again placed under house arrest on 1 July 1996 and was released on 30 September 1997.", "8. The applicant therefore was deprived of his liberty for one year, six months and twenty-five days.", "9. In a final judgment of 27 January 1998 the Sofia Military Court found the applicant guilty of failing to perform his duties and he was given a one‑year suspended prison sentence.", "10. In another set of proceedings, in a final judgment of 26 March 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment.", "11. The court also held in the second set of proceedings that the applicant should serve a single sentence for all his offences, which was set at one year in prison.", "12. On 1 July 2003 the applicant was once again detained and placed in prison to serve his sentence. He was released on 18 September 2003 by a decision of the competent prosecutor. The prosecutor noted that the period of pre-trial detention should have been deducted from the applicant’s sentence, which meant he had already served it.", "13. As he had worked in prison the applicant was also entitled to a reduction of his sentence by seventeen days.", "14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities’ Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003.", "15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been “permanently altered”, that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been “irreparably damaged”.", "16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter “the City Court”) allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been “unjustified” and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to “unlawful detention without any valid grounds”.", "17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed.", "18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003.", "19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the “nature of the offences” the applicant had been convicted for, the “regime under which the sentence had been served” and the “socially acceptable criteria for justice”. It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard.", "20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155)." ]
[ "5", "6", "34" ]
[ 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Baku.", "5. He was the chairman of the Azerbaijani National Statehood Party.", "6. In December 2010 the applicant sold his car to a certain E.R., who encountered a number of technical problems with it.", "7. On 7 January 2011 E.R. contacted the applicant and they agreed to meet on the same day. During the meeting E.R. expressed his dissatisfaction with the car and requested that the applicant return his money and take the car back. The applicant got angry, started to insult E.R. and then assaulted him together with a certain C.", "8. A passer-by intervened and stopped the altercation. E.R. reported the incident to the police on the same day.", "9. On 8 January 2011 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant by the Nasimi District Police Office under Article 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. The investigator’s decision stated that at around 8.30 p.m. on 7 January 2011 the applicant and a certain C. had insulted and assaulted E.R. on the street in Baku.", "10. On 8 January 2011 the police compiled a record of the applicant’s arrest as a suspect.", "11. On 10 January 2011 the applicant was charged under Articles 127.2.3 (deliberate infliction of less serious injury to health) and 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code.", "12. On the same day the Nasimi District Court, relying on the charges brought against the applicant and an application from the prosecutor to apply the preventive measure of remanding the applicant in custody, ordered his detention pending trial for a period of two months. The court justified the application of the preventive custodial measure by the gravity of the offences imputed to him, the risk of his reoffending and the likelihood that he might abscond if released.", "13. On 12 January 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, stating that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody and that the court had failed to substantiate the necessity for his detention pending trial. He also submitted that the court had failed to take account of his personal situation and to consider the possibility of another preventive measure, such as house arrest or release on bail.", "14. On 17 January 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there were no grounds to quash the first-instance decision.", "15. On 2 March 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case applied to the court for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention for a period of one month. He submitted that more time was needed to complete the investigation.", "16. On 3 March 2011 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant’s detention pending trial by one month, until 8 April 2011. The court justified its decision by the need for more time to carry out further investigative actions, the complexity of the criminal case and the likelihood that the applicant might abscond and obstruct the investigation if released.", "17. On 4 March 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had failed to substantiate its decision on his continued detention.", "18. On 9 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 3 March 2011.", "19. No further extension decisions are available in the case file.", "20. On 17 June 2011 the Nasimi District Court found the applicant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment.", "21. The applicant was released from serving the remainder of his sentence by a presidential pardon issued on 17 March 2016." ]
[ "5" ]
[ 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 ]
[ 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 ]
[ "5. The applicants were born in 1954 and 1951 respectively and live in Kumanovo.", "6. On 23 August 1948 a plot of agricultural land (“the land”) was confiscated from V.R., the applicants’ late grandmother, on the basis of the Expropriation Act (акт за експропријација – “the first confiscation order”), issued by the Kumanovo Peoples’ City Council (Градски Народен Одбор во гр. Куманово). According to the first confiscation order, the total surface area of the land was six shinik (шиник – an old unit of land area (see paragraph 25 below)).", "7. On 20 October 1948 a second confiscation order was issued concerning a plot of land owned by V.R. The second confiscation order did not specify the surface of the land which was to be confiscated.", "8. On 17 December 1948 the Kumanovo Confiscation Commission adopted a confiscation decision (решение за експропријација), which confirmed the above confiscations of V.R.’s real property. According to the decision, the total area of the confiscated land was 3,349 square metres (sq. m).", "9. In a final court decision in inheritance proceedings of 19 January 2001, each applicant was declared heir of one half of the land confiscated from their late grandmother. According to this decision, the surface area of the land in question was six shinik.", "10. On 15 February 2001 the applicants instituted restitution proceedings under the Restitution Act seeking restoration of the land confiscated from their grandmother. In support of their claim they submitted the first confiscation order (see paragraph 6 above). Copies of the restitution claim and the accompanying documents were communicated to the Solicitor General (Јавен Правобранител). It appears that the Solicitor General did not submit any observations in reply.", "11. On 25 June 2001 the Kumanovo Restitution Commission (part of the Ministry of Finance) (“the Restitution Commission”) made an on-site inspection and found that the land in question had been free of any buildings.", "12. On 14 January 2002 the Restitution Commission accepted the applicants’ restitution claim and decided to restore to their possession the plot of land, the total surface area of which was 8,309 sq. m, which, as stated in the order, corresponded to six shinik (“the restitution order”). The order stated that the plot had been confiscated on the basis of the first confiscation order (see paragraph 6 above). Through a proprio motu investigation it also established that the land in question had been part of a larger undeveloped, State-owned plot.", "13. It appears that the Solicitor General was served with a copy of the order but did not lodge an appeal against it. As a consequence, it became final on 18 June 2002.", "14. On 27 June 2002 the total area of the land was transferred in the second applicant’s possession (воведување во владение). The applicants then had their property rights registered in the relevant Land Registry.", "15. In a decision of 15 April 2003, which became final on 16 May 2003, the Kumanovo Court of First Instance, in non-contentious proceedings, accepted the applicants’ application to have the State, represented by the Solicitor General, delineate the area belonging to them (8,309 sq. m) from a larger plot of land belonging to the State. By this decision the applicants became the owners of a separate plot of land with the total area of 8,309 sq. m.", "16. In October 2003 the Solicitor General applied to have the applicants prohibited from further disposing of the land since the land restored to their possession had not corresponded to the land confiscated from their late predecessor in terms of its surface area.", "17. On 28 October 2003 the Kumanovo Court of First Instance dismissed that application finding that the land had been restored to the applicants’ possession on the basis of the restitution order. Furthermore, no proceedings had been instituted under section 63 of the Restitution Act (see paragraph 37 below) by a third party.", "18. On 1 July 2004 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld this decision noting that the Solicitor General had furthermore participated in the proceedings concerning the delineation of the land (see paragraph 15 above).", "19. On 7 October 2003 the Solicitor General sought, in administrative proceedings, that the restitution order be declared, under section 267(1)(5) of the Administrative Procedure Act (see paragraph 37 below), partially null and void in respect of the part of the land which had been returned to the applicants but allegedly had not been confiscated from their predecessor. The Solicitor General argued that the restitution order had been based on the first confiscation order, which had been invalid since it had neither been signed nor stamped and it had specified the surface of the confiscated land in shinik. He had submitted the second confiscation order, which had specified that the surface area of the confiscated land had been 3,340m2. The Solicitor General therefore lodged an application to have the restitution order declared partially null and void regarding the difference in surface area of the land specified in the first confiscation order of 23 August 1948 and the confiscation decision of 17 December 1948.", "20. On 23 May 2005 the Second-Instance Administrative-Procedure Commission in the Area of Denationalisation (Комисија за решавање во управна постапка во втор степен од областа на денационализацијата – “the second-instance commission”) dismissed that application finding that the final restitution order, which had meanwhile been enforced, could not be declared null and void on the basis of section 267(1)(5) of the Administrative Procedure Act because the sections of the Restitution Act on the basis of which the restitution order had been made had not contained any explicit provisions allowing for its nullification, as required under that subparagraph. As for the argument that the confiscation order had been neither signed nor stamped, is was stated that this could have been put forward before the finality of the restitution order, and could not have led to declaring the order null and void on the basis of section 267(1)(5).", "21. The Solicitor General challenged the latter decision by lodging an administrative action (тужба за управен спор) with the Administrative Court in which he complained that the restitution order of 14 January 2002 had been based on a confiscation order which had not been signed and stamped and on erroneous facts regarding the surface area of the land. In this connection the Solicitor General referred to an extract from the State Archives dated 16 August 2005 which indicated that the land had been expropriated on the basis of a confiscation order of 20 October 1948. In this submission the Solicitor General noted that his claims regarding the differences in the surface areas had been substantiated by documents supplied to him by “interested parties” according to which the accurate area of the land could be established.", "22. On 14 March 2008 the Administrative Court upheld the decision of the second-instance commission, finding that the remedy under section 267(1)(5) relied on by the Solicitor General had been inapplicable to the facts of the case. It further stated that the missing stamp and signature were not sufficient reasons to declare the restitution order null and void. Under the terms of the relevant domestic law applicable at the time, this was the final decision. With regard to the differences in surface areas the judgment stated:\n“The court, in deciding, assessed the arguments of the [Solicitor General] put forward in the claim, but it did not accept them as bases to decide differently, because none of the conditions under [section] 267 of the Administrative Procedure Act for declaring the order null and void had been fulfilled.”", "23. On 14 January 2009 the Restitution Commission, acting on its own motion (по службена должност) and relying on section 267(1)(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act, found that the restitution order was unenforceable and declared it null and void in full (“the nullity decision”). It further held that the merits of the case would be decided in a separate decision. It also issued a provisional measure (привремен заклучок), prohibiting the applicants from selling the land until the final resolution of the case.", "24. The Restitution Commission indicated that in the course of examining a separate restitution claim submitted by the heirs of a certain G.T, it had reviewed the documents concerning the applicants’ restitution application.", "25. The Restitution Commission held that under the applicable law in 1948, a confiscation order (акт за експропријација) had had to precede a confiscation decision (решение за експропријација). It found that the restitution order had been based on the confiscation order of August 1948, according to which the total surface area of the land formerly owned by the applicants’ predecessor had been six shinik. However, the confiscation decision dated 17 December 1948, on the basis of which the plot had been confiscated, had specified that the surface area of the confiscated land had been 3,349 sq. m. The Restitution Commission also referred to evidence submitted on 23 August 2001 by the Land Registry Office, according to which the area of the plot had been six shinik and had represented a part of a larger plot of land, the total surface area of which was 8,309 sq. m. A further extract from a “Geodetic Review of the Association of Land Experts of Macedonia” and “Review of old units of land area and their conversion into hectares, areas and sq. m”, issued on the basis of a letter dated 25 March 1952, specified that one shinik corresponded to 650 sq. m. Lastly, the Commission relied on a cadastral plan drawn up by a licenced surveyor (катастарска скица изработена од геометар) made for a separate set of restitution proceedings (instituted by the heirs of G.T.), according to which the surface area of the land, formerly owned by the applicants’ predecessor, had been 3,763 sq. m. In such circumstances, the Commission found that the applicants had unlawfully obtained possession of 4,546 sq. m of land, on the basis of the restitution order. For those reasons, the Commission held that the restitution order had been contrary to sections 1 and 2 of the Restitution Act and was legally unenforceable pursuant to section 267(1)(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act. In respect of the latter section, the Commission held that the unenforceability of a decision concerned not only the factual (фактичка), but also the legal (правна) impossibility of enforcement.", "26. Both applicants appealed, arguing that the restitution order was a final decision which could not be altered. They also referred to the judgement of the Administrative Court of 14 March 2008, which had stated that none of the conditions for nullity under section 267 of the Administrative Procedure Act had been fulfilled (see paragraph 22 above).", "27. On 13 October 2009 the second-instance commission dismissed the applicants’ appeals, endorsing the reasoning given by the Restitution Commission. It held that the Restitution Commission had been obliged, pursuant to section 268 of the Administrative Procedure Act, to declare the restitution order null and void.", "28. The applicants lodged an administrative action against the latter decision before the Administrative Court. They again referred to the judgement of the Administrative Court of 14 March 2008 (see paragraph 22 above). They further stated that the issue of nullity had already been finally resolved following the application lodged by the Solicitor General (see paragraphs 19-22 above).", "29. On 17 May 2010 the Administrative Court upheld their action and annulled the decision of the second-instance commission. The court further rejected as inadmissible an application by R.T. and B.T., the legal successors of G.T. (“the third persons”), to intervene in the proceedings. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n“... In the court’s opinion, there has been no breach of section 267(1)(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act ... This section concerns the impossibility for factual enforcement and the legal impossibility for enforcement which would be in contravention of ... legislation. In the present case there is no such situation and therefore it cannot be considered that section 2 of the Restitution Act has been breached ... This is so because the evidence admitted in the course of the proceedings provides a certain basis for the court to conclude that in the present case the restitution order ... was adopted in accordance with the Restitution Act, which had been preceded by a correct and full establishment of the facts, thereby leading to the conclusion that in that case all statutory conditions had been fulfilled for [the return of] the property concerned.\nWith regard to the application lodged by R.T. and B.T. ... it is clear that [they] did not participate, nor could they have participated in the administrative proceedings initiated by other persons who claimed a right to restitution of a part of the property which had indisputably been in the possession of their legal predecessors. In view of that ... in the present case there is no possibility that third persons (interested persons) can have standing as parties to the restitution proceedings. However, that does not mean that those persons will be deprived of the right to protect their rights and interests ... a possibility remains for them to establish their rights by lodging a civil claim before a competent court within five years of the finalisation of the restitution order (section 63, paragraph 2 of the Act), against the persons to whom possession was restored or compensation was paid in accordance with the provisions of the Act.”", "30. On 3 and 4 August 2010 the Solicitor General and the third persons respectively appealed against that judgment before the Supreme Court, which had in the meantime become competent to act upon appeals against judgments of the Administrative Court. In the appeal the third persons argued that the difference between 3,349 sq. m and the surface originally granted to the applicants belonged to them and adduced evidence to this end. The applicants submitted observations in reply.", "31. On 25 October 2010 the Supreme Court accepted the appeal submitted by the Solicitor General and overturned the decision of the Administrative Court. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n“In the Supreme Court’s opinion, which has been stated in several of this court’s cases, a restitution order can be considered as legally impossible to enforce, if there are breaches of the law which cannot be remedied with the application of other legal means, as is the situation in the present case. In particular, with the [restitution] order more was restored to the [applicants] than what they had been entitled to, having in mind the surface of the property which was in their legal predecessor’s possession. In support of this, the State organs submit ‘Geodetic Review of the Association of Land Experts of Macedonia’ and ‘Review of old units of land area and their conversion into hectares, areas and sq. m’ as evidence that one shinik in the city of Kumanovo amounted to 650 sq. m. This finds support in the expropriation decision of 17 December 1948 where it was noted that the expropriated land had had a surface of 3,349 sq. m, which had been preceded by an accurate determination of the object of expropriation. The finding is further supported by a cadastral plan done by a licenced surveyor (катастарска скица изработена од геометар) on the basis of the limits and boundaries of the plots of land as laid out in the expropriation decision.\n... [T]he conclusion is correct that in the present case, with the restitution order, the property registered as property of the State was restored contrary to the conditions specified in the Restitution Act, sections 1 and 2. Since the State organs established that part of the concerned property was not in possession of the legal predecessor [of the applicants], there is a legal obstacle for the exercise of a restitution right over that part of the property. Hence, such an order cannot be enforced, which is grounds for the application of paragraph 1 subparagraph 3 of section 267 of the Administrative Procedure Act, meaning that the decision is null and void (ништовно) ...\n... In respect of the third persons, or the interested persons, the Restitution Act excludes the possibility for them to appear as parties to the restitution proceedings, but what remains for them is the possibility to claim their rights in a civil suit before a competent court within five years after the finalisation of the restitution order (section 63 paragraph 2 of the Act), against the persons to whom possession was restored or compensation was paid in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”", "32. This decision was served on the applicants on 24 December 2010 and 25 January 2011 respectively. By decisions of 31 January and 28 March 2011 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible their applications for the reopening of the proceedings.", "33. On 19 December 2012, in civil proceedings initiated by the second applicant against the Land Registry, the Kumanovo Court of First Instance issued an injunction banning the respondent State from disposing of the plot of land. On 1 March 2013 the latter decision was annulled (става вон сила) as the applicant had withdrawn the action against the Land Registry.", "34. Acting upon the initial restitution application, the Restitution Commission requested clarification from the Land Registry regarding the historical records of the plot of land in question on 27 March 2013. The Land Registry confirmed that the plot which had been taken from the applicants’ predecessor was now a part of a plot owned by the State with an area of 8,309 sq. m.", "35. On 29 October 2013 the Restitution Commission accepted the applicants’ restitution claim and decided to restore to their possession a plot of land with an area of 2,460 sq. m and to award them financial compensation for the remaining part of the plot with an area of 889 sq. m which could not be restored, in total amounting to a total surface area of 3,349 sq. m.", "36. On 5 December 2013 the second applicant challenged the latter decision with an administrative action. It appears that the proceedings are still pending." ]
[ "P1-1" ]
[ 2, 3, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 26, 30 ]
[]
[ "6. The case concerned the publication of a newspaper article on the website of The New York Times. In the article the applicant had been mentioned by name and, based on reports by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter “the FBI”) and European law-enforcement agencies, the applicant’s alleged ties to Russian organised crime had been publicised. The applicant’s attempt to obtain an injunction order before the domestic courts had been unsuccessful.", "7. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Düsseldorf. He is an internationally active entrepreneur in the media sector and chief executive officer of the media company Innova Film GmbH.", "8. He also holds the position of Vice-President of the World Jewish Congress and President of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine. In 2010 the former mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg, publicly honoured the applicant for his efforts to improve American‑Russian relations.", "9. On 12 June 2001, the daily newspaper The New York Times published an article about an investigation into corruption against R.L. A slightly changed version was also published on the newspaper’s website. The online version, which was the subject of the domestic proceedings (see paragraphs 12-20 below), reads, in so far as relevant, as follows (emphasis added and names abbreviated by the Court):\n“[L] Media Company Faces a Federal Inquiry\nBy [R. B.]\nPublished: June 12 2001\nWASHINGTON, June 10— A company owned by [R.L.], the cosmetics heir and former New York City mayoral candidate, is under investigation by federal prosecutors over allegations that it paid at least $1 million in bribes to Ukrainian officials for a valuable television license, according to lawyers and Justice Department documents.\nThe United States attorney in Manhattan, [M.W.], has empaneled a grand jury and issued subpoenas, and prosecutors are studying some 6,000 pages of documents from Central European Media enterprise, which [R.L.] founded in 1991 as part of a plan to build a media empire in Europe. It now owns television stations in several Central and Eastern European countries.\nIn a Federal District Court filing in New York last year, [M.W.] sought the corporate documents, saying that they were needed for a criminal investigation into whether [R.L.]´s Central European Media had ‘made corrupt and unlawful payments to Ukrainian officials’ in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the federal law that prohibits American companies from paying bribes abroad. [R.L.] and the company did not challenge the request and turned over the documents, a lawyer said.\nThe payments being examined took place in 1996 after Ukraine´s licencing body granted a potentially lucrative licence to [R.L.]´s company despite the fact that the Ukraine Parliament had imposed a ban on new licences.\n...\nIn Ukraine, Central European Media controls the most popular station through its majority-owned subsidiary Studio 1 + 1.\nProsecutors are studying two transactions related to Central European Media’s Ukraine investment, according to documents and persons close to the investigation. In one, prosecutors are trying to determine if L’s company paid $1.2 million to two Lebanese businessmen living in Ukraine, who then distributed it to some members of Ukraine’s television licensing board.\n... [R.L.]’s bid to gain the television license in Ukraine began in 1995. That year, he met in New York with [O.V.], a top adviser to Ukraine President [L.K.], to discuss business opportunities.\nThe initial meetings between [R.L.] and his representatives and [O.V.] were not promising. ...\n[O.V.] suggested that [R.L.] team up with a new Ukrainian television broadcasting company, Studio 1 + 1, in Kiev, and he did. The principal owners were [V.R.] and Boris Fuchsmann, well known around Kiev for their influence and wealth. Less well known were their ties to Russian organized crime, according to reports by the F.B.I. and European law enforcement agencies.\n[V.R.], who no longer has an interest in 1 + 1, has denied any links to Russian organized crime. Mr. Fuchsmann did not respond to e-mail inquiries seeking comment on the licensing deal and the F.B.I.’s claim of his ties to organized crime, although an assistant confirmed that he had received the inquiries.\nA 1994 F.B.I. report on Russian organized crime in the United States described Mr. Fuchsmann as a gold smuggler and embezzler, whose company in Germany was part of an international organized crime network. He is barred from entering the United States.\n...\nBesides Mr. Fuchsmann and [V.R.], there were other, silent owners of Studio 1 + 1. In one internal fax, in April 1996, [J] described the Studio 1 + 1 shareholders as ‘‘extremely powerful’ people whom, she added, ‘I will not mention on this fax.’\nCentral European Media now owns 60 percent of Studio 1 + 1, and Mr. Fuchsmann owns at least 30 percent, according to public statements.\nAt the time it went into business with Mr. Fuchsmann and [V.R.], Central European Media did not conduct investigations into their backgrounds, according to a report by [R.L.]’s New York law firm, [D.&P.].\nIn their 20-page report, which the prosecutors now have, the firm’s lawyers said that [R.L.] had been justified in dealing with Mr. Fuchsmann and [V.R.] because they had been highly recommended by [O.V.], whom the lawyers described as ‘an ardent supporter of free-market business’.\nThe lawyers also concluded that Central European Media had not engaged in any illegal or improper activities. They said they could not rule out the possibility that Studio 1 + 1 had made improper payments, though they did not believe it had.\nThe Ukraine’s television licensing board issued a broadcast license to Studio 1 + 1 not only in spite of Parliament’s moratorium, but with only four of the board’s eight members present; the law required at least six members for a vote.\nA few days after the license was issued, Central European Media transferred $1.4 million to International Teleservices of Belize, according to a C.M.E. Wire Transfer Request. That is the second transaction being looked at by prosecutors.\nThe Belize company was indirectly owned by ‘many high Ukrainian officials,’ according to a second C.M.E. document, which did not name them.\nA third document shows that International Teleservices had paid this amount to a company in Germany owned by Mr. Fuchsmann, Innova, and that Innova had paid the license fees on behalf of Studio 1 + 1. Innova is part of a Russian organized crime network, according to U.S. and German law enforcement reports.\nIt is not clear why such a circuitous route was used, and a person involved in the transaction, with inside knowledge of the owners of International Teleservices, said the $1.4 million payment was not for a license fee. He would not say what it was for.\nCentral European Media officials were nervous about the license they won, and sought the opinion of two law firms in Kiev. Both acknowledged ‘the potential weaknesses’ of the broadcasting license, according to a C.M.E. document. One week later, O.V. had secured a letter from the Ukrainian justice ministry stating that the license was valid.\nFederal prosecutors, who opened their case in the wake of a number of private lawsuits challenging the legitimacy of the license award, have been examining documents for nearly a year, and the exact status of the investigation is not clear.”", "10. On 28 May 2001, before publication of the article, the journalist had notified the applicant, via an email to one of his employees, of the planned publication and had asked several questions. On 30 May 2001 the journalist had made a follow-up telephone call to the employee, who confirmed that the applicant had received the questions. However, the applicant refrained from answering the questions or commenting on the planned publication.", "11. Since 12 June 2001 the article, showing the date of first publication, is retrievable from the website of The New York Times. It can also be found through online search engines such as “Google” or “Bing”.", "12. On 31 July 2002 the applicant sought injunctions against certain parts of the article (highlighted in the article, see paragraph 9 above), published in the print and online versions.", "13. On 9 January 2008 the Düsseldorf Regional Court declared the applicant’s action inadmissible due to lack of international jurisdiction on the part of the German courts. It found that, at the material time, the print version of The New York Times was not distributed in Germany and that the Internet version of the newspaper was not directed at a readership in Germany. The Düsseldorf Court of Appeal confirmed that decision by its judgment dated 30 December 2008. On 2 March 2010 the Federal Court of Justice quashed the part of the decision regarding the applicant’s claim for an injunction against the challenged statements in the online version of the article and referred that part of the action back to the Court of Appeal. The court held that the online version of the newspaper was accessible from Germany, and because it mentioned a German businessman in the article, the publication had a direct connection with Germany and German jurisdiction. It therefore affirmed the international jurisdiction of the German courts in that respect.", "14. On 22 June 2011 the Court of Appeal decided on the part of the dispute which had been referred back to it by the Federal Court of Justice. It granted the injunction in so far as the article stated that the applicant had been banned from entering the United States, and dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s action for lack of merit. The Court of Appeal held that German law was applicable with regard to the online publication, as the article was accessible in Germany via the Internet and therefore the alleged violation of the applicant’s reputation had at least occurred in Germany.", "15. The court accepted that the statements interfered with the applicant’s reputation and personality right (allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht) as protected by Article 2 § 1 and Article 1 § 1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). However, as the statements had been made in the press, which was constitutionally protected pursuant to Article 5 § 1 of the Basic Law, it was necessary to balance both interests. Moreover, as the statements concerned a suspicion against the applicant, the presumption of innocence arising from Article 6 § 2 of the Convention and from German law also had to be taken into account. The court held that there was in principle a public interest in reporting on criminal offences, including the suspicion of their commission. On the other hand, continued the court, the interference with the rights of personality associated with such reporting required higher standards of care for newspaper reporting, because even if the investigation was later discontinued, “something of the accusation might stick to the person affected”. Therefore, concrete, provable connecting facts which go beyond a vague, intangible suspicion were required, the reporting must concern an incident of great weight and the suspicion must be identified as such. In addition, the reporting must be balanced, the journalist must not fail to report on exculpatory circumstances and the person concerned must, as a rule, be invited to make his own comments before publication.", "16. As regards the statements at issue, the Court of Appeal held that there was a great informational interest on the part of the public in the reporting that the applicant, as a German businessman internationally active in the media sector, was suspected by the secret service of being involved in gold smuggling, embezzlement and organised crime. This assessment was not changed by the fact that the applicant had been mentioned by name in the article, or by the fact that when the article was published in 2001, the criminal offences mentioned therein had occurred more than sixteen years previously. Regarding the latter the court pointed out that the criminal offences had become relevant again, due to new suspicions regarding the involvement of a former mayoral candidate. For the understanding of these suspicions it had been necessary to elaborate on the companies and individuals, including the applicant, involved in the alleged corruption. Similarly, describing the suspected criminal backgrounds of some of the persons involved had been necessary for the readers’ comprehension of the allegation. The court also took into account that the article remained accessible in an online archive of the daily newspaper. It held that there was a recognised public interest not only in information on current events but also in being able to research events from recent history.", "17. The court further considered that the reporting was free from polemic statements and insinuations, and made it sufficiently clear that only insights from FBI reports and the law-enforcement authorities were being reported. This was expressly pointed out in the challenged article with the words, \"according to reports by the F.B.I. and European law enforcement agencies\". The internal FBI report was confirmed by reports of several other law-enforcement agencies, and the applicant himself, while denying any criminal activities, confirmed certain facts mentioned in those reports during the proceedings. Furthermore, the author of the article had notified the applicant via email that the article would be published. In that context the court also considered that although the applicant had been aware of the defendant’s reporting even before the article had been published, he had waited for more than one year before applying for an injunction against the defendant. Therefore, the applicant had not perceived the interference with his personality right as intolerable.", "18. In sum, the court concluded that the defendant had complied with the required journalistic duty of care and that the reporting had relied on sources and background information, which the journalist could reasonably consider reliable. Therefore, the informational interest of the public outweighed the concerns of protecting the applicant’s personality right, even taking into account that such reporting might seriously damage his private and professional reputation. Regarding the alleged entry ban, the court concluded that there had been no reliable sources and that the applicant had shown that he had recently travelled to the United States.", "19. On 2 October 2012, the Federal Court of Justice rejected a complaint lodged by the applicant against the Court of Appeal’s refusal to grant leave to appeal on points of law.", "20. On 26 April 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint (no. 1 BvR 2387/12) lodged by the applicant, without providing reasons." ]
[ "5", "8" ]
[ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Krasnodar.", "6. On 4 November 2003 the applicant, who was 16 years old at the time, and his brother were stopped by Krasnogvardeyskiy district police officers Ch. and Kh. at a petrol station in the village of Bolshesidorovskoye in the Adygeya Republic. The applicant submitted that the events had taken place in the context of tense relations between his family and those police officers.", "7. He described the events as follows. He and his brother were pushing their broken motorcycle to take it to a friend for repairs. They were verbally insulted by Ch. and Kh. Ch. then sat on the motorcycle and asked them to push it. Following their refusal, the brothers were subjected to physical violence. Kh. seized the applicant by his neck, knocked him down and started strangling him. He hit the applicant’s head against the ground several times, dragged the applicant to a police car without releasing his grasp around his neck, hit his head against the car, punched him in the face and pushed him into the car. The applicant’s and his brother’s requests that their parents be informed or that they be taken home because the applicant felt unwell were disregarded by the police officers. The officers drove to the garage of a local collective farm and then to the Krasnogvardeyskiy district administration, where the applicant’s father found the applicant and his brother and took them home.", "8. According to an administrative-offence record drawn up by Officer Kh., at 2 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant’s brother was apprehended for driving a motorcycle without a driving licence. The applicant’s brother noted his disagreement, stating in the record that he had not been driving the motorcycle but had been pushing it.", "9. According to an administrative-offence record drawn up by Officer Ch., at 3 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant used obscene language in a public place, namely the petrol station in Bolshesidorovskoye. Therefore, the applicant’s father committed an administrative offence by failing to properly bring up the applicant. Relying on the police officer’s record, the Committee on Minors at the Krasnogvardeyskiy district administration subsequently found the applicant’s father guilty of that administrative offence. The Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court, however, granted the applicant’s father’s appeal against that decision, finding that the decision, the administrative-offence record and other material lacked any evidence of the applicant’s father’s failure to properly raise the applicant, and that, on the contrary, all his children had been well cared for, had studied hard at school, and the family was well thought of. The applicant was heard by the court and denied having used obscene language. The court quashed the decision and terminated the administrative proceedings against the applicant’s father (judgment of 5 January 2004).", "10. At 5.45 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant was examined by a surgeon at the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Hospital, who recorded three abrasions on his neck which were 3 to 10 cm long, and a contusion to his right elbow.", "11. On the same day the applicant’s mother complained to the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor’s office that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police officers.", "12. On 5 November 2003 a forensic medical expert from the Adygeya Republic Forensic Medical Bureau examined the applicant at the request of an investigator of the prosecutor’s office. The expert recorded abrasions on the applicant’s neck which were 7 and 12 cm long, a bruise on his right elbow measuring 5 by 4 cm, and a bruise on his lip. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted on the previous day, by fingernails as regards the abrasions on the neck, and by a hard blunt object as regards the bruises.", "13. On 6 November 2003 the applicant was examined by doctors at the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Polyclinic. He complained of a headache, dizziness, pain in his throat and pain when swallowing, pain in his neck area, lips, left eyebrow and right elbow. The doctors recorded oedema of both lips with bruises, oedema in the area of the left eyebrow and right elbow, and oedema, abrasions and bruises in the area of the neck. They diagnosed him with multiple contusions of the face, neck, larynx and laryngeal cartilages. Following an X-ray examination he was further diagnosed with a fracture of both branches of the hyoid bone.", "14. In an additional opinion of 2 December 2003 the forensic medical expert stated that the fracture of the branches of the hyoid bone, the oedema and the abrasions on the neck could have been caused on 4 November 2003 by pressure from fingers, and had resulted in harm to the applicant’s health lasting up to twenty-one days, that is, minor harm to his health.", "15. Investigators of the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of the elements of a crime in their actions. The investigators’ refusals (dated 13 November 2003, 21 November 2003, 28 December 2003, 7 February 2004, 27 April 2004, 6 June 2005, and 3 November 2005) were annulled by their superiors at the prosecutor’s office, because the pre-investigation inquiry, on which the refusals were based, was considered incomplete.", "16. In the refusal of 7 February 2004 O., an investigator, found that the applicant’s injuries had been the result of the use of physical force by Officers Ch. and Kh. in order to apprehend the applicant, who had “disobeyed their commands and attempted to escape”. The investigator held that no criminal proceedings should be brought against the police officers for lack of the elements of a crime in their actions under Article 115 of the Criminal Code (minor harm to health), intent – which was lacking in their actions – being one of those elements. Nor did the investigator consider that there was sufficient information indicating the elements of a crime in the police officers’ actions under Article 286 § 1 of the Criminal Code (abuse of authority).", "17. In a decision of 27 February 2004, setting aside the refusal of 7 February 2004, a senior prosecutor from the Adygeya Republic prosecutor’s office held that, in the course of an additional inquiry, the investigator should establish exactly what each of the police officers had done when restraining the applicant and placing him in their car, in particular if the injury had been inflicted by seizing the applicant by his neck. The prosecutor also held that it was necessary to give a legal assessment of the question whether there had been any need to apprehend the applicant, who was minor, on account of his swearing. The prosecutor noted that the relevant administrative proceedings had been brought against the applicant’s father, and no statements concerning those events had been taken from the applicant.", "18. In the most recent refusal of 29 November 2005 the defects identified by the prosecutor were not rectified. O., the investigator, maintained his findings made in the decision of 7 February 2004, stating that the applicant’s allegations had not been confirmed by the results of the pre‑investigation inquiry.", "19. The investigator relied on the police officers’ explanations that at 2 p.m. on 4 November 2003 the applicant’s brother had disobeyed their command to stop a motorcycle without a registration plate which he had been driving. The applicant had been sitting on the passenger’s seat. After the police officers had finally managed to stop the motorcycle at the petrol station, the applicant’s brother had refused to produce his driving licence. The police officers had been drawing up an administrative-offence record when the applicant had started walking away, swearing at them. They had “restrained him in order to prevent his escape”.", "20. The investigator referred to explanations by Sh. that he had seen the police stopping the motorcycle at the petrol station, that he had been invited to act as an attesting witness and sign a record of the motorcycle’s seizure which the police had drawn up on the spot, and that the applicant’s brother had refused to sign the record and receive a copy of it.", "21. The investigator’s decision also referred to statements by other third parties, in particular B., who worked at the petrol station and stated that he had seen the applicant falling onto the tarmac himself, resisting the police officers taking him to their car and trying to escape. B. stated that the police officers had not beaten up or strangled the applicant, but had “restrained him”. The applicant’s mother’s complaint that B. had given false statements was dismissed by an investigator of the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor’s office on the grounds that false explanations given in the framework of a pre-investigation inquiry, as opposed to false statements given in the course of a criminal investigation, were not punishable as a criminal offence (decision of 10 January 2004).", "22. On 23 September 2005 the applicant’s mother lodged an application (жалоба) with the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court (“the District Court”). She complained that on 27 April 2004 the Krasnogvardeyskiy district prosecutor’s office had refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officers Ch. and Kh. Its decision had been unfounded and on 3 May 2005 it had been set aside by the Prosecutor General’s Office. Since then she had not been informed of any new decision. She argued that the police officers’ actions, as a result of which the applicant had sustained serious bodily injuries, had been unlawful, and that criminal proceedings should be instituted against them.", "23. On 26 September 2005 the District Court decided that the application fell to be examined under the rules of civil procedure, and gave the applicant’s mother a time-limit for complying with those rules, in particular in relation to paying a court fee. The applicant’s mother requested that her application be examined under the rules of criminal procedure, notably Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”). On 7 December 2005 the District Court discontinued the civil proceedings and decided to examine the application under Article 125 of the CCrP.", "24. In its decision of 16 December 2005 the District Court examined the investigator’s decision of 29 November 2005 and endorsed the investigator’s conclusions that the police officers had acted lawfully. It also noted that the applicant, no longer a minor, should have applied to court himself. For those reasons, it rejected the application.", "25. The applicant’s mother appealed against the decision, seeking, inter alia, to declare the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 29 November 2005 unlawful and unfounded. On 31 January 2006 the Adygeya Republic Supreme Court quashed the decision, noting that the District Court should not have examined the application, as the applicant’s mother had lacked authority to act on the applicant’s behalf, and should not have examined the lawfulness of the police officers’ actions in its review under Article 125 of the CCrP (which concerned the lawfulness of investigators’ decisions). Since the District Court had not examined whether the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 29 November 2005 was lawful and well-founded, the Adygeya Republic Supreme Court could not deal with that issue on appeal.", "26. On 8 February 2006 the District Court held that the application did not fall to be examined under Article 125 of the CCrP and discontinued the proceedings. On 21 March 2006 the Adygeya Republic Supreme Court upheld that decision upon an appeal by the applicant’s mother, reiterating that she had lacked authority to act on the applicant’s behalf and that the lawfulness of the police officers’ actions could not be reviewed under Article 125 of the CCrP. It further stated that in her application she had not formulated a complaint that the refusal to institute criminal proceedings was unlawful or unfounded." ]
[ "3" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Istanbul.", "6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "7. On 7 December 2009 the applicant was arrested.", "8. On 9 December 2009 the applicant was placed in detention on remand by the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court on suspicion of committing crimes on behalf of an illegal terrorist organisation, disseminating propaganda for the same organisation, storage of hazardous materials, and damage to public property.", "9. On 30 December 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed his indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court.", "10. On 6 May 2010 the first hearing was held before the Istanbul Assize Court. At the end of the hearing the court ordered the continuation of his detention in the presence of the applicant.", "11. The applicant filed an objection against this decision. On 20 May 2010 the 10th Chamber of Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding an oral hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative.", "12. On 10 December 2010 the applicant was released from detention on remand.", "13. At the time when the application was lodged, the proceedings against the applicant were still pending before the first-instance court." ]
[ "5" ]
[]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Mersin.", "5. The applicant is a teacher in primary school and at the material time she was a member and secretary of the local branch of the trade union of Education and Science Workers (Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası).", "6. On 28 November 2008 the applicant participated in a demonstration organised by the above mentioned trade union on the theme “No to violence against women”.", "7. On 29 June 2009 the District Directorate of National Education imposed a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand on the applicant for her participation in the aforementioned demonstration under Article 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants.", "8. On 10 July 2009 the applicant objected to this decision and requested its annulment.", "9. On 29 July 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the Yenişehir district governor dismissed the applicant’s objection considering that the contested decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment." ]
[ "11", "13" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. Following the establishment of the communist regime in Romania in 1947, the State proceeded to nationalise buildings and agricultural land on a large scale. After the fall of the communist regime, the State enacted a series of laws aimed at affording redress for breaches of property rights by the former regime (see paragraphs 43-51 below).", "6. Laws nos. 112/1995 and 10/2001 established the principle of restitution of nationalised residential property and compensation in cases where restitution was no longer possible. Law no. 112/1995 introduced a cap on compensation, but this was subsequently abolished by Law no. 10/2001.", "7. Law no. 247/2005 attempted to harmonise the administrative procedures for restitution of properties covered by the above-mentioned laws and by the special legislation concerning restitution of agricultural land.", "8. On 12 October 2010, the Court adopted a pilot judgment in the case of Maria Atanasiu and Others v. Romania (nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010), in which it singled out the deficiencies of the restitution mechanism, indicating to the respondent State under Article 46 of the Convention that new steps needed to be taken in order to process the restitution claims with more efficiency.", "9. On 15 May 2013 Law no. 165/2013 came into force, setting out various procedures available to petitioners seeking settlement of their restitution claims.", "10. Based on the parties’ observations and comments regarding the new remedies set out by Law no. 165/2013, on 29 April 2014 the Court found in its judgment in the case of Preda and Others v. Romania (nos. 9584/02 and 7 others, §§ 134-40, 29 April 2014), that the mechanism established by the new law offered a range of effective remedies that needed to be exhausted by those claimants whose complaints referred to one of the following situations: the existence of concurrent titles to property with respect to the same plot of agricultural land; the annulment of such title to property without any compensation; the delivery of a final judgment confirming the right to compensation in respect of the unlawful seizure by the State of any type of immovable property, without fixing the amount; the failure to pay such compensation awarded in a final judgment; and the prolonged failure to give a decision on a restitution claim.", "11. However, the Court also held that Law no. 165/2013 did not contain any provisions of a procedural or substantive nature capable of affording redress on the matter of the existence of final judgments validating concurrent titles to property with respect to the same residential property. Furthermore, no procedure was available to former owners who, in the absence of restitution, would have been entitled to compensation but who did not to have access to it because the circumstances rendering restitution impossible had become known after the expiry of the time-limit for lodging compensation claims (ibid., § 124).", "12. The complaints set out in the present applications reflect the circumstances described above (see paragraph 11). In particular, the applicants have alleged that their title to the property (building and appurtenant land) had been acknowledged by the domestic courts; however, owing to the sale of the property by the State, the applicants were prevented from enjoying their respective right. They claimed that this deprivation, together with the total lack of compensation for it, had imposed on them an excessive and disproportionate burden. 1. Facts concerning application no. 10346/03, lodged by Ms Dora Dickmann\n(a) Restitution of the immovable property located on Şoseaua Giurgiului", "13. In 1950, under Decree no. 92, the State nationalised the building and its appurtenant land located at 22 Şoseaua Giurgiului in Bucharest, which belonged to the applicant’s predecessors.", "14. In 1997 the applicant lodged a claim with the domestic courts for restitution of the above-mentioned property, alleging that its nationalisation had been unlawful and that therefore the property right had left her predecessors’ rightful ownership only when it had been transferred to her as heritage. The claim was formulated against Bucharest City Council and B., a State-owned company responsible for the management of property belonging to the State.", "15. In its judgment of 6 June 1997 the Bucharest Fourth District Court allowed the claims and ordered that the property be returned to the applicant, in her capacity as sole heiress of its rightful owners. The court held that the immovable property had been nationalised unlawfully, since the applicant’s predecessors had not belonged to any of the social categories covered by the nationalisation decree and thus their right of property had been valid and continuous, being transferred as heritage to the applicant; the State could not therefore claim a valid title to the property.", "16. The judgment was not appealed against and thus became final.", "17. On 12 May 1998 the Mayor of Bucharest issued a restitution decision in respect of the immovable property located on Şoseaua Giurgiului, in compliance with the operative part of the judgment of 6 June 1997.\n(b) Sale by the State of the flats located in the Şoseaua Giurgiului property", "18. Under the terms of contracts entered into in accordance with Law no. 112/1995, company B., managing the building (see paragraph 14 above), had sold the flats located therein to the tenants.", "19. The sale contract in respect of the first-floor flat was concluded on 5 November 1996 between B., representing the State, and the tenants, S.N. and S.P.", "20. The sale contract in respect of the ground-floor flat was concluded on 23 June 1997 between B. on behalf of the State, and the tenant, S. A.-L.\n(c) Steps taken under ordinary law and under Law no. 10/2001 to obtain the rescission of the sale contracts", "21. On an unspecified date in 2000 the applicant lodged before the domestic courts two civil actions seeking the rescission of the sale contracts of 5 November 1996 and 23 June 1997 respectively, in so far as the State had sold property which it had not owned.", "22. The final judgment of 7 February 2002 given by the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the claim in respect of the first-floor flat, holding that the applicant did not have legal standing to ask for the rescission of the sale contract, in so far as she had not been a party thereto.", "23. In its final judgment of 14 October 2003, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s claim in respect of the ground-floor flat, holding that the buyer had acted in good faith and had thus acquired a valid title to the property, in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 10/2001, which had entered into force in the meantime. The court also held that the applicant was eligible for compensatory measures pursuant to the notice of claim (notificare) lodged with the administrative authorities under Law no. 10/2001 (see paragraph 25 below).", "24. On 12 August 2002 the applicant lodged another action before the domestic courts, seeking again the rescission of the sale contract concerning the first-floor flat. This time, however, she based her claim on the provisions of Law no. 10/2001. In its final judgment of 1 February 2006 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s claim, holding that in so far as the sale contract had been concluded by the buyers in good faith, it was in compliance with the law.\n(d) Steps taken under Law no. 10/2001 to obtain restitution of the flats", "25. On 12 October 2001 the applicant lodged a notice of claim with the Bucharest City Hall under Law no. 10/2001, seeking reparatory measures in respect of the two flats. Several documents were appended to the application, including a copy of the judgment of 6 June 1997 and a copy of the inheritance certificate attesting to the fact that the applicant was the sole heiress of her predecessors.", "26. On 23 and 24 April 2015 the Bucharest City Hall requested the applicant to complete her administrative file with documents related to her claim. However, the request did not reach the applicant, as the contact information mentioned in the 2001 application was no longer valid.", "27. As far as the Court is aware, no decision has been taken in respect of this claim. 2. Facts concerning application no. 10893/04, lodged by Ms and Mr Gion\n(a) Steps taken by the applicants to obtain the restitution of flat no. 30 located in Victoria Street, Piteşti, and the sale of the flat by the State", "28. On 6 May 1977 flat no. 30, located in building A/4, Victoria Street, Piteşti – the applicants’ property – was seized by the State under Decree no. 223/1974, following the applicants’ decision to leave the country. They were not notified of the administrative decision to confiscate the property.", "29. Between 1991 and 1995, the applicants wrote several letters to various domestic authorities, including the Piteşti City Council, the Piteşti Prefect’s Office and the director of company R., which managed the building on behalf of the State, seeking to obtain possession of the flat. The replies stated that the applicants’ claims could not be granted, as no relevant legislation had yet been enacted concerning reparatory measures in respect of previously nationalised property. In one of the replies sent by the Piteşti City Council on 1 May 1995, the applicants were informed that flats which had been nationalised under Decree 223/1974 could not be purchased by their current tenants from the local authorities.", "30. On 9 July 1996 the applicants lodged a claim with the administrative authorities, seeking reparatory measures in respect of flat no. 30, in accordance with the provisions of Law no. 112/1995.", "31. On 17 January 1997 company R. sold the flat to the tenants, S.C. and S.M.", "32. On 16 May 1997 the administrative authorities dismissed the applicants’ claims lodged under Law no. 112/1995, in view of the fact that the flat had already been sold to its tenants.\n(b) Restitution of the immovable property located in Piteşti", "33. On 30 August 1999 the applicants lodged before the Argeş County Court an action against Piteşti City Council, aiming to recover possession of flat no. 30. They claimed that the confiscation of the property had been unlawful, as on the one hand it had been in breach of the Constitution in force at the time, and on the other hand, they had not been notified of the administrative decision to confiscate it.", "34. On 22 May 2000 the County Court allowed the applicants’ claims. The defendant appealed. On 23 March 2001 the Piteşti Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because no statement of appeal had been submitted. The decision thus became final.", "35. On 19 September 2002 the applicants, assisted by a bailiff, recovered possession of flat no. 30; the relevant minutes mentioned that the flat was empty and unfurnished.\n(c) Challenge to the enforcement of the judgment of 22 May 2000", "36. On 1 October 2002 S.C. and S.M. challenged the enforcement of the judgment of 22 May 2000 (see paragraph 34 above). They claimed to be the rightful owners of flat no. 30, having bought it in good faith in 1997; furthermore, in so far as they had not been parties to the proceedings terminated by the outstanding judgment of 22 May 2000, they were not bound by it (inopozabilă).", "37. By a final judgment of 25 June 2003, the Piteşti Court of Appeal allowed the claims of S.C. and S.M. In its reasoning, the court essentially held that the sale contract had been validly and lawfully concluded by the tenants, who had acted in good faith at the time of the sale. Moreover, the judgment of 22 May 2000 awarding the applicants title to the property was unenforceable (inopozabilă) against the buyers, because they had not been parties to the respective proceedings.\n(d) Steps taken under ordinary law to obtain the rescission of the sale contract", "38. On 22 November 2006 the applicants lodged an action against S.C. and S.M. seeking to recover possession of flat no. 30 and urging the courts to find the sale contract unlawful. Their claims were allowed by the Piteşti District Court on 23 January 2008.", "39. An appeal lodged by the defendants was allowed by the Argeş County Court on 16 June 2008. The court considered that the sale of the flat had been lawful. At the same time, it held that the applicants were entitled to compensation for the flat, equivalent to its market value at the date of payment.", "40. The applicants have not lodged any claims under Law no. 10/2001." ]
[ "P1-1" ]
[ 10, 11, 12, 18, 20, 21, 22, 26, 29, 34, 35 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicants, who belong to the Roma ethnic group, were born in 1970 and 1957 respectively and live in Mănăstirea (Călărași).", "6. At the relevant time they were living together in a de facto partnership and were the parents of seven children:\n– E. and E.S., a boy and a girl, twins, born on 27 March 2004;\n– T., a boy, born on 7 March 2005;\n– A.-M., a girl, born on 31 March 2006;\n– S., a girl, born on 15 June 2007;\n– E.L., a girl, born on 29 June 2008;\n– I., a boy, born on 8 October 2009.", "7. The second applicant has been classified as suffering from second‑degree permanent disability on account of psychological disorders.", "8. On 3 October 2013 the applicants married.", "9. In August 2010 the first applicant sent a complaint to the Romanian president, claiming that her father had subjected her to abuse; she stated that he had raped her and threatened her children. She attached to her complaint a medical certificate attesting that in 2008 one of her children had sustained injuries necessity seven to eight days of medical treatment.", "10. Following an investigation, the authorities dealing with the matter established that the first applicant’s allegations had no basis in fact and that the complaint had been drawn up in the context of a conflict between the first applicant and the representative of the religious organisation in her village, who had allegedly excluded her from that community.", "11. The first applicant’s complaint was then transmitted to the authority responsible for monitoring the situation of maltreated or abandoned children, namely the Călăraşi Directorate-General of Social Assistance and Child Welfare (“the DGASPC”, paragraph 12 below), in order to verify the circumstances of the applicants’ children. On 16 September 2010 the DGASPC asked the Social Services Department of the Mănăstirea municipality (“the SPAS”) to look into the education provided to the family’s seven children, verify their welfare situation and their health, and to provide it with all relevant information (see paragraph 12 below).", "12. In September 2010 the SPAS visited the applicants’ home. It noted that the family lived in an insalubrious house provided by the first applicant’s father and that the applicants took no interest in their children’s health or education. The family’s monthly income amounted to 774 Romanian lei (RON) and this sum was composed of the second applicant’s disability allowance, child allowances and an allowance paid to the first applicant as a single parent. The SPAS’s report also mentioned that the applicants refused to enrol their children in school or with a doctor, and that they restricted their access to outdoor activities and any other activity which could potentially stimulate their integration or adaptation to life within the community. According to the SPAS, the applicants had refused assistance from social-service employees who wished to advise them about their responsibilities towards their children.", "13. Based on the SPAS’s findings (see paragraph 12 above), on 20 September 2010 the DGASPC sent the applicants a letter informing them that, as parents, they had a duty to provide the minimum conditions necessary for their children’s development and also to ensure that they did not neglect them. The DGASPC recommended that the applicants take the following measures:\n“ – provide [their children] with an appropriate level of physical cleanliness and clean clothes, [and guarantee the cleanliness] of the house and a proper diet;\n– sign up all the children with a family doctor, have them vaccinated and follow any recommended treatment;\n– enrol the children aged from three to seven years in a nursery school;\n– allow the children to create relationships with [the other children/] ([through] walks, games);\n– refrain from subjecting the children to physical and/or verbal violence and from giving them emotionally traumatising messages (do not create [feelings of] fear, isolation, [do not create in them a] lack of confidence).”", "14. In the same letter, the DGASPC informed the applicants:\n“The manner in which you fulfil these obligations will be monitored by ... the DGASPC.\nShould the neglect of the children persist, and if this affects their safety within the family and [if] there is a breach of certain of their rights, urgent protection measures will be taken in respect of the children, even without [your] agreement, in accordance with sections 64, 65 and 66 of Law no. 272/2004 (the Protection of Children’s Rights Act). ...”", "15. A schedule was drawn up to ensure regular monitoring of the applicants’ family by the social services. On 11 October 2010 the committee responsible for providing support to the Mănăstirea municipal guardianship and welfare office visited the applicants’ home. It submitted a report stating that the applicants claimed not to have signed up their children with a doctor and had no intention of doing so; in addition, although they had enrolled one of the children in nursery school, they did not take him there for fear he would be kidnapped. The committee’s report also noted that the house was made up of two rooms, an entrance corridor and a kitchen, where clothes and wood were piled up together. It added that the house was heated and clean, and that a meal had been prepared.", "16. It further indicated that the second applicant had become anxious and begun raising his voice to complain that he was not receiving allowances for all of his children. Informed that the monitoring of his family would last for several months, the second applicant apparently became agitated and informed the municipal employees that they were not to return to his home. The committee proposed in its report that the monitoring of the applicants’ family should continue.", "17. On 22 December 2010 and 18 January 2011 the SPAS went to the applicants’ home in order to assess the children’s situation and advise the applicants about the measures to be taken in order to meet the DGASPC’s recommendations (see paragraph 13 above). According to the SPAS, the second applicant was very recalcitrant, insulted the social-service employees, refused access to the children and declined to provide them with information about the children. In the reports drawn up after these two visits, the SPAS mentioned that the house was still poorly maintained, that the windows were covered with plastic tarpaulins, and that the door was damaged. It indicated that the children’s situation did not seem to have improved since the monitory of the family had begun, and emphasised the applicants’ refusal to cooperate with the social services and their failure to fulfil their parental obligations. In view of these findings, it suggested that a protective measure be imposed in respect of the children.", "18. On 28 January 2011 a set of measures was prepared in the context of protecting the applicants’ children, “as a result of the parents’ lack of investment in their role, consisting in providing the minimal conditions necessary to raise [their children], care for them, oversee their satisfactory development, educate them and monitor their health”. The SPAS continued to monitor the children’s situation and ensure that welfare benefits were paid to the applicants.", "19. A new report, drawn up on 25 February 2011, indicated that the applicants’ family had little contact with others and that the parents were not collaborating with the social services in respect of the monitoring of their children; their neighbours alleged that they behaved aggressively and that their children were still neglected. This report recommended that a protective measure be adopted in respect of the children.", "20. On 16 and 17 March 2011 the DGASPC drew up two reports about the applicants’ children. These noted the unsanitary conditions in the house, the very poor hygiene conditions and the applicants’ neglect of their children. With regard to this last aspect, the DGASPC noted that the applicants took little interest in their children’s health and refused to send them to school, to participate in social activities and to have contact with others. In its view, the applicants were refusing to cooperate with the authorities in improving the children’s situation. The reports concluded that, given the seriousness of the state of neglect faced by the children and the parents’ lack of agreement to protective measures, emergency placement of the underage children was recommended.", "21. On 21 March 2011 the DGASPC drew up individual protection plans for the applicants’ children, specifying their needs, the persons responsible for them and the support to be provided to the family.", "22. At the DGASPC’s request, in two separate judgments of 6 April 2011 the Călăraşi County Court (the “county court”) ordered the children’s emergency placement and transferred parental rights in their respect to the president of the Călăraşi County Council.", "23. In the absence of appeals, these judgments became final.", "24. On 4 August 2011, in spite of the applicants’ objections, employees of the DGASPC, assisted by a bailiff, police officers and a psychologist gave effect to the judgments of 6 April 2011 (see paragraph 22 above). In consequence, the youngest child, I., was placed with a child-minder in Călăraşi, a town situated about 38 km from the village in which the applicants lived; the oldest children were placed together in a residential centre situated about 88 km from the applicants’ home.", "25. The children underwent psychological and medical tests after being taken into care by the authorities. The test report noted that serious deficiencies had been observed in the children, “resulting from neglect by the parents”. Thus, according to the report, I. was suffering from “recent cerebral paroxysmal events, microcytic hypochromic anaemia and weight‑related hypotrophy”, as a result of which she had been admitted to hospital urgently. As to the children’s intellectual development, the report noted “slight delayed development ... in all the children; speech issues, a limited vocabulary, a minimal level of socialisation, [and] a tendency to withdraw from others”.", "26. On 5 August 2011 the DGASPC drew up a report on the six oldest children, noting as follows:\n“... The conclusions of the social services’ report indicate shortcomings in the place of residence (the dwelling belongs to C.G.; ..., the habitable area is insufficient and it is furnished and equipped to a minimal standard; the hygiene conditions are precarious, there are significant shortcomings [in housework and in maintaining] cleanliness in the house and also in terms of personal hygiene, clean clothing and food hygiene); financial [difficulties] – [the family’s income] is made up of an allowance for a person with second-degree disability [on account of a] psychological disorder, amounting to 234 [RON], and of State child benefit, amounting to 540 [RON]. It should be noted that although both parents live in the village of Mănăstirea, [the second applicant] has never taken steps to be registered as resident in this municipality... [The first applicant] did not attend school and is not in any paid employment.\n... the parents’ conduct was found to be negligent...: [they] did not look after or take elementary steps to provide for [their children’s] health (none of the children was registered with a doctor); provided no educational stimulation to their children, had not registered them in nursery school and had limited their right [to take part in] socialisation [activities]. In this context, [the social inquiry report has indicated] language difficulties in six of the children and anxious behaviour (dread, remaining on the side-lines, retreating from strangers, lack of confidence) on account of [their fear] of being kidnapped for organ trafficking.\n... [The applicants] are known in the community as individuals who generate conflict and tensions, and who frequently accuse, criticise and insult the local authorities and their neighbours for financial reasons (they ask for additional benefits, etc.)...\nSimilar tensions exist in the relationship between the [applicants] and members of their extended family ... The latter have stated that they are unwilling and unable to take care of [the applicants’] children, with whom they have no contact. Although [the applicants have] received psychological and educational assistance to help them fulfil their role, meet their parental obligations and to make conscious provision for the [essential] needs in raising [the children], overseeing their satisfactory development and educating them, their case has continued to be monitored by the SPAS representatives; [however,] they have been unable to enter the [applicants’] home, as communication has always been difficult and accompanied by accusations and threats.\n[The applicants] have been informed of the effect of neglect on the children’s development and about the option [that is available to the authorities] to limit their parental rights where cases of abuse through negligence are found. The protection measures available have been described to them, including maintaining normal relationships with the children throughout the period of separation from the family. The parents have vehemently rejected the appropriate protection measures and have refused to accept the intervention of specialised authorities.”", "27. Also on 5 August 2011, I. was examined by a DGASPC psychologist. It was established on that occasion that the child suffered, among other problems, from delayed motor development and language acquisition, and emotional shortcomings. The psychologist recommended cognitive stimulation, particularly in terms of language. Having regard to the findings of this report, the family’s precarious financial position and the parents’ lack of cooperation in spite of the psychological and educational advice provided by the social services, the DGASPC considered that it was necessary to replace the emergency placement measure in respect of I. by a temporary placement order.", "28. The DGASPC submitted two requests to the county court, seeking to have the emergency placement measure replaced by a temporary placement order. It presented the children’s situation as described in the reports of 5 August 2011 (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above) and indicated that no alternative form of care by a family member had been identified.", "29. The applicants, who were present at the hearing and represented by a lawyer acting pro bono, called for the action brought by the DGASPC to be dismissed. They submitted that, in spite of their lack of resources, they were bringing up their children satisfactorily and that the children were not ill.", "30. In two judgments of 7 September 2011 the country court, basing its decision essentially on section 66 of Law no. 272/2004, ordered that the children be temporarily placed in care: by an initial judgment, I. was placed with a child-minder; by the second judgment, the six other children were placed in a special residential centre. Parental rights in respect of all the children were assigned to the president of the Călăraşi County Council.", "31. In reaching this conclusion, the county court noted in its two judgments that the evidence in the case-file indicated that the applicants’ home was not a suitable place to bring up children, as the floor space was too small and poorly equipped, and there was no guarantee that it was clean. It also noted that serious shortcomings had been observed with regard to the personal hygiene and diet of family members. It noted the parents’ negligence with regard to the children’s health and their refusal to send them to school or allow them to take part in social activities. It also noted that, according to the documents in the files, the children’s language development was delayed; they displayed anxiety-related behaviours which, in the county court’s view, had been transmitted by their parents; and there were delays in the development of I.’s motor skills.", "32. The county court added that although the applicants had received psychological and pedagogical advice to help them fulfil their parental duties, they had difficulties in grasping the children’s needs and, through their conduct, still demonstrated negligence towards the underage children. It held that, for the time being, the applicants were not providing the necessary conditions for their children’s satisfactory development and that it was in the children’s best interests to be placed in care on a temporary basis.", "33. The applicants lodged appeals against those judgments. They asked for the action brought by the DGASPC to be dismissed and submitted written evidence.", "34. On 22 and 23 September 2011 the applicants’ six oldest children underwent individual psychological tests. These revealed that all of the children were slightly behind their age cohorts in terms of social and educational development and indicated that they required cognitive and educational stimulation. The children began attending school.", "35. By a final judgment of 7 November 2011, the Bucharest Court of Appeal (“the appeal court”) dismissed the applicants’ appeal against the judgment of 7 September 2011 concerning their six oldest children. It held that the placement measure was justified by the precarious nature of the applicants’ living conditions and by their attitude towards their children. It noted the temporary nature of the measure, which was due to be lifted once the applicants had submitted the necessary financial and non-financial guarantees with regard to raising their children.", "36. By a final judgment of 28 November 2011, the appeal court dismissed the applicants’ appeal against the judgment of 7 September 2011 in respect of I.’s placement. After endorsing the reasoning set out in the first-instance judgment, the appeal court considered that the lawfulness of its findings was confirmed by other evidence added to the case file, such as, for example, the medical report in respect of this child (see paragraph 22 above).", "37. Following the temporary placement of their children in care, the applicants had work done on the house to improve their living conditions.", "38. At their request, on 10 January 2012 the DGASPC carried out a social inquiry visit to their home. In its subsequent report, it was noted that the applicants had improved their living conditions by furnishing the house to a minimum level and that they now had electricity and access to drinking water. However, the DGASPC noted that the toilet area was not equipped in such a way as to permit privacy and that various sections of the roof had been visibly damaged by storms. After drawing attention to the family’s income, it noted that the applicants had made efforts to maintain contact with their children, whom they had visited on two occasions since they were placed in care, and that the first applicant, at her initiative, had accompanied one of the children to hospital when he was ill. It added that the applicants had stated that they could not afford to travel more frequently to visit the children.", "39. The above-mentioned report further indicated that the municipal authorities, through their representative, had contacted the applicants to propose assistance, which the second applicant had refused. However, the applicants had apparently begun to cooperate with the authorities and to show an interest in maintaining contact with their children and in what they had to do so that the placement measures could be ended. In this connection, the local authorities had encouraged the second applicant to register his residence at the first applicant’s address so that they could receive financial assistance from the municipality, and had informed him of the formalities to be completed. They had been offered psychological testing with a view to joining, as appropriate, a family-support programme to develop and consolidate their parenting skills. The applicants had apparently refused to undergo this testing.", "40. Having regard to those factors, the DGASPC concluded that, for the time being, the conditions for ensuring the children’s safe return to the applicants had not been met: it emphasised the lack of fuel for heating the house and the second applicant’s lack of cooperation with the authorities. It explained that it would be better to delay the children’s return to their family and that the parents needed to achieve a certain level of progress, under the SPAS’s supervision, to acquire the necessary skills to ensure their children’s safety and to be informed of the potential risks to the children. It added that the children’s return to their family in the near future was not to be ruled out; in its view, however, given the need to improve certain conditions so as to ensure their safety, the applicants’ fluctuating attitude in their communication with the authorities and the applicants’ difficulties in grasping and responding to the children’s needs, the placement measure ought to be maintained for the time being.", "41. On 17 January 2012 the DGASPC asked the SPAS to continue to monitor and advise the applicants’ family and to indicate to it those aspects that it still considered deficient in the visit that had been carried out on 10 January 2012 (see paragraphs 38 to 40 above). It also asked the SPAS to inform it of the measures taken to improve the applicants’ living conditions.", "42. On 14 February 2012, following the DGASPC’s request (see paragraph 41 above), the SPAS made another visit to the applicants’ home. On this occasion, it was noted that the applicants were maintaining contact with their children by telephone, since it was difficult for them to travel to the residential centre on account of the wintery weather conditions. The visit report established that the applicants’ physical living conditions had improved and that they had had work done to clean the house. The applicants had promised to enrol the children in school, register them with a doctor, and cooperate with the authorities. The SPAS concluded that the applicants’ living conditions had improved in comparison with those existing when their children were placed in care and that the return of all the children to their family could be envisaged.", "43. In the meantime, on 11 January 2012 the applicants had brought an action against the DGASPC before the county court. They requested that the emergency placement order in respect of their seven children be lifted and that they be returned to the family home. They argued that their living conditions were of a satisfactory standard for raising their children, and submitted to the case file a copy of the agricultural register showing that they had free accommodation, and also an electricity bill, evidence of their income and documents stating that three of their seven children were enrolled in school. They added that the children were not being cared for properly in the residential centre.", "44. The DGASPC did not follow the SPAS’s recommendation (see paragraph 42 above) and asked for the action to be dismissed on the grounds that, although the material living conditions in the applicants’ home had improved, this aspect was not sufficient to ensure the children’s safety. Nonetheless, the social inquiry report on the SPAS’s visit of 14 February 2012 (see paragraph 42 above) was included in the case file.", "45. By a judgment of 15 February 2012, the county court dismissed the applicants’ action on the ground that, in spite of the improvement in their living conditions, they had no other income apart from the allowances they received for their children and that there was no guarantee that these were used exclusively to care for the children. The court stated that those allowances had to cover the needs of the whole family.", "46. The applicants lodged an appeal. They argued that they provided appropriate living conditions to ensure their children’s physical, intellectual and moral development. In addition, the county court had wrongly concluded that their only source of income was from the child allowances, whereas, in their submission, the second applicant was in receipt of two allowances and of income for day-work carried out for various inhabitants of the village. They added that they believed that the family’s income ought to benefit the parents, but more especially the children.", "47. The DGASPC requested that the temporary placement measure be maintained.", "48. No new evidence was added to the case file.", "49. By a judgment of 20 March 2012, the appeal court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. Referring to sections 2, 66 and 68 § 2 of Law no. 272/2004, it considered that the circumstance which had led to the children’s temporary placement in care had changed only in part, and held that the contested measure was to be maintained.", "50. In its judgment, the appeal court began by setting out the reasons justifying the temporary placement measure (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above) and stated that since the children had been placed in care the applicants had visited their six children in the residential centre twice and had visited I. once.", "51. It further noted that, since being placed in care, the children had been examined and treated by a doctor and had joined nursery or primary schools, depending on their age. It noted that the children were all receiving assistance in school from a specialised educator who was monitoring each child’s situation and involving them in specially selected activities to enable them to catch up in those areas where academic delays had been observed when they were placed in care. It stated that, on the basis of the documents in the case file, the children had progressed in terms of independence, personal hygiene and diet since being placed in care and were developing positively.", "52. The appeal court then described the first meeting that had taken place in November between the applicants and the six children who were housed in the residential centre. After describing the children’s reactions, it concluded that the meeting had proceeded normally; the applicants had eaten a meal and played with the children. It noted that the applicants had not expressed any dissatisfaction to the staff about their children’s condition. It further noted that, since that meeting, the applicants had contacted the children by telephone and continued to express their fear that their children would be kidnapped for organ trafficking. However, it noted that the second applicant had refused to give his personal telephone number to the child-care staff so that he could be informed about any issue concerning the children, and that communication was possible only when he himself called the residential centre.", "53. The appeal court then compared the conditions considered necessary by the DGASPC for the children to be returned to their family (see paragraphs 38 and 39 above) with the SPAS’s findings during the social inquiry visit of 14 February 2012 (see paragraph 42 above). It noted that although the applicants had satisfied certain of the conditions imposed by the DGASPC, there remained room for improvement. It held:\n“The conditions for the children’s reintegration [into the family] have not been met, given that the other criteria laid down by the DGASPC to ensure the children’s safety are not fulfilled: [namely,] the parents’ involvement and cooperation...; the repair of the roof; registration of the [second] applicant’s home in Mănăstirea in order to be able to receive welfare payments; maintenance of links with the children by increasing the regularity of visits; acceptance of their parental responsibilities (registering the children with a doctor, enrolling them in primary and nursery school); the fact of finding employment; improved relations with the other members of the community; undergoing the psychological tests proposed by the DGASPC’s specialists to ascertain their level of parental skills, so as to be able to include them, if appropriate, in a parental support programme and thus develop and consolidate their parental skills; the prevention of major risks to the underage children by accepting monitoring by the Mănăstirea SPAS.\n....\nAt the same time, the appeal court notes that it has not been conclusively shown that the applicants have sufficient financial resources to support all of their children and to request [the latter’s] return to their family. The two allowances ... received by the [second] applicant, amounting to a total of 646 RON per month, do not represent a source of income that is sufficient to raise and educate seven children, who currently live in better conditions that those that their parents could provide them with. In addition, no evidence has been submitted proving that the applicants have received additional income through day-work carried out in the municipality by the second applicant ....”", "54. The appeal court concluded that, in any event, the improvements in the applicants’ living conditions noted in the social inquiry report which had been added to the case file (see paragraph 42 above) was not the only condition that the applicants had to fulfil before being able to request their children’s return. According to the appeal court, the applicants had still to fulfil the other conditions laid down by the DGASPC, which were intended to ensure that the children’s best interests were protected.", "55. A social inquiry report drawn up on 2 April 2012 noted that the family’s material conditions had improved, that the applicants were maintaining contact with their children by telephone and that they visited them once a month, the municipal authorities having provided them with fuel for these journeys. The report stated that the family’s monthly income consisted in two allowances received by the second applicant, amounting to a total of RON 646. It was suggested that the municipal authorities make an emergency payment of RON 1,800 to the applicants for repair of the house’s roof and the installation of toilets.", "56. By a decision of 4 April 2012, the municipal council granted the first applicant the above-mentioned RON 1,800 in emergency aid.", "57. On 10 April 2012 the applicants had a confidential interview with a psychologist from the DGASPC. Having been informed of the purpose of the interview, namely to assess their parental skills with a view to the children’s return to the family, the applicants replied to questions. The report drawn up after this interview indicated that the applicants had low parenting skills: they met only their children’s basic needs and were unaware of the effects that their conduct could have on the children’s development. It suggested that the applicants be included in a psychological support programme so as to develop and consolidate their parental skills, inform them about how to exercise their rights, put their parental responsibilities into practice and improve their skills in developing relationships with the wider community.", "58. On 17 April 2012 the second applicant registered his home address at the first applicant’s home.", "59. A visit to the applicants’ home by social services on 26 April 2012 revealed that their living conditions had improved, that the applicants had cooperated with the authorities and that they had begun to take the steps recommended to them for the children’s well-being. The DGASPC suggested that the six children who had been placed in the residential centre be reintegrated into their family.", "60. In May 2012 the children underwent psychological tests, which revealed an improvement in their general condition since they had been placed in care.", "61. By a report of 5 May 2012, the DGASPC noted that the family’s situation had improved, that the applicants had visited their son regularly, shown an interest in his health and displayed affection towards him. It also indicated that meetings had been organised not only between I. and his parents but also with his brothers and sisters. Emphasising the clear interest shown by the applicants towards their child, the DGASPC proposed that the placement measure be ended.", "62. On 7 May 2012 the DGASPC brought an action before the county court requesting that I. be returned to the applicants’ home.", "63. By a judgment of 23 May 2012, the county court decided that it was in I.’s best interests to be returned to his family, especially as the conditions for his satisfactory development had been met and his relationship with his family was very strong.", "64. On 21 June 2012 I. was returned to the applicants’ home.", "65. On 7 May 2012 the DGASPC and the applicants brought an action before the county court requesting that the temporary placement order in respect of the six other children be lifted.", "66. By a judgment of 23 May 2012, the county court dismissed the action. The applicants and the DGASPC lodged an appeal against that judgment.", "67. While that appeal was still pending, the six children spent the summer holiday at the applicants’ home, at their parents’ request. On 10 July 2012 the social services visited the applicants’ home, in the presence of the children. This visit indicated that the children would be able to live and develop in satisfactory conditions in the home. The report on this visit was added to the case file before the appeal court.", "68. By a final judgment of 22 August 2012, the appeal court set aside the first-instance judgment and ordered that the children be returned to their family. It pointed out that Law no. 272/2004 sought to protect the best interests of the child and that the public authorities were required to help ensure that children developed and were raised within their families, and explained:\n“... although the provision of a certain level of material comfort is an essential element for minors’ development, [it is nevertheless the case that] an inadequate income does not in itself represent an insurmountable obstacle to the children’s return to their family, provided that the parents show a genuine interest in raising the children themselves...”.", "69. The appeal court held that, given the improvement in the applicants’ living conditions through assistance from the public authorities, and the change in their conduct towards their children, it was in those children’s best interests to re-join their family.\n..." ]
[ "8" ]
[ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 58, 62, 64 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Antalya.", "5. The applicant is a teacher in a high school. At the material time he was a member of the local branch of the trade union of Education and Science Workers (Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası).", "6. In May 2009, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the applicant for putting up a notice encouraging the participation in a press statement published by his Union on the notice board that was set aside for that particular purpose in their office, and for distributing it in one of the common areas at school.", "7. On 30 September 2009 the District Directorate of National Education imposed a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand on him, for putting up and distributing notices produced by the trade union, of which he was a member, under Article 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants.", "8. On 6 October 2009 the applicant objected to this decision and requested its annulment.", "9. On 15 October 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the Kepez district governor dismissed the applicant’s objection considering that the contested decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment." ]
[ "11" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Ajdovščina. She is the mother of Branko Štefančič, born in 1961. Mr Štefančič suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and depression and had been admitted to the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital on several occasions. In 2007 he lodged an extensive criminal complaint, alleging that he had suffered various injustices at the hands of his work colleagues, acquaintances, the police and other organisations. Upon examining the complaint, the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office decided not to pursue it. In June 2008 Mr Štefančič started to telephone the Prosecutor’s Office and go there in person on an almost daily basis. He made various delusional accusations regarding murders that had gone unpunished “since the age of Christ”.", "6. On 19 June 2008 Mr Štefančič appeared at the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office, and was told by the receptionist that the office was closed that day. He replied that he would come back the next day, armed, and that nobody would be able to hide from him. Having been told about Mr Štefančič’s threats, the Head of the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office, B.O., telephoned the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital and told the staff what had happened. She was told that Mr Štefančič was mentally ill and had already been treated in the hospital several times. She was further advised to contact the Ajdovščina Community Health Centre and suggest that a referral be made for Mr Štefančič’s involuntary confinement. In addition, B.O. was warned by Mr Štefančič’s consulting psychiatrist that over the past few weeks his patient had threatened to kill several people, including his doctor, mother and sisters. In view of this, the psychiatrist had assessed that Mr Štefančič was dangerous and in need of treatment, and added that he should be taken seriously due to his physical strength. B.O. also called the Nova Gorica police and told them about Mr Štefančič’s visits to the Prosecutor’s Office.", "7. At 5.30 p.m. a doctor from the health centre telephoned the Ajdovščina police station to request police assistance with Mr Štefančič’s involuntary confinement on the grounds that he could become aggressive. She later took the request for his police-assisted transport and the order for his confinement to the police station in person.", "8. At 5.55 p.m. the duty officer submitted the request to the commander of the police station, who granted it immediately.", "9. At 6 p.m. officer J.T. from the Ajdovščina police station set off to the applicant’s house and found her son, who was living there, at home. He informed officers at the Nova Gorica police communications centre, and they informed the health centre staff that they could proceed with the involuntary confinement. Police officer J.T. remained at the scene until health centre medical staff consisting of B.A., the doctor on duty, and S.M. and I.P., medical technicians, arrived. Also sent to the scene were D.K., a second officer from the Ajdovščina police station, police officer dog handler J.K., and two traffic officers of the Nova Gorica traffic police.", "10. According to the police report of 31 July 2008 based on the statements made by the police officers and medical staff, upon their arrival at around 8 p.m. the police officers and medical technicians first talked to the applicant, who was sitting on a bench at the back of her house. They asked her whether her son was in the house and whether he was armed. She replied that her son was indeed in the house and was on the telephone. She further explained that she was not aware of him possessing any firearms. The medical team informed the applicant why they were there and then entered the house, while the police officers remained at the front door.", "11. Dr B.A. informed Mr Štefančič that they were going to take him to a psychiatric hospital, but he refused to go with them. The medical team attempted to persuade him, but he became agitated and verbally aggressive. The police officers warned him that he would be taken to the hospital by force if he refused to go of his own free will.", "12. The medical technicians attempted to take hold of Mr Štefančič’s arms, but he pushed them off and started to scream. Dr B.A. then instructed the police officers to handcuff him, but when J.T. and D.K. attempted to restrain him, he resisted forcefully and pushed them off. In response, the police officers used physical force in order to push him to the ground, and J.K. ordered a muzzled dog on a leash to jump at him. As Mr Štefančič did not seem to react to the dog jumping at his chest, J.K. took it back to the police car. J.T. and D.K. meanwhile continued to use physical force and managed to wrestle Mr Štefančič to the ground onto his back.", "13. The two police officers were then joined by dog handler J.K., who used the “rear chokehold” technique on Mr Štefančič. Together they managed to put him into the recovery position and medical technician S.M. injected Haldol (an antipsychotic drug with tranquilising effects) into his buttocks. As Mr Štefančič continued to resist, they could not administer the full dose of medication to him. The police officers then turned him onto his stomach, and J.T. handcuffed his hands behind his back. Medical technician I.P. injected him with Akineton, medication used on psychiatric patients to reduce the tremors caused by antipsychotic drugs.", "14. Mr Štefančič calmed down as soon as he received the second dose of medication. A few moments later, the police officers and medical technicians noticed that there was a brown palm-sized pool of liquid under his head. They alerted Dr B.A., who established that Mr Štefančič had vomited and assessed that it could have been attributed to exertion. However, when one of the medical technicians checked Mr Štefančič again, he detected an irregular heartbeat, and again called out to the doctor. The medical team began to resuscitate him at 8.10 p.m. The police officers attempted to unlock his handcuffs, but only managed to free one of his hands, before the key broke.", "15. The applicant, who was waiting outside during the intervention, was heading to the front of the house when she heard loud noises and a dog barking. When she approached the front door, she saw Dr B.A. massaging her son’s chest. She asked the police officers what was going on, to which one of them replied that they were resuscitating her son. Another ambulance arrived at the scene at 8.42 p.m., and an electrocardiogram was performed on Mr Štefančič, but to no avail. At 8.45 p.m. Dr B.A. pronounced him dead. He attributed the death to a heart attack or stroke.", "16. Immediately after Mr Štefančič’s death, the officers from the Ajdovščina police station notified the Nova Gorica police communications centre of the incident and secured the area. The duty State prosecutor and the duty investigating judge of the Nova Gorica District Court were also notified of the death. The investigating judge attended the scene and ordered a forensic examination of the body. The medical file and equipment used in his resuscitation were also seized.", "17. On 20 June 2008 police officers D.K., J.T. and J.K. made records of the methods of restraint they had used on Mr Štefančič (physical force, handcuffs and the police dog), which were confirmed by their superior officers to have been lawful.", "18. In the days after the incident, an officer of the Nova Gorica police took statements from the police officers and medical staff involved in the incident, as well as from the applicant.", "19. The applicant stated that on the evening of 19 June 2008 several police cars and an ambulance drove to the house and an officer asked her whether her son was keeping firearms. She replied that he was not, as far as she was aware. The applicant remained outside during the intervention and could not remember exactly how the events unfolded. She heard screaming, but was afraid to go inside. Sometime later she looked into the hallway and saw her son lying on the floor, surrounded by Dr B.A. and the medical technicians. She asked them what was going on, and they replied that they were resuscitating her son. She noticed that he had vomited.", "20. D.K. and J.T., police officers, stated that upon entering the house, Mr Štefančič, who appeared to be talking on the telephone, told the medical technicians that he would not go with them, and D.K. and J.T. then warned him that they would use force if necessary. Dr B.A. also tried to convince him to go with them without success and he then instructed the officers to handcuff him. D.K. and J.T. took him by the arms to lead him to the ambulance but he resisted strongly. Dog handler J.K. attempted to calm him down by ordering the police dog to jump at him but Mr Štefančič did not react to the dog’s attack. The officers struggled to wrestle him to the ground and eventually succeeded in pushing him to the ground on his back; they then turned him onto his stomach, but he continued to resist forcefully. Dog handler J.K. then used the so-called “rear chokehold” technique on him, and together they managed to turn him onto his side. One of the medical technicians then administered the first dose of medication to him, whereupon he was again turned onto his stomach and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. The second dose of medication was then administered to him and he calmed down.", "21. After Mr Štefančič received the second dose of medication, D.K. noticed a brown palm-sized pool of liquid under his head. Somebody mentioned that it was vomit and D.K. then asked if that was right. Dr B.A. was on the telephone arranging for Mr Štefančič’s transport to the psychiatric hospital but upon hearing D.K.’s question checked Mr Štefančič and said that the vomiting was due to exertion. J.T. confirmed that Dr B.A. initially said that Mr Štefančič was okay and vomited from exertion but added that the doctor did not check Mr Štefančič’s pupils or pulse. Then one of the medical technicians looked at Mr Štefančič again and checked his pulse. He called out to the doctor, saying that something was not right as he was breathing irregularly. Officer J.T. then attempted to unlock the handcuffs, and managed to get the one on his right hand off before the key broke. The medical staff started to resuscitate him. The whole incident, from the beginning of the police intervention until the beginning of the resuscitation procedure, only lasted a few minutes, five at the most.", "22. J.K., a police dog handler, confirmed that he had first joined the intervention by ordering the police dog, which was muzzled, to jump at Mr Štefančič, who, however, made no attempt to shake the dog off or to withdraw from the attack. Therefore J.K. took the dog back to his car and then returned to the house, where officers D.K. and J.T. were not able to turn Mr Štefančič onto his stomach. J.K. helped them by holding him in a rear chokehold and together they managed to turn him onto his stomach and handcuff him. As this was going on, one of the medical technicians injected medication into his buttocks. J.K. also confirmed his colleagues’ accounts as to how the resuscitation of Mr Štefančič proceeded after it was discovered that he had vomited.", "23. I.P., a medical technician, stated that on his arrival, he first asked the applicant a few questions and then entered her house with his colleague S.M. According to both medical technicians, Mr Štefančič pretended to be speaking on the telephone. I.P. explained to him that he was being taken to the psychiatric hospital to see a psychiatrist. Mr Štefančič refused to go and Dr B.A. ordered him to be handcuffed. As regards the events that ensued concerning the use of force by the police officers, I.P.’s statement matched the statements of police officers D.K., J.T. and J.K. (see paragraphs 20‑22 above), while S.M. did not pay much attention to the police operation, as he was preparing a syringe of Haldol.", "24. As soon as the police officers managed to wrestle Mr Štefančič to the ground and turn him onto his side, S.M. injected him with Haldol. S.M. added that because Mr Štefančič forcefully resisted, he could not administer the full dose of medication to him. He then left the house. While the police officers turned Mr Štefančič onto his stomach, I.P. administered the second injection into his buttocks and he calmed down. I.P. then noticed that he was not breathing or was struggling to breathe. As far as he could remember, he called out that Mr Štefančič was not breathing. Dr B.A. approached him and saw him take a breath, concluding that he was breathing. S.M., standing outside, stated that he had not seen when and how Mr Štefančič had started to vomit, but heard the exchange between his colleague and Dr B.A. The doctor then left the house and started to arrange Mr Štefančič’s transport to the hospital. I.P. checked Mr Štefančič again and exclaimed that he was not breathing. Together with the police officers they turned Mr Štefančič onto his back and I.P. noticed that he was cyanotic. He also noticed traces of vomit on Mr Štefančič’s face, so he first protected his airways. The police officers had by then removed the handcuffs from him. His colleague S.M., who confirmed that Mr Štefančič looked grey and had traces of vomit on his face, fetched the resuscitation kit from the ambulance. Together with Dr B.A. they had intubated him; however, even at the beginning of resuscitation, his pupils were dilated, which was also a bad sign. I.P. also stated that the whole incident, from the use of physical force on Mr Štefančič until the beginning of the resuscitation procedure, only lasted a few minutes, five at the most. I.P.’s account was confirmed in substance by traffic officer M.D., who together with his colleague A.K. guarded the back entrance to the applicant’s house and thus only heard part of the incident.", "25. Medical technician S.M. expressed the view that the police officers might have used excessive force in dealing with Mr Štefančič. He added that though Mr Štefančič had refused to go to the psychiatric hospital, he had not been particularly aggressive, and above all, had not physically attacked anyone.", "26. Dr B.A., a general practitioner, stated that Mr Štefančič’s psychiatrist expected that he might behave aggressively so he received instructions to give him an injection of two ampoules of Haldol and one ampoule of Akineton. Although in the beginning of the intervention Mr Štefančič appeared agitated, but not aggressive, he started to resist forcefully when the police officers attempted to handcuff him.", "27. According to Dr B.A., after Mr Štefančič was handcuffed and calmed down, he came out of the applicant’s house and started to arrange his transport. One of the police officers then called out to him that something was not right, that Mr Štefančič had vomited and was having trouble breathing. He was immediately turned onto his back. Dr B.A. noticed that Mr Štefančič had turned blue in the face and that he was wheezing. The medical team then started the resuscitation procedure, massaging his heart and intubating him, as well as administering 1 mg of adrenaline and 3 mg of atropine to him. However, as they did not have an electrocardiogram monitor or a defibrillator, another ambulance was called. By the time the second ambulance arrived at 8.42 p.m., they could only establish that Mr Štefančič had died.", "28. On 21 July 2008 a criminal investigations officer of the Nova Gorica police obtained an oral preliminary report from the forensic pathologist who had performed the autopsy of Mr Štefančič. According to him, the deceased had most likely died of asphyxiation from inhaling gastric contents (choking on his own vomit). With regard to the question of potential liability for Mr Štefančič’s death, he took the view that the asphyxiation occurred during the police intervention, and that the presence of a doctor could not have altered the course of events. He added that the doctor could only be accused of negligence if the death had occurred during the resuscitation, which in his opinion had not been the case.", "29. On 31 July 2008 the head of the Nova Gorica police criminal investigations unit submitted a report of the incident to the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office. Based on a statement provided by the forensic pathologist who conducted the forensic examination, the report stated asphyxiation from inhaling gastric contents as the cause of Mr Štefančič’s death. As to the events leading to the death, the police report summarised the statements given by the intervention team and stated that Mr Štefančič had resisted the police officers who had tried to take him to the psychiatric hospital, whereupon physical force had been used on him. After Mr Štefančič had been restrained and had calmed down, the police officers and medical technicians had noticed that he had vomited. After Dr B.A. had initially assessed that this could be attributed to exertion, he had been found to have an irregular heartbeat and the medical team had tried to resuscitate him, but to no avail. As regards the question of potential liability for Mr Štefančič’s death, the police report followed the forensic pathologist’s opinion that he had died during the police intervention and that his death could not have been prevented by any medical assistance. The report concluded by saying that no facts had been established giving rise to a suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed in connection with the death of Mr Štefančič which warranted criminal prosecution.", "30. On 10 September 2008 the completed forensic report was submitted to the investigating judge of the District Court, confirming asphyxiation from inhaling gastric contents as the immediate cause of Mr Štefančič’s death. In addition to the trauma consistent with the cause of death, the examination revealed a number of blunt injuries to various parts of his body.", "31. These included contusions on the outer edge of the shoulder blade, the left of the back and the back of the right thigh, swelling on the right of the hairline and the squamous part of the temporal bone, contusions on the inside of the upper right arm and left forearm and on the front of the left thigh. Several haematomas were recorded around the left shoulder blade, on the outer edge of the right shoulder blade, on the right of the thorax and on the scalp, as well as a pulmonary oedema, an oblique fracture of the fifth rib, bruising around the lumbar spine, and brain swelling.", "32. According to the report, these injuries had either been caused by Mr Štefančič’s body being struck by an object, by part of his body being pressed against something, by him falling, or by his body being pressed between two hard surfaces. As regards the injuries to the back of his body, hairline and front left thigh, the forensic pathologist concluded that they had most likely occurred by him falling or falling after being struck, and that the bruises were caused by the body being pulled to the ground.", "33. The toxicology report revealed a low concentration of haloperidol (an antipsychotic drug with strong calming effects) in Mr Štefančič’s blood. The forensic report concluded that the substance had been consumed either as a prescription medicine or administered during the intervention in order to calm him down, but could not be linked to his death or identified as the cause of his vomiting.", "34. No particularities or disease-related changes had been found in Mr Štefančič’s system which could have directly contributed to his death.", "35. With regard to enquiries made by the investigating judge as to whether Mr Štefančič’s death could have been prevented by prompt and adequate medical assistance, the forensic report stated:\n“Disregarding the particular circumstances surrounding the incident, this question could be answered in the affirmative; however, one cannot neglect the exceptional circumstances in which the incident occurred.\nPrompt and adequate medical assistance could have saved the life of [Mr Štefančič], even in the event that no ambulance with resuscitation equipment was immediately available.\nIt is likely that [Mr Štefančič] was thrown or pushed to the ground where, prior to being handcuffed, his body was pushed down by applying body weight or some other pressure. [Being struck or pushed in] the stomach most likely induced the vomiting. In so far as the medical staff or the officers assisting them in the involuntary confinement had noticed in due course that [Mr Štefančič] began to vomit, they could have prevented him from inhaling gastric contents either by lifting his body into a vertical position or by turning him onto his side and mechanically clearing his oral cavity by using their fingers or an aspirator (if an aspirator was at the disposal of the medical staff). However, it was not possible to apply any of these measures to an aggressive patient resisting hospitalisation; it is only possible to apply such measures after the patient has calmed down or lost consciousness as a result of disruption in the exchange of gases following the aspiration of gastric contents. Having regard to the agitation and aggressiveness of the patient, as well as the circumstances of the incident, such measures almost certainly could not have been applied.\nThe deceased only lost consciousness when his breathing was disrupted by inhaling massive amounts of gastric contents. Only then was it possible to apply more aggressive medical intervention (mechanical clearing of the oral cavity, suction of gastric contents from the oral cavity and respiratory tract, removal of potentially larger foreign objects and insertion of a tube with a balloon to prevent continuing aspiration of gastric contents, ventilation of the patient), which could not be performed on a conscious person, in particular on an aggressive person, due to the unpleasant feelings such an intervention induces. In the present case, the aspiration of gastric contents was particularly massive and aggressive, which is indicated by the pieces of food found by the histological analysis to be present even in the alveoli, the final branching of the respiratory system.\nIn the present case it was not possible, once the deceased lost consciousness, to apply those methods and to suck the gastric contents from the respiratory passages and alveoli; considering the quantity and force of the aspiration of gastric contents, medical assistance probably would not have saved the life of [Mr Štefančič].”", "36. On 18 September 2008 the investigating judge of the Nova Gorica District Court sent the statements of the persons involved in the incident, a record of the examination of the scene, the order for a forensic examination of Mr Štefančič’s body and the forensic report to the State Prosecutor’s Office.", "37. On 23 September 2008 the Head of the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office, B.O., informed the District Court that the conditions had not been met for the institution of criminal proceedings, and that the case file had been archived.", "38. On 20 January 2009 the applicant, through her representative, lodged a criminal complaint against police officers J.T., D.K. and J.K., whereby she stated that her son had been strangled and had died as a result of an unnecessary and unprofessional police intervention. The applicant also stated that the forensic report was misleading and there were doubts as to its accuracy. In addition, an anonymous criminal complaint was lodged against E.G., the head of the Nova Gorica uniformed police unit. The complainant alleged that E.G. had abused his position by giving a statement at a press conference in which he had covered up the actual cause of Mr Štefančič’s death in order to prevent criminal prosecution of Dr B.A.", "39. After having reviewed the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office’s case file, on 2 June 2009 a State prosecutor from the Group of State Prosecutors for Special Matters (Skupina državnih tožilcev za posebne zadeve – hereinafter “the Special Matters Group”), which had exclusive jurisdiction over the prosecution of criminal offences committed by police officers, rejected both criminal complaints on the basis of the police and forensic reports and the media reports from the press conference on Mr Štefančič’s death.", "40. The decision to reject the criminal complaints summarised the information included in the police and forensic reports, as well as the statements given to the police by Dr B.A. and medical technicians S.M. and I.P.", "41. The State prosecutor, relying on the forensic report, concluded that Mr Štefančič’s death could have been prevented if someone had been noticed in time that he had started to vomit. However, in the case in question Mr Štefančič had been aggressive and resisted hospitalisation, and no assistance could be provided until he had calmed down. Therefore, in the State prosecutor’s opinion there was no is reasonable suspicion that the actions of J.T., D.K. and J.K., the three police officers who had restrained Mr Štefančič, constituted a criminal offence. Moreover, as regards the anonymous criminal complaint, the State prosecutor established that, according to the reports in the media, the head of the Nova Gorica uniformed police unit had stated neither that Mr Štefančič had died as a result of being administered sedatives, nor that the medical team had immediately begun resuscitation after his condition had deteriorated. Therefore, no reasonable suspicion existed that E.G. had committed a criminal offence liable to prosecution ex officio.", "42. No appeal was available to the applicant against the decision to reject her criminal complaint. However, she could take over the conduct of criminal proceedings as a “subsidiary prosecutor”." ]
[ "2" ]
[ 1, 6, 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 30, 32, 36 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicants were born in 1961 and 1967 respectively and live in Mersin and Diyarbakır.", "5. The applicants were civil servants for tax offices attached to the Ministry of Finance in Mersin and Diyarbakır. At the material time they were members of the local branch of the trade union Büro Emekçileri, which is affiliated to Trades Union Confederation of Public Employees (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-“KESK”).", "6. In March and April 2009, the applicants were informed of the disciplinary investigations that were initiated against them for having participated in a statement to the press organised by the trade union of which they were members and were invited to send their defence submissions.", "7. Subsequently, the disciplinary sanctions of warning and reprimand were imposed on the applicants for their participation in the aforementioned trade union activities under Section 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants.", "8. The applicants objected to these decisions and requested their annulment.", "9. In May 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the tax offices dismissed the applicants’ objections considering that the contested decisions were in accordance with law and there were no grounds for annulment." ]
[ "11", "13" ]
[]
[]
[ "7. The applicants were born in 1967, 1965, 1968, 1960 and 1958 respectively and live in İzmir.", "8. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.", "9. The applicants have been employed in the duty-free shops at İzmir Adnan Menderes Airport since 1993. They are members of the Tekgıda Work Union, which had signed a collective labour agreement with the General Directorate of Monopolies on Spirits and Tobacco, the applicants’ employer and formerly a State-run enterprise.", "10. During their employment the applicants operated in “work and rest cycles”. Accordingly, in the four months of the summer period they worked continuously for twenty-four hours and rested the next twenty-four hours. For the remaining eight months of the year, the winter period, they worked for twenty-four hours and rested for the next forty-eight hours. Their work schedule did not take account of weekends or public holidays as the duty‑free shops remained open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. As regards rest breaks and periods, section 22 of their collective labour agreement provided that such periods would be counted as working time and that they could not be subject to wage deductions.", "11. On 10 October 2003 the applicants, with the assistance of their lawyer, instituted individual and separate proceedings against their employer before the İzmir Labour Court. They claimed compensation for the overtime hours they had worked beyond the legal working time for the previous five years of their employment. They referred to the Labour Code in force at the material time and to their collective agreement. Both documents defined overtime as work in excess of the regular forty-five-hour working week and provided for remuneration for such work at one and a half times the regular hourly rate.", "12. On 1 November 2003 the applicants instituted new proceedings against their employer before the İzmir Labour Court and requested further remuneration for work done on weekends and public holidays and compensation for annual leave that they had not taken.", "13. Having regard to the common background of the applicants’ complaints in both sets of proceedings, the İzmir Labour Court decided to join each applicant’s proceedings and to seek an expert report concerning the calculation of their claims for overtime, weekend and public holiday pay and remuneration for unused annual leave.", "14. On 14 July 2004 the expert submitted a report in which he noted, inter alia, that clause 25 (c) of the collective agreement concluded between the parties provided for an entitlement to overtime pay, calculated on the basis of one and half times the hourly rate. He further referred to an official audit report by the Ministry of Labour, dated 10 September 2003, which noted that during the preceding summer period, between the months of June and September, workers at the company in question had worked overtime of 139.5 hours in months which had thirty-one calendar days and 135 hours in the remaining months. In the previous winter period, between October and May, they had worked 22.5 hours and fifteen hours of overtime respectively. The hours worked in excess of the legal working time should have been remunerated accordingly. According to the expert report, the applicants’ employer had previously been cautioned, on 25 November 1996, by the Ministry of Labour concerning its practices on working hours.", "15. On the basis of his examination of the company’s timekeeping records, the expert calculated the number of hours worked as overtime in respect of each applicant, deducting three hours of rest per each day worked.", "16. The expert determined that the employer did not owe anything to the applicants for weekend and public holiday work as the remuneration for those days had been in accordance with the applicable regulations. The expert also noted that the applicants could not claim any compensation for unused annual leave as they were still working at the company and such leave was only payable at the end of a contract.", "17. The applicants raised a number of objections to the expert report. They stated that the timekeeping records used for the calculation did not reflect the actual hours worked as they were unofficial copies kept by the employer, which were not signed by employees. In that regard, the applicants submitted that they had worked for more hours than established by the expert. They requested that the court take other evidence into account, including the defendant employer’s shift orders, which detailed who would work when and for how long, as well as reports from the Regional Labour Inspectorate. They also submitted that the deduction of three hours of rest per day was not based on fact but was an assumption by the expert. The applicants submitted that in any event the expert’s hypothetical conclusion on rest periods could not be relied on because the collective agreement had expressly provided for the inclusion of such periods as a part of working time. The applicants raised no objections to the expert’s conclusion on the dismissal of their claims for pay for work at the weekend and on public holidays and for unused annual leave.", "18. In submissions of 22 July 2004, the defendant employer raised objections to the expert report and also argued that the timekeeping documents could not be relied on as they were unofficial copies. It also maintained that it had been unable to pay overtime in full owing to a lack of funds from the State. It submitted that the applicants had in any event been aware of the working arrangements and had never requested a transfer to another unit of the General Directorate of Monopolies.", "19. The İzmir Labour Court asked the expert to supplement his report with findings concerning the parties’ objections.", "20. On 4 July 2005, the expert submitted a supplement to his report, in which he corrected his findings concerning the rest periods in the light of the applicants’ objection and calculated the hours they had worked as twenty-four in the course of a twenty-four-hour shift. He maintained his findings regarding the timesheets, submitting that his in situ examination of the workplace and comparisons between the official record and the employer’s copies had not revealed any inconsistencies.", "21. On 12 September 2005 the İzmir Labour Court found in favour of the applicants in part and awarded them the amounts given in the expert’s report in respect of the unpaid overtime. It rejected their claims for pay for weekend and public holiday work and for unused annual leave.", "22. Both parties appealed to the Court of Cassation.", "23. On 17 April 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision and remitted the case. It found that the Labour Court had not taken into account any time that could have been used for rest periods and that therefore the calculation of overtime could not be deemed accurate. It also stated that the overtime calculation should be based on weekly working hours rather than the monthly working time used in the expert report.", "24. In the resumed proceedings, the İzmir Labour Court requested that the expert amend the report in light of the Court of Cassation’s decision.", "25. On 11 September 2007 the expert revised the findings as ordered and concluded that the applicants were likely to have had a minimum of three hours for rest during a twenty-four-hour shift. The expert therefore recalculated their entitlement to overtime on the basis of twenty-one hours of actual work and compared it with the legal working week of forty‑five hours.", "26. On 26 May 2008 the İzmir Labour Court awarded the applicants compensation for overtime as determined in the revised expert report.", "27. The defendant employer appealed, arguing that the presumption established in the case-law of the Court of Cassation that a person could not work more than fourteen hours in the course of a twenty-four-hour shift should be applied to the facts of the dispute. The Court of Cassation then quashed the first-instance judgment on 28 October 2008 and remitted the case on the following grounds:\n“It can be seen from the case file that during the summer months [the applicants] worked for 24 hours and subsequently rested for 24 hours; and in the winter months they worked for 24 hours and subsequently rested for 48 hours. However, as determined by the well-established case-law of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation’s Civil Division, in workplaces where there are 24-hour shifts, after the deduction of time spent on certain activities such as resting, eating and fulfilling other needs, a person can only work for 14 hours a day ... This approach must also be followed in the present case.”", "28. In the resumed proceedings, the İzmir Labour Court decided to follow the decision of the Court of Cassation and another expert report was drawn up for that purpose. The report, dated 21 July 2009, calculated the applicants’ daily working time as fourteen hours, in line with the Court of Cassation’s presumption of fact. The calculation in the new report led to no overtime being found for the weeks in which the applicants had worked three days as the working time was less than the legal limit of forty-five hours. For the weeks in which the applicants had worked four days, the report calculated the total working time as fifty-six hours, leading to an assessment in the report of nine hours of overtime. On 28 December 2009 the İzmir Labour Court rendered a final judgment in the applicants’ case, based on the expert report of 21 July 2009. As a result of that interpretation, some of the applicants’ claims were dismissed entirely, while the others were awarded almost ninety percent less than the previous expert report had calculated.", "29. On 25 January 2010 the applicants appealed against the decision and maintained that the fact that they had worked continuously for twenty-four hours had already been confirmed by the legal records of the Ministry of Labour, both parties’ witness statements and other evidence in the file, including the expert reports overturned by the Court of Cassation. Although they had proven that fact, the judgment had been based on the presumption that working for more than fourteen hours a day was physically impossible.", "30. On 18 March 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the İzmir Labour Court’s decision without responding to the applicants’ objections." ]
[ "4", "6", "P1-1" ]
[ 20 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicants are serving either life sentences or whole-life sentences in different prisons in Bulgaria.", "5. The applicant is currently serving a whole-life imprisonment sentence in Belene Prison. The sentence was delivered by the Dobrich Regional Court in 2003. It was confirmed on appeal in February 2004 and, subsequently, by the Supreme Court of Cassation in a final judgment of 19 October 2004.", "6. As it is apparent from documents in the file, the applicant had unsuccessfully sought presidential clemency several times since 2007. He was initially placed in the high-security wing of Varna Prison where he started serving his sentence; since 2004 he has been under the “special regime”.", "7. He described, and the Government did not comment on, the conditions under which he had been detained there as follows. His cell measured 5.5 by 3 metres and had a small grilled window which did not let much light in during the day. The lighting at night was also insufficient. The cell was humid, badly heated during the winter and deprived of ventilation during the summer. Given that in the cell there was neither running water, nor toilet facilities, the applicant had had to use a bucket to relieve himself. He was allowed to leave his cell three times a day, during meal times, for about forty-five minutes each time, in order to slop out, eat, wash himself and re-fill his water bottle from the tap. The prison was infested with cockroaches and rats, and he was only allowed to shower once a fortnight. The food was insufficient in quantity and of poor quality. During visits, he was separated from his family and lawyers by a grill and the meetings always took place in the presence of prison staff. His correspondence was routinely read by prison staff as he was obliged to transmit his letters to the outside world in open envelopes. The envelopes carrying correspondence with his lawyer bore a stamp showing that they had been checked.", "8. Both parties submitted that the applicant had been transferred to Belene Prison on 17 February 2009, where he continued to serve his sentence under the “special regime”. He was detained in the high-security wing of this prison, alone in a cell.", "9. According to the Government, since the beginning of his time in that prison, the applicant had gone on several hunger strikes. According to documents in the file, at the beginning of his stay in Belene Prison he demonstrated suicidal intentions and was identified as aggressive and hostile, as well as prone to attempting to escape. On the basis of an order of the prison governor of 19 February 2009, he did not take part in collective activities with other inmates, even those in his own category. In addition, the Government submitted that owing to lack of physical space in the prison, it was impossible to organise collective sport activities, or gather inmates for the purposes of reading, listening to music, playing board games or using the computer. Also, they emphasised that the impossibility was underpinned by the personal characteristics of the inmates which made them incompatible with each other and were an impediment to the authorities’ organising joint activities for them.", "10. The parties submitted that the applicant’s cell in Belene Prison was secured by a door and an external grill, both of which were locked. The light bulb remained on throughout the night, for security purposes, which the applicant claimed interfered with his sleep. His daily walks in the open air took place in a grilled space measuring, according to the applicant and not disputed by the Government, about 15 sq. m, where only persons serving life sentences were taken. According to the applicant, its floor was partially made of bare cement and there was no sports equipment there. According to the Government, there was a climbing wall, a bench and a fixed-height bar. Both parties submitted that each time the applicant left the high-security wing of the prison, he was handcuffed and the handcuffs were shackled to a belt. He claimed that his correspondence was routinely checked. According to the Government, prisoners’ correspondence was checked out of security considerations. However, the authorities only checked the contents of the envelopes which the applicant received and not the text of the letters in them.", "11. In a final judgment of 15 May 2005 the Supreme Court of Cassation sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. The documents in the case file indicate that he had been initially imprisoned in Lovech Prison and was transferred to Belene Prison on 6 October 2009 where he was placed in the high-security wing.", "12. The Government submitted that he had been serving his sentence under the “special regime” since 5 May 2005.", "13. The applicant submitted that he had been kept in isolation in Belene Prison under the “special regime” and that the living conditions in his prison cell were inadequate. In particular he claimed that he spent about twenty-three hours a day locked up in a very small, poorly lit cell with a non-secluded toilet close to his bed.", "14. The Government did not dispute his claims. They specified that the size of his cell was 6 sq. m, that it was a “normal” as opposed to a “punishment” cell, that he had a bed, a drawer, a sink and a toilet in his cell, and that there was enough space for him to move about in it.", "15. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in a final judgment of 10 December 2001 of the Supreme Court of Cassation.", "16. The applicant complained that, in accordance with the “special regime” under which he had been serving his sentence, he had been permanently locked up in a cell which he had only been allowed to leave for no more than one and a half hours a day. He also alleged very poor living conditions, the presence of rats, insufficient lighting, tainted water, limited space and time for outdoor activities, and consistent overuse of handcuffs.", "17. The Government submitted that the applicant had been serving his sentence under the “special regime” in Bobov Dol Prison between 5 February 2002 and 19 April 2007 when his regime had been changed to “severe”. He had spent the following two years under the “severe regime” and on 1 June 2009 his regime had been changed to “strict”. During his stay in Bobol Dol Prison between 2002 and 2012 the applicant had been in the high-security wing, alone in a cell measuring just under 13 sq. m. The cell had contained a sink and a toilet separated from the rest of the space. Hygiene in the cell had been satisfactory; the bed sheets had been washed weekly and the prisoners had been provided with sanitary products once a month. The cells had been disinfected and treated against mice with the same frequency.", "18. The Government submitted that the applicant had been kept in a permanently locked up cell in Bobov Dol Prison, in strict compliance with the relevant legal provisions and in particular section 71(2) of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-trial Detention Act. As of February 2016, they specified that the applicant had formally satisfied the conditions for being detained together with other prisoners but that the applicant had considered himself not ready for it.", "19. On 24 July 2012 the applicant was transferred to Pazardzhik Prison upon his request and was placed in the high-security wing, in a cell measuring 7 sq. m. He expressed an interest in working but the authorities were not in a position to provide him with work. He had not committed disciplinary breaches to the time of application. As to the conditions of detention in Pazardzhik Prison, the Government submitted that he had not raised related grievances with the authorities.", "20. The applicant was sentenced for a number of offences and was given a total sentence of whole-life imprisonment in 2000. He complained that his sentence had amounted, from the time of its imposition, to inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that he did not have an effective remedy in this connection.", "21. In a final judgment of 15 March 2010 the applicant was sentenced by an Austrian court to life imprisonment. He was transferred from Austria to Bulgaria on 15 July 2010 in order to serve his sentence. On 8 November 2010 the Vratsa Regional Court confirmed the sentence and accepted it for enforcement. This was upheld on appeal by the Sofia Appellate Court in a final decision of 9 February 2011. The applicant has been serving his sentence under the “special regime” since 18 February 2011. He is kept in a permanently locked cell in Vratsa Prison, in the high-security wing, in accordance with applicable rules for life prisoners under the Execution of Punishments and Pre-trial Detention Act.", "22. The applicant was sentenced to whole-life imprisonment on 28 February 2011 in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation.", "23. The applicant complained that his sentence had amounted, from the time of its imposition, to inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that he did not have an effective remedy in this connection.", "24. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 13 November 2008. He has been serving his sentence under the “special regime” in Varna Prison. He alleged that he spent his time almost permanently locked up in isolation from the other inmates, while the Government claimed that he was in “almost permanent contact with other inmates” without submitting more details. The applicant submitted that he had had to relieve himself in a bucket in his cell where there had been no running water. The Government clarified that this changed in 2012 when a toilet had been built in his cell. The food, according to the applicant and disputed by the authorities, was insufficient and of poor quality.", "25. The applicant was sentenced for different offences and given a total sentence of life imprisonment in a final judgment of 17 November 2011 by the Supreme Court of Cassation. The applicant has been serving his sentence in Stara Zagora Prison under the “special regime” in a permanently locked cell located in the high-security wing of the prison. The Government submitted that he was allowed to leave his cell twice a day for an hour at a time when he could see and communicate with other inmates detained in the same prison wing. He was also allowed to use sanitary facilities outside of his cell five times a day, and to shower twice a week. There was no toilet in the applicant’s cell and no ventilation system had been installed.", "26. The applicant had been serving a sentence of whole-life imprisonment in Pleven Prison since 1999 under the “special regime”. In 2003 he was placed under the lighter “severe regime” and a year later under the even lighter “strict regime” when he was also placed in a cell together with other inmates.", "27. He complained that his sentence had amounted, from the time of its imposition, to inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that he did not have an effective remedy in this connection.", "28. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment and has been serving his sentence under the “special regime” since 2009. Until 2009 he was detained in Varna Prison and since 18 February 2009 he has been detained in Plovdiv Prison. He complained in respect of his detention after February 2009, the conditions of his detention before 18 February 2009 having been examined by the Court in an earlier case with application no. 16391/05, which was decided in a judgment of 10 January 2012.", "29. Both the applicant and the Government submitted that he was detained in a permanently locked cell and isolated from the other prisoners. The Government pointed out that the applicant left his cell for an hour in the morning and for an hour in the afternoon every day for exercise and to spend time in the open air.", "30. The applicant also claimed that the material conditions in which he had been serving his sentence were inadequate and that he had been offered no collective activities or other forms of occupation.", "31. The Government stated that he was enrolled in the following weekly activities: a catechism course lasting an hour-and-a-half per week; and a course in basic computer skills with hour-long sessions; he also had an additional hour in the open air, as well as half an hour to take a bath on Wednesday evenings. Furthermore, when various competitions had taken place in the prison, or there had been concerts or recitals, inmates serving life sentences had been offered a chance to attend them as spectators. The Government further clarified that the applicant’s regime had been changed to “strict” in 2015 but he had continued to be in the high-security wing; according to the Government, he had repeatedly stated that he had not wished to be placed together with other prisoners." ]
[ "3", "8" ]
[ 20 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicants were born in 1966 and 1964 respectively and live in Linz. They have been living in a stable relationship for many years.", "6. On 21 February 2010 the applicants lodged an application to enter into a registered partnership under the Registered Partnership Act (Eingetragene Partnerschaft-Gesetz).", "7. On 17 March 2010 the Mayor of Linz dismissed their application in accordance with sections 1, 2 and 5(1)(1) of the Registered Partnership Act, finding that the applicants did not meet the legal requirements, as the registered partnership was exclusively reserved for same-sex couples.", "8. The applicants appealed. Citing, inter alia, Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, they complained of discrimination based on their sex and their sexual orientation. The Upper Austrian Regional Governor (Oberösterreichischer Landeshauptmann) dismissed the appeal on 18 August 2010, arguing with reference to Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (no. 30141/04, ECHR 2010) that as the Contracting States were allowed to restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples, it would appear unreasonable not to allow them to reserve access to registered partnerships exclusively for same-sex couples.", "9. The applicants subsequently lodged complaints with both the Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court, arguing that marriage was not a suitable option for them, as it was substantially different from a registered partnership. In their view, a registered partnership was in many ways more modern and “lighter” than marriage. The applicants put forward several examples: the different statutory time-limit for divorce versus the time-limit for dissolution of a registered partnership in the event of an irretrievable breakdown (unheilbare Zerrüttung) of the relationship; the alimony payment obligations following a divorce/dissolution where blame could be placed on one spouse/partner; the obligations conferred by the respective legal institutions, in particular as regards trust, faithfulness and contributions to the household; and the consequences of a declaration of the death of a spouse/partner. The applicants argued that the Court’s considerations in Schalk and Kopf in respect of marriage were not applicable to the registered partnership, which was a new legal institution, introduced in the twenty-first century. It was therefore neither based on a long-standing discriminatory tradition and deep-rooted social connotations, nor aimed at possible procreation.", "10. On 22 September 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint. The relevant parts of its judgment read as follows:\n“Article 12 of the [Convention] only applies to the traditional civil marriage ..., which has ‘deep-rooted social and cultural connotations’ and was, in the historical context, clearly understood ‘in its traditional sense’ (ECHR, case of Schalk and Kopf, §§ 55, 62). If the Court, in its judgment in the case of Schalk and Kopf, considers that the national provisions in the Council of Europe member States are diverse and range from allowing same-sex marriage to explicitly forbidding it, and concludes from this that, as matters stand, the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by domestic law (ECHR, case of Schalk and Kopf, §§ 60f), this must, in view of the small number of States providing for a registered partnership for different‑sex couples in addition to marriage, be even more valid for this question.\nAs the [Convention] has to be read as a whole and its Articles have to be construed in harmony with one another, and as Article 12 of the [Convention] does not grant different-sex couples, in addition to the right to marry, a right to enter into a registered partnership, the prohibition of discrimination pursuant to Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the [Convention], a provision of more general purpose and scope, cannot be interpreted as imposing such an obligation beyond the scope of Article 12 of the [Convention] either (see, concerning the correlating question of the right of same-sex couples to marry, which cannot be derived from Article 14 of the [Convention] either, ECHR, case of Schalk and Kopf, § 101).\n...\n[A]s the Austrian legislator has provided for the possibility of legal recognition for same-sex couples by introducing the registered partnership, people may rely on the prohibition of discrimination provided for by Article 14 of the [Convention] ...\nThe Court has also stated, however, in the case of Schalk and Kopf, that the legislator may restrict access to marriage to different-sex couples because it has a certain margin of appreciation as regards the exact status conferred by alternative means of recognition. Moreover, the Court assumes that the Registered Partnership Act allows couples to obtain, in many aspects, a legal status that is equal or comparable to marriage; apart from parental rights, there were only slight differences (see ECHR, case of Schalk and Kopf, §§ 108 et seq.).\nGiven that persons of different sex have access to marriage (see the [explanatory report on the draft law]); the registered partnership was introduced only to counter discrimination against same-sex couples; [the registered partnership] should, in substance, have the same effects as marriage; different-sex couples are not a group (historically) discriminated against; and there is no European consensus on this matter, it does not amount to a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the [Convention] if the Austrian legislator does not grant different-sex couples access to the registered partnership.\n...\nThe Constitutional Court is not called upon to examine whether the particular differences between these legal institutions, as regards the legal consequences and dissolution options, comply with the principle of equality [Gleichheitssatz] and the prohibition of discrimination pursuant to Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the [Convention], since the only question to be examined is whether different-sex couples have a constitutional right to access to the registered partnership.”", "11. On 27 February 2013 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint (see paragraph 9 above) as unfounded. That decision was served on the applicants’ counsel on 25 March 2013." ]
[ "14", "12", "3", "8" ]
[]
[]
[ "6. The first applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Turin. The second applicant was born in 1975 and was detained in Turin up to the time of his death on 10 January 2017.", "7. In 2004 the applicants were detained in the Asti Correctional Facility.", "8. On 10 December 2004 the second applicant intervened in a fight that had broken out between the first applicant and a prison officer.", "9. The manner in which the impugned events occurred, as submitted by the applicants and as it emerges from their witness statements during the domestic proceedings, may be summarised as follows.", "10. On 10 December 2004, following an altercation with the prison officer, the first applicant was summoned to a meeting with the correctional unit commander (comandante di reparto della polizia penitenziaria). Before he reached the commander’s office, he was stopped by a group of prison officers, who took turns beating him. Following the meeting, he was stripped of his clothes and led to a cell in the solitary confinement wing.", "11. The only item of furniture in the cell was a bed with no mattress, bed linen or covers. As to sanitary facilities, the cell had a squat toilet without running water and was not equipped with a sink. The cell window had no window panes and the only source of heating was a small, malfunctioning radiator, which provided little protection against the December weather. For a number of days, although it is unclear for how many exactly, he was left naked.", "12. During the first week of his detention in solitary confinement no food was provided and he was given only scant amounts of water. He was subsequently given rationed quantities of food.", "13. He was beaten on a daily basis, several times per day. He was repeatedly punched, kicked and hit in the head by prison officers, who assaulted him in groups of varying sizes.", "14. He was also subjected to sleep deprivation, as the beatings often took place at night and the prison officers verbally abused him in order to keep him awake.", "15. During the detention in solitary confinement the applicant did not receive visits from his lawyer or his family.", "16. On 10 December 2004, following the same altercation with the prison officer, the second applicant was stripped of his clothes and led to a cell in the solitary confinement wing of the correctional facility. The bed in the cell had no mattress, sheets or covers, and the cell had no sink. Initially there were no panes in the windows, which were covered with some plastic sheeting after an unspecified number of days. For a number of days, although it is unclear for how many exactly, he was left naked. He was subsequently given some light clothing.", "17. The applicant’s food was rationed, and at certain times he was given only bread and water. On some days he received no food at all.", "18. The applicant was beaten by prison officers, often more than once per day. He was subjected to various forms of physical violence, including being repeatedly punched, kicked and slapped, at one point with his head being pinned to the ground by one of the prison officers’ boots. The beatings occurred both during the day and at night. The applicant was beaten by four or five officers at a time. One prison officer ripped out a chunk of his hair.", "19. On 16 December 2004 he was admitted to the hospital.", "20. During the period he spent in solitary confinement he was only allowed outside the cell twice, once to shower and once for some outdoor time.", "21. A criminal investigation into the impugned treatment was launched in 2005. It was initiated when it emerged, in the context of covert surveillance in an operation to investigate drug smuggling in the Asti correctional facility, that a number of the prison officers had discussed the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicants.", "22. On 7 July 2011 five prison officers, C.B., D.B., M.S., A.D., and G.S., were committed for trial. They were charged with ill-treatment of the applicants under Article 572 of the Italian Criminal Code (“the Criminal Code”), in conjunction with Article 61 § 9 of the Criminal Code, a provision which considers the commission of an offence by a civil servant abusing his or her position to be an aggravating circumstance.", "23. On the same date the applicants joined the proceedings as civil parties.", "24. The Asti District Court’s judgment was delivered on 30 January 2012. Its findings may be summarised as follows.", "25. As to the establishment of the facts concerning the ill-treatment, the court found that the evidence gathered during the investigation and produced at the trial showed that the events had occurred in the manner described by the victims in their submissions during the trial. The Court relied on statements to the effect that the applicants had been subjected to physical and verbal abuse, coupled with the deprivation of food, water, sleep, and clothing, and had been detained in cells without adequate access to sanitation, heating, and bedding.", "26. The court further found it to be established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicants had been subjected not merely to isolated acts of harassment and abuse, but to repeated ill-treatment which had been put into practice in a systematic manner.", "27. More specifically, the court found it established beyond reasonable doubt that the first and second applicants had been subjected to repeated physical violence from 10 to 29 December 2004 and from 10 to 16 December 2004 respectively. The court found that the beatings occurred regularly at all times of the day, and particularly at night.", "28. The court noted that the second applicant had been admitted to the emergency room of the Asti Civil Hospital on 16 December 2004 with traumatic injuries. With regard to the first applicant, the court acknowledged his hospitalisation following the events without citing a date or specific medical documentation to this effect.", "29. Moreover, the court found it to be established beyond reasonable doubt that in 2004 and 2005 in the Asti Correctional Facility there had existed what it defined as a “generalised practice of ill-treatment” that had been systematically inflicted on prisoners considered to be problematic. Measures which the court defines as exceeding the bounds of permitted disciplinary or security measures were routinely taken to punish and intimidate problematic detainees and to deter other disorderly behaviour. As part of this practice, a detainee would generally be taken to a cell in the solitary confinement unit where he would be subjected to repeated harassment and abuse by prison officers. The abuse would primarily take the form of physical violence, as detainees would be beaten by groups of prison officers, often during the night. In addition, detainees would be routinely subjected to sleep, food and water deprivation, and would also be denied access to sanitary facilities.", "30. The court further found ample evidence that the prison officers operated in a climate of impunity. This was due, in the court’s view, to the acquiescence of high-level prison administrators and the complicity that existed among prison officers.", "31. It emerges that the court ordered an inspection of the correctional facility, including the solitary confinement wing, during the course of the trial. The court found that several cells in the solitary confinement wing of the Asti Correctional Facility were unfit for holding detainees. Some did not have bed linen, mattresses, sanitary facilities or heating. Although the windows in some cells had no panes and others had windows covered by metal plates with small perforations, the cells were nonetheless used during the winter months. Some cells were equipped with a bed and a squat toilet but no other furniture or sanitary facilities.", "32. Following the establishment of the facts, the court went on to assess responsibility for the established conduct. In this regard, G.S. was acquitted as to his involvement in the ill-treatment, and A.D. and D.B. were acquitted of the charge of ill-treatment under Article 572 of the Criminal Code. The court nonetheless held that the conduct of A.D. and D.B. amounted to infliction of bodily harm contrary to Article 582 of the Criminal Code. However, it ordered that the proceedings against them be discontinued due to the expiry of the applicable time-limit as laid down in the statute of limitations.", "33. With respect to C.B. and M.S., the court held that there existed sufficient evidence to conclude that they had been responsible for most, if not all, of the acts of physical, psychological, and “material” abuse at issue. The court then considered that the acts at issue could be classified as torture pursuant to the definition provided by the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It went on to observe that Italy had failed to incorporate the offence of torture into national legislation, in breach of its international obligations. It was therefore obliged to conclude that, under Italian law, there existed no legal provision that would allow it to classify the impugned conduct as acts of torture.", "34. Having taken note of the above-mentioned considerations, the court proceeded to assess which existing offence was more suitable in respect of the legal classification of C.B. and M.S.’s conduct. When conducting its assessment, the court relied on the conclusion that the primary purpose of the impugned treatment was to punish the applicants, to “maintain order” in the correctional facility, and to convey a clear message to the other detainees.", "35. The court considered that the conduct of the two prison officers thus fell most appropriately within the scope of Article 608 of the Criminal Code, which deals with abuse of authority against arrested or detained persons. However, the statutory limitation period for the offence in question had elapsed, as the court had found no procedural action which would have the effect of interrupting it.\nThe court stated that C.B. and M.S. were also responsible for the infliction of bodily harm, but that, as the statute of limitations was applicable to that offence as well, such a finding did not alter the substance of the decision. The court therefore ordered that the proceedings against C.B. and M.S be discontinued because the applicable time-limit as laid down in the statute of limitations had expired.", "36. On 22 February 2012 the public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation, arguing that the Asti District Court had erred in the legal classification of the offence with respect to C.B. and M.S. The prosecutor contended that the most appropriate offence for the purposes of classification of the conduct in question would have been aggravated ill‑treatment under Article 572 of the Italian Criminal Code ‒ as initially identified in the bill of indictment ‒ in conjunction with Article 608 of the Criminal Code.", "37. By a judgment issued on 21 May 2012, and filed with the court Registry on 27 July 2012, the Court of Cassation declared the public prosecutor’s application inadmissible. The court expressed its agreement with the prosecutor’s contention as a matter of principle but, as the statute of limitations had been likewise applicable to the offence of aggravated ill‑treatment, a decision in favour of the prosecution would have been devoid of any practical effect.", "38. On 26 July 2012 C.B. lodged an objection to execution (incidente d’esecuzione) with the Asti District Court, arguing that its decision of 30 January 2012 (see paragraph 24 above) could not be considered as final and binding insofar as he was concerned, as the decision had not been properly served on him.", "39. In a decision issued on 31 October the Asti District Court dismissed C.B.’s objection on the grounds that C.B. must have had cognisance of the decision at the moment the public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 36 above) or, at the latest, when his representative filed a defence brief at a hearing before the Court of Cassation in May 2012.", "40. On 26 July 2012 C.B. appealed against the decision before the Court of Cassation.", "41. In a judgment delivered on 11 July 2013, and filed with the Registry on 1 August 2013, the Court of Cassation granted the appeal. It found that the failure to serve the decision on C.B. could not be remedied by C.B.’s potential knowledge of the decision at a later stage, as argued by the District Court. The Asti District Court judgment of 30 January 2012 could not, accordingly, be considered final and binding insofar as C.B. was concerned.", "42. Based on the latter decision, on 10 October 2013 C.B. lodged an appeal against the Asti District Court judgment of 30 January 2012 with the Turin Court of Appeal, seeking an acquittal.", "43. No further information has been provided by the parties as to the outcome of the proceedings.", "44. In their observations of 31 March 2016, the Government indicated that four prison officers had undergone disciplinary proceedings in connection with the impugned events and by different decisions issued on 29 January 2013 the following disciplinary sanctions had been imposed:\n– C.B. was dismissed from his functions (destituito dal servizio). He was, however, reinstated on 26 November 2013, following the Court of Cassation judgment of 11 July 2013 which suspended the binding nature of the Asti District Court’s judgment (see paragraph 41 above);\n– M.S. was dismissed from his functions;\n– A.D. was suspended from duty for a period of 4 months;\n– D.B. was suspended from duty for a period of 6 months.", "45. According to a document issued by the Staff Director of the Prison Administration Department of the Ministry of Justice on 12 October 2015, and furnished by the Government, the four prison officers were not suspended from duty (sospensione precauzionale dal servizio) during the course of the investigation or the trial.", "46. At the Court’s request, the Government submitted extracts from the prison medical record of the second applicant between 26 November 2004 and 5 March 2005 and typed copies of his hospitalisation record of 16 December 2004.", "47. The prison medical record indicates that on 13 December 2004 the second applicant was examined visually (whilst still “behind bars”). He complained of pain in the thoracic area and right ear. The reporting physician noted the presence of ecchymoses and haematomas around the patient’s ribcage. He recommended a more thorough medical examination and/or transfer to the infirmary.", "48. The record further indicates that another visual examination (also “behind bars”) took place on 15 December 2004. The information in this entry is the same as in the previous entry. Transfer to the infirmary for a medical examination was recommended.", "49. On 15 December 2004 the record shows that the applicant underwent a medical examination in the afternoon. The physician reported ecchymoses on the patient’s ribcage and in the retroauricular region. Palpation of the patient revealed diffuse pain. The reporting physician recommended that X‑rays be performed for a suspected fracture. Painkillers were administered.", "50. The entry of 16 December 2004 reports the applicant’s transfer to the emergency room of the Asti Civil Hospital as a consequence of traumatic injury.", "51. According to the medical record of the Asti Civil Hospital, an X-ray revealed a fractured rib and the medical examination disclosed diffuse bruising in the thoracic and abdominal area and pain on palpation. The record states that the applicant told the doctor his injuries occurred as a consequence of an accidental fall.", "52. The prison medical record entry on the applicant’s discharge from the hospital on 16 December 2004 shows that he was prescribed painkillers.", "53. As to the first applicant, no copy of the prison medical register had been submitted by the Government, notwithstanding the Court’s request for such information." ]
[ "3" ]
[ 18, 27, 29, 38, 39 ]
[]
[ "6. The applicant was born in 1949, he is a lawyer and lives in Nicosia.", "7. The applicant was appointed as an IDC judge on 1 October 1997 and as its President on 6 December 2001.", "8. By a letter dated 18 July 2005 the two main trade unions and the two corresponding employers’ federations submitted a complaint to the Supreme Court, alleging misconduct on the part of the applicant in the exercise of his judicial functions. The letter referred, in general, to complaints received by members of trade unions and employers’ federations who had carried out duties as lay members of the IDC, concerning the applicant’s conduct towards litigants, witnesses, lawyers and lay members of the court during proceedings.", "9. The applicant was served with a written notice from the Supreme Court dated 1 September 2005, informing him of the allegations against him and noting that the Supreme Court had decided that it was justified to activate Rule 3 of the Procedural Rules concerning the exercise of the SCJ’s disciplinary authority (“the Procedural Rules”; see paragraph 41 below). The applicant was provided with a copy of the letter of complaint and was requested to send his comments within seven days.", "10. By a letter dated 7 September 2005 the applicant submitted his comments to the Supreme Court with regard to the allegations against him. The applicant observed, inter alia, that the complaint was so general and vague that he was unable to identify the precise events on which it was based as he had presided over numerous proceedings. He also informed the Supreme Court that the authors of the letter had given a copy to the press and that it had been published in a newspaper on 21 July 2005.", "11. On 16 September 2005 the Supreme Court decided, in accordance with Rules 4 and 5 of the Procedural Rules (see paragraph 41 below), to appoint an investigating judge to look into the allegations against the applicant.", "12. On 19 September 2005 the Supreme Court appointed the then President of the District Court of Nicosia as investigating judge.", "13. In a letter dated 5 December 2005 the investigating judge informed the applicant of his appointment. He also provided the applicant with statements he had taken from twenty-eight people during his investigation and invited the applicant to submit a supplementary statement, if he so wished, within ten days.", "14. On 16 December 2005 the applicant made a lengthy supplementary statement to the investigating judge, providing his comments on the statements collected by the judge and referring to various proceedings in which the witnesses had been involved. He also noted that he did not view his comments as a supplementary statement as such, since it was only at that time that the complaint had become more precise, at least in part. Furthermore, he observed that the witness statements covered a period of six years, when he had sat in about three thousand cases. The statements could not therefore provide the full picture. He suggested that statements should be taken from a number of lay members of the court and provided the investigating judge with their names and telephone numbers.", "15. On 21 December 2005, upon completion of the investigation, the investigating judge submitted a report to the Supreme Court summarising his investigation and the evidence collected. The report was accompanied by all the material he had collected, including the statements given by the witnesses and the applicant. The report made no recommendation.", "16. By a letter dated 10 February 2006 the chief registrar of the Supreme Court informed the applicant that the court had decided that a disciplinary process was warranted. He provided the applicant with the charge sheet drawn up by the Supreme Court at a meeting it had held on 9 February 2006. This included two charges of misconduct, and details of the preparatory investigation by the investigating judge. The charges against the applicant were as follows:\n“First Charge\nMisconduct (Articles 153 § 7 (4) and 157 § 3 of the Constitution)\nParticulars\nWhile you exercised the duties of President of the Industrial Disputes Court you repeatedly displayed oppressive, disparaging, scornful and, more generally, insulting behaviour towards the lay members of the Court, both inside and outside the courtroom and, at the same time, in the course of proceedings you sometimes ignored them, sometimes did not allow them to put questions and sometimes did not allow them to ask for clarification on the matters at issue.\nSecond Charge\nMisconduct (Articles 153 § 7 (4) and 157 § 3 of the Constitution)\nParticulars\nWhile you exercised the duties of President of the Industrial Disputes Court you repeatedly displayed oppressive, disparaging, scornful and, more generally, insulting and even humiliating behaviour towards lawyers and/or litigants and/or witnesses during the proceedings, including ironic comments at their expense and/or innuendos, with the result that, owing to the agitation and disruption caused to them, the entire proceedings were diverted from their proper course.”", "17. A list of fifteen witnesses was attached to the charge sheet.", "18. In his letter the chief registrar summoned the applicant to appear on 9 March 2006 before the SCJ (see paragraph 36 below) to answer the charges. He informed the applicant that the proceedings would not be held in public unless he so wished and that, pending the proceedings, he would have to refrain from carrying out his duties.", "19. On 9 March 2006, before the applicant answered the charges against him, his lawyer raised several preliminary objections. In particular, he argued that the investigation had been incomplete as statements had not been taken from the people indicated by the applicant. Furthermore, he argued that the charge sheet was incomplete, defective and vague; it did not give sufficient information to the applicant about the offences in relation to the actual content of the two charges he was facing.", "20. The SCJ ruled the same day that the charge sheet, taken together with the fifteen statements, provided sufficient information to the applicant about the facts on which the charges had been based. In that regard, it noted that the applicant had commented on all the details referred to in the statements in a lengthy statement. The SCJ also held that the investigation had been adequate and had provided grounds for bringing charges.", "21. The applicant then pleaded not guilty to the charges.", "22. A hearing was set for 29 March 2006. The applicant’s lawyer agreed that the proceedings would not be held in public.", "23. Hearings commenced on the scheduled date. The SCJ set out the procedure to be followed: every witness would read out the statement he or she had given to the investigating officer and would then be cross-examined by the applicant’s lawyer. Following a request by the applicant’s lawyer, the SCJ also held on the same day that in view of the defence’s line of argument all the files of the proceedings in which the witnesses had sat as members of the IDC, from the applicant’s appointment as president of the IDC onwards, should be brought before it. The hearing was scheduled to continue on 31 March 2006.", "24. Following a request by the applicant’s lawyer, leave was given by the SCJ on the latter date for the applicant to have full access to the IDC registry’s archives in order to enable him to examine and collect any elements that could help his defence.", "25. The hearings continued, with around seven more sessions being held. Files of the proceedings over which the applicant had presided and in which the witnesses had been involved were admitted as exhibits. They were filed in separate bundles by reference to the particular witness and were recorded in the list of exhibits.", "26. During the proceedings it was clarified that the charge sheet was limited to the period subsequent to the applicant’s appointment as President of the IDC. Further statements that related to pending proceedings and complaints that had previously been dealt with by the Supreme Court were removed from the charge sheet. Ten out of the fifteen witnesses listed on the charge sheet ultimately testified. They comprised six lay members, two lawyers and two people who had been witnesses in proceedings over which the applicant had presided. The witnesses read out and confirmed the contents of their statements. They were then cross-examined by the applicant’s lawyer.", "27. In addition, at the suggestion of the applicant’s lawyer, the court also summoned the IDC’s registrar.", "28. After the conclusion of the witness statements and an address by the applicant’s lawyer, the SCJ found on 29 May 2006 that a prima facie case had been established against the applicant. It therefore called the applicant to put forward his defence.", "29. The applicant took until 23 June 2006 to set out his defence case, testifying himself and calling thirty-six witnesses. They consisted of twenty-six lay members of the IDC, nine lawyers and a representative from the redundancy fund. The proceedings concluded with the applicant’s lawyer addressing the court. He raised the issue of the charge sheet again and also submitted that because the Supreme Court and the SCJ had the same composition, the same judges had examined the witness statements, had decided to refer the case to trial, formulated the charge sheet and overseen the proceedings. Those judges had also acted as prosecutors and had then tried the case. He argued that that was contrary to the rules of natural justice and the right to a fair trial. He stressed, however, that this had nothing to do with the judges as individuals.", "30. In a decision of 19 September 2006 the SCJ found, by a majority of twelve to one (the President and eleven justices concurring), that on the basis of the evidence and all the material facts before it, the applicant’s alleged misconduct had been proved. The SCJ assessed the evidence given by the eleven witnesses and made specific reference to events transcribed in the records of court proceedings over which the applicant had presided and in which the witnesses had been involved. It referred to ten specific cases. After hearing the applicant, in accordance with Rule 26 (see paragraph 41 below), the SCJ removed him from office.", "31. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n“...\nRule 13 secures for the judge against whom proceedings are brought all the rights provided for in Article 12 § 5 of the Constitution for persons who are charged with a criminal offence. That constitutional provision secures the well-known rights that an accused has in a criminal trial and are identical to those secured under Articles 6 §§ 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which was ratified by the House of Representatives by law in 1962 (Law 39/62). Furthermore, the provisions of Article 30 of our Constitution, which are the equivalent to those of Article 6 of the Convention, are also applicable.\n...\nAt no stage did the Supreme Council of Judicature function as a public prosecutor against Mr Kamenos. The President and Members of the Supreme Council of Judicature did not put a single question to the witnesses who were listed on the charge sheet, or to those summoned on behalf of Mr Kamenos, which might have been construed as cross-examination for the purpose of contesting the witnesses’ allegations. On the contrary, the President and Members of the Supreme Council of Judicature asked very few questions, and they were solely for the purpose of clarification; special reference will be made to some of those questions at the appropriate stage. Not a single question was put to Mr Kamenos. The Supreme Council of Judicature was not seeking to pursue a procedure of prosecution against Mr Kamenos in the form of a confrontation between prosecution and defence. For that reason, and despite having such powers under Rule 16, the relevant provision of the Constitution on the judicial process and the procedure to be followed in investigating disciplinary cases, it did not assign the duties of prosecutor to the judge-investigator or to any other judicial official. In that way, which was the declared intention of the Supreme Council of Judicature, more rights were secured for Mr Kamenos than those which he had under the aforementioned Articles of the Constitution and the Rule. That was precisely the aim of the procedure followed by the Supreme Council of Judicature, which essentially remained an audience for the witnesses’ statements.\nIt follows that this is the appropriate moment to refer to the suggestion made by Mr Kamenos’s lawyer in his final address. Its subject relates directly and absolutely to what we have just said. The lawyer alleged that the Supreme Council of Judicature had functioned in a dual capacity, given that it had judged the case and simultaneously exercised the duties of prosecutor. Clarifying his position, he said that that is inferred from the fact that the President and Members of the Supreme Council of Judicature put questions to the witnesses. In our opinion, that suggestion is unfounded and unjustifiable. It is unfounded for the reasons which we explained above, and unjustifiable because it conflicts with what the lawyer said to us at the beginning of the proceedings, when he ... spoke in praise of the powers invested by the Constitution in the Supreme Council of Judicature, describing its work as difficult and important [in those instances] when it is called upon to decide whether a judge displayed misconduct and is obliged, again in accordance with the Constitution, to terminate the latter’s services in the event of conviction. In brief, Mr Efstathiou not only accepted but also praised as correct the competence, arising from the Constitution, of the Supreme Council of Judicature, which is made up of the full bench of the Members of the Supreme Court, the highest judicial authority in the State.\n...\n[The applicant’s lawyer] asked many witnesses to express an opinion on the extent to which they considered that Mr Kamenos’s decisions were correct. Most of them, including the lawyers, gave the right reply, namely, that it was not for them to judge Mr Kamenos’s decisions. In the same way, the Supreme Council of Judicature is not judging the correctness of Mr Kamenos’s decisions. We do not have such competence. That belongs to the Supreme Court. The competence of the Supreme Council of Judicature is only to decide whether the charges of improper behaviour (misconduct) are proved, which [behaviour] in the case we are examining and according to the particulars of the charges, is continuous (κατά συρροή, διαρκής) and directly refers to the function of Mr Kamenos as the President of the Industrial Disputes Court.\n...\nWe previously stated that certain witnesses called by Mr Kamenos, evidently in an endeavour to tone down or explain what the witnesses listed on the charge sheet had testified to and who touched on Mr Kamenos’s behaviour in the course of the hearing, in essence confirmed what those witnesses had said. Several examples follow ...\n...\nFrom the evidence that we have analysed above, we find that the charges have been proved.\n...\nWe wish to clarify that the purpose of this procedure is not to punish Mr Kamenos but to protect the public by adopting of a strict standard of judicial behaviour in order to preserve public confidence in the integrity, prestige and independence of the judicial system. We borrow and adopt the above principle from the decision (Investigation concerning Judge Bruce Van Voorhis, No. 165) given in February 2003 by the Commission of Judicial Performance of the State of California, in the United States of America, which concerned a procedure against a specific judge whose services were also terminated for misconduct, with facts and particulars similar to the case before us. In essence, we translate the principle which that Commission adopted and recorded on page 31 of the decision. The principle is based, as stated in the decision, on what was said by the Supreme Court of the State, that the purpose of the procedure was not to punish judges who have erred but to protect the judicial system and those who are subject to the formidable power exercised by judges.\n...\nEvaluating the above with great care, caution and, we would say, anxiety, we are led to the conclusion that everything imputed to Mr Kamenos as stated in the two charges has been proved. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution, which are referred to in our decision, the proof of a charge of misconduct against a judge leads to the termination of his services.”", "32. The dissenting judge found in his decision that the evidence was not sufficient to prove such a serious charge as misconduct. As regards the procedure, the judge noted, inter alia, that the Supreme Council of Judicature had asked the witnesses very few questions and that they had been for the purposes of clarification. Furthermore, with regard to the investigation and the object of the hearing, he observed:\n“A judicial official with the duties of prosecutor was not appointed, a possibility which is referred to in Rule 16, and we adopted the following approach: every witness read his statement to the investigating officer out loud and, immediately after, was cross-examined by Mr Kamenos’s lawyer. During the cross-examination or subsequently members of the Supreme Council of Judicature asked the witnesses a few questions for clarification purposes. This is also exactly what happened in the case of Mr Kamenos and the 36 witnesses called by him.\n...\nBefore referring to the evidence, it is useful if we outline the methodology which led to the taking of statements by the Investigating Officer. He did not himself take the initiative of collecting evidence in view of the accusation, as he explains in his report. The persons who signed the accusation did not have any personal knowledge of the circumstances and statements were taken from all those they ... named, and from others subsequently named by those who had been initially summoned. The investigation into the manner in which Mr Kamenos exercised his duties in general was therefore not systematic and that is also the reason for not taking statements from a number of other persons whom Mr Kamenos himself indicated. Besides, as we have seen, of the 28 statements which the Investigating Office took, only 15 were attached to the charge sheet, with a further reduction to 10 in the course of the hearing. They did not include statements which, as the Investigating Officer reported, not only expressed no complaints but stated that Mr Kamenos’s conduct had been irreproachable in all respects. Consequently, as is in any case self-evident, the object of the hearing is [to determine] whether, on the basis of the evidence of those ten witnesses, the charge has been substantiated as formulated. That is to say, whether, from each individual’s evidence and the correlation between them, to the extent possible, there arises conduct as cumulatively stated on the charge sheet, [and] in the case of the second charge “with the result that, owing to the agitation and disruption they were caused, the entire proceedings were diverted from their proper course”. This (was the wording), without any specification on the charge sheet of a definite, specific incident at a specific time, ... in relation to a specific person in the context of a specific case. The witnesses who remained on the charge sheet (whose statements I shall of course return to), as lay members of the court, or as lawyers or witnesses, did not submit a complaint there and then about what they considered to be objectionable conduct. ... Nor did the litigants in any specific case which could be related to the charge sheet make a complaint at the time, or appeal or employ any other legal means so that any objectionable conduct would be examined also from the aspect of its effect on the final outcome. That was what occurred in the cases of Athanasiou v. Reana Manuf. & Trade Co.Ltd and others (2001) 1 C.L.R. 1635, and Fanos N. Epiphaniou Ltd v. Melarta and others (2002) 1 C.L.R.654, in which the Supreme Court annulled decisions issued by the Industrial Disputes Tribunal under the presidency of Mr Kamenos, using strong language about the degree of his intervention in the proceedings and the appearance of partiality to which it could give rise. Of course, the charge sheet does not extend to those cases and does not concern the issue of interventions as such ... The core of the charge is the conduct attributed to Mr Kamenos at the expense of lay members of the court, lawyers, litigants and witnesses, and it is in the light of such considerations that I shall go on to examine the evidence adduced.”", "33. The applicant continued to receive all the benefits that came with his post during the proceedings. It appears from a letter sent to him by the Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus that the applicant was considered as having retired from the date of his dismissal, 19 September 2006. He was paid a retirement lump sum and started receiving his pension." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 13, 14, 25 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Zujūnai.", "6. In 1988 the applicant was provided with a plot of land of 0.15 hectares for residential purposes.", "7. In 1992 the authorities allocated him an additional plot of land of 0.05 hectares and similar additional plots were allocated to another twenty‑four people.", "8. On 15 April 1993 the applicant purchased a total of 0.2 hectares of land from the State. At that time there was no detailed plan of Vilnius County. Nevertheless, the plot of land assigned to the applicant was approved by the county’s chief architect.", "9. The applicant obtained an official permit for the construction of a house on the land and has been living there since 2004. The house is the permanent residence of the applicant and his family. The plot of land of 0.05 hectares, which has been allocated to the applicant in 1992 (see paragraph 7 above), is where waste water treatment equipment, the gas and water supplies and an electricity meter were installed.", "10. In 2006 two neighbours started court proceedings against the applicant. They claimed that 0.05 hectares of the applicant’s land occupied part of a street and that the applicant had built a concrete fence around it, making it impossible to use the street. They asked the court to establish an easement (servitutas) for access to it.", "11. On 26 September 2006 the Vilnius District Court held that the neighbours’ rights had not been breached because they had access to their own land. However, the court ordered the applicant to give one of the neighbours access to an electricity meter.", "12. The applicant’s neighbours appealed but on 4 January 2007 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance. The court held that in accordance with the provisions of domestic law, an easement could be established only if it was impossible to use property in any other way (see paragraph 42 below). This meant that an easement could only be established if it was objectively necessary. The fact that the neighbours had to use another road and that entry to their own property was more difficult was not grounds to limit another person’s property rights, namely those of the applicant.", "13. The applicant’s neighbours lodged an appeal on points of law, and on 19 November 2007 the Supreme Court found that there were two civil cases regarding the same situation and suspended the proceedings until the other case had finished (see paragraph 15 below).", "14. On 29 May 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the Vilnius Regional Court’s decision of 4 January 2007. The court found that the applicant had purchased the plot of land of 0.2 hectares in 1993. The lawfulness of the purchase agreement had been proven by the domestic courts (see paragraph 17 below). The fact that the applicant was a bona fide owner of the land had not been denied and could only be so by reopening the proceedings involved. The court thus held that the mere fact that the applicant’s neighbours wanted to use his land because it was more convenient was not enough to establish an easement.", "15. In October 2007 the prosecutor’s office started court proceedings and asked the domestic courts to annul the decisions of the national authorities and the purchase agreement that had entitled the applicant to 0.05 hectares of land, to apply restitution, to return the plot of land of 0.05 hectares to the State and to pay the applicant 15 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 4.34 euros (EUR)) in compensation. The prosecutor argued that the authorities had breached domestic law by allocating the applicant a plot of land of 0.05 hectares, thus it had to be returned to the State. The prosecutor also noted that the applicant had paid 1,500 roubles for the land, which amounted to approximately LTL 15. The prosecutor also stated that he had only found out about the violation on 30 August 2007, when he had received a report from an expert.", "16. On 11 April 2008 the Vilnius District Court held that the land had been sold to the applicant in breach of the provisions of domestic law (see paragraph 65 below). The contested decisions had been related to property rights over the land, which was a legitimate interest of the community as a whole, and thus the prosecutor’s claim was related to the public interest. The applicant was ordered to return the plot to the State, with the State having to repay him the LTL 15. The parts of the order allocating the additional plot of 0.05 hectares to the applicant and the relevant part of the purchase agreement were annulled.", "17. The applicant appealed. On 10 December 2008 the Vilnius Regional Court noted that according to the prosecutor and the court of first instance any breach of legal norms regulating the division of land was a breach of the public interest. However, twenty-five people altogether, including the applicant, had been allocated additional plots at the time (see paragraph 7 above), but the prosecutor had only found a breach of the public interest in the applicant’s case. The court also found that when the applicant had been allocated the first plot of land (see paragraph 6 above), there had been no other plots demarcated and the land in front of his had been vacant. He thus could not have anticipated that the additional plot of 0.05 hectares would occupy part of the road because the road had not existed at the time the detailed plan had been drawn up or when the applicant had purchased the land (see paragraph 8 above). The court stated that the mechanism of allocating the additional plot to the applicant had been breached, but that he was a bona fide owner. Mistakes had been made by the authorities and taking the land from the applicant would have disproportionate consequences for him. The court observed that the applicant’s neighbours could easily access their land using other roads and their rights had not been breached. Consequently, the court overturned the first-instance decision and dismissed the prosecutor’s complaints. The case file contains no information of whether there was an appeal on points of law.", "18. The prosecutor applied to reopen the proceedings that had ended on 10 December 2008 (see paragraph 17 above). He argued that the Vilnius Regional Court had made a mistake in its application of the law and submitted that the additional plot of land should only have been allocated to the applicant after land reform plans had been carried out. Moreover, the allocation of 0.05 hectares to the applicant had been against the public interest because he had constructed a concrete fence on the road. The prosecutor added that an appeal on points of law had in fact been submitted after the appeal decision, but had been rejected by the Supreme Court.", "19. On 4 December 2009 the Vilnius District Court held that an application to reopen proceedings could only be lodged against a decision that had been appealed against (see paragraph 57 below). The prosecutor had alleged that the Vilnius Regional Court rather than the District Court had made a mistake. If the prosecutor’s request were to be satisfied and proceedings reopened, the court of first instance would have to decide on the lawfulness of a decision by a higher court and domestic law did not provide for the possibility of a court of first instance annulling decisions made on appeal. As a result, the prosecutor’s application to reopen the proceedings was dismissed.", "20. The Prosecutor General lodged a separate complaint. On 25 May 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court held that proceedings concerning a decision by an appellate court could not be reopened. Otherwise, appeals on points of law would be useless and the reopening of proceedings would be used as an opportunity to make proceedings more protracted. Moreover, there was a three-month time-limit to apply to reopen proceedings (see paragraph 58 below). The disputed decision had been adopted on 10 December 2008 and the prosecutor had sought to reopen proceedings on 8 July 2009, therefore the time-limit had been missed. As a result, the court upheld the Vilnius District Court’s decision of 4 December 2009.", "21. The Prosecutor General lodged an appeal on points of law. On 21 December 2010 the Supreme Court decided that the Prosecutor General could apply to reopen proceedings in all cases that had been terminated by a first-instance or appeal decision (see paragraphs 56 and 57 below). Moreover, the mere fact that a district prosecutor had brought civil proceedings did not mean that the Prosecutor General had to know about it. The court thus held that those processes (see paragraphs 18 above and 24 below) had been different and that the time-limit to apply to reopen proceedings had not been missed. Finally, the Supreme Court observed, without further specifications, that the lower courts had failed to properly assess the circumstances which had led to an alleged violation of the public interest and remitted the application to reopen proceedings for fresh examination by the appellate court.", "22. On 14 July 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court held that the first‑instance decision (see paragraph 19 above) had lacked reasons for why a clear mistake in the application of the law had been made (see paragraph 57 below) and without them the appellate court could not decide whether the Prosecutor General’s request to reopen proceedings had been examined properly. The court thus decided to return the case to the Vilnius District Court.", "23. On 25 October 2011 the Vilnius District Court held that an application to reopen proceedings on the grounds of a mistake in the application of the law required not only that the mistake had to be clear, but also be one of substance (see paragraph 57 below). A clear mistake could be a failure to apply a required legal rule, a failure to properly interpret the substance of a legal rule, an obvious misinterpretation of the circumstances and so on. In the case in question, the Prosecutor General’s application could not lead to a conclusion that the proceedings had to be reopened. The Vilnius Regional Court’s decision (see paragraph 17 above) had been wide‑ranging, it had given well-grounded responses to every violation of domestic law alleged by the Prosecutor General and had come to a reasoned conclusion. Reopening proceedings would thus lead to a repeated assessment of the facts and would be contrary to the domestic law and the main purpose of reopening proceedings. There was no information that the Prosecutor General had lodged an appeal on points of law against the Vilnius Regional Court’s decision (see paragraph 17 above). Even if an appeal on points of law had been submitted and rejected, that meant that the court of cassation had not considered that there had been grounds to examine the case. As a result, the Prosecutor General’s request to reopen the proceedings was dismissed.", "24. The Prosecutor General submitted a separate complaint. On 9 March 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court held that the conclusions of the lower court that there was no public interest at stake had been unfounded. Violations of domestic regulations had already been found and those regulations were necessary in the process of the sale or rent of State property. Violations of such regulations were directly related to a breach of the public interest. The court thus decided to reopen the proceedings.", "25. On 15 June 2012 the Vilnius District Court ruled that the decision of 11 April 2008 to oblige the applicant to return 0.05 hectares of land to the State and to pay him LTL 15 had been justified. The court held that the additional plot of 0.05 hectares had been allocated to the applicant in breach of the requirements of domestic law and that by holding that the rights of the applicant’s neighbours had not been breached and that the applicant had been a bona fide party to the purchase agreement, the Vilnius Regional Court had made a clear mistake in the application of the law. The court thus annulled the Vilnius Regional Court’s decision of 10 December 2008 and upheld that of the Vilnius District Court of 11 April 2008 (see paragraph 16 above).", "26. The applicant submitted a separate complaint. On 25 January 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance (see paragraph 25 above). It also held that the applicant’s argument that he could not have known that part of his land would block the road was not convincing enough as there had been a plan of the whole of the Zujūnai settlement and it had been obvious that there was a continuing road which was part of the 0.05 hectares of land in question. The court further held that the applicant had not been diligent enough and that ignorance of the law could not absolve someone of responsibility (see paragraph 37 below). The fact that the applicant had to return 0.05 hectares of land to the State did not prevent him from asking for an easement over the part of the State land where his waste water equipment and gas and water supplies were installed. The court thus rejected the applicant’s argument that the order to return 0.05 hectares of land to the State prevented him from using his house.", "27. The applicant lodged two appeals on points of law. The Supreme Court dismissed the first one as not raising important legal issues but merely disputing the facts established by the lower courts on 22 February 2013. The second appeal on points of law was dismissed on 26 April 2013. The Supreme Court accepted that if a person’s appeal was dismissed as not raising important legal issues, he or she could, within the time-limit prescribed by law, submit another appeal on points of law having corrected the deficiencies. However, it found that in the applicant’s case, the deficiencies of the first appeal on points of law had not been corrected, although the applicant had modified his arguments; therefore the complaint was repetitive and could not be accepted in accordance with the existing regulations (šiuo atveju kasacinio skundo trūkumai nepašalinti, skundas pripažintinas pakartotiniu, pagal nustatytą reglamentavimą jis negali būti priimtas).", "28. In April 2013 the applicant applied for a suspension of the execution of the decisions of the Vilnius District Court of 15 June 2012 and of Vilnius Regional Court of 25 January 2013 (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). He also sought to have the proceedings reopened. The applicant submitted that unless the execution of the decisions was suspended, he would have to initiate new proceedings for an easement.", "29. On 26 April 2013 the Vilnius District Court rejected the applicant’s request to suspend execution, holding that his arguments did not constitute sufficient grounds.", "30. On 2 August 2013 the Vilnius District Court rejected the applicant’s request to reopen the proceedings. It held that his argument that new circumstances had arisen was unfounded. The allegedly new circumstances were the fact that a general plan of the settlements of 1986 had not been registered in the State Register. The court observed that the applicant had been represented by a professional lawyer and must have been able to familiarise himself with the general plan and information about its registration. Furthermore, the fact that the plan had not been registered was not important to the examination of the case. The register had only been established in 1992 and had started functioning in 1996.", "31. The applicant submitted a separate complaint. On 27 February 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and decided to terminate the applicant’s appellate proceedings.", "32. The plot of land of 0.05 hectares was entered in the State Register as State property in May 2013.", "33. In January 2015 the authorities conducted an examination of the use of the 0.05 hectares of land and found that the applicant had not removed the fence, trees, a shed and paving stones from the plot.", "34. In September 2015 the authorities examined a March 2015 request from the applicant to purchase the plot of land of 0.05 hectares. The authorities stated that the plot could not be purchased as that would be contrary to domestic law (see paragraph 63 below). The same month the applicant was asked to remove the constructions described in the land examination document. It appears that the removal had to be conducted at the expense of the applicant.", "35. In March 2016 the authorities held that the constructions had not been removed.", "36. In February 2017 the applicant requested that the authorities rent the plot to him. In March 2017 the authorities replied that State land could be rented out if there were constructions on it that were owned by private individuals or legal entities. Such objects did not include temporary constructions, engineering systems, buildings that did not have a clear functional dependency or use, or other constructions designated as serving as dependencies of a main construction. The authorities held that the waste water treatment equipment was not an independent object and thus the applicant could not rent the plot of land." ]
[ "P1-1" ]
[ 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 31 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bacău.", "6. On 13 January 2005 the Bacău police division responsible for the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking (“the police”) was informed by the Bacău Regional Division of the Romanian Post Office (“the Post Office”) that it had identified three envelopes containing suspicious items. The envelopes, sent abroad by registered post sometime between 11 April and 13 May 2003, had been returned unopened as the intended recipients had failed to collect them. The people who had sent them could not be identified by postal workers and their addresses had proved to be fictitious. Consequently, the postal workers had opened the envelopes and contacted the police.", "7. The police seized and examined the envelopes and found that they contained Diazepam, a prescription medicine which also belonged to one of the categories of prohibited drugs under Law no. 143/2000 on the fight against drug trafficking and illegal drug use (“Law no. 143”).", "8. Between January and February 2005 similar envelopes containing similar prescription medicines meant to be sent abroad were discovered by the Post Office and given to the police.", "9. On 9 and 14 February 2005 the division for the investigation of organised crime and terrorism from the Bacău Prosecutor’s Office (“the prosecutor”) issued orders authorising the seizure of the suspicious envelopes under the urgent procedure provided for by Article 98 § 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the urgent procedure” and “the CCP” – see paragraph 26 below). The prosecutor sent the orders to the County Court for the court’s information on the next day.\nThe relevant parts of the orders read as follows:\n“The investigation showed that the recipients’ addresses are false.\nAs it appears that the envelopes contain prohibited substances which are among those listed in Law no. 143,\nBearing in mind the urgency and the well-foundedness [of the measure] under Article 98 § 12 of the CCP\nOrders\nThat the envelopes ... be taken by police officers ...\nItems which are of no relevance to the case shall be returned.”", "10. On 18 February 2005 the prosecutor started criminal investigations in the matter against unidentified perpetrators.", "11. The prosecutor requested audio and video-surveillance of the post offices in Bacău. The measure was authorised by the Bacău County Court on 23 February 2005.", "12. With the help of the surveillance material the applicant (who at that point remained unidentified) was seen on 14 March 2005 in two different post offices as he deposited two other suspect envelopes to be sent abroad. The envelopes were seized under the urgent procedure provided for by Article 98 § 12 of the CCP (see paragraph 26 below) and on the next day the prosecutor sent the orders to the court for the court’s information. An examination of the envelopes showed that they contained prescription medicine and that the sender’s address was false. The prosecutor’s orders read as follows:\n“... a man brought a parcel with suspicious contents which were of interest to investigators ...\nAs the correspondence was of interest to investigators and as the situation is urgent and duly justified, under Article 98 § 12 of the CCP\nOrders\nThat the police ... seize the parcel.\nCorrespondence and items which have been seized but which are of no relevance for the case shall be returned.”", "13. On 25 March and 18 April 2005 an expert examined the writing on the envelopes seized by the police and concluded that it belonged to the applicant.", "14. During the investigation, the prosecutor identified two pharmacies where the drugs had been procured without prescription. The pharmacists identified the applicant as the person to whom they had sold the medicine.", "15. Based on the evidence that had been gathered, the prosecutor concluded that between 2003 and 2005 the applicant had obtained medical products classified as drugs without prescription and had tried to sell them abroad.", "16. On 2 June 2005 the prosecutor committed the applicant for trial on a charge of dealing in drugs. Five of the envelopes seized on 9 February, 14 February and 14 March 2005 (see paragraphs 9 and 12 above) were attributed to the applicant and used as evidence.", "17. The applicant contested the lawfulness of the interception of his correspondence before the Bacău County Court and argued that the prosecutor had not obtained authorisation from the court to seize it, as required by the relevant provision of the CCP. As for the contents of the seized envelopes, he stated that he had sent scientific papers and samples abroad in relation to his research work and that he had used a fake identity to protect his private life and reputation in case the quality of the scientific work was considered as poor. He denied any involvement in drug trafficking.", "18. On 27 February 2007 the applicant was acquitted. The County Court excluded the prosecution’s main evidence, considering that the seized envelopes had been obtained unlawfully as the prosecutor had failed to ask the court to approve the measure. As for the remaining evidence in the file, it noted that the audio and video-recordings were not relevant for the accusations brought against the applicant and that the witnesses were unreliable as they had changed their statements in court.", "19. On 18 September 2007 the Bacău Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment.", "20. However, on 28 January 2008 the High Court of Cassation and Justice allowed an appeal on points of law by the prosecutor. It found that the lower courts had erred when they had set aside the evidence obtained from the seized correspondence. It considered that the provisions of the CCP meant that the prosecutor had been obliged to inform the courts about the seizure orders but not to seek their approval. It therefore sent the case back to the County Court and recommended that the court check whether the prosecutor’s orders had been sent as information to the court and to examine the accusation in the light of all the evidence in the file. The decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice was final.", "21. On 12 February 2009 the Bacău County Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and gave him a three-year suspended sentence. The County Court relied on the evidence in the file, namely the seized envelopes and the expert evaluation of their content and of the writing on them. It also relied on transcripts of the audio and video-surveillance in the post office and of the applicant’s telephone; statements by seven pharmacists that they had sold the medicine in question to the applicant without prescription; and testimony by two doctors who had been asked by the applicant or pharmacists to write prescriptions to cover up for the medicine sold without prescription. There was also testimony from the family doctor, who denied prescribing any medicine to the applicant’s parents, as the applicant had asserted. The County Court also had at its disposal statements from other witnesses, notably nine post office workers who remembered the applicant sending between one and five envelopes a week abroad, starting from 2003; four fellow researchers from the University, who worked or had worked in the same research team as the applicant; and a bus driver who said he had delivered an envelope for the applicant. The court heard evidence from twenty-three witnesses who had participated in various procedural acts as independent witnesses at the request of the police (martori asistenţi). The court further relied on the results of checks on the addresses abroad used by the applicant; Interpol information about the recipients of the envelopes; and police reports about checks on the two pharmacies used by the applicant, notably concerning bills and permits for selling prescription medicine which constituted drugs (see paragraph 14 above). In addition, it referred to the police report concerning the applicant’s activity on the Internet related to his alleged scientific work abroad (see paragraph 17 above). The court also had at its disposal reports from seven banks, attesting to the fact that between 2003 and 2005 the applicant had received more than a hundred money transfers from abroad for small sums, amounting to more than 41,000 United States dollars (USD) and 10,000 euros (EUR).", "22. The court dismissed the applicant’s argument of the unlawfulness of the interception of the correspondence. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, it found that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his privacy had been provided for by law and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.", "23. It also reiterated that as the situation had been urgent, the prosecutor had been allowed by law to intercept the correspondence without court authorisation, provided that he informed the court afterwards, which he had done.", "24. The applicant appealed. In the main, he argued that the interception of his correspondence had been unlawful and had breached his Article 8 rights. The court dismissed his arguments, making reference to the interpretation of the law given by the High Court of Cassation and Justice in its decision of 28 January 2008 (see paragraph 20 above). He also contested the manner in which one of the postal workers had been interviewed by the prosecutor (see paragraph 21 above). He did not contest the lawfulness of the remaining evidence. In his defence, he explained that he had received money from abroad for experiments he had performed for foreign scientists’ research work (see paragraph 21 above).", "25. The applicant reiterated his arguments in an appeal on points of law lodged with the High Court of Cassation and Justice. He did not contest the remaining evidence in the file. The High Court dismissed the case in a final decision on 22 June 2010." ]
[ "6", "8" ]
[ 1, 4, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 ]
[]
[ "5. The first applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Belgrade, Serbia. The second applicant is a privately owned company, founded by the first applicant in 1990, with its registered seat in Ilijaš - Podlugovi, Bosnia and Herzegovina.", "6. On 19 December 2001 the second applicant requested a licence to build a petrol station on the main highway in Bosnia and Herzegovina.", "7. On 21 October 2002 the Federal Road Directorate of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Directorate”) rejected the request. The second applicant appealed on 31 October 2002.", "8. On 28 February 2003 the Federal Ministry upheld that decision.", "9. On 28 March 2003 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review before the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Supreme Court”).", "10. On 25 August 2005 and 24 August 2006 the second applicant urged the Supreme Court to expedite the proceedings.", "11. On 22 November 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 21 October 2002 and 28 February 2003 (see paragraphs 7-8 above) on procedural grounds, and remitted the case to the Directorate.", "12. On 9 May 2007 the second applicant informed the Supreme Court that the decision of 22 November 2006 had not been enforced yet.", "13. On 16 August 2007 the Directorate rejected the second applicant’s request. On 30 August 2007 the second applicant appealed.", "14. On 8 November 2007 the second applicant complained to the Administrative Inspectorate of the Federal Ministry of Justice about the inaction of the administration.", "15. On 12 November 2007 the Federal Ministry upheld the decision of 16 August 2007 (see paragraph 13 above). The decision was served on the second applicant on 18 April 2008.", "16. On 30 May 2008 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review with the Supreme Court seeking it to quash the decisions of 16 August 2007 and 12 November 2007 (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). On 31 August 2009 the Supreme Court referred the claim to the Mostar Cantonal Court, as the competent court.", "17. On 27 November 2009 the Mostar Cantonal Court rejected the application for judicial review.", "18. On 6 January 2010 the applicant submitted a request for an extraordinary review of the decision of 27 November 2009 with the Supreme Court, which request was rejected as unfounded on 12 May 2010. That decision was served on the second applicant on 9 July 2010.", "19. On 6 September 2010 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”) complaining, notably, about the length of the above administrative proceedings.", "20. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as unfounded. It noted that the relevant proceedings had lasted eight years and five months in total, that seven different decisions had been rendered by the competent authorities and that, therefore, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 2, 13 ]
[ 1, 5, 9, 14, 15 ]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Dublin, Ireland.", "6. On 28 October 2008 the applicant was travelling on a passenger bus from Moldova to Romania, with Ireland as his final destination.", "7. At 12.30 a.m. his bus arrived at the Albiţa border crossing between Moldova and Romania. Romanian custom officers stopped the bus, got on and started searching the passengers. Two silver ingots were found in the applicant’s pockets.", "8. A customs officer decided that the applicant had failed to declare the ingots and confiscated them. An offence report drafted by the officer stated that the applicant had failed to declare two silver ingots of 1 kg each and had thereby breached the provisions of Article 653 (a) of the Customs Regulations (see paragraph 12 below). In addition to the confiscation the applicant was fined 3,000 Romanian lei (approximately 750 euros (EUR)). The report also stated that according to documents produced by the applicant he had bought the two ingots from a bank.", "9. The applicant lodged an administrative complaint with the Albiţa Customs Office, asking for the annulment of the offence report of 28 October 2008 and the restitution of the confiscated goods. He explained that he had legally acquired the two ingots, which had a value of EUR 500. He had kept them on him in order to prevent them being stolen during the bus trip and not to elude customs. He also stated that it had not been possible to declare goods to customs in a discrete manner or in writing. The passengers had not been allowed to get off the bus before the customs officers had got on and he had wished to avoid saying what he was carrying in front of the other passengers.", "10. On 26 January 2009 the Huşi District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint as ill-founded. Based on the elements in the case file, the court observed that the customs officer had asked the applicant whether he had anything to declare and the applicant had said no. Under those circumstances the court held that the applicant had been correctly sanctioned by the customs officer.", "11. An appeal on points of law by the applicant (recurs) was dismissed with final effect on 3 June 2009 by the Vaslui County Court. The court held that the applicant, who had signed the offence report, had failed to produce any evidence to challenge the customer officer’s findings in that document.", "12. The relevant provisions of the Romanian Customs Regulations, as approved by Government Decision No. 707/2006, are as follows:\nArticle 156\n“(1) A written customs declaration shall be submitted for the following goods:\n....\nc) objects made of precious metals, with or without precious stones, which exceed the purposes of personal use as set forth in legal provisions;\n(2) For the goods listed in paragraph (1) travellers shall submit the written customs declaration on standard forms which are made available free of charge, upon request, by customs offices.”\nArticle 653\n“The following is considered an offence and shall be sanctioned with a fine between 3,000 and 8,000 lei:\na) concealing from customs any goods or merchandise which should be placed under a customs regime. In such situations the goods shall be confiscated; ...”\nArticle 657\n“The offences set forth in the present chapter are subject to the regulations provided for by Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 on the legal system concerning offences ...”", "13. According to the Romanian Integrated Customs Tariff in force at the relevant time silver imported from the Republic of Moldova was not subject to any duties.", "14. The relevant provisions of Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 on the legal system concerning offences in force at the relevant time are as follows:\nArticle 5\n“(1) Offences may be punished with principal and complementary sanctions.\n(2) The principal sanctions are:\n...\nb) a fine\n...\n(3) The complementary sanctions are:\na) the confiscation of goods destined, used or derived from offences; ...\n(4) Special laws may provide for additional principal or complementary sanctions.\n(5) The sanction must be proportionate to the degree of social danger of the offence committed.\n(6) Complementary sanctions are applied in line with the nature and gravity of the offence.\n(7) Only one principal sanction can be applied for the same offence and one or more complementary sanctions.”", "15. The Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1214/2007 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff entered into force on 1 January 2008 and from that date was directly applicable in all Member States. In Section XIV, Chapter 71 the regulation does not provide for any customs duties for silver in unwrought or semi-manufactured forms or in powder." ]
[ "P1-1" ]
[ 3, 7, 8, 10 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Vilnius.", "6. In 1989 the applicant and R.Ž. started a company which imported and sold various goods. D.A., who was the stepson of the applicant’s sister, sometimes worked as a security guard on the company’s premises and as the applicant’s bodyguard.", "7. In July 1993 R.Ž. and another individual, A.Č., were found murdered in R.Ž.’s flat in Vilnius.", "8. In August 1993, while the applicant was in a car with D.A., the latter threatened him with a firearm. When the applicant tried to escape, D.A. hit him with the barrel of the gun, fired some shots into the ground, took the applicant’s Rolex watch and fired at several passers-by, injuring them.", "9. On an unspecified date the authorities opened a pre-trial investigation into the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. (see paragraph 7 above) and the incident between the applicant and D.A. in the car (see paragraph 8 above).", "10. In September 1993 the Lithuanian authorities issued a search warrant in respect of D.A. It appears that he had left Lithuania and lived in several different countries. In July 2009 D.A. was apprehended in Ukraine and subsequently extradited to the Lithuanian authorities.", "11. In December 2007 the applicant was officially notified that he was suspected of having organised the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state, as set out in Article 129 § 2 (2), (5), (6) and (9) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). It was suspected that the applicant had acted together with D.A. Further details were subsequently added to that notice in September 2012 and March 2013.", "12. In October 2009 D.A. was officially notified that he was suspected of having murdered R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state. D.A. was also notified that he was suspected of having attempted to murder the applicant and several other individuals, as set out in Article 129 § 2 (5), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 8 above and 34 below).", "13. In May 2010 the prosecutor decided to separate the pre‑trial investigation against the applicant and D.A. (see paragraph 37 below). He noted that the investigation concerned two criminal offences – the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. (see paragraph 7 above) and the attempted murder of the applicant and other individuals (see paragraph 8 above). The prosecutor observed that the applicant had been suspected of the former offence and that he had been granted victim status in respect of the latter offence, and the prosecutor considered that one person could not have dual status in the same investigation. He also noted that the investigation in respect of D.A. was almost complete and the case would soon be ready for trial, whereas the investigation in respect of the applicant was still ongoing. For those reasons, the prosecutor concluded that it was necessary to separate the investigation against the applicant from that against D.A.", "14. D.A. was charged with the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state (hereinafter “the first charge”) and with the attempted murder of the applicant and several other individuals (hereinafter “the second charge”). The criminal case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. With regard to the first charge, the applicant had the status of witness, and with regard to the second charge, he had the status of victim.", "15. The Vilnius Regional Court issued its judgment on 20 June 2011. It found D.A. guilty of the first charge as set out in Article 129 § 2 (2), (5) and (9) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). The court based its conclusion on multiple witness testimonies, the examination of various material objects, and conclusions delivered by forensic experts.", "16. One of the documents examined by the court was a handwritten letter which D.A. had addressed to the applicant at some point in 1993. The applicant had received that letter from D.A.’s father and presented it to the police. A forensic examination revealed that the letter had indeed been written by D.A. In the letter, D.A. stated that he had killed R.Ž. on the applicant’s orders so that the applicant would get all the profit from their business. D.A. also alleged that the applicant had bought him weapons to carry out unspecified criminal activities for the applicant’s benefit, and had bribed judges and prosecutors in order to help D.A. avoid criminal responsibility for some unspecified offences. D.A. further alleged that the applicant had promised to pay him for the murder, but had still not done so, and that that had been the reason for their conflict in the car (see paragraph 8 above). He threatened to forward the letter to various newspapers if the applicant failed to pay him.", "17. When questioned by the court, D.A. submitted that the contents of the letter were false. He claimed that the applicant had owed him some money for another debt, so he had made up the story in the letter in order to scare the applicant into paying him back. The applicant, who was questioned as a witness in respect of that charge, also denied all the allegations in the letter and stated that he had no connection to the murder.", "18. However, the court held that the letter constituted D.A.’s confession to the murder. The court considered it unlikely that D.A., who at the time of writing the letter had already been suspected of the murder, would falsely incriminate himself in the letter to the applicant, especially as their relationship at that time had not been friendly. It then stated that several of the allegations in the letter had been proved – for example, the applicant had admitted to having bought weapons for D.A., and there had indeed been several sets of criminal proceedings against D.A. which had eventually been discontinued. The court concluded:\n“As the facts laid out in the letter are consistent and objective, there are no grounds to doubt the truthfulness of the contents of the letter; the statement in the letter that [D.A.] – upon the orders of the individual in respect of whom a separate pre‑trial investigation was opened – killed [R.Ž.] so that all the profit would go to that individual alone, and that all the money which they had jointly owned would belong to the individual in respect of whom a separate pre-trial investigation was opened, must be considered true.”", "19. The descriptive part of the judgment also stated that D.A. had killed R.Ž. and A.Č. while acting with unidentified accomplices. However, the court did not take that into account as an aggravating circumstance.", "20. As for the second charge against D.A., the court changed its legal classification. The court considered that it had not been proved that D.A. had intended to kill the applicant or any of the passers-by (see paragraph 8 above). However, it found D.A. guilty of stealing the applicant’s property of high value (the Rolex watch) while threatening him with a firearm, and of negligently injuring several other individuals in his attempt to escape. D.A. was given a cumulative sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment. The court also allowed the applicant’s civil claim submitted in respect of the second charge in its entirety, and ordered D.A. to pay him 40,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 11,600 euros (EUR)) in pecuniary damages for the stolen watch.", "21. The prosecutor, D.A., the applicant and another victim submitted appeals against the Vilnius Regional Court’s judgment of 20 June 2011. In his appeal, the applicant argued that the court had de facto found him guilty of having instigated the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č., despite the fact that he had not been the accused in that case and had not been able to defend himself. The applicant asked the Court of Appeal to remove from the descriptive part of the judgment all the passages which alleged his involvement in the murder, in particular those which discussed D.A.’s letter (see paragraphs 16-18 above).", "22. In its judgment of 12 June 2012 the Court of Appeal amended the first-instance judgment in part. It held that the Vilnius Regional Court had erred in changing the legal classification of the second charge, found D.A. guilty of the second charge as it had been originally presented (see paragraph 14 above), and increased the sentence to nineteen years’ imprisonment. In addition, the court removed from the descriptive part of the judgment the phrase that D.A. had killed R.Ž. and A.Č. while acting with unidentified accomplices (see paragraph 19 above) – it held that, without identifying such individuals, inter alia, it could not be determined whether there had been an intention for them to act together.", "23. The court dismissed D.A.’s appeal contesting his guilt in respect of both charges. With regard to the first charge, D.A. argued, inter alia, that his letter to the applicant (see paragraphs 16-18 above) should not have been considered evidence of his guilt. In response to D.A.’s arguments, the court stated:\n“D.A.’s guilt in respect of the charge against him – the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state – has been proved by a series of pieces of indirect evidence collected in the case and adequately assessed in the [first‑instance] judgment, as well as one of the main pieces of direct evidence ‑ D.A.’s letter to [the applicant], allowing [the court] to make well-founded conclusions regarding the nature of the convicted individual’s actions and the form of his guilt.\n...\nIt is underlined that the principal statements of the letter, assessed together with the other evidence collected in the case, correspond to the events which took place at that time ... The chamber concludes that the facts indicated in D.A.’s letter are not made up, he refers to actual events which took place in his life, and there is no indication that he intended to threaten [the applicant] with that letter to make the latter pay him money.”", "24. As to the applicant’s appeal, the court stated:\n“Contrary to what is alleged in [the applicant’s] appeal, the first-instance court, while examining the evidence related to [D.A.’s] guilt in respect of the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č., did not assess [the applicant’s] actions relating to the organisation of the murder of those individuals. As can be seen from the case file, on 22 December 2007 [the applicant] was notified that he was suspected of having organised the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. ... [The applicant] is entitled to exercise his defence rights and defend himself against the accusation in that criminal investigation. Only that investigation can determine [the applicant’s] guilt in respect of the criminal offence of which he is suspected ... [The applicant] essentially contests his guilt in respect of the part of the judgment in which he does not have the status of either convicted individual or victim ... and his request goes beyond his procedural rights as a witness ... [The applicant’s appeal] is thereby dismissed.”", "25. D.A. and the applicant submitted appeals on points of law against the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 12 June 2012. The applicant raised essentially the same arguments as in his previous appeal (see paragraph 21 above).", "26. On 28 February 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. In response to the applicant’s submissions, the Supreme Court stated that the criminal proceedings in question concerned D.A.’s and not the applicant’s guilt in respect of the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č., and the applicant had not had victim status with regard to that charge, so he was not legally entitled to submit an appeal on points of law (see paragraph 40 below).", "27. On 11 April 2013 the applicant was served with an indictment and charged with having incited D.A. and another unidentified individual to murder R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state, as set out in Article 24 § 5 and Article 129 § 2 (2), (5), (6) and (9) of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 34-35 below). The case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits.", "28. When questioned by the court, the applicant denied his guilt in respect of the murder. He submitted that all the allegations against him in D.A.’s letter had been false, and that D.A. had written the letter with the purpose of blackmailing the applicant, which was why the applicant had decided to give it to the police. D.A. was questioned as a witness and gave essentially the same statements as in the previous criminal proceedings, including those relating to his letter (see paragraph 17 above).", "29. On 9 October 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court acquitted the applicant. It considered that neither direct nor indirect evidence adequately proved that he was guilty of having instigated the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. The court underlined that it had not been proved that the death of R.Ž., who had been the applicant’s business partner, had been beneficial to the applicant; on the contrary, after his death, their company had suffered great losses and had eventually ceased operating. In addition, the court considered that the prosecution had not established any motive for the applicant to kill A.Č.", "30. With regard to D.A.’s letter, the court stated that, although the letter included facts which were true, some of its other contents appeared to be “characteristic of blackmail”, in particular those which alleged that the applicant had bought D.A. weapons specifically to commit criminal offences, or that he had bribed some officials to help D.A. avoid criminal responsibility (see paragraph 16 above). The court also considered that D.A.’s threat to forward the letter to the media further indicated that it had been written with the purpose of blackmailing the applicant. Lastly, the court underlined that the applicant had not paid D.A. the money which he had demanded, nor had he destroyed the letter, but had submitted it to the police, which confirmed that the applicant had not been connected to the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č.", "31. The prosecutor appealed against that judgment. He submitted, inter alia, that the contents of D.A.’s letter had been examined in the previous criminal proceedings which had been concluded by a final court judgment (see paragraphs 18, 23 and 26 above), and the courts in the proceedings against the applicant should have followed that assessment.", "32. On 5 March 2015 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s acquittal. In response to the prosecutor’s arguments concerning D.A.’s letter, it stated that the courts in the criminal proceedings against D.A. had not examined the applicant’s actions in relation to the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č., so the prosecutor’s arguments had to be dismissed.\nFrom the information which the parties submitted to the Court, it appears that no appeal against that judgment was lodged before the Supreme Court." ]
[ "13", "6" ]
[ 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Celje.", "6. He had been a professional truck driver until he became unable to work due to epilepsy.", "7. On 29 September 2003 the applicant was certified as having a “category III work-related disability” as a result of his condition. He was found to have a right to be reassigned to a suitable position of employment where he and others would not be at risk because of his condition, with (retroactive) effect from 14 August 2002.", "8. On 21 February 2005 the Celje regional unit of the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (hereinafter “the regional ZPIZ”) granted the applicant a so-called “allowance for the period of waiting to be reassigned to or employed in a different appropriate position of employment” (hereinafter “waiting period allowance”) from 8 October 2004. Though the sums appear to be lower during the first few months, he had been subsequently receiving around 390 euros (EUR) per month in waiting period allowance. The regional ZPIZ relied on section 123 of the Pension and Disability Insurance Act (hereinafter “the 1992 Act”) and section 446 of the new Pension and Disability Insurance Act (hereinafter “the 1999 Act” – see paragraphs 24 and 25 below). It noted that the applicant had been registered as unemployed on 3 March 2003 and had been a beneficiary under section 22 of the 1999 Act from 1 March 2003 to 7 October 2004. Thus, once his unemployment allowance had come to an end he had become entitled to a waiting period allowance under section 123 of the 1992 Act (see paragraph 24 below). The regional ZPIZ also noted that, under section 193 of the 1992 Act, beneficiaries were entitled to a waiting period allowance until they fulfilled the conditions for retirement (ibid.).", "9. On 15 October 2010 the applicant’s doctor informed the regional ZPIZ about a shoulder injury the applicant had sustained and requested a reassessment of his level of disability.", "10. On the basis of, inter alia, information provided by the applicant’s doctor, the regional ZPIZ, on 2 February 2011, decided that the applicant had a right to be reassigned to another position of employment with several limitations, such as not to work at unprotected heights or drive category C and E vehicles, with effect from 1 February 2011. Subsequently, on 28 June 2011 it adopted a decision granting him a disability allowance (nadomestilo za invalidnost) from 24 February 2011 onwards. The regional ZPIZ relied on the 1999 Act, which had introduced certain new disability benefits (the term “disability benefit” is used to cover any type of allowance that arises from a disability) and discontinued some of those provided for under the 1992 Act, including the waiting period allowance. Sections 397 and 446 of the 1999 Act stipulated that a right to a disability allowance applied as from 1 January 2003 (see paragraph 25 below). The regional ZPIZ noted in its decision that the applicant had not been insured under the compulsory insurance scheme at the onset of his disability, but had been registered as unemployed on 3 March 2003 within thirty days of the final decision on his disability, as required by section 97 of the 1999 Act. It was established that his capacity to work had in fact further reduced, even though the category (III) of his disability remained unchanged. The regional ZPIZ found that, pursuant to section 94(1)(1) and (3)(1) of the 1999 Act, he should receive a benefit in the form of disability allowance, which in his case amounted to EUR 192.91. It drew the applicant’s attention to section 185 of the 1999 Act, which required beneficiaries to inform the ZPIZ of any change in circumstances which could affect their rights under that Act (see paragraph 26 below).", "11. On 21 July 2011 the applicant appealed against the above decision, arguing that in determining the amount of his disability benefit, the regional ZPIZ should have respected the principle of acquired rights. He pointed out that his benefit had reduced considerably, even though his disability had in fact worsened, and claimed that such a decision was unlawful.", "12. On 21 October 2011 the central Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia (hereinafter “the central ZPIZ”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal, confirming that the regional ZPIZ had properly applied the law and correctly calculated the amount of his disability allowance.", "13. On 5 December 2011 the applicant lodged a claim with the Celje Labour and Social Court challenging the above decisions. He reiterated that the disability allowance granted to him under the 1999 Act violated his acquired rights and that instead of increasing his benefit it reduced it by half, which was unlawful and unconstitutional.", "14. On 26 March 2012 the Celje Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It explained that while recipients of disability-related rights under the 1992 Act retained their acquired rights after the date set out in section 446 of the 1999 Act, in the applicant’s case a reassessment of his disability had been carried out on 2 February 2011 due to a worsening of his condition (see paragraph 10 above), which had resulted in further workplace limitations and his rights being consequently determined anew. In cases where a fresh assessment was made the 1999 Act was to be applied. The court concluded that the 1999 Act did not contain the right to a waiting period allowance. Instead, under section 94, it provided for the disability allowance (see paragraph 25 below) which had been correctly granted to the applicant.", "15. On 25 April 2012 the applicant appealed against the judgment, repeating the complaints he had made before the first-instance court and alleging that he ought to have been informed of the consequences of a request for a reassessment of his disability. If that had been the case, he would have “forbidden” his doctor from making such a request. Lastly, he reiterated that the decision of the regional ZPIZ of 28 June 2011 (see paragraph 10 above) was unlawful and unconstitutional, as it violated his right to social security; he pointed out that he was unable to survive on the newly determined disability allowance.", "16. On 21 June 2012 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, confirming the position of the lower court that the applicant’s case concerned a change in the level of disability, which had required a fresh determination of his disability benefit. In such a situation, section 397(3) of the 1999 Act provided that the applicant acquired rights under the Act. Also, since the applicant’s rights had been determined anew, the Higher Labour and Social Court concluded that there had been no violation of his acquired rights related to social security, and thus no violation of the Constitution.", "17. On 4 September 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court, arguing that he could not have legitimately expected that the worsening of his disability would result in a severe reduction of his disability benefit. In that connection, he alleged that the Higher Labour and Social Court’s view that the reduction did not interfere with his acquired rights or constitute a violation of his constitutional right to social security was arbitrary, as the court had provided no reasoning for that conclusion. The applicant further alleged that the newly determined amount of disability benefit interfered with his constitutional right to property.", "18. On 5 March 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, finding that the Higher Labour and Social Court had sufficiently explained that the change in his level of disability had required a fresh determination of his benefit in accordance with the 1999 Act.", "19. On 21 May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s judgment, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights to property and social security. He argued that the reduction in the disability benefit had put his subsistence at risk and failed the test of proportionality.", "20. On 18 November 2013 the Constitutional Court refused to accept the applicant’s complaint for consideration on the merits, referring to section 55b(2) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 27 below).", "21. In the meantime, on 22 May 2013, the applicant fulfilled the conditions for a retirement pension in the amount of EUR 374.73 and his disability allowance was discontinued from that date. He thus received the disability allowance for a period of twenty-seven months.", "22. Data concerning the applicant’s income provided by the Slovenian tax authorities shows that he received EUR 4,908 in 2010 in pension and disability insurance and, after the impugned change in his allowance, EUR 2,902 in 2011 and EUR 2,480 in 2012." ]
[ "P1-1" ]
[ 3, 5 ]
[]
[ "6. The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Gyöngyöspata. He is of Roma origin.", "7. On 12 August 2010 at about 1.50 a.m. the applicant was taken to Gyöngyös Police Department after he and his accomplices had been apprehended while driving a car containing goods apparently stolen from a nearby summer house.", "8. The applicant submitted that shortly afterwards, for about twenty minutes, he had been ill-treated by two police officers; at about 4.30 a.m. the two officers had returned and had continued hitting and kicking him for another thirty minutes or so. Some two hours later the two officers had escorted the applicant to another room for questioning, but had then continued beating him, together with several other officers. In the applicant’s account of the events, altogether six officers and two security guards took part in the ill-treatment, with the apparent intention of extracting his confession to further offences. He stated that he had been hit in the face, forced to his knees and kicked repeatedly; a paper bag had been pulled over his head and the soles of his feet had been hit many times with a piece of wood. The officers had insisted that he admit to at least three counts of theft in order for them to stop hitting him, and they had repeatedly insulted him, making references to his Roma origin. One of them had said that they would not mind if he died – there would just be one Gypsy less.", "9. The applicant eventually signed the record of the questioning, which stated that the questioning had taken place between 5.51 a.m. and 6.33 a.m.", "10. Later that morning, at about 6 a.m., the applicant was allegedly escorted to the toilet, where he said the officers had again started hitting and kicking him. One of them had removed a towel-holder from the wall and hit the applicant’s hand with it. Again, references were allegedly made to the applicant being a Roma.", "11. The applicant was released at about 2 p.m.", "12. Later that day, at the request of the applicant’s mother, the general practitioner of the neighbouring village, Dr C.S., came to the applicant’s house and examined him. Since she had apparently been told only about chest complaints, she did not examine the applicant’s legs or feet. She did not identify any marks indicating external injury on the applicant but found that his ribs were sore and suggested that he go to hospital if he wished to obtain a medical certificate recording his injuries. Dr C.S. herself did not produce a medical report on the premises.", "13. On the same evening the applicant went to the emergency room of Bugát Pál Hospital in Gyöngyös. At 7.34 p.m. he was issued with a medical certificate, for which he paid the fee due, stating that he had bruises on the forehead, the nose and the left shoulder and an abrasion on the right hip; both his hands and arms were swollen and hyperaemic; and the rear surface of both thighs, as well as the soles of his feet, were swollen, red and sore. According to the certificate, the applicant had numerous contusions that had been inflicted by other persons.", "14. Still on the same evening, at 8.38 p.m., X-rays were taken of the applicant at Albert Schweitzer Hospital in Hatvan, a town at a distance of 32 kilometres, where the applicant was driven by his family members. He was diagnosed with a “chest contusion”, a “skull contusion” and “bodily injury inflicted by human force”.", "15. The applicant stated that he had been unhurt at the time that he had been taken to the police department. He added that between his release and the medical inspection, he had been continuously accompanied by his relatives, who testified in the ensuing proceedings that he had not suffered any injuries outside the police department.", "16. On 27 September 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint alleging that he had been brutalised by police officers. The applicant alleged that during the ill-treatment the officers had made repeated references to his Roma origin. The case was being investigated by the Miskolc Public Prosecutor’s Office.", "17. On 8 November 2010 the applicant was heard as a witness and shown, for the purposes of his identifying his alleged assailants, the photos of police officers serving at the Gyöngyös Police Department. The applicant acknowledged from the outset that he would be able to identify with certainty only three of the several perpetrators. Nevertheless, he finally identified eight persons as the perpetrators – six police officers (T.B., M.Z., Gy.K., K.V., F.I. and H.A.) and two security guards employed by the police department (P.G. and Z.A.). Subsequently, the applicant became uncertain about the involvement of K.V. and H.A.", "18. The prosecutor’s office appointed a forensic expert. This expert had at his disposal the medical reports issued by Bugát Pál and Albert Schweitzer Hospitals. In his opinion given in retrospect, he made the following statement as to the time when the applicant’s injuries had been sustained:\n“The exact time of the infliction of the injuries cannot be established. Given that the doctor examining the applicant did not document any lesions characteristically pointing to an inveterate injury, it can only be said that the injuries had been sustained within a 24-48-hour-time-frame preceding the medical care. Since, according to the police report on the application of coercive measures, the local police constable handed the applicant over to the officer on duty without any complaints or injuries, the injuries were likely to have occurred after this point in time.”\n“A sérülések pontos keletkezési ideje nem határozható meg. Tekintettel arra, hogy a vizsgáló orvos idősülőben lévő sérülésre jellegzetes elváltozásokat nem dokumentált, az valószínűsíthető, hogy a sérülések az orvosi ellátást megelőző 24-48 órás időtartamon belül alakultak ki. Mivel a kényszerítő eszköz alkalmazására írt rendőri jelentés adatai szerint a körzeti megbízott panasz és sérülésmentesen adta át nevezettet az ügyeletes tisztnek, a sérülések valószínűsíthetően ezen időpontot követően keletkeztek.”", "19. On 28 December 2010 the Miskolc Investigating Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the investigation, holding in essence that the applicant’s version of events was not plausible. The prosecutor emphasised the fact that since the applicant had been apprehended just after he had committed the crime in question (and still in possession of the proceeds of that crime), coercive interrogation by police officers with the intention of extracting his confession to the offence in question seemed pointless and thus hardly plausible. Relying on the internal records of the police department recording the shifts of the officers, the prosecutor was satisfied that three of the alleged perpetrators, Gy.K., F.I. and H.A., had alibis for the time of the incident, in that early in the morning of that day, they had been assigned to patrol service. Therefore, they could not possibly have been present at the applicant’s questioning. Furthermore, the two security guards (P.G. and Z.A.) were not allowed to leave their station and thus could not have been present at the incident. The prosecutor also observed that a general practitioner had examined the applicant between his release from the police department and the first hospital inspection, but had recorded no injuries. The prosecutor also found it material that the applicant had been uncertain of the identities of the alleged perpetrators when shown photos of the Gyöngyös police officers; that he had contradicted himself on several occasions; and that he had complained about the alleged incident only on 27 September 2010, not before.", "20. On 16 January 2012 the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the discontinuation order. The prosecutor was satisfied that the investigation had been adequate and comprehensive, and that the obtaining of further evidence – in particular, by questioning the applicant’s brother and friend, who were present at his release – was superfluous. The applicant’s allegations about racist motives behind the ill-treatment were not addressed.\nThis decision was served on the applicant on 23 January 2012.", "21. On 21 March 2012 the applicant brought a substitute private prosecution against the eight presumed perpetrators – that is to say, six police officers and two security guards – on charges of coercive interrogation. The motion included assertions about racial insults being uttered during the incident.", "22. The Eger High Court held a hearing on 26 September 2012. At that hearing the applicant stated that he did not recognise the defendants P.G. and Z.A. and that he was not certain if K.V. had beaten him, so he dropped the charges against them. Accordingly, the court terminated the proceedings against these three defendants.", "23. The remaining defendants either denied the charges or refused to make any statements. The High Court heard Dr C.S., who confirmed that she had not seen any marks of external injury on the applicant’s body when examining him on the day of the incident. A court-appointed medical expert stated that if the applicant had had the injuries in question when examined by Dr C.S. then the latter must have noticed them. The court also obtained testimony from the applicant’s mother and brother and a friend (the two latter had not been heard during the investigation), who had been waiting for him in front of the Gyöngyös Police Department on his release. They all stated that the applicant had already had those injuries at the moment of his release.", "24. The High Court was satisfied that Gy.K., F.I. and H.A. had alibis for the time of the incident. As to the charges against the two other officers, T.B. and M.Z., the court highlighted that even though the applicant said that he had been ill-treated in order to force him to admit to at least three counts of theft – which he finally did – there was actually no reference in the record of the questioning to any further counts of theft. The court also emphasised that, contrary to the statements of the applicant, the two officers could not have been continuously present in the Gyöngyös Police Department because between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. they had been carrying out some onsite inspections in another town, Gyöngyöspata.", "25. On 28 November 2012 the Eger High Court acquitted the officers for want of sufficient evidence. According to the reasoning of the judgment, the court relied on documentary evidence relating to the applicant’s apprehension and questioning, documents relating to the service particulars of the officers involved, the testimony of the applicant, medical documentation, and the testimony of the officers.", "26. The applicant did not appeal.", "27. As a consequence of the applicant lodging, but subsequently withdrawing, a criminal complaint against K.V., criminal proceedings on charges of false accusation were conducted against the applicant. On 7 November 2013 the Eger District Court found him guilty as charged and placed him on three-year probation. The judgment was upheld in essence by the Eger High Court on 10 June 2014; however, the applicant’s sentence was altered to 180 days of community work." ]
[ "14", "3" ]
[ 6, 10, 15 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Co. Roscommon.", "5. In November 1999 the applicant purchased a newly-built house, which has been her dwelling place since then. The sale took the form of two agreements. The first was an agreement to purchase the land from the owners, Mr and Mrs F, for the sum of 5,000 Irish pounds (IEP) (approximately 6,350 euros). The second was a building agreement under which she paid IEP 80,000 (approximately 101,600 euros) to a building company called T and C Developments Ltd. The company was owned by Mr and Mrs F, who were the only shareholders. The house was covered by a guarantee provided by a company known as Homebond.", "6. From the time she moved into the house in March 2000, the applicant noted major structural defects in the property. She reported this to Homebond in September 2001. The company carried out an inspection of the house and, in September 2002, offered to make certain repairs to it in accordance with the terms of the guarantee. According to the applicant, Homebond refused to issue an Engineer’s certificate/guarantee upon the completion of the works, which would have been required if the applicant were to sell the house afterwards.", "7. In February 2003 the applicant instituted proceedings in the High Court against the parties mentioned above, i.e. Mr and Mrs F (first and second defendants), T and C Developments (third defendant), and Homebond (fourth defendant). A fifth defendant was included in the action, a Mr Q, who, as an engineer, had certified that the house was in compliance with the relevant building regulations. In March 2003, Mr Q’s company was named as the sixth defendant. The applicant filed her statement of claim in May 2003.", "8. Over the following months, she wrote several times to the solicitors for the first three defendants requesting that they deliver their defence, on each occasion offering some additional time for this purpose. By December 2003 these defendants had not yet delivered their defence, at which point the applicant applied to the High Court for a judgment in default of defence against them.", "9. The statement of claim was not served on the fourth defendant until December 2003, an oversight that the applicant attributed to her solicitors. The fourth defendant entered its defence to the plaintiff’s claims in May 2004.", "10. In January 2004 the High Court ordered the first three defendants to deliver their defence within three weeks. In March 2004, the applicant agreed to allow an additional 21 days for them to file their defence.", "11. In July 2004 the applicant again applied to the High Court for a default judgment against the first three defendants, in light of their failure to enter their defence to the action. The defence was filed in September 2004. While it was presented as the defence of the first and second defendants, it was clarified at a later stage in the proceedings (in mid-2009), that it also concerned the third defendant.", "12. On 20 December 2004, at the request of the applicant, the High Court gave a default judgment against the fifth and sixth defendants (Mr Q and his company), holding them liable to the applicant in damages and for costs. According to the judgment, these sums were to be assessed at a future date. The judgment was never enforced. The applicant explained that she received legal advice to the effect that the practice was to hold over such judgments until the case had been heard and damages assessed. She added that at a later stage in the proceedings (2009/2010) she received legal advice that the default judgment had by then expired.", "13. According to the applicant, in the years 2005-2008 her solicitors considered it more effective to engage principally with the fourth defendant, Homebond, in light of the guarantee on the house. Homebond made a proposal to the applicant in June 2006 to carry out remedial work on the house. Her solicitor sought clarification of the proposal, writing several times between December 2006 and February 2008 when Homebond replied. The applicant indicated her readiness to accept the proposal. However, when subsequently requested to assign her rights to Homebond she sought clarification of the matter from the company, writing in April 2008 and again in April 2009.", "14. On 20 April 2009 the High court granted a motion brought by the applicant’s solicitor to cease to represent her. From that point onwards, she acted as a lay litigant.", "15. On 22 April 2009 the applicant gave notice of intention to proceed with her case to all of the defendants, a necessary step under domestic law where proceedings have been dormant for more than one year (Order 122 r. 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts).", "16. On 20 July 2009 the High Court struck out the applicant’s motion for a judgment in default of defence. The applicant sought to appeal this ruling to the Supreme Court, requesting additional time for this purpose in September 2009, which the Supreme Court refused to allow on 16 October 2009.", "17. On 13 October 2010 the applicant again gave notice of her intention to proceed. The following month, she was informed by solicitors for Homebond that the offer made in 2002 was still valid.", "18. On 12 September 2011 the applicant once more issued notice of her intention to proceed. In November 2011 she sought a trial date and was informed that a hearing would take place in March 2012, later moved to April 2012. At that point it was suggested by a High Court judge that the parties could attempt to resolve the dispute by mediation. The applicant explored this option but did not pursue it when it became clear, by June 2012, that some of the defendants were not interested. By this stage she had been informed that the sixth defendant had gone into voluntary liquidation. In July 2012 the applicant was informed that the case would be heard in early 2013.", "19. The case was not heard as a single action. Only the fourth and fifth defendants appeared (the latter only briefly) at the hearing that commenced on 29 January 2013. The first three defendants, although given notice of the hearing, were not represented at it. The High Court’s ruling, given on 20 March 2013, therefore only considered the claims against Homebond and Mr Q. The judge ruled that Homebond was liable to the applicant under the terms of the guarantee. Although the guarantee set an upper limit of IEP 30,000 (approximately 38,100 euros), the judge considered that in the circumstances of the case it was justified to award the full amount of the estimate for repairs, approximately 51,000 euros. The judge dismissed the case against Mr Q, and observed that the real fault lay with the builder.", "20. On 10 April 2013 the High Court issued an order against the fourth defendant for the amount awarded to the applicant.", "21. On 15 May 2013 the same judge dealt with the case against the first three defendants. She held them jointly and severally liable to the applicant in damages for 94,082 euros.", "22. Homebond sought to appeal the judgment and order against it. For this it was required to serve the notice of appeal personally on the applicant within twenty-one days. According to the elements in the case-file, the company’s solicitors tried unsuccessfully to arrange service on the applicant. They subsequently applied to the Supreme Court for additional time to appeal, which was granted on 14 June 2013.", "23. The applicant brought a cross appeal, claiming that the High Court had wrongly failed to award her legal costs.", "24. In October 2014 the applicant sought to have the appeal struck out for lack of prosecution by Homebond. This was not granted. Instead, ruling on 10 October 2014 the Supreme Court granted her two weeks to make her submissions on the question of costs. The applicant filed her submissions the following week.", "25. On 28 October 2014 many pending appeals were transferred from the Supreme Court to the new Court of Appeal, including the Homebond appeal.", "26. In November 2014, the Court of Appeal directed the parties to file their respective submissions within two weeks, granting a short extension of this deadline the following month. On 19 December 2014 it set a hearing date of 23 February 2015. On the latter date it allowed Homebond’s appeal and dismissed the applicant’s cross appeal.", "27. On 10 June 2013 the first and second defendants filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of the High Court.", "28. On 8 July 2013 the High Court made a garnishee order attaching monies owed by a commercial bank to the first and second defendants in the amount of the damages awarded to the applicant.", "29. On 26 July 2013 the Supreme Court granted to the defendants a stay on the award of damages, on condition that they pay into court the sum of 45,000 euros within a period of three months, failing which the stay would lapse. The payment was not made. An application by the defendants to put forward property deeds in lieu of money was refused by the Supreme Court on 22 November 2013.", "30. The applicant obtained a judgment mortgage against the defendants on 29 October 2013.", "31. On 24 January 2014 the Supreme Court again refused an application from the defendants to stay the judgment of the High Court. It also refused to lift the garnishee order and to vacate the judgment mortgage obtained by the applicant.", "32. On 11 July 2014 the Supreme Court refused an application from the applicant to strike the appeal out for lack of prosecution. It directed the defendants to file their books of appeal within ten weeks, failing which the appeal would be dismissed.", "33. The appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeal, which indicated on 19 November 2014 that it would first consider the issue of the liability of the first and second defendants, and set a short deadline for the parties’ submissions on this.", "34. The hearing took place on 9 March 2015. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the High Court, holding that as a matter of law Mr and Mrs F were not liable to the applicant for the defects in the house since they had simply sold her the land and were not themselves party to the building agreement. There could only be a remedy against the third defendant, T and C Developments Ltd., with whom the applicant had concluded the agreement in 1999.", "35. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against this judgment. On 29 July 2015 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave." ]
[ "13", "6" ]
[ 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow.", "5. On 27 August 2002 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Administration of the Mirninskiy Ulus of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (“the Administration”), a private person S., her husband B., and a private company A. claiming a title to a flat, damages, and S.’s eviction from the flat.", "6. On 18 September 2002 the Mirninskiy District Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (“the District Court”) refused to consider his action, because there already had been a decision of 6 February 2001 taken by the District Court concerning the same dispute.", "7. On 13 November 2002 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic overruled the refusal and remitted the case for a new examination, as the action included a new co-defendant, and, therefore, it could not be said that the dispute was among the same parties.", "8. On 15 January 2003 the District Court ordered eviction of S. and her family from the flat and dismissed the claim against the Administration.", "9. On 3 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic quashed the judgment on appeal and returned the case for a fresh examination, as the lower court had failed to address issues related S.’s property rights.", "10. On 29 July 2003 the District Court ordered an expert examination of the flat in order to determine its market value.", "11. On 14 August 2003 the court proceedings resumed.", "12. In the meantime, the applicant amended his claims and sought to obtain compensation for his belongings allegedly stolen in 1999, non‑pecuniary damage, legal costs, travel expenses and reimbursement of the rent he had to pay after his eviction from the disputed flat back in 1999.", "13. On 29 August 2003 the District Court examined the case, ordered the Administration to pay the applicant 800,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the flat’s market value and dismissed the remainder of the claims. In particular, the claim for compensation for the allegedly stolen property was dismissed as unfounded.", "14. On 20 October 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) and entered into force.", "15. On 11 June 2004, upon the applicant’s request, the bailiffs initiated the enforcement proceedings.", "16. On 27 August 2004 the District Court granted the Administration’s request for suspension of the enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003 until 15 January 2005 due to financial difficulties encountered by the debtor.", "17. On 15 November 2004 the applicant’s appeal against the above decision was dismissed.", "18. On 18 March 2005 the monetary award in accordance with the judgment of 29 August 2003 was paid to the applicant.", "19. On 29 September 2005, upon the applicant’s extraordinary appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) quashed the judgment of 29 August 2003 and the decision of 20 October 2003 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The Presidium found that the courts had incorrectly applied the material law to various aspects of the case, and had failed to join the appropriate financial body as co-defendant.", "20. It appears that the amounts paid to the applicant under the quashed judgment of 29 August 2003 have not been reclaimed.", "21. On 15 November 2005 the District Court suspended the proceedings, due to B.’s illness and asked the applicant to clarify his claims.", "22. On 21 December 2005 the applicant submitted the amended claims.", "23. On 16 February 2006 the District Court joined, at the defendant’s request, the Ministry of Finance as co-defendant in the proceedings and suspended the examination of the case on account of B.’s poor state of health.", "24. On 14 February 2007 the case was assigned to a different judge of the District Court, for the sake of the court’s impartiality.", "25. On 21 March 2007 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s action.", "26. On 4 June 2007 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the judgment on appeal except for the parts concerning the eviction of S. and B., reimbursement of the rent, payments for utility services, a commission fee, and recovering of the cost of the apartment. The decision in those parts was remitted for a fresh examination due to failure by the lower court to assess certain evidence and misapplication of the material law.", "27. On 27 August 2007 the District Court suspended the proceedings pending S.’s return from vacation.", "28. On 26 October 2007 the court ordered the applicant to clarify his claims and scheduled a new hearing on 23 November 2007.", "29. On 23 November 2007 the court issued a special writ ordering the bailiffs to obtain clarifications of the claims from the applicant.", "30. It appears that at some point the applicant provided the required information.", "31. On 30 April 2008 the District Court dismissed the action as unfounded. The court explained that the applicant had other remedies to use under the civil law in order to protect his property rights. In particular, he could claim that an equivalent apartment or a compensation be provided to him.", "32. By the final judgment of 13 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the lower court’s findings on appeal.", "33. In the meantime, the applicant sued the Administration for statutory interest for the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003.", "34. On 7 February 2007 the District Court discontinued the proceedings as the judgment of 29 August 2003 had been quashed and a new decision in the case had not yet been adopted." ]
[ "P1-1", "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "8. The applicants were born in 1949 and 1923 respectively and lived in Bucharest, where the first applicant still lives.", "9. The applicants were co-owners of two adjacent plots of land in Montenegro.", "10. On 13 June 2009, during a visit to the plots, the first applicant noticed a metal fence built partly on their property. The fence divided the two plots of land and made it impossible for them to access one plot from the other. It appears that the fence had been erected some time in February 2009.", "11. On 15 July 2009 the applicants, who had legal representation, instituted civil proceedings for trespass (radi smetanja posjeda) against B.Ć., their neighbour.", "12. On 27 June 2011 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Kotor ruled in favour of the applicants and ordered B.Ć. to remove the fence and pay the applicants 1,435 euros (EUR) in respect of legal costs. The court was satisfied that the applicants had lodged their claim in time, given that the deadline for initiating proceedings was 30 days from the day on which they had noticed the trespass, taking into account that 13 and 14 July were national holidays. In doing so the court relied on section 77 of Property Act (see paragraph 14 below).", "13. On 20 December 2011 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica, ruling on an appeal lodged by B.Ć., quashed the previous judgment and rejected the applicants’ claim (tužba se odbacuje) as submitted out of time. The court held that 13 and 14 July were indeed national holidays when the courts did not sit. It considered, however, that the 30-day period within which the applicants could institute proceedings was mandatory “[in which case] there could be no shifting of the time-limit when its last day fell on a day when the courts [did] not sit”. The time-limit had therefore expired on 13 July 2009, and the applicants had not filed their claim until 15 July 2009." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 5 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Omsk.", "6. The applicant was deputy head of the Omsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences.", "7. On 22 August 2002 the Novosibirsk Regional Court authorised for 180 days the interception and recording of the applicant’s telephone conversations, interception of postal communications and the collection of data from technical channels of communication. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows:\n“Operational-search measures carried out with the aim of combatting corruption within State authorities have revealed indications of a systematic bribery scheme operated by certain prison officials in the Omsk region.\nAccording to operative information, there are good reasons to suspect [the applicant], deputy head of the Omsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences, of arranging for, and systematically receiving, unlawful payments from confidants of the convicts serving their sentences in Omsk penal institutions in exchange for granting them various privileges (such as a prison leave, improved conditions of detention or transfer to another penal institution within the Omsk region, which was for some reason preferred by the convict in question).\nGiven that [the applicant’s] actions contain elements of criminal offences under Article 290 § 4 of the Criminal Code [bribe-taking], classified as a serious offence, and under Article 285 § 1 of the Criminal Code [abuse of power], it is necessary to perform a combination of operational-search measures (interception and recording of telephone conversations, monitoring of correspondence and collection of data from technical channels of communication) in order to collect evidence of his criminal activities, and to receive information about the bribe‑givers and the payment mechanisms used.”", "8. On 18 February 2003 the Novosibirsk Regional Court authorised “audio surveillance” of the applicant’s office for 180 days. The Government did not submit a copy of that decision.", "9. Charges of bribe-taking or abuse of power have never been brought against the applicant.", "10. In March 2003 the applicant was charged with disclosure of State secrets, an offence under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code, for informing a convict’s relative that the convict was under covert surveillance.", "11. When studying the criminal case file, the applicant learnt for the first time that his telephone conversations had been recorded and his other communications monitored. He also learnt that a recording of his telephone conversation with Ms L., a sister of a convict detained in a penal institution under his supervision, formed the basis for the charge of disclosure of State secrets. During the conversation, which had taken place on 17 October 2002, the applicant had warned Ms L. that her relative was under covert surveillance and that there were listening devices hidden in his cell.", "12. At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the recording of his telephone conversation with Ms L. was inadmissible as evidence as it had been obtained unlawfully.", "13. On 16 February 2005 the Omsk Regional Court found the applicant guilty of disclosure of State secrets, an offence under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code. It relied on the recording of the applicant’s telephone conversation with Ms L., among other evidence. It found that the recording was admissible as evidence as it had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In particular, the interception of the applicant’s telephone conversations had been authorised by a court on the grounds that he was suspected of the serious criminal offence of bribe‑taking. The applicant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years.", "14. In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, in particular, of a violation of his right to respect for his private life. He argued that the interception of his communications had been unlawful and unjustified, and that the recording of his conversation with Ms L. was inadmissible as evidence.", "15. On 21 June 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal. It noted that all the evidence had been collected in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was admissible." ]
[ "8" ]
[ 2 ]
[]
[ "5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, are similar to those in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011).", "6. Between 21 and 27 December 1989 many people including the applicants and/or their close relatives involved in this case took part in the anti-communist demonstrations in Bucharest, Timișoara, Brașov, Reșița and Craiova which led to the fall of the communist regime. They were injured or killed by gunfire during the demonstrations.", "7. In 1990 following the overthrow of the communist regime, the military prosecutor’s office opened investigations into the armed crackdown on the demonstrations. The main criminal investigation into the use of violence, particularly against civilian demonstrators, during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest and other cities has been contained in file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014).", "8. In a number of cases concerning events in Bucharest and Craiova, the prosecutor decided not to initiate a criminal investigation or to discontinue the proceedings. Those decisions were taken between 1990 and 2007. It results from the documents submitted by the parties that, after the adoption of those decisions, the prosecutor continued to examine the circumstances of these cases in the main criminal investigation – object of file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014).", "9. To date, the main criminal investigation appears to be still ongoing. The most important procedural steps were summarised in Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Alecu and Others v. Romania, nos. 56838/08 and 80 others, §§ 7-13, 27 January 2015. Subsequent developments are as follows.", "10. Following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in February 2014, jurisdiction over the case was relinquished in favour of the military prosecutor’s office.", "11. On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor’s office closed the investigation, finding that the applicants’ complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the facts which had been investigated could not be classified as criminal offences and that some of them were res judicata. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision (see Ecaterina Mirea and Others v. Romania, nos. 43626/13 and 69 others, § 15, 12 April 2016). However, from the information available on the prosecutor’s office website, the investigation is still ongoing and must have therefore been reopened." ]
[ "2" ]
[ 2, 3, 6 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Kópavogur. At the material time he was a well-known person in Iceland who for years had published articles, blogs and books and appeared in films, on television and other media, under pseudonyms.", "6. In November 2011, an 18-year-old woman reported to the police that the applicant and his girlfriend had raped her. In January 2012 another woman reported to the police that the applicant had committed a sexual offence against her a few years earlier. Upon the completion of the police investigation the Public Prosecutor, on 15 June and 15 November 2012, dismissed the cases in accordance with Article 145 of the Act on Criminal Procedures, because the evidence which had been gathered was not sufficient or likely to lead to a conviction. The applicant submitted a complaint to the police about allegedly false accusations made against him by the two women. This case was also dismissed.", "7. On 22 November 2012 Monitor, a magazine accompanying Morgunblaðið (a leading newspaper in Iceland), published an interview with the applicant. A picture of the applicant was published on the front page and in the interview the applicant discussed the rape accusation against him. The applicant claimed several times that the accusations were false. He stated, inter alia, that it was not a priority for him for the girl’s name to be exposed and that he was not seeking revenge against her. He accepted that having placed himself in the spotlight of the media he had to tolerate publicity which was not always “sunshine and lollipops” but criticised the way the media had covered his case. When asked about the girl’s age, he responded that the girl had been in a club where the minimum age had been 20 years and that it had been a shock to find out later that she had been only 18 years old. When asked about his complaints against the girl for allegedly wrongful accusations, he stated again that he was not seeking revenge against those who had reported him to the police, but that it was clear that they had had ulterior motives. He hoped that the police would see that it was important to have a formal conclusion in the case and that the documents in the case were “screaming” conspiracy.", "8. On the same day, X published an altered version of the applicant’s front-page picture with the caption “Fuck you rapist bastard” on his account on Instagram, an online picture-sharing application. X had altered the picture by drawing an upside down cross on the applicant’s forehead and writing “loser” across his face.", "9. Apparently X had believed that only his friends and acquaintances, who were his “followers” on Instagram, had access to the pictures he published. However, his pictures were also accessible to other Instagram users.", "10. On 23 November 2012 the newspaper Vísir published an online article about X’s post, along with the altered picture and an interview with the applicant.", "11. On 26 November 2012 the applicant’s lawyer sent a letter to X requesting that he withdraw his statement, apologise in the media and pay the applicant punitive damages. By email the same day, X’s lawyer submitted that X had not distributed the picture online; it had been posted for a closed group of friends on Instagram and others had distributed it. Furthermore, the email stated that X was sorry and that the picture had been shared without his consent or knowledge.", "12. On 17 December 2012, the applicant lodged defamation proceedings against X before the District Court of Reykjavík and asked for him to be sentenced to punishment, under the applicable provisions of the Penal Code, for altering the picture and for publishing it on Instagram with the caption “Fuck you rapist bastard”. The applicant further requested that the statement “Fuck you rapist bastard” be declared null and void and that X be ordered to pay him 1,000,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK; approximately 8,800 euros (EUR)) in non-pecuniary damages under the Tort Liability Act, plus interest, ISK 150,000 (approximately 1,300 EUR) for publishing the judgment in the media under Article 241 of the Penal Code, and the applicant’s legal costs.", "13. By judgment of 1 November 2013, the District Court found against the applicant. The court stated, inter alia, that the applicant enjoyed the personal protection afforded by law, irrespective of which of his pseudonyms he was using. In the same way, the applicant had to take responsibility for material he issued, irrespective of the name he chose to use when doing so. The court further considered that the altered picture, along with the text, should be considered as a whole and that it contained X’s opinion of the applicant’s person, which indicated a strong dislike. As to the subject matter, the District Court found that the picture and the statement had been a part of general public debate because the applicant was a well-known person in Iceland and had to accept being the subject of public discussions. The court then described in detail his professional activities of writing online, publishing books and appearing on television, especially under pseudonyms, the subject matter of his work, the subsequent criticism of his work and his participation in public debates about it. The court noted that this had led to greater outcry and public debate about the accusations against him of sexual offences, a debate in which he had participated. The court concluded that the manner in which the words had been presented by X had been more invective than a factual statement, and should therefore be considered as a value judgment rather than a statement of fact. X’s statement had been within the bounds of freedom of expression granted to him by law.", "14. On 26 March 2014 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court against the District Court’s judgment. Before the Supreme Court the applicant reiterated his argument that X’s Instagram account had been an “open” account, meaning that the picture had been accessible not only to his followers but to all Instagram users, over 100,000,000 people at the material time. He submitted further documents to support his argument.", "15. By judgment of 20 November 2014 the majority of the Supreme Court (two out of three judges) upheld the District Court’s conclusion. The Supreme Court accepted that the altered picture had been accessible, not only to X’s followers on Instagram, but to other users as well.", "16. Furthermore, the judgment contained the following reasons:\n“[X] claims that his act of uploading the altered picture onto the picture-sharing application in question did not constitute the publication of the picture within the meaning of Article 236(2) of the Penal Code No 19/1940, as he had believed that only a limited number of people would have access to it. This cannot be accepted, as the act of making something accessible in electronic format to such a large number of people as stated above, irrespective of whether the persons in question are the friends and acquaintances of the person doing so, [...], is considered to be a publication according to the traditional definition of the term. It remains to be determined whether [X’s] publication of the picture had, given the circumstances, constituted a defamatory allegation against the [applicant] under Article 235 of the Penal Code.\nThe appealed judgment describes in detail that, before the complaints of sexual offences against him as described above had been reported, [the applicant] had been a well-known person, not least for his performance in public under the names of Gillz or Gillzenegger, the names under which he wrote on Internet, published books and pictures and presented himself in the media. The views of the [applicant] published there garnered some attention, as well as controversy; views which included his attitudes towards women and their sexual freedom. The documents of the case reveal that there were instances when his criticism had been directed towards named individuals, often women, and in some cases his words could be construed to mean that he was in fact recommending that they should be subjected to sexual violence. The [applicant] has often justified such conduct by stating that the material had been meant in jest and that those who criticised it lacked a sense of humour. The Supreme Court agrees with the District Court that the [applicant] enjoys the personal protection provided for by law, under Article 71 of the Constitution and Article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights, cf. Act No 62/1994, irrespective of whether he was appearing under his own name or a pseudonym. In the same manner, he must take responsibility for the material he produces, irrespective of what name he chooses to use.\nWhen the [applicant] gave the aforementioned newspaper interview and employed provocative, if not derogatory, comments about others, including the girl who had accused him of sexual offences, he launched a public debate and should, moreover, have known that his comments would result in strong reactions from those who strongly disliked his abovementioned views. [X] enjoys freedom of expression according to Article 73(2) of the Icelandic Constitution and Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the District Court reached the correct conclusion that under these circumstances he had enjoyed greater freedom to express himself about the [applicant] and his opinions.\nIn assessing whether or not comments or other expressions can be considered a defamatory allegation according to Article 235 of the General Penal Code, taking into consideration the manner in which the provision of Article 10 of the [Convention] has been clarified by the European Court of Human Rights, it has to be decided whether the expression involved a value judgment or a factual statement. Although it can be agreed that by using the term ‘rapist’ about a named person, that person is being accused of committing rape, account must be taken of the context in which the term is set, cf. the ruling of the Supreme Court on 29 January 2009 in Case No 321/2008. If the altered picture and the comment ‘Fuck you rapist bastard’ are taken as a whole – as the parties agree should be the case – the Supreme Court agrees with the District Court that this was a case of invective on the part of [X] against the [applicant] in a ruthless public debate, which the latter, as stated previously, had instigated. It was therefore a value judgment about the [applicant] and not a factual statement that he was guilty of committing rape. In this context, it makes a difference, even though this alone is not decisive for the conclusion, that [X] did not maintain that the [applicant] had thus committed a criminal offence against someone else, named or unnamed. Accordingly, and with reference to the conclusion of the appealed judgment, the conclusion that [X] expressed himself within the limits of the freedom to which he is entitled under Article 73(2) of the Constitution, must be upheld. As a result he is acquitted of all the [applicant’s] claims.\nAs is rightly stated in the appealed ruling, the modified picture and the comments of [X] attached thereto were indecent and tasteless with respect to the [applicant]. For this reason, and with reference to Article 130(3), cf. Article 166 of Act No 91/1991 on Civil Procedure, legal costs before both court instances will be cancelled.”", "17. In the minority’s opinion, the statement “Fuck you rapist bastard”, considered in the light of the content of the article published by Monitor, could not be considered a value judgment but rather a grave insinuation that the applicant had committed a serious criminal offence. The minority concluded that, considering that the criminal investigation had ended with the case against the applicant being dismissed, and even if the applicant was a public person who had expressed himself in a controversial way in public, he should not have to tolerate this kind of comment." ]
[ "10", "8" ]
[ 1, 11 ]
[]
[ "4. Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis.", "5. Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation.", "6. On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (“the Town Court”) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,100,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,800,000 for non‑pecuniary damage.", "7. No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final. Some judgments in respect of several applicants remained unenforced (see “Enforcement status” in the Appendix).", "8. On different dates in 2012 and 2013 the domestic courts granted the defendant authority’s request to extend the time-limit for appeal essentially on the ground that the defendant authority had not been served with the impugned judgments. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law. The applicants were ordered to repay the sums received under the judgments.", "9. The applicants lodged a supervisory review application. There is no indication that they requested the enforcement proceedings to be suspended pending the examination of their supervisory review application.", "10. Between June and August 2013 the Presidium of the regional Supreme Court partially quashed the appeal judgments as regards the applicants’ obligation to reimburse the sums paid." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 5, 6 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Belgrade.", "6. On 15 June 2004 the applicant was injured in a traffic accident. He suffered severe serious injuries. An investigation into this incident was initiated in November 2004 and terminated in May 2005, with no criminal charges being brought.", "7. On 10 June 2005 the applicant lodged a civil claim for non-pecuniary damages with the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade against the Belgrade City’s Transportation Company (Gradsko saobraċajno preduzeċe Beograd).", "8. On 27 December 2007 the Second Municipal Court ruled in the applicant’s favour. On 3 July 2008 the District Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to the first instance.", "9. On 23 October 2009 the Second Municipal Court adopted a partial decision (delimičnu presudu) against which the applicant and the defendant appealed on 7 December 2009 and 10 December 2009, respectively.", "10. On 30 September 2010 the Court of Appeals in Belgrade quashed the decision and remitted the case to the Court of First Instance for a re-trial.", "11. In the meantime, on 22 December 2009, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining under Article 32 of the Constitution (a provision which corresponds to Article 6 of the Convention) about the overall fairness of domestic proceedings and their length. The Constitutional Court’s decision was rendered on 4 November 2010. No violation in respect of the applicant’s complaints was found.", "12. Due to applicant’s change to the value of the dispute (vrednost spora), on 31 October 2010 the Court of First Instance ruled that it had no further jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s complaint. The case was then sent to the High Court in Belgrade.", "13. On 20 June 2013 the High Court adopted a partial judgment against which the applicant and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals in Belgrade.", "14. On 6 June 2014 the Court of Appeals partly quashed the impugned judgment.", "15. It would appear that the case is still pending before the High Court.", "16. Additionally, on 28 October 2014 the applicant lodged a new submission with the Constitutionals Court concerning, inter alia, the length of the impugned proceedings. It would appear from the facts of the case that the Constitutional Court has not yet responded." ]
[ "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "4. The applicants were born in 1957, 1961 and 1980 respectively and live in Svetlograd, Stavropol Region. The first and second applicants are husband and wife. The third applicant is their son.", "5. According to the first applicant, on 8 August 2003, at approximately 11.30 p.m., a police patrol car approached his car on a dark village road. A police officer, using a loudspeaker, ordered the first applicant to pull over. The first applicant replied that he would stop at the nearest road police post. The officer repeated his order, noting that he needed to borrow gasoline for the police car. The first applicant kept driving. Near Svetlograd the police officers blocked the road. When the first applicant stopped the car, one of the five policemen pulled him out of the car and hit him in the face. The police officers threw him against the hood of his car, kicked him in the shins and hit him with a butt of a machine gun. The first applicant fell down and fainted. After he regained consciousness and stood up, the police officers claimed that he was drunk and told him to take a breath test which showed that the first applicant was sober. The police officers checked his documents, searched his car and left. The first applicant got into his car and drove away in the same direction. Having driven approximately 500 metres, he saw that the police car had stopped and that the police officers had gathered around it. The first applicant approached the officers. The officer in charge identified himself as Ye. and apologised for the excessive force his subordinates had used towards the first applicant.", "6. The first applicant arrived home at approximately 2.30 a.m. on 9 August 2003. On the same day the first and third applicants filed a complaint about the incident with the local police station.", "7. At 9 a.m. on the same date the first applicant visited the second applicant who underwent a medical treatment in hospital. According to the second applicant, her husband told her about the altercation with the police. He also had visible bruising on his face. At 10.30 a.m. the first applicant underwent a medical examination at the same hospital. Having been diagnosed with multiple injuries, he was admitted for in-patient treatment. An extract from a medical record drawn up in the hospital indicated that the first applicant had injuries on the right cheek, the left shin and the lower back and the swelling of soft tissues.", "8. On 13 August 2003 the first applicant was admitted to the Stavropol Regional Hospital where he was diagnosed with “a multisystem trauma; closed craniocerebral injury; a light brain contusion; an injury of the soft tissues of the right temporal region; a closed uncomplicated stable vertebra medullispinal injury, a compression fracture of the Th. VII vertebra; an intramuscular haematoma of the right side of the lumbar region; a neurologic form of the lumbar plexitis.” Ten days later he was released from hospital on conditions of bed rest and subsequent supervision by a neurologist and orthopaedist.", "9. On 11 August 2003 investigator G. questioned the police officers who denied the first applicant’s allegations. They claimed that they had ordered the first applicant to pull over because they had suspected that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol. The first applicant had refused to comply and had verbally insulted them demonstrating obscene hand gestures. After having searched the first applicant and his car, they had let him go.", "10. On the same date the investigator ordered a forensic medical examination of the first applicant. Having examined the first applicant, the forensic expert documented multiple injuries on the right cheek and the lumbar region, multiple bruises all over the body and swelling of the soft tissues. The expert considered that those injuries could have resulted from the impact of solid blunt objects or from the fall.", "11. On 20 August 2003 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. It appears that his decision was quashed on a later date.", "12. On 9 September 2003 the first applicant underwent another forensic medical examination. The expert documented the first applicant’s injuries considering that they might have resulted from the impact of solid blunt objects.", "13. According to the first applicant, on 20 September 2003 an investigator of the district prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. On 3 October 2003 the district prosecutor dismissed the first applicant’s complaint against the investigator’s decision. Ten days later, the Petrovskiy District Court of the Stavropol Region quashed the prosecutor’s decision and authorised a new round of inquiry.", "14. On 28 October 2003 the police issued a report on the inquiry conducted in response to the first applicant’s complaint. Having examined the forensic medical documents and the statements made by the police officers, the first applicant and the witnesses, the police investigator concluded that the first applicant might have sustained injuries as a result of the force used by the police officers in response to his unlawful actions.", "15. On 21 December 2003 investigator G. ordered a new forensic medical examination of the first applicant in order to reconcile inconsistencies in the experts’ findings.", "16. It appears that the first applicant’s complaint about the police brutality was dismissed by the authorities on another six occasions. Each time a superior prosecutor or a court quashed those decisions considering the investigator’s findings incomplete and unsubstantiated and ordering further inquiry into the first applicant’s allegations.", "17. On 22 July 2005 the district prosecutor opened a criminal investigation into the first applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment by unidentified police officers.", "18. On 22 December 2005 the investigator V. stayed the criminal proceedings, holding that it was impossible to establish the alleged perpetrators who had assaulted the first applicant.", "19. On 2 February 2006 the first deputy of the regional prosecutor quashed decision of 22 December 2005 noting that the investigation had not been completed and reopened the proceedings.", "20. On 6 March 2006 the investigator concluded that there was no evidence showing that the first applicant’s injuries had been caused by the police officers and that he was unable to establish the real perpetrator. The first applicant appealed.", "21. On 3 April 2006 the district prosecutor partly accepted the first applicant’s complaint and resumed the investigation. At the same time the prosecutor endorsed the investigator’s reasoning that there was no evidence showing that the offence had been committed by the police officers. A week later the proceedings were again stayed because the perpetrator of the offence remained unknown.", "22. On 6 June 2006 investigator D. again discontinued the criminal investigation. The investigator established that, when searching the first applicant and his car, one of the police officers had punched him on the right cheek and hit him in the back twice with a blunt solid object. The investigator also accepted that, as of the morning of 9 August 2003, the first applicant had bruises on the right cheek, the back and the left shin. He further noted that the forensic medical experts had not ruled out a possibility that the first applicant might have sustained those injuries as a result of the altercation with the police, as alleged by him. The investigator dismissed the first applicant’s allegations referring to his prior criminal record. He also noted that a number of the first applicant’s neighbours had not confirmed that the latter had had any injuries on him on 9 August 2003. As regards the statements made to the contrary by the other neighbours, the investigator found them to be unsubstantiated. Lastly, the investigator took into account that all the police officers denied the first applicant’s accusations. However, it was impossible for the investigator to establish the alleged perpetrator for lack of relevant evidence.", "23. It appears that the decision of 6 June 2006 was quashed and the case was re-opened.", "24. On 17 July 2006 investigator D. discontinued the criminal investigation reproducing verbatim his earlier decision of 6 June 2006. He also considered that the first applicant had willfully made false accusations against the police officers and should be held liable for his actions. The investigator forwarded the relevant material to the prosecutor’s office.", "25. On 14 January 2011 the deputy head of the supervision unit of the Investigative committee considered the decision of 17 July 2006 unlawful and unsubstantiated, quashed it and remitted the matter for further investigation. He noted, inter alia, that the investigator had failed (1) to establish what each of the police officers had done once they had pulled over the first applicant’s car; (2) to check whether any of the police officers had had a machine gun as claimed by the first applicant; and (3) to establish the reasons why the witnesses who had initially claimed that they had seen the police officers beating the first applicant had revoked their statements.", "26. On 1 March 2011 the senior investigator with the district investigative committee dismissed the first applicant’s accusations against the police officers duplicating the findings summed up in the earlier decisions on the matter. Nevertheless, he allowed that the first applicant’s injuries could have resulted from the beatings and that a criminal investigation should be opened on charges of battery. He transmitted the materials to the head of the district investigative committee. The parties did not inform about the outcome of the proceedings.", "27. On 30 September 2004, at approximately 11.00 p.m., the applicants, suspecting that their neighbour had committed a number of thefts and intended to steal their property, beat him up, broke into his car, took the documents for the car and refused to return them until the arrival of a police patrol car.", "28. On 15 June 2005 the Petrovskiy District Court found the applicants guilty of vigilantism and sentenced each of them to two and half years’ imprisonment. The sentence was suspended on eighteen months’ probation. On 4 August 2005 the Stavropol Regional Court upheld the applicants’ conviction on appeal." ]
[ "3" ]
[ 4, 10, 18 ]
[ 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 18 ]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Ivanovo.", "6. At the relevant time the applicant was a member of the Ivanovo Region electoral commission.", "7. On 23 October 2003 a deputy head of the Ivanovo Region Department of Internal Affairs ordered audio-visual “surveillance” (“наблюдение”) of the applicant’s office. The parties did not submit a copy of that decision.", "8. The surveillance was carried out from 27 October to 5 November 2003 by means of a hidden camera.", "9. The applicant was subsequently charged with abuse of power, an offence under Article 285 of the Criminal Code. While studying the criminal case file he discovered that it contained video recordings of him talking on the telephone in his office.", "10. At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the video recordings were inadmissible as evidence as they had been obtained unlawfully without prior judicial authorisation. He also challenged the authenticity of the recordings.", "11. On 27 September 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Ivanovo convicted the applicant of abuse of power and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. The court relied on statements by several witnesses, physical evidence, expert reports and the video recordings of the applicant’s telephone conversations. It found that the video recordings were authentic and that they had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.", "12. The applicant appealed. He reiterated, in particular, his argument that the video recordings were inadmissible as evidence.", "13. On 12 November 2004 the Ivanovo Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. The court held that the District Court had correctly declared the video recordings admissible as evidence because they had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law." ]
[ "8" ]
[]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sarajevo.", "5. In 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against his employer, the local police, seeking his reinstatement and damages. His claim was eventually rejected.", "6. The first-instance judgment was rendered by the Sarajevo Municipal Court on 17 April 2006.", "7. The second-instance judgment was rendered by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 27 March 2008.", "8. The third-instance judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 January 2010.", "9. On 19 April 2010 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina complaining under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the outcome and length of his labour dispute.", "10. On 10 April 2013 the Constitutional Court found a breach of the applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time and rejected the remainder of the case. It did not award any damages." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 4 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in the Krasnoyarsk region.", "6. At the material time the applicant was a police officer with the Economic Crimes Department of the Department of the Interior of the Krasnoyarsk Region.", "7. On 31 July 2008 a certain Mr P. complained to the internal security department of the Department of the Interior of the Krasnoyarsk Region (“the internal security department”) that the applicant had extorted money from him. In particular, the applicant had asked for money in exchange for assisting him, through his contacts in the regional government, in obtaining a licence for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. Mr P. gave the internal security department a recording he had made of his telephone conversation with the applicant earlier the same day. During that conversation the applicant had asked Mr P. to bring him money before 2 August 2008.", "8. Police officers invited Mr P. to take part in an “operative experiment” (“оперативный эксперимент”), to which he consented. On the same day the head of the internal security department ordered an operative experiment in respect of the applicant with the use of audio and video recording devices.", "9. On the same day, 31 July 2008, the head of the internal security department also ordered the interception of the applicant’s telephone communications without judicial authorisation by reference to section 8(3) of the of the Operational-Search Activities Act (hereafter “the OSAA”). The decision read in its entirety as follows:\n“[The internal security department] has received operative information that [the applicant], a senior police officer with the Economic Crimes Department of the Department of the Interior of the Krasnoyarsk Region, is extorting money in the amount of 200,000 roubles from [P.], the director of limited liability company [the company name], for assisting him in obtaining a licence for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. At the request of the police officer the money must be delivered in the period from 31 July to 2 August 2008; the exact time and place for delivering the money is to be agreed in advance by telephone [telephone number] given by [the applicant].\n[The applicant’s] actions contain elements of a criminal offence under Article 290 § 2 of the Criminal Code [bribe-taking] ...\nIt is necessary to perform the operational-search measure ‘interception of telephone communications’ with the aims of documenting [the applicant’s] criminal activities in a thorough and objective way, collecting evidence and uncovering other participants in criminal offences.”", "10. On 1 August 2008 the acting head of the internal security department sent a letter to the deputy President of the Tsentralnyy District Court of Krasnoyarsk, informing her that on 31 July and 1 August 2008 the applicant’s telephone had been tapped in accordance with the urgent procedure provided for by section 8(3) of the OSAA. He then repeated verbatim the decision of 31 July 2008 ordering the interception of the applicant’s telephone communications.", "11. On the same day, 1 August 2008, after the police had intercepted the applicant’s telephone conversation with Mr P. in which the two men had arranged to meet later that day, Mr P. was provided with a video camera, a radio transmitter and the necessary amount of money in banknotes marked with a special substance. The applicant and Mr P. met in the applicant’s car, where Mr P. left the marked money. Immediately after Mr P. had left, the applicant was arrested by the police, his car was searched and the money was seized.", "12. On 18 August 2008 the Investigations Committee of the Krasnoyarsk Region opened criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of attempted fraud, an offence under Article 159 of the Criminal Code, in connection with the aforementioned incident. The applicant was suspected of attempted fraudulent appropriation of the funds of a private company in the amount of 200,000 Russian roubles.", "13. On 28 October 2008, in reply to a request from the applicant for an expert examination of the recordings of his telephone conversations and the video recordings of his meeting with Mr P., the investigator in charge of the case held, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n“... [the applicant’s] guilt for the criminal offence under Article 159 § 3 ... is completely proven by the preponderance of evidence collected.”", "14. Identical statements were made by the investigator in his decisions of 7 November and 12 December 2008 and 1 April 2009 rejecting various complaints lodged by the applicant.", "15. In reply to the applicant’s complaints that his telephone had been tapped unlawfully without judicial authorisation, the investigator stated, in his decisions of 7 November and 12 December 2008, that section 8(3) of the OSAA permitted the interception of telephone communications without judicial authorisation in urgent cases, provided that a court was notified within twenty-four hours of its commencement and judicial authorisation was obtained within forty-eight hours, failing which it had to be discontinued. Interception of the applicant’s telephone communications had been ordered by the head of the internal security department because at the time there had been sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant was involved in a serious criminal offence punishable under Article 290 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code. The District Court had been notified of the interception the next day, and on the same day, that is, before the expiry of the forty-eight-hour time-limit, the interception had been discontinued; hence, there had been no reason for seeking judicial authorisation. The interception of the applicant’s telephone communications had therefore been lawful.", "16. During the trial the applicant challenged the admissibility of all the items of evidence obtained as a result of the “operative experiment” and the interception of his telephone communications. He argued, in particular, that the police had had insufficient grounds for carrying out the surveillance measures and that they had not obtained a judicial authorisation to intercept his telephone communications.", "17. On 7 December 2009 the Tsentralnyy District Court declared the audio and video recordings admissible as evidence. It held, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n“... [the applicant] argues that the operative experiment and other operational-search measures were unlawful because such measures are permissible only with the aim of suppressing, preventing and investigating criminal offences of medium severity or more serious criminal offences. I suppose that at the time when the police made the decision to carry out the operative experiment and other operational-search measures against [the applicant] they had information that he had committed criminal offences classified as serious or especially serious under the law (abuse of power, bribe‑taking).\nIn the court’s opinion, for ordering operational-search measures it is sufficient that there be some elements of a criminal offence, rather than the entire corpus delicti, permitting [the police] to make a preliminary rather than definitive classification of the offence ...\nThe court is not convinced by [the applicant’s] arguments that the interception of his telephone communications was unlawful because the case file does not contain a judicial decision authorising this operational-search measure. The operational-search measure against [the applicant] was carried out in conditions of urgency.\nSection 8(3) of the OSAA provides that a judge must be informed within twenty‑four hours of the commencement of operational-search activities in conditions of urgency and that judicial authorisation must be obtained within forty-eight hours, failing which the activities must be discontinued.\nThe court agrees with [the applicant] that the case file does not contain a judicial decision authorising operational-search measures. At the same time it notes that a judge was informed about the operational-search measures within twenty-four hours and the measures were discontinued within forty-eight hours of their commencement, as required by section 8(3) of the OSAA. No judicial refusal of authorisation was received. It therefore finds that no breaches of legal provisions governing operational‑search measures were committed in the present case ...”", "18. On 22 December 2009 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged, sentenced him to two years and two months’ imprisonment, and stripped him of his rank in the police. The court based its judgment on the statements of numerous witnesses, material evidence, expert opinions, and the audio and video recordings made on 31 July and 1 August 2008. It found that the recordings were authentic and had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, repeating the reasoning set out in the decision of 7 December 2009 on the admissibility of evidence.", "19. In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, among other things, that the District Court had relied on unlawfully obtained evidence, in particular on recordings of his telephone conversations made without judicial authorisation. He also contested the authenticity of the recordings.", "20. On 8 April 2010 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal, adhering to the reasoning of the trial court. It found, in particular, that the audio and video recordings had been correctly declared admissible as evidence and found authentic." ]
[ "13", "8" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. On 12 April 2002 the local police sent to the local investigations committee audio recordings of telephone conversations between the applicant and several persons, and video recordings of their meetings in a flat in Novgorod. The accompanying letter, which the Government presented to the Court, stated that the audio and video recordings had been obtained in the course of covert “operational-search” measures (“оперативно-розыскные мероприятия”) authorised by the President of the Novgorod Regional Court on 19 July and 31 August 2000 and 17 and 27 February 2001.", "6. On 16 April 2002 the applicant was arrested and charged with several counts of drug trafficking committed by an organised criminal group. Four more persons were arrested on the same charge.", "7. On 18 April 2002 the Novgorod Regional Prosecutor’s Office ordered the applicant’s placement in custody pending trial. He remained in custody throughout the criminal proceedings.", "8. The applicant learned about the audio and video recordings on an unspecified date while studying the criminal case file.", "9. On 26 June 2002 the investigation was completed and the case was sent for trial to the Novgorod Town Court.", "10. On 18 July 2002 counsel of one of the defendants asked that the trial be adjourned until September 2002 because he would be on annual leave until 6 September.", "11. On 20 August 2002 the Novgorod Town Court scheduled the first hearing for 16 September 2002. The hearing of 16 September 2002 was adjourned until 23 September 2002 because the applicant’s counsel was in hospital and because the prosecution witnesses did not appear. The trial eventually started on 20 November 2002.", "12. At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the audio and video recordings were inadmissible as evidence as they had been obtained without prior judicial authorisation.", "13. His co-defendants pleaded guilty. They testified that the applicant was the leader of an organised group dealing in drugs. The applicant and another defendant, Mr K., had rented a flat where the members of the group had met to receive instructions from the applicant and to distribute the profits. They had also packaged and stored drugs in the flat. The owner of the flat testified that he had rented his flat to Mr K. and that on several occasions the rent had been paid by the applicant.", "14. On 24 November 2004 the Novgorod Town Court found the applicant and his co-defendants guilty of drug trafficking. It found it established that the applicant was the leader of an organised criminal group dealing in drugs. It relied on witness testimony, expert reports, audio recordings of telephone conversations between the defendants and video recordings of their meetings in the rented flat. It found that the recordings were admissible as evidence because they “had been obtained in the course of authorised covert operational-search measures aiming at uncovering criminal acts committed by Zubkov and the criminal group organised by him”. The applicant was sentenced to nine years and six months’ imprisonment.", "15. In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, in particular, that the audio and video recordings had been obtained without prior judicial authorisation.", "16. On 8 February 2005 the Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. It repeated verbatim the Town Court’s finding that the audio and video recordings were admissible as evidence because they “had been obtained in the course of authorised covert operational-search measures aiming at uncovering criminal acts committed by Zubkov and the criminal group organised by him”.", "17. The applicant worked as an investigator at the Prosecutor General’s Office.", "18. On 6 April 2004 he was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting bribery.", "19. On 29 October 2004, while studying the criminal case file, the applicant discovered that it contained audio recordings of his telephone conversations during the period from November 2003 to March 2004.", "20. The criminal case file also contained a letter of 21 October 2004 from the Federal Security Service to the local prosecutor stating that the audio recordings had been obtained in the course of covert operational‑search measures authorised by the Tver Regional Court in its decisions nos. 55-21, 55-30, 55-76, 55-93 and 55-103. Given that they were classified documents, the decisions could not be shown to the prosecutor and would be shown to the trial court only at its request.", "21. During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He argued, in particular, that the audio and video recordings were inadmissible as evidence because the case file did not contain a copy of the judicial authorisation. The prosecutor stated in reply that the interception of his telephone communications had been authorised by the Tver Regional Court. A copy of the authorisation had not been included in the case file because it was confidential.", "22. On 14 May 2005 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting bribery and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The court relied, among other things, on the audio recordings of his telephone conversations. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that the audio recordings were inadmissible as evidence, finding that “the examination of the material in the case file [had] permitted [the court] to establish that the evidence [had been] obtained in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Operational-Search Activities Act”.", "23. The applicant appealed. He submitted that the Regional Court had not given reasons for its finding that the audio recordings were admissible as evidence. In particular, it had not examined whether the interception of his telephone conversations had been duly authorised by a court and carried out in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.", "24. On 7 December 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal. The court did not specifically address the applicant’s argument that the audio recordings were inadmissible as evidence. It held that the finding of guilt had been based on evidence which had been properly analysed and assessed by the Regional Court. The applicant received the decision on 7 March 2006.", "25. On 5 July 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir ordered the applicant’s detention on charges of fraud. The applicant was absent from the hearing but his counsel attended. On 14 July 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The applicant was absent also from the appeal hearing, which was again attended by his counsel.", "26. On 3 November 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 5 January 2007. On 7 November 2006 the applicant appealed. On 5 December 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure and upheld the decision of 3 November 2006.", "27. The applicant’s detention was further extended on several more occasions.", "28. In the period from 14 September 2006 to 12 January 2007 the applicant was detained in four remand prisons. According to the applicant, all four remand prisons were overcrowded.", "29. From 14 to 22 September 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-67/1 in Smolensk. Cell 196 measuring 15 sq. m was equipped with eight sleeping places and accommodated up to sixteen inmates.", "30. From 25 to 28 September 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison 76/1 in Yaroslavl. Cell 133 measuring 9 sq. m was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to eight inmates.", "31. From 29 September to 1 October 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison 43/1 in Kirov. His cell measuring 50 sq. m was equipped with forty sleeping places and accommodated up to twenty inmates. The cell was equipped with wooden boards instead of individual beds.", "32. From 2 October 2006 to 12 January 2007 the applicant was held in remand prison 33/1 in Vladimir. Cell 63 measuring 14 sq. m was equipped with four sleeping places and accommodated up to five inmates.", "33. On 28 and 29 September 2006 the applicant was transported by rail between remand prison IZ-76/1 and remand prison IZ-43/1 from Yaroslavl to Kirov. The train compartment was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to ten inmates.", "34. On 1 and 2 October 2006 the applicant was transported by rail between remand prison IZ-43/1 and remand prison IZ-33/1 from Kirov to Vladimir. The train compartment was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to twelve inmates.", "35. On 25 December 2006 the applicant started to study the criminal case file and discovered that it contained audio recordings of his telephone conversations between 22 and 25 July 2004.", "36. On 2 February 2007 the applicant asked the investigator for a copy of the judicial decision authorising the interception. On the same day the investigator refused his request. Relying on the Interior Ministry’s Order no. 336 of 13 May 1998 (see paragraph 54 below), he replied that the police were not required to send the interception authorisation to the investigator; it was to be kept in the operational search file. The Vladimir Regional Court’s decisions of 28 May and 2 June 2004 authorising interception of the applicant’s telephone communications were stored by the local police. They were classified documents and neither the applicant nor his counsel, who had no security clearance, could be granted access to them.", "37. On 6 February 2007 the applicant complained to the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir that the interception of his telephone communications had been unlawful, in particular because the case file did not contain a judicial authorisation. He submitted that the refusal to give him a copy of the interception authorisation had frustrated him in the exercise of his defence rights and deprived him of an effective remedy against an interference with his rights guaranteed by Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, he had been unable to ascertain whether the interception authorisation had been issued by a competent court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, whether it had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons or whether the requirements for judicial authorisation, such as the authorised duration of interception, had been complied with at the implementation stage.", "38. On 19 February 2007 the Frunzenskiy District Court examined the complaint under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 63 below) and rejected it. Relying on section 12 of the Operational-Search Activities Act (see paragraph 49 below), the court held that the judicial decision authorising operational-search measures and the material that served as a basis for that decision were to be held in the exclusive possession of the State agency performing such measures. It had therefore not been included in the criminal case file and the defendant was not entitled to have access to it. The court further referred to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 14 July 1998, holding that the person whose communications were to be intercepted was not entitled to participate in the authorisation proceedings or to be informed about the decision taken (see paragraph 50 below). The refusal to give the applicant a copy of the judicial authorisation had therefore been lawful. The court also rejected the applicant’s complaint about the unlawfulness of the interception, without giving any reasons.", "39. On 3 April 2007 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision of 19 February 2007 on appeal, finding it lawful, well reasoned and justified." ]
[ "5", "8" ]
[ 21 ]
[]
[ "4. Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis.", "5. Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation.", "6. On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (“the Town Court”) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,200,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,600,000 for non‑pecuniary damage.", "7. No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final but have never been executed.", "8. On different dates the Town Court granted the defendant authority’s request to extend the time-limit for appeal on the grounds that the authorities had not received a copy of the judgment in due course. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law." ]
[ "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Murmansk.", "6. On 23 December 2003 the Murmansk regional prosecutor’s office initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant, who was suspected of leadership of a criminal armed gang. According to the authorities, the applicant, as the leader of the gang, had planned and committed several offences, namely aggravated kidnapping, assault, aggravated robbery and extortion, in Murmansk and Moscow.", "7. On 23 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court authorised the interception and recording of the applicant’s telephone communications on his mobile telephone, number ...-15. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows:\n“[The police] are investigating [a case] against a criminal gang involved in robberies and the extortion of money and personal belongings from citizens in Murmansk and other Russian regions. [The applicant] is the leader of the gang. [M.] and [Z.] are members of that gang. According to intelligence information, these people are planning to commit aggravated extortion from Murmansk businessmen. Operational-search measures have revealed that [the applicant] uses mobile phone number ...-15, registered as belonging to [M.].\nIn view of the above and given that it seems impossible to obtain the information necessary to expose [the applicant’s] unlawful activities by overt investigation, the court, on the basis of Article 23 of the Russian Constitution and Article 186 § 2 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure]\ndecides to authorise for 180 days the interception of [the applicant’s] telephone communications on his mobile telephone number ...-15.”", "8. On 24 and 25 December 2003 the police intercepted the applicant’s conversations with an accomplice, M.", "9. On 25 December 2003 two of the applicant’s accomplices, M. and S., were arrested. The applicant went into hiding.", "10. On the same day, 25 December 2003, at the applicant’s request his brother retained G. as the applicant’s legal representative. The legal services agreement stated that G. was to consult and defend the applicant while his name was on the police’s wanted persons list in connection with charges that were not yet known to him. If the applicant were to be arrested by the police, an additional agreement would be signed between G. and the applicant. There is no evidence that the police or the investigator were informed about that agreement.", "11. On 26 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court authorised the interception and recording of the applicant’s telephone communications on his mobile telephone number ...-49. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows:\n“[The police] have intelligence information about a criminal gang involved in robberies and the extortion of money and personal belongings from citizens in Murmansk and other Russian regions. [The applicant] is the leader of the gang. Operational-search measures have revealed that [the applicant] uses mobile phone number ...-49.\nIn view of the above and given that it seems impossible to obtain the information necessary to expose [the applicant’s] unlawful activities by overt investigation, the court, on the basis of Article 23 of the Russian Constitution and Article 186 § 2 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure]\ndecides to authorise for 180 days the interception of [the applicant’s] telephone communications on his mobile telephone number ...-49.”", "12. On 26 and 27 December 2003 the police intercepted conversations between the applicant and G.", "13. On 27 December 2003 the applicant was arrested.", "14. On 28 December 2003 G. informed the investigator that he was the applicant’s defence counsel by virtue of instruction no. 1062 of the Murmansk Regional Bar Association (“the Bar Association”). He was formally admitted (допущен) as counsel for the applicant.", "15. On 5 January 2004 the applicant was charged with aggravated robbery, assault, kidnapping and extortion, committed by an organised criminal group. S. and M. were also charged with the same criminal offences.", "16. At the beginning of August 2004 the investigator informed G. that his presence was required during investigative procedures involving the applicant. On 23 August 2004 the investigator was informed by the Bar Association that G. was on annual leave until 4 October 2004.", "17. On 24 August 2004 the investigator appointed legal aid counsel for the applicant, noting that he had refused to choose replacement counsel and had insisted on being represented by G.", "18. On 30 August 2004 the investigator decided to remove G. as counsel for the applicant, finding that it was necessary to question him about his telephone conversations with the applicant on 26 and 27 December 2003. He noted that at the time, G. had not yet been the applicant’s counsel. However, well aware that the applicant had committed serious criminal offences, G. had advised him what to do. In particular, he had told the applicant that money was needed, which could possibly mean that G. had intended to bribe a police official. He had also informed him about the course of the criminal proceedings, which had become known to him as at the time he had been representing the applicant’s accomplices, S. and M. When the police had tried to force the applicant’s door, the applicant had summoned G., who had said that he could not come and offered to send another lawyer. He had then advised the applicant to try to avoid arrest and, if that was not possible, to destroy his telephone and the SIM card, and to remain silent when questioned. In the investigator’s opinion, by giving such advice, G. had been trying to hide his connections with the applicant and his knowledge of the criminal offences committed by him. Given that at the material time G. had not been formally admitted as the applicant’s counsel, he should be considered as having advised him in his capacity as a simple citizen. He should therefore be called as a witness in the criminal proceedings against the applicant.", "19. On 11 October 2004 the criminal case against the applicant and his accomplices was transferred to the Murmansk Regional Court for trial. The criminal case file comprised twelve volumes; five criminal cases were joined into one criminal case against the applicant and his accomplices.", "20. A preliminary hearing was held on 21 and 22 October 2004.", "21. The trial started on 3 November 2004. The applicant asked the court for permission for his brother, a civil lawyer working at a company which sold car spare parts, to act as his defence counsel. The court rejected his request, stating that the applicant’s brother was not qualified to participate as defence counsel in criminal proceedings, that he did not have the relevant practical experience, and that the applicant was already represented by legal aid counsel.", "22. On 4 November 2004 the applicant requested that legal aid counsel assigned to his case be removed for failure to provide adequate legal assistance. The court rejected his request. The applicant then requested that AM. be admitted as his defence counsel instead of the legal aid lawyer. The judge granted that request and AM. represented the applicant throughout the remainder of the criminal proceedings. The trial was adjourned until 15 November 2004 to let AM. study the case file.", "23. On 15 November 2004 the hearing was again postponed, until 22 November 2004, owing to the failure of one of the co-accused to appear due to illness.", "24. Further hearings were held between 22 November and 9 December 2004.", "25. On 22 November 2004 the applicant challenged the admissibility as evidence of transcripts of his telephone conversations with G. on 26 and 27 December 2003. He argued that G. had been his counsel as from 25 December 2003, as confirmed by the legal services agreement of that date and by relevant payment invoices. The conversations in question were therefore protected by legal professional privilege and their transcripts could not be used in evidence in criminal proceedings.", "26. On 30 November 2004 the Murmansk Regional Court found that the legal services agreement of 25 December 2003 stated that G. was to provide the applicant with legal assistance in the framework of criminal proceedings, without clearly identifying the criminal proceedings to which it related. The investigator had not been informed about that agreement. G. had not been formally admitted as the applicant’s counsel in the present criminal proceedings until 28 December 2003 when he had shown the investigator the relevant instruction by the Bar Association. The Regional Court found it relevant that during the conversations intercepted by the police, G. had advised the applicant to remain in hiding and to destroy the evidence. Moreover, having been present, as their counsel, at S.’s and M.’s questioning after their arrest, G. had informed the applicant about their statements to the investigator. When summoned by the applicant to assist him at the time of his arrest, he had refused to come and had offered to send another lawyer. That gave reasons to doubt that G. had been representing the applicant at the time in the present criminal proceedings. The investigator had subsequently removed G. as counsel for the applicant. G. had not, however, been called to testify against the applicant in breach of legal professional privilege. Given that the applicant’s conversations with G. intercepted by the police contained information about the applicant’s criminal activities, they were not subject to legal professional privilege and their transcripts were admissible as evidence.", "27. On 9 December 2004 the court ordered a graphological expert report and for that reason adjourned the trial until 5 April 2005.", "28. On 4 April 2005 the applicant lodged an action before the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Murmansk, challenging the investigator’s decision of 30 August 2004 to remove G. as his counsel. On 6 June 2005 the Oktyabrskiy District Court dismissed that complaint as inadmissible, finding that it could not be examined once the investigation had been completed. The applicant could raise the complaint before the trial court.", "29. Meanwhile, further hearings were held on 5, 25 and 27 April and 5 and 12 May 2005.", "30. On 19 May 2005 the court ordered a complex psychological expert examination of one of the co-accused and adjourned the trial pending the expert examination report. A further complex psychological examination was ordered on 4 July 2005 and the trial was again adjourned until 7 October 2005.", "31. On 7 October 2005 the trial was adjourned because the court ordered that two prosecution witnesses who had testified against S. and who were detained in Moscow be transported to Murmansk for a cross‑examination.", "32. The trial remained adjourned between 7 October 2005 and 6 March 2006 while awaiting the transfer of the prosecution witnesses, who at the time were on trial in a criminal case in Moscow. They were transferred to Murmansk on 3 March 2006, after their conviction of 7 October 2005 had been upheld on appeal on 26 December 2005.", "33. On 29 December 2005 the applicant challenged the admissibility as evidence of the transcripts of his telephone conversations with M. on 24 and 25 December 2003 and with G. on 26 and 27 December 2003. He claimed, in particular, that the transcripts had been obtained unlawfully.", "34. The trial was resumed on 6 March 2006. Hearings were held on 16 March, 6, 7, 13 and 20 April 2006.", "35. During the trial the court examined numerous pieces of evidence, including three expert reports and the statements of six victims and twenty‑four witnesses from Murmansk and Moscow.", "36. On 12 May 2006 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. It relied on the transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with G. and M., among other evidence, observing that the interception of the applicant’s telephone communications had been authorised by a court. Having analysed the transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with G., it held as follows:\n“The lawyer had not been formally admitted to provide legal assistance to [the applicant] at the time [when the interception had taken place]. His actions were considered by the investigator to be unlawful and served as a basis for the decision to remove [G.] as counsel for [the applicant] and for considering the question of opening criminal proceedings [against G.]. The court does not have any reason to believe that the information obtained as a result of [intercepting the applicant’s] telephone communications with [G.] cannot be used as evidence, given that the information in question has not become known to [G.] as a result of providing legal assistance to [the applicant].”", "37. The applicant appealed against the conviction, claiming that the Regional Court had erred in its assessment of the evidence, that the transcripts of his telephone conversations with his co-defendant M. and counsel G. had been unlawfully used as evidence in the criminal proceedings, that G. had been unlawfully removed as counsel from his case, and that the authorities had refused to allow his brother to act as his legal representative.", "38. On 18 December 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction. It held, in particular, that the transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with M. and G. had been correctly admitted as evidence. It further observed that the applicant’s allegations of violations of his right to defence during the preliminary investigation had been examined by the first-instance court and had been rejected as unsubstantiated.", "39. The applicant was arrested on 27 December 2003.", "40. On 29 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court remanded the applicant in custody. It held that he was suspected of particularly serious offences, did not have a permanent job, and that his assertions that he owned a family business were unconvincing. There were therefore sufficient reasons to believe that he might abscond, obstruct the course of justice, and continue his criminal activities.", "41. On 24 February and 18 June 2004 the Regional Court ordered extensions of the applicant’s detention, citing the need for further investigation, the gravity of the charges and the risks of the applicant absconding, putting pressure on witnesses and obstructing the course of justice. There were no factors relating to the applicant’s character, state of health, family or other circumstances which would warrant release. The applicant did not appeal against those extension orders.", "42. On 11 October 2004 the criminal case file was transferred to the Regional Court for trial. On 22 October 2004 the Regional Court ordered the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention during trial, referring to the gravity of the charges and the lack of permanent employment “at the time of the commission of the crimes”. It considered that the grounds which had served as the basis for the preventive measure remained valid. The applicant did not appeal.", "43. On 5 April, 4 July, 7 October and 29 December 2005 and 7 April 2006 the Regional Court extended the applicant’s and his co‑defendants’ detention, finding that the grounds which had served as the basis for the preventive measure remained valid and that there were therefore no reasons to change it. The trial could not proceed for objective reasons as it was necessary to wait for the results of a psychological expert examination of S. and for the transfer for questioning of two prosecution witnesses against S.", "44. The applicant appealed against the above extension orders to the Supreme Court. He submitted that he had been permanently residing in Murmansk, that he had been working in the family business, that he had no previous convictions and that he had no intention of absconding from the authorities. The authorities had failed to substantiate their allegations that he might abscond or continue with his criminal activity. As regards the risk that he might put pressure on witnesses, it was no longer relevant as all the witnesses had already been questioned by the trial court. According to the applicant, the extension of his detention had been based solely on the gravity of the charges against him. The trial had been adjourned for reasons which were not related to his personal situation, but in order to carry out expert psychological examinations of one of the co-accused and to ensure the transfer from Moscow of two prosecution witnesses who were to give evidence against that same co-accused. He asked to be released on bail or on his father’s personal guarantee.", "45. On 11 August, 9 November and 15 December 2005 and 30 March 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the above extension orders on appeal, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risks of the applicant absconding or putting pressure on witnesses. The fact that the witnesses had already been questioned was irrelevant because the applicant might still put pressure on them or otherwise obstruct the trial.", "46. The applicant was held as follows: in remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk from 30 December 2003 to 21 May 2006; in correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi, Murmansk Region, in a special wing with the material conditions of detention of a remand prison (ПФРСИ – помещение, функционирующее в режиме следственного изолятора) from 21 May to 9 October 2006; in remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda from 12 to 17 October 2006; and in remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow from 18 October 2006 to 24 January 2007.", "47. The Government submitted that it was impossible to provide original documentation concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention in remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk because all the official records had been destroyed after the expiry of the statutory period for their storage. In respect of that detention facility they submitted only statements and reports prepared by the prison authorities in 2010. They also submitted copies of the prison population register for the entire periods of the applicant’s detention in correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi and in remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda, and selected pages from the prison population register for the period of detention in remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow.", "48. The Government submitted the following information about the applicant’s detention, which was based on the above-mentioned documents:\n \nDetention facility\nCell No.\nPeriod of detention\nSurface area\n(in square metres)\nNumber of inmates\nNumber of beds\nremand prison IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk\n \n331\n30 December 2003 to 5 January 2004", "49. The Government asserted that in all the cells where the applicant had been detained between 2003 and 2007, the number of inmates had not exceeded the number of beds and that at all times while in detention the applicant had been provided with an individual sleeping place. At the same time, the Government submitted as follows:\n“... during the applicant’s detention the sanitary norm for space per inmate was not always complied with. However, it happened only occasionally ... and the prosecutor’s office demanded that these infractions be eliminated ...”", "50. Relying on the statements and reports prepared by the prison authorities in 2010, the Government further submitted that the applicant had been provided with bed sheets and cutlery. The cells were cleaned daily by the inmates and the administration of the penal institutions carried out a sanitary treatment of the premises every month.", "51. All cells were equipped with wash basins supplying cold water; hot water was available for personal and household needs. In addition, the inmates were allowed to use their own kettles and water heaters.", "52. At all times in all the remand prisons, the applicant and the other inmates were allowed to take a fifteen-minute shower once a week; their linen was changed weekly.", "53. The applicant and other inmates were allowed to take one hour’s daily exercise in specially equipped yards.", "54. According to the applicant, remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk had been severely overcrowded and the space available to him had been below the domestic standards. The applicant contested the accuracy of the data submitted by the Government about the designated number of bunk beds within the cells. For instance, in cell no. 423 the actual number of bunk beds had been eight and not three as submitted by the Government, as could be seen from the photographs he had submitted to the Court. Cell no. 406 had seven sleeping bunks and housed up to nine inmates.", "55. In reply to the applicant’s complaints about poor conditions of detention, the Murmansk regional prosecutor’s office stated, on 14 November 2005, as follows:\n“... the applicant’s complaints ... that the conditions of detention in SIZO-1 were not fully compatible with the sanitary regulations prescribed by the Federal Law on pre‑trial detention ... that the minimum individual space prescribed by the Law (4 sq. m per person) was not always complied with, that the premises needed repair, that the walls in some of the cells were stained with mould and crumbling, that the plumbing was often out of order, that not all the cells were equipped with a sufficient number of shelves and TV sets, that broken glass in the windows was not replaced promptly and that there were no refrigerators – [all these complaints] reflect the reality.\nThese deficiencies were noted by the prosecutor’s office during their inspection of SIZO-1.”", "56. On 25 April 2006 the Murmansk regional prosecutor’s office stated:\n“... in 2005-06 the number of detainees in SIZO-1 frequently exceeded the prescribed limits. For these reasons it was not always possible to comply with the sanitary regulations (4 sq. m per inmate). For the same reasons the requirements concerning the separate detention of different categories of detainees were sometimes not complied with ...”", "57. As regards correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi, the applicant stated that during his stay there he had been detained in inadequate conditions. The cells had been overcrowded. The space available to him throughout the detention period had been below the domestic standards. In particular, he had shared a cell measuring 20 sq. m with five other detainees.", "58. On 28 September 2006 the applicant complained to the Murmansk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of inadequate conditions of detention in IK-16. In particular, he complained of poor nutrition, overcrowding, a lack of newspapers and television sets, and of the authorities’ refusal to make copies of documents at inmates’ requests. He received no reply.", "59. Furthermore, as regards remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda, the applicant stated that the quality of the food in the prison had been extremely poor. He had been detained with thirty-six other detainees in a cell measuring 50 sq. m. The cell had been infested with cockroaches, bedbugs and rats. The detainees had slept on bunk beds.", "60. Lastly, as regards remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow, according to the applicant, he had been held in cell 434, which measured 13 sq. m, with seven other detainees. The inmates had slept on bunk beds. There had been a table measuring 1 m by 0.3 m but no benches or chairs to sit on. The cell had been swarming with insects. The inmates had been allowed to take exercise only in groups.", "61. From 9 to 12 October 2006 the applicant was transferred by train from Murmansk to Vologda. He was given no food. He received his first meal on 13 October 2006.", "62. On 17 and 18 October 2006 the applicant was transferred by train from Vologda to Moscow.", "63. From 24 January to 9 February 2007, on the way from Moscow to Murmansk, between St Petersburg and Murmansk, the applicant was transported in cramped conditions in a compartment with up to sixteen other inmates, some of whom were suffering from tuberculosis.", "64. As regards the conditions of the applicant’s transportation between Murmansk and Vologda from 9 to 12 October 2006, the applicant was transported in a compartment with other inmates, none of whom were suffering from tuberculosis. He was transferred from Vologda railway station to the local remand prison IZ‑35/2 in a special vehicle separately from other inmates.", "65. When the applicant was transferred from Vologda railway station to Moscow on 17 and 18 October 2006, he was not transported with inmates who were suffering from tuberculosis.", "66. When the applicant was transferred from Moscow to Murmansk between 24 January and 9 February 2007, he was transported first alone in the railway compartment, then from St Petersburg onwards he was transported with other inmates, none of whom were suffering from tuberculosis.", "67. During the transfers the applicant was duly provided with dry food rations; he was given permission to use hot water and the toilet.", "68. The applicant did not lodge any complaints about the conditions of his transportation between Murmansk and Moscow. He did not apply for medical assistance, nor did he complain about the state of his health.", "69. In their submission the Government neither specified the number of inmates transported with the applicant, nor the size of the compartments in which they had travelled. Nor did they submit any copies of documents regarding that part of the applicant’s complaints, including the distribution of dry rations for the trip." ]
[ "5", "3", "8", "6" ]
[ 2, 6, 50, 51 ]
[]
[ "5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.", "6. The first and second applicants’ son was killed in a traffic accident on 17 July 2010 in which the fourth applicant sustained serious injuries. The third applicant is the fourth applicant’s mother.", "7. The applicants joined the criminal proceedings concerning the accident as victims.", "8. On 9 and 10 December 2010 the applicants lodged a civil action within the criminal proceedings against the suspect, J., claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage and reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the criminal proceedings.", "9. On 28 January 2011 the applicants, represented by lawyers of their own choice, concluded an out-of-court settlement with J. (hereinafter “out-of-court settlement agreement”). They informed the prosecutor that they had agreed that the case would be settled (kokkuleppemenetlus). J. informed the prosecutor that he had paid the compensation to the applicants as laid down in the out-of-court settlement agreement.", "10. On 4 February 2011 the applicants’ consent to the application of the settlement procedure was recorded in a report signed by the prosecutor and the applicants’ representatives. The report stated that the applicants had been informed of their rights under the settlement procedure and set out the consequences of applying the settlement procedure. In a section entitled “Remarks”, it was noted that the applicants had given up their claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage against J. (as lodged on 9 and 10 December 2010), but had not given up their claim for reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the criminal proceedings. The report also stated that the victims had no right to withdraw their consent to the settlement procedure. At that time, the applicants had submitted neither an itemised list of legal costs nor any supporting documents.", "11. On 11 February 2011 J. gave his consent to the application of the settlement procedure. The prosecutor, J. and the latter’s counsel signed a settlement agreement in which they agreed, inter alia, on the type and extent of the damage caused. The agreement stated that the victims had withdrawn the civil claims they had lodged within the criminal proceedings.", "12. On 14 February 2011 the Harju County Court committed J. for trial and scheduled a hearing for 7 March 2011. J., his counsel and the prosecutor were summoned to appear at the court hearing. The applicants, however, were not summoned.", "13. On 4 March 2011 the applicants lodged a claim for legal costs in the amount of 6,483.66 euros (EUR) and submitted supporting documents. The Harju County Court received their submission on 7 March 2011.", "14. J., his counsel and the prosecutor attended the hearing held before the Harju County Court as scheduled. According to the court record, the trial judge disclosed the applicants’ claim for reimbursement of their legal costs. J. asked the court not to examine the claim as it had been absorbed by the out-of-court settlement agreement. The applicants alleged that they had not been allowed to address the court notwithstanding their presence in the court building.", "15. In a judgment of the same date, the Harju County Court convicted J. of violating traffic and driving regulations and sentenced him to a suspended prison term. It also withdrew J.’s driving licence and ordered him to pay the State Treasury expenses consisting of compensation levies (sundraha) and the cost of expert assessments. It held that the victims had given up the civil claims they had lodged within the framework of the criminal proceedings. The judgment made no reference to the applicants’ claim for reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the criminal proceedings.", "16. The applicants lodged an appeal against that judgment. They complained that they had not been allowed to attend the court hearing of 7 March 2011 and that the court had left their claim for reimbursement of the legal costs undecided.", "17. On 23 March 2011 the Harju County Court refused to examine the appeal. Relying on Articles 246 and 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCrP; Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik), the court found that the applicants had not been parties to the court proceedings and did not, therefore, have the right to appeal (see paragraph 29 below).", "18. The applicants appealed against the County Court’s decision, insisting that they had been parties to the proceedings and had the right to appeal.", "19. At a public hearing on 5 April 2011 the Tallinn Court of Appeal examined the appeal in the presence of J. and his counsel, the prosecutor and the applicants’ counsel. At the hearing, the prosecutor firstly noted that the applicants had not submitted any documents concerning their claim for legal costs, despite the fact that they had had a week after the settlement to do so. According to the report of the hearing, the prosecutor later noted that those documents could have been submitted when the applicants had signed the report (see paragraph 10 above) or a few days later. The report stated that J. had wanted to submit the out-of-court settlement agreement to the judge in order to prove that it covered all the relevant damages. However, the Court of Appeal had refused, considering that it did not concern the subject matter of the dispute before the court in those proceedings.", "20. By a decision of 13 April 2011, the Tallinn Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the Harju County Court’s decision of 23 March 2011. It referred to Article 243 of the CCrP, under which the victim was not entitled to revoke his or her consent to the application of the settlement procedure, and to Article 246 of the Code, which provided that the victim did not have to be summoned to a court hearing in settlement proceedings (see paragraphs 28 and 29 below). The Court of Appeal concluded that the applicants, as victims, had not been parties to such court proceedings and that, accordingly, they had no right to appeal against the County Court’s judgment.", "21. Although the Court of Appeal’s decision stated that it was final and not amenable to appeal, the applicants’ counsel nevertheless challenged it before the Supreme Court.", "22. By a decision of 3 October 2011 in case no. 3-1-1-60-11 the Supreme Court refused to examine the appeal on points of law because the Court of Appeal’s decision had been final and not amenable to appeal. It nevertheless stated that according to the established case-law, in settlement proceedings the court should not limit itself to merely analysing the settlement reached. It must also verify whether there were still questions that should be addressed in the subsequent judgment, but which had not been included in the settlement agreement. The court noted that according to Article 245 of the CCrP, the settlement agreement did not necessarily have to address matters dealing with the costs of criminal procedure or cover the extent of granting the civil claim or of compensating for the damage caused by the criminal offence. However, referring to Article 306 §§ 11, 13 and 14 of the CCrP and Article 248 § 1 (3) of the CCrP, the Supreme Court considered that those matters should not be overlooked by the court concerned (see paragraphs 30 and 31 below)." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 5, 8, 9, 10, 14, 17 ]
[ 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 ]
[ "7. The applicant was born in 1980. He arrived in Russia in 2003. He travelled to Tajikistan on a number of occasions to visit his parents for short periods of time.", "8. On 3 May 2011 the applicant was charged in absentia in Tajikistan with participating in an extremist religious movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and an international search and arrest warrant was issued in his name. On 6 May 2011 the Tajik authorities ordered his pre-trial detention.", "9. On 3 November 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and detained. On 4 November 2013 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) ordered his detention pending extradition.", "10. On 4 December 2013 the Tajik prosecution authorities requested the applicant’s extradition on the basis of the above charges. The request included assurances regarding his proper treatment, which were formulated in standard terms.", "11. On 12 December 2013 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 May 2014.", "12. An appeal by the applicant of 16 December 2013 was dismissed by the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) on 3 February 2014.", "13. On 29 April 2014 the District Court again extended the applicant’s detention until 3 August 2014.", "14. An appeal by the applicant of 5 May 2014 was dismissed by the City Court on 23 July 2014.", "15. On 9 October 2014 the applicant’s extradition was refused by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, owing to the absence of culpable actions under Russian criminal law.", "16. On 13 October 2014 the applicant was released from detention.", "17. On 13 October 2014, immediately after his release, the applicant was rearrested for violating migration regulations.", "18. On 14 October 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violating migration regulations, fined him and ordered his administrative removal. Allegations by the applicant regarding a real risk of ill-treatment were dismissed, and he was detained pending expulsion. The District Court assessing the risks stated that “[t]he claims of the representative ... are of a speculative nature and not confirmed by the case materials”", "19. The above judgment was upheld on appeal by the City Court on 24 October 2014. Claims by the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention were dismissed with reference to the District Court’s assessment of the case, which took into consideration “...the nature of the administrative offence, the character of the accused [who was criminally convicted in Russia]... the length of his stay in Russia and other circumstances of the case”.", "20. According to the latest submissions of his representative in 2015, the applicant was still in detention.", "21. On 18 December 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Tajikistan and a real risk of ill-treatment.", "22. On 15 September 2014 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged that decision in the courts, referring, inter alia, to the risk of ill‑treatment.", "23. On 12 November 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the City Court." ]
[ "5", "3" ]
[]
[ 2, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 ]
[ "5. The first applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Illertissen. The second applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Harburg.", "6. On 9 December 2007 both applicants went to a football match in Munich.", "7. The police had predicted an increased risk of clashes between rival football supporters owing to confrontations at previous matches between the two teams. Therefore a total of 227 police officers were deployed, including two squads – comprising eight to ten police officers each – of the 3rd platoon of the Munich riot control unit (Unterstützungskommando), one squad of the 2nd platoon of the Munich riot control unit and the 23rd platoon of the 6th Dachau public-order support force battalion (Bereitschaftspolizei). The deployed officers of the Munich riot control unit also included “video officers”, who carried handheld video cameras and recorded videos of incidents that might be relevant under criminal law. The officers of the Munich riot control unit were dressed in black/dark blue uniforms and wore black helmets with visors. The officers of the Dachau public-order support force battalion wore green uniforms and white helmets with visors. Both uniforms did not include any name tags or other signs identifying the individual officers. However, on the back of the helmets an identification number of the squad was displayed.", "8. After the match had ended the police cordoned off the stands of the supporters of one of the teams, including both applicants, to prevent them from leaving the stadium and encountering supporters of the other team. The cordon was lifted after around fifteen minutes.", "9. According to the first applicant, he left the stands after the blockade had been lifted. While walking between the exit of the stands and the exit of the football stadium a group of police officers dressed in black uniforms came running towards the exiting spectators with their truncheons raised above their heads. Some of these officers started hitting the spectators with their truncheons without any prior warning as soon as they reached them. The first applicant himself was hit with a truncheon on the head, which resulted in a bleeding laceration of 3 cm behind his ear. After having reached the exit of the stadium he was treated by a paramedic in an ambulance that was parked close to the ground. Subsequently, he returned to his home town, where he was treated in the emergency unit of the local hospital.", "10. The second applicant also exited the stands after the blockade had been lifted. Before exiting the stadium he was grabbed by the shoulder and, after turning round, had pepper spray doused in the face at close range. He lay down on the ground and was subsequently struck on his left upper arm with a truncheon. He suffered swelling and redness of his face and pain in his arm.", "11. Both applicants were able to identify their attackers as police officers, but were not able to distinguish them further, owing to their identical uniforms and the lack of identifying signs or name tags.", "12. According to the Government the blockade was lifted due to the aggressive behaviour of some of the spectators and the pressure applied to the police cordon. When the supporters streamed from the stands towards the exit, they came upon police units which had been called in to provide backup for the police cordon. Subsequently some of the supporters continued their aggressive behaviour towards these officers and provoked them. The supporters’ conduct resulted in the arrest of one supporter and two police officers sustained minor injuries. After a few minutes the police pacified the situation and got the exiting supporters under control.", "13. The Government furthermore challenged the accounts of the applicants and submitted that there was no credible evidence that the applicants had deliberately been hit or harmed by police officers and that the injuries had been a result of the police operation.", "14. As of 15 December 2007 the press reported about the police operation in the aftermath of the football match, inter alia quoting football supporters describing arbitrary attacks by police officers of the riot control unit with truncheons and pepper-spray. In an article of 18 December 2007 a spokesperson of the police commented on the operation and stated that the alleged assaults by police officers would be investigated. On 2 January 2008, the Munich public prosecutor’s office instigated a preliminary investigation. On 21 January 2008 the second applicant reported the alleged police violence and submitted a medical certificate concerning the effects of the pepper spray on his face from the same day. He filed a formal criminal complaint on 7 March 2008. The first applicant filed a criminal complaint against an unidentified police officer on 25 April 2008. He also submitted a medical certificate confirming a bleeding laceration on his head. The certificate was issued at 12.05 a.m. on 10 December 2007. Several other spectators at the match had also lodged criminal complaints against unidentified police officers.", "15. The investigation was conducted by the unit of the Munich police responsible for offences perpetrated by public officials under the responsibility of the Munich public prosecutor’s office. The officer in charge interviewed a total of twenty witnesses, including the applicants, the officer in charge of the Munich riot control unit and the squad leaders of the deployed squads of the 2nd and 3rd Munich riot control units.", "16. The investigating division was also provided with a DVD showing excerpts of the video surveillance recorded by the riot control police at the football match. The DVDs were compiled by the “video officers” of the Munich riot control unit. In line with their usual procedure the entire recorded video material was reviewed by the respective video officer after his or her deployment and the parts which were deemed relevant under criminal law and of sufficient quality to serve as evidence were copied to a DVD.", "17. On 10 September 2008 the competent public prosecutor discontinued the investigation. He found that the investigation had produced evidence that some of the police officers had used truncheons against spectators, including women and children, in a disproportionate way and without an official order or approval. However, he concluded that the investigation had not led to a situation where concrete acts of violence could be related to specific police officers and it could not be ascertained either whether the use of force had been justified. In sum, the public prosecutor had been able neither to establish whether the applicants’ injuries had been inflicted by police officers nor to identify the suspects who had allegedly struck and used pepper spray on the applicants.", "18. The applicants appealed against the decision to discontinue the investigation and argued, in particular, that the public prosecutor had only questioned the squad leaders, but had not identified all the officers involved in the operation and deployed in the area of the stadium at issue.", "19. On 14 October 2008 the public prosecutor reopened the investigation and ordered further enquiries. On 20 October 2008 the head of the investigation unit met with the platoon leaders of the Munich riot control unit and other division heads of the Munich police to discuss the investigation. Neither the public prosecutor nor the applicants’ representative attended the internal police meeting. Subsequently, a further twenty-two witnesses were interviewed including fourteen platoon leaders, squad leaders and video officers of the deployed police units. The individual squad members of the three squads of the Munich riot control unit were not interviewed. The applicants had requested that they be interviewed, as the evidence had suggested that the alleged perpetrators had belonged to one of these three squads.", "20. The investigating police unit was also provided with video surveillance recorded by the 23rd platoon of the 6th Dachau public-order support force battalion. Upon the request of the applicants to secure the entire video material of the police operation, and not only the already submitted video excerpts, it was established that the original video tapes and possible digital copies had already been deleted and that only the excerpts were still available.", "21. On 4 August 2009 the public prosecutor discontinued the investigation again. In a detailed fifteen-page decision he first summarised the investigative measures taken, referring in particular to the interviews of several witnesses, including police officers and the alleged victims, the review of video material from the police and from the internet, the assessment of the applicants’ written observations and of the submitted documents, inter alia, medical certificates, as well as gathered information and reports on past events and applicable guidelines. After assessing all the available evidence, the public prosecutor concluded that the enquiries had shown that several supporters had aggressively approached, insulted and provoked the deployed police officers and that therefore a situation had existed in which the officers could have been justified in using their truncheons. Besides this general conclusion he held that the applicants had neither been able to identify a particular suspect nor to determine whether the suspected police officers had been male or female and that the investigation had not produced other persons who had witnessed the alleged acts against the applicants. Furthermore, he outlined in detail certain “considerable discrepancies” in the witness statements of the first applicant and referred to “unspecific” statements of the second applicant. Consequently, according to the public prosecutor, there was insufficient evidence to establish criminal conduct by specific police officers to the detriment of both applicants. He concluded that the investigation had to be discontinued again, since the considerable additional investigative measures had not revealed disproportionate conduct on the part of individual police officers, in particular truncheon strikes against innocent bystanders, which would require criminal prosecution of the respective officers.", "22. On 20 August 2009 the applicants appealed and pointed out that the members of the deployed squads had still not been questioned and that the inspected videos were fragmentary, but nonetheless contradicted certain parts of the statements made by the squad leaders.", "23. On 3 February 2011 the Munich general public prosecutor confirmed the decision of the public prosecutor’s office of 4 August 2009 to discontinue the investigation. The instructions on available legal remedies attached to the decision informed the applicants that they could request a judicial decision in the framework of proceedings to force criminal proceedings (Klageerzwingungsverfahren).", "24. On 19 September 2011 the Munich Court of Appeal declared the applicants’ application to force further enquiries inadmissible. The court interpreted the applicants’ request as an application to force criminal proceedings (Klageerzwingungsantrag) and held that these proceedings were only admissible if the prosecution of one or more identified accused had been requested. An application to force criminal proceedings against an unidentified accused had to be declared inadmissible, since the proceedings were not supposed to identify the accused or replace investigations. Only in a case where a public prosecutor’s office had entirely refrained from investigating a crime had a court the possibility to order an investigation. Under Article 173 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung – hereinafter “the CCP”; see paragraph 37 below) a court was only allowed to conduct minor enquiries to fill in remaining gaps in an investigation. Moreover, the applicants had not submitted specific facts or evidence that would have allowed the court to identify an accused.", "25. On 25 October 2011 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint, relying on Articles 2 § 2, 19 § 4 and 103 § 1 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) (see paragraphs 29-31 below). Besides referring to articles of the Basic Law, the applicants also referred in their complaint to Articles 2, 3, and 13 of the Convention. In essence they complained that the investigation had not been effective and that the Court of Appeal had not evaluated the effectiveness of the investigation.", "26. On 23 March 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter “the Constitutional Court”) refused, in a reasoned decision (2 BvR 1304/12), to admit the applicants’ constitutional complaint. The court held that the investigations had been conducted diligently, but had not established sufficient suspicion of criminal conduct on the part of specific police officers. Moreover, the remaining gaps and factual uncertainties could not be attributed to omissions in the investigation. The court also found that it had not been necessary to question all the squad members who had possibly been involved. In its decision the Constitutional Court referred to the Court’s case-law concerning the procedural obligation of Article 2 of the Convention and, in particular, to the cases of McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (27 September 1995, Series A no. 324) and Grams v. Germany ((dec.), no. 33677/96, ECHR 1999‑VII). The court also emphasised that the public prosecutor’s office had been the responsible authority for the investigation and thereby “master of the proceedings” (Herr des Verfahrens).", "27. During the investigation the applicants also filed criminal complaints in respect of assistance given in an official capacity in avoiding prosecution or punishment (Strafvereitelung im Amt) and suppression of evidence (Beweismittelunterdrückung). The applicants alleged that several relevant parts of the video material, showing disproportionate police violence, had been deleted. The investigation against the five police officers was discontinued by the Munich public prosecutor’s office.", "28. A subsequent appeal before the Munich general public prosecutor was to no avail." ]
[ "3" ]
[ 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 21 ]
[ 4, 5, 8, 9, 12 ]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Riga.", "5. On 24 November 2005 a residential building maintenance services provider, Kurzemes Namu Apsaimniekotājs, a limited liability company (“the plaintiff”), brought a claim against the applicant for recovery of a debt for their services in the amount of 320 Latvian lati (LVL – approximately 455 euros (EUR)). The next day civil proceedings were instituted in that connection. The applicant disagreed; she argued that she did not owe any money to the plaintiff – they had not concluded an agreement for maintenance services and she was free to choose another service provider. In those proceedings the applicant was represented by Mr S. Seļezņovs, who was not a lawyer.", "6. On 30 December 2005 a judge of the Riga City Kurzeme District Court (Rīgas pilsētas Kurzemes rajona tiesa – hereinafter “the City Court”) scheduled the first hearing to take place on 21 April 2006. During this hearing the applicant’s representative requested additional time to examine the relevant legal norms and to obtain the relevant documents from the plaintiff. The City Court postponed the hearing to allow both parties to “prepare documents”. The next hearing was scheduled for 9 August 2006.", "7. On 9 August 2006 the plaintiff applied to have the hearing postponed because the applicant’s debt for services had in the meantime increased and the plaintiff had not yet settled the courts fees for the increased claim. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2006.", "8. On 17 October 2006 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim and submitted the relevant documents. The applicant’s representative applied to have the hearing postponed so as to examine those documents. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 31 January 2007.", "9. On 31 January 2007 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim to LVL 426 (approximately EUR 606) and submitted more documents. The applicant’s representative submitted written observations and some documents showing some debts that had been paid. The City Court admitted them to the case file and scheduled the next hearing for 23 March 2007.", "10. On 23 March 2007 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim and submitted more documents. The applicant’s representative requested that more detailed information be provided in this connection. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to provide observations by 13 August 2007 and scheduled the next hearing for 12 September 2007.", "11. On 11 September 2007 the City Court informed both parties that another judge was taking over the case; the next hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2007.", "12. On 17 October 2007 both parties pleaded their case. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to provide more detailed information and scheduled the next hearing for 13 November 2007.", "13. On 13 November 2007 the applicant’s representative applied to have the hearing postponed as he had only received the relevant documents on the previous day. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 14 February 2008.", "14. On 14 February 2008 the applicant’s representative pleaded the case. He argued that the service charges which the applicant had been asked to settle had been unclear. The plaintiff did not have all the relevant documents at hand and thus requested time to submit additional information. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to submit the specific documents and scheduled the next hearing for 17 April 2008.", "15. On 17 April 2008 the plaintiff submitted the relevant documents and the applicant’s representative applied to have the hearing postponed to examine them. His application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 4 June 2008.", "16. The parties continued to plead their case in the hearing of 4 June 2008. The City Court imposed a monetary fine on the applicant’s representative for disobeying a judge’s order. Following an application by the plaintiff the hearing was postponed because the applicant’s debt for services had in the meantime increased; they had not prepared the documents for the increased amount of the debt. The plaintiff was ordered to submit the relevant documents by an unknown date in September 2008 and the next hearing was scheduled for 28 October 2008.", "17. On 28 October 2008 the City Court held the last hearing in the case; it refused a fresh application by the plaintiff to postpone the hearing once again. On 6 November 2008 the City Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against the applicant as unsubstantiated – the plaintiff had not proved that the expenses had actually been incurred and that they had duly reflected the services provided. On 27 November 2008 the plaintiff appealed against the judgment. On 28 November 2008 a judge of the City Court gave the plaintiff additional time to comply with the procedural requirements for lodging an appeal. On 2 December 2008 the plaintiff rectified those deficiencies. On 3 December 2008 the appeal was admitted and sent to the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa – hereinafter “the Regional Court”).", "18. The first hearing before the Regional Court was held on 13 September 2010. The plaintiff increased the amount of the claim because the applicant’s debt for services had in the meantime increased to LVL 3,173 (approximately EUR 4,515) and submitted the relevant documents. The applicant’s representative disagreed with the increase of the claim. The Regional Court admitted those documents to the case file and scheduled the next hearing for 8 December 2010.", "19. On 8 December 2010 the Regional Court held the last hearing in the case. The plaintiff did not attend, nor did it inform the court of any reasons for its absence. The Regional Court decided to proceed with the case. On 22 December 2010 the Riga Regional Court partly allowed the plaintiff’s claim and ordered the applicant to settle the debt in the total amount of LVL 2,854 (approximately EUR 4,059). Although the parties had not concluded an agreement for maintenance services, the applicant was obliged to pay for those services in accordance with domestic law. She could contest bills provided by the plaintiff, however she had failed to do so. The applicant had selectively paid some bills, but not all of them. The Regional Court refused the plaintiff’s claim to receive contractual penalty (līgumsods) for late payment but awarded default interest of 6%. On 18 January 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 3 February 2012 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) remitted it to the Regional Court as the applicant had not paid the security deposit for lodging it. Those deficiencies were rectified.", "20. On 3 April 2012 the Senate of the Supreme Court, following a preparatory meeting, refused to institute proceedings on points of law." ]
[ "6" ]
[ 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 ]
[ 2, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16 ]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Manisa.", "5. On 17 August 1999 the applicant’s daughter, Nesrin Delibaş, lost her life following the collapse of the building where she resided in Düzce as the result of an earthquake (see M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, nos. 14350/05 and 2 others, § 16, 17 November 2015 for further details regarding that earthquake). According to official records, fourteen other people lost their lives as a result of the collapse of the same building.", "6. Shortly after the incident, criminal proceedings were brought against the contractor (H.E.) and the architect (S.D.) of the building in question. On 27 August and 31 August 1999 H.E. and S.D. were questioned by the police and the Düzce public prosecutor, respectively. They denied all accusations in respect of the collapse of the building.", "7. During an expert examination of the remains of the building on 26 August 1999, certain problems were noted with the building’s reinforcing rods. It was also noted that the metal brackets had not been properly fastened to the girders. Apart from H.E. and S.D., against whom charges had already been brought in connection with the collapse of the building, the experts also identified the involvement of T.A., a civil engineer, and İ.Ö., the Head of Technical Services of the Municipality of Düzce (“the Municipality”), in the preparation and authorisation of the respective construction project.", "8. On 31 August 1999 the police questioned İ.Ö., the Head of Technical Services of the Municipality. He denied all accusations in respect of the collapse of the building.", "9. According to another report dated 7 September 1999, the expert examination of the collapsed building revealed that the granulometry of the concrete used in the building was very poor, that the concrete contained a very high proportion of pebbles, that the water-to-cement ratio in the concrete mix was not appropriate and had resulted in the formation of pores in the concrete, and that the ironwork had worked loose from the concrete because the metal brackets had corroded.", "10. On 14 September 1999 the applicant asked to join the proceedings as a civil party. He added that he wished to lodge a criminal complaint against all individuals who had been involved in the construction of the defective building in their different capacities, including the public officials who had authorised its construction and occupation.", "11. On 23 September 1999 the Düzce public prosecutor disjoined the investigation against the Head of Technical Services of the Municipality (İ.Ö.) from those against H.E. and S.D. in view of the special judicial procedures that had to be followed in respect of the prosecution of civil servants under the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants and Public Officials (Law no. 4483).", "12. On 24 September 1999 the Düzce public prosecutor’s office filed a bill of indictment with the Düzce Assize Court against H.E. and S.D. in respect of the deaths caused by the collapse of the building in question on 17 August 1999. The public prosecutor accused them of endangering the lives of others by carelessness, negligence or inexperience under Article 383 § 2 of the Turkish Criminal Code in force at the material time (Law no. 765), emphasising in particular the structural shortcomings in the building noted by the experts (see paragraph 7 and 9 above).", "13. At the hearing held on 21 October 1999 the applicant requested the investigation of all municipal officials who had authorised the construction and occupation of the building despite its failure to comply with the relevant technical regulations. Over the course of the criminal proceedings, the applicant repeated this request at least ten times.", "14. According to an expert report added to the criminal case file on 29 April 2001, the following people had responsibility for all private construction undertaken within the municipal boundaries: (i) the contractor, who was responsible for the realisation of the project in compliance with the technical and work safety standards; (ii) the project engineer, who was responsible for all technical aspects of the project, including compliance with all relevant rules and regulations; (iii) the municipal representative, who was responsible for examining the calculations and the plan prepared by the project manager, verifying the compatibility of the project with the regulations in force, and authorising the project; and (iv) the technical implementation officer, who was in charge of inspecting the construction work on behalf of the Municipality. On this basis, the experts concluded that H.E. and S.D. bore 25% and 37.5% responsibility for the collapse of the building. The experts stated that they could not, however, offer opinions on the responsibility of anyone other than the two defendants in the case (H.E. and S.D.).", "15. On 21 June 2001 the Düzce Assize Court held that the statutory period during which H.E. and S.D. could be held criminally liable in connection with a collapse of the building had started running in 1985 – when the last official licence for the building was obtained – and had already expired by the date of the earthquake. The case was accordingly discontinued for having become time‑barred. The applicant appealed.", "16. On 21 October 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court. It held that the statutory time-limit was to be calculated from the date on which the building collapsed, that is to say from 17 August 1999, the date on which the offence in question had been committed.", "17. On 14 August 2003 an additional indictment was filed against T.A., the civil engineer who had taken part in the construction of the building in question (see paragraph 7 above). It was noted in the indictment that T.A. had obtained licences to secure the illegal extension of the building subsequent to its construction.", "18. On 11 December 2003 the Düzce Assize Court convicted H.E., S.D. and T.A. as charged and sentenced each of them to 10 months’ imprisonment and a fine, but decided to suspend execution of the sentences under Section 6 of the Execution of Sentences Act (Law no. 647). The applicant appealed against this judgment and once again requested an investigation into the responsibility of the relevant municipal officials in relation to the collapse of the building.", "19. On 6 July 2004 the Court of Cassation once again quashed the first‑instance court’s judgment, this time as the court had not taken any decision as regards the applicant’s request to join the proceedings as a civil party in respect of the case subsequently brought against T.A.", "20. On 5 October 2004 the Düzce Assize Court commissioned a new expert report from the Yıldız Technical University in Istanbul. The expert report subsequently released on 21 April 2005 found that the building in question had collapsed on account of the structural problems noted in the earlier expert reports, as well as its illegal extension subsequent to its construction. It was also stated in the report that the defendants jointly bore 75% of the responsibility for the collapse of the building. The remaining 25% responsibility lay with the Municipality officials on account of their failure to duly inspect the building before issuing it with the necessary permits for occupation.", "21. On 7 June 2005 the Düzce Assize Court convicted H.E., S.D. and T.A. as charged, and sentenced each of them, once again, to 10 months’ imprisonment and a fine. Execution of the sentences was suspended pursuant to Article 51 § 1 of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237). Relying on the findings of the later expert report as regards the responsibility of the municipal officials for the collapse of the building, it also decided that a criminal complaint should be filed against the relevant officials with the Düzce public prosecutor’s office. The defendant H.E lodged an appeal against this judgment.", "22. On 5 December 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment for the third time. It found that the assize court had failed to evaluate the case in the light of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) which had entered into force on 1 June 2005.", "23. On 21 February 2007 the Düzce Assize Court decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings in respect of all three of the defendants as the prosecution of the offence in question had become time-barred.", "24. On 23 October 2007 the Court of Cassation held firstly that the decision of the first-instance court, in so far as it concerned S.E. and T.A., was null and void, since the earlier judgment of 7 June 2005 had already become final in their regard as they had not lodged an appeal. It then went on to uphold the decision to discontinue the proceedings in respect of H.E. only.", "25. On 16 August 2000 the applicant, along with his wife and other daughter, instituted compensation proceedings before the Sakarya Administrative Court against the the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement (Bayındırlık ve İskan Bakanlığı), the Düzce governor’s office and the Municipality of Düzce, in respect of the death of their daughter Nesrin Delibaş. The applicant and his wife each claimed 2,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Their daughter claimed TRY 500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage only.", "26. On 29 December 2005 the Sakarya Administrative Court commissioned an expert report to determine responsibility on the part of the administration for the collapse of the building.", "27. As regards the findings in the reports adduced to the criminal case file, the experts noted that the quality of the concrete used in the construction and certain structural elements of the building had been below the required standard. The building had, moreover, been illegally extended after its construction. The municipal officials had failed to duly inspect the building during its construction phase or before issuing the necessary permit for its occupation. They had also failed to carry out a soil survey in the area and to identify the potential “disaster zones” in the event of an earthquake, with a view to limiting the height of buildings in such areas. The experts concluded that, in view of such failures, the Municipality had been 50% responsible for the collapse of the building in question. On the other hand, it found that the other two defendants had not been at fault.", "28. Relying on that expert report, on 27 June 2007 the Sakarya Administrative Court partially accepted the applicant’s claims against the Municipality, and awarded him TRY 1,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage in accordance with his request, plus interest. It also awarded his wife and daughter TRY 1,000 and TRY 500, respectively, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. It rejected their claims in respect of pecuniary damage as being unfounded.", "29. On 14 September 2007 the applicant and his family received a total of TRY 11,371.80 (approximately 6,455 euros (EUR) at the material time) from the Municipality as compensation. In the meantime, the Municipality appealed against the judgment of the Sakarya Administrative Court.", "30. On 23 May 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the lower administrative court." ]
[ "2" ]
[ 7, 9, 11, 17, 25 ]
[ 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13 ]
[ "5. By five judgments of the Travnik Municipal Court (“the Municipal Court”) of 5 March 2009, 18 January 2012, 31 March 2010, 30 April 2012 and 13 June 2011, which became final on 17 June 2010, 13 February 2012, 1 September 2010, 12 March 2013 and 21 July 2011, respectively, the Central Bosnia Canton (Srednjobosanski kanton, “the CB Canton”; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicants various sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs.", "6. The writs of execution issued by the Municipal Court on 23 September 2010, 14 June 2012, 4 October 2010, 13 February 2013 and 25 October 2011, respectively, were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges on the debtor’s account. On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the Municipal Court that the enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent.", "7. On 26 February 2013 and 7 January 2014 the Ministry of Finance of the CB Canton (“the Ministry”) informed the bank that no funds for the enforcement of final judgments had been provided in the cantonal budget for 2013 and 2014 and that, accordingly, the final judgments against the canton could not be enforced.", "8. However, on 9 January 2015, upon the applicants’ enquiry, the Ministry informed them that in 2013 the canton had designated 620,000 convertible marks (BAM)[1] for the enforcement of judgments and BAM 605,900 in 2014 for the same purpose.", "9. The applicants complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”). On 17 September 2014 (decision no. AP 3438/12) and 26 February 2015 (decision no. AP 4242/14), the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants’ and five other cases, on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the CB Canton to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of the cantonal debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although some of the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation.\nThe relevant part of the decision of 17 September 2014 reads as follows:\n“36. ... The court notes that the judgments [in favour of the appellants] have not been enforced due to the lack of funds on the debtor’s bank account.\n... 39. The Constitutional Court reiterates that under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 1 of the European Convention all levels of government must secure respect for individual human rights, including the right to enforcement of final judgments under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention ... The scope of that obligation is not reduced in the present case, notwithstanding the large number of judgments ... [T]he Constitutional Court notes that in Jeličić v. BiH, and again in Čolić and Others v. BiH, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated that ‘it is not open to a State authority to cite lack of funds as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt. Admittedly, a delay in the execution of a judgment may be justified in particular circumstances, but the delay may not be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article 6 § 1’ ... 40. The Constitutional Court agrees with the position taken by the European Court ... it is nevertheless aware of the effects the global economic crisis had on Bosnia and Herzegovina...The court notes that the federal and the cantonal governments had taken certain steps with the view to enforcement of final court decisions. Section 138 of the Federal Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 provides that the final judgments against the Federation and the cantons shall be enforced within the amount of budgetary funds designated for that purpose ... and that the creditors shall enforce their claims in the order in which they acquired the enforcement titles ...\n... 42. The court finds that the crux of the problem in the present case is that the CB Canton did not identify the exact number of unenforced judgments and the aggregate debt ... without which it is impossible to know when all the creditors will realise their claims against this canton. Furthemore, there should exist a centralised and transparent database of all the claims listed in chronological order according to the time the judgments became final. It should include the enforcement time-frame and a list of partial payments, if any. This will also help to avoid abuses of the enforcement procedure. These measure and adequate funds in the annual budget would ensure that all the final judgments are enforced within a reasonable time ... and the CB Canton would ensure the respect of its obligations from Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n... 44. The court considers that the adoption of section 138 of the Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 had a legitimate aim, because the enforcement of a large number of judgments at the same time would jeopardise the normal functioning of the cantons. However, the limitation of the enforcement in the present case is contrary to the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which requires that a fair balance is struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights ... Section 138 places a disproportionate burden on the appellants ... they are placed in a situation of absolute uncertainty as regards the enforcement of their claims ...\n... 46. In order to comply with its positive obligation, the government of the CB Canton must, as explained above, calculate the total amount of the aggregate debt arising from the final judgments and prepare a comprehensive and transparent database ... This court will not specify what a reasonable time-limit should be ... but, in any event, it must be in accordance with Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n... 47. ... The current situation does not give any guarantees to the appellants that their claims against the CB Canton will be enforced within a reasonable time”.", "10. The Constitutional Court’s decision of 26 February 2015 follows the same legal reasoning.", "11. On 19 January 2016 Mr Jasmin Hodžić and Ms Jasmina Mezildžić concluded out-of-court settlements with the government of the CB Canton pursuant to which part of their principal claims were to be paid within 15 days following the settlement. They renounced the remaining principal claim and default interest. The legal costs were to be settled by a separate agreement. From the information available in the case it transpires that no such agreement has been concluded.", "12. As regards the rest of the applicants, the final judgments in their favour have not yet been enforced." ]
[ "46", "P1-1", "6" ]
[ 6 ]
[]
[ "4. The applicants are Turkish nationals, whose dates of birth and places of residence are shown in the appendix. They all own plots of land located in different cities of Turkey.", "5. Following local land development plans, the applicants’ plots of land were designated for public use. Subsequently, complaining about the decrease in the market value of the land and the long-term uncertainty about the fate of their plots of land, the applicants initiated compensation proceedings before the civil courts.", "6. During the proceedings relating to their land, the applicants submitted the decision given by the Plenary Chamber of the Court of Cassation (civil divisions, numbered E.2004/5-555 K.2005/17) to the domestic courts and asserted that according to this decision their compensation claims had to be accepted.", "7. On various dates between 2007 and 2010, the applicants’ respective claims for compensation were dismissed by the domestic courts on the ground that their plots of land were not actually seized by the authorities. In their decisions, neither the courts of first instance nor Fifth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation, which examined the applicants’ claims on cassation, expressed any reason as to why they had reached a different conclusion from the plenary Court of Cassation.", "8. The details of the proceedings may be found in the appended table." ]
[ "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lived, prior to his arrest and conviction, in Moscow.", "5. On an unspecified date the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having murdered Ch. He was charged with unlawful purchase and possession of firearms and aggravated murder.", "6. On 11 July 2006 the investigator questioned Sh., who had witnessed Ch.’s murder. Sh. identified the applicant as the perpetrator. On 27 July 2006 she confirmed her earlier statements in the applicant’s presence. On an unspecified date Sh. was admitted to hospital and was unable to attend the trial.", "7. On 28 March 2007 the trial by a jury opened in the Moscow City Court.", "8. On 10 April 2007 the jury returned a guilty verdict. The twelve jurors held the applicant responsible for the murder by ten votes to two, and for unlawful possession of firearms by nine votes to three.", "9. By a judgment of 13 April 2007, the Moscow City Court sentenced the applicant to eighteen years’ imprisonment.", "10. On 18 April 2007 the applicant lodged a statement of appeal in which he alleged, inter alia, that Sh.’s statement had been read out during the trial in contravention of the applicable rules of criminal procedure. On 28 April 2007 he lodged a supplementary statement of appeal “in connection with newly discovered circumstances”. He wrote that he had found out that on several occasions the presiding judge had entered the room where the jurors had been deliberating and advised them to declare him guilty. The applicant asked the appellate court to take evidence from the jurors and to quash the conviction.", "11. On 14 May 2007 Judge Sht., who had presided over the applicant’s trial, refused to amend the minutes of the trial to take note of the applicant’s statement that the judge had been present during the jury’s deliberations, had advised them as to how to fill out the questionnaire and had made comments about the applicant’s character and guilt.", "12. On 21 May 2007 the applicant’s representative obtained a statement, certified by a notary public from N., a juror. The juror stated that during the trial the presiding Judge Sht. had often visited the deliberations room, that he had spoken of the applicant’s guilt as if it had been already established and that he had given them instructions on how to fill out the questionnaire.", "13. On 5 June 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal. It rejected the applicant’s complaint about the presiding judge’s interference with the jury deliberations in the following terms:\n“The [applicant’s] allegations ... that the presiding judge breached the secrecy of jury deliberations and that he entered the deliberations room and told the jury how they were supposed to answer the questions [issued by the judge] are not substantiated.\nIt follows from the trial record that the defence did not object to the actions of the presiding judge and did not allege any breach of confidentiality of jury deliberations.\nThe [applicant’s] argument that he learned about those breaches only after the end of the trial is not grounds for quashing the conviction.\nThe additional documents submitted by the defence – the statement by one of the jurors certified by a notary public – may only give rise to an application to law-enforcement authorities, which would have to decide on the institution of criminal proceedings.\nMoreover, the jurors rendered the verdict by a majority vote rather than unanimously ...”", "14. As regards the applicant’s argument that Sh., a witness, was not questioned in person during the trial and that the presiding judge allowed an earlier statement of hers to be read out, the Supreme Court noted as follows:\n“The defence did not object to the reading-out of the statement by Sh., who did not appear in court on account of her undergoing treatment in hospital. Neither [the applicant] nor his counsel questioned the authenticity of the medical certificate submitted by Sh.’s counsel ...”", "15. By a letter of 16 July 2007, the Moscow city prosecutor’s office rejected the applicant’s complaint concerning the actions by the presiding judge by reference to the Supreme Court’s findings in the judgment of 5 June 2007." ]
[ "6" ]
[]
[]
[ "5. By a judgment of the Zenica Cantonal Court of 5 February 2007, three judgments of the Tešanj Municipal Court of 30 July 2008, 31 March 2008 and 15 May 2009 and a judgment of the Zenica Municipal Court of 26 April 2007, which became final on 5 February 2007, 18 August 2008, 23 March 2009, 25 June 2010 and 27 March 2008, respectively, the Zenica-Doboj Canton (Zeničko-dobojski kanton; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicants different sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs.", "6. The writs of execution issued on 2 March 2007, 5 April 2010, 2 March 2010, 14 December 2010 and 24 June 2008, respectively, by the Zenica Municipal Court and the Tešanj Municipal Court, were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges on the debtor’s account.", "7. On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the competent courts that enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent.", "8. On 12 July 2008 the first applicant, Mr Suljo Kunić, complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”).", "9. On 12 October 2011 (decision no. AP 2110/08) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in Mr Suljo Kunić’s and ten other cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in the appellants’ favour. It ordered the government of the Zenica-Doboj Canton to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of the cantonal debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time.\nThe relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“39. ... The court notes that the judgments [in favour of the appellants] have not been enforced due to the lack of funds on the debtor’s bank account.\n... 45. The Constitutional Court reiterates that under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 1 of the European Convention all levels of government must secure respect for individual human rights, including the right to enforcement of final judgments under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention ... The scope of that obligation is not reduced in the present case, notwithstanding the large number of judgments... [T]he Constitutional Court notes that in Jeličić v. BiH, and again in Čolić and Others v. BiH, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated that ‘it is not open to a State authority to cite lack of funds as an excuse for not honouring a judgment debt. Admittedly, a delay in the execution of a judgment may be justified in particular circumstances, but the delay may not be such as to impair the essence of the right protected under Article 6 § 1’ ... 46. The Constitutional Court agrees with the position taken by the European Court ... it is nevertheless aware of the effects the global economic crisis had on Bosnia and Herzegovina ... The court notes that the federal and the cantonal governments had taken certain steps with the view to enforcement of final court decisions. Section 138 of the Federal Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 provides that the final judgments against the Federation and the cantons shall be enforced within the amount of budgetary funds designated for that purpose ... and that the creditors shall enforce their claims in the order in which they acquired the enforcement titles ... In 2010 and 2011 the amount of funds for that purpose in the budget of the Zenica-Doboj Canton was 100,000 convertible marks.\n... 48. The court finds that the crux of the problem in the present case is that the Zenica-Doboj Canton did not identify the exact number of unenforced judgments and the aggregate debt ... without which it is impossible to know when all the creditors will realise their claims against this canton. Furthemore, there should exist a centralised and transparent database of all the claims listed in chronological order according to the time the judgments became final. It should include the enforcement time-frame and a list of partial payments, if any. This will also help to avoid abuses of the enforcement procedure. These measure and adequate funds in the annual budget would ensure that all the final judgments are enforced within a reasonable time ... and the Zenica-Doboj Canton would ensure the respect of its obligations from Article 6 §1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n... 50. The court considers that the adoption of section 138 of the Enforcement Procedure Act 2003 had a legitimate aim, because the enforcement of a large number of judgments at the same time would jeopardise the normal functioning of the cantons. However, the limitation of the enforcement in the present case is contrary to the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which requires that a fair balance is struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights ... Section 138 places a disproportionate burden on the appellants ... they are placed in a situation of absolute uncertainty as regards the enforcement of their claims...\n... 52. In order to comply with its positive obligation, the government of the Zenica-Doboj Canton must, as explained above, calculate the total amount of the aggregate debt arising from the final judgments and prepare a comprehensive and transparent database ... This court will not specify what a reasonable time-limit should be ... but, in any event, it must be in accordance with Article 6 § 1 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.\n... 54. ... The current situation does not give any guarantees to the appellants that their claims against the Zenica-Doboj Canton will be enforced within a reasonable time.”", "10. On 16 January 2013 the Constitutional Court adopted a procedural decision to the effect that its decision of 12 October 2011 and eight other decisions on the same matter in cases concerning various individual appellants (see paragraph 15 below) had not been enforced.", "11. The final judgments in the applicants’ favour have not yet been enforced." ]
[ "P1-1", "46", "6" ]
[ 5 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Mardin. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant was a student at the Philosophy Department of the Faculty of Arts and Science at Dicle University.", "6. On 28 March 2006 a funeral of four militants of the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party), an illegal armed organisation, took place in Diyarbakır.", "7. An incident report regarding events that took place between 28 March and 1 April 2006 was prepared on 3 April 2006 by the police and was signed by more than 220 officers. It stated that on 24 March 2006 fourteen PKK militants had been killed by the security forces and that the remains of four of the militants were released to their families in order to be buried in Diyarbakır. On 28 March 2006 at around 7 a.m., the remains were taken to a mosque where around 1,500‑2,000 people had gathered. The crowd blocked the traffic as they carried the coffins, chanted separatist, hostile slogans in Turkish and Kurdish in support of the organisation and Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, and waved PKK posters and banners. The crowd then walked to a cemetery for the burial of the deceased. The security forces did not intervene as there were relatives of the deceased, including children and old people, in the crowd. The police report stated that after the burial ceremony had been completed, a group of about 1,000 people continued to march. They were warned by the police that they were not allowed to chant illegal slogans, disseminate propaganda in support of the organisation or wave illegal flags. However, the crowd became agitated and started throwing stones at the police officers on duty, injuring a number of them and causing extensive damage to State buildings and vehicles, banks, shops and other vehicles belonging to private individuals. According to the police report, more people later joined the illegal demonstration, which continued on 29, 30 and 31 March and 1 April. The report further stated that prior to those events some media organs controlled by the PKK had called for mass protests.", "8. On 5 March 2007 a demonstration was held on the campus of Dicle University to protest about the conditions of Abdullah Öcalan’s detention, and in particular about his alleged poisoning by the Turkish authorities. A group of forty people entered the university building and asked the students to leave. They held a press conference on the premises of the university and chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan.", "9. On 9 March 2007 the applicant was arrested.", "10. On 10 March 2007 he was questioned at the anti-terror branch of the Diyarbakır police headquarters where he denied taking part in both the demonstration of 5 March 2007 and the funeral of 28 March 2006 and the subsequent events.", "11. On the same day, the applicant made a statement to the Diyarbakır public prosecutor. He was shown photographs that had been taken of him on 28 March 2006 and 5 March 2007 during the funeral and the demonstration at the university. The applicant accepted that he had participated in the funeral of one of the PKK militants. He stated that the militant had been a relative of a friend of his, that he had attended the funeral as a religious duty, but that he had not attacked the police with stones. The applicant also stated that on 5 March 2007 he had stood in front of the university building with other students for a short while and that his photograph must have been taken then. He stated that he had not chanted slogans with the demonstrators.", "12. The applicant was brought before a judge of the Diyarbakır Assize Court later that day. He maintained that his statements to the public prosecutor had reflected the truth. The judge remanded the applicant in custody on the basis of a strong suspicion that he had committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in support of a terrorist organisation or its purposes.", "13. On 8 May 2007 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant with the Diyarbakır Assize Court. The applicant was charged with disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK and with membership of an illegal organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) and Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237), on the basis of Articles 220 § 6 and 314 § 3 of the same Code. The public prosecutor noted that on 28 March 2006 the applicant had participated in an illegal demonstration held under the pretext of a funeral; had chanted a slogan; and had covered his face with the hood of his coat during the demonstration. The public prosecutor also noted that the applicant had supported the chanting of slogans in favour of the PKK by applauding during the demonstration of 5 March 2007. The public prosecutor further claimed that the applicant had regularly, willingly and knowingly participated in illegal demonstrations organised by political parties, associations and persons who supported the PKK and that therefore he should be punished for membership of an illegal organisation.", "14. In support of the indictment, the public prosecutor submitted police video recordings of the funeral held on 28 March 2006 and the demonstration at Dicle University of 5 March 2007 to the court. In the first recording, the applicant was seen in a crowd next to a coffin making a “V” sign. In the second recording the applicant was again seen in a crowd with the hood of his coat on his head. In the third recording, the applicant was seen applauding with other students.", "15. On 19 June 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court held the first hearing during which the applicant made defence submissions. He stated that he had attended the funeral on 28 March 2006 and that he had briefly participated in the gathering at the university on 5 March 2007. He accepted that he was the person in the photographs. He denied the accuracy of the allegation that he had chanted slogans during the funeral and the demonstration. He noted that he did not remember that he had made a “V” sign, but that he might have done so, along with the rest of the crowd. A witness was also heard by the trial court, and confirmed the applicant’s version of events of 5 March 2007. At the end of the hearing the court ordered the applicant’s continued detention on remand.", "16. On 30 November 2007, at the end of the fourth hearing, the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of membership of an illegal organisation, the PKK, pursuant to Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 § 6 and 314 § 3 of the same Code, and sentenced him to six years and three months’ imprisonment. The applicant was also convicted of two counts of disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, for which he received a sentence of a total of one year and eight months’ imprisonment.", "17. The court first gave a summary of the applicant’s defence submissions, the public prosecutor’s observations on the merits of the case and the evidence in the case file. That evidence was the applicant’s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the judge, dated 10 March 2007; a photograph relating to the funeral of 28 March 2006; printed versions of news articles published by various media in support of the PKK which had been downloaded from the Internet; the arrest and incident reports; reports on the video recordings; a copy of the leaflet distributed at Dicle University on 5 March 2007; reports by experts on the examination of the video recordings; the applicant’s identity documents; and a document showing that he had no previous criminal record.", "18. In its judgment, the Assize Court observed, on the basis of the police video recordings and the photographs extracted from those recordings, that the applicant had attended the funeral of four PKK militants on 28 March 2006; that he had walked in front of one of the coffins during the funeral; and that he had made a “V” sign. Noting that the funeral had subsequently turned into propaganda for the PKK-KONGRA/GEL, thus an illegal demonstration, and considering that the applicant had walked close to the coffins, the court considered that the applicant had played an active role in the illegal demonstration. The court noted that it was not established that the applicant had chanted slogans during the funeral. As to the demonstration held on 5 March 2007 at Dicle University, the trial court noted that the applicant had applauded while other demonstrators had chanted slogans in support of Abdullah Öcalan.", "19. The Assize Court noted that the funeral of the PKK militants and the demonstration of 5 March 2007 had both been held in line with calls and instructions issued by the PKK. They had subsequently turned into propaganda events in favour of the PKK and had become illegal demonstrations. Hence, the court found it established that the applicant had acted with the intention of supporting the deceased on 28 March 2006 and had acted together with illegal demonstrators on 5 March 2007, thereby committing the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK and its leader.", "20. The Diyarbakır Assize Court further referred to a decision dated 22 March 2007 (case no. 2006/9165, decision no. 2007/2432) of the Ninth Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation, in which the latter had considered that the acts of the accused demonstrators (participation in the demonstration of 28 March 2006 after calls for a demonstration had been made by the PKK, in accordance with the latter’s aims; the chanting of slogans in support of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan; singing the PKK’s youth march song; burning tyres and blocking traffic; carrying PKK flags and banners and Öcalan posters; attacking public buildings, as well as police and civilian vehicles with stones and Molotov cocktails; carrying the bodies of the PKK militants who had been killed by the security forces) should be considered as offences committed on behalf of that organisation. The Court of Cassation found therefore that the accused should be punished for those offences and also be convicted of membership of an illegal organisation. Noting that the applicant had acted together with the aforementioned demonstrators on 28 March 2006, the Diyarbakır Assize Court considered that the applicant’s participation in the funeral and demonstration and his conduct at that time had also occurred as a result of instructions and calls by the PKK. The court considered that the applicant had acted on behalf of the organisation, in line with the goals and activities of the PKK, and that therefore he should be punished for not only disseminating propaganda, but also for membership of an illegal organisation.", "21. One of the three judges sitting on the bench of the assize court dissented. In his dissenting opinion, the judge stated that neither Article 220 § 6 of the Criminal Code nor the explanatory memorandum on Article 220 § 6 explained the concept of committing an offence on behalf of an illegal organisation. The dissenting judge noted that such an offence should be capable of producing a result for a terrorist organisation and its aims, such as the offences of aggravated injury, kidnapping, deprivation of liberty, murder or bombing. He also noted that such an offence should have devastating repercussions for society when the way of committing the offence, the time of the offence and its effects were taken into consideration. He finally opined that in order to conclude that non-members of an illegal organisation had committed an offence on behalf of that illegal organisation, there should be a decision to commit an offence on behalf of that organisation and an intention to join the organisation in question. The judge therefore concluded that the applicant should only have been convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713.", "22. The applicant appealed.", "23. On 29 January 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 30 November 2007 in so far as it related to the applicant’s conviction under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 § 6 and 314 § 3 of the same Code, for membership of an illegal organisation. The higher court, however, quashed the applicant’s conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 on procedural grounds.", "24. On 23 March 2009 the Court of Cassation’s decision of 29 January 2009 was deposited with the registry of the first-instance court.", "25. On 28 April 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court once again convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713.", "26. On 17 October 2012 the Court of Cassation quashed the applicant’s conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713.", "27. On 14 December 2012 the Diyarbakır Assize Court decided to suspend the criminal proceedings against the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, pursuant to Law no. 6352, which had entered into force on 5 July 2012. The suspension was for a period of three years, on the condition that he did not commit an offence when expressing ideas and opinions through the medium of the press or other media, or by any other method.", "28. In the meantime, on 25 October 2010 the applicant was expelled from Dicle University by the administrative board of the Faculty of Arts and Science because he had failed to complete his degree within the maximum period of seven years for an undergraduate programme. The case lodged by the applicant against that decision was dismissed by the Diyarbakır Administrative Court on 5 June 2012. The court considered that the fact that the applicant had been serving a prison sentence did not justify his non‑attendance at classes and examinations.", "29. After serving four years and eight months of his sentence, the applicant was released from prison on 15 November 2011." ]
[ "11" ]
[ 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 22 ]
[]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Yerevan.", "6. The applicant had a daughter, K.M., who was born on 19 November 1985.", "7. On 7 September 2007 at 10 p.m. K.M., who was in the early weeks of pregnancy at the time, was at home with her parents and husband when she fainted and began to have convulsions. An ambulance was called, which arrived 40-45 minutes later.", "8. Upon arrival, the ambulance doctor, A.G., found K.M. nearly unconscious, with impaired breathing and low blood pressure. According to the applicant, the doctor was told at that point that K.M. was pregnant. A.G. diagnosed a convulsion syndrome, gave K.M. two injections – one of relanium and one of magnesium – and took her to hospital. It appears that neither the doctor nor the nurse nor the driver of the ambulance helped her family carry K.M. downstairs from the eighth floor of the building and put her into the ambulance. Moreover, although K.M. had not regained consciousness after the injections, A.G. chose not to sit beside her during the journey to hospital, but instead sat beside the driver in the driver’s cab.", "9. On the same day A.G. and the nurse drew up an ambulance visit record stating that they had arrived seven minutes after receiving the ambulance call and that they had administered only one medical injection, of relanium.", "10. On 14 September 2007 K.M. died in hospital without ever regaining consciousness.", "11. On the same day the Avan and Nor-Nork District Prosecutor’s Office of Yerevan launched an inquiry into her death and ordered an autopsy, which was also carried out that day. According to its report (forensic medical opinion no. 728), K.M. died from general intoxication of the organism, caused by an impairment of vital brain function, which in turn had been caused by extensive and diffuse thrombosis of neuro-vessels.", "12. During the inquiry, the investigator took statements from the medical personnel who had provided assistance to K.M., including A.G., the nurse, and the driver. In particular, in her statement of 14 November 2007 the nurse stated that the doctor had ordered her to administer an injection of magnesium sulphate but that K.M.’s convulsions had continued, after which the doctor had handed her a phial of relanium, which she had injected. In her statement made on the same day A.G. explained that upon arrival they had found K.M. having seizures and that, from talking to her family, she had learnt that K.M. was pregnant. She had then ordered the nurse to inject relanium and, knowing that K.M. was pregnant, she did not inject any other medication and did not take any further measures since she did not consider it necessary in the circumstances.", "13. On 26 November 2007 the ambulance nurse and A.G. were questioned again. The nurse stated, in particular, that the fact that only the injection of relanium and not the one of magnesium had been mentioned in the ambulance visit record could possibly be explained by her having forgotten to remind the doctor about the injection of magnesium. A.G. stated, inter alia, that she had ordered the nurse to give two injections.", "14. In the course of the inquiry the investigator ordered a forensic medical investigation to be carried out by a panel of experts. According to the results of the opinion (forensic medical opinion no. 89) produced on 14 January 2008, the injection of relanium 2 mg and magnesium 3 g by the ambulance crew had been correct at the given moment, taking into account the patient’s condition − that is to say convulsion syndrome − and the injection of the given quantity of those substances was not contra-indicated. The opinion also stated that K.M.’s medical treatment had been correct and had corresponded to the diagnosis.", "15. On 27 February 2008 the investigator decided to reject the institution of criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti.", "16. On 29 February 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Avan and Nor-Nork District Prosecutor’s Office of Yerevan, seeking a new forensic medical investigation in which he would be allowed to participate. In particular, he claimed that his daughter had died as a result of negligence by A.G., who had given her two injections of chemical substances, the use of which was contra‑indicated given K.M.’s pregnancy, impaired breathing and low blood pressure. In this respect, the applicant referred to medical instructions on the use of relanium and magnesium and extracts from a medical book, copies of which he attached to his application. The applicant also alleged that the ambulance had arrived belatedly, had lacked essential medical equipment such as an oxygen cylinder, and that the ambulance crew in general had not acted with due diligence.", "17. On 3 March 2008 the District Prosecutor’s Office decided to quash the decision of 27 February 2008 and remit the case to the investigator for further inquiry. The decision stated, in particular, that the applicant’s request for an additional forensic medical investigation involving his participation was well-founded.", "18. On 5 March 2008 the investigator ordered an additional forensic medical investigation by a panel of experts which was asked to determine the following:\n“1. The cause of K.M.’s death, whether she suffered from any illnesses from birth ... whether an illness she had suffered from birth could have caused her death or somehow have a causal link to her death. 2. Whether the injection of relanium 2 mg and magnesium 3 g by the ambulance crew was correct, whether the quantity was within that allowed and whether injecting magnesium might have entailed negative consequences. 3. Whether there was any medication (in medical theory, in science) or medical approach the administration of which could have improved K.M.’s condition and whether it should have been administered by the ambulance crew or in hospital. Whether the medical treatment had been appropriate and sufficient or whether omissions had occurred and, if so, who had been responsible for them. 4. K.M.’s transfer to the hospital took about 40 minutes; whether speedier transfer to the hospital would have made it possible to save K.M. 5. Whether K.M.’s five-week pregnancy contributed to the emergence and development of her illness, whether the pregnancy and the illness she was diagnosed with had a direct causal link with each other. 6. K.M.’s hospital record ... contained notes concerning the medical assistance, injections and medication and the doctors who had administered them over seven days. Whether the medical treatment provided had been correct, the injected medication correctly chosen with regard to type and quantity and whether these were permissible or not. If not, which doctor was responsible for errors and finally whether the medical treatment administered had brought about death. 7. The scientific methods on which forensic medical opinion no. 728 and the forensic medical opinion no. 89 of the panel of experts were based, whether these were supported by medical literature and which methods had been applied during previous examinations...", "19. On 23 April 2008 the panel of experts delivered its report (forensic medical opinion no. 6), the conclusions of which read as follows:\n“1 and 8: No information indicating that K.M. had congenital disorders was discovered, according to the medical documents. K.M.’s death resulted from general intoxication of the organism, caused by an impairment of vital brain function, which in turn was caused by extensive and diffuse thrombosis of neuro-vessels. As regards prior diseases resulting in functional disorders which could have brought about the convulsion syndrome, it was impossible to draw any conclusions in the absence of relevant medical documents. 2. Injection of relanium 2 mg and magnesium 3 g by the emergency care specialists was correct in view of the presence of the convulsion syndrome at the given moment. Not injecting magnesium at the given moment could have entailed negative consequences. 3. In the case in question the medical assistance provided by the ambulance crew and in hospital was appropriate and sufficient, without omissions, which is substantiated by the data contained in the medical documents and by the evidentiary material in the case file. 5. K.M.’s five-week pregnancy was not linked to the cause of her death since the pregnancy and the illnesses did not have a direct causal link with each other either. 7. Opinion no. 728 concerning the forensic medical examination of K.M.’s corpse and opinion no. 89 produced by the forensic medical investigation panel are accurate and well‑founded; scientific methodologies were applied: histological examinations of the organs of the corpse were performed, and leading specialists of the Ministry of Health participated in the panel examination.", "20. On 25 April 2008 the investigator decided to reject the institution of criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. The decision stated in particular that the relevant members of the medical personnel, including the emergency care specialists who had provided first aid assistance to K.M., had been questioned. It further reiterated the conclusions of the experts reflected in the forensic medical opinions nos. 89 and 6 and stated that the initial medical assistance administered as first-aid and the subsequent hospital treatment provided to K.M. had been performed properly, appropriately and in a timely manner without any errors or omissions.", "21. On the same day the investigator lodged a request with the director of the “Emergency Medical Service” State Close Joint Stock Company of the Yerevan Municipality (“the Emergency Medical Service”) seeking to impose an appropriate penalty on the ambulance crew. In particular, the investigator stated that there had been a 40-minute delay before the ambulance arrived and that only one of two injections given to K.M. had been mentioned by the ambulance doctor in the visit record. Furthermore, the process of taking the patient to hospital had been slow and disorganised. The ambulance driver had not carried the patient downstairs and had not assisted in putting her in the ambulance. Instead of sitting beside K.M., whose condition was extremely critical, the doctor had chosen to sit in the driver’s cab next to the driver. The investigator’s conclusion was therefore that the ambulance crew had arrived after a serious delay and had not provided proper medical assistance.", "22. On 30 April 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan concerning the investigator’s decision of 25 April 2008 seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against A.G. and the nurse. The applicant submitted, in particular, that the panel of experts performing the additional forensic medical investigation had not taken due account of his arguments, which had been based on relevant medical literature and Government decrees. He reiterated his arguments with regard to the contra-indication of relanium and magnesium in cases of pregnancy and low blood pressure and the other arguments previously submitted in his complaint lodged with the District Prosecutor’s Office.", "23. On 16 May 2008 the medical council of the Emergency Medical Service held a meeting at which the circumstances described in the investigator’s decision of 25 April 2008 were discussed. It appears that the members of the ambulance crew submitted written “explanations” (բացատրություն) in relation to the events of 7 September 2007. As a result, A.G. received a reprimand for serious breach of work regulations and medical ethics. Also, the head of the relevant emergency department was ordered to improve the supervision of employees as regards respecting work regulations, so as to prevent similar occurrences in future, and to examine every such case.", "24. On 26 May 2008 the Avan and Nor-Nork District Court of Yerevan dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the inquiry into K.M.’s death had been thorough and adequate. In doing so, the District Court referred to the results of the fresh forensic medical opinion. As regards the late arrival of the ambulance, incorrect completion of the visit record and the doctor’s failure to sit beside the patient during the journey to the hospital, the District Court referred to the fact that A.G. had been reprimanded for poor performance of her duties.", "25. On 16 July 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Criminal Court of Appeal. He argued, in particular, that the District Court had failed to question A.G. and the nurse. Furthermore, the District Court had not adequately addressed their arguments concerning the injection of K.M. with substances that were contra-indicated, given her condition, or the over-dosage thereof which, he alleged, had caused her death.", "26. On 4 September 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the District Court. In doing so, it stated that there was no necessity to summon A.G. and the nurse to testify in court since they had already made statements during the inquiry. As regards the applicant’s arguments with regard to the contra‑indication of medical substances administered by injection to K.M., the Court of Appeal relied on the forensic medical opinions according to which their administration had been correct, taking into account the convulsion syndrome at that moment.", "27. On 30 September 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation against the decision of the Court of Appeal.", "28. On 30 October 2008 the Court of Cassation decided to refuse the examination of the appeal on points of law (վճռաբեկ բողոքը թողնել առանց քննության) since it had not been lodged by an advocate (փաստաբան) licensed to act before the Court of Cassation, as required by Article 404 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant claims that he could not afford the costly services of such an advocate." ]
[ "2" ]
[ 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21 ]
[ 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19 ]
[ "5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Hamburg. He is the brother of the late Y.C., also a Gambian national, who was born in 1987 and applied for asylum in Austria in 2004.", "6. On 4 April 2005, the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht) convicted Y.C. of drug trafficking and sentenced him to seven months’ imprisonment. Y.C. began serving his sentence at Vienna‑Josefstadt Prison (Strafvollzugsanstalt). On 2 May 2005 he was transferred to Linz Prison.", "7. On 18 April 2005 the Vienna Federal Police Authority (Bundespolizeidirektion) dismissed Y.C.’s asylum application and ordered his expulsion to the Gambia. An appeal lodged by Y.C. was dismissed by the Vienna Federal Asylum Office (Bundesasylamt) on 6 June 2005. He did not appeal against this decision and it became legally binding on 5 July 2005.", "8. On 8 September 2005 the Linz Federal Police Authority issued an order for Y.C. to be placed in detention with a view to his expulsion.", "9. On 12 September 2005 Y.C. was conditionally released from prison and directly transferred to the Linz police detention centre (Polizeianhaltezentrum – hereinafter “the detention centre”).", "10. Upon his admission to the detention centre, Y.C. was examined by a police doctor (Polizeiarzt), who noted that Y.C. was in a good general state and was fit for detention. His weight was recorded at 76.5 kg and his height at 170 cm. Communication between the authorities and Y.C. took place in English.", "11. On 26 September 2005 the police doctor, while conducting a routine examination which all detainees have to undergo at two-week intervals, again noted that Y.C.’s state of health was good and recorded his weight at 70 kg.", "12. On 27 September 2005 Y.C. went on hunger strike. On 28 September 2005 he informed the authorities thereof. Representatives of Human Rights Association Austria (Verein Menschenrechte Österreich), a non-governmental organisation (NGO) who had already been counselling him since the day of his admission to the detention centre, came to talk to him. On the same day Y.C. was subject to an initial hunger-strike examination (Hungerstreik-Eingangsuntersuchung). Y.C. was handed an information pamphlet on hunger strikes (in English) and was also orally informed by the public medical officer of the possible consequences of a hunger strike. A medical hunger-strike protocol (Hungerstreikprotokoll) was filled out, in which his state of health was described as follows:\n“Musculature in a good, well-trained state, pronounced muscles of the upper arm, six-pack like someone who practices athletic sports, appears vital, overall.”", "13. On the hunger-strike protocol it was noted that at the outset of his hunger strike, Y.C. had weighed 67 kg. On the basis of this, Y.C.’s “critical weight” was calculated at 54 kg (see paragraph 64 below). Under the heading “reasons given for hunger strike”, it was noted that Y.C. “absolutely wanted to be transferred back to cell no. 36”. He had been placed in a different cell because he and his cellmates had allegedly tried to escape from cell no. 36.", "14. Daily health checks of Y.C. were subsequently carried out, during which his weight was checked, his blood pressure was taken and his oxygen saturation level was measured. Until 1 October 2005, no anomalies were detected.", "15. On 2 October 2005 the public medical officer noted that Y.C.’s tongue was slightly dry, and on 3 October 2005 that his lips were “barky” (borkig). Further, there were occasional comments on the hunger-strike form to the effect that Y.C. resisted examination and was “malingering” (simuliert) – for example, he had “pretended to fall”, “refused to be examined”, “needed to be carried by other detainees”, and “tilted over from [his] chair in an ostentatious manner”.", "16. After examining Y.C. during the morning of 4 October 2005, Dr F.G., the police doctor in charge, noted the following:\n“Pretends to be weak, has to be physically supported by two detainees – therefore weight check not possible. Dry tongue, barky lips. I request a medical assessment by a specialist. Possibly blood test, ionogram.”", "17. On 4 October 2005 at 9.30 a.m., Y.C. was taken to Linz General Hospital (Allgemeines Krankenhaus) for examination and an assessment of whether he was fit enough for further detention. Because Y.C. resisted the examination and kicked out at a nurse, his hands and feet had to be shackled by the police officers who had accompanied him to the hospital. According to a report drawn up by the treating doctor on 4 October 2005, it was “not possible to assess the intake of liquids”, “communication [was] difficult” because Y.C. did not speak German, he had “dry lips” and had his eyes “constantly closed”, but “walking [was] possible if [he was] supported”. The hospital further noted that if his general condition worsened, he would have to be force-fed and taken to a psychiatric ward, because he “lashed out from time to time”. Taking his blood for a blood test had been difficult and risky; nevertheless, with the support of the two police officers, who secured Y.C. in a chair in the examination room, the doctor nonetheless managed to take a small amount of blood. After consulting the senior doctor, the treating doctor formally confirmed Y.C.’s fitness for detention and noted the police doctor’s telephone number in order to contact him after obtaining the results of the blood test.", "18. Y.C. was subsequently taken back to the detention centre and at around 11 a.m. was placed alone in a security cell (Sicherheitszelle) because of his behaviour at the hospital. His shackles were removed. The security cell did not contain a water outlet, but Y.C. could request a water bottle at any time. A police officer checked on Y.C. every fifteen to thirty minutes. At 12.30 p.m., Y.C., who was lying on the bed, reacted to the police officer’s presence by lifting his head. When the officer next checked, at 12.50 p.m., he was not breathing anymore and had no pulse. At 1.20 p.m. he was declared dead by an emergency doctor who had been immediately called to the scene. The presumed time of death was 12.40 p.m. His weight was recorded at 59 kg. At 1.42 p.m. the blood test results from the hospital examination (see paragraph 17 above) were produced. They indicated that Y.C. had been dehydrated and that he should have been hydrated intravenously and placed in intensive care.", "19. In a report of 5 October 2005 the doctor from the hospital noted that Y.C. had been uncooperative during his examination. It had been virtually impossible to take a blood sample as the patient had resisted strongly. At that time nothing had indicated that Y.C.’s physical condition could become life-threatening. In a statement given on 14 October 2005 the doctor described Y.C. as not having been weak at all, rather, he had been physically strong and had steadily resisted treatment with all his might (nach Leibeskräften), using the whole of his body and kicking out with his legs. After examination of his tongue, pulse, respiration, heartbeat and skin, he had observed Y.C.’s dry lips, but had seen none of the other usual signs of dehydration or other abnormalities. He further stated that even as an experienced emergency unit doctor, a rapid and fatal development of Y.C.’s situation had not at all been foreseeable by him.", "20. On 4 October 2005, the day of Y.C.’s death, the Linz public prosecutor’s office (Staatsanwaltschaft – hereinafter “the public prosecutor”) instituted a criminal investigation against “unknown offenders” and requested the Linz Regional Court (Landesgericht) to conduct a judicial investigation. The investigating judge ordered that an autopsy be conducted by a sworn and judicially certified expert (beeideter und gerichtlich zertifizierter Sachverständiger); the autopsy was conducted on 5 October 2005. On the same day, the investigating judge, in response to a request made by the public prosecutor, delivered a decision ordering the seizure of the blood samples taken from Y.C., together with the pertinent examination report.", "21. On 5 October 2005 the Linz Federal Police Authority submitted a detailed report on the circumstances of Y.C.’s death.", "22. On 6 October 2005 the public prosecutor requested the Office for Internal Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior (Büro für interne Angelegenheiten des Bundesministeriums für Inneres – hereinafter the “OIA”) for it to carry out an investigation. The request included that interviews be conducted with: the two police officers who had accompanied Y.C. to the hospital on the day of his death; the police doctor who had examined Y.C. on that day; the doctor at Linz General Hospital who had examined Y.C.; the police officers who had been checking on Y.C. when he was placed in the security cell; and Y.C.’s cellmate.", "23. On 12 October 2005 the public prosecutor added to the case file a note regarding a telephone conversation between him and Dr H., the expert who had conducted the autopsy, regarding the preliminary findings of that autopsy.", "24. The OIA subsequently conducted an investigation at the detention centre’s medical service, procured documents from the detention centre, and produced written records of the requested interviews (see paragraph 22 above). The OIA’s report was submitted to the public prosecutor on 18 October 2005.", "25. On 24 October 2005 the investigating judge complied with a request lodged by the public prosecutor for the inclusion in the case file of the results of the investigation up until that date, as well as for Y.C.’s medical history to be obtained from the detention centre, and for these documents to be transmitted to the expert Dr H. It was further decided that the scale used to weigh Y.C. at the detention centre be seized and sent for technical examination.", "26. On 5 November 2005 the OIA submitted a report containing the results of the supplementary investigation.", "27. On 1 December 2005, after being supplied with all pertinent documents by the OIA, the Austrian Human Rights Advisory Board (Menschenrechtsbeirat – hereinafter “the Advisory Board” – an independent monitoring body established in 1999 at the Ministry of the Interior) issued a report on Y.C.’s death. In that report, the Advisory Board considered several points to be problematic: that Y.C., after his visit to Linz General Hospital on 4 October 2005, had been further monitored only by police officers, rather than by medical professionals; that no interpreter had been present during the said hospital visit; that a blood sample had been taken from Y.C. against his will; and that the calculation of Y.C.’s critical weight had been questionable. The issues of Y.C.’s possible dehydration and carrying sickle cell disease had not been addressed in the report, as it had been drawn up before the delivery of the final autopsy report by Dr H. (see paragraph 30 below).", "28. On 12 December 2005 the applicant, who was represented by counsel, joined the criminal proceedings as a private party.", "29. By an order of 14 December 2005 the investigating judge urged the expert to submit his report.", "30. On 4 January 2006 Dr H., the forensic expert who had conducted the autopsy, submitted his final autopsy report (dated 5 October 2005), as well as his expert report on Y.C.’s death, to the Linz Regional Court. He stated in the autopsy report that Y.C.’s body had not shown signs of “significantly acute malnutrition”, nor had there been signs of “classic dehydration”.", "31. In the more detailed expert report, Dr H. stated that Y.C.’s body had not shown signs of any injuries; therefore, death caused by the use of force could be excluded. Y.C. had been slim, but had not appeared malnourished. His body had weighed 59.3 kg; his height had been 171 cm. No typical external signs of dehydration had been visible, except for the lips appearing to be slightly dry. The results of the internal investigation had recorded a thickening of the blood, which indicated a possible alternation to the blood while Y.C. had still been alive caused by a lack of hydration. Dr H. noted that a hunger strike alone could not lead to a thickening of the blood, as long as enough fluids were consumed. As concerns the hunger strike, Dr H. stated that it was likely that Y.C. had not eaten solid food for several days, but that it was unlikely that he had engaged in a long-term total hunger strike as the large intestine had still been filled with an abundance of stool along its entire length.", "32. Dr H. further stated that neither Y.C.’s external appearance nor the medical reports produced until 4 October 2005 had indicated a life‑threatening situation, although there had been a significant reduction in his weight. Rather, it was more likely that a shift in the electrolyte system had commenced over a period of several days, as indicated by the results of the blood test conducted by Linz General Hospital on 4 October 2005. A post-mortem examination of Y.C.’s blood (conducted in the course of the autopsy) had shown that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait (Sichelzellanlage). Dr H. explained that sickle cell disease (Sichelzellenkrankheit) was an inherited red blood cell disorder; while red blood cells (containing normal haemoglobin) were disc-shaped, sickle haemoglobin could form stiff rods within the cell, changing it into a sickle shape. Dr H. added that the disease was rare among the white population, occurring mostly among black people. Unlike in the case of people suffering from sickle cell disease, in Y.C.’s blood the trait had been present in the heterozygous form, which is why the disease had remained undetected during his lifetime. In cases like Y.C.’s, symptoms of sickle cell disease only manifested themselves if there were further damaging external factors, such as dehydration or a lack of oxygen.", "33. Dr H. concluded that the cause of Y.C.’s death had been dehydration, combined with the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait, which had caused a shift in the electrolyte system and had ultimately caused his heart to stop beating. Neither the authorities nor Y.C. himself had been aware that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait. Dr H. stated that Y.C.’s death could only have been prevented if he had been tested earlier for sickle cell trait, or if he had been aware that he was a carrier thereof. However, the hunger-strike protocol had not indicated any necessity for a blood test in that respect. The test results from the hospital on the day of Y.C.’s death would have given reason for further tests. However, the results had only been produced after Y.C.’s death.", "34. On 12 October 2005 the public prosecutor made a note in the criminal file (Aktenvermerk) about a conversation with Dr H. The doctor had expressed the opinion that with hindsight Y.C.’s extraordinarily aggressive behaviour at the hospital on the day of his death had resembled a delirious state caused by advanced dehydration and the consequent disintegration of his blood cells.", "35. On 13 January 2006 the public prosecutor decided to discontinue the criminal investigation into the death of Y.C., as no sufficient evidence could be found to warrant criminal proceedings. The applicant was informed that he had the right to ask the Council Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Linz Regional Court to conduct a preliminary investigation. However, he was also informed that he would have to bear the full costs of the criminal proceedings should the Council Chamber grant his request but the proceedings did not result in a criminal conviction. This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 19 January 2006. The applicant did not request that a preliminary investigation be instituted.", "36. On 2 March 2006 the applicant submitted the decision of 13 February 2006 issued by the Upper Austria Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhänigiger Verwaltungssenat Oberösterreich – hereinafter “the IAP”) (see paragraph 46 below) to the public prosecutor and requested him to investigate further. On 13 March 2006 the public prosecutor replied that the documents submitted had already been made available to him, but that they could not change his assessment of the procedural results obtained so far, since every aspect of the legal question to be answered had already been clarified by Dr H.’s autopsy report and his comprehensive expert report.", "37. On 15 November 2005 the applicant requested the IAP to review the lawfulness of Y.C.’s detention (Schubhaftbeschwerde) and at the same time lodged a complaint about the conditions of his detention (Maßnahmenbeschwerde). He submitted in particular that Y.C. should not have continued to be kept in detention because he had no longer been fit to be detained on account of his hunger strike. As regards the conditions of Y.C.’s detention, he submitted that the medical treatment of Y.C. had not been in conformity with section 10(1) of the Detention Ordinance (Anhalteordnung – see paragraph 59 below). He furthermore claimed that his brother had been placed in a security cell, without access to water, on the day of his death, in contravention of section 5(5) of the Detention Ordinance.", "38. On 13 February 2006 the competent member of the IAP held a hearing during which he examined as witnesses the applicant, a cellmate of Y.C., one of the police doctors who had examined Y.C. during his hunger strike, and the police officers who had been in charge of examining detainees on the day of Y.C.’s death.", "39. Y.C.’s former cellmate, H.C., stated that they had gone on hunger strike together to protest the duration of their detention, and that they had not been treated correctly by t