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(Declaratory Relief) 115. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 114 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 116. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Rag-bone.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Rag-bone.com and by extension R&B Stores, which R&B owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 117. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) 15 (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 23 103. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 102 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 104. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 105. R&B Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). Rag-bone.com is a service, privilege or advantage of the R&B Stores. Rag-bone.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 106. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the R&B Stores and Rag-bone.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 107. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Rag-bone.com, causing Rag-bone.com and the services integrated with the R&B Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 24 108. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 109. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 110. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Rag-bone.com and the R&B Stores under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 111. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 112. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 113. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 25 114. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 27. Defendant, R&B, operates R&B Stores in New York State and provides clothing, shoes, handbags, and accessories. 28. Rag-bone.com is a service and benefit offered by R&B in New York State and throughout the United States. Rag-bone.com is owned, controlled and/or operated by R&B. 29. Rag-bone.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale that are available in the R&B Stores. The online store allows the user to browse clothing, shoes, handbags, and accessory, make purchases, learn about archives, and perform a variety of other functions. 30. Among the features offered by Rag-bone.com are the following: 8 (a) learning about store information including, allowing persons who wish to visit R&B Stores to learn their location, hours of operation, and phone numbers; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase clothing, shoes, handbags, and accessories; and (c) learning about archives, career opportunities, and promotions. 31. This case arises out of R&B’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to Rag-bone.com, including the goods and services offered by R&B Stores through rag-bone.com. Due to R&B’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to rag-bone.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to R&B Stores, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through rag-bone.com. 32. R&B denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Rag-bone.com by preventing them from freely navigating Rag-bone.com. 33. Rag-bone.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 34. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Rag-bone.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description 9 of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Rag-bone.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate R&B Stores’ web pages and/or make purchases. 35. Rag-bone.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Rag-bone.com, these forms include search fields to locate jackets, fields that specify the number of items desired, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise and locations, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 36. Similarly, Rag-bone.com lacks accessible drop-down menus. Drop-down menus allow customers to locate and choose products as well as specify the quantity of certain items. On Rag-bone.com, blind customers are not aware if the desired products, such as jackets, have been added to the shopping cart because the screen-reader does not indicate the type of product or quantity. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Rag-bone.com. 37. Furthermore, Rag-bone.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on rag-bone.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind 10 individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 38. Rag-bone.com also lacks accessible forms. Quantity boxes allow customers to specify the quantity of certain items. On Rag-bone.com, blind customers are unable to select specific quantity because the screen-reader does not indicate the function of the box. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the quantity box. Furthermore, Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping cart because the shopping basket form does not specify the purpose of the shopping cart. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping cart. Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping carts and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Rag-bone.com. 39. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Rag-bone.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 40. Rag-bone.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Rag- bone.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Rag-bone.com. 41. Due to Rag-bone.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at a R&B Stores. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the Stores or require assistance in navigating the Stores. 11 By contrast, if Rag-bone.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and programs and make purchases and/or reservations via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.0 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Rag-bone.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Rag-bone.com. 42. Rag-bone.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Rag-bone.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of R&B Stores in New York State and throughout the United States. 43. Plaintiff, Marion Kiler, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Rag-bone.com, most recently in January 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Rag- bone.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to find a store location and to make an online purchase of a women’s jacket. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Rag-bone.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 45. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Rag-bone.com and the R&B Stores. 12 46. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Rag-bone.com and R&B Stores, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Rag-bone.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in the R&B Stores, during the relevant statutory period.” 50. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Rag-bone.com and as a result have been denied access 13 to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in the R&B Stores, during the relevant statutory period.” 51. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 52. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Rag-bone.com and the R&B Stores. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Rag-bone.com and by extension the goods and services offered through Defendant’s website to R&B Stores. 53. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Rag-bone.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Rag-bone.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Rag-bone.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Rag-bone.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 14 54. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims R&B has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Rag-bone.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 55. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 56. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 58. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 59. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 60. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 61. The R&B Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(E). Rag-bone.com is a service, privilege or advantage of R&B Stores. Rag-bone.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 62. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the R&B Stores. 63. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 64. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 16 65. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 66. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of R&B Stores who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Rag-bone.com, have not been provided services 17 that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Rag-bone.com and R&B Stores in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 71. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 72. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 74 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 76. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or 18 employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 77. The R&B Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Rag-bone.com is a service, privilege or advantage of R&B Stores. Rag-bone.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 78. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the R&B Stores and Rag-bone.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 79. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Rag-bone.com, causing Rag-bone.com and the services integrated with R&B Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 80. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 81. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary 19 aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 82. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 83. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 20 accommodations and/or opportunities of Rag-bone.com and R&B Stores under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 86. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 87. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 89. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 90. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 89 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 91. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 92. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such 21 place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 93. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 94. The R&B Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Rag-bone.com is a service, privilege or advantage of the R&B Stores. Rag-bone.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 95. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates R&B Stores and Rag-bone.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 96. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Rag-bone.com, causing Rag-bone.com and the services integrated with the R&B Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 97. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither 22 fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 98. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 99. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 100. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 101. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 102. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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21. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 77(a) and (bX3) on behalf of the following class (the "Class"): All persons who are or were royalty owners in Idaho wells where Defendants Alta Mesa Resources, Inc., Alta Mesa Services, L.P., Alta Mesa Holdings, L.P.; AM Idaho, LLC, High Mesa Holdings, L.P., and High Mesa Services, LLC (including their affiliated predecessors and affiliated successors, collectively "Alta Mesa") are or were the operator (or a working interest owner who marketed its share of gas and directly paid royalties to the royalty owners) from January 1,2014 to the date Class Notice is given ("Class Period"). The Class claims relate to royalty payments for gas and its constituents (such as residue gas, natural gas liquids, or drip condensate). Excluded from the Class are: (l) agencies, departments or instrumentalities of the United States of America, including but not limited to the U.S. Department of the Interior (the United States, Indian tribes, and Indian allottees); (2) Defendants, their affiliates, predecessors, and employees, officers, and directors; (3) any entity that produces, gathers, processes, or markets gas, and its affiliates; (4) overriding royalty owners and others whose interest was carved out from the lessee's interest; and, (5) royalty owners only to the extent they take gas in-kind, if any. 90. Plaintiffs and the Class incorporate by reference the allegations in all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 91. Plaintiffs and the other Class Members entered into written, fully executed, oil and gas leases with Defendants, and those leases include implied covenants requiring Defendants to prepare the gas and its constituent parts for market at Defendants' sole cost. The leases also place upon Defendants the obligation to properly account for and pay royalty to royalty owners under the mutual benefit rule, the best reasonable price, and good faith and fair dealing. 92. At all material times, Plaintiffs and the Class have performed their terms and obligations under the leases. 93. Defendants conspired to and did breach the leases, including the express terms and/or implied covenants, by their actions and/or inactions in underpaying royalty or not paying royalty on all products sold from the gas stream and in using transactions with affiliates in calculating royalties. 94. As a result of Defendants' breaches, Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged through underpayment of the actual amounts due for which they are entitled to recover in an amount to be proven at trial. 95. Plaintiffs and the Class incorporate by reference the allegations in all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 96. The Defendants intentionally made omissions regarding the price, volume, various products produced, and deductions to suggest that the price was a third-party commercial price STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE Defendants. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT. 1 Electronically Filed

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(Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227: On behalf of the Class) 1. An order certifying the Class as defined above; 10. In recent years, marketers who have often felt stymied by federal laws limiting solicitation by telephone, facsimile machine, and e-mail have increasingly looked to alternative technologies through which to send bulk solicitations cheaply. 12. An “ SMS message” is a text message call directed to a wireless device through the use of the telephone number assigned to the device. When an SMS message call is successfully made, the recipient’s cell phone rings, alerting him or her that a call is being received. As cellular telephones are inherently mobile and are frequently carried on their owner’s person, calls to cellular telephones, including SMS messages, may be received by the called party virtually anywhere worldwide. 13. Unlike more conventional advertisements, wireless spam actually costs its recipients money, because cell phone users must frequently pay their wireless service providers either for each text message call they receive, or incur a usage allocation deduction to their text plan, regardless of whether or not the message is authorized. 14. Over the course of an extended period prior to the commencement of this action, Defendant and its agents directed the mass transmission of wireless spam to the cell phones nationwide of what they hoped were potential customers of Defendant. 15. For instance, within the period of limitations applicable to this action but on dates currently unknown to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s cell phone indicated that a text call was received. 17. Upon information and belief, Defendant sent similar transmissions of wireless spam to a list of cellular telephone numbers on a mass basis. 18. At no time did Plaintiff consent to the receipt of the above-referenced message or any other such wireless spam text messages from Defendant. 19. Plaintiff was not in an “ established business relationship” with Defendant. Plaintiff had not done business with Defendant in the last eighteen months, nor had he made an inquiry regarding Defendant’s services or products in the three months prior to receipt of the text call. 2. An award statutory damages; 20. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a class (the “ Class” ) defined as follows: Persons who received one or more text message advertisements sent on behalf of Defendant 21. Defendant and its employees are excluded from the Class. 22. Also excluded from the Class are those persons who a. Consented to receive texts from Defendant, or b. Had an established business relationship with Defendant 24. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to prosecuting this action vigorously on behalf of the members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff, nor his counsel, has any interest adverse to those of the other members of the Class. 25. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive and will have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 26. Defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in transmitting the wireless spam at issue, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class. 28. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to the following: (a) Does the wireless spam Defendant distributed violate 47 U.S.C. § 227? (b) Are the Class members entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness or knowing conduct of Defendant? (c) Did the conduct described above violate the Class’s right to privacy? 29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 3. An injunction requiring Defendants to cease all wireless spam activities; 31. These text calls were made en masse through the use of a short code and without the prior express consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class to receive such wireless spam. 32. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’ s conduct, the members of the Class suffered actual damages by having to pay their respective wireless carriers for the text messages and, under section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. Plaintiff is also entitled to an injunction prohibiting wireless spam pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A). 33. Because Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiff and the Class did not consent to the receipt of the aforementioned wireless spam, because Defendant’ s conduct was willful, or both, Plaintiff asks the Court to exercise its discretion pursuant to section 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), to treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Kenneth Hill, on behalf of himself and the Class, prays for the following relief: 4. An incentive award for Plaintiff; 6. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.

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17. Plaintiffs were each offered work and employed on Defendant Mesa Packing’s harvesting crews. 18. Plaintiffs were promised, among other things: a. Pay for all hours worked; b. Pay of $12.75 per hour in the 2018 season; c. Pay of $13 per hour in the 2019 and 2020 seasons; d. Overtime pay in compliance with Wage Order 14; and e. Payment of wages in compliance with California law. 19. The terms of Plaintiffs and others similarly situated, whether as seasonal or migrant agricultural workers, were required to be in writing as California Labor Code § 2810.5 mandates that the disclosure be in writing, effectively electing for Plaintiffs and others similarly situated, that Defendant provide the written disclosures specified in the AWPA at 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) and 1831(a) to meet both statutory requirements. 20. The terms of the required disclosure promised to Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, formed a working arrangement enforceable under federal law. 21. Defendant’s daily work schedule included pre-shift exercises for Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. 23. The distribution of items for harvest occurred pre-shift, and the work, without justification, was not recorded or compensated by Defendant. 24. Specifically, Defendant failed to record the accurate field arrival time and the start of work of Plaintiffs and members of the Class that occurred prior to scheduled shift start times. 25. Additionally, because Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated workers, began work before it was light out, Plaintiffs needed headlamps to see and harvest the crop. 26. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers acquired, maintained, charged and replaced headlamps and batteries without any reimbursement from Defendant for their expenses. 27. Defendant also did not record or compensate Plaintiffs for the time spent charging, preparing and maintaining their headlamps. 28. Defendant knew or should have known that headlamps were in use as they were clearly visible on their workforce. 29. As a result of their practice of failing to record all hours worked, Defendant, without justification, did not pay wages in keeping with California wage statutes and paid wages below those required by California law and the parties working arrangement. 30. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated regularly worked for a piece rate based on the units of production with an understanding that all nonproductive time would be paid separately. 31. Defendant did not record the hours associated with Plaintiffs’ piece rate activities in violation of California and federal law. 32. Because Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, routinely worked a significant portion of their week, if not the majority of their week, performing piece rate work, the result was a significant under recording of hours worked. 33. As a product of this pay record manipulation, Defendant’s employment records routinely reflect dozens or hundreds of units of production being performed by Plaintiffs and other similarly situated workers, each week, in zero hours. 35. Defendant’s paystubs violated the AWPA’s recordkeeping provisions and California statutory paystub requirements by failing to list the total number of hours worked and the hours associated with piece rate work. 36. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiffs and members of the Class were also suffered and permitted to work for several minutes after the start of and before the end of their thirty (30) minute unpaid meal periods. 37. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant automatically deducted thirty (30) minutes from the daily hour totals of Plaintiffs and members of the Class for meal periods regardless of whether they used, or were permitted, a full thirty minutes for an off-duty meal period. 38. Time spent off-the-clock by Plaintiffs and members of the Class before the scheduled start of their shifts, during their thirty (30) minute unpaid meal periods, and after the scheduled end of their shifts, constitutes hours worked that has gone and continues to go unpaid by Defendant. 39. Plaintiffs and other workers similarly situated were required to report to work Monday through Friday and at times Monday through Saturday, but at times were sent home before being provided at least half of their usual or scheduled day’s work. 40. On occasions when Defendant’s crew leaders and/or supervisors sent workers home after reporting to work but before receiving half of their usual or scheduled day’s work, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and members of the Class reporting time wages of at least half their usual or scheduled day’s work. 41. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant knew, should have known, or otherwise showed willful and reckless disregard for the requirement that Plaintiffs and members of the Class were entitled to receive all meal periods or payment of one additional hour of pay at the regular rate of pay when a meal period was missed, late, or incomplete. 43. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiffs and members of the Class were not paid meal period premium wages for each late, short or missed meal period. 44. On information and belief, Defendant knew, should have known, or otherwise showed willful and reckless disregard for the requirement that Plaintiffs and members of the Class were entitled to receive all rest breaks or payment of one additional hour of pay at the regular rate of pay when a rest break was missed or incomplete, and that they did not receive payment of one additional hour of pay at the regular rate of pay when a rest break was missed or incomplete. 45. Plaintiffs and members of the Class regularly worked in excess of 3.5 hours in a day without being provided an off duty and uninterrupted ten (10) minute rest break, and regularly worked more than six (6) hours in a day without a second ten (10) minute rest break. 46. Defendant did not pay Plaintiffs and other workers similarly situated rest break premium wages for late, short or missed rest breaks. 47. The wage and time recording violations also caused minimum and overtime violations as Defendant failed to accurately record all compensable hours worked underreporting Plaintiffs’ hours and thereby underreporting and underpaying minimum and overtime wages. 48. Defendant Mesa Packing, LLC is a farm labor contractor registered with the state of California although federally unregistered. 49. Defendant Mesa Packing left a space on its paystubs for FLC license but this space was not completed with a license number. 50. Proposed Class. Plaintiffs brings this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following Class: 51. All workers employed by Defendant at work sites in California and compensated, in part, on a piece rate basis or employed during early morning or late evening low-light conditions. 52. There is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the class is ascertainable: 54. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of each class they seek to represent in that they arise from Defendant's failure to conform their wage and hour practices to the requirements of the federal AWPA requirements and regulations, the AWPA working arrangement, and the California Labor Code and the applicable California Wage Order, resulting in injury to Plaintiffs and the other putative class members. 56. Adequacy of Plaintiffs as Class Representatives. Plaintiffs Miguel-Sanchez, Meza- Estrada, and Jiménez-Cruz, can adequately and fairly represent the interests of the Plaintiff Class as defined above because their individual interests are consistent with, not antagonistic to, the interests of the class. Further, Plaintiffs have no actual or potential conflict with any member of the class. 57. Adequacy of Counsel for the Class. Counsel for Plaintiffs possess the requisite resources and ability to prosecute this case as a class action and are experienced labor and employment attorneys who have successfully litigated other cases involving similar issues. 58. Propriety of Class Action Mechanism. Class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of each Class. Defendant has implemented a scheme that is generally applicable to the Plaintiff Class, making it appropriate to issue relief, including injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Plaintiff Class. In particular, the violations of law perpetrated against all Class Members in this case revolve around the application and interpretation of the AWPA working arrangement, AWPA disclosure, and AWPA and state paystubs and wage payment violations. 60. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 7 through 59 of this Complaint by reference as though fully set forth herein. 61. Plaintiffs Miguel-Sanchez, Meza-Estrada, and Jimenez bring Count One against Defendant Mesa Packing for the 2015 to present seasons in which they worked for the Defendant pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1854. This count is brought as a Rule 23 class claim. 62. Defendant intentionally violated the rights of Plaintiffs and others similarly situated under the AWPA by: a. Failing to provide a written disclosure of the terms and conditions of work as required by 29 U.S.C. § 1821(a) and as required by 29 U.S.C. § 1831(a) through operation of Cal. Labor Code 2810.5; b. Providing false and misleading information regarding the terms and conditions of employment, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821(f) and 1831(e); c. Violating the terms of the working arrangement, without just cause, made with Plaintiffs and others similarly situated, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1822(c) and 1832(c); these working arrangements include those terms contained in California Wage Order 14, those posted at the work site; d. Failing to pay wages when due for unpaid hours worked, and for missed or non- compliant meal periods and rest breaks, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1822(a) and 1832(a); and e. Failing to provide workers with accurate, itemized written statements which include the correct number of hours worked, the correct hourly, piece rate, and nonproductive time rates of pay, the correct total pay period earnings, and the correct net pay, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d) and 1831(c). 64. Pursuant to California Labor Code § 2810.5, employers must provide notice to employees of their rate(s) of pay, designated pay day, and the basis of wage payment. As such, Defendant had at the time of Plaintiffs’ seasonal recruitment, and continue to have, an obligation to inform Plaintiffs and others similarly situated of such information, including all applicable piece rate, hourly rate, and nonproductive time rates of pay. 65. The failure by Defendant to provide Plaintiffs and the Class notice of these details regarding compensation operates as a violation of AWPA’s disclosure and working arrangement provisions. 66. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant gave notice to Plaintiffs and, on information and belief, the Class of the kind of work and rates of pay for such work, pursuant to Labor Code § 1695, by posting the rates of pay for each service provided, including the piece rates of pay for piece-rate work, and the hourly rates for hourly work, nonproductive time and rest periods. 67. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant communicated the terms of employment with Plaintiffs by posting the Wage Orders at the job site enumerating specific obligations of the employer with regard to working conditions required by state law, and in particular with regard to: the payment of minimum wages; recordkeeping requirements; provision of meal periods; provision of rest breaks; and application of penalties. 68. Defendant provided false and misleading information regarding the terms and conditions of employment, including failing to disclose that hours were not be recorded for piece rate work, that pre shift preparation time would not be recorded or compensated, and that some equipment would not be provided. 69. For each violation of AWPA, each Plaintiff and class member is entitled to recover his or her actual damages, or up to $500 per violation in statutory damages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1854. Wherefore, Plaintiffs request relief as described herein and below. 71. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), Plaintiffs bring this as a class claim and allege that Defendant’s actions violated their rights and the rights of other similarly situated individuals to receive the minimum wage required by California Law. 72. As described above in paragraph 21 through 33, Defendant did not record portions of Plaintiffs’ and class members’ work day including compensable pre and post shift work, exercise and waiting time. 73. The hours, referenced above, were worked without additional payment. Consequently, those hours were completely uncompensated in violation of California's minimum wage laws. Cal. Labor Code §§ 1182.11-1182.13, 1194, and 1197. 74. As a result of Defendant’s failure to comply with the aforementioned portions of the California Labor Code and Wage Order 14, Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff Class have been deprived of wages due them in amounts to be proven at trial, and are also owed liquidated damages for violations of their right to a minimum wage. 75. Pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 1194(a), Plaintiffs seek to recover the unpaid balance for all uncompensated hours, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Pursuant to Cal. Labor § 1194.2, Plaintiffs also seek to recover liquidated damages. 76. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in paragraphs 7 to 59. 77. Plaintiffs brings this claim pursuant to California Labor Code § 1194 on behalf of themselves and a class of other workers, pursuant to Federal Rule 23(b)(3), and alleges that Defendant has violated California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 14 by failing to accurately record and pay overtime wages for work performed. 79. Specifically, Defendant failed to accurately record and compensate their field laborers for all compensable hours, including pre and post shift activities, waiting time, and piece-rate compensated time as detailed in paragraphs 21 through 24 and 25 through 37. 80. Plaintiffs and a class of others similarly situated did not receive premium pay for all overtime hours worked as a result of the underreporting of hours. 81. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and/or omissions of the Defendant, Plaintiffs and the class have been deprived of overtime wages due and are entitled to recover their unpaid wages. 82. Plaintiffs and the class seek the relief described below, including damages in the amount equal to unpaid overtime hours (at the premium rate), pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 1194. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES IN VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE § 1194 and WAGE ORDER 14 Violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act (“AWPA”) (29 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. – Rule 23 Class Count)

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12. HealthMarkets provides its agents with 3 things that are critical to the sale of HealthMarkets’ insurance packages: Training, Technology and Leads. Training: 13. HealthMarkets provides a full training program that is designed to prepare agents to make sales.1 14. It provides agents with access to HealthMarkets University where agents learn business plan development, receive instructor-led training and receive ongoing coaching and mentorship.2 15. Upon information and belief, the training teaches agents how to place cold calls to consumers. 16. HealthMarkets even provides its insurance agents with call scripts that should be used in order to solicit business from consumers.3 29. On December 6, 2008, Plaintiff registered his cellular telephone number on the DNC in order to avoid receiving unsolicited calls and text messages. 30. Plaintiff uses his cellular phone for personal use only. Plaintiff’s cellular phone number is not associated with a business. 31. On January 2, 2019 at 3:45 PM, Plaintiff received an unsolicited phone call to his cellular phone from Defendant using phone number 720-925-9569. The call was not answered, but a voicemail was left regarding booking an appointment with Lauren Taylor for an insurance quote. 32. After the voicemail was left on his cellular phone, Plaintiff received an autodialed text message from Defendant to his cellular phone using phone number 720-925-9569 on January 2, 2019 at 4:45 PM: 48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 47 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 49. Defendant and/or its agents placed unwanted solicitation calls and/or sent unwanted solicitation text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class. 50. These solicitation phone calls and text messages were sent en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class. 51. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class are each entitled to, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 52. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was willful or knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class. 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 47 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Arising From Calls and Texts Sent by HealthMarkets Agents HealthMarkets is Responsible for the Telemarketing Calls Placed by Its Agents Plaintiff Received Unwanted Autodialed Calls and Text Messages to His Cell Phone Number, Despite Plaintiff Registering His Phone Number on the DNC Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Declements and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed No Consent Class)

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1465A FLATBUSH AVE BROOKLYN, NY 11210 JOEL GOLDSTEIN 244 E 117 LLC, DDEH 311 E. 109 LLC, DDEH 312 E 106 LLC, DDEH 411 E 114 LLC, DDEH 411 E118LLC, DDEH 417E 114ST LLC, DDEH 421 FLSA Minimum Wage Violations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (FLSA Class) 310. The Representative Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the FLSA Class members, incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 311. Defendants’ failure to compensate the Representative Plaintiffs and other members of the FLSA class at the FLSA minimum wage rate of pay violates 29 U.S.C § 206. 312. As a result of the foregoing, the Representative Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants on their own behalf, and on behalf of those FLSA Class Members similarly situated who file written consents to joinder in this action, for all unpaid wages, including minimum wage and overtime wages owed by Defendants to the Representative Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207, together with an award of an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, costs, interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, as provided for under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 313. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful, thus the three year statute of limitations of 29 U.S.C. § 255 applies. Illegal Deductions, New York Labor Law, Article 19 § 193 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2.10(a). (New York Class) 321. The Representative Plaintiffs incorporate in this cause of action each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 322. In violation of the New York Labor Law, Article 19, § 193, Defendants unlawfully deducted wages from the Representative Plaintiffs, including inter alia, deductions by requiring Superintendents to spend their own money on work-related expenses, which further reduced their wages below the required minimum wage, including but not limited to, cellular telephone expenses, supplying their own tools and supplies to complete mandated work, and requiring Representative Plaintiffs and those similarly situated to hire and pay from their own income laborers to assist in performing certain work, including workers to perform their duties while they took time off. 323. As a result of the foregoing, the Representative Plaintiffs seek judgment against Defendants on their own behalf, and on behalf of those New York Class Members similarly situated who file written consents to joinder in this action, for reimbursement of unlawful deductions, as well as liquidated damages, and interest, and such other legal and equitable relief from Defendants’ unlawful and willful conduct as the Court deems just and proper. LLC, DDEH 216 E 118 LLC, DDEH 2171 THIRD LLC, DDEH 291 PLEASANT LLC, DDEH 231 E 117 LLC, DDEH 233 E 111 STREET LLC, DDEH LLC 150 WEST 30TH ST, 2ND FL LLC 1465A FLATBUSH AVE BROOKLYN, NY 11210 NYLL Wage Theft Prevention Act – Failure to Provide Wage Statements (New York Class) 328. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the New York Class members, repeat and re-allege and incorporate each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 329. The NYLL and Wage Theft Prevention Act (“WTPA”) require employers to provide employees with an accurate wage statement each time they are paid. 330. Throughout Plaintiffs’ employment with Defendants, Defendants willfully failed to provide Plaintiffs and the New York Class with wage statements at the end of every pay period that correctly identified the name of the employer; address of employer; rates of pay or basis thereof; regular hourly rate; whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; number of overtime hours worked; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; net wages; and such other information as required by

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12. Allegations concerning each Plaintiff are based on personal knowledge. All other allegations are based on investigation by Plaintiffs’ counsel. 56. Plaintiffs propose a class consisting of: All residents of the United States who are members of the British Airways Executive Club, who purchased a Reward Ticket with frequent flier miles from November 9, 2006 to the present (the “Proposed Class”), and who paid a purported “fuel surcharge” when making the purchase. B. The Class is so Numerous that Individual Joinder is Impractical. 57. According to its 2011 annual report, BA “is the UK’s largest international scheduled airline and one of the world’s leading global premium airlines.” 58. On information and belief, there are at least hundreds of thousands of Executive Club Members within the United States. On information and belief, no fewer than tens of thousands of those Members have redeemed Miles for Reward Tickets and paid the “fuel surcharges” during the relevant time period. C. The Answers to Questions Common to the Proposed Class will Drive the Resolution of this Litigation, and Common Questions Predominate over Individual Questions. 59. The answer to two questions will determine BA’s liability to all (or nearly all) Class Members. -12- 1061826.5 60. Plaintiffs contend that the Contract does not permit BA to impose any charge that is not an “incidental fee[] or tax[] charged by any person or relevant authority or body.” Whether or not the Contract permits such a charge is a legal question that is common to all Class Members, the answer to which would drive resolution of the litigation. If a judge and/or jury were to agree with Plaintiffs, BA would be liable to all Class Members for imposition of its “fuel surcharge.” 61. Plaintiffs also contend that the “fuel surcharge” is not a “fuel surcharge” at all, because it is unrelated to the fluctuating price of worldwide oil; and that even if BA were contractually permitted to impose its own fuel surcharge, such a charge would only be proper if it were based on BA’s actual fuel costs. The issue of whether the “fuel surcharges” are based on BA’s fuel costs presents a question of fact that is common to all Class Members, the answer to which would drive resolution of the litigation. Should a judge and/or jury agree with Plaintiffs on this issue, BA would be liable to all Class Members for imposition of the “fuel surcharges.” 62. Put more broadly, this litigation focuses entirely on whether BA’s conduct was in breach of the Contract, as interpreted under the law of a single jurisdiction. Should a judge and/or jury find BA liable for breach of the Contract, it is a ministerial task to determine damages for Plaintiffs and Class Members because, on information and belief, BA maintains electronic records of the ”fuel surcharges” it assessed against each and every Plaintiff and Class Member. D. Plaintiffs’ Claims are Typical of the Claims of all Class Members. 63. Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, are Executive Club Members. 64. Plaintiffs’ relationship with BA, like the relationship between all Class Members and BA, is governed by the terms of the Contract. 65. Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, redeemed Miles for Reward Tickets. -13- 1061826.5 66. Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, paid a “fuel surcharge” when purchasing their Reward Tickets. 67. If BA is liable to Plaintiffs for the claim enumerated in this Complaint, it also is liable to all Class Members for that claim. E. Plaintiffs and their Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Proposed Class. 68. Plaintiffs will put the interests of the Class Members on equal footing with their own interests, and Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit out of a desire to help all Class Members, not merely out of a desire to recover their own damages. 69. Plaintiffs’ counsel are highly experienced class action litigators who are well- prepared to represent the interests of the Class Members. F. A Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions. 70. BA is a sophisticated party with substantial resources. 71. Each individual Proposed Class Member’s damages are relatively small. On information and belief, relatively few Proposed Class Members will have more than $2000 in damages. 72. Prosecution of this litigation is likely to be expensive. For example, Plaintiffs’ counsel anticipate that to fully analyze BA’s “fuel surcharge” and fuel cost data, expert analysis alone will cost at least tens of thousands of dollars. 73. Given the high cost of litigation, relatively low individual damages, and the fact that an individual litigating against BA would have to hire an expert to perform an analysis regarding BA fuel costs and “fuel surcharges” that would be similar to the analysis required to prove the claims of an entire Class, it would not make economic sense for any (or almost any) Class Member to pursue this litigation as an individual action. -14- 1061826.5 V. A. Proposed Class Definition.

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10. From approximately August 2012 through October 2012, Romero was employed by Defendant as a security guard. 11. Security guards, including Romero, are responsible for (i) patrolling residential premises to prevent and detect signs of intrusion and ensure security of doors, windows, and gates; (ii) answer alarms and investigate disturbances; (iii) monitor and authorize entrance and departure of residents, visitors, and other persons to guard against theft and maintain security of premises; (iv) write reports of daily activities and 4 irregularities, such as equipment or property damage, theft, presence of unauthorized persons, or unusual occurrences; (v) call police or fire departments in cases of emergency, such as fire or presence of unauthorized persons; and (vi) circulate among visitors, residents, and other persons to preserve order and protect property. 12. Security guards, including Romero, regularly work in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 13. Defendant does not pay security guards, including Romero, at one and one- half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven (7) day workweek as required by the FLSA. 14. Instead, Defendant pays security guards, including Romero, at their regular rate (or at some other rate less than one and one-half times their regular rate) for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 15. On information and belief, these same illegal pay practices were applied to all employees of Defendant who were compensated in the same or similar manner to that of Plaintiff. 16. On information and belief, Plaintiff was a nonexempt employee under the guidelines of the FLSA. 5 17. As a nonexempt employee, Plaintiff was legally entitled to be paid at one and one-half times her “regular rate” for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) during each seven (7) day workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). 18. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) at one and one-half times her regular rate. 19. Instead, Defendant paid Plaintiff at her regular rate (or at some other rate less than one and one-half times her regular rate) for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each workweek. 20. As a result, Plaintiff was regularly “shorted” on her paycheck by not being paid at a rate of time and one-half for hours worked in excess of forty (40). 21. In the event that Defendant classified Plaintiff as exempt from overtime, Plaintiff was misclassified, as no proper exemption enumerated within the guidelines of the FLSA excused Defendant from appropriately paying Plaintiff full overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours during each seven (7) day workweek, as is specifically required by the FLSA. 22. Rather, Defendant knowingly, willfully, and with reckless disregard, carried out its illegal pattern and practice of failing to pay Plaintiff proper overtime wages. B. Defendant Failed to Keep Accurate Records of Time Worked. 23. The FLSA requires employers to keep accurate records of hours worked by nonexempt employees. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). 6 24. In addition to the pay violations of the FLSA identified above, Defendant also failed to keep proper time records as required by the FLSA. C. Defendant’s Illegal Actions Were and Are Willful Violations of the FLSA. 25. The illegal pattern or practice on the part of Defendant with respect to compensation and failure to maintain accurate time records are direct violations of the 29. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the facts set forth in the above sections of this Complaint. 30. On information and belief, other employees have been victimized by Defendant’s patterns, practices and policies identified above in violation of the FLSA. 31. These employees are similarly situated to Plaintiff because, during the relevant time period, they held similar positions, were compensated in a similar manner and were denied payment for all hours worked at the minimum wage and overtime wages at a rate of time and one-half for hours worked in excess of forty (40). 7 32. Defendant’s patterns or practices of failing to pay the minimum wage and overtime compensation are generally applicable policies or practices and do not depend on the personal circumstances of the Members of the Class. 33. Since, on information and belief, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the Members of the Class, collective action treatment is appropriate. 34. All employees of Defendant, regardless of their rate of pay, who were not paid at their proper overtime rate for hours worked in excess of forty (40) are similarly situated. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. The Class is therefore properly defined as: All current and former security guards or any other employee who: (1) worked at any business located in the United States that was owned, operated, and/or acquired by Defendant during the class period; (2) claim they were misclassified as exempt from overtime compensation or was an hourly employee and now seek payment for overtime hours worked; and/or (3) were compensated on any basis where they were not properly paid at a rate of time and a half for hours worked in excess of forty (40). 35. Plaintiff has retained counsel well versed in FLSA collective action litigation who is prepared to litigate this matter vigorously on behalf of Plaintiff and any other Members of the Class. 36. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the facts set forth in the above-sections of this Complaint. 8 37. Defendant’s practice of failing to pay its nonexempt employees at the minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime compensation at one and one-half times their regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) is in direct violation of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a). 38. Defendant violated the FLSA as well as the Texas Labor Code by failing to pay Plaintiff her full and proper compensation. 39. Plaintiff is entitled to payment for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in an amount that is one and one-half times her regular rate of pay. 40. Plaintiff is entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to her unpaid regular and overtime wages as a result of Defendant’s failure to comply with the guidelines of the FLSA. 9. Defendant owns and operates a private security company that operates in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. A. Defendant Failed to Properly Compensate Plaintiff for All Hours Worked and at the Rate of Time and One-Half for All Overtime Hours.

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11. Defendants, in a combined effort, jointly dictated, controlled and ratified all of the policies and practices relating to ATE work, timekeeping and compensation. 12. Defendants, in a combined effort, jointly encouraged, required and/or permitted ATEs to work more than 40 hours per week, only paid ATEs for billable hours (i.e. only ATE hours billed to a client) and did not pay ATEs for any hour they worked that was not billed to a client. 14. As part of Defendants’ combined effort to recruit, place and manage ATEs, Defendant Cerner was typically responsible for, and did in fact: a. Conduct orientation and on-boarding activities for ATEs; b. Determine ATE work schedules; c. Approve any ATE schedule changes; d. Instruct and enforce the required dress code for ATEs; e. Resolve issues regarding transportation schedules for ATEs; f. Resolve requests to transfer ATEs from a different (i.e. “quiet”) area to a busier one. g. Conduct calls and meetings with ATEs for various reasons relating to each respective project; and, h. Review, update and circulate transportation schedules and approve of alternative forms of transportation for ATEs; 15. Defendants assigned ATEs to Project Managers, or Team Leads, who served as their first point of management contact. For example, Plaintiff’s Team Lead was Taylor McLaughlin. Other Cerner management personnel included Dimitri Reese. Defendants required ATEs to report to, communicate with, and respond to any requests from their Team Leads and other Cerner management personnel and direct questions to them as needed. Defendants expected ATEs to complete any duties assigned to them by their Team Leads or other Cerner management personnel during the course of the project. 16. Defendants required all ATEs to remain on campus until their scheduled shift concluded unless they received prior approval from their Team Leads or other Cerner management personnel. 18. Defendants typically scheduled ATEs as full-time employees. 19. Under Defendants’ shared guidance, ATEs’ primary duty was to provide first-line troubleshooting relating to the implementation of the software system. For example, Plaintiff was assigned to the radiology units within Hershey Medical Center and was tasked with providing direct interaction with the healthcare organization’s employees to help them use the software. 20. Under Defendants’ shared guidance, ATEs’ other duties included reinforcing training, providing At-The-Elbow support without touching the mouse or keyboard, not teaching the staff any new things or tout better ways elsewhere and not providing any sort of patient care. 21. Under Defendants’ shared guidance, ATEs had little discretion in the performance of their job and worked within closely-prescribed limits provided by Defendants. More complex technical issues were escalated to the next level. 22. Under Defendants’ shared guidance, ATEs’ primary duties: were not related to the management of the business operations of Defendants or their customers, did not require the use of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance, did not involve the performance of work requiring advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning and did not involve work requiring invention, imagination, originality, or talent in a recognized field of artistic or creative endeavor. 24. Despite the fact that ATEs did not meet any test for exemption, Defendants failed to pay ATEs the requisite overtime rate of 1½ times their regular rate for hours worked over 40 per week. Rather, Defendants paid ATEs their regular straight, hourly rate for time worked over 40 hours per week that was recorded by Defendants and nothing for the non-billable work they were encouraged, suffered and permitted to perform. 25. Defendants paid all hours worked, including all hours over 40 per workweek, at a standard straight-time hourly rate of pay. 26. Defendants did not keep accurate time records of all the work ATEs performed on a daily basis. Rather, ATEs were required to record only their scheduled work hours on Defendants’ Paylocity system. 27. Defendants knew that ATEs were routinely working more than 40 hours per week, because they actively encouraged, suffered, permitted and/or directed ATEs to perform such work. 28. Defendants knew that they were not properly compensating ATEs, because these employees’ timesheets clearly indicate that they routinely worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not receiving any wages calculated at an overtime premium rate. 29. Plaintiff brings his FLSA claim on an opt-in, collective basis pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for himself and all people who have worked for Defendants as an ATE, or in any other similarly-titled, hourly-paid position, during the maximum limitations period (the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 31. The FLSA Collective is “similarly situated,” as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), because its members worked under similar terms and conditions, in similar jobs and were subjected to the common policies and practices described herein. 32. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective do not meet any test for exemption under the 35. Plaintiff brings her PMWA claim on an opt-out, class action basis pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 for herself and all people who have worked for Defendants as an ATE, or in any other similarly-titled, hourly-paid position in Pennsylvania during the maximum limitations period without receiving all overtime wages due for all overtime hours they worked (the “PA Class”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 36. Plaintiff is a member of the PA Class because he worked as an hourly-paid ATE in Pennsylvania during the relevant period and was not paid overtime wages due for overtime hours he worked. 37. Class treatment of Plaintiff’s PMWA claim is appropriate because the PA Class satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 38. The PA Class is so numerous that joinder of all its members would be impracticable. Defendants employed over 40 people who fit the PA Class definition, meaning that joining all of their claims would be impracticable. 39. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims belonging to the PA Class. Plaintiff is similarly-situated to the PA Class because he worked for Defendants under the common policies and procedures identified above, and was denied legally-required wages for his work as a result of Defendants’ common course of wrongful conduct. 41. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the PA Class because: there is no apparent conflict of interest between Plaintiff and the PA Class; Plaintiff’s counsel have successfully prosecuted many complex class actions, including state-law wage and hour class actions, and will adequately prosecute these claims; and Plaintiff has adequate financial resources to assure that the interests of the PA Class will not be harmed because her counsel has agreed to advance the costs and expenses of litigation on the Class’ behalf contingent upon the outcome of this litigation consistent with Pa. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(e)(1). 43. Allowing Plaintiff’s PMWA claim to proceed as a class action will be superior to requiring the individual adjudication of each PA Class member’s claim, since requiring more than 100 hourly-paid employees to file and litigate individual wage claims will place an undue burden on the PA Class members, Defendants and the Courts. Class action treatment will allow a large number of similarly-situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expenses if these claims were brought individually. Moreover, as the damages suffered by each PA Class member are relatively small, the expenses and burdens associated with individual litigation would make it prohibitively impractical for them to bring individual claims. Further, the presentation of separate actions by individual PA Class members could create a risk for inconsistent and varying adjudications, establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and/or substantially impair or impede the ability of the PA Class members to protect their interests. 44. Allowing Plaintiff’s claims to proceed in a class action setting is also appropriate because Pennsylvania’s wage laws expressly permit private class action lawsuits to recover unpaid regular and overtime wages. 45. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein. 46. Defendants are “employers” as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 48. The wages Defendants pay to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are “wages” as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 49. Defendants are an “enterprise engaged in commerce” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A). 50. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) expressly allows private plaintiffs to bring collective actions to enforce employers’ failure to comply with the FLSA’s requirements. 51. Throughout the relevant period, Defendants have been obligated to comply with the FLSA’s requirements, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have been covered employees entitled to the FLSA’s protections, and Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have not been exempt from receiving wages required by the FLSA for any reason. 52. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) requires employers to pay their employees an overtime rate, equal to at least 1½ times their regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 53. Defendants have intentionally violated this provision of the FLSA with respect to the FLSA Collective by maintaining common timekeeping and compensation policies and practices that include routinely failing to track the hours the PA Class members actually worked and suffering or permitting Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective to work overtime hours per week without paying them overtime wages for these hours. 54. By engaging in this conduct, Defendants have acted with willful and/or reckless disregard for the FLSA Collective members’ rights under the FLSA. 56. For all the reasons stated above, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are similarly situated individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 57. Each of the preceding paragraphs is incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein. 58. The unpaid wages at issue in this litigation are “Wages” as defined by PMWA § 3(d). 59. Defendants are “Employers” as defined by PMWA § 3(g). 60. Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Class members are “Employees” as defined by PMWA § 3(h). 61. PMWA Section 4(c) requires employers to pay their employees overtime compensation of “not less than one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate” for all hours worked over 40 in a given workweek. Under the PMWA, overtime is calculated based on the number of hours worked in a “workweek”, defined in controlling regulations as “a period of 7 consecutive days”. See 34 Pa. Code § 231.42. 62. PMWA § 8 requires employers to “keep a true and accurate record of the hours worked by each employee and the wages paid to each.” 64. The PMWA does not contain an exemption to the overtime requirements of § 4(c) for any type of computer employee. See PMWA § 333.105. 65. Throughout the relevant period, Defendants were obligated to comply with the PMWA’s requirements, Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Class members were covered employees entitled to the PMWA’s protections, and Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Class members were not exempt from receiving wages required by the PMWA for any reason. 66. Defendants have intentionally violated these provisions of the PMWA by maintaining common timekeeping and compensation policies and practices that include routinely failing to track the hours the PA Class members actually worked and suffering or permitting Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective to work overtime hours per week without paying them overtime wages for these hours 67. By engaging in this conduct, Defendants have acted with willful and/or reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s and the PA Class members’ rights under the PMWA. 68. There is no language in the PMWA, no exception to the PMWA or its enabling Regulations, or any applicable provision elsewhere in Pennsylvania law that permits Defendants to avoid paying Plaintiff and the PA Class for their overtime work, so Defendants have no good faith justification or defense for failing to pay Plaintiff and the PA Class members all wages mandated by the PMWA. 9. Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class and collective are individuals who have worked for Defendants as an ATE, or in any similarly-titled, hourly-paid position during the statutory period. Among other things, ATEs were all paid an hourly rate of pay, shared similar job titles, training, job descriptions and job tasks. VIOLATION OF THE FLSA (For Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective) VIOLATION OF THE PMWA (For Plaintiff and the PA Class)

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15. So Be was adopted from Russia when she was 20 months old after being removed from her natural parents because of their neglect. By the time she was 14, she was diagnosed with Unspecified Mood Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. She also struggled with learning challenges, and was diagnosed with Developmental Disorder of Scholastic Skills and Mathematics Disorder. All of these disorders are recognized by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. 16. These disorders manifested in a variety of ways. So Be developed eating disorders, engaged in suicideation, and was severely depressed. After continued suicideation, So Be’s caregivers recommended that she enroll as an inpatient at a wilderness therapy program. With their advice, Su Be selected New Vision Wilderness Therapy, where So Be was treated between July 5, 2017 and September 1, 2017. Su Be was charged, and paid $29,205 for those medically necessary services. Defendants’ Denial of Coverage 18. Su Be brings this class action on behalf of two classes. The “Comcast Class” is: All persons (a) insured by a certificate of coverage (b) underwritten by Comcast Corporation (c) whose wilderness therapy coverage requests were denied (d) because the applicable health insurance plan specifically excluded wilderness therapy from coverage. 19. The “Magellan Class” is All persons (a) whose self-funded ERISA-regulated health insurance plans were (b) administered by Magellan and (c) whose wilderness therapy coverage requests were denied (d) because the applicable health insurance plan specifically excluded wilderness therapy from coverage. 20. The class period for both classes began six years before the commencement of this action and concludes on the date the classes are certified. 21. The exact number of members of either class is not known, but it is estimated there are at least hundreds of persons in either class. Accordingly, class membership is so numerous that joinder of individual members of the two classes in this action is impracticable. Individual class members are identifiable as the names and addresses of all members of both classes are contained in business records maintained by defendants and may be obtained through discovery. 23. The claims of Su Be are typical of the claims of all members of either class because Defendants employ the same or similar coverage language, and coverage practices, for each and every member of the two classes. The same legal theories are raised for each member of the two classes. 24. Su Be can fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of each member of both classes because she has no conflict of interest in this cause of action with either of the two classes and their membership. Su Be’s interests are perfectly aligned with the members of both classes and Su Be and the members of both classes have a mutual interest in seeking damages and other relief against Defendants. Su Be is represented by competent and experienced class action counsel. 25. This action is maintainable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of either class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 27. Su Be realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-26 as if fully set forth. 28. Su Be’s first legal claim is brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for violations of the Parity Act, which is incorporated into ERISA, at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a. It is brought on her own behalf, and on behalf of the Comcast Class. 29. Under the Parity Act, health insurers must “treat sicknesses of the mind in the same way that they would a broken bone.” New York State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. United Health Grp., 980 F. Supp.2d 527, 542 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 798 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2015). 30. A “treatment limitation” is a limit on either “the scope or duration of treatment.” 29 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(3)(B)(iii). 32. Second, any limitation applied to mental health treatment must be scrutinized by comparing it to the limitations placed on an analogous medical or surgical treatment in the same classification. 45 C.F.R. § 146-136(c)(2)(i)-(ii). 33. Comcast’s health insurance plans exclude from coverage medically necessary services rendered at wilderness therapy programs while expressly covering comparable medically necessary services rendered at skilled nursing facilities and rehabilitation hospitals. 34. This disparate treatment for comparable services results in Comcast being out of parity. This disparate treatment in comparable services violates the federal Parity Act as incorporated into Comcast’s health plans. 35. Su Be realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-26 as if fully set forth. 36. Su Be’s second claim is brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) for violations of the Parity Act, which is incorporated into ERISA, at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a. It is brought on her own behalf, and on behalf of the Magellan Class. 37. Under the Parity Act, health insurers must “treat sicknesses of the mind in the same way that they would a broken bone.” New York State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. United Health Grp., 980 F. Supp.2d 527, 542 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 798 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2015). 39. Regulations promulgated under this statute focus the Court’s analysis in two respects. First, both “quantitative” and “nonquantitative” treatment limitations may run afoul of the Parity Act. 45 C.F.R § 146-136(a). Whereas a quantitative limitation is reduceable to a number, a nonquantitative treatment limitation is any other limitation on the scope or duration of treatment. 45 C.F.R. § 146-136(c)(4)(i). 40. Second, any limitation applied to mental health treatment must be scrutinized by comparing it to the limitations placed on an analogous medical or surgical treatment in the same classification. 45 C.F.R. § 146-136(c)(2)(i)-(ii). 41. Magellan administers health insurance plans that exclude from coverage medically necessary services rendered at wilderness therapy programs while expressly covering comparable medically necessary services rendered at skilled nursing facilities and rehabilitation hospitals. 42. This disparate treatment for comparable services results in Magellan being out of parity and in violation of the federal Parity Act as incorporated into the health plans it administers. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Su Be, and all other persons similarly situated, demands judgment against Defendants, for benefits, damages, interest, costs, attorney’s fees including enhancement of fees, a trial by jury for all issues so triable, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. Insurance coverage promises VIOLATING PARITY ACT PROTECTIONS BROUGHT INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE COMCAST CLASS VIOLATING INCORPORATED PARITY ACT PROTECTIONS BROUGHT INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE MAGELLAN CLASS

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35. The Class is defined as all consumers who purchased the Products anywhere in the United States during the Class Period (the “Class”). 36. Plaintiff also seeks certification, to the extent necessary or appropriate, of a subclass of individuals who purchased the Products in the State of New York at any time during the Class Period (the “New York Subclass”). 37. The Class and New York Subclass shall be referred to collectively throughout the Complaint as the Class. 38. The Class is properly brought and should be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(a), satisfying the class action prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy because: 39. Numerosity: Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of consumers who are Class Members described above who have been damaged by Defendant’s deceptive and misleading practices. 41. Typicality: Plaintiff is a member of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of each Class Member in that every member of the Class was susceptible to the same deceptive, misleading conduct and purchased the Defendant’s Products. Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the same causes of action as the other Class Members. 43. Predominance: Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), common issues of law and fact identified above predominate over any other questions affecting only individual members of the Class. The Class issues fully predominate over any individual issue because no inquiry into individual conduct is necessary; all that is required is a narrow focus on Defendant's deceptive and misleading marketing and labeling practices. 45. Accordingly, this Class is properly brought and should be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) because questions of law or fact common to Class Members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy. 49. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. New York General Business Law Section 349 (“GBL § 349”) declares unlawful “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state . . .” 51. The conduct of Defendant alleged herein constitutes recurring, “unlawful” deceptive acts and practices in violation of GBL § 349, and as such, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members seek monetary damages and the entry of preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against Defendant, enjoining them from inaccurately describing, labeling, marketing, and promoting the Products. 52. There is no adequate remedy at law. 54. Defendant’s improper consumer-oriented conduct—including labeling and advertising the Products as being “Certified Natural” and/or “Natural” —is misleading in a material way in that it, inter alia, induced Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members to purchase and pay a premium for Defendant’s Products and to use the Products when they otherwise would not have. Defendant made their untrue and/or misleading statements and representations willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the truth. 55. Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members have been injured inasmuch as they paid a premium for products that were—contrary to Defendant’s representations— not “Certified Natural” and/or “Natural”. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members received less than what they bargained and/or paid for. 56. Defendant’s advertising and Products’ packaging and labeling induced the Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members to buy Defendant’s Products and to pay a premium price for them. 57. Defendant’s deceptive and misleading practices constitute a deceptive act and practice in the conduct of business in violation of New York General Business Law §349(a) and Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members have been damaged thereby. 59. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350 provides, in part, as follows: False advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is hereby declared unlawful. 61. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350a(1) provides, in part, as follows: The term ‘false advertising, including labeling, of a commodity, or of the kind, character, terms or conditions of any employment opportunity if such advertising is misleading in a material respect. In determining whether any advertising is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations made by statement, word, design, device, sound or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations with respect to the commodity or employment to which the advertising relates under the conditions proscribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual . . . 62. Defendant’s labeling and advertisements contain untrue and materially misleading statements concerning Defendant’s Products inasmuch as they misrepresent that the Products are “Certified Natural” and/or “Natural”. 64. Defendant’s advertising, packaging and products’ labeling induced the Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members to buy Defendant’s Products. 65. Defendant made their untrue and/or misleading statements and representations willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the truth. 66. Defendant’s conduct constitutes multiple, separate violations of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350. 67. Defendant made the material misrepresentations described in this Complaint in Defendant’s advertising, and on the Products’ packaging and labeling. 68. Defendant’s material misrepresentations were substantially uniform in content, presentation, and impact upon consumers at large. Moreover, all consumers purchasing the Products were and continue to be exposed to Defendant’s material misrepresentations. 69. As a result of Defendant’s recurring, “unlawful” deceptive acts and practices, Plaintiff and New York Subclass Members are entitled to monetary, compensatory, treble and punitive damages, injunctive relief, restitution and disgorgement of all moneys obtained by means of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Plaintiff and Class Members have been injured as a result of Defendant’s violations of the following state consumer protection statutes, which also provide a basis for redress to Plaintiff and Class Members based on Defendant’s fraudulent, deceptive, unfair and unconscionable acts, practices and conduct. 73. Defendant violated the aforementioned states’ unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws by representing that the Products are “Certified Natural” and/or “Natural”. 74. Contrary to Defendant’s representations, the Products are not “Certified Natural” and/or “Natural”. 75. Defendant’s misrepresentations were material to Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ decision to pay a premium for the Products. 76. Defendant made their untrue and/or misleading statements and representations willfully, wantonly, and with reckless disregard for the truth. 77. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the aforementioned states’ unfair and deceptive practices laws, Plaintiff and Class Members paid a premium for the Products. 78. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Defendant has been unjustly enriched. 80. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 81. Defendant provided the Plaintiff and Class Members with an express warranty in the form of written affirmations of fact promising and representing that the Products are “Certified Natural” and/or “Natural”. 82. The above affirmations of fact were not couched as “belief” or “opinion,” and were not “generalized statements of quality not capable of proof or disproof.” 83. These affirmations of fact became part of the basis for the bargain and were material to the Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ transactions. 84. Plaintiff and Class Members reasonably relied upon the Defendant’s affirmations of fact and justifiably acted in ignorance of the material facts omitted or concealed when they decided to buy Defendant’s Products. 85. Within a reasonable time after they knew or should have known of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and Class Members, placed Defendant on notice of their breach, giving Defendant an opportunity to cure their breach, which they refused to do. 87. Defendant thereby breached the following state warranty laws: a. Code of Ala. § 7-2-313; b. Alaska Stat. § 45.02.313; c. 89. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 90. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of all members of the Class. Upon certification, the Class will consist of more than 100 named Plaintiffs. 92. The Products are “consumer products” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 93. Plaintiff and other members of the Class are “consumers” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 94. Defendant is “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the Magnuson- Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(4) & 2301(5). 95. Defendant represented in writing that the Products are “Certified Natural” and/or “Natural”. 96. These statements were made in connection with the sale of the Products and relate to the nature of the Products and affirm and promise that the Products are as represented and defect free and, as such, are “written warranties” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A). 97. As alleged herein, Defendant breached the written warranty by selling consumers Products that are not “Certified Natural” and/or “Natural”. BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTIBILITY (On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members) BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY (On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GBL § 349 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass Members) VIOLATION OF NEW YORK GBL § 350 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members) VIOLATION OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES (On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members) VIOLATION OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members)

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29. As is apparent on the face of the text messages, the messages advertise the commercial availability of Defendant’s property, goods, and/or services and encourage the future purchase or investment in property, goods, and/or services. 30. Plaintiff received the subject text in Miami-Dade County, which is within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages identical to the one above to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district and throughout the United States. 32. The Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7119 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 7119 Number. 33. The 7119 Number has been on the National Do Not Call Registry since December 15, 2004. 34. The 7119 Number begins with area code 305. Thus, Defendant knew or should have known that it was transmitting a text message to an individual located in Florida prior to transmitting the message. 35. The source of each of the unsolicited SMS text messages sent by Defendant to the 7119 Number was 774-53, which is an SMS short code owned or leased by or on behalf of Defendant or Defendant’s agent(s) or affiliate(s), and is used for operating Defendant’s text message campaigns, including the sending of SMS text messages telemarketing and advertising various of Defendant’s goods and services. 37. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 38. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers. 39. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order. 41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers. 42. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention. 43. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 45. The above execution of Defendant’s instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 46. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention: 48. Defendant’s text messages took up memory space on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, with each message taking up approximately 190 bytes. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. 49. Defendant’s text messages also caused the depletion of Plaintiff’s cellular telephone battery. The battery used to power Plaintiff’s cellular telephone can only be recharged a limited number of times before the battery’s voltage begins to decrease, causing the cellular phone to turn off completely, without warning, if the battery drops below the minimum voltage needed to safely power Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 50. Plaintiff has no reason to believe, that absent a Court order, that Defendant would voluntarily stop violating the TCPA. 52. Excluded from the Class is Defendant, any entity in which the Defendant has a controlling interest, or which has a controlling interest in the Defendant, and any of Defendant’s legal representatives, assigns or successors. Also excluded is any judge presiding over this case and any member of any such judge’s immediate family. Members of the Class are referred to as “Class Members.” 53. Plaintiff and all Class Members have been impacted and harmed by the acts of Defendant and/or its agents, affiliates or subsidiaries. 54. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages on behalf of herself and the Class. 55. This action may properly be brought and maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This class action satisfies the numerosity, typicality, adequacy, commonality, predominance and superiority requirements. 56. Upon application by Plaintiff’s counsel for certification of the Class, the Court may also be requested to utilize and certify subclasses in the interests of manageability, justice, and/or judicial economy. 57. Numerosity. The number of persons within the Class is substantial, believed to amount to thousands of persons dispersed throughout the United States. It is therefore impracticable to join each member of the Class as a named plaintiff. Further, the size and relatively modest value of the claims of the individual members of the Class renders joinder impracticable. Accordingly, utilization of the class action mechanism is the most economically feasible means of determining and adjudicating the merits of this litigation. 59. Adequacy. As Class representative, Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to, or conflict with, the interests of the absent Class Members and is able to fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members. Plaintiff has raised viable claims of the type reasonably expected to be raised by the Class Members and will vigorously pursue those claims. If necessary, Plaintiff may seek leave to amend this Complaint to add additional representatives of the Class or assert additional claims. 60. Competency of Class Counsel. Plaintiff has retained and is represented by experienced, qualified and competent counsel committed to prosecuting this action. These lawyers are experienced in handling complex class action claims, including class actions alleging violations of the TCPA, and have previously been appointed as class counsel in such cases. 63. Additionally, the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members may create a risk of multiple adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class who are not parties to such adjudications, thereby substantially impairing or impeding the ability of such nonparty Class Members to protect their interests. The prosecution of individual actions by Class Members could further establish inconsistent results and/or establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. 64. Defendant and/or any of its affiliates, subsidiaries, or agents have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class appropriate. 65. Moreover, on information and belief, the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 66. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 68. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. at § 227(a)(1). 69. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to store telephone numbers, using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers and/or to dial numbers from a list automatically, without human intervention, to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 70. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express written consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 71. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. 72. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. 74. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 65 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 75. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 76. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.” 77. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 78. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 80. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 81. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class) Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

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13. Plaintiff has never purchased an item from Defendant, inquired about Defendant’s products, provided his contact information to Defendant, or visited Defendant’s website. 15. At the time Plaintiff received these calls and messages, Plaintiff was the subscriber and/or sole user of the 9996 Number. 16. Plaintiff primarily uses the 9996 Number as a personal phone. 17. The 9996 Number has been registered with the National Do Not Call Registry since February 20, 2007. 18. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing, advertising, or solicitations because they promote Defendant’s business, goods and services. 19. Plaintiff has never inquired about or purchased any of Defendant’s goods or services. 20. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant (1) with his contact information, (2) with the 9996 Number, (3) with his prior express consent to be contacted with text messages sent using an ATDS, or (4) with his prior express written consent to be contacted by telemarketing text messages sent using an ATDS. 21. As demonstrated above, Plaintiff requested multiple times that Defendant stop contacting the 9996 Number using the “stop” key word provided in the text messages. 22. Notwithstanding, Plaintiff continued to receive unsolicited text messages from Defendant. 24. The failure to stop calling is indicative of Defendant’s failure to implement a written policy for maintaining a do-not-call list and to train its personnel engaged in telemarketing on the existence and use of the do-not-call-list. 25. An ATDS was used to send the text messages to the 9996 Number. 26. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text messages demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. The text messages include no personal identifiers and are formatted in a generic manner. 27. The text messages also include instructions on how to respond in manner that the ATDS will understand. As an example, the text message contains the key words “help” and “stop” as responses. 29. A short code is a standard 5-digit code that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 31. Upon information and belief, to place the text messages, Defendant used a software suite (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit bulk SMS text messages. Systems like the Platform utilized by Defendant have the capacity to transmit thousands of texts messages per second and are technologically more sophisticated in their availability to transmit messages than a traditional smartphone. 32. The Platform utilized by Defendant is an ATDS because it has the capacity to (1) store telephone numbers; (2) using a random or sequential number generator. 33. The Platform utilized by Defendant is also an ATDS because it has the capacity to (1) produce telephone numbers; (2) using a random or sequential number generator. 34. For example, the Platform has the capacity to indefinitely store telephone numbers within a computer database for subsequent dialing. 36. A packet in the context of SMS transmission is an envelope of data that contains various instructions and content, including the target cellular telephone number to be dialed, the sequence in which to dial each number, and wording of the message. The following is an example of a typical SMS packet: SubmitReq:StatusReportReq=true,Destination=0011166500313,Sequence=35722 139,Originator=91157,OriginatorType=3,Body=3:2e:0a11:2f14:2f11:0aDEBIT(p) $1:2e47:0aCHKCARDFOUTSETCROBERTIDUS:0aFornexttransaction:3aReply N:0aForprevious:3aReplyP,BillingRef=,ClientRef=41883049- 1,ProfileId=31174,Operator=31003,Tariff=0,Tag- Program=stdrt,TagChClientID=31174,TagChUsername=corvette_31174,ServiceI d=51437,Interface=xml, 37. In the context of SMS packet creation, the Platform utilizes a random and/or sequential number generator to pull and generate telephone numbers from a list of numbers and transfer those numbers to a separate list for the creation of the packets, and ultimately placement into each independent SMS packet. 38. In the context of dialing the numbers, the Platform utilizes a random and/or sequential number generator to pick and designate the sequence in which to dial the telephone numbers. The Platform independently selects the rate and time at which to dial each telephone numbers and may temporarily store the packets in a queue when the volume exceeds capacity to deliver them. 39. The Platform also has the capacity to use its random and/or sequential number generator to generate random or sequential identification numbers that it assigns to each SMS packet. 41. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 42. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Class defined as follows: ATDS CLASS: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action: (1) Defendant, or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, (2) transmitted a text message; (3) using the same type of equipment used to text message Plaintiff; (4) to said person’s cellular telephone number; (5) where the purpose of the text message was to encourage the purchase or rental of, or investment in, Defendant’s property, goods, or services. DO NOT CALL CLASS: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) Defendant, or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, (2) placed more than one text message call within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number that had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, Defendant’s property, goods, or services; (5) who did not purchase or transact business with Defendant during the eighteen (18) months immediately preceding the date of the first message; and (6) who did not contact Defendant during the three (3) months immediately preceding the date of the first message with an inquiry about a product, good, or service offered by Defendant. Internal Do Not Call Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, (1) Defendant, or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, (2) placed a text message call, (3) for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, Defendant’s property, goods, or services, (4) to said person’s residential telephone number, (5) after the person had requested to Defendant to not receive any more telephonic communications from Defendant. 43. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 48. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 54. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 55. It is also a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “initiate any telephone call…using an automatic telephone dialing system…To any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.” 47 C.F.R. § 56. Additionally, it is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “[i]nitiate, or cause to be initiated, any telephone call that includes or introduces an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing, using an automatic telephone dialing system…other than a call made with the prior express written consent of the called party or the prior express consent of the called party when the call is made …” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). 58. Defendant used an ATDS to make non-emergency telemarketing calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 59. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express written consent from the called party to make such calls. 60. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express written consent to call the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 61. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a) of the TCPA by using an ATDS to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 62. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew, or should have known, that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 63. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. 64.1200(a)(1)(iii). 72. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-51 as if fully set forth herein. 73. In pertinent part, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) provides: No person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity. The procedures instituted must meet the following minimum standards: (1) Written policy. Persons or entities making calls for telemarketing purposes must have a written policy, available upon demand, for maintaining a do-not-call list. (2) Training of personnel engaged in telemarketing. Personnel engaged in any aspect of telemarketing must be informed and trained in the existence and use of the do-not-call list. 74. Under 47 C.F.R § 64.1200(e), the rules set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers. 75. Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members made requests to Defendant not to receive future calls on their cellular telephone numbers from Defendant. 77. Defendant’s refusal to honor opt-out requests is indicative of Defendant’s failure to implement a written policy for maintaining a do-not-call list and to train its personnel engaged in telemarketing on the existence and use of the do-not-call-list. 78. Thus, Defendant has violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). 79. Pursuant to section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every negligent violation. 80. As a result of Defendant’s knowing or willful conduct, Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages per violation. 81. Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant’s illegal conduct in the future, pursuant to section 227(c)(5). PROPOSED CLASS Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the ATDS Class)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s retail stores. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail stores and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical retail stores locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the locations and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical retail stores on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to purchase items and to view the items. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . their title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s retail stores locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 45. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s retail stores are places of public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s retail stores. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and constitutes a sales establishment and places of public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub- Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 71. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and places of public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 72. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 74. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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25. Defendant is a dental benefits provider and administrator. 26. Defendant’s dental benefits business includes dental plans for individuals, private employers, and families. 27. Defendant also operates as a dental benefits administrator that provides Medicaid, Medicare, long term care, and children's health insurance plans and programs to state agencies and managed care organizations. 28. Defendant provides services to approximately 4 million children and adults throughout the United States. 30. One such unsolicited telemarketing text was sent to Plaintiff, who has never had any type of relationship with Defendant. 31. Specifically, on November 25, 2016, Defendant caused the following automated text message to be sent to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 5940 (the “5940 Number”): 31. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 33. The telephone number identified in the text message (1-800-281-9724) belongs and is operated by Defendant. 33. “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)). 34. Plaintiff received the subject text within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 34. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 35. Plaintiff never provided her telephone number to Defendant. 35. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained consent from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 36. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 36. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their consent. 37. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 5940 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 5940 Number. 37. Defendant knew or should have known that it did not have consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 38. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 39. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text message at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. 40. Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16-2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Every call uses some of the phone owner's time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”). 41. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 42. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, received a telephone call or text message made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, not for emergency purposes and without the recipient’s prior express consent. 46. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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21. Defendant is a restaurant that operates its restaurant as well as the Website to the public. The restaurant is located at 144 Second Avenue, New York, New York. Defendant’s restaurant constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s restaurant provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to find information about the restaurant location and hours, food, to inquire about pricing and other products available online and in the restaurant for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by the Defendant. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s restaurant. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s restaurant and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in February 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information on the location and hours of the restaurant, food, inquiries about pricing and other products available online and in the restaurant for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical location, and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical restaurant on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the location to purchase a meal. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . their title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently locate Defendant’s restaurant’s locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s restaurant is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s restaurant. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical location is located in the State of New York and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with this physical location. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 72. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical location in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 73. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 74. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendant owns, operate and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Breach of Implied Warranty In Violation Of Cal. Comm. Code § 2314) (Breach of Express Warranty In Violation Of Cal. Comm. Code § 2313) Plaintiff incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each of the paragraphs set forth above. Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page20 of 33 21 (Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq) (Violations of Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.) Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page24 of 33 25 (Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq.) Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. (Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.) Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 21. Apple designs both the hardware component of the Apple Devices as well as the operating system (the iOS) that runs each device 22. The iPhone is the most popular of the three devices. For example, in 2011 and 2012, Apple sold 72 million and 125 million iPhones respectively. Apple sold approximately 11 million and 8 million iPods touches and 32 million and 58 million iPads in the same time period. 23. The iPod touch is a portable digital music and media player based on Apple’s proprietary iOS and includes a multi-touch interface and the App Store. 24. The iPhone combines a mobile phone, an iPod touch, and an internet communication device into a single hand-held product. The iPhone is therefore more than simply Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page7 of 33 8 a phone and Apple’s marketing of the iPhone has focused not on its ability to make phone calls, but on the availability and utility of third-party apps. Indeed, since the launch of the App Store, Apple’s Annual Reports to shareholders have cautioned that “[t]he Company believes decisions by customers to purchase its hardware products depend in part on the availability of third-party software applications and services for the Company’s products…with respect to iOS devices, the Company relies on the continued availability and development of compelling and innovative software applications, which are distributed through a single distribution channel, the App Store.” 25. The iPad is a multi-purpose mobile device. Like the iPhone and the iPod touch, the iPad is based on the Company’s multi-touch technology and comes installed with the App Store. The iPhone, iPod touch and the iPad share many of the same apps. 26. The price of each Apple Device depends on the available memory on the device measured in gigabytes (GB). Apple sells a locked iPhone starting at $199 for a 16GB phone, $299 for a 32GB phone, and $399 for a 64GB phone. 27. Thus, Apple sells additional memory at a premium, telling consumers, “[t]he more gigabytes you have, the more content you can store on your iPhone – apps, photos, HD videos, music, movies and more.” 28. Similarly, Apple charges a premium for additional space on the iPad: $499 for the 16GB iPad, $599 for the 32GB iPad, and $699 for the 64GB iPad. As with the iPhone, Apple encourages consumers to purchase an iPad with a larger capacity. 29. Finally, the iPod touch is priced at $199 for 16GB, $299 for 32GB and $399 for 47. Apple is headquartered in Cupertino, California. 48. Apple does substantial business in California, with a significant portion of the proposed Nationwide Class located in California. 49. Plaintiffs injuries were caused by Apple's wrongful conduct in false advertising that originated in California. Apple's misleading marketing, promotional activities and literature were coordinated at, emanate from and are developed at its California headquarters, and all critical decisions regarding marketing and advertising were made within the State of California. 50. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all persons similarly situated pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3). The proposed class is both ascertainable and shares a well-defined community of interest in common questions of law and fact. Furthermore, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance and superiority requirements. The Class is defined as follows: All persons and entities who purchased in the United States an Apple Device for their own use and not for resale, which uses utilizes Apple’s iOS operating systems 6.0, 6.1.3, 7.0, or 7.0.3. Excluded from the Class are (1) Defendant; (2) any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest; (3) Defendant’s officers, directors, and employees; (4) Defendant’s legal Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page17 of 33 18 representatives, successors, and assigns; and (5) the Court to which this case is assigned. 51. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of Class members because such information is in the exclusive control of Defendant. However, Plaintiff believes that Class members are sufficiently numerous, most likely in the millions of purchasers, and geographically dispersed throughout the nation, and that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. The information as to the identity of the Class members can be substantially determined from records maintained by Defendant and its agents such as sales records, registration records, warranty agreements, warranty claim records, and public notification. 52. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of, and not antagonistic to, the claims of the other Class members because Plaintiff is an iPhone and iPad owner and by asserting her claims, she will also advance the claims of all members of the Class who were damaged by the same wrongful conduct of Apple as alleged herein, and the relief sought is common to the Class. 53. The common legal and factual questions which do not vary from Class member to Class member as to the Apple Devices, and which may be determined without reference to individual circumstances of any Class member include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the Apple Maps App contains a design defect; b. Whether the Apple Maps App is a manufacturing defect; c. Whether the Apple Devices are susceptible to malfunction as a result of such defect(s); d. Whether Apple has breached its express written warranty; e. Whether Apple has breached an express written warranty based on representations it made in marketing materials; f. Whether Apple has breached the implied warranty of merchantability; Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page18 of 33 19 g. Whether Apple’s marketing and descriptions of the Apple Devices were likely to deceive a reasonable consumer; h. Whether Apple knew or should have known that the Apple Devices were vulnerable to malfunctions; i. Whether Apple had a duty to Plaintiff and the Class to disclose the true nature of the Apple Devices’ mapping defects; j. Whether the facts withheld by Apple from Plaintiff and the Class would be material to a reasonable person; k. Whether Apple engaged in unfair competition when it represented that the Apple Devices and Map Apps had characteristics that it does not actually have; l. Whether the Apple Devices fail to perform in accordance with the reasonable expectations of ordinary consumers; m. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to compensatory damages, and the amount of such damages; and n. Whether Apple should be ordered to make full restitution to Plaintiff and members of the Class, as well as injunctive relief. 54. These common questions and others predominate over questions, if any, that affect only individual members of the Class. 55. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class. There are no material conflicts with any other member of the Class that would make class certification inappropriate. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class actions, including complex cases and consumer actions, and Plaintiff will prosecute this action vigorously. Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page19 of 33 20 56. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual litigation of the claims of all Class members is impracticable. Even if every Class member could afford individual litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome on the courts if individual litigation of numerous cases would proceed. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action, with respect to some or all of the issues presented in this Complaint, presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system, and protects the rights of each Class member. 57. Prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant, and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same complex factual issues. 58. Injunctive relief is appropriate as to the Class as a whole because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class. 59. Whatever difficulties may exist in the management of the class action will be greatly outweighed by the benefits of the class action procedure, including, but not limited to, providing Class members with a method for the redress of claims that may not otherwise warrant individual litigation. 60. Defendant Apple issued written warranties to Plaintiff and the Class wherein Defendant warranted that its Apple Devices were free of defects in materials and workmanship. 61. In addition, Plaintiff was exposed to representations made by Apple in its marketing materials regarding iOS 6 and Apple Maps, e.g., keynote address from Apple Executive touting the new iOS 6 as a “major initiative” and persistent encouragement by Apple to stick with its products because “the more our customers use our Maps the better it will get.” September 28, 2012 Letter from Apple CEO, Tim Cook. 62. In fact, the Apple Devices at issue are not fit for its advertised purpose of providing a product that contains a Map function which accurately directs the user to the desired destination, accurately depicts landmarks, etc. Despite CEO Cook’s September 28, 2012 letter promising improvements, the Huffington Post and several other media outlets reported just weeks ago that Apple Maps directed users across an airport runway.15 63. Apple has had actual notice of the Apple Maps defects by virtue of the media coverage of the problems (e.g. – The New York Times, Fortune, Wall Street Journal), including the hundreds of messages posted on technology websites such as MarketWatch.com, and Gizmodo.com, and by virtue of the filing of this lawsuit. Additionally, as unsophisticated consumers, Plaintiff and the Class are relieved of any notice requirement, and Apple, who has superior knowledge of its technology, is estopped from asserting lack of notice as a defense. In addition, on September 26, 2013, Plaintiffs’ counsel provided separate written notice of the faulty Apple Maps to Apple, Inc. 15 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/25/apple-maps-bad_n_3990340.html Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page21 of 33 22 64. Defendant has breached its warranty obligations by not agreeing to refund the purchase price of the Apple Devices to dissatisfied customers and not agreeing to replace without charge all flawed Apple Maps applications. 65. Defendant’s breach of the warranty was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff and the Class to suffer economic losses and other general, consequential and specific damages, according to proof. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class pray for relief as set forth below. 66. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each of the paragraphs set forth above. 67. Defendant had direct dealings with Plaintiff and the Class through its vast marketing efforts. As a result of their direct dealings with Defendant, Plaintiff and the Class purchased Apple Devices from Apple and/or Apple-authorized retailers. Notwithstanding this, privity is not required because Plaintiff and the Class are the intended beneficiaries of Defendant’s implied warranties. 68. By operation of Cal. Com. Code § 2314, Defendant impliedly warranted that its devices are merchantable, fit for its ordinary purpose, and free of defects. 69. In fact, the devices are not in merchantable condition because the Map application is defective as described above. The iPhone 4 cannot perform its ordinary purpose because Apple Maps does not accurately direct the user to the desired destination, does not accurately depict landmarks, etc., when used in the ordinary course and for the ordinary purpose for which devices were sold. Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page22 of 33 23 70. Defendant breached the warranties by undertaking the wrongful acts herein alleged. The Apple Devices and, specifically, the pre-installed Apple Maps are substantially likely to malfunction before the end of their useful life. 71. As a result of Defendant’s breach of the warranty, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered economic losses and other general, consequential and specific damages, including the amount paid for their defective Apple Devices, according to proof. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class pray for relief as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each of the paragraphs set forth above. 73. Plaintiff and Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Act. 74. Defendant is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the Magnuson- Moss Act. 75. The Apple Devices are a “consumer product” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Act. 76. Defendant’s written affirmations of fact, promises and/or descriptions as alleged herein are each a “written warranty” as to the Apple Maps functionality and accurate performance and/or there exists an implied warranty for the sale of such products within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Act. Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page23 of 33 24 77. For the reasons detailed above, Defendant breached these express and implied warranties, as the Apple Devices did not perform as Defendant represented or were not fit for their ordinary use. Defendant Apple has refused to remedy such breaches, and its conduct caused damages to Plaintiff and member of the Class. 78. The amount in controversy of Plaintiff’s individual claims meets or exceeds the sum of $25. The amount in controversy of this action meets or exceeds the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit. 79. As Defendant has refused all previous requests, resorting to any informal dispute procedure and/or affording Defendant another opportunity to cure these breaches of warranties is unnecessary and/or futile. Any remedies available through any informal dispute settlement procedure would be inadequate under the circumstances. Any requirement under the Magnuson- Moss Act or otherwise that Plaintiff resorts to any informal dispute settlement procedure and/or afford Defendant a reasonable opportunity to cure the breach of warranties described above is excused and/or has been satisfied. 80. Plaintiff seeks to revoke her acceptance of the defective Apple Devices, or, in the alternative, seek all damages, including diminution in value of her Apple Devices in an amount to be proven at trial. Class members are entitled to recover damages, specific performance, costs, attorneys’ fees, rescission, and/or other relief as is deemed appropriate. 81. In violation of Civil Code, §1750, et seq., Apple has engaged and is engaging in unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the course of transactions with Plaintiff, and such transactions are intended to and have resulted in sales of any merchandise. 82. In violation of the CLRA, Apple has engaged, and is engaging, in unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the course of transaction with Plaintiff, and such transactions are intended to and have resulted in the sale of goods to consumers. 83. Plaintiff and members of the Class are consumers as that term is used in the CLRA Act because they sought or acquired Apple’s goods (the Apple Devices) for personal, family, or household purposes. Apple’s past and ongoing acts and practices include but are not limited to: Apple’s representations that its goods were of a particular standard, quality, and grade, when in fact, they were of another, in violation of Civil Code, §1770(a)(7). 84. Specifically, as described herein, Apple has made the following representations, expressly or by implication to Plaintiff and other members of the Class about the Apple Devices: (i) that Apple designed the Apple Devices to safely and reliably download and update its apps, (ii) that the App Store does not permit apps that violate its developer guidelines to be sold or to be made available for free through the App Store, (iii) that “Apple takes precautions – including administrative, technical, and physical measures – to safeguard [purchaser’s] personal safety,” and, (iv) that Apple Maps will improve as more consumers use it. 85. These representations were materially misleading. 86. Plaintiff and members of the Class would not have purchased the Apple Devices and/or would not have paid as much for them if Apple disclosed that the above representations were false and if there were aware that Apple Maps would not provide public transit directions, would mislabel restaurants, landmarks, streets, etc., and provide inaccurate directions. Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page25 of 33 26 87. Apple’s violations of the CLRA have caused damage to Plaintiff and the other Class members and threaten additional injury if the violations continue. This damage includes the injuries and losses set forth above. 88. Under §1782 of the CLRA, Apple has received notice in writing by certified mail of the particular violations of §1770 of the CLRA from Plaintiff on behalf of all Class members, demanding Defendant offer to resolve the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers of the intent to so act. 89. Thirty days have passed since Plaintiff sent the CLRA letter, registered mail return receipt requested, and Apple has failed to take the actions required by the CLRA on behalf of all affected consumers. Plaintiff and the Class are therefore entitled to all forms of relief provided under § 1780 of the CLRA. 90. Based on its knowledge or reckless disregard of the facts as detailed herein, Apple was guilty of acting with malice, oppression or fraud. 91. Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of Apple’s violation of California Business & Professions Code §17500, et seq. 92. Apple’s acts and practices as described herein have deceived and/or are likely to deceive members of the Class and the public. Apple has repeatedly advertised that its products were safe and secure. Apple has furthered assured consumers that it closely monitors the apps Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page26 of 33 27 available in the App Store. Instead, Apple has left its customers vulnerable to all hazards which result from inaccurate directions, and flawed maps. 93. By its actions, Apple is disseminating uniform advertising concerning its products and services, which by its nature is unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading within the meaning of California Business & Professions Code §17500, et seq. Such advertisements are likely to deceive, and continue to deceive, the consuming public for the reasons detailed above. 94. The above-described false, misleading, and deceptive advertising Apple disseminated continues to have a likelihood to deceive in that Apple has failed to disclose that its mapping application does not provide public transit directions, mislabels restaurants, landmarks, streets, etc., and provides inaccurate directions. 95. In making and disseminating the statements alleged herein, Apple should have known its advertisements were untrue and misleading in violation of California Business & Professions Code §17500, et seq. Plaintiff and members of the Class based their decisions to purchase the Apple Device in substantial part on Apple’s misrepresentations and omitted material facts. The revenues to Apple attributable to products sold in those false and misleading advertisements amount to millions of dollars. Plaintiff and the Class were injured in fact and lost money or property as a result. 96. The misrepresentations and non-disclosures by Apple of the material facts detailed above constitute false and misleading advertising and therefore constitute a violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17500, et seq. 97. As a result of Apple’s wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class request that this Court enjoin Apple from continuing to violate California Business & Professions Code § 17500, et seq. Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page27 of 33 28 98. In violation of California Business and Professions Code, §17200 et seq., (“Unfair Competition Law”). Apple’s conduct in this regard is ongoing and includes, but is not limited to, statements made by Apple and Apple’s omissions, including as set forth above. 99. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and on behalf of each member of the Class, seeks restitution, injunctive relief, and other relief allowed under the Unfair Competition Law. 100. Apple’s business acts and practices are unlawful, in part, because they violate California Business and Professional Code, §1750, et seq., which prohibits false advertising, in that they were untrue and misleading statements relating to Apple’s provision of goods and with the intent to induce consumers to enter into obligations relating to such goods, and regarding which statements Apple knew, or which by exercising reasonable care should have known, were untrue and misleading. 101. Apple’s business acts and practices are also unlawful in that, as set forth herein, they violate the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code, §1750, et seq. 102. Plaintiff reserves the right to identify additional provisions of the law violated by Apple as further investigation and discovery warrants. 103. Apple is therefore in violation of the unlawful prong of the Unfair Competition Law. 104. Apple’s business acts and practices are also unfair because they have caused harm and injury-in-fact to Plaintiff and members of the Class and for which Apple has no justification Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page28 of 33 29 other than to increase, beyond what Apple would have otherwise realized, its market share and revenue from sale of the Apple Devices. 105. Apple’s conduct lacks reasonable and legitimate justification in that it has benefited from such conduct and practices while Plaintiff and members of the Class have been misled as to the nature and integrity of the Apple Devices and have lost money, including the purchase price of the Apple Device and/or the difference of the inflated price and the price Apple should have charged for a product that fully disclosed the true nature of the Apple Devices. 106. Apple’s conduct offends California public policy, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and/or the state constitutional right of privacy. 107. In addition, Apple’s modus operandi constitutes a sharp practice in that Apple knew and should have known that consumers care about the accuracy of maps, but are unlikely to be aware or/and able to detect the means by which Apple and/or its licensors were conducting themselves in a manner adverse to its commitments and its users’ interests. Apple is therefore in violation of the unfair prong of the Unfair Competition Law. 108. Apple’s acts and practices were also fraudulent within the meaning of the UCL because they were likely to mislead members of the public. 109. While Apple represented at all times that, the Apple Devices were safe and secure; in actuality, the Maps application guided Plaintiffs to unknown locations. Apple did not inform purchasers, like Plaintiff, that their Apple Devices may be vulnerable to mapping fallacies such as: mislabeled restaurants, landmarks, streets, etc., and publishing inaccurate directions, but instead, represented at all relevant times that “Apple takes precautions – including administrative, technical, and physical measures – to safeguard [purchaser’s] personal safety.” Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page29 of 33 30 110. By engaging in the above-described acts and practices, Apple has committed one or more acts of unfair competition within the meaning of the UCL. Plaintiffs and members of the Class have suffered an injury-in-fact and have lost money and property, including, but not limited to, the expected utility and performance of their Apple Devices, the purchase price of their Apple Devices, and/or the difference between the price Class members paid and the actual worth of the product has Apple disclosed the true nature of the Apple Devices. 111. Apple had a duty to disclose the material content and security characteristics of the Apple Devices and their operations because (i) it knew or should have known about these characteristics at the time that Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased their Apple Devices because Apple created the Apple Devices and the iOS that ran these devices; (ii) had exclusive knowledge of material facts that were not known to Plaintiff; and (iii) made representations regarding the Apple Devices’ administrative, technical, and physical measures taken to safeguard [purchaser’s] personal safety but that Apple Maps would lead consumers to unknown, sometimes dangerous places. 112. Plaintiff and members of the Class were deceived by Apple’s representations and cultivation of its reputation for security and innovation and reasonably relied on Apple’s representations and omissions as described herein and were consequently injured as alleged herein. 113. Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered injuries as a direct and proximate result of Apple’s unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business practices. Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page30 of 33 31 A. Background of Apple’s Product Line.......................................................................... 7 B. Apple’s defection from Google launched a disaster for Apple’s Maps……...............9 C. Apple’s Mapping Application is clearly Defective.....................................................11 D. Apple Has Failed To Honor Its Warranties ...............................................................15 E. Apple’s Misrepresentations........................................................................................16 A. Background of Apple’s Product Line Negligent Misrepresentation Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 114. Apple claims to review each application before offering it to its users, purports to have implemented app standards, and claims to have created measures to protect the personal safety of its customers. 115. However, unbeknownst to consumers such as Plaintiff, Apple failed to properly monitor app makers and to provide accurate mapping information to Plaintiffs. In making these representations to Plaintiff and the Class, Apple intended to induce Plaintiff and the Class to purchase the Apple Devices. 116. At all times herein, Plaintiff and the Class were unaware of the falsity of Apple’s statements. Plaintiff and the Class reasonably acted in response to the statements made by Apple when they purchased an Apple device and updated the operating systems. 117. As a proximate result of Apple’s negligent misrepresentations, Plaintiff and Class members purchased Apple Devices. VI. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS......................................................................................17 VII. CAUSES OF ACTION .......................................................................................................20 VIII. DEMAND FOR RELIEF...................................................................................................31 Case5:13-cv-05332-EJD Document1 Filed11/15/13 Page2 of 33 3 Plaintiff Nancy Romine Minkler (“Plaintiff”), brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated in the United States against Defendant APPLE, INC. (hereinafter “Apple” or “Defendant”). Plaintiff’s allegations are made on information and belief except as to allegations regarding herself which are based on personal knowledge. Plaintiff alleges as follows: I.

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35. Defendant is a company that sells solutions to improve personal credit scores. During spring 2015 (starting in March 2015), in an effort to solicit potential customers, Defendant began making telephone calls, en masse, to consumers across the country. On information and belief Defendant and or its agents purchase “leads” containing consumer’s contact information and creates an electronic database from which Defendant makes automated calls. 36. Defendant knowingly made these telemarketing calls without the prior express written consent of the call recipients, and knowingly continue to call them after requests to stop. As such, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Class, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 37. On or about March 16, 2009 Plaintiff Carranza registered her cellular phone number with the area code (619) and ending in 0058 with the National Do Not Call Registry. 38. Plaintiff Carranza is the regular carrier and exclusive user of the telephone assigned the number ending in 0058. The number is assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff Carranza is charged for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 39. In the spring of 2015, Plaintiff Carranza began receiving calls on her cellular telephone from the number (718) 509-9927, claiming to be Defendant, CreditRepair.com 40. Plaintiff Carranza never had a business relationship with Defendant. Yet, she received at least 9 calls from Defendant. 51. A Plaintiff’s injury must be both “concrete” and “particularized” in order to satisfy the requirements of Article III of the Constitution. Id. 52. For an injury to be concrete it must be a de facto injury, meaning it actually exists. In the present case, Plaintiff took the affirmative step of enrolling herself on the National Do-Not-Call Registry for the purpose of preventing marketing calls to their telephones. Such telemarketing calls are a nuisance, an invasion of privacy, and an expense to Plaintiff. See Soppet v. enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 679 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2012). All three of these injuries are present in this case. See also Chen, supra. 53. Furthermore, the Third Circuit recently stated, Congress found that “[u]nsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients,” Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043, and sought to protect the same interests implicated in the traditional common law cause of action. Put differently, Congress was not inventing a new theory of injury when it enacted the TCPA. Rather, it elevated a harm that, while “previously inadequate in law,” was of the same character of previously existing “legally cognizable injuries.” Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1549. Spokeo addressed, and approved, such a choice by Congress. Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., No. 16- 3277, 2017 WL 2925432, at *4 (3d Cir. July 10, 2017). 69. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth in each and every preceding paragraph of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein. 70. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 75. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth in each and every preceding paragraph of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein. DNC CLAIM IN VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ. (64 C.F.R. § 64.1200(C)) (By Plaintiff Against All Defendants) INTERNAL DNC CLAIM IN VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ. (64 C.F.R. § 64.1200(D)) (By Plaintiff Against All Defendants)

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11. According to State Auto's website, www.stateauto.com, State Auto was created in 1921 and currently has assets of $4.6 billion and writes $2.0 billion in premiums in the United States. 12. Plaintiff, like all proposed class members, currently has, had, or was covered under a contract of automobile insurance with State Auto. The contract of insurance between Plaintiff, as well as each proposed class member, and State Auto provides coverage for the total loss of a vehicle in an accident on the basis of the "actual cash value" of the vehicle or the "[ a ]mount necessary to repair or replace the property with other property of like kind and quality". See Exhibit 1 (Policy) at pp. 33-35. The material policy language for all State Auto policies during the relevant time period is identical or substantially the same. 13. For total loss claims that deviate from providing actual cost values, "[a]ny deductions from such cost, including deduction for salvage, must be measurable, discernible, itemized and specified as to dollar amount and shall be appropriate in amount. The basis for such settlement shall be fully explained to the first party claimant." Arkansas Insurance Regulation 43, § 10. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that any adjustments are reasonable, justified and fully explained and to ensure that consumers have the ability to evaluate and challenge any deductions that are improper. 15. State Auto bases its valuations and payments on total loss claims on manipulated data and reports that do not meet State Auto's duties under Arkansas law, imposing unmeasurable, indiscernible, nonitemized, unspecified and unexplained "condition adjustments" to artificially reduce the values of comparable vehicles. 16. Upon information and belief, to calculate its valuations and claims payments, State Auto obtains a market valuation report from a third-party company called CCC Information Services, Inc. ("CCC"). These market valuation reports purport to contain values for comparable vehicles recently sold or for sale in the geographic area of the insured. The reports also contain a purported valuation for the loss vehicle based upon the data for the comparable vehicles in the report. Upon information and belief, State Auto instructs CCC as to what specific data to include in the report as the basis for the valuation, including whether to include condition adjustments to the comparable vehicles. 17. As a general business practice, State Auto offers its insureds a claim amount equivalent to the valuation of the loss vehicle that is specified in the market valuation report prepared by third-party CCC. 19. Plaintiff owned a 2014 Lexus RX 350 A WD that was deemed a total loss on or about September 21, 2018. 20. Plaintiff made a claim with State Auto for the total loss of her vehicle. 21. State Auto provided a total loss valuation to Plaintiff for her total loss claim. State Auto based its offer upon a valuation report obtained from CCC. 22. State Auto valued Plaintiffs total loss claim at $25,326.001 and paid Plaintiff that amount. State Auto's valuation was based on a CCC market valuation report. The market valuation report listed values of four different comparable vehicles and applied a uniform condition adjustment of -$966 to all four vehicles without itemizing or explaining the basis of the adjustment as required by Arkansas law. The market valuation report reduced the amount of the four comparable vehicles by exactly the same amount, regardless of any individual differences in the condition. These unmeasurable, indiscernible, nonitemized, unspecified and unexplained adjustments were violative of Arkansas law and contrary to State Auto's contractual obligations, and they resulted in an underpayment on Plaintiffs claim of $966. 24. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or controlled person of Defendants, as well as the officers, directors, agents, servants or employees of Defendants and the immediate family members of any such person. Also excluded is any judge who may preside over this cause of action. 25. The exact number of the Class, as herein identified and described, is not known, but it is estimated to be at least one hundred. Accordingly, the Class is so numerous that joinder of individual members herein is impracticable. 27. The claims of the Plaintiff, who is representative of the class herein, are typical of the claims of the proposed class, in that the claims of all members of the proposed class, including the Plaintiff, depend on a showing of the acts of State Auto giving rise to the right of Plaintiff to the relief sought herein. There is no conflict between the individually named Plaintiff and other members of the proposed Class with respect to this action, or with respect to the claims for relief set forth herein. 28. The named Plaintiff is the representative party for the Class, and is able to, and will fairly and adequately, protect the interests of the Class. The attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class are experienced and capable in complex civil litigation, insurance litigation and class actions. 29. Class certification is appropriate under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because State Auto's actions are generally applicable to the Class as a whole, and Plaintiff seeks equitable remedies with respect to the Class as a whole. 31. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges all- preceding paragraphs contained 32. State Auto's insurance contract with its insureds provides coverage for the total loss of a vehicle in an accident on the basis of actual cash value of the vehicle or the amount necessary to replace the insured vehicle with a vehicle of like kind and quality. 33. State Auto has breached its contract with Plaintiff and the members of the Class by not paying total loss claims upon the actual cash value ofloss vehicles. State Auto departed from the use of actual cash value by basing its valuations and claims payments on the values of comparable vehicles that have been artificially reduced by an arbitrary and unjustified "condition adjustment" that is unmeasurable, indiscernible, nonitemized, unspecified and/or unexplained. 35. State Auto's breaches and violations have caused damage to Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiffs and proposed Class members' damages include the amounts illegally deducted by State Auto from the insureds' payments. herein. 36. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges all preceding paragraphs contained 37. An actual case and controversy within the meanmg of the Arkansas Declaratory Judgment Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-101, et seq., which may be adjudicated by this Court exists between Plaintiff and the proposed Class and State Auto. 38. Plaintiff, for herself and on behalf of the Class, seeks a declaration of rights and liabilities of the parties herein. Specifically, Plaintiff is seeking a declaration that in paying total loss claims with first-party insureds, it is a violation of Arkansas law and the insurance contract with State Auto for State Auto to base the valuation and payment of claims on values of comparable vehicles that have been reduced by "condition adjustments" that are unmeasurable, indiscernible, nonitemized, unspecified and/or unexplained. 39. State Auto's unlawful common policy and general business practice as described herein are ongoing. Accordingly, State Auto has violated, and continues to violate, Arkansas law. A. State Auto's Improper Valuation of Total Loss Claims. BREACH OF CONTRACT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

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14. Defendant is a retailer of CBD products for men and women. Products can be purchased online, through the Website, or at third party vendors throughout the United States, including several New York locations. Products available for purchase at third- party retailers and online include CBD oils, salves, vape cartridges and similar items. 15. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its retail operation, serving as its gateway. Through the Website, Defendant’s customers are, inter alia, able to: learn information about Defendant’s company; learn information about hemp and CBD, including how it can be administered and effects; learn about the products available for purchase on the Website; learn about the return policy; and learn about rewards. 16. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace. Through the Website, customers can learn about Defendant’s products, learn about the return policy, and complete a purchase. 18. Plaintiff Nisbett cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 20. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Nisbett, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offer to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Nisbett encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from taking advantage of Defendant’s retail operations enjoying them equal to sighted individuals. 21. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Nisbett could independently navigate it, learn about Defendant’s products, and complete a purchase, as sighted users can. 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Nisbett has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 24. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 25. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Nisbett seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 27. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Nisbett and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 29. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 30. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 31. Plaintiff Nisbett seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of Defendant’s retail operations during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 33. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members and the New York Subclass Members: a. Whether Defendant’s online retail operations constitute a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the 39. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 41. Defendant’s retail operations constitute a public accommodations under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Their Website is a service, privilege, or advantage that is integrated with its retail operations. 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 46. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Nisbett requests the relief as set forth below. 47. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 49. Defendant’s online retail operations and third-party retailers located in the State of New York constitute a public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of its retail operations. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with the retail operations. 50. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because its owns and operates its retail operations and the Website. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 52. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 53. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 54. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 56. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Nisbett and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its retail operations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 57. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Nisbett seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 58. Plaintiff Nisbett is entitled to compensatory damages and civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 59. Plaintiff Nisbett is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 61. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 62. The NYCHRL provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) 63. The Website is a public accommodation under NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 64. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 65. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its online retail services to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 67. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Nisbett and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its online retail operations under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Nisbett seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 70. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Nisbett contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its retail operations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 74. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Their Website And Their Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 11. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 12. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. 13. At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a business relationship with Defendant. 14. Plaintiff did not provide Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers to Defendant through any medium at any time. 15. Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s contact information through unknown means. 24. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 25. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or Defendant’s agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 37. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 38. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 39. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 102. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 103. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals the full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and hard of hearing. 104. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 19. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 22. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard-of-hearing persons access to the goods and services of the Website. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on the Website. 23. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 27. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 29. Defendant operates the Website, which provides information and services that connect athletes and active people with private coaches. It delivers information and sells to tens of millions of people across the United States. 30. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 32. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 34. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 35. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard-of-hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the videos on the Website. 37. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 38. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to apprehend the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends or family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard-of-hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the services provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 40. Plaintiff attempted to watch the video the “See What You Can Do With CoachUp” on the Website in March 2018 but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 42. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 43. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, and methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 46. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 47. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 48. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 49. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 50. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 51. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 64. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 65. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 66. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 67. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 68. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 70. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 71. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 74. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 78. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 79. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 82. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 83. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 84. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 86. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .” 87. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 88. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 89. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 90. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 92. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 93. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 94. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 96. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 97. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 98. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination.

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11. Robert Brogden management communicated to Plaintiff Foster that they perceived a problem of employees logging into the system but not logging out over the course of the day during periods of non-work, such as lunch breaks. 12. Shortly after the new time system was implemented on or about March 1, 2016, Plaintiff Foster was instructed to enact a protocol within the software program that automatically deducted 30 minutes of time from every hourly employee’s daily pay record to account for a lunch break. 13. Upon information and belief, this automatic pay deduction practice preceded the March 1, 2016 installation of the time recording software program. 14. By enacting the automatic 30 minute deduction protocol, Robert Brogden enacted a policy of arbitrarily deducting pay from employees without any connection to actual hours worked. 15. Under the new automatic 30 minute deduction protocol, an employee who worked through lunch or otherwise did not take a lunch break on a given day was still subject to an arbitrary 30 minute deduction and was not paid. 16. Under the new automatic 30 minute deduction protocol, time entries actually entered by employees for their true lunch breaks were automatically overridden in favor of the automatic and arbitrary 30 minute deduction. 18. Robert Brogden had previously installed a system of “writing up” hourly employees for not punching out during periods of non-work but, given the time required to manage and oversee such employees, management elected to install the arbitrary and automatic 30 minute deduction protocol instead. 19. As a result of Robert Brogden’s installation of the automatic pay deduction protocol, Robert Brogden employees were not and continue to not be paid fully and fairly for hours worked. 20. In or about April of 2016, Plaintiff Foster received training for her Robert Brogden job capacities in the payroll and human resources departments when she first learned that Robert Brogden’s practice of enacting automatic pay deductions from hourly employees may be a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 21. Plaintiff Foster informed management at Robert Brogden that their practice of automatically deducting pay from hourly employees may not be lawful. 22. On or about May 30, 2016, Plaintiff Foster contacted and was informed by the Kansas Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, that the practice of automatically deducting pay from hourly employees was, in fact, not lawful. 23. On June 5, 2016, Plaintiff Foster sent an email to Robert Brogden management, including the General Manager and Owner, informing them of her findings regarding the unlawful practice of automatically deducting time from hourly employees. 24. The recipients of Plaintiff Foster’s email did not respond to her. 26. Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 25 above. 27. Plaintiffs bring the FLSA claims, as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, seek relief on a collective basis challenging, Robert Brogden’s practice of failing to accurately record all hours worked, arbitrarily deducting hours allegedly not worked and, as a result, failing to pay hourly employees for the full and fair amount of hours worked. 28. The class of employees on behalf of whom Plaintiffs bring this “opt-in” collective action are similarly situated because they have been or are employed in the same or similar position as individually-named Plaintiffs and were subject to the same or similar unlawful practices as the individually-named Plaintiffs. The number and identity of other Plaintiffs yet to opt-in and consent to be party Plaintiffs may be determined from the records of Robert Brogden, and potential Plaintiffs may easily and quickly be notified of the pendency of this action. 29. Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 28 above. 30. At all times material herein, Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. 32. Robert Brogden was, and is, subject to the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA because it is an enterprise engaged in commerce and its employees are engaged in commerce. 33. Robert Brogden willfully violated the FLSA by failing to fully and accurately account for hours and overtime hours worked by its employees. 34. In the course of perpetrating these unlawful practices, Robert Brogden has also willfully failed to keep accurate records of all hours worked by its hourly employees. 35. Robert Brogden willfully violated the FLSA by implementing an automatic 30- minute daily deduction for lunch breaks without completely relieving from duty each hourly employee subject to the automatic deduction. Hourly employees subject to the automatic 30- minute deduction were expected to and/or required to perform work duties, whether active or inactive, while eating. 36. Section 13 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 213, exempts certain categories of employees from the overtime pay obligations set forth under Section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA. None of the FLSA exemptions apply to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs must be paid overtime pay in accordance with Section 7 of the FLSA. 37. The individually-named plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees are victims of a uniform and company-wide compensation policy. This uniform policy, in violation of the FLSA, has been applied to all hourly employees. 39. Robert Brogden has not acted in good faith nor with reasonable grounds to believe its actions and omissions were not a violation of the FLSA, and as a result thereof, Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees are entitled to recover an award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime pay described above, pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA. 40. Alternatively, should the Court find Robert Brogden did not act willfully in failing to pay overtime pay, Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate. 41. As a result of the aforesaid willful violations of the FLSA’s overtime provisions, overtime compensation has been unlawfully withheld by Robert Brogden from Plaintiffs for which Robert Brogden is liable pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), together with an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of this action. WHEREFORE, individually-named Plaintiffs, and all similarly situated employees, demand judgment against Defendant Robert Brogden’s Olathe Buick GMC, Inc. and pray for: (1) compensatory damages; (2) liquidated damages; (3) attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by Section 16(b) of the FLSA; (4) pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; and (5) such other relief the Court deems fair and equitable. 42. Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 41 above. 44. Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. WHEREFORE, individually-named Plaintiffs, and all similarly situated employees, demand judgment against Defendant Robert Brogden’s Olathe Buick GMC, Inc. and pray for: (1) compensatory damages; (2) liquidated damages; (3) attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by Section 16(b) of the FLSA; (4) pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; and (5) such other relief the Court deems fair and equitable. 45. Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 44 above. 46. Plaintiff Ashley Foster engaged in protected activity under the Fair Labor Standards Act by contacting the Kansas Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, in connection with her concern that Defendant Robert Brogden’s automatic time deduction practice violated FLSA and the Kansas Wage Payment Act. 47. Plaintiff Ashley Foster engaged in protected activity under the Fair Labor Standards Act by informing her employer Robert Brogden that she had contacted the Kansas Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, and that she was informed that Robert Brogden’s automatic time deduction practice was unlawful. 48. Subsequent to informing Robert Brogden of her communication with the Kansas Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, and of her belief that Robert Brogden’s automatic time deduction practice was unlawful, Plaintiff Ashley Foster was subjected to adverse employment action. 49. Plaintiff Ashley Foster’s employment was terminated by Robert Brogden and such termination would not have occurred, but for her engaging in protected activity under the 5. Robert Brogden has been in operation as a car dealership at 1500 E. Santa Fe, Olathe, Kansas 66061 since at least 1995, selling vehicles and automotive services to consumers throughout the Kansas City metropolitan area. 6. Plaintiffs, and all other similarly situated persons, are current and former employees of Robert Brogden, employed in various hourly-wage employment capacities, including mechanics, porters, and accounting and human resources personnel. 7. Plaintiff Ashley Foster was employed by Robert Brogden to perform both accounting and human resources functions. 8. In or about January of 2016, Plaintiff Foster was tasked with implementing a new system for tracking hours worked by all hourly workers employed by Robert Brogden. 9. Under the old system, workers would track their hours by using punch cards in conjunction with a punch card/time clock machine. Hourly employees’ worked hours would be recorded by physically “punching in” and “punching out” during periods of work and non-work. Retaliatory Discharge Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Brought on Behalf of All Individual Plaintiffs and All Others Similarly Situated) Violation of the Kansas Wage Payment Act (Brought on Behalf of All Individual Plaintiffs and All Others Similarly Situated)

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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) (OMFWSA Violations) 13. Defendant operates a parcel delivery service and delivers Amazon packages to customers in Northeast Ohio. 14. Plaintiff White was employed by Defendant as a driver between October 2018 and July 2019 and delivered Amazon packages in Cleveland and the surrounding areas. 15. Other similarly situated employees were employed by Defendant as drivers. 16. Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers were classified by Defendant as non- exempt employees. 17. Defendant paid Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers on an hourly basis. 18. Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers drove vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of less than 10,000 pounds. (Failure to pay for on-duty meal periods) 19. Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers were not provided with bona fide meal periods during which they were completely relieved from duty. 20. Defendant automatically deducted 30 minutes per day for a meal period, despite the fact that Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers did not receive meal periods and/or performed work during meal periods because of the substantial amount of work that they had to perform. 21. During the time that was considered their meal period, Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers continued making deliveries. 22. Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers a way to report a missed meal period. 23. Defendant was aware that Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers did not receive bona fide meal periods due to the amount of work assigned to Plaintiff and other similarly 4 situated drivers. 24. As a result of Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated drivers for meal periods during which they performed work, Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers were denied significant amounts of overtime compensation. 25. Plaintiff Jessie White estimates that he performed work during his meal periods approximately five (5) days per week. 26. Plaintiff worked approximately 45 to 54 hours per week on average. 27. Defendant knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers for meal periods during which they performed work. (Defendant Willfully Violated the FLSA) 28. Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. 29. Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on his own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 30. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff himself is a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All former and current drivers employed by Peregrine Express LLC at any time between January 24, 2017 and the present. 31. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, but upon information and belief aver that it consists of at least 100 persons. 32. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 5 216(b) as to claims for unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests, as well as his own, in bringing this action. 33. These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s business and payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 34. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of himself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as: All former and current drivers employed by Peregrine Express LLC at any time between January 24, 2017 and the present. 35. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least 100 persons. 36. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to its employees for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; (b) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff and other members of the class for Defendant’s violation of R.C. §§ 4111.03 and 4111.10. 6 37. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Named Plaintiff’s claims rise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other Ohio Class members. 38. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. His interest is not antagonistic to, but rather is in unison with, the interests of the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 39. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 40. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 42. Defendant’s practices and policies of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly 7 situated drivers for meal periods during which they performed work violated the FLSA, 29 CFR § 785.19. 43. By engaging in the above-described practices and policies, Defendant willfully, knowingly and/or recklessly violated the provisions of the FLSA. 44. As a result of Defendant’s practices and policies, Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers have been damaged in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 46. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers for meal periods during which they performed work violated the OMFWSA, R.C. § 4111.14. 47. By engaging in the above-described practices and policies, Defendant willfully, knowingly and/or recklessly violated the provisions of the OMFWSA, R.C. § 4111.03. 48. As a result of Defendant’s practices and policies, Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers have been damages in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the OMFWSA.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a Resort and Casino that operates RIVERS CASINO Resort and Casino as well as the RIVERS CASINO website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. 22. Defendant operates RIVERS CASINO (its “Casino”) in New York, at 1 Rush Street, Schenectady, NY 12305. 23. Its Casinos constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Casinos provide to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including Casino locations and hours, access to its Player Login online portal, information pertaining to its hotel, spa and casino, including information on the various slot machines and gaming platforms it offers at its physical locations, and related goods and services. 25. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Casinos. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Casinos and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Casinos on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 32. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Casinos are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Casinos. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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(Illegal Deductions, New York Labor Law, Article 19 § 193 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2.10(a)) 120. Plaintiffs, the FLSA Plaintiffs, and the New York Class repeat, reiterate, and reallege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 121. In violation of NYLL § 193, Defendants unlawfully deducted wages from Plaintiffs and Class Members, by requiring superintendents to spend their own money on work-related expenses which were required for the performance and completion of mandated work. 122. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs and Class Members for reimbursement of unlawful deductions, plus liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and any other appropriate relief. 24. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who have been similarly underpaid in violation of the FLSA, and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and an opportunity to join. 25. The total number of persons who are eligible to join the FLSA Collective Action identified above, including both current and former employees over the relevant period, is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number can be based are presently within the sole control of Defendants. Upon information and belief there are at least forty (40) FLSA members, and there could be significantly more. 26. The precise number of FLSA collective action members should be readily available from a review of the Defendants’ personnel, scheduling, time and payroll records, and from input received from the collective action as part of the notice and “opt-in” process provided by 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 27. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf all others similarly situated class of persons under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), defined to include: All superintendents and handymen, employed by Defendants, during the relevant statutory period who: (1) worked in excess of forty hours per week without receiving overtime compensation at the mandatory statutory rate; (2) were not issued accurate and/or complete pay stubs/wage statements on each payday containing the information required by N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3); and/or (3) were not issued accurate and/or complete pay notices upon hiring and annually thereafter, containing the information required by N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(1) (hereinafter, the “New York Class”). 29. Commonality/Predominance: There is a well-defined community of interest among the Rule 23 Class members and common questions of both law and fact predominate in the action over any questions affecting individual members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs, the New York Class members wages for each hour worked; b. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the New York Class the statutorily-mandated rate of pay of one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week; c. Whether Defendants violated the NYWTPA by failing to provide Plaintiffs and the New York Class with a written statement upon hiring, and annually, as required by NYLL § 195(1); d. Whether Defendants violated the NYWTPA by failing to provide Plaintiffs and the New York Class with sufficiently detailed wage statements with each payment, as required by NYLL § 195(3); e. Whether Defendants took unlawful deductions from Plaintiffs' and the New York Class’ wages, by requiring them to pay the cost of tools, supplies, and cellular phones which were required for the maintenance of the buildings; f. Whether Defendants should be required to pay compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest for violating the NYLL; and g. Whether Defendants’ violations were willful. 31. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 York Class. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the litigation of wage-and-hour class actions. 32. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because, inter alia, it is economically unfeasible for the Rule 23 Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer. 33. The case will be manageable as a class action because Defendants should have payroll systems that will allow the wage-and-hour facts and damages issues in the case to be determined with relative ease. Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3), or in the alternative (c)(4), are satisfied in the case, class certification is appropriate. 34. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making relief, including declaratory and/or injunctive relief, appropriate for the Class. 35. Plaintiffs bring FLSA and NYLL claims on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated Plaintiffs (“Class Members”) employed by Defendants who were denied lawful wages. 37. Upon information and belief, Defendants have employed more than forty (40) superintendents and handymen during the statutory period. 38. As superintendents, the job duties of Plaintiffs and of the Class Members included, inter alia: (i) repairs including painting and roofing; (ii) fumigating the apartments; (iii) minor electrical work; (iv) maintaining building boilers; (v) checking hallways for cleanliness and maintenance issues; (vi) tiling; (vii) minor plumbing; (viii) minor carpentry work; (ix) cleaning inside and outside the buildings; and (x) addressing tenants’ concerns. 39. Although the Plaintiffs and Class Members were required to work more than 40 hours per week, the Defendants systematically failed to pay Plaintiffs Class Members overtime wages at a rate of one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 per work week. 40. Significantly, Plaintiffs were routinely assigned handyman “side jobs” which frequently required work in the evenings and on weekends. However, Plaintiffs and Class Members were never compensated at the overtime rate for these “side jobs”. 41. At all relevant times, the Defendants failed to keep complete and/or accurate records of the hours worked by and wages paid to the Plaintiffs. In fact, Defendants have systematically underreported the number of hours worked by Plaintiffs and Class Members, and effectively omitted their overtime hours from any payroll records, in order to evade their obligations under the FLSA and the NYLL. 43. Additionally, the Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and all similarly situated class members with accurate wage statements with each payment, as required by the NYWTPA. Likewise, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and all similarly situated class members with accurate wage notices upon hiring, and annually thereafter, as required by the NYWTPA. 44. Upon information and belief, Defendants' unlawful conduct as described herein is pursuant to a policy or practice of attempting to minimize labor costs by violating the FLSA and 46. Plaintiff Mr. P. Huitzil was employed as a building superintendent. He worked for a property owned and/or managed by Defendants located at 1 The Boulevard, New Rochelle, New York, from on or about March 2003 to May 5, 2019. 47. During the course of his employment, Mr. P. Huitzil’s resided in a basement apartment in the building located at 1 The Boulevard. Defendants required Mr. P. Huitzil to be on-call to deal with any situation that arose in the building twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week. 49. Additionally, Mr. P. Huitzil was required to perform handyman assignments, outside of his regularly scheduled hours, consisting of nonstandard repairs and renovations in the buildings owned and/or managed by Defendants, including inter alia: a. 18 May Street, New Rochelle, New York; b. 32 Coligni Ave, New Rochelle, New York; c. 1920 Osborne PL, Bronx, New York; d. 2525 Aqueduct Ave, Bronx, New York; e. 560 Audubon Avenue, New York, New York; f. 2533 Aqueduct Ave, Bronx, New York; g. 1916 Palmer Ave, Larchmont, New York; and h. 45 Mitchell Pl, White Plains, New York. 50. Defendants regularly directed Mr. P Huitzil to perform handyman “side jobs” in these buildings and frequently asked him to perform and complete these assignments outside of his scheduled work hours. 51. As a result, Mr. P. Huitzil’s regularly worked six (6) days per week, working at least fifty-two (52) hours per week in total—which equals approximately (12) hours per week of overtime work. 53. Thus, Defendants failed to pay Mr. P. Huitzil for some of his working hours, and also failed to pay him overtime compensation at the mandatory statutory rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a work week. 54. Further, Mr. P. Huitzil was required to spend his own money on work-related expenses, including inter alia: (i) cellular telephone expenses; (ii) supplying his own tools and supplies to complete mandated work; and (iii) paying laborers to assist him with completing mandated work. Occasionally, Defendants would to reimburse Mr. P. Huitzil for some of these expenses. 55. Throughout the duration of his employment, Defendants failed to provide Mr. P. Huitzil with the required written wage notice upon hiring, and annually thereafter. Likewise, Defendants failed to provide Mr. P. Huitzil and the required wage statements, containing accurate information about his wages, in violation of the NYWTPA. 56. Mr. P. Huitzil has spoken to other superintendents who are employed by Defendants, and they advised him that, they too, were denied lawful overtime wages. 57. Mr. P. Huitzil has been designated as the class representatives for the FLSA Collective Action and the New York Class. Rogelio Huitzil (“Mr. R. Huitzil”) 58. Plaintiff Mr. R. Huitzil was employed as a building superintendent at a building owned and/or managed by Defendants, located at 1920 Osborne Place, Bronx, New York, from on or about January of 2000 to September 16, 2016. 60. As a superintendent, Mr. R. Huitzil’s duties included, inter alia: (i) minor repairs including painting and roofing; (ii) fumigating the apartments; (iii) minor electrical work; (iv) maintaining building boilers; (v) checking hallways for cleanliness and maintenance issues; (vi) tiling; (vii) minor plumbing; (viii) minor carpentry work; (ix) cleaning inside and outside the buildings; and (x) addressing tenants’ concerns. 61. Additionally, Mr. R. Huitzil was required to perform handyman assignments, outside of his regularly scheduled hours, consisting of nonstandard repairs and renovations in the building and in other buildings owned and/or managed by Defendants, including inter alia: a. 2525 Aqueduct Avenue, Bronx, New York; b. 2523 Aqueduct Avenue, Bronx, New York; and c. 502 Audubon Avenue, New York, New York. 62. As a result, Mr. R. Huitzil’s worked an average of sixty-five (65) hours per week in total—which equals twenty-five (25) hours per week of overtime work. 63. However, in a ploy to circumvent overtime provisions of the FLSA and NYLL, Defendants did not utilize any time tracking device or system to keep track of the hours Mr. R. Huitzil worked. Instead they created a fiction that Mr. P. Huitzil only worked forty (40) hours per week, and paid him a flat rate for forty hours each week, regardless of how many hours he actually worked. 64. Thus, Defendants unlawfully and systematically failed to pay Mr. R. Huitzil overtime compensation at the mandatory statutory rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a work week. 66. Further, Mr. R. Huitzil was required to spend his own money on work-related expenses, including inter alia: (i) cellular telephone expenses; (ii) supplying his own tools and supplies to complete mandated work; and (iii) paying laborers to assist him with completing mandated work. 67. Additionally, throughout the duration of his employment, Defendants failed to provide Mr. R. Huitzil with the required written wage notice upon hiring, and annually thereafter. Likewise, Defendants failed to provide Mr. R. Huitzil and the required wage statements, containing accurate information about his wages, in violation of the NYWTPA. 68. Mr. R. Huitzil has spoken to other superintendents who are employed by Defendants, and they advised him that, they too, were denied lawful overtime wages. 69. Mr. R. Huitzil has been designated as the class representatives for the FLSA Collective Action and the New York Class. Francisco Diaz (“Diaz”) 71. As a superintendent, Mr. Diaz’ duties include, inter alia: (i) minor repairs including painting and roofing; (ii) fumigation of the apartments; (iii) minor electrical work; (iv) maintaining building boilers; (v) checking hallways for cleanliness and maintenance issues; (vi) tiling; (vii) minor plumbing; (viii) minor carpentry work; (ix) cleaning inside and outside the buildings; and (x) addressing tenants’ concerns. 72. Additionally, Mr. Diaz was routinely required to perform handyman “side jobs” outside his regularly scheduled work hours, consisting of nonstandard repairs and renovations in his assigned buildings. 73. As a result of Mr. Diaz’s duties and responsibilities, he worked an average of sixty- five (65) hours per week in total—which equals twenty-five (25) hours per week of overtime work. 74. However, in a ploy to circumvent overtime provisions of the FLSA and NYLL, Defendants did not utilize any time tracking device or system to keep track of the hours Mr. Diaz worked. Instead they created a fiction that Mr. Diaz only worked forty (40) hours per week, and paid him a flat rate for forty hours each week, regardless of how many hours he actually worked. 75. Thus, Defendants unlawfully and systematically failed to pay Mr. Diaz overtime compensation at the mandatory statutory rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a work week. 76. Further, Mr. Diaz was required to spend his own money on work-related expenses, including inter alia: (i) cellular telephone expenses; (ii) supplying his own tools and supplies to complete mandated work; and (iii) paying laborers to assist him with completing mandated work. 78. Mr. Diaz has spoken to other superintendents who are employed by Defendants, and they advised him that, they too, were denied lawful overtime wages. 79. Mr. Diaz has been designated as the class representatives for the FLSA Collective Action and the New York Class. Francisco Diaz III (“Mr. Diaz III”) 80. Plaintiff Mr. Diaz III was employed as a building superintendent, at a property owned and/or managed by Defendants, located at 32 Coligni Ave, New Rochelle, New York, from on or about July of 2015 to on or about August 2018. 81. During the course of his employment, Mr. Diaz III resided in a basement in the building located at 32 Coligni Ave. Defendants required Mr. Diaz III to be on-call to deal with any situation that arose in the building twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week. 82. As a superintendent, Mr. Diaz III’s duties included, inter alia: (i) minor repairs including painting and roofing; (ii) fumigating the apartments; (iii) minor electrical work; (iv) maintaining building boilers; (v) checking hallways for cleanliness and maintenance issues; (vi) tiling; (vii) minor plumbing; (viii) minor carpentry work; (ix) cleaning inside and outside the buildings; and (x) addressing tenants’ concerns. 83. Mr. Diaz performed his superintendent duties by working early morning and late afternoon shifts during the week, and full days on the weekend, averaging forty-five (45) hours– which equals to two (5) hours per week of overtime work. 85. During this peak period, Mr. Diaz III’s hours changed significantly and required him to work an average of seventy-five (75) hours per week in total—which equals twenty-five (25) hours per week of overtime work. 86. However, in a ploy to circumvent overtime provisions of the FLSA and NYLL, Defendants did not utilize any time tracking device or system to keep track of the hours Mr. Diaz III worked. Instead they paid him a flat rate each week, regardless of how many hours he actually worked. 87. Thus, Defendants unlawfully and systematically failed to pay Mr. Diaz III overtime compensation at the mandatory statutory rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a work week. 88. Further, Mr. Diaz III was required to spend his own money on work-related expenses, including inter alia: (i) cellular telephone expenses; (ii) supplying his own tools and supplies to complete mandated work; and (iii) paying laborers to assist him with completing mandated work. 89. Additionally, throughout the duration of his employment, Defendants failed to provide Mr. Diaz III with the required written wage notice upon hiring, and annually thereafter. Likewise, Defendants failed to provide Mr. Diaz III and the required wage statements, containing accurate information about his wages, in violation of the NYWTPA. 90. Mr. Diaz III has spoken to other superintendents who are employed by Defendants, and they advised him that, they too, were denied lawful overtime wages. 92. In the summer of 2018, Mr. Diaz III complained to his supervisor, Alfonso De Jesus, that he was owed wages for the long hours that he worked each week, without adequate compensation. 93. On or about June of 2018, Mr. Diaz III followed up on his complaint to find out if De Jesus would provide him with the wages he was entitled to as a matter of law. 94. Within a week, Mr. Diaz III received a joint request from Hayco’s principal, A. Hay and property manager, De Jesus, asking him to waive his overtime rights – a request that is expressly unlawful. Moreover, as per the request, Mr. Diaz III was asked to agree to a new policy whereby employees would only receive overtime pay only if they had received prior authorization for the overtime work. 95. In the two weeks that followed, De Jesus persistently demanded that Mr. Diaz III sign the document. However, Mr. Diaz III adamantly refused to do so. In fact, Mr. Diaz III submitted a written response in which he explained that he did not fully understand what he was being asked to sign, and therefore wished to meet in person with Hay so that they could discuss. Mr. Diaz III understood that Defendants were blaming him for never having reported his overtime hours, when this had never been the company’s policy. Thus, Mr. Diaz III very much wanted a meeting to discuss the matter further. This meeting never happened. 97. Plaintiff Mr. Montero was employed as a building superintendent for Defendants. From on or about December of 2013 to on or about July of 2016, Mr. Montero worked for two properties owned and/or managed by Defendants: a. 2525 Aqueduct, Bronx, New York; and b. 2523 Aqueduct, Bronx, New York. 98. Mr. Montero resided in a basement apartment in the building located at 2525 Aqueduct, Bronx, New York. Defendants required Mr. Montero to be on-call to deal with any situation that arose in the building twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week. Perfecto Huitzil (“Mr. P. Huitzil.”)

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10. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (32). 11. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an entity that meets the definition of “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (32). 12. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. 13. Plaintiff had a credit card that was serviced by Defendant NGI. 14. Plaintiff did not list a cellular phone number in or on any other documents at any time during the transaction that resulted in the debt being serviced by Defendant NGI, nor did he verbally provide NGI with a cellular phone number at any time during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed to NGI. Plaintiff did not give Defendant prior express consent to call Plaintiff on his cellular telephone with the use of an autodialer and/or prerecorded message, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). 15. On numerous occasions Plaintiff explicitly instructed Defendant NGI not to call him on his cell phone. 16. On information and belief Defendant obtained Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number from a third party, or by “trapping” such number, i.e., making a record of him cell phone number using caller identification technology, but did not receive that number from Plaintiff. 18. Such calls were by prerecorded voice message and were made several times per week, beginning no later than 2012. 19. The telephone number Defendants and/or their agents called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1). 20. These telephone calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(i). 21. These telephone calls by Defendants and/or their agents violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 22. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on Defendants to demonstrate that Plaintiff provided express consent within the meaning of the statute. 23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 24. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or their agents to said person’s cellular telephone through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or with an artificial or prerecorded voice who did not provide prior express consent during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action. 26. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the tens of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 27. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through their agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using an autodialer and/or with a prerecorded voice message, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 28. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 29. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 31. As a person that received numerous calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 32. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 33. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 36. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 37. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 38. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above paragraphs 1 through 34, inclusive, of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 40. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 41. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 43. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 (five-hundred dollars) in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • An award of attorneys’ fees and costs to counsel for Plaintiff and the Class. • An order certifying this action to be a proper class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, establishing an appropriate Class and any Subclasses the Court deems appropriate, finding that Plaintiff is a proper representative of the Class, and appointing the lawyers and law firms representing Plaintiff as counsel for the Class. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 101. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 102. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and 22 facilities of the Website and by extension the Restaurant, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 103. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 19. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 6 Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant, during the relevant statutory period.” 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant, during the relevant statutory period.” 21. There are hundreds of thousands of visually impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually impaired. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 22. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of the Website and the Restaurant. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse the Website and by extension the goods and services offered through the Website by the Restaurant. 23. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; 7 c. Whether Defendant through its Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through its Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally blind. 25. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 8 27. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 28. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 29. Defendant owns and operates the Restaurant located at 3165 Harkness Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11235. 30. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 31. Among the features offered by the Website are the following: (a) information about the Restaurant, including its hours, phone number, and location; (b) menus; (c) retail prices; (d) and information about the Restaurant’s history. 32. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Restaurant, as well as to the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. Defendant denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely navigating the Website. 9 34. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as shopping, banking, etc., for sighted and blind persons. 35. The blind access websites by using keyboards in conjunction with screen-reading software which vocalizes visual information on a computer screen. Except for a blind person whose residual vision is still sufficient to use magnification, screen access software provides the only method by which a blind person can independently access the Internet. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, blind persons are unable to fully access Internet websites and the information, products, and services contained therein. 36. There are well established guidelines for making websites accessible to blind people. These guidelines have been in place for at least several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”). The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including, but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard and not just a mouse; adding alternative text to non-text content; and adding headings so that blind people can easily navigate the site. Without these very basic components, a website will be inaccessible to a blind person using a screen reader. 10 37. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include but are not limited to: the use of images of text, rather than text, to display essential content. 38. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.4.5, text should be used to convey information, rather than images of text. The menus on the “Menu” page and the coupons on the homepage are rendered as images, rather than as text that would be accessible via a screen reader. Because of this formatting, blind users such as Plaintiff are unable to determine what kinds of food the Restaurant offers. Additionally, blind users cannot access the Restaurant’s coupons and therefore would pay more than sighted users who are able to understand the images of text. Thus, the Website’s inaccessible design denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently access coupons and menus on the Website. 39. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Restaurant. 40. Plaintiff has made several attempts to view the coupons and menus on the Website, most recently in August 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on the Website. These access barriers have caused the Website to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing it to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 42. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of the Website and the Restaurant. 11 43. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 46. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 47. The Restaurant is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of 12 Defendant. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Restaurant. Independent of the Restaurant, the Website is also a public accommodation. 48. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the Website. 49. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I) it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 50. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 51. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 52. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of 13 the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 53. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Defendant who are blind have been denied full and equal access to the Website, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 55. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and the Restaurant in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 57. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 14 58. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 59. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 60. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 62. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 63. The Restaurant is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Restaurant. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Restaurant. Independent of the Restaurant, the Website is a public accommodation. 64. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Restaurant and the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 65. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove 15 access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Restaurant to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 66. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 67. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 68. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class 16 on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 70. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 71. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and the Restaurant under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 72. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 74. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 75. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth 17 and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . .” 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 80. The Restaurant located in New York State is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Restaurant. The Website is a service that is by and integrated 18 with the Restaurant. 81. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Restaurant and the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Restaurant to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non- disabled public. 83. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making the Website accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 84. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .” 85. Specifically, under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more 19 than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .” 86. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 87. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 88. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 89. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 90. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 91. The Restaurant is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Restaurant. Independent of the Restaurant, the Website is a public 20 accommodation. 92. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Restaurant and the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 93. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Restaurant to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 94. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 95. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its 21 discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and the Restaurant under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 97. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 99. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 100. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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21. Defendant is a clothing and apparel company that owns and operates the website, www.buffalojeans.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Upon information and belief, because CENTRIC DENIM USA, LLC.’s Website has never been accessible and because CENTRIC DENIM USA, LLC. does not have, and has never had, an adequate corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that CENTRIC DENIM USA, LLC. retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that CENTRIC DENIM USA, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that CENTRIC DENIM USA, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that CENTRIC DENIM USA, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that CENTRIC DENIM USA, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility- related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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13. He persuaded the Alabama Legislature to pass a law in 1965 establishing the museum known today as the U.S. Space & Rocket Center. Before construction of the museum was completed in 1970, von Braun moved the Saturn V 500DIF to the museum ensuring that the rocket would be on view to the public even as NASA continued putting men on the moon.' The USS&RC, an agency of the State of A1abam, provides for and participates in the management and control of facilities that house and display exhibits of space exploration and hardware made available by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 2 The USS&RC operates under the authority of ALA. CODE § 41-9-430 - 41-9-439. 14. The USS&RC opened the museum doors to the public on March 17, 1970, and was dedicated as "The Alabama Space and Rocket Center," under the auspices of the Alabama Space Science Exhibit Commission. A few years later, the name was changed to the U.S. Space & Rocket Center. The USS&RC is an agency of the State of Alabama and the official visitor information site for NASA's Marshall Space Flight and the U.S. Army Missile Command in Huntsville, Alabama.3 16. The USS&RC has employed thousands of individuals over the years in full-time, part-tithe, and seasonal capacities. It currently employs approximately 120 employees. The USS&RC's Paid Holidays 17. The USS&RC issues a Full-Time Employee Benefits Summary to each of its full-time employees (the "Summary.") A copy of the Summary is attached hereto as Exhibit B and its terms incorporated by reference as if filly set out herein. 18. The Holidays and Personal Days portion of the Summary states as follows: The following Holidays, with pay, are observed at the U.S. Space & Rocket Center: New Year's Day Labor Day Martin Luther King's Birthday Thanksgiving Day Memorial Day Christmas Day Independence Day Should the holiday occur on a Saturday or Sunday, either the Friday before or the Monday after will become the designated holiday. Full-time employers who work on an authorized holiday will be given compensatory time off by their supervisor or manager as soon as possible. Alabama State. Holidays 20. Specifically, ALA. CODE § 1-3-8(a) states: Sunday, Christmas Day, New Year's Day, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday, Robert E. Lee's birthday, George Washington's birthday, Thomas Jefferson's birthday, Confederate Memorial Day, National Memorial Day, Jefferson Davis' birthday, the Fourth day of July, Labor Day, Columbus Day and Fraternal Day, Veterans' Day, American Indian Heritage Day, and the day designated by the Governor for public thanksgiving shall each be deemed a holiday. If any holiday falls on Sunday, the following day is the holiday. If any holiday falls on Saturday, the preceding day is the holiday. Veterans' Day shall be observed by the closing of all state, courfly, and municipal offices, all banks located within this state, and the public schools on such day. 21. The next sub-section of the Act, ALA. CODE § 1-3-8(b), provides a schedule for both federal and State-legislature-created holidays (the "State Holidays:") Robert E. Lee's Birthday -- the third Monday in January. George Washington's Birthday -- the third Monday in February. Confederate Memorial Day -- the fourth Monday in April. Jefferson Davis' birthday -- the first Monday in June. Columbus Day and Fraternal Day -- the second Monday in October. Veterans' Day -- the eleventh day of November. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Birthday the third Monday in January. National Memorial Day -- the last Monday in May. Thomas Jefferson's birthday -- the third Monday in February. American Indian Heritage Day -- the second Monday in October. 23. Finally, ALA. CODE § 1-3-8(f) explains how the compensatory leave set forth in subsection (e) is to be handled by employers for employees who do not receive the State Holiday as instructed: Each employee shall attempt to schedule any compensatory leave day provided in lieu of a regularly scheduled holiday, subject to the approval of the supervisor, during the quarter that the regularly scheduled holiday occurred. If any compensatory leave day cannot be scheduled during the designated quarter, the compensatory leave day may be accumulated at the request of the employee for up to one year. Supervisors failing to schedule compensatory leave days for employees within the quarter, unless the day is carried forward at the request of the employee, shall justify that action in writing to the Director of State Personnel and the employee shall receive pay at a rate not less than the employee's usual and customary rate of pay for any compensatory leave day to which the employee may be entitled and which has not been taken. (Emphasis added.) 24. The USS&RC's Summary does not comply with Alabama state law with regard to payment of State Holidays, nor do the Defend-ants comply with Alabama law in this regard in practice. The Directors and Officers of the USS&RC, including those named herein, have, for decades, have disregarded Alabama law and do not comply with the foregoing. Alabama Longevity Pay 25. Another unique creation of the State Legislature is to compensate long- serving employees through so-called "longevity pay." 27. Further, ALA. CODE § 36-6-11(b) provides The above payments shall be in addition to all salaries or wages and shall be in addition to any per diem allowances or expense allowance that may be in force at the time of payment. The sum shall not be used in computing retirement or other benefits. 29. The Department of Examiners of Public Accounts (the "Department") is an independent legislative audit agency for the State of Alabama. The Department has the authority to perform audits of the accounts of all entities receiving or disbursing public Rinds. The Department is part of the Legislative branch of state government, and is independent of the Executive and Judicial branches of state government, as well as all local governments in the State.5 30. The Department is empowered to audit the books, accounts, and records of all state and county offices, officers, bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, departments, and agencies and to report on expenditures, contracts, or other audit findings found to be in violation of law. The Department has the authority to make audits of the accounts of all entities receiving or disbursing public funds. The Department is empowered to conduct investigations as a result of audits and to assist other governmental officers such as the Attorney General, District Attorneys, and federal agencies, and to certify official acts and require the repayment of amounts of monies and other resources due to the State, County, municipality, or other governmental units from various public officers, their employees, or agents. 6 The Department Issues The Report 32. An examination was performed from October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2012 by the Department to determine whether public officers, agents and employees of the USS&RC properly and lawfully accounted for money and other public assets or resources received, disbursed or in the custody of the USS&RC (the "Examination.") 33. On January 17, 2014, the Department issued a report which represented the results of the Examination (the "Report.") A copy of the Report is attached hereto as Exhibit A and its terms are incorporated by reference as if fully set out herein. 34. The Department's Report concluded with a number of findings of impropriety, audit non-conformities, accounting irregularities and non-compliance with Alabama law on a number of matters including: improper reimbursement of travel expenses, procurement of professional services, and irregularities in notice and conducting meetings of the USS&RC's Executive Committee. 35. However, salient to the instant Complaint were the following conclusions: The USS&RC provides six fewer holidays to its state employees than are mandated by law for state employees; and The USS&RC's employees who were entitled to receive longevity payments received less that the amount to which they were entitled.7 37. The Department issued the following recommendation to correct the USS&RC's failure to pay State Holidays as required: The commission should award to its employees the holidays provided by the Code of Alabama 1975, Section 1-3-8(a), and should provide a day of compensatory leave or paid compensation in lieu of any holiday on which the employee is required to work, as required by the Code of Alabama 1975, Section 1-3-8(e). 39. The Department issued the following recommendation to correct the USS&RC's failure to Longevity Pay as required: The Commission should re-compute longevity pay for each employee for all years in which they were qualified to receive longevity pay for reason of not having received a cost of living pay increase and should pay the employees the total amount of all underpayments due them. 40. To date, the Defendants have not remediated in any respect their non- compliance with Alabama law with respect to either payment of State Holidays or Longevity Pay to its prior and/or current employees. The Defendants' Reaction to the DeDartmeut' s Report 41. After the Report was issued, the findings and recommendations were reported in various media outlets. 42. The USS&RC's leadership, including the individual Defendants named herein, called a meeting of all the full-time, part-time and then-employed seasonal workers. The USS&RC's leadership stated: 1) they were aware of the Department's Report; 2) they believe the Report was in error; but 3) if they needed to do anything to comply with the Report, they would. 43. To date, the Defendants have not changed any policies with regard to payment of State Holidays to current or former full-time employees of USS&RC. 44. 10 date, the Defendants have not changed any policies with regard to payment of State Holidays to current or former part-time employees of USS&RC. 46. To date, the Defendants have not paid for the State Holidays owed, but not-yet-paid to any current or former employees of USS&RC. 47. To date, the Defendants have not changes any policies with regard to payment of Longevity Pay to current or former full-time employees of USS&RC. 48. To date, the Defendants have not paid for the Longevity Pay owed, but not-yet-paid to any current or former employees of USS&RC. 49. In sum, the Defendants have done nothing in response to the Department's Report. Named Plaintiffs' Alle2ations Janice Ingalls 50. Janice Ingalls started with the USS&RC in October 2000 as an Administrative Assistant to the then Chief Operating Officer. She was a full-time employee with excellent annual reviews before retiring on good terms on March 1, 2011. 51. Until she read the Report issued by the Department regarding the Defendants' practices with regard to underpaying employee benefits, Ms. Ingalls never knew that the Defendants had failed to follow Alabama law with regard to Longevity Pay or State Holidays. 52. During her employment, Ms. Ingalls was not paid for State Holidays as required by State law. 54. Kamara Davis began her employment in a part-time capacity in February 2000 as a Camp Counselor with the Space Camp. She remained employed in that capacity until July 2003, and returned as a Camp Counselor with the Space Camp in February 2004. Ms. Davis became a full-time employee in October 2005 as all Account Executive in the Sales Department. She was a full-time employee with excellent annual reviews. In September 2007, Ms. Davis was promoted to Director of Sales, On March 1, 2011, Ms. Davis was asked to resign due to extended illness resulting from her military service. 55. Until she read the Report issued by Department regarding the Defendants' practices with regard to underpaying employee benefits, Ms. Davis never knew that the Defendants had failed to follow Alabama law with regard to Longevity Pay or State Holidays. 56. During her employment, Ms. Davis was not paid for State Holidays as requited by State law. 57. During her employment, Ms. Davis was not paid Longevity Pay as required by State law. Milton Parker 58. Milton Parker began his employment as the Custodial Manager with the Space Camp on November 3, 1997. He is currently a full-time employee with excellent annual reviews and numerous citations for valuable service. 60. During his employment, Mr. Parker was not paid for State Holidays as required by State law. 61. During his employment, Mr. Parker was not paid Longevity Pay as required by State law. Equitable Toffin2 62. The Defendants have systematically failed to pay benefits that were due under Alabama law to current and former employees of the USS&RC and did not disclose to Class Members that they were failing to do so. Furthermore, the Defendants have failed to remedy their unlawful practices even in light of the Report and mandate issued by the Department as a result of its Examination. As a consequence, the Defendants have improperly retained unpaid benefits which should be rightfully in the hands of USS&RC employees. 63. The Defendants' plan, scheme and common course of conduct was applicable to all current and former full-time, part-time and seasonal employees of the 86. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege, and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 85 above as if fully set forth herein. 87. Defendants have violated the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution against Plaintiffs and Class Members by retaining funds which were theirs under State law. 89. Defendants' actions violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as the rights of Plaintiffs and the Class under the Takings Clause and the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. 90. Defendants have damaged Plaintiffs and Class Members because Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered economic loss as a result Defendants' illegal behavior. Count II Violation of Due Process 91. Plaintiffs repeat, re-allege, and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 - 90 above as if fully set forth herein. 92. The conduct and improper practices described herein violate Alabama law and deprive Class Members of due process rights afforded to them under the Alabama Constitution. As described herein, the Defendants have violated due process tights afforded to Plaintiffs and Class Members under the Alabama Constitution by failing, and continuing to fail, to adhere to applicable Alabama state law governing State Holidays and Longevity Payments. In so doing, Defendants have unlawfully taken Class Members' property without due process. 94. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in paragraph 1 through 93 above, as if fully set forth herein. 95. Plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of the putative Class, seek a ruling that the Defendants have violated Alabama law with respect to the payment of State Holidays and the payment of Longevity Pay. 96. Plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of the Class, seek injunctive relief enjoining the Defendants from continuing to violate Alabama law with respect to the payment of State Holidays and the payment of Longevity Pay. 97. Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of all monies owed together with interest. Plaintiffs further seek a mandatory injunction requiring the Defendants to discontinue violating Alabama law with respect to the payment of State Holidays and the payment of Longevity Pay and to provide such other relief as is just and proper. 98. Plaintiffs and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law. Count I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 History of the U.S. Space & Rocket Center

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(Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) 27. Defendant, Hu Master Holdings LLC, controls and operates Hukitchen.com. in New York State and throughout the United States. 28. Hukitchen.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse chocolate bars, hunks, gems, and crackers, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 29. Among the features offered by Hukitchen.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Hu on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to view the different flavors of chocolate and nut products, make purchase; and (c) learning about the company and its story, promotions, and recipes, amongst other features. 30. This case arises out of Hu’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Hukitchen.com. Due to Hu’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Hukitchen.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Hu, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Hukitchen.com. 32. Hukitchen.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 33. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Hukitchen.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Hukitchen.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 36. Similarly, on Hukitchen.com, blind customers are not aware if the desired products, such as chocolate-covered almonds, have been added to the shopping cart because the screen-reader does not indicate the type of product. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Hukitchen.com. 37. Furthermore, Hukitchen.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Hukitchen.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 38. Furthermore, Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping cart because the shopping cart form does not specify the purpose of the shopping cart. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping cart. Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping carts and cannot checkout and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Hukitchen.com. 39. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Hukitchen.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 41. Due to Hukitchen.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Hukitchen.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Hukitchen.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Hukitchen.com. 42. Hukitchen.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Hukitchen.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Hukitchen.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Hukitchen.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 45. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Hukitchen.com. 46. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Hukitchen.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Hukitchen.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Hukitchen.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 50. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Hukitchen.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Hukitchen.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 51. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 52. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Hukitchen.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Hukitchen.com. 54. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Hu has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Hukitchen.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 55. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 58. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 59. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 60. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 61. Hukitchen.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 62. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Hukitchen.com. 64. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 65. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 66. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 68. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Hu who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Hukitchen.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Hukitchen.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 71. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 72. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 74 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 76. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 77. Hukitchen.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 78. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Hukitchen.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 79. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Hukitchen.com, causing Hukitchen.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 81. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 82. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 83. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 85. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Hukitchen.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 86. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 87. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 89. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 90. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 89 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 91. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 93. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 94. Hukitchen.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 95. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Hukitchen.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 96. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Hukitchen.com, causing Hukitchen.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 98. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 99. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 100. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 101. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 102. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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10. At all times material, each Plaintiff was an owner of a commercial vehicle within the meaning of 49 C.F.R. § 376.2(d) and a "lessor" within the meaning of 49 C.F.R. § 376.2(f). 11. Benchmark is a motor carrier as defined at 49 U.S.C. § 13102 (12). 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 mandates that leases between motor carriers such as Benchmark and commercial vehicle owners such as the Plaintiffs contain specific terms and that regulated motor carriers such as Benchmark adhere to those terms. 12. Benchmark is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Unified. Both Benchmark and Unified share common executive management and the actions of Benchmark are for the ultimate benefit of Unified. 13. The officers and directors of Unified exercise effective control over the operation of Benchmark and are and have been fully aware of the conduct complained of herein which results in significant profits for Unified. 14. Benchmark and Unified are jointly and severally responsible for the damages claimed herein. 16. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all other individuals and entities similarly situated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The class is defined as follows: All owner-operators of motor vehicle equipment who at any time in the four years prior to the filing of this lawsuit were parties to a lease agreement governed by 49 C.F.R. Part 326 with Benchmark Transport Services, Inc. and/or Benchmark Logistics, Inc. Excluded from the class are all owners, officers and directors of Benchmark Energy Transport Services, Inc., Benchmark Logistics, Inc., and Unified Logistics Holdings, LLC. 17. Plaintiffs are a member of the class they seek to represent. 18. This action satisfies the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 19. The conduct of Benchmark has caused money damages to Plaintiffs and the proposed class. 20. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 22. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the class. The same conduct that gives rise to the claims of Plaintiffs are identical to those that give rise to the claims of other members of the class. 23. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. There are no disabling conflicts of interest between Plaintiffs and the class. 24. Plaintiffs have suffered the same injuries as other class members making their interests co-extensive with those of the class. 25. Common questions of law and fact predominate over individualized questions. 26. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 27. Benchmark has in its possession all records necessary to determine who would be members of the class and what amounts are owing to the class. 28. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(2) a carrier providing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 13501 et seq. is liable for damages sustained by a person for violations of 49 U.S.C. § 13101 et seq. and of regulations promulgated pursuant to 49 49. For Count Two of their Complaint, Plaintiffs reallege those matters set forth in paragraphs one through 48 above and further state: 50. Benchmark breached its lease contracts with each Plaintiff that incorporated the provisions specified in 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 as a matter of law. (see Exhibit A) 51. As a result of the breach of the leases by Benchmark, each Plaintiff has incurred damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but estimated to be in excess of $10,000.00 per year for each Plaintiff. 52. For Count Three of their Complaint, Plaintiffs reallege those matters set forth in paragraphs one through 51 above and further state: 54. As a direct and proximate result of Benchmark's violations of part 376, owner- operators are deprived of sums rightfully belonging to them and have incurred substantial monetary damages. Benchmark’s failures are actionable under 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(1) and (2). 55. Throughout the terms of the leases between each Plaintiff and Benchmark, Benchmark prepared or caused to be prepared periodic settlement statements that Benchmark provided to each Plaintiff setting forth each Plaintiff’s compensation. 56. In preparing periodic settlement statements, Benchmark caused the settlement statements to understate the revenue billed by Benchmark that in turn understated the compensation to which each Plaintiff was entitled. 57. Benchmark understated each Plaintiff’s compensation on periodic settlement statements in order to commit acts of conversion of funds due to each Plaintiff from Benchmark. 58. As the proximate result of the conversion by Benchmark, each Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but estimated to be in excess of $10,000.00 per year for each Plaintiff.

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11. On or about July 9, 2008, July 11, 2008, July 21, 2008, October 29, 2008, April 28, 2009, April 30, 2009, May 7, 2009, May 19, 2009, June 30, 2009, September 29, 2009, October 6, 2009, December 1, 2009, January 22, 2010, February 1, 2010, March 4, 2010, April 2, 2010, June 2, 2010, June 22, 2010, June 23, 2010, July 16, 2010, August 12, 2010, August 18, 2010, September 21, 2010, September 30, 2010, October 14, 2010, October 26, 2010, October 28, 2010, November 30, 2010, December 2, 2010, December 29, 2010, February 4, 2011, March 23, 1011, June 3, 2011, November 1, 2011, December 1, 2011 and December 5, 2011, Defendants faxed a total of 36 advertisements to Plaintiff. Copies of the facsimiles are attached 4 hereto as Group Exhibit B. Twenty-seven (27) of these fax advertisements were sent by Defendants after the Geismann case was filed and remained pending. 12. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the faxes. 13. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and similar unsolicited facsimiles to Plaintiff and more than 39 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 14. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 15. Defendants’ facsimiles did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 64

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1. 12. 13. Excluded from the class are all attorneys for the class, officers and members of Telecomputer Services, Inc., including officers and members of any entity with an ownership interest in Telecomputer Services, Inc. or its parent or subsidiary companies, any judge who sits on the case, and all jurors and alternate jurors who sit on the case. 15. Every aggrieved consumer misled by defendants’ advertisement as alleged in this complaint suffered an actual ascertainable loss of service fees they paid to defendants. But for defendants’ false representations as alleged in this complaint and their failure to disclose known defects and nonconformities of their services, plaintiff and the members of the putative class would not have paid defendants any money and would have instead used a different internet service provider. 16. Defendants’ behavior as alleged in this complaint willfully violated the UTPA, including ORS 646.608(1) (b), (e), (g), (i), and (t). This UTPA violation is common to the putative class. 17. The class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, the class includes thousands of members, based on defendants’ public statements about the size of its customer base. 19. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class because each was misled by defendants’ false representations and failures to disclose, the injuries suffered by plaintiff and the class members vary only in the amount of service fees collected by defendants, and plaintiff’s claim for relief is based upon the same legal theories as are the claims of the other class members. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the class because his claim is typical of the claims of the class, he is represented by nationally known and locally respected attorneys who have experience handling class action litigation and consumer protection cases who are qualified and competent, and who will vigorously prosecute this litigation, and their interests are not antagonistic or in conflict with the interests of the class. 21. 7. On November 7, 2017, it was reported that defendants breached their legal duty to their customers by failing to use reasonable care to protect their data from unauthorized access by third parties. See Spirit One gave subscriber access to other customers’ emails, The Oregonian, Mike Rogoway, November 7, 2017. 8. In an attempt to increase profits, defendants cut corners and failed to maintain adequate technological safeguards to ensure its services would be online and available to access by their customers upon request, as advertised. Defendants knew that their failure to protect their customers’ data from unauthorized access would cause serious risk of invasion of privacy, credit harm and identity theft for years to come. Plaintiff files this complaint as a national class action lawsuit. The class consists of consumers who: a) Viewed defendants’ advertisement for services and paid defendants a service fee to receive defendants’ services, and b) Who were unable to access defendants’ services as advertised after September 29, 2017 as alleged in this complaint.

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10. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the Debt”). 11. The Debt was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 12. Sometime after the incurrence of the Debt, Plaintiff fell behind on payments owed. 13. Thereafter, at an exact time known only to Defendant, the Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 14. In its efforts to collect the debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter (“the Letter”) dated January 11, 2018. (“Exhibit 1.”) 15. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 16. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 17. The question of whether a collection letter is deceptive is determined from the perspective of the “least sophisticated consumer.” 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) prohibits a debt collector from using the false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney. 19. The Letter is on the letterhead of “The Law Offices of M.L. Zager, P.C.” 20. The Letter identifies Defendant as a debt collector. 21. Defendant was acting as a debt collector, as defined by the FDCPA, concerning Plaintiff’s alleged debt. 3 22. No attorney employed by Defendant had any meaningful involvement in the day- to-day collection of Plaintiff’s alleged debt. 23. Although the letter references it is from Joseph Loughlin, it is unsigned. 24. Although the letter references it is from Joseph Loughlin, it directs the Plaintiff to an “Acct. Representative” Vanessa Owens. 25. The Letter contains no disclaimer concerning the lack of attorney involvement in the collection of Plaintiff’s alleged debt. 26. The Letter misleads consumers into believing that there is meaningful attorney involvement in the collection of the debt. 27. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be deceived by Defendant’s conduct. 28. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be deceived in a material way by Defendant’s conduct. 29. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be deceived into believing that an attorney had meaningful involvement in the collection of the alleged debt. 30. Defendant has violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3) by falsely implying that its collection letter is a communication from an attorney. 31. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York from whom Defendant attempted to collect a consumer debt using a collection letter substantially similar to the Letter herein, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. 32. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 33. Defendant regularly engages in debt collection. 34. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendant attempted to collect delinquent consumer debts using a collection letter substantially similar to the Letter herein. 35. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this class action complaint affect all members of the Class and predominate over 4 any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. This class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 36. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 37. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class action proposed is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this class action complaint will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws.

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1. An order certifying the Class as defined above; 1. An order certifying the Class as defined above; 1. An order certifying the New York Subclass as defined above; 1. An order certifying the Class as defined above; 11. Defendant, through its vending machines located throughout New York and elsewhere nationwide, provides snacks, meals, and beverages to consumers. 12. As an ordinary business practice, Defendant discloses the price of each food or beverage product sold in its vending machines using either a physical label or a digital screen located by the payment terminal. 13. However, Defendant fails to inform consumers that using a credit or debit card to purchase such products will result in an additional surcharge beyond the price specifically disclosed by Defendant. 14. Indeed, consumers are only made aware of the credit card surcharge after they have swiped their credit or debit card and the transaction is processed, at which point it is too late to cancel the transaction. 15. Accordingly, Defendant regularly collects credit card surcharges that it did not have any authorization to charge and falsely advertised the price of its food and beverage products. 17. Specifically, relying on the prices represented on Defendant’s vending machine, Plaintiff chose to purchase a beverage that was advertised as being sold for $2.00. Plaintiff swiped his credit card on the payment terminal attached to the vending machine to provide payment for his drink purchase, and the selected the drink product, which was promptly provided to him by the machine. 18. However, when Plaintiff later checked his online bank statement, he discovered that he was actually charged $2.35 for the drink product – 35 cents more than the price that was specifically displayed on Defendant’s vending machine. 19. Critically, nowhere on the machine, or at any point during the purchase process, did Defendant disclose that credit or debit card users would be charged an additional surcharge or that Plaintiff would be charged $2.35 instead of $2.00. 2. An award of actual or compensatory damages; and 2. An award of actual or compensatory damages; 2. An award of actual or compensatory damages; and 2. An award of actual or compensatory damages; and 20. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class were deceived and/or misled by Defendant’s representations regarding the purchase price of the beverage and food products which they purchased from Defendant’s vending machines and these representations and Defendant’s failure to disclose a credit card fee were material factors that influenced Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ decisions to purchase such products. 21. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would not have purchased the products that they bought, or would have chosen a different payment method, had they known that Defendant’s representations about the purchase price were false and misleading and that an additional fee would be assessed if they used a credit or debit card. 23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and a nationwide class (the “Class”) and a New York Subclass (the “Subclass”), defined as follows: The Class: All persons in the United States who, within the applicable statute of limitations, purchased products from one of Defendant’s vending machines using a credit or debit card. The New York Subclass: All persons in the United States, who within the applicable statute of limitations, purchased products from one of Defendant’s vending machines located in the State of New York using a credit or debit card. 24. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Class and Subclass. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the other members of the Class and Subclass, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interest adverse to those of the other members of the Class and Subclass. 25. Absent a class action, most members of the Class and Subclass would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive and would have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 27. The factual and legal bases of Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff and to the other members of the Class and Subclass are the same, resulting in injury to the Plaintiff and to all of the other members of the Class and Subclass. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class and Subclass have all suffered harm and damages as a result of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. 28. Upon information and belief, there are thousands of members of the Class and Subclass such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 3. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. 3. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. 3. An award of statutory damages, including damages for Defendant’s willful and knowing violation of GBL § 349; 30. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 29 as though fully set forth herein. 31. The New York Consumer Protection from Deceptive Acts and Practices statute, codified at General Business Law § 349 (“GBL § 349”), declares unlawful all deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of any business, including the sale of products, such as Defendant’s food and beverage products. 32. Plaintiff and the members of the Subclass constitute “persons” who have been injured by violation of GBL § 349, and therefore are entitled to bring an action to enjoin such unlawful and deceptive practices, and recover damages. 33. Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein is consumer-oriented conduct, in that Defendant sells food and beverage products to consumers and members of the public. 34. Defendant’s actions in assessing a credit card surcharge fee that is not disclosed to consumers is materially misleading. 35. As a result of Defendant’s materially misleading statements regarding the price of food and beverages that Defendant offered for sale, Plaintiff and the members of the Subclass have been injured. 36. Upon information and belief, the aforementioned actions and conduct of the Defendant have been committed willfully and knowingly. 38. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 29 as though fully set forth herein. 39. Defendant offered various food and beverage products for sale to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class at a specific price. 4. Injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant’s unfair and deceptive advertising practices; 40. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class accepted Defendant’s offer to purchase the food and beverage products offered for sale by Defendant at the price disclosed, and tendered payment. 42. However, Plaintiff did not honor the prices listed for its food and beverage products, and instead charged Plaintiff and the other members of the Class an additional credit card surcharge that Defendant had not disclosed, and that Plaintiff and the other members of the Class did not agree to pay. 43. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have incurred monetary damages in the amount of the credit card surcharge automatically assessed by Defendant. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, prays for the following relief: 44. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 29 as though fully set forth herein. 45. Defendant offered various food and beverage products for sale to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class at a specific price. 46. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class chose to purchase the food and beverage products offered for sale by Defendant at the price disclosed, and tendered payment. 48. As a result of Defendant’s undisclosed credit card surcharges, it has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 49. Allowing Defendant to retain the undisclosed credit card surcharges is against equity and good conscience. 5. An award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs; and 50. Defendant lacks any justification for keeping the undisclosed charges paid by Plaintiff and members of the Class. 51. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have incurred monetary damages in the amount of the credit card surcharge automatically assessed by Defendant. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, prays for the following relief: 52. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 29 as though fully set forth herein. 53. Defendants were responsible for the maintenance and operation of the vending machines from which Plaintiff and members of the Class made purchases. 54. Plaintiff, and members of the Class, were not given notice of any charge, fee, or payment owed above or in addition to the price stated for the product on Defendant’s vending machine. 56. The amount of money paid on top of the indicated purchase price by Plaintiff and members of the Class was never refunded 57. Plaintiff and members of the Class relied on the posted prices for goods in Defendant’s vending machines when making their purchases. 58. Plaintiff and members of the Class expected to pay only the amount of the prices displayed in or on the Defendants’ vending machines. 59. Each time Plaintiff or a member of the Class made a purchase from a Defendant’s vending machines, they were ultimately charged the incorrect amount, higher than the displayed price. 6. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. 60. Defendant misrepresented the amount it was charging consumers. 61. Defendant fraudulently omitted the actual amount it was charging consumers. 62. Defendant intended that Plaintiff and members of the Class make purchases at vending machines it owned or serviced. 63. Defendant intended Plaintiff and members of the Class to make purchases by relying on its omission that additional charges would be charged on credit card and debit card purchases. 64. Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered damages each time they made purchases at Defendant’s vending machines intending to pay only the amount displayed on the machine. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class, prays for the following relief: Breach of Contract (on behalf of the Class) Fraudulent Misrepresentation (on behalf of the Class) Unjust Enrichment, In the Alternative (on behalf of the Class) Violation of the New York Consumer Protection from Deceptive Acts and Practices Statute, General Business Law § 349 (on behalf of the New York Subclass)

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Negligent Misrepresentation 163. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the above allegations as if fully set forth herein. 164. Defendant had a duty to disclose the presence of artificial ingredients, synthetic additives, chemical preservatives or added artificial colors in Misbranded Tea Products. 165. In making misrepresentations of fact and omissions of material fact to Plaintiff and the other Class members about its Misbranded Tea Products, Defendant failed to fulfill its duties to disclose the material facts alleged above. Among the direct and proximate causes of said failure to disclose were the negligence and carelessness of Defendant. 166. Plaintiff and the other Class members, as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s breaches of its duties, reasonably relied upon such representations and omissions to their detriment. 167. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered damages in an amount to be proved at trial, together with punitive damages.

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23. In or about September 2019, Defendant sent the following telemarketing text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 3899 (the “3899 Number”): 6 24. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff an automobile. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises that Defendant is “highly motivated to make deals!!!!” with “GREAT specials”. 27. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 7 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 3899 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 3899 Number. 30. Plaintiff has been registered with the national do-not-call registry since 2008. 31. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 32. The text messages originated from telephone number 330-915-3129, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 33. The number used by Defendant (330-915-3129) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 34. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS 8 gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 35. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 36. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 37. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 39. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 42. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 43. To transmit the messages at issue, the Platform automatically executed the following steps: 9 a. The Platform retrieved each telephone number from a list of numbers in the sequential order the numbers were listed; b. The Platform then generated each number in the sequential order listed and combined each number with the content of Defendant’s message to create “packets” consisting of one telephone number and the message content; c. Each packet was then transmitted in the sequential order listed to an SMS aggregator, which acts an intermediary between the Platform, mobile carriers (e.g. AT&T), and consumers. d. Upon receipt of each packet, the SMS aggregator transmitted each packet – automatically and with no human intervention – to the respective mobile carrier for the telephone number, again in the sequential order listed by Defendant. Each mobile carrier then sent the message to its customer’s mobile telephone. 44. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 45. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 46. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention: 10 47. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 48. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted approximately 120 seconds reviewing all of Defendant’s unwanted messages. Each time, Plaintiff had to stop what she was doing to either retrieve her phone and/or look down at the phone to review the message. 49. Furthermore, Defendant’s text messages took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 50. Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 11 51. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 52. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting Defendant’s goods and services, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and services; and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 53. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 56. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 57. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 63. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any 14 automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 64. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 65. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 66. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 67. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 68. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 69. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 15 70. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 71. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 72. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 73. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 74. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 75. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 76. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”1 1 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003) Available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-153A1.pdf 16 77. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 78. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 79. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 80. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 81. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. 17 Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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!Violation of the l•air Labor Standards Act! 18. The Individual Defendants actively participate in the day-to-day operat ion of the Restaurant. For instance , Individual Defendants perso nally supervise and direct the work of the employees. instruc t the emp loyees how to perform their jobs, and correc t and/or reprimand the employees for errors made. 39. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as class representat ive on behalf of l1imself and all other current and former non-exempt emp loyees who have been or were emp loyed by Defendants since Decembe r 1. 20 13 (the "Collective Action Period"), and who were compensated at rates less than the statutory minimum wage ru1d/or less than time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of fo11y (40) hours per workweek (the "Collective /\ction Members"). 41. Plaintiff will fairly and adequate ly protect the interests of the Collect ive Actio.n Members and has retained counsel that is exper ienced and competent in the fields of emp loyment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are cont rary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 42. Th is action should be certified as a collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of either inconsistent or varying adjudicat ions with respect to individual members of the class, or adj udica tions with respect to individual members of the class that would as a practical matter be dispositivc of the interests of the other members not parties to the ad_judication, or substantially impair or impede their abi lity to protect their interests. 43. A collective action is superior to othe r avai lable methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joind er of all members is impracticab le. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collec tive Action Members may be relative ly small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficu lty in the management of this action as a collective action. 46. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by the Defendants' wrongfu l conduct. 47. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rul.es 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Prncedure. 48. Plaintiff brings his New York Labor Law claims on behalf of all persons who were emp loyed by Defendants m any time since December 1, 2010 (the "Class Period") who were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the New York Labor Law and have not been paid statutory minimum wages, overt ime compensation, and/or "spread of hours' ' premium in violation of the New York Labor Law (the "C lass"). 49. Upon information and belief, the persons in the Class identified herein arc so numerou s that joind er of all members is impracticable. Although the identity and precise number of such persons is unknown , and the facts upon which the calcu lation of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants , the Class consists of all non-managerial current and former employees and, therefore , is so numerous that joinder is impracticable and most of whom would not be likely to file individua l suits because they lack financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims . . 51. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable lo the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or conesponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 52. Plaintiff has committed himself to pursuing this action and has retained counsel experienced in employment law and class action litigation. 53, Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the NY Class members. Plaintiff understands that, as class representative , he assumes a fiduciary respons ibility 10 the Class and Collective Action Members to represent their interests fairly and adequately , and that he must consider the interests of the Class and Collective Action Members just as he would represent and consider his own interests, and that he may not favor his own interests over those of the Class or Collective Action Members. 54. Plaintiff recognizes that any reso lution of a class action lawsuit, including any settlement or dismis sal thereof: must be in the best interests of the Class and Collective Action Members. Plaintiff understands that in order to provide adequate represen tation, he must remain informed of litigation development s and he understands that he may be called upon to testify in depositions and at trial. 55. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the Class and Plain ti li s claims are typical of the Class. 57. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in parngrap hs " 1" through "56" of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 58. At all relevant times, upon information and bel ief, the Corporate Defendants were and continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a) . Further, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are covered individua ls within the meaning of the F{.,SA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 59. At all relevant times. Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 60. Upon information and beliet: at least within each of the three (3) most recent years, the Corporate Defendants - either jo intly or individually, has had gross revenues in excess of $500.000. 6 1. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members worked hours for which they were not paid the statutory minimum wage. 62. Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for hours worked. 64. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were entitled to be paid at the rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 65. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members overtime compensation in the lawful amount for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 66. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensat ion at the statutory rate of time and one- half to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week, wnich violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 el seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(I) and 215(a). 67. Defendants knowing ly and willfully disrega rded the provisions of the J=LSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Collect ive Action Members at the statlltory minimum wage rate and the statutory overt ime rate of time aod one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per week , when they knew or should have known such was due and that non-payment of minimum wages and overtime com pensation would financially injure Plaintiff and the Collect ive Action Members. 69. Defendants failed to properly disclose or appr ise Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members of their rights under the FLSA. 70. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of the FLSA. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to the FLSA. 71. Due to chc reck less, willfu l and unlawful acts of the Defendants. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members suffered damages in an amount not presently asce rtainab le of unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overt ime compensation, an equa l amoun t as liquidated damages , and prejudgment interes t thereon . 72. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 73. Plaint iff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegat ion and statement contained in paragraphs " 1" throug h "72" of this Com plaint as if fully set forth herein. 74. Defendants emp loyed Plaintiff and the Class members within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 65 J. 75. Defendants know ingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and members of the Class by failing to pay them minimum wages in the lawfol amount for hours worked. 77. Employers are requ ired to pay a "sprea d of hours" premium of one (I) additi onal hour's pay at the statutory minimum hourly wage rate for each day where the spread of hours in an emp loyee's workday exceeds ten ( I 0) hours. New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146 -1.6. 78. Defendants knowing ly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and members of the Class by failing to pay them a "sprea d of hours" premium for each day they worked in excess of ten ( I 0) hours pursuant to New York State Department of Labor Regu lations. 79. Defe11dants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and members of the Class of their rights under the New York Labor Law. 80. Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff and members of the Class with a statement with every payment of wages listing gross wages, deductions and net wages , in contravention of New York Labor Law§ 195(3) and New York State Departmen t of Labor Regulations§ 146-2.3. 81. Defendant~ failed to keep true and accurate records of hours worked by each emp loyee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate , the wages paid to all employees, and other simi lar information in contravention of New York Labor Law § 661 83. At the time of their hiring, the Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff and members of the Class of their rates of pay and their regular ly designated payday, in contraven tion of New York Labor Law§ 195(1). 84. Due to the Defendants' New York Labo r Law violat ions, Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to recover from the Defendants their unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compe nsation, and unpaid "spread of hours" premium. reasonable attorneys ' fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to New York Labor Law§§ 663(1) , J 98. 85. Plaintiff and members of the Class are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labo r Law § 663( I). as well as civil penaltie s and/or liquidated damages pursuant to tbe New York State Wage Theft Prevention Act. fViolation of the New York Labor LawJ

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14. 8 Spruce owns and manages New York by Gehry, an apartment building located at 8 Spruce Street, New York, New York. It rents within this building, studio apartments, and apartments with one or more bedrooms. 15. 8 Spruce’s Website is heavily integrated with its building, serving as a gateway to it. Through the Website, 8 Spruce’s tenants and prospective tenants are, inter alia, able to: learn information about the building, including its location, apartment features and building amenities; view images and floorplans of the apartments; learn about the neighborhood; learn about what apartments are available; read press reviews about the building, interact with the company via social media links contained on the Website, contact the company via an online form and apply for an apartment. 17. Plaintiff Fischler cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 19. Plaintiff Fischler was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services 8 Spruce offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant websites: a. Images are not properly tagged and therefore are not detected by screen readers; no alt-text is provided for these images. b. Links use general text like “Click Here” with no surrounding text explaining the link’s purpose. c. Links use general text like “Read More” without explaining the links purpose. d. Several links on a page share the same link text but go to a different destination. e. Webpages have markup errors. 8 Spruce Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 21. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, learn about available apartments, learn about the neighborhood, and contact the building as sighted users can. 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 23. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Fischler and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Fischler alleges that 8 Spruce has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Fischler, as a member of a protected class. 24. 8 Spruce therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 26. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because 8 Spruce lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Fischler seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring 8 Spruce to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Fischler to assist 8 Spruce to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.1 compliant; b. Training 8 Spruce employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that 8 Spruce’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on 8 Spruce’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 27. Although 8 Spruce may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, 8 Spruce lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 29. 8 Spruce has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 30. 8 Spruce has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 31. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access 8 Spruce’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in 8 Spruce’s apartment building, during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 32. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in 8 Spruce’s apartment building, during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 34. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: a. Whether 8 Spruce’s apartment building is a place of “public accommodation”; b. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; c. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; d. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and e. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 35. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that 8 Spruce has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 37. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 38. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 42. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 46. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Fischler requests the relief as set forth below. 47. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. 8 Spruce’s State of New York apartment building constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 8 Spruce’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of 8 Spruce. 8 Spruce’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these apartment building. 49. 8 Spruce is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its New York apartment building and the Website. 8 Spruce is a “person” within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 51. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 52. 8 Spruce’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that 8 Spruce has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 54. As 8 Spruce’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 55. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. 8 Spruce’s New York City building is a sales establishment and public accommodation under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with that establishment. 57. 8 Spruce is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its New York City apartment building and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 59. 8 Spruce’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 60. As such, 8 Spruce discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins 8 Spruce from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 61. As 8 Spruce’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 63. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that 8 Spruce denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its apartment building, which 8 Spruce owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 64. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. 8 Spruce, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates LIBERTY Cruises as well as the LIBERTY website, offers it to the public and it offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its Cruises. 21. Defendant operates LIBERTY Cruises in New York. At least one of these Cruises disembarks from a New York City pier. 22. These Cruises constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Cruises provide to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of services including Cruise locations and hours, information about cruise line services, including its Yachts and cruises, special pricing offers, privacy policies, promotional information, online reservations and other services. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Cruises. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Cruises and the numerous facilities, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical Cruise locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Cruises on its Website and other important information about the Cruises locations and hours, information about cruise line services, including its Yachts and cruises, special pricing offers, privacy policies, promotional information, online reservations and other services. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and learn about Defendant’s operations as sighted individuals do. 32. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s Cruise locations and hours, information about cruise line services, including its Yachts and cruises, special pricing offers, privacy policies, promotional information, online reservations and other services. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Cruises are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Cruises. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 81. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 85. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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21. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation above as though fully plead herein. 22. Upon information and belief the Selectee List finds its beginnings with the “Terrorist Screening Center” (hereinafter “TSC”) established in 2003 to consolidate the government’s approach to identifying and tracking individuals suspected of terrorist activities and/or those individuals that are known associates of the same. 23. Upon information and belief, the TSC is managed by the FBI, which develops, maintains, and amends the consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (colloquially known as the “Terrorist Watch List”). 24. The TSC shares information with other law enforcement agencies such as the Transportation Security Administration (hereinafter “TSA”), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (hereinafter “CBP”) for use in screening travelers entering the United States. 37. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation above as though fully plead herein. 47. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation above as though fully plead herein. 54. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation above as though fully plead herein. 55. Defendants’ actions as described herein were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, otherwise not in accordance with law, and contrary to constitutional rights, power, privilege, or immunity, and should be adjudicated as unlawful and set aside as such pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A) and (2)(B). 56. Congress has instructed that procedures be established to “enable airline passengers who are delayed or prohibited from boarding a flight because the advanced passenger prescreening system determined that they might post a security threat, to appeal such determination and correct information contained in the system. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(J)(2)(C)(iii)(I). 57. Further, Congress instructed the Executive to “establish a timely and fair process for individuals identified as a threat . . . to appeal to the [TSA] the determination and correct any erroneous information.” 49 FAILURE TO PROVIDE POST-DEPRIVATION NOTICE AND HEARING Violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution UNLAWFUL AGENCY ACTION U.S.C. § 706

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118. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference. 119. At all relevant times, Defendants have been an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA. 120. Defendants employed Plaintiff and each member of the FLSA Class. 121. Defendants’ pay policy denied Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class overtime compensation as required by the FLSA. 122. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class proper overtime violates 29 32. Lencho Oilfield Services is a Solids Control business. 33. Lencho Oilfield Services conducts business within the State of Texas and New Mexico. 34. Birdwell was paid according to Lencho’s day rate policy. 35. Defendants’ employees routinely handle goods or materials – such as fuel, tool bags, generators, lubricants, toolboxes, personal protective equipment, waterproof boots, gloves, and special fluid monitoring equipment - that have moved in, or were produced for, interstate commerce. 36. Defendants are an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, covered by the FLSA, and subject to the FLSA’s recordkeeping requirements and overtime wage requirements. 37. In each of the past three (3) years, Defendants’ gross revenue has exceeded $500,000. 39. Over the past three years, Defendants employed dozens of individuals—including Plaintiff as Day Rate Workers across Texas and New Mexico 40. While the Putative Class Members’ job duties may vary somewhat, these differences are not relevant for determining their rights to overtime pay. 41. Defendants pay their Day Rate Workers a day rate for the work they perform. 42. Plaintiffs’ and the Day Rate Workers’ day rates are readily found in Defendants’ payroll records. 43. The Day Rate Workers were paid a day rate. 44. The Day Rate Workers were not paid a salary. 45. The Day Rate Workers were paid based on the number of days they worked. 46. If a Day Rate Worker did not work on a certain day, then they were not paid for that day. 47. A salary is not the same as a day rate. 48. Defendants nonetheless paid a day rate without any overtime to certain employees, including Plaintiff. 49. It is well-known day rate employees are not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA and state wage laws, no matter what their job duties are. 50. Defendants recorded the hours worked by their non-exempt employees, including Plaintiff’s. 51. Defendants’ Day Rate Workers are non-exempt employees. 53. Defendant Lawrence Deculit was also directly responsible for implementing Lencho’s practice of paying its employees a day rate without overtime. 54. Lencho and Defendant Deculit had the power to hire and fire Lencho’s employees, including Plaintiff, and regularly exercised this authority. 55. Defendant Deculit hired Plaintiff. 56. Defendant Deculit set the amount of Plaintiff’s pay. 57. Defendant Deculit set up Lencho’s day rate pay plan. 58. Defendant Deculit set up Plaintiff’s work schedule. 59. Defendant Deculit controlled Plaintiff’s job locations. 60. Defendant Deculit set the employment policies and rules applicable to Plaintiff. 61. While the precise job duties of the Day Rate Workers may vary somewhat, any variations do not impact their entitlement to overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 62. An employer can pay a non-exempt employee on a day rate basis provided the employee receives overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in a week. 29 C.F.R. § 778.112. 63. Birdwell worked for Defendants as a Solids Control Technician. 64. Defendants paid Birdwell according to on a day rate. 65. Defendants routinely scheduled Birdwell and the other Putative Class Members, for twelve (12) or more hours each workday. Defendants scheduled Birdwell and the other Putative Class Members for 21 days in a row followed by 10 days off before working another 21 days assignment. 67. Over the past three (3) years, Defendants employed dozens of individuals – including Birdwell as Solids Control Technicians. 68. Defendants paid/pay the Putative Class Members a day rate without overtime. Defendants’ day rate employees (Solids Control Technicians) are non-exempt employees. 69. While the precise job duties of the day rate employees may vary somewhat, any variations do not impact their entitlement to overtime for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 70. An employer can pay a non-exempt employee on a day rate basis provided the employee receives overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 29 C.F.R. § 778.112. 71. All of Defendants’ Day Rate Workers perform manual labor in support of Defendants’ solid control business. 72. All of Defendants’ Day Rate Workers are entitled to overtime pay. 73. None of Defendants’ Day Rate Workers received/receive overtime pay. 74. Defendants know their Day Rate Workers work more than forty (40) hours in a workweek. 75. Defendants know their Day Rate Workers are not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 77. Birdwell brings this claim under Section 216(b) of the FLSA as a collective action. 78. The same policy that caused Birdwell to be denied his overtime pay caused Defendants’ other Day Rate Workers to be denied their overtime pay. 79. While the precise job duties performed by the Putative Class Members might vary somewhat, these differences don’t matter for the purposes of determining their entitlement to overtime. 80. Nor do any differences in job duties matter for determining whether Defendants’ policy of not paying Day Rate Workers overtime is legal. 81. The members of the FLSA Collective are all entitled to overtime for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek consistent with the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 82. Because Defendants uniformly failed to pay overtime to all Day Rate Workers, Birdwell and the Putative Class Members are similarly situated within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 83. Upon information and belief, Defendants employed numerous day rate employees like Birdwell during the past three (3) years. 84. Nearly all of the questions related to Birdwell and the FLSA Collective can be answered on a collective basis. 85. Defendants’ practice of paying day rates and not paying members of the FLSA Collective overtime is based on established companywide policies. 87. The most important questions presented in this case can be resolved on a collective- wide basis. 88. Absent a collective action, many members of the FLSA Collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendants will retain the proceeds of its violations of the

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(42 U.S.C. § 1981) 10. P&G intentionally discriminates against non-citizen applicants for employment in the United States on the basis of alienage by utilizing a facially discriminatory policy and/or practice that categorically denies employment to non-citizens who are authorized to work in the U.S., but who are not U.S. permanent residents, refugees, or individuals granted asylum. 11. P&G further subjects non-citizen applicants for employment in the United States, on the basis of alienage, to additional requirements that are not imposed on U.S. citizen applicants, and rejects the non-citizen applicants who cannot satisfy the additional requirements. 12. In October 2013, P&G denied Mr. Rodriguez’s application for an internship with the company on the basis of these policies and/or practices, even though he was legally authorized to work in the United States. 13. On or around December 5, 2012, Mr. Rodriguez was granted an Employment Authorization Document (“EAD”) pursuant to DACA. 14. On or around September 2013, Mr. Rodriguez attended an on-campus information session at FIU advertising P&G’s internship program. Eduardo Moreno, a P&G recruiter and FIU alumnus, and Jose Nuñez, an FIU student who had completed a P&G internship and worked as a company Campus Ambassador, hosted the information session. 15. During the information session, Mr. Moreno discussed the various types of internships P&G offered and informed the attendees that the internships were paid, were approximately 10 to 12 weeks in duration, and could be based in either Cincinnati, Ohio or Boston, Massachusetts. 17. After the information session, Mr. Moreno handed out his business card and instructed the attendees, including Mr. Rodriguez, to send him their resumes so that he could review the resumes and give the attendees advice about obtaining an internship with P&G. 18. The P&G Campus Ambassador, Jose Nuñez, also collected the attendees’ contact information, including Mr. Rodriguez’s, and later emailed them a sample of P&G’s assessment exam, which is part of the internship application and was discussed in the information session. 19. Later that night, Mr. Rodriguez sent Mr. Moreno his resume, expressed his desire for a P&G internship, and requested input on his resume. 20. A few days later, Mr. Moreno emailed Mr. Rodriguez with some pointers for his resume. 21. After receiving Mr. Moreno’s input and making revisions to his resume, Mr. Rodriguez went to P&G’s career website, www.experiencePG.com, selected an internship application for P&G’s Finance and Accounting Department, uploaded his resume, and answered the company’s pre-screening questionnaire. 23. Mr. Rodriguez correctly responded “No” to each of the above questions. He then completed the rest of the pre-screening questionnaire and submitted it to P&G through its website. 24. According to the information given to attendees at the FIU information session, the next step in Mr. Rodriguez’s application process was for him to complete two types of assessment tests online, which should have been sent to him as a web link via an email from P&G following the submission of his application. 25. Mr. Rodriguez never received the expected web link to P&G’s assessment tests. After a week of waiting, he emailed both Mr. Moreno and Mr. Nuñez and inquired about the status of his application. Mr. Moreno responded via email and instructed Mr. Rodriguez to correct his graduation date on his online application and re-submit it to P&G, as Mr. Rodriguez had erroneously indicated that he would graduate from FIU on the Fall of 2014 instead of the Winter of 2014. 26. Mr. Rodriguez revised his online application and then emailed P&G’s Recruitment Team on October 3, 2013, explaining that he needed to revise his graduation date. He also requested clarification of the company’s immigration status criteria. Mr. Rodriguez’s email explained that he possessed a valid work permit and did not need employer sponsorship to work lawfully in the United States. 27. A day or two after sending his email to P&G’s Recruitment Team, Mr. Rodriguez received an internship rejection letter from P&G via email. 29. In addition to P&G’s immigration status screening questionnaire and Mr. Moreno’s statement regarding P&G’s policy and/or practice, some P&G job postings specifically warn under the “Qualifications” section that “[c]andidates must be a U.S. citizen or national, refugee, asylee or lawful permanent resident.” 36. Plaintiff brings his class allegations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), (c)(4) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class defined as follows: All non-citizens, who are within the jurisdiction of the United States and legally authorized to work in the United States, who were denied employment with P&G in the United States under the company’s policies and/or practices for hiring non-citizens, between July 17, 2013 and the date of judgment in this action (the “Class”). 37. Plaintiff is a member of the Class. 38. Upon information and belief, the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all of them is impracticable. P&G has offices throughout the United States, USCIS has approved over 1.3 million initial and renewal requests for DACA, and there are thousands of other individuals who, despite having work authorization, do not meet P&G’s requirements for 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 47. Plaintiff brings this claim on his own behalf and on behalf of the Class. 48. Plaintiff is a person within the jurisdiction of the United States. 49. Plaintiff is an alien. 50. Plaintiff is legally authorized to work in the United States. 51. P&G has discriminated against Plaintiff and the Class on the basis of alienage by rescinding or denying them contracts to work or deterring them from work opportunities because they are not U.S. citizens, permanent residents, refugees, or individuals granted asylum by the United States. 52. P&G’s intentional discrimination against Plaintiff and the Class has interfered with their right to make and enforce work contracts. 53. Defendant’s facially discriminatory policy and/or practice of denying work opportunities to Plaintiff and the Class based on their alienage, despite their legal authorization to work in the United States, has harmed Plaintiff and the Class and constitutes unlawful alienage discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 55. Defendant’s conduct has caused, and continues to cause, Plaintiff and the members of the Class substantial losses in earnings and other work benefits.

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18. In 2010, FCA began equipping its vehicles with AHR systems in order to protect against whiplash injuries in the event of a rear-end collision. FCA installed these headrests in millions of vehicles sold throughout the United States, including in this District and the rest of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Millions of these vehicles remain on the road. 19. Grammer designed and manufactured the AHR Systems that FCA installed in its vehicles, and which are at issue in this action, and supplied them to FCA with the intent and knowledge that the headrests would be installed in FCA vehicles that would be sold in the United States and in this District. 21. In promotional materials and advertising, FCA repeatedly touts its dedication to safety, with respect to the design and manufacture of its Vehicles. For instance, in the brochures advertising its Jeep vehicles, FCA proclaims that the vehicles have “over 70 available safety and security features” and that “beneath the surface of the Jeep Grand Cherokee lies a work of safety . . . systems that give you confidence behind the wheel and help protect you and your passengers.” In advertising the Chrysler 300, FCA asserts that these Vehicles “have 80+ standard and available safety features” and are “Equipped to Protect.” The brochure advertising the Town and Country states that FCA’s “care for future generations meet[s] your safety standards.” 22. The AHR Systems installed in the Subject Vehicles constitute one of the critical safety features promoted by FCA. As explained above, these headrests were designed to prevent or reduce injuries to the Vehicle driver and passengers in the event of a rear-end collision. When functioning properly in the manner described above, the headrests’ forward deployment protects the passenger from suffering whiplash injuries when the car has been hit from behind. 24. A reasonable consumer would consider the existence of this defect in the subject Vehicles material in deciding whether to purchase or lease a Vehicle. Had Plaintiff Mario Soares and other Class Members known about the defective AHR System, they would not have purchased or leased their FCA Vehicles, and/or they would have paid less for them. As a result of Plaintiff Mario Soares and Class Members’ reliance on FCA’s material misrepresentations and/or omissions, Plaintiff Mario Soares and the Class have suffered ascertainable loss of money and/or property and/or loss of value in their vehicle. 25. Reasonable consumers, like Plaintiff Mario Soares and Class Members, expect and assume that a vehicle’s headrest will not suddenly and unexpectedly deploy and strike them in the head while driving on the highway, or under any other normal driving conditions. Plaintiff Mario Soares and the Class would also be reasonable in assuming that Grammer would not provide FCA with known safety defects, and that FCA would not sell or lease vehicles with known safety defects. Further, reasonable consumers like Plaintiff Mario Soares and Class Members would expect that Defendants would disclose to consumers any defects upon learning of those defects. Plaintiff Mario Soares and Class Members would also be reasonable in assuming that Defendants would not fail to disclose any defects, would not persistently deny the existence of defects, and would not charge consumers hundreds of dollars to address those defects. 36. Plaintiff Mario Soares owns a 2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee. In April of 2015, Mr. Soares purchased the Vehicle from Stateline Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram in Somerset, Massachusetts for personal, non-commercial purposes. At the time of purchase, the Vehicle was new. 37. One factor that influenced Mr. Soares’ decision to buy the Jeep, rather than another vehicle, was their understanding that that the Jeep was one of the safest SUV’s available. In coming to this understanding and making this choice, they relied in part on FCA’s assurances that the Vehicle was safe, along with FCA’s advertisements and the materials available on FCA’s website concerning the Vehicle’s safety features. 38. If, at the time that he purchased his Jeep, Mr. Soares had been aware of the fact that the 2015 Jeep was outfitted with a defective AHR System, which was composed of weak materials that made the Jeep unsafe to drive, he would not have purchased the Jeep or would have paid significantly less for it. 40. After the headrest deployed, Mr. Soares and Ms. Costa conducted research to determine if the defendants would cover the cost of replacing both the driver and passenger side headrests. This research revealed that the defendants have a policy of not covering the cost of replacing either headrest under its warranty. They also discovered that the cost to them to replace the headrest would likely exceed $1,400. Because Mr. Soares does not have sufficient funds to cover the costs of replacing the two headrests, he continues to drive the vehicle with a deployed headrest on one side and a defective, non-deployed, headrest on the other that could explode at any moment. Plaintiff Maria Costa 41. On or about February 17, 2020, Ms. Costa was driving the 2015 Jeep Grand Cherokee owned by her husband, Mario Soares. While Ms. Costa was driving, and without experiencing any collision or other rear-end impact, the AHR System in the Jeep unexpectedly deployed, creating a loud sound. The headrest hit Ms. Costa in the back of the head and startled her, and caused her to be distracted from the road. 42. As a result of the deployment, Ms. Costa has suffered chronic migrane headaches and neck pain that continue to this day. 48. Pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Mario Soares brings this action against Defendants individually and on behalf of a proposed Class comprised of: All persons in Massachusetts who currently own or lease, or who have owned or leased, any of the Subject Vehicles manufactured by FCA or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates that is equipped with an ARH system. 49. Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendants; Defendants’ employees, affiliates, officers, and directors, including franchised dealers; any claims for physical injuries related to the defect at issue in this litigation; and the judicial officer(s) to whom this case is assigned, and the judicial officer(s)’ immediate family and legal staff. 50. Plaintiff Mario Soares reserves the right, subject to additional information obtained through further investigation and discovery, to amend, expand, or narrow the foregoing definition of the Class. 51. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of his claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims, and because Plaintiff otherwise meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, as alleged below. Numerosity – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) 53. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Classes and predominate over questions affecting only individual members of the Classes. Such common questions of law or fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the design and/or materials used in AHR Systems are defective; b. Whether the Subject Vehicles’ owners’ manuals, written care and maintenance materials, and product labeling sufficiently warn customers about the dangers associated with the Subject Vehicles; c. Whether the AHR system defect constitutes a safety risk; d. Whether Defendants knowingly failed to disclose to and warn consumers of the ARH defect with the intent that consumers rely upon such concealment, suppression, or omission; e. Whether Defendants had a duty to disclose to consumers material facts concerning the serious problems that would inevitably result from the Subject Vehicles’ defect; f. Whether Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein constitutes a violation of Mass. G. L. Ch. 93A § 2; g. Whether FCA’s refusal to repair Vehicles that experienced an AHR failure constitutes a breach of express warranty; and h. Whether FCA’s sale of the defective Subject Vehicles constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 54. Defendants engaged in a common course of conduct giving rise to the legal rights Plaintiff Mario Soares seek to enforce on behalf of himself and the other Class Members. Similar or identical statutory and common law violations, business practices, and injuries are involved. These common questions, and the common answers they will generate, predominate in both quality and quantity over any individual issues that may exist. Typicality – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) 56. Plaintiff Mario Soares is an adequate representative of the Class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class members he seeks to represent. Plaintiff Mario Soares has retained counsel highly experienced in the prosecution of complex class action litigation, and Plaintiff Mario Soares intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff Soares and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all members of the proposed Class. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) 57. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other Class Members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as requested in the Prayer for Relief below, with respect to the members of the Class as a whole. Superiority – Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) 59. Furthermore, this Class may be certified because, first, the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the proposed Class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant; and, second, the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them which would, as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other Class Members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. ANOTHER CAR BUT I LOOKED AROUND AND THERE WAS NO CARS AROUND. I PULLED OVER AND LOOKED AT MY HEADREST AND IT EXPLODED AND HIT ME IN THE HEAD. I CALLED AND BROUGHT MY APPROX 6" IF THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE DRIVERS SEAT IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CAUSED THE DRIVER TO LO[ ]SE CONTROL OF THE JEEP. AT OWNERS EXPENSE. I SAW THAT MULTIPLE OTHER OWNERS OF THE 2013 TOWN AND COUNTRY ALSO HAD THIS PROBLEM. PLEASE INVESTIGATE THIS PROBLEM, I BOUGHT THIS VEHICLE BRAND NEW I. BACKGROUND MILEAGE WAS 74,519. • 2/5/17 - WHILE DRIVING IN THE CITY GOING 45MPH THE PASSENGERS HEADREST RESTRAINT SYSTEM RANDOMLY EXPLODED/ACTIVATED, NUMBER. THEY ARE BASICALLY SAYING IT IS OUT OF THEIR HANDS AND IN THE DEALERSHIPS. WE THEN CONTACTED THE DEALERSHIP WHERE WE PURCHASED AND SERVICE OUR JEEP. THEY TOLD US TO Plaintiff Mario Soares THE VEHICLE WITH ONLY 10 MILES ON IT AND SINCE THE VEHICLE NOW HAS 43,000 MILES ON IT THE MANUFACTURERS WARRANTY IS EXPIRED. THIS ISSUE IS TRULY OF GREAT CONCERN AS IT COULD THE MANUFACTURER SENT AN INSPECTOR TO INSPECT THE VEHICLE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 99,000. • 6/8/15 - THE CONTACT OWNS A 2011 JEEP COMPASS. WHILE DRIVING UNUSABLE UNLESS YOU ABSOLVE US OF LIABILITY THE VEHICLE WAS ONLY TRAVELING LESS THAN 2 MILES AN HOUR PULLING INTO OUR DRIVEWAY IT WAS A DRIVER'S SIDE HEADREST RESTRAINT AT WAS AT 80000 MILES AT THE TIME SO NO LONGER UNDER FULL WARRANTY, BUT THE MANUFACTURER SHOULD HAVE TO REPLACE FAULTY SAFETY EQUIPMENT REGARDLESS.

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13. Defendant DPS is a horizontal directional drilling business and does business throughout New Mexico and the United States. Defendants earn over $500,000.00 per year in gross sales. 14. Defendant Gardner holds himself out as the President of DPS in which capacity he has controlled the day-to-day operations of Defendant DPS. Specifically, during this time period, Gardner (1) had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and the Class Members; (2) controlled the amount Plaintiff and the Class Members were to be paid for each hour of work; and (3) regularly controlled and established company rules for Plaintiff and the Class Members. 15. Plaintiff specifically was referred to as an “Inspector” for Defendants during the three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, occupied this position for a period of several consecutive years, and through 2018. 19. Plaintiffs incorporate all allegations previously made in this Complaint. 20. Plaintiffs bring their class action on behalf of the respective NM Class Members. 21. The NM Class Members are so numerous that their joinder is impracticable. While the precise number of the NM Class Members is unknown, 300 or more Oilfield Workers worked at least one workweek of more than 40 hours in or out of New Mexico for Defendants over the past three years. 27. During the relevant period, Defendants violated and are violating the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-7, and 215(a)(2), by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA as aforesaid, for workweeks longer than 40 hours without compensating such employees for their work in excess of forty hours per week at rates no less than one-and-a- half times the regular rates for which they were employed or by failing to pay minimum wages to such employees. Defendants acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members in accordance with the law. ACCORDANCE WITH THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.EHC.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 31. Plaintiff, Jason Camacho, attended the NACAC college fair at Javits on Nov. 5, 2018 in order to obtain information from the college exhibitors presenting and marketing at the fair including the Defendant’s school. 32. Soon after attending the Javits fair, Mr. Camacho attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s school but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 35. The stated principles of NACAC members include “They strive to eliminate bias within the educational system based on …disability.”1 36. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant, that is a member of NACAC, intentionally violated NACAC’s basic principles to eliminate bias toward the disabled as well as federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. 37. NACAC maintains a business relationship with the New York Daily News newspaper which publishes full page advertisements for the NACAC college fairs at Javits and an onsite guide to the exhibitors which is distributed free of charge to attendees at the college fairs. Exhibitors, such as the Defendant, may participate in the New York Daily News advertisements and/or advertise in the onsite guide. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 40. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 41. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 42. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 44. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 48. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 56. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 58. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Defendant’s school and it’s exhibits at Javits are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s school. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 63. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 64. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 66. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant’s physical exhibit locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 87. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 90. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 92. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 97. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 98. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. DECLARATORY RELIEF 116. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 117. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 118. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504 VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

win

17. Specifically, Plaintiff made a cash withdrawal from Defendant’s ATM at the following locations: (a) On or about September 1, 2012, Plaintiff made an electronic fund transfer at Defendant’s ATM located at 100 West Emory Road, Powell, Tennessee. Defendant charged Plaintiff a fee of $3.00 in connection with the above- described transaction. 18. At the time of the above-described electronic transaction, Plaintiff did not maintain any accounts with Defendant. 19. At the time of the above-described transaction, Defendant was acting as an “automated teller machine operator” that operated the automated teller machine at which Plaintiff initiated an electronic fund transfer or a balance inquiry. 20. However, at the time of the above-described transaction, there was no notice posted “on or at” the ATM operated by Defendant apprising consumers that a fee would be charged for use of the ATM. 21. Because Defendant did not post the required notice, it was not permitted to charge a usage fee to Plaintiff and other class members. 22. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 23. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of persons to be defined as follows: All persons who during the year preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint: 1) where charged a “terminal fee” at Defendant’s ATM located at 100 West Emory Road, Powell, Tennessee which was operated by Defendant when such persons made an electronic fund transfer and/or balance inquiry where, 2) no notice indicating that such fee was to be charged was posted on or at the outside of the ATM machine. 24. Congress expressly intended that the EFTA would be enforced, in part, through private class actions. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m(a). 25. The EFTA’s class action enforcement provisions are identical, in relevant part, to the class action enforcement provisions of other consumer protection statutes and housed within 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Don Anderson’s Class Action Complaint - 6 - the Consumer Credit Protection Act. (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) There is abundant authority interpreting and applying these statutory class action provisions, throughout the federal judiciary. Federal courts have routinely certified classes relating to consumer claims for statutory damages, generally, and for violation of the EFTA’s ATM fee disclosure provisions, specifically. See, e.g., Hammer v. JP’s Southwestern Foods, LLC, No. 08-cv-0339 (W.D. Mo.)(Gaitan, J.); Flores, supra 2008 WL 4861511 at 3-5; Burns, supra., 2006 WL 3754820 at *11-12; Jackman v. Global Cash Access Holdings, 09-cv-897 (W.D. Pa.)(McVerry, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Nolf v. Allegheny Bank of Pittsburgh, 09-cv-645 (W.D.Pa.)(Bissoon, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Dragotta v. Northwest Bancorp, Inc. d/b/a Northwest Savings Bank, 09-cv-632 (W.D. Pa.)(Fischer, J.) .)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Parker v. First-Citizen Bank & Trust Company, 09-cv-0588 (M.D. Tenn.)(Campbell, J.) .)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Polevoy v. Devon Bank, 08-cv-4822 (N.D. Ill.)(Kennelly, J.) (class certified and final settlement approval granted);Ochart v. Broadway Bank, 08-cv-4893, (N.D. Ill.)(Castillo, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted);Anthony v. Fifth Third Bank (Chicago), 08-cv-4359, (N.D. Ill)(Schenkier, J.)(class certified and final settlement approval granted); Zintel v. Financial Partners Credit Union, (C.D. CA), SACV 09-0868. (class certified and final settlement approval granted). 26. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 27. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that there are at minimum, thousands of members of the class described above. 28. The exact size of the class and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records. 29. Members of the class may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Don Anderson’s Class Action Complaint - 7 - notices, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by this Court. 30. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful and willful conduct. 31. Plaintiff and members of the class were each consumers who used an ATM machine operated by Defendant to make an electronic fund transfer or balance inquiry and were charged a terminal owner fee, notwithstanding that the posting providing notice of the fee required by EFTA “on or at” Defendant’s terminals was not present. 32. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class. 33. The questions of fact and law common to the class predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: a. Whether, under 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) and 12 C.F.R. 205.16, Defendant was, at all relevant times, an automated teller machine operator that imposed a fee on consumers for providing host electronic fund transfer services to those consumers; b. Whether Defendant complied with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693(d)(3)(B) and 12 C.F.R. 205.16; and, c. Whether Plaintiff and members of the class are entitled to statutory damages, costs and/or attorneys’ fees for Defendant’s acts and conduct. 34. Adequacy of Representations: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation. 35. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the class. While the aggregate damages which may be awarded to the members of the class are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by the individual members of the class are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff Don Anderson’s Class Action Complaint - 8 - individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the class to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff does not know of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced by or against any member of the class. The likelihood of the individual members of the class prosecuting separate claims is remote. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent, or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. In contrast, the conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the class. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

lose

(Declaratory Relief) (Violations of New York State Human Rights Law) (Injunctive Relief and Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) (Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Injunctive Relief) (Violations of New York State Civil Rights Law) (Statutory Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) 27. Plaintiff has been diagnosed with cerebral palsy and cannot walk. As a result, he uses a wheelchair for mobility. 28. Defendant DELAWARE NORTH ISLANDIA PROPERTIES LLC owns or leases the commercial property which houses the public accommodation named Jake's 58 Hotel & Casino located at 3635 Express Drive North, Islandia, NY (hereinafter ‘facility’). 29. Defendant owns or operates the public accommodation named Jake's 58 Hotel & Casino located at 3635 Express Drive North, Islandia, NY. 30. In 2016/2017, Defendant purchased and substantially renovated the commercial property located at 3635 Express Drive North, Islandia, New York. A significant amount of the renovations were to the areas which affects or could affect access to or usability of its place of public accommodation. 31. In 2017, Plaintiff has gone to Defendant’s public accommodation several times. Each time, Plaintiff encountered several inaccessible slot machines. 32. Each inaccessible slot machines has an affixed seat. The affixed seat prevents Plaintiff and all others similarly situated from accessing the slot machine. 33. Defendant provides complementary self-serve soft drinks to its patrons. However, the self-serve soft drink machine is at an inaccessible height and cannot be reached by plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 34. The operable parts of Defendant’s self-service soft drink machine are more than 48 6 inches high. Consequently, Plaintiff, an individual who uses a wheelchair, cannot reach the soft drink machine. 35. Plaintiff has the intention to patronize Defendant’s public accommodation when it becomes readily accessible to and usable. 36. The removal of existing architectural barriers is readily achievable. 37. To date, Defendant has failed to remove the architectural barriers. 38. Defendant’s facility named Jake's 58 Hotel & Casino located at 3635 Express Drive North, Islandia, NY is a public accommodation within the meaning of Title III of the ADA, 42 63. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 64. Defendant’s facility named Jake's 58 Hotel & Casino located at 3635 Express Drive North, Islandia, NY is a public accommodation within the meaning of New York State Human Rights Law § 292(9). 65. Defendant has not provided Plaintiff and others similarly situated with evenhanded treatment in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 66. Defendant’s direct or indirect unevenhanded treatment of Plaintiff and others similarly situated is demonstrated when he was segregated from all other customers. 67. Defendant has, because of Plaintiff’s disability, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from or denied Plaintiff any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of their public accommodation. 68. Defendant has demonstrated that the patronage or custom thereat of Plaintiff and others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited. 69. Defendant and its agents discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 70. Defendant discriminated in against Plaintiff by creating, fostering, and otherwise failing to prevent or remedy the discrimination against Plaintiff, in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 71. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant unlawful discrimination in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer mental 11 anguish and emotional distress. 72. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 73. On the basis of Plaintiff’s disability, Defendant has violated his Civil Rights. 74. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the penalty prescribed by Civil Rights Law § 40-c and 40-d, in the amount of $500 for each and every violation. 75. Pursuant to NY Civil Rights law, Defendant is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 76. Notice of the action has been served upon the Attorney-General as required by Civil Rights Law § 40-d. 77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 78. Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment concerning the violations committed by Defendant specifying the rights of Plaintiff and other persons similarly situated as to the policies, practices, procedures, facilities, goods and services provided by Defendant.

lose

(FLSA – COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) (RACE/COLOR DISCRIMINATION – OHIO REVISED CODE § 4112.02, et seq.) (RETALIATION – OHIO REVISED CODE § 4112.02(I)) (UNPAID OVERTIME PURSUANT TO THE OHIO WAGE LAW) (VIOLATION OF OHIO'S PROMPT PAY ACT) 24. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was paid on an hourly basis in the amount of approximately $20 per hour. 25. He primarily performed blue-collar job duties consisting of operating equipment and performing general construction work on behalf of Defendants during all times relevant. 27. Plaintiff’s primary job duties did not consist of the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 28. Thus, at all times relevant, Plaintiff was employed as a non-exempt hourly employee entitled to overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in any workweek. 29. During the past three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff regularly worked over (40) hours per week. 30. During all times relevant, Plaintiff was not paid time-and-a-half (“overtime rate”) for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) resulting in unpaid overtime wages and other wages owed to Plaintiff because Defendants have an automatic meal deduction policy and/or practice whereby they deduct thirty (30) minutes per day from Plaintiff’s compensable time even though Plaintiff did not receive an uninterrupted meal period in the amount of 30 minutes each day. 31. During the relevant time period, Defendants applied the same pay practices and policies to all hourly, non-exempt employees, including Plaintiff. 32. During the previous three years preceding this Complaint, Named Plaintiff was not paid for all of his compensable hours worked due to the aforementioned meal deduction policy even though employees did not receive an uninterrupted meal period. 33. Defendants knew or should have been aware that Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, but willfully elected not to compensate him for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) during the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint. 35. Named Plaintiff brings his FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a representative action on behalf of himself and all other Similarly Situated Persons (“SSPs”) of the opt-in class, consisting of: All current and former hourly, non-exempt employees of Defendants who performed general labor and worked over 40 hours in any workweek but were not properly compensated for all of their overtime hours worked under the FLSA because of Defendant’s automatic meal deduction policy for the period beginning three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (the “§216(b) Class” or the “§216(b) Class Members”). 36. Examples of employees that may be members of the §216(b) Class include, but may not be limited to, general laborers, foremen, or equivalent positions primarily performing similar general labor job duties for Defendants. 37. This FLSA claim is brought as an "opt-in" collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) as to claims for overtime compensation, compensation withheld in violation of the FLSA, liquidated damages and attorneys' fees under the FLSA. In addition to Named Plaintiff, numerous putative §216(b) Class Members have been denied proper overtime wages due to Defendants’ company-wide payroll policies and practices. Named Plaintiff is representative of those other similarly situated employees and is acting on behalf of his interests as well as their own in bringing this action. 39. The net effect of Defendants’ policies and practices is that Defendants willfully failed to pay overtime wages and maintain proper recordkeeping to save payroll costs. Thus, Defendants enjoyed substantial ill-gained profits at the expense of the Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members. V. 40. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 41. During relevant times, Plaintiff and those similarly situated worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek, but were not compensated at a rate of at least one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 because of Defendants’ automatic meal deduction policy. 42. During relevant times, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA and the Ohio Wage Act. 43. Plaintiff and those similarly situated have suffered damages and continue to suffer damages as a result of Defendants’ acts or omissions as described herein. 44. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 46. During the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendants jointly employed the Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members. 47. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members were paid on an hourly basis when working in non-exempt positions. 48. Named Plaintiff and the §216(b) Class Members worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 49. The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated for every hour worked in a workweek. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(b). 50. The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees receive overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 51. Plaintiff was not exempt from receiving FLSA overtime benefits because, inter alia, she was not “executive,” “administrative,” or “professional” employees, as those terms are defined under the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1, et seq. 52. Plaintiff was not exempt from receiving FLSA overtime benefits because, inter alia, she was not a “learned professional” employee, as that term is defined under the FLSA. See 62. This claim is brought under Ohio Law. 63. Ohio Law requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” (1.5) the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek, “in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937.” See O.R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 64. The Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated to the Named Plaintiff from Ohio worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but were not paid one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 65. Defendants’ company-wide corporate policy of not properly paying their hourly, non-exempt one and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay rates for each hour worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek because they were not paid for time spent working through the meal period deduction even though Defendants knew or should have known that Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated did not receive an uninterrupted meal period of thirty (30) minutes each day in any workweek because they were performing substantial duties on behalf of Defendants. 66. Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans were not exempt from the wage protections of Ohio Law. 67. Defendants’ repeated and knowing failure to pay overtime wages to the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans were violations of R.C. §4111.03, and as such, Defendants acted willfully. 69. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 70. During relevant times, Defendants were entities covered by the OPPA and the Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans have been employed by Defendants within the meaning of the OPPA. 71. The OPPA requires Defendants to pay Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans all wages, including unpaid overtime, on or before the first day of each month, for wages earned by him during the first half of the preceding month ending with the fifteenth day thereof, and on or before the fifteenth day of each month, for wages earned by her during the last half of the preceding calendar month. See O.R.C. § 4113.15(A). 72. During relevant times, Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans were not paid all wages, including overtime wages at one and one-half times his regular rate within thirty (30) days of performing the work. See O.R.C. § 4113.15(B). 73. The Named Plaintiff’s and those similarly situated Ohioans' unpaid wages remain unpaid for more than thirty (30) days beyond his regularly scheduled payday. 74. Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated Ohioans have been harmed and continue to be harmed by such unpaid wages. 76. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 77. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on an individual basis. 78. Plaintiff is a member of a protected class from discrimination on the basis of race/color because he is African-American. 79. Defendants jointly employed Plaintiff for the purposes of Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112. 80. At the time of his termination, Plaintiff was the only black foreman/general laborer. 81. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was qualified for the position he held. 82. During Plaintiff’s employment, similarly situated non-protected employees were treated more favorably than Plaintiff. 84. The above-referenced disparaging remarks were directed at Plaintiff immediately preceding the yearly interim break, which occurs from January through March each year. 85. Upon Plaintiff’s expected return to work at the end of March 2017 after the interim break,2 like he had done for the past 23 years, Plaintiff received a phone call from Imer. 86. During the phone call, Imer indicated to Plaintiff that “I am not bringing you back because you are a problem and upper management does not want a problem.” In response, Plaintiff said, “aren’t you upper management?” Imer replied, “Yeah, that’s what I mean.” 87. At the time of his termination, Plaintiff had unblemished and lengthy work history. Nevertheless, Plaintiff was terminated by Imer who frequently expressed his animus towards Plaintiff and other individuals of his race/color as described above. 88. By engaging in the preceding conduct, Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff, created a hostile work environment, terminated his employment, and/or otherwise treated him less favorably than other white employees in the terms, privileges, and conditions of employment, because of his race/color, in violation of Section 4112.02 of the Ohio Revised Code. 89. Similarly situated Caucasian employees were not treated with the same indignity and did not otherwise receive the same unfavorable treatment as Plaintiff. 91. Defendants' conduct was willful, wanton, reckless and/or malicious for which Defendant is liable for compensatory damages, punitive damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 92. At all times material herein, Defendants acted in conscious and/or reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s rights, with great probability that its acts and omissions would cause substantial harm to Plaintiff. 93. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 94. In response to the racially-charged comments as described in this Complaint, Plaintiff verbally opposed being treated differently because of his race/color. He indicated to Imer that he did not appreciate being referred to as the “problem”, he did not belong in “nigger creek” like the rest of “them”, and that he would not be addressing Imer as “yes, sir” like the black people do in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, where the purported “nigger creek” is located. 95. As such, he engaged in protected activity. 96. Once Plaintiff engaged in the aforementioned protected activity, Defendants purposefully retaliated against Plaintiff by terminating his employment and/or not rehiring him upon return from the interim break. 98. Defendants’ conduct was willful, wanton, reckless, and/or malicious for which Defendants are liable for compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. A. 216(b) Collective Action for Unpaid Overtime and Other Wages. SITUATED

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(Class Action Alleging Violations of Michigan Common Law) A. VIOLATIONS OF MICHIGAN COMMON LAW (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE 22. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of answering phone calls made by Logisticare’s customers, answering customer inquiries, and assisting customers with scheduling medical transportation. 23. Plaintiff Chapman was employed by Logisticare in its call center located in Southfield, Michigan from approximately August 2019 until April 2020. 24. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt call-center employees who were (and are) paid by the hour. 25. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members typically worked approximately forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours per week. 26. In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked up to three (3) compensable hours “off-the-clock” per week and have not been compensated for that time. Unpaid Start-Up Time 27. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours they worked for Logisticare as a result of Logisticare’s corporate policy and practice of requiring their hourly call-center employees to clock-in only when ready to take their first call. 29. If Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are not ready and on the phone at shift start, they can be (and often are) subject to discipline. 30. If Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members clock in prior to their shift start time, they are also subject to discipline. 31. Therefore, the only way to be ready on time, and avoid discipline, is to prepare the computer “off-the-clock” and without pay. 32. During this start up time, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated although they were expected to have completed this process in advance of their official start times. Unpaid Work During Meal Period Breaks 33. Logisticare provides Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ with one unpaid thirty-minute meal break each day. 34. However, Logisticare requires Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to perform “off-the-clock” work during their unpaid meal break. 36. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are required to log back into their computer, perform a restart process, log back into the phone system, then clock in, and be back on the phone before their meal break end. 37. The log off process used prior to taking a meal break can take anywhere from one (1) to three (3) minutes. 38. The log in process used after returning from a meal break can take anywhere from another one (1) to three (3) minutes. 39. This lengthy log off and log in procedure had to be performed during Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ meal break per Logisticare’s policy. Unpaid Technical Downtime 40. Further, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ computers crashed multiple times each week and required Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to reset them, which took ten (10) minutes or more each time. 41. At times, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members would spend anywhere from ten minutes (10) to several hours in a day troubleshooting their computer or talking to technical support trying to get their computer to work so they could work. 43. Logisticare requires Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to actively troubleshoot their issues, but Logisticare does not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for any of their time spent rebooting or troubleshooting. 44. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated for the time they worked for Logisticare rebooting or troubleshooting Logisticare’s computers after they crashed or experienced other technical difficulties. Unpaid Rest Breaks Lasting Twenty Minutes or Less 45. In addition, Logisticare also enforced a uniform company-wide policy wherein they improperly required their non-exempt hourly employees—Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members—to clock out for rest breaks lasting twenty minutes or less. 29 C.F.R. § 785.18; see also Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Am. Future Sys., Inc., 833 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2017). 46. Logisticare permitted Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to take two fifteen-minute breaks each day but required them to clock out for any and all breaks taken outside the two fifteen-minute breaks. 48. Logisticare has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff. 49. Logisticare is aware of their obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week, but have failed to do so. 50. Because Logisticare did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours worked, and time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Logisticare’s pay policies and practices violate the FLSA. 51. Because Logisticare did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all straight time hours worked, Logisticare pay policies and practices also violate Michigan state law. V. 52. Paragraphs 1–51 are fully incorporated herein. 53. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 69. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 70. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of Logisticare’s employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they have not been paid. 71. Other similarly situated employees of Logisticare have been victimized by Logisticare’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 72. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 53. 73. Logisticare’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members the overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies and practices of Logisticare, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or the FLSA Collective Members. 74. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 75. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members do not prevent collective treatment. 77. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 78. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Logisticare will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations. 79. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 80. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 53 and notice should be promptly sent. 81. Paragraphs 1–80 are fully incorporated herein. 82. Plaintiff Chapman further brings this action pursuant to the Michigan common law equitable theory of unjust enrichment. See Athan v. United States Steel, 364 F. Supp. 3d 748, 754 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (recognizing that the FLSA does not cover unpaid straight-time wages). 83. The Michigan Class is defined as: 90. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 91. Plaintiff Chapman and the Michigan Class Members bring their Michigan unjust enrichment claim as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Logisticare to work in Michigan since October 8, 2014. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5813. 92. Class action treatment of Plaintiff Chapman and the Michigan Class Members is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 93. The number of Michigan Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 94. Plaintiff Chapman’s claims share common questions of law and fact with the claims of the Michigan Class Members. 95. Plaintiff Chapman is a member of the Michigan Class and her claims are typical of the claims of other class members, and she has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other class members. 97. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 98. Accordingly, the Michigan Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph 83. VI.

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136 PRYOR STREET, ROOM C-103, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 SUMMONS 1- .1 \A}'\1 I urns aidaid CL(s)(..-H-A )c.se 2017CV288702 Tctaney,cin Lx,-'1,-)aW oP +hernsei ,es ) n i"i(i( (::;01Ar)O,Kiy 5)11,{(1-17-ri Plaintiff, ) vs. ) S-Dve' o TentneSS _,Inc. (co:20 ;?„-6,1 5, Fred 15 a,tpcv- 0 )0Y, ) Prey's Phkdm(L)); DcFS I ) -6-vv)ttai w Defendant Ivd,s we, )) ) ) 15. Plaintiffs bring this Class action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23. 16. The Class which Plaintiffs seek to represent is defined as: All consumers to whom Defendants, within two years from the date of filing this action, provided an electronically printed receipt at the point of a sale or transaction at any of Defendants' physical store locations in the United States, on which receipt Defendants printed the expiration date of the consumer's debit card (the "Class" ).1 18. Numerositv: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of their claims through this Class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 19. Plaintiffs believe and thereon allege that there are, at a minimum, thousands (i.e., two thousand or more) of members that comprise the Class. 20. The exact size of the Class is ascertainable through Defendants' records, including but not limited to Defendants' sales and transaction records. 21. Members of the Class may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in Class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, and/or first-Class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this Class and deemed necessary and or appropriate by the Court. 22. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the entire Class. The claims of Plaintiffs and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 24. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There are a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting the members of the Class. 25. The questions of fact and law common to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: (a) Whether Defendants' conduct of providing Plaintiffs and the Class with sales or transaction receipts whereon Defendants printed the expiration date of the card violated the FACTA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.; (b) Whether Defendants' conduct was willful; and (c) Whether Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to statutory damages, punitive damages, costs, and or attorney fees for Defendants' acts and conduct. 27. Consistency Of Adjudications: A class action would promote the consistency of adjudicating the rights of Class members. In contrast, the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 29. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in this Complaint. 30. Plaintiffs assert this claim on behalf of themselves and the Class against Defendants. 31. Title 15 U.S.C. § 1681 c(g)(1) provides that "no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction." 33. Defendants transact business in the United States and accept credit cards and debit cards in the course of transacting business with persons such as Plaintiffs and members of the Class. In transacting such business, Defendants use cash registers and or other machines or devices that electronically print receipts for credit card and debit card transactions. 34. After December 3, 2006, and within two years from the date of filing this action, Defendants, at the point of a sale or transaction with Plaintiff Lillie Williams, provided Plaintiff Lillie Williams with one or more electronically printed receipts on each of which Defendants printed the expiration date of her debit card and the last four digits of her debit card number. 35. After December 3, 2006, and within two years from the date of filing this action, Defendants, at the point of a sale or transaction with Plaintiff Cussetta Journey, provided Plaintiff Cussetta Journey with one or more electronically printed receipts on each of which Defendants printed the expiration date of her debit card and the last four digits of her debit card number. 37. As set forth above, .FACTA was enacted in 2003 and gave merchants who accept credit and or debit cards up to December 4, 2006 to comply with its requirements. 38. Defendants knew of and were well informed about the law, including specifically FACTA's requirements concerning the truncation of credit and debit card numbers and prohibition on the printing of expiration dates. 39. For example, but without limitation, on February 22, 2017, FRED'S STORES OF TENNESSEE, INC. was served with a letter to cease and desist 4. Nor is Defendants' willful violation of FACTA a trifling matter. In the statement provided during his signing of FACTA in 2003, the President underscored the importance of the legislation in combating rampant identity theft: This bill also confronts the problem of identity theft. A growing number of Americans are victimized by criminals who assume their identities and cause havoc in their financial affairs. With this legislation, the Federal Government is protecting our citizens by taking the offensive against identity theft. 41. Other entities, including but not limited to Defendants' payment card processor (also known as the acquirer, merchant bank, or acquiring bank) which processes credit and debit card payments for transactions occurring at Defendants' stores, likewise informed Defendants about FACTA, including its specific requirements concerning the truncation of credit and debit card numbers and prohibition on the printing of expiration dates, and Defendants' need to comply with same. 42. In addition, many companies such as VISA and MasterCard devised and implemented policies well before the operative date of FACTA's requirements, wherein such policies VISA, MasterCard and others required Defendants (and informed Defendants of the requirements) to truncate credit and debit card numbers and prevent the printing of expiration dates on receipts. 5. Courts have likewise emphasized the purpose of FACTA. For example, the Ninth Circuit recently emphasized that "[i]n fashioning FACTA, Congress aimed to 'restrict the amount of information available to identity thieves.'" Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 718 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 149 Cong. Rec. 26,891 (2003) (statement of Sen. Shelby)). 50. Defendants have also harmed Plaintiffs and the Class by exposing them to at least an increased risk of identity theft and debit card fraud. For Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class as against Defendants) STATE OF GEORGIA LTLLIE WILLIAMS and CUSSETTA ) JOURNEY, on behalf of themselves and all )) others similarly situated, )) Plaintiffs, ) ) cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print . . . the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction" 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (emphasis added.)

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12. Throughout the time period March 27, 2010 through the present, 3PD has employed and/or jointly employed with retailers around the country, thousands of Drivers to provide home delivery services to these retailers. 13. When prospective Drivers apply for a position with 3PD, 3PD requires them to fill out an application, which requests information such as Drivers’ employment history, driver’s license information, accident history, and personal references. The application also asks whether Drivers are currently working for another employer and whether they intend to continue working for another employer while working for 3PD. 14. 3PD also requires prospective Drivers to undergo a physical examination and to submit to drug and alcohol testing. Drivers must agree to continue to submit to drug and alcohol testing throughout their employment. 15. 3PD requires its Drivers to sign lengthy form contracts which mischaracterize each driver as an “independent contractor.” The contracts are designed to conceal the true nature of the relationship between 3PD and its drivers which is that of employer and employee. 3PD requires Drivers to sign these adhesion contracts as a condition of employment as well as to agree to periodic addenda drafted by Defendant which also constitute adhesion contracts. 41. From March 6, 2010 through the present, 3PD and Home Depot have jointly employed thousands of Drivers to provide delivery services to Home Depot. 42. Specifically, 3PD and Home Depot have the authority to hire and fire Drivers, supervised and controlled Drivers’ work schedules and conditions of employment; determined Drivers’ rate and method of payment and maintained employment and other records for Drivers. 43. Once Drivers are hired, 3PD and Home Depot require them to be on-duty and/or on- call for approximately 10 hours per day, six days per week. 3PD and Home Depot have complete authority over the hours Drivers are required to work per day, the deliveries they are required to make and the order of such deliveries. In light of 3PD’s and Home Depot’s requirement that Drivers be available to work exclusively for them at least ten hours per day, Drivers are effectively denied the opportunity to perform services for other entities during these hours. Additionally, 3PD and Home Depot require Drivers to respond to calls within thirty minutes. Again, this requirement makes it virtually impossible for Drivers to perform services for anyone other than 3PD and Home Depot. 44. After a customer purchases merchandise, the customer arranges with Home Depot to have the merchandise delivered by Drivers. A delivery order is then assigned to a particular Driver through Home Depot and through 3PD’s “Central Fulfillment” department. Drivers do not have the discretion or ability to reject a delivery order; once the order is assigned, Drivers are generally required to accept it. In other words, 3PD and Home Depot exercise total control over Drivers’ workloads, work assignments and hours of work. 61. Plaintiff brings his FLSA claims as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The groups of similarly situated individuals that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows: All current and former Drivers who were employed by Defendant 3PD to provide merchandise delivery services at any time from March 27, 2010 through the present (“the Driver Collective”). All current and former Drivers who were employed by Defendant 3PD and/or Defendant Home Depot to provide merchandise delivery services for Home Depot at any time from March 27, 2010 through the present (“the Home Depot Collective”). 67. Plaintiff seeks to maintain his Arizona state law claims as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, Plaintiff seeks to certify the following Rule 23 Classes: All current and former Drivers who were employed by Defendant 3PD to provide merchandise delivery services in the State of Arizona at any time from March 27, 2010 through the present (“the Driver Class”). All current and former Drivers who were employed by Defendant 3PD and/or Defendant Home Depot to provide merchandise delivery services for Home Depot in the State of Arizona at any time from March 27, 2010 through the present (“the Home Depot Class”). 76. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. Failure to Pay Wages, Overtime Compensation and Minimum Wage in Violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207

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1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 11. On or November 7, 2012, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 12. On information and belief, Defendants receive some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. On information and belief, Defendants profit and benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 13. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the fax. 15. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 16. Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 17. In accordance with F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) with respect to whom Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation for the sending of such faxes, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 18. Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 21. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 22. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 23. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 25. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 26. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 27. Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): 3. a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines. The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act. The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶ 31 of its 2006 Report and Order (In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Junk Prevention Act of 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006). The requirements of (3) above are contained in § (b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice Requirements via § (b)(2)(D)(ii). Compliance with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult nor costly. The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon the owners of the telephone lines and fax machines giving them the right, and means, to stop unwanted faxed advertisements. 30. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants are continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 32. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 33. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice was unlawful.

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102. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 103. Count I is brought on behalf of all Plaintiffs. 104. Exhibits A-D include a settlement offer that is misleading as to whether the debt collector may revoke the offer of settlement at any time. 105. Exhibits A-D effectively threaten to revoke the settlement offers at any time and without notice even though neither Enhanced nor the creditor intended to revoke these offers. 106. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692f. 11. On or around September 14, 2017, Enhanced mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff Voeks regarding an alleged debt owed to “AT&T.” A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A. 112. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 113. Count III is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Dombrowski. 114. Exhibits C & D include contradictory deadlines as to the expiration of the validation notice and thus the representations included Exhibit C and/or Exhibit D are false, deceptive, and misleading as to such deadlines. 115. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692f, and 1692g(b) 12. Upon information and belief, the alleged debt referenced in Exhibit A was incurred for telecommunications services used only for personal, family, or household purposes. 13. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by a computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff Voeks inserted by the computer. 14. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form debt collection letter, used by Defendant to attempt to collect alleged debts. 16. Exhibit A contains the statutory validation notice that the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, requires debt collectors provide alleged debtors along with, or within five days of, the initial communication: 17. Exhibit A also contains the following settlement offers: 18. Exhibit A states that Enhanced is “not obligated to renew these offers.” 19. Exhibit A, however, does not provide an expiration upon which the settlement offers listed under “Option 2” and “Option 3” would need to be renewed. 20. In the absence of an expiration date, the unsophisticated consumer would understand a statement that the debt collector is “not obligated to renew this offer,” to mean that Enhanced could, and would, rescind the settlement offer at any time and without notice. 21. Upon information and belief, the debtor can settle the account for the amounts listed under Option 2” and “Option 3,” or less, at any time. 23. While Exhibit A largely tracks this safe-harbor language, without an expiration date for the settlement offers made under “Option 2” and “Option 3,” the language does not have its intended effect. 24. As a practical matter, the unsophisticated consumer is not an FDCPA lawyer. She does not know that the purpose of the statement that “we are not obligated to renew any offers provided” is to make her “realize that there is a renewal possibility but that it is not assured.” 25. Instead, where the debt collector states that it is not obligated to renew an offer but does not include an expiration date by which payment must be made, the unsophisticated consumer would understand the safe-harbor language to mean that the offer was subject to revocation. 26. The unsophisticated consumer may even believe that the law requires a debt collector to include the Seventh Circuit’s safe-harbor language if it will rescind the offer. 27. Without an expiration date, the unsophisticated consumer would interpret a debt collector’s statement that it is “not obligated to renew” as an implied threat to revoke the settlement offer at any time and without notice. 29. The safe-harbor language used in Exhibit A was created specifically for cases where a debt collection letter stated a settlement date certain. Without a date certain, the language is false, deceptive, misleading, and confusing, and gives rise to FDCPA liability. Al v. Van Ru Credit Corp., No. 17-CV-1738-JPS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70321 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 26, 2018). 31. The unsophisticated consumer, not knowing when the settlement offer expired, would feel intimidated into paying. Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., 558 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Confusing language in a dunning letter can have an intimidating effect by making the recipient feel that he is in over his head and had better pay up rather than question the demand for payment.”). 32. Moreover, providing the settlement offer alongside the validation notice contradicts and overshadows the consumer’s validation rights. 33. The settlement offer in Exhibit A is confusing to the unsophisticated consumer because it requires that the consumer tender a payment within the validation period or shortly thereafter, but does not explain how the validation notice and settlement “deadline” fit together. Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997) (“In the typical case, the letter both demands payment within thirty days and explains the consumer’s right to demand verification within thirty days. These rights are not inconsistent, but by failing to explain how they fit together the letter confuses.”). 34. The unsophisticated consumer, unsure when the settlement offer in Exhibit A expires, would feel compelled to make a settlement payment as soon as possible, and during the validation period, to ensure the settlement offer had not expired without notice prior to her tendering of payment. Thus, there is an apparent contradiction between the settlement offer and the validation notice. 36. The unsophisticated consumer would not know whether requesting verification of the debt would be interpreted as a rejection of the settlement offer. 37. The plain language of Exhibit A is unclear as to how the debt collector would proceed in the event that the consumer mailed a dispute along with a payment that was intended to accept the settlement offer in the case that the debt could be verified. 38. Where a consumer mailed a dispute along with a payment that was intended to accept a settlement offer in Exhibit A, under the terms of Exhibit A, the debt collector might: a. Hold the payment in escrow pending verification of the debt; b. Interpret the payment as an accord and satisfaction and settlement in full that contractually bars the consumer from requesting verification of the debt; or c. Send the payment back to the consumer pending verification of the debt, in which case the consumer may no longer be able to settle the debt because the offer would have expired while the debt collector was obtaining verification. 39. Where a consumer mails a dispute along with a payment that was intended to accept a settlement offer with an impending expiration date, whether the FDCPA requires a debt collector to proceed along any of the above paths is an open question in the Seventh Circuit. See Bailey v. TRW Receivables Management Services, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19638, *7-8 (D. Haw. Aug. 16, 1990) (“There is nothing in the statute which indicates that a debt collector is not required to provide verification where a consumer requests it after paying the debt.”). 41. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether she had effectively exercised her validation rights by sending a payment along with a dispute letter. 42. The unsophisticated consumer may unwittingly reject a settlement offer by tendering the settlement payment along with her dispute letter. If the debt collector treated the acceptance of a settlement offer as a continuing attempt to collect a debt, see Sambor, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1243, the debt collector would need to return the settlement payment pending verification of the debt. 43. Because the debt collector may be legally obligated to return the consumer’s settlement payment pending verification of the debt, the expiration date would lapse before the consumer had effectively made the settlement payment. By the time the debt collector verified the debt, the consumer would have missed her chance to settle the debt even though she attempted to tender a payment before the expiration date. 44. Moreover, the unsophisticated consumer would have no idea how to both seek verification of the debt and preserve the settlement offer in Exhibit A. 45. The consumer needs time to process the information contained in an initial debt collection letter before deciding whether to dispute, pay or take other action. This is the point of the 30 day period in 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a). See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., 516 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2008) (“the aim of § 1692g is to provide a period for the recipient of a collection letter to consider her options.”). 47. The § 1692g validation period lasts for 30 days. It is the consumer’s right to request verification until the end of the thirty day period. If the request is not made until the end of the thirty day period, the verification request would not be processed, researched by the creditor, and returned to the consumer until long after settlement offer payment deadline has expired. The consumer would be left with no time to review the verification and determine whether to accept the settlement offer. 48. The unsophisticated consumer would have no idea how to both seek verification of the debt and preserve the settlement offers in Exhibit A. The unsophisticated consumer would believe that the settlement offer would expire before the debt collector provides verification and would be left with little or no time to review the verification and determine whether to accept the settlement offer. 49. The effect of the settlement offer in the initial written debt communication is to discourage or prevent consumers from exercising their validation rights. 50. Defendant did not include explanatory language in Exhibit A, see, eg. Bartlett, 128 F.3d 497, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1997). 51. Any explanatory language should make clear whether a dispute will extend the settlement offer while the debt collector is in the process of complying with its obligation to verify the debt. 53. In the context of credit reporting, there is a difference between resolving an account by paying the account in full and resolving the account by settling it in full. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether the account would be reported as “paid in full” or “settled in full.” See e.g., Molton v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. 659, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2004); Nielsen v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39781, at *4-5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2015); Shaw v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134991, at *31-32 (S.D. Calif. Sept. 28, 2016); Keller v. Trans Union LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 283, at *7-8 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2017). 54. Upon information and belief, the offer to “reduce your outstanding balance” stated in Exhibit A is mere a settlement offer, not a “reduced balance” by which the consumer may pay the account in full. 55. Upon information and belief, if the consumer paid the “full reduced balance amount,” Enhanced, and/or the creditor, would report the account to consumer reporting agencies as “settled in full” rather than “paid in full.” 56. Upon information and belief, Enhanced uses the phrase “reduce your outstanding balance” to confuse consumers and induce them into paying this amount under the assumption that Convergent, and the creditor, will report the account to consumer reporting agencies as “paid in full.” 57. Plaintiff Voeks was deceived, misled, and confused by Exhibit A. 59. On or about November 16, 2017, Enhanced mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff Maniaci regarding an alleged debt owed to “AT&T.” A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit B. 60. Upon information and belief, the alleged debt referenced in Exhibit B was incurred for telecommunications services used only for personal, family, or household purposes. 61. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is a form letter, of the same form as Exhibit A, and with the information specific to Plaintiff Maniaci inserted by computer. 62. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is the first written communication that Defendant sent to Plaintiff Maniaci regarding the alleged debt to which Exhibit B refers. 63. Exhibit B contains the statutory validation notice that the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, requires debt collectors provide alleged debtors along with, or within five days of, the initial communication: 64. Exhibit B also contains the following settlement offer: 65. Exhibit B states that Enhanced is “not obligated to renew these offers.” 67. Moreover, providing the settlement offer alongside the validation notice contradicts and overshadows the consumer’s validation rights. 68. Moreover, the representation of the settlement amounts as a means for the consumer to “reduce your outstanding balance” is likewise false, deceptive, and misleading. 69. Plaintiff Maniaci was deceived, misled, and confused by Exhibit B. 70. The unsophisticated consumer would be deceived, misled, and confused by Exhibit B. Facts Related to Plaintiff Dombrowski 71. On or about October, 2017, Enhanced mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff Dombrowski regarding an alleged debt owed to “AT&T.” A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit C. 72. Upon information and belief, the alleged debt referenced in Exhibit C was incurred for telecommunications services used only for personal, family, or household purposes. 73. Upon information and belief, Exhibit C is a form letter, of the same form as Exhibits A-B, and with the information specific to Plaintiff Dombrowski inserted by computer. 74. Upon information and belief, Exhibit C is the first written communication that Defendant sent to Plaintiff Dombrowksi regarding the alleged debt to which Exhibit C refers. 76. Exhibit C also contains the following settlement offer: 77. Exhibit C states that Enhanced is “not obligated to renew these offers.” 78. Exhibit C, however, does not provide an expiration upon which the settlement offers listed under “Option 2” and “Option 3” would need to be renewed. 79. Moreover, providing the settlement offer alongside the validation notice contradicts and overshadows the consumer’s validation rights. 80. Moreover, the representation of the settlement amounts as a means for the consumer to “reduce your outstanding balance” is likewise false, deceptive, and misleading. 81. On or about February 14, 2018, Enhanced mailed another debt collection letter to Plaintiff Dombrowski regarding the same alleged “AT&T” debt. A copy of the letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit D. 82. Upon information and belief, the letter in Exhibit D is also a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff Dombrowski inserted by computer. 83. Upon information and belief, the letter in Exhibit D is also a form debt collection letter used by Enhanced to attempt to collect the alleged debt. 84. Just as Exhibit D, Exhibit C lists the “Amount of Debt” as $407.92 and lists an “Account Number” ending in “9879.” 85. Exhibit D also includes the following settlement offer: 87. Exhibit D, however, does not provide an expiration upon which the settlement offers would need to be renewed. 88. Additionally, Exhibit D also contains the following debt validation notice: 89. Exhibit C and Exhibit D thus give conflicting deadlines. 90. Additionally, as previously stated, by providing the settlement offer without an expiration date in combination with the statement “we are not obligated to renew this offer,” the unsophisticated consumer would understand that the offer could be revoked at any time, without notice, prior to the expiration of the validation period. 91. The settlement offer in Exhibit D thus contradicts and overshadows the consumer’s validation rights. 92. Plaintiff Dombrowski was confused by both Exhibit C and Exhibit D. 93. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused by Exhibit C and Exhibit D. The FDCPA 96. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 97. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) specifically prohibits debt collectors from making a “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 98. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Facts Relating to Plaintiff Voeks

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70. Plaintiffs, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, adopt and incorporate by reference all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 71. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Washington Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.010 et seq. (the “WCPA”). The stated purpose of the WPCA is “to complement the body of federal law governing restraints of trade, unfair competition and unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition.” Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.920. 72. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.020 declares unlawful “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce …” 73. Plaintiffs and all Class Members of the Washington Class are “persons” and the transactions at issue in this Complaint constitute “trade or commerce” as defined by Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.010. 74. Defendants violated WCPA by engaging in the unfair and deceptive actions and/or omissions as described herein by engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices that occurred in trade or commerce, had an impact on public interest, and caused injury to property. 90. Plaintiffs, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, adopt and incorporated by reference all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 91. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the North Carolina Consumer Protection Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 et seq. (the “NCUDAP”). 92. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 states “Unfair methods of competition in or affective commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.” 93. Defendants violated NCUDAP by engaging in the unfair and deceptive actions and/or omissions as described herein by engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices that occurred in trade or commerce, had an impact on public interest, and caused injury to property. SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-3052 T E L E P H O N E : ( 2 0 6 ) 6 2 3 - 1 9 0 0 F A C S I M I L E : ( 2 0 6 ) 6 2 3 - 3 3 8 4 Timothy W. Monsees VIOLATION OF THE WASHINGTON CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.010 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 et seq. WALKER FIRE CONTROL TRIGGER ASSEMBLY DEFECT

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(Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) 22. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of Astoria (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 23. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because: a. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of March 3, 2017, there were approximately 101.2 million shares of Astoria common stock outstanding, held by hundreds to thousands of individuals and entities scattered throughout the country. The actual number of public shareholders of Astoria will be ascertained through discovery; b. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including the following: i) whether Defendants have misrepresented or omitted material information concerning the Proposed Merger in the Proxy in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act; ii) whether the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act; and iii) whether Plaintiff and other members of the Class will suffer irreparable harm if compelled to vote their shares regarding the Proposed Merger based on the materially incomplete and misleading Proxy. - 7 - c. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class, has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature, and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class; d. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and Plaintiff does not have any interests adverse to the Class; e. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class; f. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect to the matters complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with respect to the Class as a whole; and g. A class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 24. The Merger Consideration appears inadequate in light of the Company’s recent financial performance and prospects for future growth. Indeed, on April 26, 2017, the Company reported first-quarter earnings of $14.4 million and profits of 12 cents per share. The Company also posted revenue of $121.6 million in the quarter, and its adjusted revenue was $92 million. 25. Further, the Company’s shares have increased 11 percent since the beginning of the year, and 34 percent in the last 12 months. 26. Additionally, in its fourth quarter investor presentation, the Company noted that it - 8 - has “23 consecutive years of core profitability as a public company,” a “clean, well-capitalized balance sheet,” and is “well positioned in its core Long Island market.” The Company also stated that its net interest margin increased every year between 2012 and 2016.1 27. In sum, it appears that Astoria is well-positioned for financial growth, and that the Merger Consideration fails to adequately compensate the Company’s shareholders. It is imperative that Defendants disclose the material information they have omitted from the Proxy, discussed in detail below, so that the Company’s shareholders can properly assess the fairness of the Merger Consideration for themselves and make an informed decision concerning whether or not to vote in favor of the Proposed Merger. II. The Merger Agreement’s Deal Protection Provisions Deter Superior Offers 28. The Individual Defendants have also agreed to certain deal protection provisions in the Merger Agreement that operate conjunctively to deter other suitors from submitting a superior offer for Astoria. 29. First, the Merger Agreement contains a no solicitation provision that prohibits the Company or the Individual Defendants from taking any affirmative action to obtain a better deal for Astoria shareholders. The Merger Agreement states that the Company and the Individual Defendants shall not (i) initiate, solicit, knowingly encourage, or knowingly facilitate inquiries or proposals with respect to any acquisition proposal, (ii) engage or participate in any negotiations with any person concerning any acquisition proposal, or (iii) provide any confidential or nonpublic information or data to, or have or participate in any discussions with, any person relating to, any acquisition proposal except to notify a person that has made or, to the knowledge 1 Investor Presentation Fourth Quarter Ended December 31, 2016, Astoria Financial Corporation, http://ir.astoriabank.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=94317&p=irol-presentations. - 9 - of Astoria, is making any inquiries with respect to, or is considering making, an acquisition proposal, of the existence of Astoria’s obligations with respect to such acquisition proposals under the merger agreement. 30. Additionally, the Merger Agreement grants Sterling recurring and unlimited matching rights, which provides it with: (i) unfettered access to confidential, non-public information about competing proposals from third parties which it can use to prepare a matching bid; and (ii) several days to negotiate with Astoria, amend the terms of the Merger Agreement and make a counter-offer in the event a superior offer is received. 31. The non-solicitation and matching rights provisions essentially ensure that a superior bidder will not emerge, as any potential suitor will undoubtedly be deterred from expending the time, cost, and effort of making a superior proposal while knowing that Sterling can easily foreclose a competing bid. As a result, these provisions unreasonably favor Sterling, to the detriment of Astoria’s public shareholders. 32. Lastly, the Merger Agreement provides that Astoria must pay Sterling a termination fee of $75.7 million in the event the Company elects to terminate the Merger Agreement to pursue a superior proposal. The termination fee provision further ensures that no competing offer will emerge, as any competing bidder would have to pay a naked premium for the right to provide Astoria shareholders with a superior offer. 33. Ultimately, these preclusive deal protection provisions restrain the Company’s ability to solicit or engage in negotiations with any third party regarding a proposal to acquire all or a significant interest in the Company. 34. Given that the preclusive deal protection provisions in the Merger Agreement impede a superior bidder from emerging, it is imperative that Astoria’s shareholders receive all - 10 - material information necessary for them to cast a fully informed vote at the shareholder meeting concerning the Proposed Merger. 53. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 54. Section 14(a)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1). 55. Rule 14a-9, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, provides that Proxy communications with shareholders shall not contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. 56. SEC Regulation G has two requirements: (1) a general disclosure requirement; and (2) a reconciliation requirement. The general disclosure requirement prohibits “mak[ing] public a non-GAAP financial measure that, taken together with the information accompanying that measure, contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the presentation of the non-GAAP financial measure…not - 18 - misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(b). The reconciliation requirement requires an issuer that chooses to disclose a non-GAAP measure to provide a presentation of the “most directly comparable” GAAP measure, and a reconciliation “by schedule or other clearly understandable method” of the non-GAAP measure to the “most directly comparable” GAAP measure. 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(a). As set forth above, the Proxy omits information required by SEC Regulation G, 17 C.F.R. § 244.100. 57. The omission of information from a proxy statement will violate Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 if other SEC regulations specifically require disclosure of the omitted information. 58. Defendants have issued the Proxy with the intention of soliciting shareholder support for the Proposed Merger. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the Proxy, which fails to provide critical information regarding, amongst other things: (i) financial projections for the Company and Sterling; (ii) the valuation analyses performed by each company’s financial advisor; (iii) the fees Sandler O’Neill stands to receive in connection with the Proposed Merger; and (iv) conflicts of interest faced by Astoria’s directors. 59. In so doing, Defendants made untrue statements of fact and/or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their roles as officers and/or directors, were aware of the omitted information but failed to disclose such information, in violation of Section 14(a). The Individual Defendants were therefore negligent, as they had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were misstated or omitted from the Proxy, but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such information to shareholders although they could have done so without extraordinary effort. 60. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the Proxy - 19 - is materially misleading and omits material facts that are necessary to render it not misleading. The Individual Defendants undoubtedly reviewed and relied upon the omitted information identified above in connection with their decision to approve and recommend the Proposed Merger; indeed, the Proxy states that Sandler O’Neill reviewed and discussed its financial analyses with the Board, and further states that the Board considered both the financial analyses provided by Sandler O’Neill as well as its fairness opinion and the assumptions made and matters considered in connection therewith. Further, the Individual Defendants were privy to and had knowledge of the projections for the Company and Sterling and knew or should have known of the conflicts faced by Sandler O’Neill each of the Company’s directors that have been inadequately disclosed in the Proxy. 61. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the material information identified above has been omitted from the Proxy, rendering the sections of the Proxy identified above to be materially incomplete and misleading. Indeed, the Individual Defendants were required to review Sandler O’Neill’s analyses in connection with their receipt of the fairness opinion, question Sandler O’Neill as to its derivation of fairness, and be particularly attentive to the procedures followed in preparing the Proxy and review it carefully before it was disseminated, to corroborate that there are no material misstatements or omissions. 62. The Individual Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. The preparation of a proxy statement by corporate insiders containing materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence. The Individual Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the Proxy or failing to notice the material omissions in the Proxy upon reviewing it, which they were required to do carefully as the Company’s directors. Indeed, the Individual Defendants were intricately - 20 - involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement and the preparation of the Company’s financial projections. 63. Astoria is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’ negligence in preparing and reviewing the Proxy. 64. Further, Sterling was directly responsible for the preparation of certain sections of the Proxy, including the incomplete and misleading sections summarizing its projections and the valuation analyses performed by its bankers, and was negligent in allowing the Proxy to be disseminated to Astoria’s shareholders with incomplete and misleading information contained therein. Sterling permitted the use of its name in the Proxy to solicit Astoria’s shareholders to vote in favor of the Proposed Merger. 65. The misrepresentations and omissions in the Proxy are material to Plaintiff and the Class, who will be deprived of their right to cast an informed vote if such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed Merger. 66. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. 67. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 68. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Astoria within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Astoria, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s - 21 - operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 69. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Proxy and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 70. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the Exchange Act violations alleged herein, and exercised the same. The Proxy at issue contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Merger. They were thus directly involved in preparing this document. 71. In addition, as the Proxy sets forth at length, and as described herein, the Individual Defendants were involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger Agreement. The Proxy purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants reviewed and considered. The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their input on the content of those descriptions. 72. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 73. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control - 22 - over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed. 74. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. I. The Merger Consideration Appears Inadequate in Light of Astoria’s Recent Financial Performance and Growth Prospects

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65. This action is properly maintainable as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 66. This action is brought on behalf of Named Plaintiffs and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Defendants as accessioners or lab aides on or after August 9, 2013, who elect to opt-in to this action (“FLSA Collective”). 67. Defendants assigned and/or are aware of all the work that Named Plaintiffs and members of the FLSA Collective performed. 68. As part of its regular business practice, Defendants intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA collective. This pattern, practice, and/or policy includes, but is -9- not limited to, willfully failing to pay Named Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective overtime compensation for the hours they worked in excess of 40 hours in a given week. 69. Defendants are aware or should have been aware that federal law requires and required Defendants to pay employees performing non-exempt duties, including Named Plaintiffs and members of the FLSA Collective, an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 70. Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective all perform or performed the same primary duties. 71. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 72. Named Plaintiffs bring their cause of actions under the NYLL as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all current and former accessioners and lab aides who worked or have worked at any branch location in New York at any time between August 9, 2010, and the date of final judgment in this matter (the “New York Class”). 73. Excluded from the New York Class are Defendants legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has, or who at any time during the class period has had, a controlling interest in ECL; and all persons who will submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the New York Class. 74. The New York Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 75. Upon information and belief, the size of the New York Class is believed to be in excess of 40 individuals. -10- 76. The questions of law and fact common to the New York Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. These questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to: (1) whether Defendants violated the NYLL; (2) whether Defendants failed to compensate Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week; (3) whether Defendants failed to compensate Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class spread of hours compensation for hours worked in excess of 10 hours in a day; (4) whether Defendants provided Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class with wage notifications that comply with the requirements of NYLL § 195(1); and (5) whether Defendants provided Named Plaintiff and the New York Class with wage statements that comply with the requirements of 84. Named Plaintiffs, members of the FLSA Collective, and the New York Class (collectively “Class Members”) worked for Defendants as accessioners and lab aides. 85. Throughout their employment with Defendants, Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members consistently worked more than 40 hours per week. 86. Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members would also often work in excess of 10 hours in a single day. 87. Defendants are aware that Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members worked more than 40 hours per workweek, yet Defendants failed to pay them all overtime compensation earned at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay. 88. Defendants are aware that Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members worked more than 10 hours in a day, yet Defendants failed to pay them any spread of hours compensation in the amount of one hours pay at the applicable minimum wage rate. 89. Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class did not receive wage notifications at the time of hire informing them of, among other things, (1) their regular rates of pay, (2) their overtime rates of pay, (3) the basis of their rate of pay (e.g., whether they were hourly employees), or (4) the regular pay day designated by Defendants. 90. Through at least the end of 2015, Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class did not receive wage statements from Defendants reflecting their overtime hourly rates of pay when they worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. 91. Named Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. -13- 92. Defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as described in this Complaint. 93. At all relevant times, Named Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former FLSA Collective members were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 94. The overtime provisions set forth in §§ 201, et seq. of the FLSA apply Defendants. 95. Defendants are an employer engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 96. At all relevant times, Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective were employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 97. Defendants failed to pay Named Plaintiffs and the other similarly situated current and former FLSA Collective members the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the AGAINST DEFENDANTS -- FLSA OVERTIME COMPENSATION AGAINST DEFENDANTS -- NEW YORK OVERTIME COMPENSATION 102. Named Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 103. 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2 requires that “[a]n employer shall pay an employee for overtime at a wage rate of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate.” 104. Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class have been employees within the meaning of NYLL. 105. Defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the NYLL, as described in this Complaint. 106. Defendants violated the NYLL, in relevant part, by failing to pay Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class overtime wages as required by the NYLL and NYCRR. 107. Defendants failed to pay Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 108. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL have been willful and intentional. 109. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Named Plaintiff and the New York Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime compensation in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, costs and other damages recoverable under the NYLL. -15- AGAINST DEFENDANTS -- NEW YORK SPREAD OF HOURS COMPENSATION 110. Named Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 111. Title 12 NYCRR § 142-2.4 requires that “[a]n employee shall receive one hour’s pay at the basic minimum hourly wage rate, in addition to the minimum wage required in this Part for any day in which . . . the spread of hours exceeds 10 hours.” 112. Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class Members worked more than 10 hours in a day. 113. When the Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class Members worked more than 10 hours in a day, they were not provided an additional hour’s pay at the minimum wage rate. 114. Defendants’ failure to pay spread of hours compensation under the NYLL and NYCRR was willful and intentional. 115. By the foregoing reasons, Defendants have violated 12 NYCRR § 142-2.4 and is liable to the Named Plaintiff and members of the putative class in an amount to be determine at trial, plus interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. AGAINST DEFENDANTS -- NEW YORK § 195(1) WAGE NOTICE VIOLATION 116. Named Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 117. Pursuant to Section 195(1) of the NYLL, an employer is required to provide its employees at the time of hiring a notice containing information, such as, “the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; . . . the regular pay day designated by the employer . . .; [and] the name of the employer . . . . For -16- all employees who are not exempt from overtime compensation . . ., the notice must sate the regular hourly rate and overtime rate of pay.” 118. Pursuant to Section 198-1(b) of the NYLL, an employee that does not receive a wage notification, as required by NYLL § 195(1), may bring a civil action to recover damages of $50 for each work day that the violation occurs or continues to occur, but not to exceed $5,000. 119. Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class did not receive wage notifications at the time of hire from Defendants informing them of, among other things, (1) their regular rates of pay, (2) their overtime rates of pay, (3) the basis of their rate of pay (e.g., whether they were hourly employees), or (4) the regular pay day designated by Defendants. 120. Defendants violated NYLL § 195(1) by failing to provide Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class with wage notifications and wage statements containing the information required by NYLL § 195, et seq. 121. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL were willful, widespread, and repeated. 122. Due to Defendants’ violations of NYLL § 195(1), Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class are each entitled to recover damages of $50 for each work day that the violation occurs or continues to occur, but not to exceed $5,000, together with costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, , and such other relief allowed under the NYLL. AGAINST DEFENDANTS -- NEW YORK § 195(3) WAGE STATEMENT VIOLATION 123. Named Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 124. Pursuant to Section 195(3) of the New York Labor Law, an employer is required to furnish each employee with a statement with every payment of wages that identifies, among other things, whether the employee is paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, -17- commission, or in another manner. For employees that are not exempt from overtime compensation under New York state law or regulation, such wage statement must also include “the regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate or rates of pay; the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked.” 125. Pursuant to Section 198-1(d) of the New York Labor Law, an employee that does not receive a wage statement, as required by NYLL § 195(3), may bring a civil action to recover damages of $250 for each work day that the violation occurs or continues to occur, but not to exceed $5,000. 126. Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class did not receive wage statements from Defendants that reflected their overtime rates of pay. 127. Defendants violated NYLL § 195(3) by failing to provide Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class with wage statements containing the information required by NYLL § 195(3). 128. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL were willful, widespread, and repeated. 129. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Named Plaintiffs and the New York Class are each entitled to recover damages of $250 for each work day that the violation occurs or continues to occur, but not to exceed $5,000, together with costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, and such other relief allowed under the NYLL.

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15. Plaintiff seeks damages, restitution, contribution, and any and all other relief the Court deems proper related to provable lost profits due to Defendant’s failures and violations. 43. According to a report prepared in 2013 for Visit Santa Barbara by Destination Analysts, Inc. entitled Visit Santa Barbara – Santa Barbara South Coast Visitor Profile Study, (the “South Coast Report”), approximately 6.1 million individuals visit the Santa Barbara South Coast annually. The South Coast Study found that this results in direct visitor spending of at least $4.0 Million, the generation and support of more than 12,000 jobs, and an annual generation of at least $46 Million in tax revenue. 10 58. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained herein as if fully set forth herein. 59. Plaintiff brings this action, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained herein as if fully set forth below. 66. The Federal Oil Pollution Act defines a responsible party as including “any person owning or operating a pipeline.” (33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(E)). At all relevant times, Defendant has owned and operated Line 901, AKA the Failed Pipeline, qualifying Defendant as a responsible party under the Federal Oil Pollution Act. 67. Defendant also qualifies as a responsible party under the Federal Pollution Act as a transporter of petroleum and petroleum byproducts via acceptance for transport of oil by way of the Failed Pipeline. Defendant also dictates the destination of this transport. 68. The Federal Oil Pollution Act defines facility expansively, and includes any device used for “producing, storing, handling, transferring, processing, or transporting oil.” (Id. at (9)). Line 901, AKA the Failed Pipeline, qualifies as a facility under the Federal Oil Pollution Act. 69. Defendant is both the owner and operator of a facility for purposes of the Federal Oil Pollution Act. 70. Defendant’s Failure described herein, specifically its failure to adequately maintain, oversee, replace, repair, monitor, or operate the Failed Pipeline, caused the discharging, spilling, leaking, pouring, omitting, and releasing of oil from the Failed Pipeline into the surrounding environment, including the Pacific Ocean. 77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained herein as if fully set forth below. 78. Defendant is a responsible party as defined in Ca. Gov. Code Section 8670.3(w) because Defendant is the transporter of oil and Defendant is an entity that accepts responsibility for oil and its transport. 79. Oil is defined within the Act to include “any kind of petroleum, liquid hydrocarbons, or petroleum products” (Cal. Gov. Code 8670.3(n)), which Defendant accepted for transport and determined the destination facility. 85. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained herein as if fully set forth below. 93. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations contained herein as if fully set forth below. 94. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant’s Failed Pipeline caused sudden and accidental releases of petroleum and petroleum byproducts and associated hazardous substances into the surrounding environment, which was then able to travel towards and onto Refugio Beach and surrounding beaches and into the Pacific Ocean. It is estimated that the contamination plume has spread multiple miles down the coastline. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s sudden and accidental releases due to Defendant’s negligent oversight, supervision, monitoring, repair, replacement, and/or operation of the Failed Pipeline, the tourism industry in Santa Barbara County has and will continue to be negatively impacted. 95. Defendant, particularly in dealing with hazardous substances, owed a duty to Plaintiff and other members of the community to exercise reasonable and ordinary care, which it failed to do with respect to Defendant’s negligent oversight, supervision, monitoring, repair, replacement, and/or operation of its Failed Pipeline. 96. Defendant breached its duty by negligently causing, permitting, failing to abate, and/or contributing to the contamination described herein. NEGLIGENCE STRICT LIABILITY DUE TO ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES STRICT LIABILITY UNDER CAL. GOV. CODE § 8670, ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701, ET SEQ.

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24. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff retirement saving investment plans. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s services, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 27. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9495 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 9495 Number. 30. Plaintiff has been registered with the national do-not-call registry since October 21, 2007. 32. The text messages originated from telephone number 310-00, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 33. The number used by Defendant (310-00) is known as a “short code,” a standard 5-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 34. Short codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a short code. 35. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 37. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 38. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting their purchase of a Defendant membership, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and services; and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 39. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 42. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 43. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 48. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 49. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 51. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 52. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 53. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 54. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 55. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-47 as if fully set forth herein. 56. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 57. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 59. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 60. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 47 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 61. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 62. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”1 63. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 65. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 66. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 67. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Aiding and Abetting in Violation of the NYSHRL) (Individual and Class Action Claims) (Against Defendants Thompson and Levien) 304. Plaintiffs and the members of the Race Class, Age Class, and/or Gender Class hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in all of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 305. Defendants Thompson and Levien knowingly or recklessly aided and abetted the unlawful employment practices, discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiffs and the members of the Race Class, Age Class, and/or Gender Class in violation of the NYSHRL. 306. As a direct and proximate result, Plaintiffs and the members of the Race Class, Age Class, and/or Gender Class have suffered and continue to suffer monetary and/or economic harm, including, but not limited to, loss of past income, future income, compensation and benefits, for which they are entitled to an award of monetary damages and other relief. 307. As a direct and proximate result, Plaintiffs and the members of the Race Class, Age Class, and/or Gender Class have suffered, and continue to suffer, emotional distress for which they are entitled to an award of monetary damages and other relief. 37. The Times, on its website, states a goal of “having a staff as wide as it is deep, broad in perspective, backgrounds and experiences . . . to capture the multitude of voices of America and the world, with true fidelity.” 38. Recently, diversity has been subverted at every turn throughout the organization, and in particular on the business side in the Advertising division. 39. In 2011, the Times terminated Janet Robinson as CEO. She was replaced with Defendant Mark Thompson, a candidate riddled with problems involving ethics scandals, poor decision-making and a record of gender and age discrimination at the BBC. 40. At the time, Mr. Thompson was Director-General of the BBC, where he was embroiled in a scandal that saw the media organization squash an important piece of investigative journalism. That piece would have revealed one of the network’s most well-known former personalities, Jimmy Savile, to be a serial pedophile. 41. In or around December 2011, the BBC’s show “Newsnight” was going to run the story when the piece was suddenly cancelled. Incredibly, around the same time, the BBC ran numerous tributes to Mr. Savile and his contributions to the network. 42. When the cancellation of the program became known, in or around October 2012, all eyes looked to Mr. Thompson to determine whether he had played a role. 44. As a result, Mr. Thompson changed his story, acknowledging that he was told about an investigation, but maintained his lack of awareness of any details involving sexual abuse. However, this version of events was then undone by the surfacing of an audio recording in which he admitted awareness that the investigation involved “sexual abuse of some kind.” 45. In fact, it became known that Mr. Thompson was so sensitive to his alleged involvement becoming public that he had his lawyers send a letter to the BBC threatening to sue the network if any stories regarding his involvement in the suppression were released. 46. Mr. Thompson’s inconsistent statements led the then-New York Times’s Public Editor, Margaret Sullivan, to question his appointment to the CEO helm. Ms. Sullivan stated that Defendant Thompson’s: “integrity and decision-making are bound to affect the Times and its journalism – profoundly. It’s worth considering now whether he is the right person for the job, given this turn of events.” 47. New York Times columnist Joe Nocera questioned the Mr. Thompson hire in his own column, saying: “Thompson winds up appearing willfully ignorant, and it makes you wonder . . . what kind of leader he was. It also makes you wonder what kind of chief executive he’d be at The Times.” 48. In hiring Mr. Thompson, the New York Times either willfully ignored or completely dismissed that he had significant problems with gender and age discrimination while at the BBC. 50. In addition, in November 2008, four female BBC presenters of the show “Countryfile,” Michaela Strachan, Charlotte Smith, Miriam O’Reilly and Juliet Morris, were all dismissed from the program while male hosts John Craven and Adam Henson were kept on. 51. Miriam O'Reilly, one of the terminated “Countryfile” presenters, claimed she was “warned about wrinkles,” and she filed an age discrimination suit and won a payout against the 98. Ms. Grant began her employment at the Times as an Account Manager. I. Plaintiff Ernestine Grant

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35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth above. 36. Actions for relief under the unfair competition law may be based on any business act or practice that is within the broad definition of the UCL. Such violations of the UCL occur as a result of unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts and practices. A plaintiff is required to provide evidence of a causal connection between a defendant's business practices and the alleged harm--that is, evidence that the defendant's conduct caused or was likely to cause substantial injury. It is insufficient for a plaintiff to show merely that the defendant's conduct created a risk of harm. Furthermore, the "act or practice" aspect of the statutory definition of unfair competition covers any single act of misconduct, as well as ongoing misconduct. Violation of Unfair Business Practices Act

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2. That Plaintiffs be awarded an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants in unpaid minimum wages due under the FLSA, plus an additional like amount in liquidated damages; 3. That Plaintiffs be awarded an amount to be determined at trial against Defendants in unpaid overtime wages due under the FLSA, plus an additional like amount in liquidated damages; 4. That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs of litigation, including their reasonable attorneys’ fees from Defendants; 5. That Plaintiffs be awarded nominal damages; 6. That the Court issue a Notice of Present Lawsuit to all individuals similarly situated to Plaintiffs, allowing all such similarly-situated individuals to file their written consent to join this action as Plaintiffs; 7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted, 3100 Centennial Tower 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 (404) 979-3171 (404) 979-3170 (f) charlesbridgers@dcbflegal.com kevin.fitzpatrick@dcbflegal.com 86. Defendants employed E. Jackson as a dancer from approximately 2002 until approximately 2006. 88. During the Relevant Time Period, E. Jackson normally worked 5-6 days per week. 89. During the Relevant Time Period, E. Jackson normally worked 9-10 hours during each work shift. 90. Defendants employed A. Jackson as a dancer from approximately December 12, 2001 until December 5, 2015. 91. During the Relevant Time Period, A. Jackson normally worked 6 days per week. 92. During the Relevant Time Period, A. Jackson normally worked 13-14 hours during each work shift. 93. At all times material hereto, Goosebumps did not employ Plaintiffs in a bona fide professional capacity within the meaning of 29 USC § 213 (a). 95. At all times material hereto, Goosebumps did not employ Plaintiffs in a bona fide executive capacity within the meaning of 29 USC § 213 (a). 96. At all times material hereto, Goosebumps did not employ Plaintiffs in the capacity of an “outside salesman” so as to be exempt from the minimum and maximum hour requirements of 29 USC § 213 (a). 97. At all times during the Relevant Time Period, Plaintiffs were not exempt from the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA by reason of any exemption. 98. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs were not exempt from the maximum hours requirements of the FLSA by reason of any exemption.

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10. Defendant’s messages to constituted “telephone solicitation” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) and “unsolicited advertisement” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 11. Defendant used an “telephone facsimile machine” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. 19. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the two proposed classes (hereafter “The Classes”). 20. The class concerning the unsolicited telephone facsimile messages (hereafter “The Facsimile Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendant to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously consented to receiving such messages within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 21. The class concerning unsolicited text messages (hereafter “The Texting Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the Unites States who received any SMS messages from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such messages within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 22. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Facsimile Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendant to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously not provided their telephone facsimile number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 8. Beginning in or around March 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on its cellular telephone number ending in -6147 and, beginning in or around February 2017, on it facsimile numbers ending in -2803, and -2428 as well in an effort to sell or solicit its services. 9. Defendant contacted Plaintiff via facsimile from telephone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendant. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B); and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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) FUND V LLC, and TATE & KIRLIN ) 17. On or about June 1, 2015, Tate sent plaintiff, on First Financial’s behalf, the letter attached as Exhibit A. 18. Exhibit A 19. is a form letter regularly used by Tate to collect for First Financial. Exhibit A 20. On or about August 7, 2015, Tate sent plaintiff, on First Financial’s behalf, the is a form intended for use as the first letter Tate sends to a consumer. letter attached as Exhibit B. 21. Exhibit B 22. is a form letter Tate regularly uses to collect for First Financial. Exhibits A-B between September 20, 2009 and September 26, 2009, more than five years prior to the date of the letters. seek to collect a medical debt incurred at Weiss Memorial Hospital 23. No payments were made on the account after October 2009. 24. The debt was for non-elective services performed more than five years prior to the date of the letters. 25. Any such debt was incurred for personal, family, or household purposes, and not for business purposes. 26. A debt for non-elective medical services is not one governed by a written contract. Even if the patient signs a consent form prior to services being performed, (a) the extent and cost of the services ultimately required and (b) the amount covered by insurance cannot be definitively known prior to performance, so the contract cannot be one wholly in writing. 4 27. The applicable Illinois statute of limitations is therefore five years, 735 ILCS 5/13-205; Portfolio Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Feltman, 391 Ill.App.3d 642, 909 N.E.2d 87 (1st Dist. 2009). 28. Exhibits A-B offer a settlement or “discount.” They state that paying will “satisfy your account.” Exhibit B adds that “We are not obligated to renew this offer.” 29. Tate regularly sends Exhibits A-B to collect non-elective medical bills that are more than five years and one month since the date of service or last payment by the consumer, including such debts allegedly owned by First Financial. 30. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-29. 31. Exhibits A-B imply that the alleged debt is legally enforceable. 32. Nothing in any of the correspondence Defendants sent disclosed that the debt was barred by the statute of limitations or not legally enforceable. 33. It is Defendants’ policy and practice to send and cause the sending of letters seeking to collect time-barred debts that (a) offer settlements and (b) do not disclose that the debt is time-barred. 34. The Federal Trade Commission has determined that “Most consumers do not know their legal rights with respect to collection of old debts past the statute of limitations . . . . When a collector tells a consumer that she owes money and demands payment, it may create the misleading impression that the collector can sue the consumer in court to collect that debt.” (http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/01/asset.shtm) 35. In early 2012, the FTC entered into a consent decree with Asset Acceptance, one of the largest debt buyers in the United States, requiring that it disclose to consumers when it is 5 attempting to collect debts that are barred by the statute of limitations. United States of America (For the Federal Trade Commission) v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, Case No. 8:12-cv-182-T-27EAJ (M.D.Fla.). 36. On October 1, 2012, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which has taken over much of the FTC’s enforcement responsibility and has been granted rule-making authority with respect to debt collection, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency entered into consent orders with three American Express-related entities requiring disclosure that debts they attempt to collect were time-barred. 2012-CFPB-0002; 2012-CFPB-0003; 2012-CFPB-0004. The orders require that “the Bank shall continue to provide disclosures concerning the expiration of the Bank’s litigation rights when collecting debt that is barred by the applicable state statutes of limitations . . . .” (2012-CFPB-0002, p. 6 of 35, 2012-CFPB-0003, p. 5 of 28. 37. The October 1, 2012 orders further require disclosure of “all material conditions, benefits and restrictions concerning any offer of settlement. . . .” (2012-CFPB-0002, p. 7 of 35, 2012-CFPB-0003, p. 6 of 28). Thus, they recognize that “settlement offers” that fail to disclose material information may be misleading. 38. On January 30, 2013, the FTC issued its report, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/ debtbuyingreport.pdf. The report reaffirms its position in the United States of America v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 8:12- cv-182-T-27EAJ (M.D. Fla. 2012), American Express Centurion Bank (FDIC-12-315b, FDIC- 12-316k, 2012-CFPB-0002), American Express Bank, FSB (2012-CFPB-0003) and American Express Travel Company, Inc. (2012-CFPB-0004) cases, that a defendant may violate the 6 FDCPA by sending a collection letter demanding payment of a time barred debt without disclosing that the debt was time barred. 39. The report cites to a study (Timothy E. Goldsmith & Natalie Martin, Testing Materiality Under the Unfair Practices Acts: What Information Matters When Collecting Time- Barred Debts?, 64 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 372 (2010)) that establishes the disclosure that a debt is time barred in a debt collection letter is material to the consumer. 40. Courts have also held that the offer of a settlement on a time-barred debt is misleading. Buchanan v. Northland Group, Inc., 776 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2015); McMahon v. LVNV, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2014). 41. Defendant engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692f, by sending consumers letters in the form of Exhibits A-B, offering to settle time-barred debts without disclosure of that fact. 42. Section 1692e provides: § 1692e. False or misleading representations [Section 807 of P.L.] A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . (2) The false representation of-- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; . . . (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. . . . (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. . . . 7 43. Section 1692f provides: § 1692f. Unfair practices [Section 808 of P.L.] A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. . . . 44. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of two classes, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 45. The Tate class consists of (a) all individuals with Illinois addresses (b) to whom defendant Tate (c) sent a letter offering to settle or discount (d) a medical debt on which the last payment or activity had occurred more than five years and one month prior to the letter, (e) as to which defendant cannot produce a written agreement specifying the dollar amount of the debt and agreeing to pay it (f) which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date 21 days after the filing of this action. 46. The First Financial class consists of (a) all individuals with Illinois addresses (b) who were sent on behalf of First Financial (by Tate or anyone else) (c) a letter offering to settle or discount (d) a medical debt on which the last payment or activity had occurred more than five years and one month prior to the letter, (e) as to which defendant cannot produce a written agreement specifying the dollar amount of the debt and agreeing to pay it (f) which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date 21 days after the filing of this action. 47. On information and belief, based on the use of form letters, the class members are so numerous that joinder of all members is not practicable. 8 48. There are questions of law and fact common to the class members, which common questions predominate over any questions relating to individual class members. The predominant common question is whether defendants’ letters violate the FDCPA when sent to collect a time-barred debt. 49. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 50. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in class actions and FDCPA litigation. 51. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that: a. Individual actions are not economically feasible; b. Members of the class are likely to be unaware of their rights; c. Congress intended class actions to be the principal enforcement mechanism under the FDCPA. WHEREFORE, the Court should enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class members and against defendant for: (a) Statutory damages; (b) Actual damages, including all amounts paid on time-barred debts; (c) Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; and (d) Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. /s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman 9 Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner Catherine C. Charpie

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number (954) 320-0431, (520) 445-4901, (929) 200-1493, (562) 285-6048. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 21. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the four proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 22. The class concerning the ATDS claim for revocation of consent, to the extent prior consent existed (hereafter “The ATDS Revocation Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had revoked any prior express consent to receive such calls prior to the calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 8. Beginning in or around August 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -1636, -5903, -6147 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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15. Enterprise Restoration provides a variety of services to its clients in the state of Louisiana and nationwide. Enterprise Restoration utilizes manual laborers to provide these services. 17. John W. Adams, III was also an employer, for FLSA purposes, of Plaintiffs and the other manual laborers. John W. Adams, III at all times relevant to this action owned and operated Enterprise Restoration and exercised control over the day-to-day operations and finances of Enterprise Restoration. Specifically, as to Plaintiffs and the other manual laborers, John W. Adams, III (1) held the power to hire and fire; (2) managed and controlled work schedules and employment conditions; (3) determined rates and methods of payment; and (4) maintained employment records. 18. Although Plaintiffs were non-exempt employees under the FLSA and routinely worked in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs an overtime rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 19. Defendants have also willfully and improperly applied the same unlawful pay practice to many other non-exempt employees. Plaintiffs are aware of scores of other current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants who also worked overtime hours for Defendants without receiving overtime pay. 20. Any records concerning the number of hours worked by and amounts paid to Plaintiffs and the other manual laborers are in the possession and custody of Defendants. 21. Plaintiffs bring this suit as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of themselves and all others employed by Defendants as manual laborers paid by the hour within three years prior to the filing of this Complaint who, like Plaintiffs, have not been compensated at one and one-half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a single workweek. 22. Plaintiffs have consented in writing to be a part of this action. Plaintiffs’ signed consent forms are attached hereto as Exhibit A. 23. Plaintiffs are aware that this practice has not been limited to payment of their wages, but it a practice within the operations of Defendants’ business. 24. Defendants classify and pay all of their manual laborers in the manner described herein. As such, Defendants maintained a common pay practice or policy and the FLSA Collective are similarly situated to Plaintiffs. 25. Defendants’ manual laborers all perform similar job functions and duties although one employee might have more tenure, experience, or require less supervision than another employee in the same or similar position. As such, the FLSA Collective are similarly situated to Plaintiffs. 27. Defendants possess the names and contact information of the FLSA Collective in their records. 28. The FLSA Collective should be allowed to receive notice about this lawsuit and given an opportunity to join. Like Plaintiffs, these similarly situated employees are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and other damages. Therefore, notice is appropriately sent to the following class: All individuals who were employed by Enterprise Restoration, L.L.C. and/or John W. Adams, III, as manual laborers and paid by the hour during any workweek from within three (3) years of the filing of this action, through the time notice of this action is provided. 29. Defendants willfully engaged in a pattern of violating the FLSA as described in this Complaint in ways including, but not limited to, failing to pay their employees overtime compensation. Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255. 30. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all of the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 31. The FLSA applies to Defendants’ employment of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. 32. The FLSA mandates that employees are entitled to overtime premium pay at a rate of no less than one and one-half times the employee's regular rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 33. Defendants have willfully refused to pay overtime to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 34. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of income and other damages. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective are entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with this claim. 35. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of the FLSA. Defendants knew or showed reckless disregard for the fact that their compensation practices were in violation of the FLSA.

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14. Defendant is an online retailer of clothing, accessories, and facemasks for adults. On the Website, customers can purchase hats, gloves, masks and clothing. 15. With no brick and mortar stores of its own, Defendant relies on the Website to reach consumers. 16. The State of New York has required that all residents wear protective face masks when out in public. Defendant now offers face masks for sale on its Website. 17. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its retail operations. Through Defendant’s Website, customers can learn about Defendant, including its history and manufacturing process; learn about Defendant’s products, including construction details and materials used. Through its advertising, Defendant is trying to sell its products to consumers in New York. 19. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Tatum-Rios and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its online retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 20. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. She is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. She has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen- reading software. 23. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Tatum-Rios encountered have caused a denial of her full and equal access in the past, and now deter her on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 24. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios could independently navigate it, view goods and service items, learn about Defendant’s products, and purchase items for delivery, as sighted individuals can. 25. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 27. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 28. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 30. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 31. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 32. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 34. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services Defendant offers during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 35. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services Defendant offers during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 36. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services Defendant offers during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 38. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 39. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because she has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because she has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 41. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 42. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 43. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 44. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service. 45. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 47. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 48. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, she has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 50. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service. 52. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a “person” within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 53. Defendant is violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). 55. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Defendant has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 56. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Tatum-Rios and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 58. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodation under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 60. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is therefore a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 63. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Tatum-Rios and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 64. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Tatum-Rios seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 65. Plaintiff Tatum-Rios, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website and Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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(42 U.S.C. § 1983; Violation of the Help America Vote Act Against Defendants Reagan, Maricopa County, and Fontes) (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Violation of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution Against Defendants Reagan, Maricopa County, and Fontes) (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Violation of the National Voter Registration Act Against Defendants Reagan, Maricopa County, and Fontes) 1. For an order certifying a Class and Subclass pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2); 13. To be eligible to vote in a particular election, Arizona law requires that the voter’s registration form be “received by the county recorder . . . prior to midnight of the twenty-ninth day” before that election. A.R.S. § 16-120. 15. Columbus Day is a state and federal holiday. See A.R.S. § 1-301(A); 5 2. For compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined according to proof; 3. For costs of suit and attorneys’ fees as provided by law; and 4. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 44. Plaintiff is a United States Citizen living in Arizona. He brings this action against the Defendants both as an individual and as a representative of a class of all Arizona voters who had their ballots discarded due to the unlawful October 10, 2016 Policy, which set an unlawful voter registration deadline. 45. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) to certify a class of individuals who did not have their ballots counted due to the unlawful October 10, 2016 voter registration deadline. 46. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all Arizona voters who registered to vote on October 11, 2016 and cast a provisional ballot in the November 8, 2016 General Election. 48. The members of the Class and Subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The Class and Subclass consist of hundreds of individuals who registered to vote on October 11, 2016 and cast a provisional ballot in the November 8, 2016 General Election. 49. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class and Subclass, including: a. Whether the Defendants violated the Class and Subclass members’ right to register to vote by adopting a voter registration deadline that did not comply with the National Voter Registration Act; b. Whether the Defendants violated Class and Subclass members’ right to vote by refusing to count their ballots and certifying election results that did comply with the Help America Vote Act; c. Whether the Defendants violated Class and Subclass members’ federal and constitutional rights by engaging in conduct that led to the disenfranchisement of all voters who registered on October 11, 2016. 50. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class and Subclass because the policies, practices, and conduct that violated Plaintiff’s rights are the same as those that were applied to all members of the Class and Subclass. Plaintiff is a member of the Class and Subclass he seeks to represent. 52. Defendants have acted on grounds applicable to the Class and Subclass, in that their policies, practices, and conduct have affected all Class and Subclass members. 53. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs of this Complaint and the paragraphs in the counts below as though fully set forth herein. 54. The purpose of the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) is to, among other things, “establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office.” 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1). 55. To accomplish this, the NVRA requires that states provide for voter registration via several methods: registration with an application for a driver’s license, 52 U.S.C. § 20504; registration by mail, 52 U.S.C. § 20505; and in-person registration at registration sites or government offices, 52 U.S.C. § 20506. 57. Arizona law requires that voter registration forms be “received . . . prior to midnight of the twenty-ninth day preceding the date of the election.” A.R.S. § 16-120. Twenty-nine days before the November 2016 Election was October 10, 2016, which is the registration deadline the Defendants set. That date, however, fell on Columbus Day. It was thus impossible for Arizonans to register using certain NVRA-mandated methods on that date. For example, MVD and post offices were closed on Columbus Day. The same was true of October 9, 2016 because it was a Sunday. Therefore, Arizonans were required to register to vote via these methods, by the latest, Saturday, October 8, 2016. This deadline was 31 days before the election and violates the NVRA. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1). 58. Put differently, given that 29 days before the November 2016 Election fell on Columbus Day, the first available day to require voters to register through the NVRA methods that was “not later” than 29 days before the election was Tuesday, October 11, 2016. Accordingly, Defendants’ insistence that voters who registered by October 11, 2016 were ineligible vote in the November 2016 Election was inconsistent with, and a violation of, the NVRA and Arizona law. 60. Defendants’ violations of 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1) directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages. 61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs of this Complaint and the paragraphs in the counts below as though fully set forth herein. 62. Under the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), “[i]f the appropriate State or local election official to whom [a] [provisional] ballot or voter information is transmitted … determines that the individual is eligible under State law to vote, the individual’s provisional ballot shall be counted as a vote in that election in accordance with State law.” 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(4). 63. Because all of the provisional ballots described herein were cast by voters, who should have been eligible to vote under state law, the plain language of 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(4) required that those votes should have been counted. 65. Defendants’ violation of 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(4) directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages. 66. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs of this Complaint and the paragraphs in the counts below as though fully set forth herein. 67. Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” 68. Article I, Section 2 secures the right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted in Congressional elections. 69. Because all of the provisional ballots described herein were cast by qualified voters within the State of Arizona, Article I, Section 2 required Defendants to count their vote. 71. Defendants’ violation of Article I, Section 2 directly and proximately caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows: I. BACKGROUND

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.MUHLENBERG.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 31. Plaintiff, Jason Camacho, attended the NACAC college fair at Javits on Nov. 5, 2018 in order to obtain information from the college exhibitors presenting and marketing at the fair including the Defendant’s school. 32. Soon after attending the Javits fair, Mr. Camacho attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s school but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 35. The stated principles of NACAC members include “They strive to eliminate bias within the educational system based on …disability.”1 36. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant, that is a member of NACAC, intentionally violated NACAC’s basic principles to eliminate bias toward the disabled as well as federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. 37. NACAC maintains a business relationship with the New York Daily News newspaper which publishes full page advertisements for the NACAC college fairs at Javits and an onsite guide to the exhibitors which is distributed free of charge to attendees at the college fairs. Exhibitors, such as the Defendant, may participate in the New York Daily News advertisements and/or advertise in the onsite guide. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 40. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 41. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 42. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 44. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 48. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 56. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 58. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Defendant’s school and it’s exhibits at Javits are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s school. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 63. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 64. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 66. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant’s physical exhibit locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 87. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 90. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 92. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 97. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 98. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. DECLARATORY RELIEF 116. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 117. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 118. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504 VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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11. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and/or continue to employ, “employee[s],” including the Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees. At all relevant times, Defendants have had gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 12. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, an “employer” as defined by the MMWL. At all relevant times, D e f e n d a n t s h a v e employed, and/or continue to employ, “employee[s],” including Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees as defined by the MMWL. 13. The primary job of Property Managers is to manage individual apartment complexes and affordable housing on behalf of the Defendants and others. Many Property Managers, including Harger, supervise less than three full time employees in performance of their job duties. 14. All Property Managers are similarly situated in that they supervise less than three full time employees and are all subject to Defendants’ policy and practice that designated and/or treated them as exempt employees. Accordingly, all Property Managers perform work without overtime compensation. 16. Defendants require Property Managers to record their work time via time cards, but they do not use the time cards as a basis for wage payment. Moreover, not all time is recorded because Plaintiff and others similarly situated engage in work away from their work location, including company meetings held in Columbia Missouri, and additional work on the evenings and weekends. Accordingly, while most time is recorded, Defendants fail to accurately record all of the actual time worked by all Property Managers. Defendants could easily and accurately record the actual time worked by all Property Managers. 17. Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of 50 hours per week, but she was not compensated at a rate of at least one and one half times her regular rate for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 18. In light of Defendants’ failure to accurately record time worked by all Property Managers, Defendants fails to provide accurate wage statements to all Property Managers. 19. Harger was a Property Manager for Defendants from July 2007 through February 2015. (I would eliminate this paragraph as it is duplicative of the info in paragraph 1) 20. During her employment, Harger typically worked approximately 50 hours per week in the office, and an additional 2-3 hours per week outside the office. Additionally, Harger and others similarly situated were required to travel to Columbia, MO and other locations for training 22. Because Defendants misclassified Harger as an exempt employee and she worked in excess of forty hours per week, Harger is entitled to overtime compensation. 23. Upon information and belief, other Property Managers employed by Defendants also are entitled to overtime compensation because Defendants improperly classified them as exempt employees and they worked in excess of forty hours per week. 24. The same unlawful practices and procedures described above affect all property managers (who supervise less than three full time employees) nationwide, including in the states of Missouri, Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Carolina and Texas. 25. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint. 26. During the relevant period, Plaintiff supervised less than three full time employees. Defendants employ other Property Managers at locations throughout the United States who like Plaintiff, supervised less than three full time employees. 27. Defendants classify Property Managers as exempt employees under the FLSA. Thus, Defendants does not pay Property Managers overtime compensation. 29. All similarly situated property managers working for Defendants are similarly situated in that they all perform essentially the same respective job functions and supervise less than three full time employees. 30. All similarly situated Property Managers are similarly situated in that they are all subject to D e f e n d a n t s ’ same compensation policy, plan, or procedure that requires them to perform work and/or requires them to be present at work without paying them overtime. This denies the similarly situated Property Managers their overtime compensation. 31. Defendants’ policy and practice of classifying similarly situated Property Managers as exempt employees and denying them overtime compensation violates the FLSA. 32. Plaintiff brings this Complaint as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on behalf of: All persons nationwide who were, are or will be employed by Defendants as Property Managers who supervised less than three full time employees from August 24, 2012 to the present, plus periods of tolling, who have not been compensated at one and one- half times the regular rate of pay for all services performed in excess of forty hours per week. 33. This claim is being brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA for all claims asserted by Plaintiff because her claims are similar to the claims of the similarly situated Property Managers. 34. The number and identity of other similarly situated Property Managers yet to opt-in and consent to be party plaintiffs may be determined from Defendants’ records, and potential class members may easily and quickly be notified of the pendency of this action. 36. The foregoing conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated employees of Defendants, seeks damages in the amount of all respective unpaid overtime compensations at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a work week, plus liquidated damages, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated employees of Defendants who compose the similarly situated Property Managers, seek recovery of all attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of this action, to be paid by Defendants, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint. 40. Plaintiff has been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the MWL, codified at Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 290.500 et seq. 42. Defendants were the “employer” of Plaintiff within the meaning of the MWL. 43. Plaintiff was Defendants’ “employee” within the meaning of the MWL. 44. As set forth herein, Defendants illegally classified and/or treated the Missouri Named Plaintiff and the Missouri Class Members as exempt, and thus failed to pay the Missouri Named Plaintiff and the Missouri Class Members the overtime required by Missouri law. 45. Pursuant to the MWL, Plaintiff and the Missouri Class Members are entitled to be compensated at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which such employees are employed for all work performed in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 46. Defendants, pursuant to its policy and practice, violated the MWL by refusing and failing to pay Plaintiff and the Missouri Class Members overtime wages required under the 8. Defendant Fairway is a provider of property management services to companies such as JES Holdings, Inc. 9. Defendant JES is a privately owned group of companies, including Fairway Management and FWM Payroll Clearing, Inc., that employs more 600 employees and offers clients a fully-integrated array of services from site selection to direct delivery of investor benefits. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Brought by Plaintiff and the Proposed Collective Against Defendants) Violation of the Missouri Wage Law (Brought by Plaintiff and the Proposed Class Against Defendants)

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1. Instagram is a popular social media platform, wholly owned by Facebook, with approximately one billion annual active users. 2. Instagram’s focus as a social media platform is based on allowing users to share photographs and videos with one another. Originally, users were only able to post photographs or videos to their Instagram “Feed,” which is a permanent collection of users’ content that others can interact with by viewing, commenting, or liking. In August 2016, Instagram launched “Stories,” a feature where users can post photographs or videos that disappear from view within a 24-hour period. 22. Facebook which was founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg, Eduardo Saverin, Dustin Moskovitz, and Chris Hughes, first began as a new social media platform directed towards college students. By the end of the following year, Facebook had amassed over six million users. 23. In 2006, Facebook expanded its membership from college students to anyone over the age of thirteen. Four years later, Facebook had not only surpassed “Myspace” as the most popular and most visited, social media platform, but it had also accomplished the difficult task of having over 400 million active users. To date, Facebook reports over 2.6 billion active users. 24. Facebook’s rise to becoming the most popular social media platform in the United States was no small feat. During the process, and to maintain its dominance in the market, Facebook acquired several other social media platforms and other apps to boost its portfolio. Some of Facebook’s most popular acquisitions have included “WhatsApp” and “Instagram.” 3. As a social media platform that allows users to post photographs and videos, Instagram has access to a user’s smartphone camera for the limited purpose of allowing users to directly take a photograph or video and then post that content to its platform. 4. Instagram claims to only access users’ smartphone cameras with user permission, such as when a user is interacting with the Instagram application’s (also referred to as an “app”) camera feature. 5. For example, Instagram recently released a statement saying “[Instagram] only access[es] your camera when you tell us to—for example, when you swipe from Feed to Camera.” Instagram claims when its camera feature is not used, it does not access users’ smartphone cameras.1 82. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 individually and on behalf of the following Class: All Instagram users whose smartphone cameras were accessed by Instagram without their consent from 2010 through the present (the “Class Period”).24 83. Excluded from each Class are: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and any members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendants or its parent has a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers, and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. Common Law Invasion of Privacy – Intrusion Upon Seclusion (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) The History of Facebook and Instagram

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25. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 62. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 63. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 64. Plaintiff proposes the following Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons within the United States who received a non-emergency telephone call from or on behalf of Ultimate Vacation Group LLC to a cellular or residential telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice within the applicable statute of limitations. Collectively, all these persons will be referred to as “Class members.” Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class. 65. Excluded from the Class are the Defendant, and any entities in which the Defendant has a controlling interest, the Defendant’s agents and employees, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 66. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but Plaintiff reasonably believes Class members number, at minimum, in the thousands. 67. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of the Defendant. 69. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. 70. Additionally, the disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. 71. Further, the Class can be identified easily through records maintained by Ultimate and/or other telemarketing agents. 72. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. 73. The questions of law and fact, referred to above, involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. 75. As a person who received a non-emergency telephone call using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without providing his prior express consent to the Defendant within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member who also received such phone calls. 76. Further, Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. 77. Plaintiff has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 78. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions, including class claims involving violations of the TCPA. 79. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 80. Class wide relief is essential to compel the Defendant to comply with the TCPA. In point of fact, at least one individual has filed suit against Ultimate for violating the TCPA, but the robocalls have continued unabated. 81. The interest of the Class members in individually pursuing claims against the Defendant is slight because the statutory damages for an individual action are relatively small, and are therefore not likely to deter the Defendant from engaging in the same behavior in the future. 83. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 84. Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 85. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 86. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 87. As a result of the Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 88. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. 90. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 91. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 92. As a result of the Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 93. Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by the Defendant in the future. 94. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs as provided by law. ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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14. The facts in support of this action are based on Plaintiff’s review of publicly- available information. Based on a review of these documents, and as described in greater detail herein, Plaintiff believes that discovery will result in the production of many more inculpatory documents within Defendants’ sole possession, custody, or control. Case3:15-cv-00700-MEJ Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page4 of 19 44. This lawsuit is brought on behalf of Plaintiff individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of itself and members of a Class defined as follows: All owners of sound recordings or musical performances that were initially “fixed” on a physical medium (i.e., recorded) prior to February 15, 1972 and whose sound recordings were reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited by Defendants in the States of California, New York and Florida through Beats Music or iTunes Radio and for which Defendants have not received authorization or license to reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit. 45. Excluded from the Class are Defendants; any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of Defendants; any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest; any officer, director, or employee of Defendants; any successor or assignee of Defendants. 46. Ascertainability: The Class is readily ascertainable and is one for which records should exist. 47. Numerosity: Due to the nature of this case, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds to thousands of geographically dispersed Class members, the exact number and Case3:15-cv-00700-MEJ Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page9 of 19 53. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 54. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 55. Under California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), Plaintiff and members of the Class possess exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the performances embodied in those recordings. 56. Defendants, without authorization or license, reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s Recordings, through Beats Music and iTunes Radio. As such, Defendants have infringed Plaintiff and the members of the Class’s exclusive ownership interests in the Pre-1972 Recordings in violation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2). 57. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ violation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), Defendants have received and retained money and value that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. Case3:15-cv-00700-MEJ Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page11 of 19 59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 60. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 61. California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. prohibits acts of unfair competition, which mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices. 62. Fair dealings with artists are matters of great public concern in California and elsewhere. As a society, we value creative expression, and accordingly foster and protect such expression through copyright, trademark and other intellectual property laws. Specifically applicable here is Senate Bill No. 1034, where the California Legislature determined that “the recording industry is an important industry to the State of California,” and that “artistic labor is an important resource to the people of California that is vital to maintaining a healthy and vibrant recording industry.” 63. As alleged herein, Defendants, without authorization or license, reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s Recordings, through Beats Music and iTunes Radio. As such, Defendants have infringed Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ exclusive ownership interests in the Pre-1972 Recordings in violation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2). 64. As a result, Defendants’ uniform policies, acts, omissions, and practices, among others, violate numerous provisions of California statutory and common law, including, but not limited to California Civil Code § 980(a)(2). Plaintiff reserves the right to allege other violations of law that constitute unlawful business acts or practices based upon the above-described Case3:15-cv-00700-MEJ Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page12 of 19 70. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 71. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 72. Under California, New York and Florida law, Plaintiff and the members of the Class possess exclusive ownerships in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the artistic performances embodied in those recordings. 73. Plaintiff and the members of the Class (or their predecessors in interest) invested substantial time and money in developing the Pre-1972 Recordings that Defendants reproduced, performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited through Beats Music and iTunes Radio. 74. Because Defendants did not obtain licenses to the Pre-1972 Recordings, they did not incur any of the costs that a licensee would otherwise be obligated to pay in order to reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit these recordings. 75. Defendants have and continue to misappropriate for its commercial benefit the Pre-1972 Recordings through Beats Music and iTunes Radio. 76. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ misappropriation, Defendants have received and retained money and value that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and the Class. 77. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of California, New York and Florida law, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial, but which is likely to be tens of millions of dollars. 78. Defendants acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. Defendants’ conduct was undertaken in conscious disregard of Plaintiff and other members of the Class’s rights to the Pre- 1972 Recordings. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to punitive damages against Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish and make an example of Defendants and to discourage Defendants and others from engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future. /// /// Case3:15-cv-00700-MEJ Document1 Filed02/13/15 Page14 of 19 Misappropriation Under California, New York And Florida Law Unlawful and Unfair Business Acts and Practices in Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Violation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2)

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18. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the allegations set forth above. 19. While employed by Defendant, Plaintiff Sanchez performed work as an hourly meat processing employee at Defendant’s Arkansas City meat processing facility. 20. While employed by Defendant, Plaintiff Posadas performed work as an hourly meat processing employee at Defendant’s Arkansas City meat processing facility. 21. During the Plaintiffs’ employment with the Defendant, the Defendant employed numerous other individuals who had similar job duties as hourly meat processing employees with a similar compensation structure as the Plaintiffs. Said other hourly meat processing employees also worked at Defendant’s Arkansas City, Kansas location (the putative collective and class action plaintiffs). 22. Plaintiffs bring their FLSA claims as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons who were, are, or will be employed by the Defendant as hourly meat processing employees within three years from the commencement of this action who have not been compensated for all straight time and overtime premiums for all hours for which they suffered or were permitted to work. 23. Plaintiffs bring their FLSA claims as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to Section 16 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated putative plaintiffs of the collective action. 24. Plaintiffs and the putative plaintiffs are similarly situated in that they have been subjected to Defendant’s common practices or policies of refusing to pay straight time and overtime for all hours worked in violation of the FLSA. 26. At all times relevant herein, Defendant has had gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Dollars) annually. 27. The FLSA requires each covered employer to compensate all employees for all hours suffered or permitted to work and to pay overtime premiums at a rate of not less than one and one-half the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a workweek. 28. At all relevant times, Defendant has had a policy and practice of paying hourly meat processing employees based on a principle of “gang time.” Pursuant to Defendant’s gang time compensation system, hourly meat processing employees were typically paid only for the time that their respectively assigned meat processing production lines were running, along with pay for an additional ten minutes per day for “dress time.” 29. Defendant’s gang time policies have resulted in a substantial difference between the amount of time for which Defendant’s hourly meat processing employees were compensated and the amount of their compensable time as required by law, resulting in Defendant’s failure to pay hourly meat processing employees for all compensable time, including the failure to pay overtime as required by the FLSA. 30. More generally, the Defendant has failed to compensate Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated employees for all hours worked, and therefore, Defendant has violated, and continues to violate, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 32. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated employees of Defendant, seek damages in the amount of all respective unpaid straight time with overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a work week, plus liquidated damages, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 34. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the allegations set forth above. 35. The Plaintiffs bring their claims for Defendant’s violations of the KWPA as a class action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and as representatives of the following class: All current and former hourly meat processing employees of Defendant who worked at Defendant’s Arkansas City facility in the past three years and who were subject to Defendant’s “gang time” and other policies and practices resulting in Defendant’s failure to compensate them for all of their compensable time. 36. At all relevant times, Defendant has been an “employer” within the meaning of the KWPA, K.S.A. § 44-313(a). 37. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and continues to employ, “employees,” within the meaning of the KWPA § 44-313(b), including the Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. 38. The Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, bring a claim for Defendant’s violation of the KWPA, K.S.A. § 44-312 et seq. 40. For purposes of the KWPA, such wages were due pursuant to the respective agreements between Defendant and its hourly meat processing employees to pay each of them an hourly wage for their work. In the alternative, such wages were due pursuant to the FLSA and its implementing regulations by the United States Department of Labor. 41. Such failure to pay Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, their wages due has constituted a willful violation of the KWPA, K.S.A. 44-314(b), because such failure to pay wages due benefited Defendant and caused a direct detriment to the Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated. 45. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the allegations set forth above. 46. In the alternative to Court II above, Plaintiffs hereby assert a claim for quantum meruit on behalf of themselves and as representatives of the following class: All current and former hourly meat processing employees of Defendant who worked at Defendant’s Arkansas City facility in the past three years and who were subject to Defendant’s “gang time” and other policies and practices resulting in Defendant’s failure to compensate them for all of their time spent for the benefit of Defendant. 47. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class conferred a benefit upon Defendant by performing work and spending time for Defendant’s benefit without receiving just compensation in return. 49. Defendant accepted and retained the benefit of Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class performing work and spending time for Defendant’s benefit without receiving just compensation in return so that it is inequitable for Defendant to retain such benefit without payment of the value thereof. FLSA Claims KWPA Claims Quantum Meruit

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24. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, Plaintiff brings his First Cause of Action as a collective action under the FLSA on behalf of himself and the following collective: All persons employed by Defendants at any time since February 26, 2013 and through the entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) who worked as electricians, laborers, foremen and all other hourly employees (the “Collective Action Members”). 25. A collective action is appropriate in this circumstance because Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are similarly situated, in that they were all subjected to Defendants’ illegal policy of failing to pay overtime premiums for work performed in excess of forty (40) hours each week. As a result of this policy, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members did not receive the legally-required overtime premium payments for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 26. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members had substantially similar job duties, work schedules, and were paid by Defendants pursuant to the same or substantially similar payment structure. 6 27. Pursuant to the NYLL, Plaintiff brings his Second through Seventh Causes of Action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and the following class: All persons employed by Defendants in New York at any time since February 26, 2010 and through the entry of judgment in this case (the “Class Period”) who worked as electricians, laborers, foremen and all other hourly employees (the “Class Members”). 28. The Class Members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class Members are determinable from the records of Defendants. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under Rule 23. 29. The Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 30. Upon information and belief, there are in excess of forty (40) Class Members. 31. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual Class members. Such common questions will determine Defendants’ liability to all (or nearly all) Class Members. Common questions include: a. whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class Members within the meaning of the NYLL; b. whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time records for all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Class Members; c. what proof of hours worked is sufficient where employers fail in their duty to maintain time records; d. whether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek; 7 e. whether Defendants breached their contracts with certain government agencies by failing to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members the prevailing wages for work performed pursuant to such contracts; f. whether Defendants breached their contracts with certain government agencies by failing to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members the prevailing wage supplemental benefits for work performed pursuant to such contracts; g. whether Defendants breached their contracts with certain government agencies by failing to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members the prevailing wage overtime premiums for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours in a day and for weekend work; h. whether the Defendants had a policy of demanding and receiving kickbacks from Plaintiffs and the Class by requiring them to pay Defendants their prevailing wages earned while providing labor on public works projects; h. whether Defendants failed to provide proper wage notice to Plaintiff and Class Members at the beginning of their employment and/or on February 1 of each year as required by the NYLL; i. whether Defendants failed to furnish to Plaintiff and the Class Members a statement of wages, hours worked, rates paid and gross wages, as required by the NYLL; and j. whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory damages, liquidated damages, interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys’ fees. 32. The answer to these questions would drive resolution of the litigation. If a judge 8 and/or jury agrees with Plaintiff on these issues, Defendants would be liable to all Class Members for their NYLL wage and hour violations. 33. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class Members’ claims. Plaintiff, like all Class Members, is a non-management employee of Defendants who worked for Defendants pursuant to their corporate policies. Plaintiff, like all Class Members, was, inter alia, not paid overtime premium pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a given workweek and did not receive proper wage statements and wage notices. If Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for the claims enumerated in this Complaint, they are also liable to all Class Members. 34. Plaintiff and his Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class. There are no conflicts between Plaintiff and the Class Members, and Plaintiff brings this lawsuit out of a desire to help all Class Members, not merely out of a desire to recover her own damages. 35. Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action litigators who are well-prepared to represent the interests of the Class Members. 36. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Defendants are sophisticated parties with substantial resources. The individual plaintiff lacks the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate defendants. 37. The individual members of the Class have no interest or capacity to bring separate actions; Plaintiff is unaware of any other litigation concerning this controversy; it is desirable to concentrate the litigation in one case; and there are no likely difficulties that will arise in managing the class action. 9 38. At all relevant times, Defendant Fast Electric has been in the construction and electrical contracting business. 39. Akro’s filings with the New York State Department of State, Division of Corporations lists Defendant Kostika as Akro’s Chief Executive Officer. 40. PJP’s filings with the New York State Department of State, Division of Corporations lists Defendant Perrone as PJP’s Chief Executive Officer. 41. Rock Scaffolding’s filings with the New York State Department of State, Division of Corporations lists Defendant Singh as Rock Scaffolding’s Chief Executive Officer. 42. Upon information and belief, Defendants Kostikas and Perrone were regularly present at the Public Works Projects to oversee the work of Plaintiff and Fast Electric’s other employees. 43. During all relevant times, Defendant Fast Electric contracted with one or more of the corporate defendants (i.e. Akro, PJP and Rock Scaffolding) to provide electrical installation work in connection with the contracts entered into by Akro, PJP, and/or Rock Scaffolding for work on behalf of NYCHA or other public entities. Defendants’ Prevailing Wage Projects 44. Upon information and belief, Defendants have entered into certain contracts, as either a subcontractor or prime contractor, with certain government agencies including the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”), or with prime contractors not currently known, to furnish labor, material and equipment to perform work on these Public Works Projects. 45. Upon information and belief, among other Public Works Projects, Fast Electric 10 entered into a contract to perform work as a subcontractor with NYCHA, with Akron as the prime contractor. Upon information and belief, this particular contract was for a NYCHA project, contract number: BW1128079 (the “NYCHA Project”). 46. Upon information and belief, Fast Electric entered into certain contracts to perform work as a subcontractor for certain Public Works Projects, with Akron, PJP and Rock Scaffolding as the prime contractors. 47. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and other employees of Fast Electric working on the NYCHA Project, performed work at various NYCHA housing developments throughout New York City including, among others, the Hammel Houses in Far Rockaway, the Parkside Housing Project in Bronx, the East New York City Line Housing Development in Cypress Hills, Brooklyn, and the Gowanus Houses in Brooklyn. 48. Upon information and belief, the contracts for these Public Works Projects required that Defendants pay and ensure payment of the prevailing rates of wages and supplements to all workers furnishing labor on the sites of the Public Works Projects, including their direct employees and all other persons furnishing labor on the sites of the Public Works Projects. Upon information and belief, the public works contracts also provided that any subcontracts that Defendants entered into contain language requiring the payment of prevailing rates of wages and supplements to all workers furnishing labor on the sites of the Public Works Projects. 49. As required by law, a schedule containing the prevailing rates of wages and supplemental benefits (“Prevailing Wage Schedule”) to be paid to Plaintiff should have been annexed to and formed as part of the public works contracts. If not annexed to the public works contracts, these schedules were expressly or impliedly incorporated into the contracts as a matter 11 of law and/or public policy. 50. The promise to pay and ensure payment of the prevailing wage and supplemental benefit rated in the public works contracts was made for the benefit of all workers furnishing labor on the sites of the Public Works Projects and, as such, the workers furnishing labor on the sites of the Public Works Projects are the beneficiaries of that promise and the contracts entered into between Defendants and governmental agencies. Plaintiff’s Work for Defendants 51. Plaintiff Carty worked for Fast Electric as an electrician from in or around December 2011 through in or around December 2014 (the “Carty Employment Period”). 52. At the beginning of the Carty Employment Period, Plaintiff Carty was typically scheduled to work approximately between three and four (3-4) days per week, from approximately 7:00 am through approximately between 8:00 pm and 3:00 am, for a total of between approximately forty (40) and fifty (50) hours per week. During approximately the last eight (8) months of the Carty Employment Period, Carty was scheduled to work five (5) days per week from approximately 7:00 am until approximately 7:00 pm, for a total of approximately sixty (60) hours per week. 53. Throughout the Carty Employment Period, Carty worked on certain Public Works Projects at least once a month, with Fast Electric as the subcontractor and certain other companies as general contractors, including Akro, PJP and Rock Scaffolding. 54. Plaintiff was aware that Fast Electric was a sub-contractor to Akro, PJP and Rock Scaffolding on the Public Works Projects because Defendant Acosta would inform him of the addresses and general contractor’s name for each of the projects that Plaintiff had to drive to perform electrical work. 12 55. When working on the NYCHA Project, as a subcontractor to Akro, Plaintiff was issued his prevailing wage checks by Akro instead of by Fast Electric. 56. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff was issued checks by other general contractors for his work on the public works projects, but was required to cash these checks and provide “kickbacks” to his supervisor at Fast Electric. 57. While working on certain Public Works Projects, including the NYCHA Project, Carty was required to sign in and out on time sheets which provided the hours that Carty started and finished work and his classification as an “A” electrician. 58. At the beginning of the Carty Employment Period, for his work, Carty was paid approximately $12.00 per hour which was periodically increased through his employment period to a final wage of $16.00 per hour. Throughout most of the Carty Employment Period, Carty was paid entirely in cash, except approximately the last 6 months of his employment, when he was paid with a combination of check and cash. 59. Notwithstanding the fact that Carty typically worked at least 40 hours per week including as much as 60 hours in a week, Carty never received overtime premium pay equal to one and one-half (1.5) times his regular hourly wage. Defendants’ failure to pay Carty overtime premium pay for his hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a given workweek was a corporate policy of Defendants that applied to all of Defendants’ electrician laborers, foreman, and other hourly employees. 60. During the Carty Employment Period with Defendants, Plaintiff primarily performed work on NYCHA Projects in New York City. 61. Throughout most of the Carty Employment Period, Plaintiff performed various types of electrical work in scaffold projects including, but not limited to, installing (running and 13 terminating new wires) low and high-voltage electrical conduit, lighting fixtures, etc. 62. Upon information and belief, in furtherance of the public works contracts entered into by Defendants, Plaintiff and the members of the putative Collective Action and Class performed various types of electrical work including, but not limited to, installing (running and terminating new wires) low and high-voltage electrical conduit, lighting fixtures. 63. For his work on the Public Works Projects, Defendants required Plaintiff to cash his prevailing wage check and give the wages back to Defendants as “kickbacks” so that they could pay him for all hours worked on both the Public Works Projects and private jobs. Defendants thus paid Plaintiff at his regular hourly rate of approximately $12.00 - $16.00 per hour for all hours worked, including hours in excess of forty (40) hours per week and hours worked on Public Works Projects over eight (8) hours per day and/or weekend hours. Defendants thus failed to pay Plaintiff the prevailing rate of wages, overtime wages, and supplemental benefits as required by the New York City Prevailing Wage Schedules for his work on the Public Works Projects. 64. Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff was always paid approximately $12.00 - $16.00 per hour in cash for all hours worked, he was instructed by Defendants that if anyone from the “city” should ask how much they are paid, they should say that they are paid the correct prevailing wages of approximately $98.00 per hour. 65. Upon information and belief, all other employees of Fast Electric were also required to cash their prevailing wage checks and give it back to Defendants as “kickbacks” in order to get paid for all hours worked, including hours worked on the Public Works Projects, at their regular hourly rate. 66. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff or Class Members with a proper wage notice 14 at the time of hire or on February 1 or each year, or wage statement(s) with every payment of wages. 67. Plaintiff’s work was performed in the normal course of Defendants’ business and was integrated into the business of Defendants. 68. Defendants have simultaneously employed other individuals like Plaintiff during the relevant time periods and continuing until today, to perform work as electricians at Defendants’ work sites. As stated, the exact number of such individuals is presently unknown but within the sole knowledge of Defendants and can be ascertained through discovery. Defendants’ Unlawful Corporate Policies 69. Like Plaintiff, Defendants’ other employees were required to work for Defendants in excess of forty (40) hours each week, yet Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and their other employees overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. This refusal to pay Plaintiff and Defendants’ other employees overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a given week was a corporate policy of Defendants that applied to all of Defendants’ hourly employees. 70. Defendants entered into contracts with public entities which obligated Defendants to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members at or above the local prevailing wage rates, including any required supplementary benefits and overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week, eight (8) hours per day, and hours worked on Saturday and Sunday. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff these prevailing wage rates, supplementary benefits, and overtime premiums was a corporate policy that also applied to all of Defendants’ other similarly situated employees. 71. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff or Class Members with a proper wage notice 15 at the time of hire or on February 1 or each year, or wage statement(s) with every payment of wages. Defendants’ failure to provide proper wage notice and wage statements was a corporate policy of Defendants which applied to all of their employees throughout the Class Period. 72. As employees of Defendants who were assigned to work on Defendants’ publicly financed projects, Plaintiff and the Class Members were intended third-party beneficiaries of Defendants’ public works contracts. 73. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members at the appropriate prevailing wage rates for their publicly financed contracts, yet upon information and belief, Defendants were compensated under these contracts as though they had paid the appropriate prevailing wage rates to Plaintiff and the members of the collective action. 74. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Collective Action Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 75. By failing to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants have violated and continue to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a)(2). 76. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 77. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime caused Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. Plaintiff and the Collective Action 16 Members are entitled to recover from Defendants his unpaid overtime premium compensation, damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of the action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 78. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 79. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ rights by failing to pay overtime compensation at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 each week, in violation of the NYLL and regulations promulgated thereunder. 80. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime premium compensation caused Plaintiff and the Class Members to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime compensation, damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of the action pursuant to NYLL §§ 663(1) et seq. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 82. Defendants required Plaintiff and the Class Members to pay Defendants a portion of their prevailing wages, in violation of New York Labor Law § 198-b. 82. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and the Class Members notice as required by Article 6, § 195, in English or in the language identified by Plaintiff and the Class 17 Members as their primary language, containing Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay, if applicable; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with the NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; or any “doing business as” names used by the employer’ the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 83. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants fifty dollars ($50) per employee for each workweek that the violations occurred or continue to occur, or a total of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) per employee, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190, et seq., liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and injunctive and declaratory relief. 83. Defendants’ failure to comply with New York Labor law’s prohibition on kickbacks caused the Plaintiffs and the Class Members to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 85. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and Class Members with an accurate statement of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195, containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime 18 rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. 86. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each workweek that the violations occurred or continue to occur, or a total of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) per employee, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and injunctive and declaratory relief. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 88. Upon information and belief, the public works contracts entered into by 19 Defendants contained schedules of the prevailing rates of wages and supplemental benefits to be paid to Plaintiff and the employees performing work pursuant to such contracts. 89. Those prevailing rates of wages and supplemental benefits were made part of the public works contracts for the benefit of Plaintiff and the other employees performing work pursuant to such contracts. 90. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff at the correct prevailing wage rates for straight time, overtime, and supplemental benefits for work performed on Public Works Projects constituted a material breach of the contracts entered into between Defendants and certain public entities. 91. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff at prevailing wage rates, they are entitled to relief from Defendants for breach of contract under New York common law of contracts. 92. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 93. Based on Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff the appropriate prevailing wage rates, Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff. 94. Equity and good conscience require that Defendants pay restitution to Plaintiff. 95. Upon information and belief, when Defendants entered into the public works contracts, they agreed to pay the required prevailing wages, overtime, shift-differential and holiday premiums, and supplemental benefit rates of pay to Plaintiff and other employees who 20 performed work pursuant to these contracts. 96. Plaintiff provided valuable services to Defendants on prevailing wage projects for which Plaintiff expected compensation. Defendants knowingly accepted such services yet failed to pay Plaintiff the reasonable value of such services as defined by the New York City prevailing wage schedules. 97. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff at prevailing wage rates on prevailing wage jobs and Defendants’ corresponding unjust enrichment, Plaintiff is entitled to relief from Defendants under New York’s common law of unjust enrichment. 98. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff the reasonable value of the valuable services they rendered, Plaintiff is entitled to relief from Defendants under New York’s common law of quantum meruit. BREACH OF CONTRACT (Brought On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members) Defendants’ Companies FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT – UNPAID OVERTIME (Brought On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members) NEW YORK LABOR LAW – WAGE STATEMENT VIOLATIONS (Brought On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members) NEW YORK LABOR LAW – WAGE NOTICE VIOLATIONS (Brought On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members) NEW YORK LABOR LAW – ILLEGAL KICKBACKS (Brought On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members) NEW YORK LABOR LAW – UNPAID OVERTIME (Brought On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members) UNJUST ENRICHMENT & QUANTUM MERUIT (Pled In The Alternative) (Brought On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members)

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 105. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 106. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension the Restaurant, which Defendant owns, operates, 25 and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 107. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 2. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making the Website accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 20. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant, during the relevant statutory period.” 21. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant, during the relevant statutory period.” 7 22. There are hundreds of thousands of visually impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually impaired. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 23. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of the Website and the Restaurant. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on the Website and by extension the goods and services offered through the Website by the Restaurant. 24. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through its website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through its website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 25. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that 8 Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 26. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 27. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 28. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 29. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 3. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making the Website accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 30. Defendant operates the Restaurant, a thematic restaurant chain, with locations throughout the United States. It owns and operates one location in New York State, located at 300 Third Street, Niagara Falls, NY 14303. 9 31. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 32. Among the features offered by the Website are the following: (a) restaurant information, allowing persons who wish to dine at the Restaurant to learn its location, hours, and phone numbers; (b) a Wild Bunch Kids Zone tab, displaying a kid’s menu and other activities for children who dine with their families at the Restaurant; (c) information about making a reservation; (d) information about the Restaurant’s social networks; (e) information about the Restaurant’s Email Club; (f) information about parties and group events; (g) information about the Restaurant’s testimonials and employment opportunities; and (h) an online shop displaying many of the products and services available at the Restaurant. 33. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Restaurant, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 34. Defendant denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely navigating the Website. 10 35. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as shopping, banking, etc., for sighted and blind persons. 36. The blind access websites by using keyboards in conjunction with screen-reading software which vocalizes visual information on a computer screen. Except for a blind person whose residual vision is still sufficient to use magnification, screen access software provides the only method by which a blind person can independently access the Internet. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, blind persons are unable to fully access Internet websites and the information, products and services contained therein. 37. There are well established guidelines for making websites accessible to blind people. These guidelines have been in place for at least several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility. The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including, but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard and not just a mouse; ensuring that image maps are accessible, and adding headings so that blind people can easily navigate the site. Without these very basic components a website will be inaccessible to a blind person using a screen reader. 38. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: the lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible forms, the lack of 11 adequate prompting and labeling; the lack of navigation links; the denial of keyboard access; and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 39. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen reader can speak the alternative text while a sighted user sees the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on the Website that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. (Screen readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user.) As a result, Plaintiff and blind customers are unable to determine what is on the Website, browse the site, investigate the Restaurant’s menu and/or make a reservation online. 40. Similarly, the Website lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image to allow user interaction. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots,” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the Website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The “Locations” page contains an image map detailing locations throughout the United States, but the image map does not contain alt-text. The image maps on the Website’s locations are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and other blind individuals attempting to make a reservation. 41. In addition, the Website’s online reservation service is inaccessible for blind users, rendering it impossible to make a reservation without a sighted companion. Specifically, when prompted to select a date, the Website produces a calendar view which is only accessible through the use of a mouse. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be 12 accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Due to the Website’s inaccessible design, screen reader software fails to prompt users to manually type in their preferred date. 42. According to WCAG 2 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the Website. Plaintiff must tab through every menu option on the Website to reach the desired service. Thus, the Website’s inaccessible design denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on the Website. 43. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make a reservation at the Restaurant. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the Restaurant or require assistance in navigating the Restaurant. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate menus and make reservation via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. 44. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Restaurant. 45. Plaintiff has made numerous attempts to make a reservation on the Website, most recently in September 2017, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on the Website. Additionally, Plaintiff was unable to find the location on the Website, preventing Plaintiff from going into the physical location to complete a reservation. These access 13 barriers have caused the Website to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 46. Plaintiff experienced many barriers in attempting to access The Website. For instance, the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) are part of a series of web accessibility guidelines published by Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI) of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which are the main international standards organization for the Internet. Plaintiff was completely blocked from online ordering since the Website is barely accessible. Defendant has failed to adhere to the recommendations of many of these guidelines such as, a. WCAG 2.1 recommending businesses to make all functionality available from a keyboard since the Website requires the visual activity of mouse manipulation to complete a purchase. a. WCAG 2.4 recommending businesses to provide help for users to navigate, find content and determine where they are on the Website due to the Website’s lack of links and headings. b. WCAG 4.1 recommending businesses to maximize compatibility with current and future user agents, including assistive technologies, for the reasons stated above. 47. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing it to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 48. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of the Website and the Restaurant. 49. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: 14 (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 50. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 51. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 52. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 53. The Restaurant is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Restaurant. Independent of the Restaurant, the Website is also a public accommodation. 15 54. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because they own and operate the Website. 55. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I) it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 56. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 57. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 58. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 16 59. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making the Website accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 60. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Defendant who are blind have been denied full and equal access to the Website, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 61. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 62. As such, Defendant discriminate, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and the Restaurant in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 63. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 64. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 17 65. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 66. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. The Restaurant is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Restaurant. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Restaurant. Independent of the Restaurant, the Website is a public accommodation. 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because they own and operate the Restaurant and the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 71. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with 18 the Restaurant to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 72. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 73. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 74. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law 19 § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 75. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 76. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and the Restaurant under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 77. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 78. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 80. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 20 81. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 82. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 83. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof …” 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision” 85. The Restaurant located in New York State is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Restaurant. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Restaurant. 21 86. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because they own and operate the Restaurant and the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Restaurant to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby…” 89. Specifically, under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of 22 competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside …” 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 92. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 93. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 94. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of … disability … directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 95. The Restaurant is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of the Restaurant. Independent of the Restaurant, the Website is a public accommodation. 96. Defendant is subject to City Law because they own and operate the Restaurant 23 and the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 102(1). 97. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Restaurant to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities … any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to … enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 98. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8- 107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (d) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (e) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (f) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 99. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 24 100. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and the Restaurant under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 101. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 102. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 103. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 104. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

win

ACTION Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause:

win

11. For at least four years prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Prior Action on October 6, 2014, and continuing to the present Defendants have had a consistent policy of failing to pay all wages due, including overtime at premium rates and failing to provide and pay wages due for meal breaks and rest breaks to all of their security guard employees. 21. During the four-year period preceding the filing of the Prior Action on October 6, 2014 and continuing to the present, Plaintiff and the Class members were employed by Defendants as security guards in the State of California. The terms and conditions of employment between Plaintiff and the Class members on the one hand, and Defendants on the other hand, were and are governed by the California Labor Code, Title 8, California Code of Regulations, §§ 11000, et seq., and Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order 4-2001. Pursuant to such statutes, regulations and Wage Order, Plaintiff and the Class members are classified as non-exempt employees and, based thereon, are entitled to overtime pay for hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours in any workday or more than 40 hours in any workweek. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that the Class Period for this action is the period commencing four years prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Prior Action on October 6, 2014 through and including the date judgment is entered herein. 22. During the Class Period, Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class members for all hours worked and, as a result, have required Plaintiff and the Class members to work for less than the legal minimum wage. 34. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference each of the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 35. California Labor Code § 204 requires Defendants to pay Plaintiff and the Class members all wages due and owing no less than twice during each calendar month, on days designated in advance by Defendants as regular paydays. 36. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that Defendants had a policy and practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the Class members all wages due and owing on the regular paydays and/or at any time thereafter. Based thereon, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class members in accordance with California Labor Code § 204. 37. As a proximate result of Defendants’ violation of California Labor Code § 204, Plaintiff and the Class members have been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. Plaintiff seeks recovery of all earned but unpaid wages. 38. Pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 218.5 and 218.6, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class members, is entitled to recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs. 44. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 45. During the Class period, California Labor Code Sections 226.7 and 512 and the applicable IWC order applied to Defendants’ employment of Plaintiff and the Class members. At all times relevant hereto, California Labor Code Section 226.7 provided that no employer such as Defendants could require employees such as the Plaintiff and Class members to work during any meal period mandated by an applicable order of the IWC. 50. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 56. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 57. During the Class period, California Labor Code Sections 201 and 202 applied to Defendants’ employment of Plaintiff and the Class members. At all times relevant hereto, California Labor Code § 201 requires that if an employer discharges a member of the Class, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately. Further, California Labor Code Section 202 provides that, if an employee such as a member of the Class voluntarily leaves his or her employment, the wages earned and unpaid must be paid by the employer within seventy-two (72) hours thereafter, unless the employee had given seventy-two (72) hours pervious notice of this or her intention to leave in which case the employee is entitled to receive his or her wages immediately at the time of quitting. 58. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that during the Class Period, Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class members, who are former employees, their earned and unpaid wages, either at the time of their discharge or within seventy-two (72) hours of their quitting. Defendant therefore violated California Labor Code Sections 201 and 202. 61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 62. California Labor Code § 226(a) requires Defendants to furnish to each employee at the time of each payment of wages an accurate itemized statement showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee . . . (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employees is paid on a piece-rate basis . . . (4) all deductions, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of the employee and identifying number, (8) name and address of the legal entity that is the employer, and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employees. Subdivision (a) of California Labor Code section 226 further requires the employer to keep a record or copy of the itemized wage statement on file for at least three years at the place of employment or at a central location within the State of California. 68. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 77. Based on the acts alleged above, and on behalf of himself, the Class members, and the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”), Plaintiff seeks penalties under California Labor Code §§ 2698 and 2699, et seq., for Defendants’ violation of California Labor Code §§ 201- 204, 226(a), 226.7, and (e), 510, 512, and 1194. 78. For each such violation, Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to penalties in an amount to be shown at the time of trial calculated as follows: a. For $100 for the initial violation per employee per pay payment; and b. For $200 for each subsequent violation per employee per pay period. 79. In compliance with California Labor Code § 2698, Plaintiff KARAPETYAN sent a certified letter on September 8, 2014 to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and Defendant setting forth the facts and theories supporting Plaintiff KARAPETYAN’s allegation of the California Labor Code violations by Defendants. FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE LAWFUL REST BREAKS AND FAILURE TO PAY REST BREAK WAGES DUE (By Plaintiff and All Classes Against All Defendants) FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE LAWFUL MEAL PERIODS AND FAILURE TO PAY MEAL PERIOD WAGES DUE (By Plaintiff and All Classes Against All Defendants) FOR FAILURE TO PAY WAGES TIMELY ON TERMINATION (By Plaintiff and the Terminated Security Guard Subclass Against All Defendants) FOR FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES (By Plaintiff and All Classes Against All Defendants) FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCURATE WAGE STATEMENTS (By Plaintiff and All Classes Against All Defendants) FOR FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES (By Plaintiff and All Classes Against All Defendants) FOR PENALTIES PURSUANT TO THE LABOR CODE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL ACT (By Plaintiff and All Classes Against All Defendants) FOR VIOLATION OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE §§ 17200, et seq. (By Plaintiff and All Classes Against All Defendants)

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(Individual and Deputy Attorney General class members’ First Amendment claim against all Defendants) (Individual and Objecting State Employee class members’ First Amendment claim against the State Defendants) 10. At all relevant times, New Jersey Statute Annotated Section 52:14-15.9e has required that State disbursing officers shall, if they receive written authorization from an employee, deduct union dues from employee’s compensation and remit those monies to the union. 12. Effective May 18, 2018, New Jersey amended Section 52:14-15.9e in the so- called “Workplace Democracy Act” to, among other things, prohibit employees from stopping the deduction of union dues from their wages except during an annual ten- day escape period. Section 52:14-15.9e now states, in part: Employees who have authorized the payroll deduction of fees to employee organi- zations may revoke such authorization by providing written notice to their public employer during the 10 days following each anniversary date of their employment. Within five days of receipt of notice from an employee of revocation of authoriza- tion for the payroll deduction of fees, the public employer shall provide notice to the employee organization of an employee’s revocation of such authorization. An employee’s notice of revocation of authorization for the payroll deduction of em- ployee organization fees shall be effective on the 30th day after the anniversary date of employment. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14-15.9e (as amended by P.L. 2018, c.15, § 6, eff. May, 18, 2018). However, a “collectively negotiated agreement may also include a provision specifying the effective date of a termination in deductions as of the July 1.” Id. Hereinafter, this restriction shall be referred to as Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction. 14. On information and belief, the dues deduction authorization forms the State generally uses and enforces as evidence of employee consent to union dues deductions under Section 52:14-15.9e are on forms, or are based on forms, developed and ap- proved by the Department of the Treasury. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14-15.8. 15. Dues deduction authorization forms signed by State employees before May 18, 2018, and some dues deduction forms signed by State employees after that date, did not include terms stating the signatory agreed that he or she could revoke the au- thorization only by providing written notice during ten-days prior to the anniversary date of his or her employment. 15.9e, violate those individuals First Amendment right to free speech and association, as secured against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 15.9e, compel those individuals to subsidize a union and its speech as a condition of their employment and against their will. 16. On information and belief, the dues deduction authorization forms the State uses and enforces do not include terms that notify employees that they have a First Amendment right not to subsidize a union and its speech or that state the employee agreed to waive that constitutional right by signing the form. 18. Since on or around October 2010, IBEW Local 33 has been the exclusive rep- resentative of State employees in the “Deputy Attorneys General Unit,” which con- sists of deputy attorney generals employed by the State Department of Law and Pub- lic Safety, subject to certain exclusions. 19. The State and IBEW Local 33 were parties to collective bargaining agree- ments governing the Deputy Attorneys General Unit effective July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2015 (“2013-15 CBA”) and effective July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2019 (“2015-19 CBA”), and are currently parties to a collective bargaining agreement governing the unit effective from July 1, 2019 to June 30, 2023 (“2019-23 CBA”). 20. All three collective bargaining agreements include a provision at Article VII(1)(a) that states, in relevant part, “the State agrees to deduct from the regular paycheck of any employee, by automatic payroll deduction, dues of the union provided the employee submits an authorization for dues deduction in writing and in proper form to the responsible payroll clerk.” 21. The 2013-15 CBA and 2015-19 CBA also included a provision at Article VII(1)(b) that restricted when employees could stop dues deductions that stated, in relevant part: “DAsG [Deputy Attorneys General] shall be eligible to withdraw such authorization only as of July 1 of each year provided the notice of withdrawal is filed timely with the responsible payroll clerk. Unless a DAG withdraws authorization for the deduction of Union dues, the State will continue the deductions.” 23. The 2013-15 CBA and 2015-19 CBA also included “representation fee (agency shop)” provision at Article VII(2) that required, in relevant part, that “[a]ny employee in the negotiated unit on the effective date of this Agreement who does not join the Union within thirty (30) days thereafter shall pay a representation fee in lieu of dues to the Union by automatic payroll deduction for services rendered by the majority representative.” This representation fee requirement was authorized by New Jersey Statute Annotated Sections 34:13A-1-5.6 to 5.8. 24. Plaintiff Heather Anderson is a deputy attorney general employed by the State in the Department of Law and Public Safety. Anderson is subject to IBEW Local 33’s exclusive representation and to its collective bargaining agreements with the State. 26. On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court in Janus held that the First Amend- ment guaranteed public employees a right to not pay for union speech and that States and unions could not deduct or collect payments for union speech from employees without clear and compelling evidence that the employees’ waived that First Amend- ment right. 138 S. Ct. at 2486. 27. Anderson does not want to financially support IBEW Local 33 or its speech. Her attempts to exercise her First Amendment right under Janus to stop paying for that speech has been frustrated by Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction, as detailed below. 28. In an email from Anderson to IBEW Local 33 President Andrew Reese dated November 14, 2019, Anderson wrote “[p]lease provide instructions on how to with- draw from the union. Thank you.” Reese responded with an email the next day stating that “[y]our email is enough. Can I ask why you’re withdrawing, and right when we’re focusing our efforts on negotiating our next contract?” Anderson responded the same day with “[p]ersonal choice. Thank you.” 30. The State and IBEW Local 33 continued to seize union dues from Anderson’s wages, over her objections, pursuant to Section 52:14-15.9e and the 2019-23 CBA. 31. In an email from Anderson to Reese dated July 22, 2020, Anderson wrote “[p]lease withdraw me from the union. Thank you.” Reese responded with an email to Anderson dated July 30, 2020 that referenced to and attached his December 2019 email, which stated that “[t]he State has told us that members are not able to with- draw from the union unless they make the request within 10 days after their anni- versary date, as set forth in the Workplace Democracy Act.” 32. The State and IBEW Local 33 continued to seize union dues from Anderson’s wages, over her objections, pursuant to Section 52:14-15.9e and the 2019-23 CBA. 33. In a letter dated and sent by email on February 10, 2021, Anderson provided notice to IBEW Local 33 and her state employer that she resigned her union mem- bership, revoked any deduction authorization she may have signed, and did not con- sent to the deduction of any union dues or fees from her wages. The letter is attached as Exhibit A and is incorporated herein. 35. On February 12, 2021, two State officials notified Anderson in separate emails that the State would not honor Anderson’s request to stop dues deductions because the request was not made within the ten-day period mandated by the 2019-23 CBA. Specifically, Kathleen Dollard responded to Anderson’s letter with an email stating: Good Morning Ms. Anderson: As per the IBEW Union Contract, in order to withdraw from the Union you need to notify the union within 10 days of your New Hire Anniversary date. Please note, your new hire date is August 4, 2003, therefore you will need to withdraw from the Union within 10 days of August 4, 2021. I have attached the proper form for you to complete and returned within those 10 specific days. Thank you. Melica Blige, an employee relations administrator with the State Department of Law and Public Safety, sent an email to Anderson that stated in relevant part: Per the Memorandum of Agreement between the State of NJ and the IBEW Local 33, in order to withdraw from a dues authorization, a DAG must submit a written request to withdraw within ten days following his/her anniversary date of employment. According to our records your anniversary date is 8/4/03. Kindly resubmit your request, for removal from the union, between August 5, 2021 through August 15, 2021. Upon receipt of your request, your withdrawal will be effective on the 30th day after your anniversary date. A copy of these emails are attached as Exhibit C and incorporated herein. 36. After February 10, 2021, the State and IBEW Local 33 continued to seize un- ion dues from Anderson’s wages, over her repeated objections, pursuant to Section 52:14-15.9e and the 2019-23 CBA. 38. The State and IBEW Local 33, by seizing union dues from Anderson over her objections, compelled and continue to compel Anderson to subsidize union speech as a condition of her employment and in violation of her First Amendment right to not that subsidize that speech. 39. Plaintiff brings this case on her own behalf and on behalf of two classes of similarly situated employees: (a) a “Deputy Attorneys General” class of all State employees in Deputy Attor- neys General Unit who are subject or become subject to the escape period re- striction authorized by Section 52:14-15.9e and/or Article VII(1)(b) of the 2019- 23 CBA, or any similar provision in a subsequent agreement; and (b) an “Objecting State Employee” class that consists of all State employees who had or are having union dues seized from their wages by the State De- fendants after providing notice to the State that they opposed those seizures outside of the ten-day escape period prescribed by Section 52:14-15.9e. Alternatively, Plaintiff requests certification of the class or subclass the Court deems appropriate. 41. There are questions of fact and law common to all Deputy Attorneys General class members. Factually, all are subject to the same escape-period restriction on when they can exercise their First Amendment right to not subsidize union speech. The dispositive question of law is the same for the Plaintiffs and Deputy Attorneys General members: does the escape-period restriction violate the employees’ First Amendment rights to not subsidize union speech? 42. There are questions of fact and law common to all Objecting State Employee class members. Factually, all are State employees who suffered injury as a result of Section 52:14-15.9e escape period restriction—i.e., the State seized payments for un- ion speech seized from all of these employees over their objections because of Section 52:14-15.9e. The dispositive question of law is the same for the Plaintiffs and Object- ing State Employee class members: does it violate the First Amendment for the State to enforce Section 52:14-15.9e escape period restriction against them and seize pay- ments for union speech from them over their objections? 43. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Deputy Attorneys General and Objecting State Employee class members’ claims because all claims concern whether the State violates the First Amendment by seizing payments for union speech from employees who object, or want to object, to those seizures outside the ten- day escape period prescribed by Section 52:14-15.9e. 45. Both proposed classes can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because sep- arate actions by Deputy Attorneys General and/or Objecting State Employee mem- bers concerning the constitutionality of Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction and Defendants’ enforcement of that restriction would risk inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants. 46. Both proposed classes can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because an adjudication determining the constitutionality of Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restrictions and Defendants’ enforcement of that restriction will, as a practical mat- ter, be dispositive of the interests of all Deputy Attorneys General and/or Objecting State Employee members or substantially impair or impede their ability to exercise their First Amendment rights. 47. The Deputy Attorney General class can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2) because, by maintaining and enforcing Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to members of the Deputy Attorneys General class, so that final injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate for class members as a whole. 54. Defendants, by maintaining and enforcing Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction and Article VII(1)(b) of the 2019-23 CBA against Anderson and members of the Deputy Attorney General class, violate those individuals’ First Amendment right to free speech and association, as secured against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 55. Anderson and members of Deputy Attorney General class are suffering the irreparable harm and injury inherent in a violation of First Amendment rights, for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 57. Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction is unconstitutional on its face or, alternatively, as applied to Anderson and members of the Deputy Attorney Gen- eral class. 58. The State Defendants, by seizing payments for union speech from Anderson and Objecting State Employee class members’ over their objections because those ob- jections were made outside of the ten-day escape period prescribed by Section 52:14- 59. The State Defendants, by seizing payments for union speech from Anderson and Objecting State Employee class members’ over their objections because those ob- jections were made outside of the ten-day escape period prescribed by Section 52:14- 60. Anderson and members of Objecting State Employee class are suffering the irreparable harm and injury inherent in a violation of First Amendment rights, for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 62. Section 52:14-15.9e’s escape period restriction is unconstitutional on its face or, alternatively, as applied to Anderson and members of the Objecting State Em- ployee class. A. The State of New Jersey Prohibits State Employees from Exercising Their First Amendment Right to Stop Subsidizing Union Speech Except During a Ten-Day Escape Period.

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) ) Registered Agent: ) National Corporate Research, LTD. ) 222 E. Dunklin Ste 102 ) Jefferson City, MO 65101 ) ) Defendant. )

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21. Defendant is a custom fitted swimming goggles manufacturing company that owns and operates the website, www.themagic5.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Upon information and belief, because THEMAGIC5 INC.’s Website has never been accessible and because THEMAGIC5 INC. does not have, and has never had, an adequate corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that THEMAGIC5 INC. retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that THEMAGIC5 INC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that THEMAGIC5 INC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that THEMAGIC5 INC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that THEMAGIC5 INC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility-related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Class Action) Violations of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Class Action) Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Class Action) Violation of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (Individual Action) RETALIATION and WRONGFUL TERMINATION 10. Plaintiff is an individual security officer who was employed by Defendants from approximately February of 2000 until March 1, 2015. 11. Defendant, PROTECH SECURITY GROUP, INC. contracts with various construction sites, commercial locations and private individuals to provide security services. 12. During the applicable statute of limitations period, Defendants would assign Plaintiff and other similarly-situated security officers to such construction sites, commercial locations or private individuals for the purpose of providing security and patrol services. 13. At all relevant times, Defendants required Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to patrol and monitor their assigned sites for scheduled periods of time. Defendants scheduled the shifts for all of its security officers, including Plaintiff. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were required to remain onsite until another security officer relieved them from their post. If Plaintiff’s, or another similarly situated security officer’s, scheduled shift ended and a relief security officer was not present, Defendants required the on- duty security officer to stay at their assigned site past their scheduled shift until another security officer arrived to relieve them from their post. 14. At all relevant times, Defendants trained and instructed Plaintiff and its similarly situated employees on how to perform their job duties. 4 15. At all relevant times, Defendants additionally controlled, supervised and monitored Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated security officer’s work by regularly sending management personnel to visit worksites and checking on Plaintiff and its similarly situated security officers and employees. 16. Plaintiff and other similarly situated security officers were not allowed breaks, including for meals, and were required to monitor and patrol their assigned sites continually for the duration of their shifts until they were relieved from their post. 17. Defendants’ routinely and continually did not pay Plaintiff and their similarly situated employees for all time worked and committed unlawful employment practices that included, but are not limited to: a. docking hours from Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for alleged violations of Defendants’ rules and/or policies; b. docking hours from Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees if they were minutes late for their scheduled shifts; c. docking hours from Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees if management arrived at a site and a security officer was found to be offsite for any reason, including to eat or obtain food; d. incorrectly calculating and/or eliminating hours worked from Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’ time sheets for reasons other than those stated above, or for no reason; and e. wrongfully classifying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees as independent contractors when they were employees. 5 18. Plaintiff and other similarly situated security officers typically worked sixteen to twenty-four hour shifts in a single day and typically worked five to six days per week. As a result, Plaintiff and other similarly situated security officers typically worked well in excess of forty hours in most individual work weeks. 19. At the end of each week, Plaintiff and other similarly situated security officers were required to send Defendants timesheets documenting their site location and hours worked. 20. Plaintiff and other similarly situated security officers were paid different rates depending on their assigned sites. Plaintiff was typically paid $10.00 per hour by Defendants. 21. At all relevant times, Defendants knew and were aware at all times that their security officers routinely worked in excess of forty hours per individual work week. Nonetheless, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and their similarly situated employees overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty hours during individual work weeks, as required by Federal and Illinois wage and hour law. 22. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were all subject to Defendants’ uniform policies and practices and were victims of Defendants’ schemes to deprive them of regular and overtime pay. As a result of Defendants’ improper and willful failures to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees in accordance with the requirements of Federal and Illinois wage and hour law, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees suffered lost wages and other damages. 23. Continually and throughout his employment, Plaintiff complained to management, including but not limited to Keith Benson, about not being paid for hours worked, often as punishment for alleged violations of Defendants’ rules and policies. 6 24. Continually and throughout his employment, Plaintiff complained to management, including but not limited to Keith Benson, about not receiving overtime wages. 25. In retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints regarding Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff for certain work hours and the non-payment of overtime wages, Defendants reprimanded Plaintiff, threatened to remove him from job sites and, ultimately, terminated his employment in March of 2015. 27. With respect to the IMWL, IWPCA and FLSA claims, Plaintiff, William Hudson, seeks to represent a class that is comprised of and defined as: “All security officers and patrol personnel who worked for Defendant PROTECH SECURITY GROUP INC., its subsidiaries, affiliated companies and/or predecessors at any time during the relevant statute of limitations period.” 28. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under F.R.C.P. 23 because: a. This class is so numerous that joinder of all the claims is impracticable; b. There are questions of law or fact that are common to the class and predominate over any variations or individual issues that may exist between members of the Plaintiff class; c. The claims of the Representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the class; and d. The Representative Plaintiff will fairly and accurately protect the interests of the class. 7 Numerosity 29. While the precise number of members of the Class has not yet been determined at this time, Class Plaintiff believes Defendants have employed in excess of one hundred persons who have been subject to Defendants’ common unlawful pay practices during the Violation Period. Commonality 30. There are numerous and substantial questions of law and fact common to members of the class including, but not limited to: a. Whether Defendants’ complained of practices violated the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq., the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; b. Whether Defendants failed to compensate class members for all the work they assigned, required, encouraged, suffered or permitted class members to perform; c. Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate records for all time worked; d. Whether Defendants failed to compensate class members for all work performed in excess of forty hours per workweek with overtime premium wages; e. Whether Defendants willfully failed to comply with federal and state wage and hour laws; f. Whether Defendants improperly classified and compensated Plaintiff and the class members as independent contractors instead of hourly employees g. Whether Plaintiff and the other class members were injured by Defendants’ conduct, and the measure of damages and/or injunctive relief to which Plaintiff and the class are entitled. 8 31. These and other questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class are important and predominate over questions, if any, which may affect only individual members. Adequacy 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of each Class member in that Plaintiff was a typical employee subject to Defendants’ payment practices and has no interest antagonistic to the other members of the class. Furthermore, Plaintiff has retained competent legal counsel experienced in class action litigation. Typicality 33. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all members of the class in that Plaintiff and the putative class members were or should have been employed by Defendants as hourly workers subjected to and damaged by Defendants’ alleged unlawful payment practices. Plaintiff’s claims and relief sought, monetary damages, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and costs, are predominately common with each class member .Superiority 34. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because individual joinder of the parties is impracticable. Class action treatment will allow numerous similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that would be incurred if these claims were brought individually. The presentation of separate civil actions by individual class members could create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 9 Defendants and/or substantially impair or impede the ability of class members to protect their interests. 35. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the class, hereby re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-34 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 35. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the class, hereby re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-34 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 35. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the class, hereby re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-34 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 35. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the class, hereby re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-34 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 16 36. This count arises from Defendants’ violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. in failing to pay overtime wages and properly compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals for the actual time they worked and for all time worked in excess of forty hours in individual work weeks. 36. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the matters alleged herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 36. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the matters alleged herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 36. Continually and throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff complained to management, including but not limited to Keith Benson, about having hours docked from his actual hours workedas punishment for alleged violations of Defendants’ rules and policies. 37. At all relevant times Defendants are and were “employers” and the Plaintiff and class members are and were “employees” under Illinois statute 820 ILCS § 115/1 et seq. 37. Defendants are “employers” and Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals are “employees” under Illinois Statute 820 ILCS § 105 et seq. 37. Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals were directed by Defendants to work in excess of forty hours per individual work week. 37. Continually and throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff complained to management, including but not limited to Keith Benson, about having time eliminated and/or incorrectly calculated and shorted from his actual hours worked. 38. Defendants “docked” Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals’ hours for alleged violations of Defendants’ rules, polices and standards and often, for no reason at all. 38. Continually and throughout his employment with Defendants Plaintiff complained to management, including but not limited to Keith Benson, about not receiving overtime wages for weeks in which he worked in excess of forty hours 38. Illinois Statute 820 ILCS § 105 et seq. requires employers to pay employees minimum wage for all hours worked. 38. Illinois Statute 820 ILCS § 115/1 et seq., Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, defines wages as “any compensation owed to an employee pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the two parties...” Payment to separated employees is termed “final compensation” and is defined as “wages, salaries, earned commissions, earned bonuses and any other compensation owed the employee by the employer pursuant to any employment contract or agreement between the two parties.” 39. In response to Plaintiff’s complaints about being “docked” time worked, not being paid for all hours worked and his complaints regarding non-payment of overtime wages, Plaintiff was reprimanded, told he would be removed from job assignments and eventually, on or aboutMarch 1, 2015, was terminated from his employment with Defendants. 39. Section 105/4(a) requires employers to pay employees one and a half times their regular rate for all hours worked over forty hours per individual work week. 39. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees are entitled to be compensated at their regular pay rate for all time worked, including any “docked” time, and at a rate of one and one half times their regular pay rate for all time worked in excess of forty hours in individual work weeks. 39. Illinois statute 820 ILCS § 115/4 requires employers to pay employees all wages earned by an employee during a semi-monthly or bi-weekly pay period no later than 13 days after the end of the pay period in which such wages were earned. Illinois Statute 820 ILCS §115/5 provides that “every employer shall pay the final compensation of separated employees 12 in full, at the time of separation, if possible, but in no case later than the next regularly scheduled payday for such employee.” 40. Defendants violated Illinois Statute 820 ILCS § 105 et seq. by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiff and other class members as employees for the actual time they worked each week, including unpaid overtime at one and a half times their regular, hourly rate, for all hours worked per week in excess of forty hours during the violation period. 40. At all times relevant, there was an agreement between Defendants, on the one hand, and Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees on the other hand, that Defendants would pay them an hourly wage in exchange for all time worked as security officers and patrol personnel, and there was no agreement allowing Defendants to dock and/or eliminate time actually worked from Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’wage calculations.. 40. Defendants’ failure and refusal to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for all time worked, and overtime wages for all time worked in excess of forty hours per individual work week, violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. 15 40. The Illinois Minimum Wage Act, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq., Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq., and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. prohibit employers from retaliating against employees for complaints regarding non- payment of earned wages. 41. Defendant routinely “docked” Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’ time when Defendants’ supervisors or management believed Plaintiff or other similarly situated employees had violated one of Defendants’ rules, policies or standards it had in place for its security officers and patrol personnel. Defendant breached its agreement to pay Plaintiff and all other similarly situated individuals an hourly wage for all time worked by “docking” pay to Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals for alleged violations of rules, policies or standards. 41. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by “docking” and/or eliminating Plaintiff’s and similarly situated employees’ time worked by purposefully refusing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for all time worked and purposefully refusing to pay overtime wages for time worked in excess of forty hours in an individual work week. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, WILLIAM HUDSON, individually and on behalf of the class, prays for judgment against Defendants, PROTECH SECURITY GROUP, INC. and KEITH BENSON, and each of them, as follows: a. Certifying the class of individuals who were employed by Defendants as hourly paid, non-exempt employees in the State of Illinois at any time during the relevant statute of limitations period; b. Compensating Plaintiff and the other class members in the amount owed for all time worked including one and one half times Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’ hourly rate for all time worked in excess of forty hours per individual work week; c. Appointing Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; d. Appointing WILLIAM HUDSON as Class Representative; e. Awarding liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid wages and overtime wages found due; f. Awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action; and g. Providing for such relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. 41. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Illinois and Federal wage and hour statutes when it terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for his complaints regarding Defendants’ wage and hour policies and practices. 41. Additionally, Defendants’ policy and practice of docking and/or eliminating hours from Plaintiff’s and other class members’ timesheets violated Illinois Statute 820 ILCS § 105 et seq. 42. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful employment actions, Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer lost wages and other damages. 17 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, WILLIAM HUDSON, individually, prays for judgment against Defendants PROTECH SECURITY GROUP, INC. and KEITH BENSON, and each of them, as follows: a. Declaring conduct of Defendants, and their agents/employees as described herein, is in violation of the Illinois Minimum Wage Act, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq., Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. and/or the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207; b. Awarding compensatory and punitive damages; c. Awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and d. Providing for such relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 42. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and other class members have suffered and continue to suffer lost wages and other damages. 10 42. Defendants breached its agreement to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals by routinely eliminating hours worked and/or incorrectly calculating the total time worked by Plaintiff and other similarly situated security officers. 43. Defendant violated Illinois Statutes 820 ILCS § 115 et seq. by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated class members for the actual time they worked each week within 13 days of the date such compensation was earned and by failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and class members their rightful wages by the next scheduled payday after their separation. 13 43. Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to injunctive relief to prevent Defendant from continuing its violations of these statutory provisions and other appropriate class-wide injunctive relief for the class. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, WILLIAM HUDSON, individually and on behalf all others similarly situated prays for judgment against the Defendants, PROTECH SECURITY GROUP, INC. and KEITH BENSON, and each of them, as follows: a. Certifying the class of individuals who were employed by Defendants as hourly paid, non-exempt employees in the State of Illinois at any time during the relevant statute of limitations period; b. Appointing Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; c. Appointing WILLIAM HUDSON as Class Representative; d. Declaring and finding that the Defendants committed one or more of the following acts: i. violated provisions of the Illinois Minimum Wage Act, 820 ILCS § 105 et. seq. by failing to pay minimum wage to Plaintiff and all class members for time worked; and/or ii. violated provision of the Illinois Minimum Wage Act, 820 ILCS § 105 et. seq. by failing to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and all class members; and/or iii. violated provisions of the Illinois Minimum Wage Act, 820 ILCS § 105 et. seq., by eliminating hours from Plaintiff and class members pay calculations for alleged violations of Defendants’ rules and policies or for no reason at all. e. Awarding compensatory damages, including all regular and overtime pay owed, in an amount according to proof; f. Awarding interest on all regular and overtime compensation due accruing from the date such amounts were due; g. Awarding all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in prosecuting this claim; h. Granting leave to amend to add claims under applicable state and federal 11 law; i. Granting leave to name additional Plaintiffs by motion or any other method approved by Court; j. Entry of a Permanent Injunction barring Defendants from engaging further in practices that violate the Illinois Minimum Wage Act, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq.; and k. Providing such relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals have suffered and will continue to suffer lost wages and other damages. 45. Plaintiffs are also entitled to class-wide injunctive relief to prevent Defendants from continuing its violations of these statutory provisions and other appropriate class-wide injunctive relief. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, WILLIAM HUDSON, individually and on behalf of the other class prays for judgment against Defendants PROTECH SECURITY GROUP, INC. and KEITH BENSON, and each of them, as follows: a. Certifying the class of individuals who were employed by Defendants as hourly paid, non-exempt employees in the State of Illinois at any time during the relevant statute of limitations period; b. Appointing Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; c. Appointing WILLIAM HUDSON as Class Representative; d. Declaring and finding that the Defendants violated provisions of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act 820 ILCS § 115 et seq. by “docking” Plaintiff’s and other class members pay and failing to pay Plaintiff and the other class members wages for all time worked; e. Awarding compensatory damages, including all wages owed, in an amount according to proof as provided by statute; f. Awarding interest on all regular and overtime compensation due accruing from the date such amounts were due; g. Awarding all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in prosecuting this claim; h. Granting leave to amend to add claims under applicable state and federal law; i. Granting leave to name additional Plaintiffs by motion or any other method approved by Court; 14 j. Entry of a Permanent Injunction barring Defendants from engaging further in practice that violate the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq.; and k. Providing for such relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

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12. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay them wages for all hours worked, including those at the overtime premium for hours worked in excess of forty (40) each workweek. The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 17. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to §16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. 26. In or around October 2017, Plaintiff RODNEY J. SANCHEZ was hired by Defendants’ Signature Cleaning Services cleaning business as a maintenance worker and cleaner. Plaintiff worked for Defendants until in or around March 2018, when his employment was terminated by Defendants. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants, Plaintiff was employed to work predominantly at one of Defendants’ clients’ buildings, located at 11 East 52nd Street, New York, New York 10022. However, Defendants were able to send Plaintiff to any of Defendants’ other client locations. 27. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff was scheduled to work from 8:00am until 4:00pm, from Mondays through Fridays, for forty (40) hours per week. Plaintiff was also scheduled to work every other Saturday from 8:00am to 12:00pm, for an additional four (4) hours of work, every other workweek. Plaintiff regularly worked without any lunch breaks. 28. From the start of Plaintiff’s employment through December 2017, Plaintiff was compensated on an hourly basis of $11.00 per hour. From in or around January 2018 until the end of Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff was compensated on an hourly basis of $13.00 per hour. 29. Based on Plaintiff’s direct observations and conversations with other employees, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members had similar work schedules and received similar hourly rates. 31. Because of Defendant’s policy of time-shaving, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members did not receive compensation for all of their hours worked, including overtime hours, because the hours worked as reflected in the paystubs were incorrect. 32. On several occasions when Plaintiff was compensated for hours that he worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek, however, Defendants compensated such hours on a straight- time basis, through a separate check. When Plaintiff complained to the Individual Defendant, Defendants failed to correct the underpayment. Through personal conversations with FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members, other non-exempt employees were also occasionally paid in cash to conceal Defendants’ failure to compensate their employees for all hours worked, including at the proper overtime premium for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 34. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff never received a proper wage and hour notice upon hiring or upon changes in the information on the notice, as required under the NYLL. In fact, Plaintiff was never provided with any wage and hour notices by Defendants. Similarly, Class Members never received proper wage and hour notices upon hiring or upon changes in the information on the notice. 35. Defendants failed to maintain proper employment records, as required by the FLSA and NYLL. At all relevant times, Defendants provided fraudulent wage statements to Plaintiff, which failed to accurately show the number of hours worked by Plaintiff in a given workweek. Class Members received similar fraudulent wage statements due to Defendants’ policy of time shaving. 36. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying employees for all hours worked, including overtime hours, due to a policy of time- shaving, in violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law 37. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying either the FLSA minimum wage or the New York State minimum wage, and the proper overtime rate thereof for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek, due to Defendants’ policy of time-shaving. 38. Defendants unlawfully failed to provide Plaintiff and Class Members with wage and hour notices upon hiring, as required under the NYLL. 40. Plaintiff retained Lee Litigation Group, PLLC to represent Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members, in this litigation and have agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services. 41. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 40 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 42. At all relevant times, Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). Further, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). 43. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA. 44. At all relevant times, the Corporate Defendant had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 45. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of failing to pay wages for all hours worked. 47. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs’ rights by failing to pay them the statutory minimum wage rate due to time-shaving. 48. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs’ rights by failing to pay them for all overtime hours worked at the rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, including overtime wages owed due to Defendants’ policy of time-shaving 49. Records, if any, concerning these matters should be in the possession and custody of the Defendants. Plaintiff intends to obtain all records by appropriate discovery proceedings to be taken promptly in this case and, if necessary, will then seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to set forth the precise amount due. 50. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 51. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful disregard of the FLSA, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated (i.e., double) damages pursuant to the FLSA. 52. Due to the intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid wages, plus an equal amount as liquidated damages. 54. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 53 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 55. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were employed by the Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law, §§2 and 651. 56. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay Plaintiff and Class Members for all hours worked, including at the statutory rate of time and one- half the regular rate for overtime hours worked, due to Defendants’ policy of time-shaving. 57. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them wages in the lawful amount for all hours worked due to time shaving. 58. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them the statutory minimum wage rate due to time-shaving. 59. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them for all overtime hours worked at the rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, including overtime wages owed due to Defendants’ policy of time-shaving. 60. Defendants failed to properly notify employees of their hourly pay rate and overtime rate, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law. 62. Defendants failed to provide proper wage statements with every payment as required by New York Labor Law § 195(3). 63. Due to the Defendants’ New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid wages, damages for unreasonably delayed payments, reasonable attorneys’ fees, liquidated damages, statutory penalties and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to New York Labor Law. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBERS VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND FLSA COLLECTIVE PLAINTIFFS

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10. On or about August 30, 2019, Plaintiff received a text from Defendant that read: “Hi Jesus, My Name is Shane i am a Lead Recruiter at Mars Solutions Group and i am contacting you regarding a job opening just want to check and see if you are available in the job market. i have send you the job details to your email please check my email or give me a call on my direct line 262-299-”. 15. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the classes (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing text messages from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls, or who had revoked such consent, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of class certification. 16. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing text messages from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls, or who had revoked such consent, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of class certification. 8. Beginning on or about August 30, 2019, Plaintiff received an unsolicited text message from Defendant on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -3228, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. During this time, Defendant began to use Plaintiff’s cellular telephone for the purpose of sending Plaintiff spam advertisements and/or promotional offers, via text messages, including a text message sent to and received by Plaintiff on or about August 30, 2019 from Defendant’s phone number, (262) 372-6471. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 21. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.MERCY.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in September 2017, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 44. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s school is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s school. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 71. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 74. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 75. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 77. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 78. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 82. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 83. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 84. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 85. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. 87. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and the Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under the RA and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 88. Defendant’s violations of Sec. 504 of the RA were intentional or with deliberate indifference. 89. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff is entitled to damages from the Defendant. 90. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 91. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 92. Defendant’s locations are public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 93. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 94. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 96. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the City Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed City Sub-class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the City Sub-class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504 VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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23.10.060, for unpaid wages and overtime wages, on behalf of themselves and a Class of NPSI seafood processing employees who were denied wages and overtime as mandated by the AWHA and governing regulations (“AWHA Class”). This action includes all such employees whom NPSI continues to deprive of required wages and overtime in the future. 41. Plaintiffs seek to bring their FLSA claims on behalf of all persons who worked for NPSI as salmon processing employee from October 19, 2017 until the date of judgment. 42. Those persons whom Plaintiffs seek to represent in the FLSA Collective Action (“FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”) are defined as: Every person who works or has worked as a seafood processing employee in the state of Alaska for North Pacific Seafoods, Inc. during the period from October 19, 2017 to the date of judgment who timely opt in to this action. 45. Plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3) and AWHA § 23.10.110(b) to recover damages and penalties under the AWHA § 46. The AWHA Class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is composed of and defined as follows: Every person who works or has worked as a seafood processing employee in the state of Alaska for North Pacific Seafoods, Inc. during the period from October 19, 2018 to the date of judgment who does not timely opt out of this action. 47. Plaintiffs further bring this class action under Alaska Statutes § 23.10.015, for false representations to procure employees, on behalf of themselves and a Subclass of the AWHA Class who came to Alaska or relocated within Alaska based on false or deceptive representations, false advertising, or false pretenses concerning the kind and character of the work to be done, the amount and character of the compensation to be paid for the work, or the sanitary or other conditions of employment (“False Claims Subclass”). 48. The False Claims Subclass that Plaintiffs seek to represent is composed of and defined as follows: Every person who changed location from one place to another in Alaska or was brought into Alaska to work as a seafood processing employee for North Pacific Seafoods, Inc. during the period from October 19, 2018 to the date of judgment who does not timely opt out of this action. 7. The Alaska seafood processing industry provides tens of thousands of jobs each year. Of the approximately 23,000 workers in the industry, 75 percent are from out-of-state. According to Alaska’s Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Bristol Bay, the state’s major salmon processing region, brings in more than 5,000 processing workers from outside Alaska each year. 8. Seasonal workers in Alaska’s seafood industry suffer from wage theft, poor treatment and high numbers of injuries, and high attrition. A May 2020 letter from the state’s Department of Labor and Workforce Development to shore-based fish processing employers identified complaints often found within the fish processing industry, including: “Changes to the rate of pay without the required written notice” “Payment of wages and overtime inconsistent with the Alaska Wage and Hour Act” “Nonpayment of wages for all hours worked” “Employees subjected to unlawful deductions from wages, the withholding of paychecks, or the reimbursement to employers for room and board above statutory limits and without written authorization” “Employees not being provided return transportation when the employer is required to do so.” Labor Conditions in the Seafood Processing Industry

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(UNPAID OVERTIME WAGES UNDER THE FLSA) (UNPAID OVERTIME WAGES UNDER THE FLSA) 10. This action is brought by Plaintiff, to recover from the Corporate Defendants unpaid overtime compensation, as well as an additional amount as liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees under the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and also under the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1) states, “No employer shall employ any of his employees… for a work week longer than 40 hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above-specified at a rate not less than one and a half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 28. Plaintiff re-adopts each and every factual allegation as stated in paragraphs 1-27 above as if set out in full herein. 29. At the times mentioned, the Individual Defendants were, and are now, the owners, directors, and/or high-ranking officers of the Corporate Defendants. The Individual Defendants were employers of Plaintiff and others similarly situated within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA [29 U.S.C. § 203(d)], in that the Individual Defendants acted directly or indirectly in the interests of Corporate Defendants in relation to the employees of Corporate Defendants, including Plaintiff and others similarly situated. The Individual Defendants had operational control of Corporate Defendants, were involved in the day-to-day functions of Corporate Defendants, provided Plaintiff with his work schedule, and are jointly liable for Plaintiff’s damages. 30. The Individual Defendants are, and were at all times, relevant persons in control of Corporate Defendants’ financial affairs and can cause Corporate Defendants to compensate (or not to compensate) their employees in accordance with the FLSA. 44. Plaintiff re-adopts each and every factual allegation as stated in paragraphs 1-8 above as if set out in full herein. 45. The Corporate Defendants and Plaintiff entered into a verbal contract whereby Plaintiff was to perform construction work for the Corporate Defendants and the Corporate Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiff $1,850 per week or $20.55 per hour for his work. 46. Corporate Defendants benefited from Plaintiff’s work for approximately 23 weeks, from approximately July 2019 through December 15, 2019. 47. Plaintiff fully performed under the contract. 48. Corporate Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff the amount they promised and agreed to pay Plaintiff under the contract. 9. Plaintiff re-adopts each and every factual allegation as stated in paragraphs 1-8 above as if set out in full herein. AND SECTION 448.08, FLORIDA STATUTES

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22. Defendant Nexen is a subcontracting company that, upon information and belief, contracted with Defendant Amazon to provide laborers for Defendant Amazon’s warehouses. 23. Plaintiffs worked as warehouse laborers for Nexen and Amazon in December 2017. (Exhibit A, ¶ 1) (Exhibit B, ¶ 1). 24. Plaintiffs were told by Nexen managers that they would make $25.00 an hour for the work that they did in the Amazon warehouse in Hazel Park, MI. (Exhibit A, ¶ 3) (Exhibit B, ¶ 2). 25. When Plaintiffs arrived at the Amazon warehouse, they checked in with employees who worked in the Amazon warehouse. (Exhibit A, ¶ 6) (Exhibit B, ¶ 6). 26. Plaintiffs were given safety equipment by the employees at the Amazon warehouse for them to use including safety vests and gloves. (Exhibit B, ¶ 7). 28. While working at the Amazon warehouse, Plaintiffs used Amazon’s equipment including hydraulic pallet jacks, large metal racks, and portable metal lines used to load and unload products onto trucks. (Exhibit A, ¶ 6) (Exhibit B, ¶ 9). 29. Plaintiffs did not get paid for the work that they did for Nexen and Amazon, so they contacted Defendant Kirka, the owner of Nexen. (Exhibit A, ¶¶ 8 -9) (Exhibit B, ¶¶ 11 – 13). 30. Plaintiffs had significant difficulties getting ahold of Defendant Kirka. (Exhibit A, ¶ 9) (Exhibit B, ¶ 14). 31. Plaintiff McKearnan finally got a hold of Defendant Kirka after calling him six times. Defendant Kirka told him to come down to the Amazon warehouse and fill out W-2 forms so that he could be paid. (Exhibit B, ¶¶ 14 – 15). Plaintiff McKearnan filled out the paperwork as instructed. (Exhibit B, ¶ 16). Plaintiff McKearnan still was not paid after filling out the W-2 forms, so he called Defendant Kirka again, but Defendant Kirka never returned his calls. (Exhibit B, ¶ 18). 33. To date, Plaintiffs have not received any compensation for the work that they did for Defendant Nexen or Defendant Amazon. (Exhibit A, ¶ 12) (Exhibit 34. Plaintiffs brings the FLSA claims (Counts I – III) in this action as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 35. Plaintiffs assert these claims on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all similarly situated laborers. 36. Plaintiffs seek to notify the following employees of their right under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to join this action by filing in this Court written notice of their consent to join the action: All individuals who worked at any time during the past three years for Defendant Nexen as laborers out of the Amazon warehouse in Hazel Park, MI. 38. Upon information and belief, Defendant Nexen has employed many similarly situated laborers during the time period relevant to this action. 39. The identities of these employees, as a group, are known only to Defendants. Because the numerous members of this collective action are unknown to Plaintiffs, joinder of each member is not practicable. 40. Plaintiffs ask this Court to require Defendants to furnish Plaintiffs with the contact information of other similarly situated laborers pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their FLSA claims. 41. Collective adjudication is appropriate in this case because the employees who Plaintiffs wish to notify of this action have been employed in the same position as Plaintiffs; have performed work similar to that of Plaintiffs; have been subject to the same policies and procedures as Plaintiffs; and have been subject to compensation practices similar to those which form the basis of Plaintiffs’ case, including unlawful failure to pay the minimum wage under the FLSA. 47. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and reallege all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 48. Plaintiffs were “employees” of Defendant Nexen as that term is defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), because Defendant Nexen “suffered or permitted” them to work for it. 50. Defendant Nexen is an “enterprise” as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 204(r)(1), and is engaged in the processing and handling of goods which move in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). 51. Defendant Nexen is required to comply with the requirements of the 56. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and reallege all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 57. Plaintiffs were “employees” of Defendant Kirka as that term is defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), because Defendant Kirka “suffered or permitted” them to work for him. 58. Defendant Kirka was an employer of Plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) because he “suffered or permitted” them to work for him. 59. Defendant Kirka, upon information and belief to be true, has ownership interest in the enterprise Defendant Nexen, which employed Plaintiffs. 60. Defendant Kirka has operational control of Defendant Nexen. Defendant Kirka’s operational control includes his overseeing of the pay policies of Defendant Nexen and the signing off on all of the payroll for Defendant Nexen. 61. As an employer of Plaintiffs and the putative class members, Defendant Kirka is required to comply with the requirements of the FLSA. 62. The minimum wage provision of the FLSA requires that employers pay at least the minimum wage to employees for all hours worked. 29 U.S.C. § 206. 64. Defendant Kirka willfully failed to comply with the minimum wage provision of the FLSA. 65. In addition to compensatory damages for unpaid minimum wages, Plaintiffs are owed liquidated damages in an amount equal to their compensatory damages pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and their reasonable attorneys’ fees, to be paid by Defendant Kirka for his willful failure to pay at least the minimum wage for all hours worked by Plaintiffs. 66. Under the theory of Corporate Officer Liability adopted by this circuit in Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1991), Defendant Kirka is jointly and severally liable for the violations of the FLSA. 67. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and reallege all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 68. Defendant Amazon was Plaintiffs’ joint employer. Defendant Amazon contracted out work through subcontracting companies like Defendant Nexen in order to deliver Amazon products to Amazon customers. Defendant Amazon set a number of policies and procedures that it enforced through Defendant Nexen. 70. Defendant Amazon is an “enterprise” as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 204(r)(1), and is engaged in processing and handling of goods which move in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). 71. Defendant Amazon is required to comply with the requirements of the 78. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and reallege all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 79. Plaintiffs were Defendant Nexen’s “employees” as that term is defined by the WOWA, MCL § 408.412. 80. Defendant Nexen was Plaintiffs’ “employer” as that term is defined by the WOWA, MCL § 408.412. 81. Defendant Nexen knowingly, intentionally, and willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and the putative class members at least the Michigan minimum wage for all hours worked, in violation of the WOWA, MCL § 408.414. 83. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and reallege all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 84. Plaintiffs were Defendant Kirka’s “employees” as that term is defined by the WOWA, MCL § 408.412. 85. Defendant Kirka was Plaintiffs’ “employer” as that term is defined by the WOWA, MCL § 408.412. 86. Defendant Kirka knowingly, intentionally, and willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and the putative class members at least the Michigan minimum wage for all hours worked, in violation of the WOWA, MCL § 408.414. 88. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and reallege all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 89. Plaintiffs were Defendant Amazon’s “employees” as that term is defined by the WOWA, MCL § 408.412. 90. Defendant Amazon was Plaintiffs’ “employer” as that term is defined by the WOWA, MCL § 408.412. 91. Defendant Amazon knowingly, intentionally, and willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and the putative class members at least the Michigan minimum wage for all hours worked, in violation of the WOWA, MCL § 408.414. 92. As a result of Defendant Amazon’s failure to pay Plaintiffs the applicable Michigan minimum wage, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of damages, including but not limited to, compensatory damages, liquidated damages in an amount equal to their compensatory damages, costs of their lawsuit, and their reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to MCL § 408.419. Defendant Kirka - Violation of the Minimum Wage Provision of the WOWA Defendant Steve Kirka - Violation of the Minimum Wage Provision of the FLSA Defendant Amazon - Violation of the Minimum Wage Provision of the FLSA Defendant Nexen - Violation of the Minimum Wage Provision of the WOWA Defendant Nexen - Violation of the Minimum Wage Provision of the FLSA Defendant Amazon - Violation of the Minimum Wage Provision of the WOWA FLSA Collective Action Claims Brought Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

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26. The FLSA allows employers to pay less than minimum wage to employees who receive tips. 29 U.S.C. 203(m). In doing so, an employer may take a “tip credit,” which allows employers to include in their calculation of tipped employees’ wages an amount that an employee receives in tips. Id. 27. In order to apply a tip credit toward an employee’s minimum wage under the FLSA, an employer must satisfy several conditions, including: (1) the employer must inform the employee that it will take a tip credit; and, (2) tipped employees must retain all the tips they receive, except those tips included in a valid tipping pool among employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. Id. 28. Defendants have violated and continue to violate the FLSA by requiring their servers and bartenders to participate in an invalid tip pool, whereby servers and bartenders must pay a flat rate every shift ($25 for servers and $10 for bartenders) to management. 29. Plaintiffs’ participation in the tip pool is mandatory and imposed by Defendants as a condition of Plaintiffs’ employment throughout the relevant time period. 8 30. At the start of the relevant statutory period (and before), management claimed, in writing, the $25 and $10 tip pool contributions went to “front of the house” employees. However, the hosts who constituted the front of the house did not receive the tips. 31. When pressed on the issue by Plaintiff Euring and others, management claimed the money went to the hosts and the food runners. However, neither the hosts nor the food runners received the $25 and $10 tip pool contributions. 32. Instead, Defendants Bharathbhai Patel, Charles Patel, and Chicago Chop House Inc. kept the $25 and $10 tip pool contributions. 33. In or around October 2017, Defendants Chicago Chop House, Inc. (the Patel group) sold the restaurant known as Chicago Chip House to Defendant Chop Hospitality LLC (the McCahill group). 34. With a new ownership group in place, servers and bartenders hoped the illegal practice would end. Unfortunately, the McCahill group, which was aware of the tip pool and how it operated when they bought the business from the Patel group, continued making use of the tip pool scheme. 35. In addition to the tip pooling arrangement, there was continuity in restaurant operations from the time the Patel group owned the restaurant to the time the McCahill group owned the restaurant. 36. There was continuity in the work force before and after the sale of the restaurant from the Patel group to the McCahill group, including but not limited to Plaintiff Euring as a server and Defendant Siemen as the General Manager. 9 37. One change the McCahill group did make was to claim, in writing, that the $25 and $10 tip pool contributions went to the maître d’ rather than the “front of the house” the Patel group falsely stated the money went. 38. However, that was merely a change in verbiage describing an identical illegal tip pooling operation as the Chicago Chop House does not and has not had a maître d’ at any relevant time. 39. After the sale, Plaintiffs Leisner and Euring asked Defendants McCahill and Siemen about the tips earmarked for the nonexistent maître d’. 40. In or around March 2018, Plaintiff Joshua Leissner asked Defendant Doris Siemen where his $25 shift fee actually went and not only did she refuse to answer, but she told him that if he did not like paying it, he could quit and go work somewhere else. 41. On multiple occasions in April and May, 2018, Plaintiffs Leisner and Euring asked Claudio Aceves, a manager, where the tip pool contributions earmarked for the nonexistent maître d’ actually went. Aceves said he did not know and would check with management and finally, after repeated inquiries by Plaintiffs Leisner and Euring, Aceves said he asked Defendants and was told to leave it alone. 42. Mr. Euring repeatedly asked Mr. McCahill about the $25 fee he paid every shift and Mr. McCahill assured Mr. Euring the new ownership group was aware of the issue and would look into it. 43. Eventually, in May 2018, Mr. McCahill told all of the servers at a lineup meeting before service began for the day that the $25 and $10 maître d’ fees went to Defendant Siemen, who is the General Manager. 10 44. On a few occasions when the restaurant did not have many customers, Ms. Siemen told servers that they did not have to pay the full maître d’ tip credit, confirming that she has control over their pay. 45. To the extent the tips do go to Defendant Siemen, the General Manager of the restaurant who has the power to hire and fire employees, set schedules, assign who works which tables, and directs and supervises the work of Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees, that is plainly a violation of the allowable use of tip credits under the FLSA. 46. The FLSA requires employers to pay minimum wages for all hours worked. 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 47. As a result of Defendants improper use of the tip credit provisions of the FLSA, Defendants paid regular compensation to Plaintiffs based on an incorrectly low regular rate of pay. 48. At all material times, Defendants’ failure to pay wages at the correct rate of pay was willful. 49. Accordingly, Plaintiffs bring this collective action to recover unpaid regular wages under the FLSA. 50. Plaintiffs restate and incorporate all the above paragraphs by reference. 51. As a result of Defendants’ improper use of the tip credit provisions of the FLSA, Defendants paid wages to Plaintiffs based on an incorrectly low regular rate of pay. 52. At all material times, Defendants’ failure to pay wages at the correct rate of pay was willful. 11 53. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer lost wages and other damages. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID MINIMUM WAGES

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42. As joint employers, Defendants provide home health care services to elderly and/or infirm individuals through home health care aides such as Plaintiff. 43. Defendants serve clients in Connecticut. 44. Defendants employ individuals as home health care aides within their clients' homes. The specific work assignments and hours of operation are determined by Defendants. 45. Defendants assign the home health care aides employed by them to work fixed schedules based upon the needs of Defendants’ clients. 46. Defendants require the home health care employed by them to obtain Defendants’ approval in advance of any change to their schedule, including for vacation, personal days or sick days. 47. Defendants require the home health care aides employed by them to record their hours spent at each client’s residence. 48. Defendants require the home health care aides employed by them to address to Defendants any concerns, complaints, requests or other issues that arise in connection with the provision of services to Defendants’ clients; Defendants specifically prohibit the home health care aides employed by them from bringing such matters directly to the attention of Defendants’ clients. 50. Defendants do not require that the home health care aides employed by them provide any financial investment in the operation of Defendants’ business. 51. Defendants market their service through various forms of advertising, license and insure their home health care aides in the performance of service for Defendants’ clients, coordinate the placement of their home health care aides with specific clients, arrange for coverage of services to clients when Defendants’ home health care aides request time off and handle all billing and collection for home health care services performed by their home health care aides. 52. During her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Scott was not entitled to earn any incentive, bonus, commission or profit share other than the compensation paid to her by Defendants as wages for hours worked. 53. Upon information and belief, Defendants have never paid any other individual employed by them as a home health care aid any incentive, bonus, commission or profit share other than the compensation paid to them as wages for hours worked. 54. Upon information and belief, Defendants are compensated by various payors, including Medicaid, Medicare, private insurance companies, and directly by their clients. The payors are billed hourly based on the amount of time Defendants’ aides spend within the clients' homes. 77. For purposes of the FLSA collective action, the collective is defined as: All home health care aides employed by Defendants on and after three years from the date this action is commenced who were not paid overtime for hours worked over forty in a workweek. 78. Similarly situated former and current employees are readily identifiable through Defendants' records. These similarly situated employees can be located and should be notified of and allowed to opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 79. Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a class of employees who were and are employed as home health aides by Defendants from April 7, 2011 through the present day and who were not properly paid overtime pay and/or had unlawful deductions taken from their wages pursuant to the CGS for the period March 12, 2017. 80. Common questions of fact exist as to all of the members of the proposed class and predominate over the questions affecting only individual members -- namely, whether Defendants did not pay overtime wages to and/or made unlawful wage deductions from their employees who were and are home health care aides. 82. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the proposed class, as Plaintiff and the other members' sustained damages arising out of the same wrongful conduct of Defendants in failing to pay overtime wages and making unlawful wage deductions. 83. Plaintiff is represented by [local counsel] and Charny & Wheeler P.C. which has the resources, expertise and experience necessary to prosecute this class action and their attorneys do not have knowledge of any conflicts among the potential members of the class or their respective counsel. 84. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy raised in this lawsuit because: (1) the prosecution of separate actions would be inefficient and wasteful of judicial resources; (2) the members of the proposed class are likely located throughout the Northeast Region and are not likely to be able to vindicate and enforce their claims unless this action is maintained as a class action; (3) the issues raised can be more fairly and efficiently resolved in the context of a single action rather than piecemeal litigation in separate actions; (4) the resolution of litigation in a single forum will avoid the risk of confusion and possible inconsistent determinations; (5) the prosecution of separate actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individuals pursuing claims against the defendants which would establish incompatible standards of conduct; (6) the defendants have acted on grounds applicable to all class members, making final declaratory relief on behalf of all members necessary and appropriate; and (7) questions of law and fact common to members of the class on issues of liability predominate over any questions, such as those of individual damages, that will affect individual class members. 86. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding allegations. 87. Defendants employed Plaintiff and those similarly situated for workweeks longer than 40 hours and willfully failed to compensate Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated for the time worked in excess of 40 hours per week, at a rate of at least one and one-half times the regular hourly rate, in violation of the requirements of the FLSA. 88. As a consequence of the willful underpayment of wages, Plaintiff and those employees similarly situated have incurred damages and Defendants are indebted to them in the amount of the unpaid overtime compensation, together with interest, liquidated damages and attorney's fees and costs, in an amount to be determined at trial. 89. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding allegations. 90. Defendants employed Plaintiff and those similarly situated for workweeks longer than 40 hours and willfully failed to compensate Plaintiff for the time worked in excess of 40 hours per week, at a rate of at least one and one-half times the regular hourly rate, in violation of the requirements of the CGS. 92. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations. 93. During the term of her employment with Defendants, Defendants deducted a meals credit from the wages of Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated. 94. Defendants represented that the basis for such deductions was the existence of an arrangement by which their client would provide meals to Plaintiff and others similarly situated at a value equivalent to the amount of such deduction. 95. By way of their complaints, Defendants had actual and constructive notice that Plaintiffs and other employees similarly situated did not receive the meals for which the meals credit were intended to be deducted. 96. Notwithstanding such notice, Defendants deducted the meal credit from the wages of Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated. 97. Defendants' deduction of the meals credit from the wages of Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated constitutes an unlawful deduction within the meaning of CGS. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME IN VIOLATION OF THE FLSA Collective Action FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES IN VIOLATION OF STATE LAW Class Action UNLAWFUL DEDUCTION OF WAGES IN VIOLATION OF CGS Class Action

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10. Mr. Nelson has a full-time job with a manufacturing company. When there is a work stoppage or slow-down associated with his manufacturing job, Mr. Nelson is entitled to receive temporary unemployment benefits from the Georgia Department of Labor. 11. Historically, benefit recipients like Mr. Nelson would receive their payments from the State of Georgia through a paper checks that were issued by the appropriate agency. 12. In 2012, however, the State of Georgia decided to stop issuing paper checks to benefit recipients and elected to have a private company issue MasterCard-branded debit cards to benefit recipients like Mr. Nelson. 13. Mr. Nelson, like any other benefit recipient who was receiving payments via paper check, was automatically enrolled in the new debit card program. 14. Now, when the Georgia Department of Labor issues unemployment payments, they are posted to Mr. Nelson’s debit card account for his use. 16. The State of Georgia was not alone in its decision to cease issuing paper checks for recipients of unemployment benefits, TANF recipients, or child support beneficiaries and instead retain Conduent and Comerica to issue debit cards using the EPPICard®, Way2Go Card®, and GO Program® marks. 17. Over 20 states across the country have switched to debit cards programs using the EPPICard®, Way2Go Card®, and GO Program® marks to deliver unemployment and child support benefits. 18. Conduent and Comerica administer the EPPICard®, Way2Go Card®, and GO Program® debit card programs for the State of Georgia and at least a dozen other states, including but not limited to Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 19. When a benefit recipient like Mr. Nelson receives their debit card, Conduent and Comerica allegedly provide them with a Comerica Bank Debit MasterCard Card Terms of Use that ostensibly outlines the terms and conditions that govern use of the debit card. A representative copy of the Terms of Use issued by Conduent and/or Comerica is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 21. The standardized Terms of Use were presented to Mr. Nelson and other benefit recipients on a “take it or leave it” basis, and card holders are often not informed that they have any other option to receive their funds. The form contract was drafted and imposed by Conduent and/or Comerica, which is the party of vastly superior bargaining strength. The Terms of Use is an agreement of adhesion. 22. The Terms of Use contain detailed procedures of what a cardholder is supposed to do if they believe their debit card has been lost or stolen or that someone has unlawfully transferred money from their debit card. See Exhibit A, ¶ 23. For example, the Terms of Use advise card users as follows: Lost or Stolen Card/PIN. If you believe your Card or PIN has been lost or stolen or that someone has transferred or may transfer money from your available funds without your permission, call us at 1-888- 929-2460, or write to us at Customer Account Services, P.O. Box 245997, San Antonio, Texas 78224-5997 with details. See Exhibit A, ¶ 8. 25. The Terms of Use also inform cardholders the following regarding their liability with respect to fraudulent or unauthorized transactions on their accounts: Tell us AT ONCE if you believe your Card or PIN has been lost or stolen. Telephoning is the best way of keeping your possible losses down. You could lose all the money associated with your Card. If you tell us within two business days, you can lose no more than $50 if someone used your Card or PIN without your permission. If you do NOT tell us within two business days after you learn of the loss or theft of your Card or PIN, and we can prove that we could have stopped someone from using your Card or PIN without your permission if you had told us, you could lose as much as $500. [Note: You will not be liable for the $50 or $500 amounts stated above for transactions where your PIN is not used to verify your identity if you have not reported two or more incidents of unauthorized use in the immediately preceding 12 months, your Card is in good standing, and you have exercised reasonable care in safeguarding your Card from risk of loss or theft.] Also, if the written transaction history or other Card transaction information provided to you shows transfers that you did not make, tell us at once. If you do not tell us within 60 days after the transmittal of such information, you may not get back any money you lost after the 60 days if we can prove that we could have stopped someone from taking the money if you had told us in time. If a good reason (such as a long trip or a hospital stay) kept you from notifying us, we will extend the time periods. We will cancel your Card if it is reported to us as lost, stolen or destroyed. Once your Card is canceled, you will have no liability for further transactions involving the use of the canceled Card. See Exhibit A, ¶ 11. 27. Instead of following the procedures outlined in the Terms of Use, Defendants engage in a pattern of conduct that includes sham investigations and improper denial of meritorious claims regarding fraudulent charges and unauthorized uses. 28. Further, Defendants ignore the limitations of liability language contained in the Terms of Use and leave the users of EPPICard®, Way2Go Card®, and GO Program® debit cards holding the bag on hundreds, thousands, and even tens of thousands of dollars of fraudulent charges and unauthorized uses. 29. Mr. Nelson’s experiences with Defendants illustrate this reality. 30. Mr. Nelson makes it a practice not to use his EPPICard. Instead, he allows any benefits that he may receive to simply accumulate on his card. 32. Mr. Nelson does not receive paper statements from Defendants for his account, opting instead, to check his balance by calling the EPPICard customer service number. 33. On July 26, 2017, Mr. Nelson called to check the balance in his account and verify that the payments from the Georgia Department of Labor had been credited to his account. 34. During this telephone call, Mr. Nelson discovered that his account balance was incorrect. 35. The level two customer service representative that Mr. Nelson talked to read off the activity that had been made on his account. The charges to Mr. Nelson’s account totaled $12,506.63. 36. Mr. Nelson explained to the representative that he had not used his card to make these unauthorized transactions and that his EPPICard was still in his possession inside his personal safe. 38. That same day, the EPPICard Fraud Services Department opened an investigation into Mr. Nelson’s claim and assigned a tracking number of 1- 4068667824 to the investigation. 39. Mr. Nelson was sent a letter that requested that he complete the enclosed Questionnaire of Fraud in its entirety and return it using the enclosed envelope. 40. The letter also informed Mr. Nelson that the investigation would be completed within 45 days. 41. On July 27, 2017, Mr. Nelson contacted the Gwinnett County Police Department to report the fraud that had been committed against his account. 42. Mr. Nelson informed Officer Howard that unbeknownst to him, between February 18, 2017 and June 5, 2017, an unknown individual or individuals had made $12,506.63 in purchases using his debit card account without his permission. 44. On July 27, 2017, Mr. Nelson also reported the fraud on his account to the MasterCard Assistance Center, since his EPPICard is branded with the MasterCard logo. 45. MasterCard informed Mr. Nelson that he should follow up with Defendants regarding his situation. 46. After receiving the Questionnaire of Fraud, Mr. Nelson attempted to complete the form in its entirety. However, Mr. Nelson was unable to completely finish the form because it asked him to list all of the unauthorized charges. 47. Therefore, on August 7, 2017, Mr. Nelson again contacted EPPICard and spoke with Connie, who indicated that she would mail Mr. Nelson his statements so he could complete the Questionnaire. 48. On August, 21, 2017, having not received his account statements, Mr. Nelson again contacted EPPICard and spoke with Grace. Grace also indicated that she would mail Mr. Nelson his statements so he could complete the Questionnaire. 50. On September 8, 2017, while still awaiting receipt of his account statements that he had requested on numerous occasions for the past month, Mr. Nelson received a letter from EPPICard’s Fraud Services Department saying that it had completed its investigation and that it could not confirm that any fraud occurred. 53. Mr. Nelson’s September 18 letter included the list of transactions contained in Paragraph 51, above, and also enclosed a copy of the completed Questionnaire of Fraud. 54. On September 20, 2017, Mr. Nelson then filed an Identity Theft Report with the Federal Trade Commission. 55. On the same date, Mr. Nelson also filed reports with the Comptroller of the Currency and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regarding the fraudulent activity on his account. 56. On September 21, 2017, Mr. Nelson called EPPICard to follow up regarding the fraud investigation. After initially speaking with Olivia, he was transferred to Robin. Robin took down Mr. Nelson’s contact information and transferred him to a supervisor named Jarred. Jarred advised Mr. Nelson to submit a written request to EPPICard seeking to have his dispute reopened for secondary review. 57. Per Jarred’s instructions, on September 24, 2017, Mr. Nelson sent EPPICard a letter detailing his experiences and requesting that his dispute be reopened for secondary review. 59. EPPICard’s December 11, 2017 letter indicated that Mr. Nelson could request a copy of the documents that they relied upon in making their determination. 60. Mr. Nelson contacted EPPICard to request a copy of these documents, but just like it did with his account statements, EPPICard failed to provide Mr. Nelson with the requested information. 61. As of the filing of this Complaint, Defendants still refuse to refund Mr. Nelson the $12,506.63 that was fraudulently removed from his account. 62. Unfortunately, Mr. Nelson’s experiences with Defendants are not isolated. The website ConsumerAffairs.com has collected hundreds of online complaints from people across the country that detail similar experiences with EPPICard. 65. Marshayla, from Mesquite, TX, wrote the following on October 11, 2017: My account was used somehow fraudulently so I filed a claim. I filled out paperwork and mailed it in. The fraud department ruled against me and never contacted me via email, mail or phone call. I’m out $300 and all they recommend is to write a letter. You are better off transferring your money to a REAL financial institution where they treat fraud claims thoroughly and more seriously. 70. EPPICard user Tiffany, from Houston, TX, shared the following on October 15, 2015: On August 28, 2015, I made a fraud report to Eppicard because over a course of a month, $406 ($103 in July, $303 on August 28th) was stolen from my card at an ATM in Baltimore, MD. The problem is I live in Houston, TX and still had the card in my possession. I followed the necessary procedures of calling and reporting the fraud, completing the documents once received by me in the mail, mailing them back to Eppicard within the allowable 10 days, and then just waiting... I’ve contacted them several times regarding this matter, only to be told the case is still under investigation. I last called on Tuesday, October 13th and was informed the case was “denied, with no further information.” I repeatedly tried to get an explanation as to why the fraud investigation was denied, but was told they “needed more information”, although I’d fulfilled all obligations required of me and submitted all documents in a timely fashion. 72. According to Ms. Mueller, she has been hearing consumer complaints about EPPICard since 2009. Id. 73. According to Ms. Mueller’s investigation, even though the EPPICard is “supposed to have the same kinds of protections as a traditional debit card, consumers have compared resolving fake charges after a card is compromised to running on a hamster wheel.” Id. 74. Ms. Mueller has fielded complaints regarding EPPICard from Florida, Illinois, Wisconsin, Connecticut, Georgia, and Texas that chronicle the following issues: EPPICard losing fraud paperwork multiple times; EPPICard wrongly and repeatedly telling consumers they need to pursue the phony charges with the merchant; and EPPICard issuing provisional credits only to reverse the credits and reinstate the charges even when the charges were made in foreign countries or in states far from the cardholder. Id. 75. Mr. Nelson’s experiences and the others outlined above demonstrate that Defendants systematically refuse to provide refunds to EPPICard users who experience fraud on their accounts. 77. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rule 23. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule 23. 78. The proposed class is defined as: All Conduent and Comerica EPPICard®, Way2Go Card®, and GO Program® customers in the United States who, within the applicable statute of limitations preceding the filing of this action to the date of class certification, incurred fraudulent charges on their accounts and were denied a refund of such charges in violation of Defendants’ Terms of Use (the “Class”). 79. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. In addition, subclasses will likely be sought for those victims of Defendants’ practices who reside in certain states where statutory protections, such as fair business practices statutes, have been violated by Defendants. 8. 81. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impractical. The Class consists of thousands of members whose identity is within the knowledge of Conduent and Comerica and can be ascertained only by reviewing the records of Conduent and Comerica. 82. The claims of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class in that Mr. Nelson, like all Class members, lost funds based on the improper practices described herein. The representative Plaintiff, like all Class members, has been damaged by the misconduct of Conduent and Comerica. Furthermore, the factual basis of Defendants’ misconduct is common to all Class members, and represents a common thread of conduct resulting in injury to all members of the Class. 83. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class and those common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. 85. Other questions of law and fact common to the Class include: a. The proper method or methods by which to measure damages, and b. The declaratory relief to which the Class is entitled. 86. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other Class members, in that they arise out of the same wrongful policies and practices and the same or substantially similar unconscionable provisions of Defendants’ contractual agreements and other related documents. Plaintiff has suffered the harm alleged and has no interests antagonistic to the interests of any other Class member. 88. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the amount of each individual Class member’s claim is small relative to the complexity of the litigation, and due to the financial resources of Conduent and Comerica, no Class member could afford to seek legal redress individually for the claims alleged herein. Therefore, absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses and Defendants’ misconduct will proceed without remedy. 90. Plaintiff repeats paragraphs 1 through 89 above. 91. Plaintiff and Defendants have contracted for services, as embodied in Comerica’s Terms of Use and related documentation. 92. Defendants violated the contract by failing to adhere to the policies and procedures contained in the contract with respect to fraudulent and unauthorized transactions. Thus, Defendants have materially breached the express terms of their own form contract. 93. Plaintiff and the Class have performed all, or substantially all, of the obligations imposed on them under the contracts, or those obligations have been waived by Defendants. 94. Plaintiff and members of the Class sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ breaches of the contracts. 96. Subterfuge and evasion violate the obligation of good faith in performance even when an actor believes his conduct to be justified. A lack of good faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. Defendants have breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing through their policies and practices as alleged herein. 97. Plaintiff and the Class have performed all, or substantially all, of the obligations imposed on them under the Terms of Use. 98. Plaintiff and members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Whether based on direct breaches of the contract, or violations of the contract as a result of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or both, Defendants should be required to make Plaintiff and the Class whole. Breach of Contract/Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Conversion

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(Failure to pay wages) NY Lab. Law §191 (Failure to pay overtime) (NY STATE) (Failure to pay minimum wages) (NY STATE) (Failure to pay overtime) (Federal- 29 USC 201 et. seq.) (Failure to provide wage notices) (NY Lab. Law §198(1-b) & NY Lab. Law §198(1-d)) (Unlawful Retaliation) (NY STATE) NY Lab. Law §215 (Unlawful Retaliation) (Federal- 29 USC §215) 1. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and reincorporates all allegations as though fully set forth herein.. 1. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and reincorporates all allegations as though fully set forth herein. 10. Corporate Defendant is involved in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 10. The Defendants unlawfully terminated Plaintiff for complaining about the Defendants unlawful pay practices as set forth in this Complaint. 11. Corporate Defendant’s annual revenues exceed $500,000 for the year 2020. 11. By the Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff is entitled to recover lost wages, liquidated damages, attorney fees, costs, and pre-judgement and post-judgement interest from the Defendants. 12. Corporate Defendant’s annual revenues exceed $500,000 for the year 2019. 12. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and reincorporates all allegations as though fully set forth herein. 13. The provisions of 29 U.S.C. §215 apply to the Defendants and protect the Plaintiff. 13. On information and belief, Corporate Defendant regularly purchases goods from locations outside the State of New York and utilizes such products within the State of New York. 14. The business activities of the Corporate Defendant are related and performed through unified operation or common control for a common business purpose. 14. Under 29 U.S.C. §215, the Defendants were prohibited from unlawfully retaliating against Plaintiff for complaining about the Defendants violations of the New York Labor Law. 15. The Defendants unlawfully terminated Plaintiff for complaining about the Defendants unlawful pay practices as set forth in this Complaint. 15. The Corporate Defendant engages in a combination of different activities in the course of its business operation, including but not limited to: (1) advertising, (2) bookkeeping, (3) managing employees, (4) selling, and (5) purchasing supplies (jointly as the “Related Activities”). 16. By the Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff is entitled to recover lost wages, liquidated damages, attorney fees, costs, and pre-judgement and post-judgement interest from the Defendants. 16. The Corporate Defendant has an organizational structure whereby there is an individual, or group of individuals, who control the Related Activities. 17. Corporate Defendant failed to keep accurate and sufficient payroll and time records, as required by law. 17. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and reincorporates all allegations as though fully set forth herein. 18. During the Relevant Time Period, Corporate Defendant did not record the Plaintiff’s exact daily work start time and exact daily work end time. 18. The overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the supporting federal regulations, apply to Defendants and protect the Plaintiff. 19. Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff overtime wages to which Plaintiff was entitled under the FLSA and the supporting Federal Regulations. 19. Corporate Defendant did not maintain sufficient payroll and time records to determine the weekly pay and hours worked by the Plaintiff. 2. Under the Wage Theft Prevention Act, New York Labor Law, §195, Defendants willfully failed to furnish Plaintiff with a required notice containing the following information: i. the rates or rates of pay and basis thereof, ii. whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission or other allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; iii. the regular pay designated by the employer per NYLL §191; iv. the name of the employer; v. Any “doing business as” names used by the employer; vi. The physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address, if different; vii. The telephone number of the employer 2. The minimum wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting regulations apply to Defendant and protect the Plaintiff. 20. The Plaintiff was an employee of the Corporate Defendant during the Relevant Time Period. 21. Defendants’ unlawful conduct, as described in this Complaint, has been willful and intentional. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that the practices described in this Complaint are unlawful. Defendant have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the compensation of Plaintiff. 21. The Plaintiff was not an independent contractor while performing services for Corporate Defendant during the Relevant Time Period. 22. Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 22. Corporate Defendant provided all of the equipment and material for the Plaintiff to perform his job. 23. Corporate Defendant treated the Plaintiff as a “W-2” wage earner. 23. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and reincorporates all allegations as though fully set forth herein.. 24. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting regulations apply to Defendant and protect the Plaintiff. 25. Corporate Defendant assigned the Plaintiff the specific job duties to which he had to perform. 25. Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff overtime wages to which Plaintiff was entitled under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 26. The Plaintiff was not free to hire other employees to work in his place to perform his job duties for Corporate Defendant. 26. By the Defendants’ knowing or intentional failure to pay Plaintiff overtime wages for hours worked over 40 hours per workweek, they have willfully violated NYLL Art. 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 27. Plaintiff never had any ownership interest in Corporate Defendant and never invested capital into Corporate Defendant. 27. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff is entitled to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action, and pre- judgment and post-judgment interest from the Defendants. 3. Defendants willfully failed to furnish Plaintiff with an accurate statement of wages as required by NYLL §195(3), containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of the employee; name of the employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof; whether paid by hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hour rate or rates of pay, and overtime rates of pay; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours; deductions, allowances, and net wages. 3. Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff call in wages to which Plaintiff was entitled under the NYLL and 12 NYCRR §142-2.3 of the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 4. Due to Defendants’ violation of NYLL §195(1), Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants liquidated damages of $50 per each workday that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of $5,000, reasonable attorney fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to NYLL § 198(1-b). 48. Plaintiff bring each cause of action set forth herein as a collective action on behalf of the following class of potential opt-in litigants: All current and former warehouse employees who were employed by united Parcel Service in any workweek in the past three years (“FLSA Class”). 49. Plaintiff reserves the right to redefine the FLSA Class prior to class certification and thereafter, as necessary. 5. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff an accurate statement with each payment of wages that sets forth Plaintiff’s hours worked, rates of pay, gross wages, credits claimed (for tips, meals, and lodging) if any, deductions and net wages. 5. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff is entitled to recover unpaid call in pay wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action, and pre- judgment and post-judgment interest from the Defendants. 50. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under 29 U.S.C §216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the FLSA Class defined above. 51. Plaintiff desires to pursue Plaintiff’s FLSA claims on behalf of any individuals who opt-in to this action under 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 53. Specifically, the Defendants typically paid Plaintiff and the FLSA Class by not paying for waiting time pay when the employees were required to enter into the facility and programing the time clock to begin tracking work hours after the employees already started working. By these acts, each employee was underpaid by approximately 45 minutes every day, which impacted overtime rates. 54. The Similarly-Situated employees are known to the Defendants, are readily identifiable, and may be located through the Defendants’ records and the records of any payroll company that the Defendant uses. The Defendants employ FLSA Class Members in the State of New York. These similarly-situated employees may be readily notified of this action through direct U.S mail and/or other appropriate means, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for the collective adjudication of their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 55. Plaintiffs bring each cause of action of this lawsuit as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of themselves and the following class: All current and former warehouse employees who were employed by united Parcel Service in any workweek in the past three years (the “New York Class”). 56. Plaintiff reserves the right to redefine the New York Class prior to class certification and thereafter, as necessary 57. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the New York Class defined above. 58. On information and belief, the members of the New York Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 40 members of the New York Class. 59. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the New York Class because there is no conflict between the claims of Plaintiffs and those of the New York Class, and Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the New York Class. Plaintiff’s counsel is competent and experienced in representing multi-plaintiff wage and hour claims such as this one. 60. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed New York Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members, including, without limitation: whether the Defendants have violated and continue to violate the laws of New York through its policy or practice of not paying its employees for all hours worked. 62. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the New York Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. 63. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit many similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The New York Class is readily identifiable from the Defendants’ own employment records. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the New York Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants. 64. A class action is superior to other available methods for adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all members is impractical. Further, the amounts at stake for many of the New York Class members, while substantial, are not great enough to enable them to maintain separate suits against the Defendant. Each individual class member might not have substantial enough damages to justify private counsel bringing an individual claim on behalf of such individual class member. Accordingly, this is the type of case and the type of circumstances for which Rule 23 was enacted. 65. Without a class action, the Defendant will retain the benefit of its wrongdoing, which will result in further damages to the Plaintiff and the New York Class. Plaintiff envisions no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action 66. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and reincorporates all allegations as though fully set forth herein. 67. Under NY Lab. Law §191, an employer is required to pay an employee within one week of the services performed by the employee. 68. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff his wages as required by NYLL §191 by not paying wages within the statutory time-period. 7. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and reincorporates all allegations as though fully set forth herein. 7. Corporate Defendant is an “employer” under the FLSA. 8. Corporate Defendant is an “employer” under the NYLL. 8. The provisions of NY Lab. Law §215 apply to the Defendants and protect the Plaintiff. 9. During any period of time whatsoever between November 4, 2019, through January18, 2020, Corporate Defendant had the ability to perform one or more of the following actions: (1) hire the Plaintiff, (2) terminate the employment of the Plaintiff, (3) set the Plaintiff’s wage rate, (4) maintain payroll records concerning the Plaintiff, or (5) institute work rules for the Plaintiff. 9. Under NY Lab. Law §215, the Defendants were prohibited from unlawfully retaliating against Plaintiff for complaining about the Defendants violations of the New York Labor Law. Fair Labor Standards Collective Class Definition New York State Class Definition

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64.1200(c)(2) provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to a “residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) extends the privacy protection in subsection 64.1200(c) to wireless telephone numbers. 64.1200(d); Liberty Power consistently fail to honor the requests of Plaintiff and other individuals to stop calling, and specifically to place their name and telephone number on Liberty Power’s internal do not call list and to otherwise maintain an adequate do not call policy required under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). 70. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff asserts this claim on behalf of himself and the members of the Artificial/Prerecorded Voice Class. 71. The TCPA prohibits certain uses of telecommunication equipment that would interfere with telephone service subscribers’ privacy and/or property rights with respect to their telephone. In particular, the TPCA makes it unlawful for any person: to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes or is exempted by rule or order by the Commission under paragraph (2)(B). 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). 73. Liberty Power and its agents also utilized artificial and/or prerecorded voice messages in calls to residential telephones of Plaintiff and Artificial/Prerecorded Voice Class members. 74. Liberty Power and its agents do not and did not obtain legally effective prior express consent to call the Artificial/Prerecorded Voice Class members’ residential telephone numbers. 75. Liberty Power and its agents violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by placing telephone calls to the residential telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the other members of the Artificial/Prerecorded Voice Class using an artificial or prerecorded voice without their prior express written consent. 76. Liberty Power willfully violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) because it knew that Plaintiff and the other Artificial/Prerecorded Voice Class members had not given prior express consent to receive calls made using an artificial, and/or prerecorded voice and that Liberty Power and its agents used these methods to call the residential telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the other Artificial/Prerecorded Voice Class members. 77. Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of the other members of the Artificial/Prerecorded Voice Class, seeks to recover statutory damages (including treble damages for willful violations), as well as injunctive and equitable relief under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) against Liberty Power. 78. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff asserts this claim on behalf of himself and members of the National DNC Class. 80. Liberty Power and its agents violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating telephone solicitations to wireless and residential telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the other National DNC Class members. 81. Liberty Power did not have an established business relationship with Plaintiff and class members. 82. Liberty Power and its agents made more than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiff and members of the class within a 12-month period without their prior express consent to receive such calls. Plaintiff and members of the National DNC Class never provided any form of consent to receive telephone calls from Liberty Power and/or Liberty Power does not have any legally effective evidence of consent to place telemarketing calls to them. 83. Plaintiff and the other members of the National DNC Class have a claim against Liberty Power because Plaintiff and the other members of the National DNC Class received more than one telephone call within a 12-month period made by or on behalf of the Liberty Power in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. As a result of the conduct of Liberty Power and its agents, Plaintiff and the class suffered actual damages and have a claim for $500 in statutory damages for each such violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, and injunctive relief. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 85. Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of the other members of the National DNC Class, seeks to recover statutory damages (including treble damages for willful violations), as well as injunctive and equitable relief under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) against Liberty Power. 86. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Plaintiff asserts these claims on behalf of himself and members of the Internal DNC Class. 88. The TCPA creates a private right of action for injunctive and monetary relief for any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12–month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of [e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d).]” 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). See also 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3) (liability for company specific DNC list violations). 89. Liberty Power did not institute minimum procedures required under 47 C.F.R. § 90. Liberty Power and its agents violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to residential and wireless telephones of Plaintiff and members of the class without instituting minimum procedures required under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). 91. Liberty Power willfully violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). Liberty Power knew that it and its agents failed to institute minimum procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of Liberty Power and that they repeatedly ignored and/or refused to honor Plaintiff and class members’ requests to be placed on a company DNC list. Violations of the TCPA Against Corp and Holding by Plaintiff, Individually and on Behalf of the National DNC Class Violation of the TCPA Against Corp and Holding by Plaintiff, Individually, and on Behalf of the Artificial/Prerecorded Voice Class Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 Against Corp and Holding by Plaintiff Individually and on Behalf of the Internal DNC Class

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10. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was domiciled in and a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 26. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 27. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who received any telephone call/s from Defendants or their agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 28. Defendants and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 29. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in at least the following ways: Defendants, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using an ATDS, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 42. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 43. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 44. As a result of Defendants knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). I, Alex Madar, hereby certify that, according to the computer program used to prepare this document, Complaint, contains 3820 words. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 5th day of August, 2019, in San Diego, California. /s/ Alex S. Madar Alex S. Madar Attorney for Plaintiff KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. 227 THE (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227 ET. SEQ. � As a result of Defendants negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). � Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. � Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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15. Defendant is a retailer of customizable apparel. Through the Website, customers can purchase tees, sweatshirts, bags, hats and similar items, and have designs printed or embroidered onto the material. Defendant also offers other printing services, such as business cards, brochures, posters, tickets, stickers and similar items. 16. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its retail operations. Through the Website, customers can learn about customizable products, including materials used, quality and construction; learn about the process; review the catalog; and request a quote via an online form. -7- 17. The Website is a commercial marketplace. As mentioned above, the Website is Defendant’s main point of sale. Through the Website, customers can view the catalog, complete a purchase for delivery, learn about the shipping and return policy, and get a quote. 18. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Fischler and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Fischler and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 19. Plaintiff Fischler cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 20. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about November 23, 2020, Plaintiff Fischler encountered multiple access barriers that denied him the enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the goods and services of Defendant’s retail operations services. Because of these barriers he was unable to, substantially equal to sighted individuals: a. Know what is on the Website. This is due in part to the non-text images, which are not accompanied by the requisite alternative text. On the home page, for example, images are all labeled with file name. The same is true on the “how it works” page. On the catalog page, a sighted user is given a comparison of products -8- based on quality. However, the images are not properly labeled. Also the way it is laid out makes it nearly impossible for a screen reader user to understand the information being presented. Lastly, Plaintiff Fischler was unable to learn about Defendant’s social media presence because the links are not properly labeled. A sighted user can easily locate Defendant’s Facebook and Instagram links and, by clicking on those links, be taken to Defendant’s profile where additional information, including sample designs, is available. b. Navigate the Website. This Website was extremely difficult to navigate using a screen reader. Links, images and buttons are not properly labeled. There is not proper feedback from the screen reader instructing screen reader users how to interact with form fields. When trying to customize a chair, there is no use of ARIA to alert a screen reader user that options have been successfully selected. Plaintiff Fischler repeatedly encountered issues with screen reader focus. Ultimately, because of issues with screen reader focus, Plaintiff Fischler found it nearly impossible to navigate this Website independently using his screen reader. 21. Plaintiff Fischler was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant Website: a. Images are not properly labeled with alt-text. b. Frames do not have a title. c. Some pages have the same title so the title cannot be used to distinguish pages. -9- d. Button elements are empty and have no programmatically determined name. e. Form controls have no label. f. Forms have fields without label elements or title attributes. g. Links use general text like “buy now” with no surrounding text explaining the link purpose. h. Webpages have no headings and headings are not nested correctly. Defendant Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 22. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Fischler, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Fischler encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting Defendant’s Website and taking advantage of its retail operations and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals. 23. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, learn about Defendant’s products, learn about customization, and get a quote, as sighted users can. 24. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. -10- 25. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Fischler and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Fischler alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Fischler, as a member of a protected class. 26. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 27. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 28. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Fischler seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Fischler to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for its Website: -11- a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.1 compliant; b. Training Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies with the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 29. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 30. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 31. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. -12- 32. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 33. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied equal access to Defendant’s Website and its retail operations during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 34. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied equal access to Defendant’s Website and its retail operations during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 35. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied equal access to Defendant’s Website and its retail operations during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 36. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: a. Whether Defendant’s website is a place of “public accommodation”; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace; -13- c. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; d. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; e. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of their goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and f. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of their goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 37. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 38. Plaintiff Fischler will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. -14- 39. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 40. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 42. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 43. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace and a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s retail operations. The Website is a service that is integrated with its retail operations. 44. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, -15- services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 45. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 46. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 47. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Fischler, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. -16- 48. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Fischler requests the relief as set forth below. 49. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace and constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s retail operations. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with its retail operations. 51. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which is marketed to and used by consumers located in the State of New York. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 52. Defendant is violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its retail operations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). 53. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring -17- that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 54. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Defendant has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 55. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its retail operations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 56. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. -18- 57. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace and constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with those establishments. 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which is marketed to and used by consumers located in the City of New York, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its retail operations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8- 107(15)(a). 61. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or -19- c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 62. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 63. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 64. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 65. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its retail operations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et -20- seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 66. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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1. On January 8, 2020, Plaintiff Bonnie Mosely (“Plaintiff”) commenced this putative class action case. (ECF No. 1.) 2. GRC was served on January 13, 2020, making its deadline to respond to the Complaint February 3, 2020. 3. The Court may extend a response date either on its own or upon a request made before the time to act has expired. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, this Motion is timely because Monday, February 3, 2020 is the date on which GRC is currently required to respond to the Complaint. 4. Good cause exists for a twenty eight (28) day extension of time for GRC to respond to the Complaint. Namely, counsel for GRC was just recently retained on this FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ITS RESPONSIVE PLEADING Defendant General Revenue Corporation (“GRC”), by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully moves the Court for a twenty-eight (28) day extension of time through and until March 2, 2020 for GRC to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint. In support of its Motion, GRC states as follows:

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17. To market its energy products and services, Direct Energy contracts with one or more third party vendors to make telemarketing calls, including Lead Genesis. Direct Energy’s vendors, including Lead Genesis, use automatic telephone dialing systems (“ATDS”) and/or artificial or prerecorded voice messages to contact potential new customers. Direct Energy’s vendors, including Lead Genesis, contact potential customers who have not consented to being contacted either through the use of ATDS or pre-recorded messages, such as the Plaintiff. 18. Direct Energy and its vendors, including Lead Genesis, benefit from the arrangement because Direct Energy obtains new business through its vendor’s efforts, and its vendors secures significant payment for their services. 19. Direct Energy is vicariously liable for the conduct of the vendors, including Lead Genesis, it hires to make telemarketing calls under ordinary principles of agency because Direct Energy directed or authorized the vendor’s conduct constituting the statutory violations alleged herein. 20. Direct Energy established, approved, or ratified Lead Genesis’s policies and practices. 35. Class Definition. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiffs bring this case as a class action on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons in the United States to whom: (a) Defendants or a third party acting on Defendants’ behalf, made one or more non- emergency telephone calls; (b) promoting Direct Energy’s goods or services; (c) to their cellular telephone number; (d) through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (e) at any time in the period that begins four years before the date of filing this Complaint to trial. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest or that has a controlling interest in Defendants, and Defendants’ legal representatives, assignees, and successors. Also excluded are the judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the judge’s immediate family. 36. Numerosity. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. On information and belief, the Class has more than 1,000 members. Moreover, the disposition of the claims of the Class in a single action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and the Court.

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11. On or around July 8, 2013, Defendant learned that for approximately 16 months, from March 2012 until July 2013, Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ PII had been stored on an unsecure Internet server maintained by a third-party enrollment system vendor. See Exhibit 1: July 26, 2013 letter to Plaintiff from Combined Insurance (“Breach Notification Letter”). During this period of time, anyone with an Internet connection was able to access Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII without their knowledge, authorization, or consent. 12. Defendant is an insurance company that has provided and continues to provide supplemental insurance to certain Dillard’s employees and their dependents. 13. In a letter dated July 26, 2013, Defendant notified Plaintiff and the other Class members that their PII was stored on an Internet server maintained by a third-party enrollment system vendor from March 2012 until July 2013, without proper security measures. See Exhibit 1: Breach Notification Letter. 14. The putative Class consists of persons who purchased certain policies, as referenced in Exhibit 1, from Defendant between March 2010 and March 2012, and dependents covered under such policies. 15. As individuals who were covered by Defendant’s insurance policies, Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ PII was entrusted to Defendant. 16. Despite knowing about the Security Breach since at least July 8, 2013, Defendant did not begin to formally notify Plaintiff and Class members of the Security Breach until July 26, 2013—more than two weeks after learning of the Security Breach and more than 16 months after the information was first stored on an Internet server without proper security measures. 4 17. During the intervening period between the Security Breach and the date the first wave of notification letters were sent to Plaintiff and Class members on July 26, 2013, the PII was accessible for sale and misuse on the robust international cyber black market, while Plaintiff and Class members had no chance whatsoever to take measures to protect their privacy. Defendant’s willful and wanton conduct placed Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ PII in the well-known and well-recognized sphere of harm for such information. 18. Defendant has admitted that the PII entrusted to it was improperly stored: [O]n July 8th, 2013, we learned that two files containing the personal information of certain Dillard’s associates and their dependents were stored on an Internet server by a third party enrollment system vendor since March 2012 without the proper security measures. The files contained the Social Security numbers, names, addresses, dates of birth, and enrollment and premium information for some associates and dependents. The files did not, however, contain personal medical or claims information. See Exhibit 1: Breach Notification Letter. In the aftermath of the Security Breach, Defendant represented to affected individuals that it took remedial steps, including removing the files from all publicly-accessible online environments. Id. 19. Notwithstanding Defendant’s wrongful actions and inaction and the resulting Security Breach, Defendant offered a mere one year of credit monitoring services. Defendant’s offer is plainly insufficient given the trove of PII that was made available to the world and the well-documented manipulation and machinations of cyber-criminals. 20. Defendant’s wrongful actions and inaction—to wit, failing to maintain reasonable security measures to protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII with which it was entrusted— caused the dissemination into the public domain of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII without their knowledge, authorization, or consent. 5 21. As a result of Defendant’s failure to properly safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII entrusted to it, Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ privacy has been (and will continue to be) invaded and their rights violated. Their compromised PII was private and sensitive in nature, was disclosed to a third-party vendor, and was disseminated to the members of the public who used it to harm Plaintiff and Class members. Security Breaches Lead to Identity Theft 22. Identity theft occurs when a person’s PII, such as the person’s name, e-mail address, address, Social Security number, billing and shipping addresses, phone number and credit card information, is used or attempted to be used without his or her permission to commit fraud or other crimes.1 23. According to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), “the range of privacy- related harms is more expansive than economic or physical harm or unwarranted intrusions” and “any privacy framework should recognize additional harms that might arise from unanticipated uses of data.”2 Furthermore, “there is significant evidence demonstrating that technological advances and the ability to combine disparate pieces of data can lead to identification of a consumer, computer or device even if the individual pieces of data do not constitute [PII].”3 1 See FTC, Identity Theft, available at http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature-0014-identity-theft (last visited May 8, 2014). 2 FTC Report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, 8 (March 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (last visited May 8, 2014). 3 FTC Report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers, Preliminary FTC Staff Report, 35–38 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (last visited May 8, 2014); Comment of Center for Democracy & Technology, cmt. #00469, at 3; Comment of Statz, Inc., cmt. #00377, at 11–12. 6 24. The FTC estimates that the identities of as many as 9 million Americans are stolen each year.4 Because Plaintiff’s and Class members’ Social Security numbers were made publicly available, they face a significantly heightened risk of identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud. In fact, as detailed herein, Plaintiff has already been a victim of identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud. 25. Javelin Strategy & Research (“Javelin”), a leading provider of quantitative and qualitative research, released a 2012 Identity Fraud Report (the “Javelin Report”), quantifying the impact of security breaches. According to the Javelin Report, individuals whose PII is subject to a reported security breach—such as the Security Breach at issue here—are approximately 9.5 times more likely than the general public to suffer identity fraud and/or identity theft. 26. According to the FTC, victims of identity theft are at serious risk of substantial losses. “Once identity thieves have your personal information, they can drain your bank account, run up charges on your credit cards, open new utility accounts, or get medical treatment on your health insurance. An identity thief can file a tax refund in your name and get your refund. In some extreme cases, a thief might even give your name to the police during an arrest.”5 27. The FTC also warns consumers about medical identity theft. “A thief may use your name or health insurance numbers to see a doctor, get prescription drugs, file claims with your insurance provider, or get other care. If the thief’s health information is mixed with yours, your treatment, insurance and payment records, and credit report may be affected.”6 4 Id. 5 See FTC, Signs of Identity Theft, available at http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0271-signs-identity- theft (last visited May 8, 2014). 6 See FTC, Medical Identity Theft, available at http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0171-medical- identity-theft (last visited May 8, 2014). 7 28. Identity thieves also use Social Security numbers to commit other types of fraud. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) found that identity thieves use PII to open financial accounts and payment card accounts and incur charges in a victim’s name.7 This type of identity theft can be the most damaging because it may take some time for the victim to become aware of the theft, while in the meantime causing significant harm to the victim’s credit rating and finances. Moreover, unlike other PII, Social Security numbers are incredibly difficult to change and their misuse can continue for years into the future. 29. Identity thieves also use Social Security numbers to obtain false identification cards, obtain government benefits in the victim’s name, commit crimes, and, as occurred here, file fraudulent tax returns to pilfer the victims’ tax refunds. Identity thieves also obtain jobs using stolen Social Security numbers, rent houses and apartments, and obtain medical services in the victim’s name. Identity thieves also have been known to give a victim’s personal information to police during an arrest, resulting in the issuance of an arrest warrant in the victim’s name and an unwarranted criminal record. The GAO states that victims of identity theft face “substantial costs and inconvenience repairing damage to their credit records,” as well the damage to their “good name.”8 30. The unauthorized disclosure of a person’s Social Security number can be particularly damaging, because Social Security numbers cannot be easily replaced like a credit card or debit card. In order to obtain a new Social Security number, a person must show evidence that someone is using the number fraudulently, as well as show that he has done all he 7 See http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf (last visited May 8, 2014). 8 See http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09759t.pdf (last visited May 21, 2014). 8 can to fix the problems resulting from the misuse.9 Thus, individuals whose PII has been stolen cannot obtain a new Social Security number until the damage has already been done and they have shown they have done all they can to fix the problems. 31. What is more, obtaining a new Social Security number is not an absolute prevention against continued identity theft. Government agencies, private businesses, and credit reporting companies likely still have the person’s records under the old number, so the effects of the identity theft may persist long after the incident. For some victims of identity theft, a new number may actually create more problems. Because prior positive credit information is not associated with the new Social Security number, it is more difficult to obtain credit due to the absence of a credit history. 32. Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII is a valuable commodity to identity thieves. Once personally identifiable information, such as Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII, has been compromised, criminals often trade the information on the “cyber black market” for a number of years.10 Identity thieves and other cyber criminals openly post stolen credit card numbers, Social Security numbers, and other personal financial information on various Internet websites, thereby making the information publicly available. In one study, researchers found hundreds of websites displaying stolen personal financial information. Strikingly, none of these websites was blocked by Google’s safeguard filtering mechanism—the “Safe Browsing list.” The study concluded: It is clear from the current state of the credit card black-market that cyber criminals can operate much too easily on the Internet. They are not afraid to put out their email addresses, in some cases phone numbers and other credentials in their advertisements. It seems that the black market for 9See Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number, SSA Publication No. 05-10064, October 2007, ICN 46327, available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10064.html (last visited May 8, 2014). 10 Companies, in fact, also recognize PII as an extremely valuable commodity akin to a form of personal property. See T. Soma, et al, Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 11, 3–4 (2009). 9 cyber criminals is not underground at all. In fact, it’s very “in your face.”11 Damages Sustained by Plaintiff and Class Members 33. The Security Breach was a direct and foreseeable result of Defendant’s failure to adopt and maintain reasonable and industry-standard security measures to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII from unauthorized access, use, and disclosure, as required by various state and federal regulations, industry practices, and common law duties. 34. Defendant’s wrongful actions and inaction directly and foreseeably caused the theft and dissemination into the public domain of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII without their knowledge, authorization, and consent. As a direct and foreseeable result of Defendant’s wrongful actions and inaction and the Security Breach, Plaintiff and Class members have suffered, and will continue to suffer, economic damages and other actual harm including, without limitation: (i) economic losses as a result of identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud; (ii) improper disclosure of their PII; (iii) loss of privacy; (iv) reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred to remedy identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud and to mitigate the increased risk of identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud pressed upon them by the Security Breach; (v) anxiety and emotional distress; and/or (vi) the value of their time spent mitigating the effects of identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud and/or the increased risk of identity theft, identity fraud, and medical fraud—for which they are entitled to compensation. 35. As a result of the Security Breach, a thief or thieves submitted to the Internal Revenue Service a fraudulent Income Tax Return for 2013 in Plaintiff’s name. Plaintiff has spent time and has incurred, and likely will in the future incur additional, out-of-pocket expenses for 11 StopTheHacker, The “Underground” Credit Card Blackmarket, available at http://www.stopthehacker.com/2010/03/03/the-underground-credit-card-blackmarket/ (last visited May 8, 2014). 10 accountant/tax preparer services in order to challenge and remedy the fraudulent Income Tax Return. Plaintiff has also been damaged financially by the related delay in receiving her tax refund for 2013. 36. Plaintiff has also been damaged by fraudulent T-Mobile charges and medical charges in her name. Plaintiff had to take the time to file a police report, obtain a copy of her Social Security card, and make calls in order to challenge the fraudulent charges. 37. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action as a class action individually and on behalf of the following Class of similarly situated individuals: All persons whose personally identifiable information (“PII”) was provided to Combined Insurance in connection with insurance policies purchased from Combined Insurance during the period of time from March 2010 to March 2012 and whose PII was stored on an Internet server without proper security measures, including each person to whom Combined Insurance sent a letter notifying them of the security breach. Excluded from the Class are (i) Defendant and its owners, officers, directors, employees, agents, and representatives and its parent entities, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, and assigns; and (ii) the Court, Court personnel, and members of their immediate families. 38. Numerosity—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of the Class members would be impracticable. Based upon the two-year period of time when the relevant insurance policies were purchased, Class members are believed to number in at least the hundreds or more. The precise number of Class members is presently unknown to Plaintiff, but may be ascertained from Defendant’s records. Disposition of this matter as a class action will provide substantial benefits and efficiencies to the Parties and the Court. 11 39. Commonality and Predominance—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over any potential question that affects only individual Class members. Such common questions of law or fact include, inter alia: a) whether Defendant willfully or negligently violated FCRA by failing to adopt and maintain reasonable security measures to limit the dissemination of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII to permissible purposes under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b; b) whether Defendant violated the Illinois Insurance Code by failing to properly secure Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII; c) whether Defendant’s violation of the Illinois Insurance Code constitutes negligence per se; d) whether Defendant willfully, recklessly, and/or negligently failed to adopt and maintain reasonable procedures designed to prevent unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII; e) whether Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class members to exercise reasonable care in storing and maintaining their PII; f) whether Defendant breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in storing and maintaining Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII; g) whether Defendant owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and Class members and whether Defendant breached that duty; h) whether Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiff and Class members; i) whether Defendant breached an implied contract with Plaintiff and Class members; j) whether Defendant was unjustly enriched to the detriment of Plaintiff and Class members; k) whether by publicly disclosing Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII without authorization, Defendant invaded Plaintiff’s and Class members’ privacy; and l) whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to damages, injunctive relief, and other equitable relief, and the measure of such damages and relief. 12 Defendant engaged in a common course of conduct giving rise to the legal rights sought to be enforced by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the other Class members. Individual questions, if any, pale by comparison, in both quality and quantity, to the numerous common questions that dominate this action. 40. Typicality—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of Class members’ claims in that Plaintiff’s claims and Class members’ claims all arise from Defendant’s failure to properly safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII and the resulting Security Breach. Further, there are no defenses available to Defendant unique to Plaintiff. 41. Adequacy of Representation—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4). Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of Class members. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with, Class members’ interests. Additionally, Plaintiff’s attorneys are highly experienced in the prosecution of consumer class actions, including security breach class actions, and intend to vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of Plaintiff and Class members. 42. Insufficiency of Separate Actions—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1). Absent a representative class action, members of the Class would continue to suffer the harm described herein, for which they would have no remedy. Even if separate actions could be brought by individual consumers, the resulting multiplicity of lawsuits would cause undue hardship and expense for both the Court and the litigants, as well as create a risk of inconsistent rulings that might be dispositive of the interests of similarly situated consumers, substantially impeding their ability to protect their interests, while establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. The Class thus satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). 13 43. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other Class members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as described below, with respect to the members of the Class as a whole. 44. Superiority—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). A class action is superior to other available means for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy, and no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this matter as a class action. Additionally, the damages and other detriment suffered by Plaintiff and the other Class members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be required to individually litigate their claims against Defendant, so it would be impracticable for Class members to individually seek redress for Defendant’s wrongful conduct. Even if Class members could afford individual litigation, the court system should not be required to bear the burden and expense of such inefficiency. Individualized litigation would also create the potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of a single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 45. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44 as if fully set forth herein. 46. FCRA defines a “consumer reporting agency” as: [A]ny person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third 14 parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 47. FCRA defines a “consumer report” as: [A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of establishing the consumer’s eligibility for (A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (B) employment purposes; or (C) any other purpose authorized under [15 U.S.C. §] 1681(b). 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). 48. FCRA defines “medical information” as: [I]nformation or data, whether oral or recorded, in any form or medium, created by or derived from a health care provider or the consumer, that relates to—(A) the past, present, or future physical, mental, or behavioral health or condition of an individual; (B) the provision of health care to an individual; or (C) the payment for the provision of health care to an individual. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i). 49. FCRA specifically protects medical information, restricting its dissemination to limited instances. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(d)(3); 1681b(g); 1681c(a)(6). 50. Defendant is a Consumer Reporting Agency under FCRA. On a cooperative nonprofit basis and/or for monetary fees, Defendant regularly assembles consumer information including, among other things, insurance policy information, such as names, dates of birth, and Social Security Numbers of those insured; claims information, such as the date of loss, type of loss, and amount paid for claims submitted by an insured; and a description of insured items. Defendant also regularly utilizes interstate commerce to furnish such information/PII on consumers (consumer reports) to third parties, including the Medical Information Bureau. 15 51. Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ PII, including their enrollment and premium information, constitute Consumer Reports under FCRA, because this information bears on, among other things, their credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, physical/medical conditions, and mode of living, and is used or collected, in whole or in part, for the purpose of establishing Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ eligibility for insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 52. FCRA requires the adoption of reasonable procedures with regard to, inter alia, the confidentiality and proper utilization of personal and insurance information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). FCRA also requires that: “Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures designed to . . . limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under section 1681b of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e. 53. Defendant failed to adopt and maintain reasonable procedures designed to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 54. Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII, in whole or in part, constitutes medical information as defined by FCRA. The PII included enrollment and premium information, which constitute data relating to the provision of, and payment for, health care under FCRA’s definition of medical information. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i). Defendant’s consumer reports provided to the Medical Information Bureau also contained information regarding the past, present, or future physical, mental, or behavioral health or condition of an individual. 55. Defendant’s violation of FCRA, as set forth above, was willful or, at the very least, reckless, constituting willfulness. 56. As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or reckless failure to adopt and maintain 16 reasonable procedures to limit the furnishing of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII to the purposes listed under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ PII was made accessible to unauthorized third parties in the public domain, compromised, and stolen. Plaintiff suffered individual harm as a result of Defendant’s willful and/or reckless violations of FCRA. 57. As a further direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s willful and/or reckless violations of FCRA, as described above, Plaintiff and the other Class members were (and continue to be) injured and have suffered (and will continue to suffer) the damages described in detail above. 58. Plaintiff and the other Class members, therefore, are entitled to compensation for their actual damages or statutory damages of not less than $100, and not more than $1,000, each, as well as attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). 59. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 54 as if fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant negligently failed to adopt and maintain reasonable procedures designed to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the purposes listed under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 61. Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ PII was wrongfully disseminated to the public as a direct and foreseeable result of Defendant’s failure to adopt and maintain such reasonable procedures. 62. As a direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s negligent violations of FCRA, as described above, Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ PII was made accessible to unauthorized third parties in the public domain, compromised, and stolen. Plaintiff suffered 17 individual harm as a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of FCRA. 63. As a further direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s negligent violations of FCRA, as described above, Plaintiff and the other Class members were (and continue to be) injured and have suffered (and will continue to suffer) the damages described in detail above. 64. Plaintiff and the other Class members, therefore, are entitled to compensation for their actual damages, as well as attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a). 65. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44 as if fully set forth herein. 66. Pursuant to 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1002, the obligations imposed by Article XL of the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection portion of the Illinois Insurance Code applies to “insurance institutions . . . [that] collect, receive or maintain information in connection with insurance transactions.” Defendant here is an “insurance institution” for purposes of the Code. 67. Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII made available to the public fall within the definition of “Personal Information,” as defined in 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1003, and as used in Article XL of the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection portion of the Illinois Insurance Code. 68. An insurance institution shall not disclose any personal information about an individual collected or received in connection with an insurance transaction without a valid written request submitted by an authorized individual and/or agency, subject to exceptions inapplicable here. 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1014. 18 69. Defendant, by allowing Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII to become accessible and available via the Internet, as described above, violated the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection portion of the Illinois Insurance Code, because the Security Breach was not pursuant to a valid, written request submitted by an authorized individual and/or agency and/or in accordance with 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1014. 70. As a result of Defendant’s violation of Article XL of the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection portion of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/Art. XL), Plaintiff and the Class suffered and will continue to suffer actual damages. 71. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44 and 65 through 70 as if fully set forth herein. 72. Defendant’s violation of Article XL of the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection portion of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/Art. XL), resulted in injury to Plaintiff and the Class. 73. Article XL of the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection portion of the Illinois Insurance Code was enacted in order to, inter alia, limit the disclosure of information collected in connection with insurance transactions. 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1001. 74. The statute was designed to protect the class of persons to which Plaintiff and the Class members belong against the unauthorized disclosure of their PII. 75. As a result of Defendant’s violation of Article XL of the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection portion of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/Art. XL), Plaintiff and the Class suffered and will continue to suffer actual damages. 19 76. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44 as if fully set forth herein. 77. Defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable care and caution in storing and maintaining Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII. 78. Defendant violated its duty by failing to adopt and maintain reasonable and appropriate safeguards and security protocols to ensure that Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII was not disclosed to unauthorized third parties. 79. Defendant’s wrongful actions and inaction constituted negligence. 80. It was reasonably foreseeable that Defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care and caution in safeguarding and protecting Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII would result in an unauthorized third party gaining access to such information for an unlawful purpose. 81. Plaintiff and Class members were (and continue to be) damaged as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s failure to secure and protect their PII. 82. But for Defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care, Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ PII would not have been stored on an unsecure Internet server and made publicly available for approximately 16 months, and Plaintiff and Class members would not have suffered damages relating to same. 83. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44 as if fully set forth herein. 84. Plaintiff and Class members placed their trust and confidence upon Defendant with regard to the handling, maintenance, and disposition of their confidential PII. Therefore, 20 Defendant owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and Class members to secure and protect the PII with which it was entrusted. 85. Defendant breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff and Class members by failing to safeguard and ensure the confidentiality and security of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII. 86. As a proximate result of Defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty, Plaintiff and Class members suffered and will continue to suffer actual damages. 87. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44 as if fully set forth herein. 88. Plaintiff and members of the Class entered into contracts with Combined Insurance; Combined Insurance received insurance premiums in exchange for providing insurance coverage and its promises to protect their PII. 89. Combined Insurance promised to protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII in its written “Privacy Pledge” to its customers. In a document titled “Our Privacy Pledge to You,” Combined Insurance states that “we maintain physical, electronic and procedural safeguards that comply with federal regulations to guard your personal information.” It also states that “we restrict access to your personal information to those employees who need to know such information.” 90. Combined Insurance did not maintain physical, electronic and procedural safeguards in compliance with federal regulations, including FCRA, and it did not restrict access to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ personal information to those employees who need to know such information, as Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII was left unsecured and unprotected for approximately 16 months on a server accessible to anyone with an Internet connection. 21 91. Defendant’s failure to meet these promises and obligations in its “Privacy Pledge” constitutes a breach of contract. 92. As a result of Defendant’s breach of contract, Plaintiff and the Class suffered and will continue to suffer actual damages. 93. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44 as if fully set forth herein. 94. Plaintiff pleads this count in the alternative to the breach of contract count. 95. In order to sign up for Defendant’s insurance, Plaintiff and Class members provided their PII to Defendant. 96. In exchange for insurance coverage for Plaintiff and Class members, Defendant received insurance premiums. 97. By Plaintiff and Class members providing their PII and Defendant accepting their PII and insurance premiums, the parties entered into implied contracts that Defendant would safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII. 98. Defendant breached the implied contract, because it failed to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII, as the PII was left unsecured and unprotected for approximately 16 months on a server accessible to anyone with an Internet connection. 99. As a result of Defendant’s breach of implied contract, Plaintiff and Class members suffered and will continue to suffer actual damages. BREACH OF CONTRACT BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY INVASION OF PRIVACY BY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS 107. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44 as if fully set forth herein. 108. Defendant’s failure to secure and protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII directly resulted in the public disclosure of such private information. For approximately 16 months, Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII was openly posted on the Internet or otherwise freely available to the public over the Internet. 23 109. Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII is not of a legitimate public concern; publicity of their PII would be, is, and will continue to be offensive to reasonable people. 110. Plaintiff and Class members were (and continue to be) damaged as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s invasion of their privacy by publicly disclosing their PII. Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to actual damages directly and/or proximately caused by the public disclosure of private information, and nominal damages. 111. Defendant’s wrongful actions and inaction (as described above) constituted (and continue to constitute) an invasion of Plaintiff’s and Class members’ privacy by publicly disclosing their PII. NEGLIGENCE PER SE NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT NEGLIGENCE UNJUST ENRICHMENT 100. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 44 as if fully set forth herein. 22 101. Plaintiff pleads this count in the alternative to the breach of contract and breach of implied contract counts. 102. A monetary benefit was conferred on Defendant in that it was paid premiums for the insurance policies under which Plaintiff and Class members were, and in some cases still are, covered. A portion of the insurance premiums paid was to fund adequate, reasonable, and proper measures of PII protection, which Defendant had a duty to provide but failed to provide, to the detriment of Plaintiff and Class members. 103. Defendant has received, and in some cases continues to receive, the payment of insurance premiums for insurance coverage for Plaintiff and Class members. 104. A portion of the insurance premiums paid were for the costs of data security and management in accordance with the law and industry standards. 105. It would be unjust for Defendant to retain the portion of the insurance premiums paid for the costs of data security and management, because Defendant failed to secure and protect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ PII in accordance with the law and industry standards. 106. As a result of Defendant’s unjust enrichment, Plaintiff and the Class suffered and will continue to suffer actual damages. VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS INSURANCE CODE WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

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