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(Against All Defendants For Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder) (Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants) 19. Oracle develops, manufactures, markets, sells, hosts, and supports database and middleware software, application software, cloud infrastructure, hardware systems, and related services worldwide. Oracle is among the world’s largest software makers by revenue. Through its Oracle Cloud offerings, the Company purports to be a leader in the core technologies of cloud information technology environments, including database and middleware software as well as enterprise applications, virtualization, clustering, large-scale systems management and related infrastructure. The Company’s Oracle Cloud offerings include SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS offerings. 20. Oracle was founded in 1977 and is headquartered in Redwood City, California. False and Misleading Statements were Issued During the Class Period 36. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Oracle securities were actively traded on the NYSE. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by Oracle or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 37. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 38. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff have no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 40. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 41. Plaintiffs will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud-on- the-market doctrine in that:  Defendants made public misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts during the Class Period;  the omissions and misrepresentations were material;  Oracle securities are traded in an efficient market;  the Company’s shares were liquid and traded with moderate to heavy volume during the Class Period;  the Company traded on the NYSE and was covered by multiple analysts;  the misrepresentations and omissions alleged would tend to induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of the Company’s securities; and  Plaintiffs and members of the Class purchased, acquired and/or sold Oracle securities between the time the Defendants failed to disclose or misrepresented material facts and the time the true facts were disclosed, without knowledge of the omitted or misrepresented facts. 42. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 44. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 45. This Count is asserted against Defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 46. During the Class Period, Defendants engaged in a plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, pursuant to which they knowingly or recklessly engaged in acts, transactions, practices and courses of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; made various untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. Such scheme was intended to, and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; (ii) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of Oracle securities; and (iii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase or otherwise acquire Oracle securities and options at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, Defendants, and each of them, took the actions set forth herein. 48. By virtue of their positions at Oracle, Defendants had actual knowledge of the materially false and misleading statements and material omissions alleged herein and intended thereby to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, Defendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts as would reveal the materially false and misleading nature of the statements made, although such facts were readily available to Defendants. Said acts and omissions of Defendants were committed willfully or with reckless disregard for the truth. In addition, each Defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that material facts were being misrepresented or omitted as described above. 49. Information showing that Defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth is peculiarly within Defendants’ knowledge and control. As the senior managers and/or directors of Oracle, the Individual Defendants had knowledge of the details of Oracle’s internal affairs. 51. During the Class Period, Oracle securities were traded on an active and efficient market. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, relying on the materially false and misleading statements described herein, which the Defendants made, issued or caused to be disseminated, or relying upon the integrity of the market, purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Oracle securities at prices artificially inflated by Defendants’ wrongful conduct. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class known the truth, they would not have purchased or otherwise acquired said securities, or would not have purchased or otherwise acquired them at the inflated prices that were paid. At the time of the purchases and/or acquisitions by Plaintiff and the Class, the true value of Oracle securities was substantially lower than the prices paid by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. The market price of Oracle securities declined sharply upon public disclosure of the facts alleged herein to the injury of Plaintiff and Class members. 52. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants knowingly or recklessly, directly or indirectly, have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 53. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases, acquisitions and sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure that the Company had been disseminating misrepresented financial statements to the investing public. 55. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of Oracle, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of Oracle’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information about Oracle’s misstatement of income and expenses and false financial statements. 56. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Oracle’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by Oracle which had become materially false or misleading. 57. Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Individual Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and public filings which Oracle disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period concerning Oracle’s results of operations. Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants exercised their power and authority to cause Oracle to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein. The Individual Defendants therefore, were “controlling persons” of Oracle within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In this capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct alleged which artificially inflated the market price of Oracle securities. 59. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by Oracle. Background

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CREF SOCIAL CHOICE ACCOUNT; TIAA GLOBAL PUBLIC INVESTMENTS, MBS LLC; TIAA-CREF DUTY OF INDEPENDENCE (In The Right Of The Trustee And On Behalf Of The Trusts Against U.S. Bank) ...................................................................... 173  FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY – DUTY OF CARE (In The Right Of The Trustee And On Behalf Of The Trusts Against U.S. Bank) ......................................................................................................... 175  FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION NEGLIGENCE – DUTY OF CARE (In The Right Of The Trustee And On Behalf Of The Trusts Against U.S. Bank) ............................... 177  INSURANCE COMPANY; STONEBRIDGE RE COMPANY; TRANSAMERICA INTERNATIONAL INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO; PIMCO FUNDS: PRIVATE ACCOUNT PORTFOLIO SERIES LONG DURATION OF POST-DEFAULT DUTY OF INDEPENDENCE (In The Right Of The Trustee And On Behalf Of The Trusts Against U.S. Bank) .................................... 180  XIX.  CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................... 181  XX.  PORTFOLIO SERIES MORTGAGE PORTFOLIO; PIMCO FUNDS: PRIVATE ACCOUNT PORTFOLIO SERIES REAL Trustee And On Behalf Of The Trusts Against U.S. Bank) ........................................... 162  SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT OF 1939, 53 STAT. 1171 (In The Right Of The Trustee And On Behalf Of The Trusts Against U.S. Bank) ...................................................................... 170  VII.  BACKGROUND – THE TRUSTEE’S ROLE AS GATEKEEPER IN THE SECURITIZATION PROCESS............................................................................... 39 

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(Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) 1.pdf. See also The Spectranetics Corp., SEC Staff Comment Letter 1 (July 18, 2017) (“Item 4. The Solicitation or Recommendation Certain Spectranetics Forecasts, page 39 . . . [P]rovide the reconciliation required under Rule 100(a) of Regulation 22. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of Neon (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 24. Neon is a clinical-stage immune-oncology company and a leader in the field of neoantigen-target therapies, dedicated to transforming the treatment of cancer by directing the immune system towards neoantigens. 26. Neon is well-positioned for financial growth and the Merger Consideration fails to adequately compensate the Company’s shareholders. It is imperative that Defendants disclose the material information they have omitted from the F-4, discussed in detail below, so that the Company’s shareholders can properly assess the fairness of the Merger Consideration for themselves and make an informed decision concerning whether or not to vote in favor of the Proposed Transaction. 27. If the false and/or misleading F-4 is not remedied and the Proposed Transaction is consummated, Defendants will directly and proximately have caused damages and actual economic loss (i.e. the difference between the value to be received as a result of the Proposed Transaction and the true value of their shares prior to the merger), in an amount to be determined at trial, to Plaintiff and the Class. II. The Materially Incomplete and Misleading F-4 29. A company’s financial forecasts are material information a board relies on to determine whether to approve a merger transaction and recommend that shareholders vote to approve the transaction. Here, the F-4 discloses that “in connection with the exploration of strategic alternatives as described in this proxy statement/prospectus, including the proposals from BioNTech, Neon management prepared certain non-public, unaudited projections of financial performance for Neon for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2020 through 2044, or the Management Projections, based on its view of the prospects of Neon, and risk-adjusted these projections for Neon’s principal programs consisting of (i) Neon’s two lead T cell programs, NEO- PTC-01, or PTC, and NEO-STC-01, or STC, and, together with PTC, the T cell Therapies, and (ii) Neon’s two vaccine programs, NEO-PV-01, or PV, and NEO-SV-01, or SV, and, together with PV, the Vaccines.” F-4 210. The F-4 also discloses projections for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2045 through 2050, which represent extrapolations by Duff & Phelps. Id. 30. When soliciting proxies from shareholders, a company must furnish the information found in Schedule 14A (codified as 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101). Item 14 of Schedule 14A sets forth the information a company must disclose when soliciting proxies regarding mergers and acquisitions. In regard to financial information, companies are required to disclose “financial information required by Article 11 of Regulation S-X[,]” which includes Item 10 of Regulation S- K. See Item 14(7)(b)(11) of 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101. 32. In order to facilitate investor understanding of the Company’s financial projections, the SEC provides companies with certain factors “to be considered in formulating and disclosing such projections[,]” including: (i) When management chooses to include its projections in a Commission filing, the disclosures accompanying the projections should facilitate investor understanding of the basis for and limitations of projections. In this regard investors should be cautioned against attributing undue certainty to management’s assessment, and the Commission believes that investors would be aided by a statement indicating management’s intention regarding the furnishing of updated projections. The Commission also believes that investor understanding would be enhanced by disclosure of the assumptions which in management’s opinion are most significant to the projections or are the key factors upon which the financial results of the enterprise depend and encourages disclosure of assumptions in a manner that will provide a framework for analysis of the projection. (ii) Management also should consider whether disclosure of the accuracy or inaccuracy of previous projections would provide investors with important insights into the limitations of projections. In this regard, consideration should be given to presenting the projections in a format that will facilitate subsequent analysis of the reasons for differences between actual and forecast results. An important benefit may arise from the systematic analysis of variances between projected and actual results on a continuing basis, since such disclosure may highlight for investors the most significant risk and profit-sensitive areas in a business operation. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3) (emphasis added). 33. Here, Neon’s shareholders would clearly find complete and non-misleading financial projections material in deciding how to vote, considering that the Board specifically relied on the financial forecasts in reaching its decision to, among other things, approve the Merger Agreement and the transactions contemplated by it. F-4 208-09. 35. The F-4 discloses that “in connection with the exploration of strategic alternatives as described in this proxy statement/prospectus, including the proposals from BioNTech, Neon management prepared certain non-public, unaudited projections of financial performance for Neon for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2020 through 2044, or the Management Projections, based on its view of the prospects of Neon, and risk-adjusted these projections for Neon’s principal programs consisting of (i) Neon’s two lead T cell programs, NEO-PTC-01, or PTC, and NEO- STC-01, or STC, and, together with PTC, the T cell Therapies, and (ii) Neon’s two vaccine programs, NEO-PV-01, or PV, and NEO-SV-01, or SV, and, together with PV, the Vaccines.” Id. at 210. The F-4 also discloses projections for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2045 through 2050, which represent extrapolations by Duff & Phelps. Id 36. The F-4 goes on to disclose, inter alia, Neon’s forecasted values for projected non- GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) financial metrics for 2020 through 2050 for (1) EBITDA, (2) Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, (3) Net Operating Profit After Tax, and (4) Free Cash Flow, but fails to provide (i) the line items used to calculate these non-GAAP metrics or (ii) a reconciliation of these non-GAAP projections to the most comparable GAAP measures. Id. at 213. 38. The F-4 defines Free Cash Flow as “Neon’s free cash flow before interest payments and is calculated as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, less capital expenditures, less increases in net working capital and less tax expense.” Id. at 213 n.2. Nevertheless, the F-4 fails to reconcile Free Cash Flow to its most comparable GAAP measure or disclose the line items used to calculate Free Cash Flow, rendering the F-4 materially false and/or misleading. Id. at 213. 39. The F-4 fails to define Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, reconcile Earnings Before Interest and Taxes to its most comparable GAAP measure or disclose the line items used to calculate it, rendering the F-4 materially false and/or misleading. Id. 40. Similarly, the F-4 fails to define Net Operating Profit After Tax, reconcile Net Operating Profit After Tax or disclose the line items used to calculate it, rendering the F-4 Materially false and/or misleading. Id. 41. Thus, the F-4’s disclosure of these non-GAAP financial forecasts provides an incomplete and materially misleading understanding of the Company’s future financial prospects and the inputs and assumptions for which those prospects are based upon. It is clear that those inputs and assumptions were in fact forecasted and utilized in calculating the non-GAAP measures disclosed and relied on by the Board to recommend the Proposed Transaction in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. 43. As such, this information must be disclosed in order to cure the materially misleading disclosures regarding both the financial projections developed by the Company as well as the projections relied upon by the Company’s financial advisors. The Financial Projections Violate Regulation G 44. The SEC has acknowledged that potential “misleading inferences” are exacerbated when the disclosed information contains non-GAAP financial measures1 and adopted Regulation G2 “to ensure that investors and others are not misled by the use of non-GAAP financial measures.”3 46. Moreover, the SEC has publicly stated that the use of non-GAAP financial measures can be misleading.5 Former SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White has stated that the frequent use by publicly traded companies of unique company-specific non-GAAP financial measures (as Neon included in the F-4 here) implicates the centerpiece of the SEC’s disclosures regime: In too many cases, the non-GAAP information, which is meant to supplement the GAAP information, has become the key message to investors, crowding out and effectively supplanting the GAAP presentation. Jim Schnurr, our Chief Accountant, Mark Kronforst, our Chief Accountant in the Division of Corporation Finance and I, along with other members of the staff, have spoken out frequently about our concerns to raise the awareness of boards, management and investors. And last month, the staff issued guidance addressing a number of troublesome practices which can make non-GAAP disclosures misleading: the lack of equal or greater prominence for GAAP measures; exclusion of normal, recurring cash operating expenses; individually tailored non-GAAP revenues; lack of consistency; cherry- picking; and the use of cash per share data. I strongly urge companies to carefully consider this guidance and revisit their approach to non-GAAP disclosures. I also urge again, as I did last December, that appropriate controls be considered and that audit committees carefully oversee their company’s use of non-GAAP measures and disclosures.6 48. Compliance with Regulation G is mandatory under Section 14(a), and non- compliance constitutes a violation of Section 14(a). Thus, in order to bring the F-4 into compliance with Regulation G, Defendants must provide a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures to their respective most comparable GAAP financial measures. 7 Available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1442596/000110465916089133/ filename1.htm. 8 Available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1442596/000000000016062042/ filename1.pdf. 9 Available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1266719/000114420411046281/ filename1.htm. See also Actel Corporation, SEC Staff Comment Letter 2 (Oct. 13, 2010) (“Opinion of Actel’s Financial Advisor, page 24 . . . This section includes non-GAAP financial measures. Please revise to provide the disclosure required by Rule 100 of Regulation G.”), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/907687/000000000010060087/filename 62. Section 14(a)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any [F-4] or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1). 63. As set forth above, the F-4 omits information required by SEC Regulation G, 17 C.F.R. § 244.100, which independently violates Section 14(a). SEC Regulation G, among other things, requires an issuer that chooses to disclose a non-GAAP measure to provide a presentation of the “most directly comparable” GAAP measure and a reconciliation “by schedule or other clearly understandable method” of the non-GAAP measure to the “most comparable” GAAP measure. 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(a). 64. The failure to reconcile the non-GAAP financial measures included in the F-4 violates Regulation G and constitutes a violation of Section 14(a). 66. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 67. SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes in registration statements that contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading[.]” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a). 68. Regulation G similarly prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes by “mak[ing] public a non-GAAP financial measure that, taken together with the information accompanying that measure . . . contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the presentation of the non-GAAP financial measure . . . not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(b) (emphasis added). 69. Defendants have issued the F-4 with the intention of soliciting shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the F-4, which fails to provide critical information regarding, amongst other things, the financial projections for the Company. 71. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the F-4 is materially misleading and omits material facts that are necessary to render it not misleading. The Individual Defendants undoubtedly reviewed and relied upon the omitted information identified above in connection with their decision to approve and recommend the Proposed Transaction. 72. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the material information identified above has been omitted from the F-4, rendering the sections of the F-4 identified above to be materially incomplete and misleading. 73. The Individual Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and reviewing the F-4. The preparation of a registration statement by corporate insiders containing materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence. The Individual Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the F-4 or failing to notice the material omissions in the F-4 upon reviewing it, which they were required to do carefully as the Company’s directors. Indeed, the Individual Defendants were intricately involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement and the preparation of the Company’s financial projections. 74. Neon is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’ negligence in preparing and reviewing the F-4. 75. The misrepresentations and omissions in the F-4 are material to Plaintiff and the Class, who will be deprived of their right to cast an informed vote if such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed Transaction. 77. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 78. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Neon within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as directors and/or officers of Neon, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the F-4 filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 79. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the F-4 and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 81. In addition, as the F-4 sets forth at length, and as described herein, the Individual Defendants were involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger Agreement. The F-4 purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants reviewed and considered. The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their input on the content of those descriptions. 82. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 83. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed. I. The Proposed Transaction

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12. HCI provides information technology educational services for the healthcare industry throughout the United States, including New York. 13. Plaintiff Gray worked as an ATE for HCI during the statutory period and was assigned to work at Mt. Sinai Hospital in New York, NY from January 2018 to March 2018, the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, MN from March 2018 to April 2018, Deaconess Hospital in Evansville, IN in May 2018, and BJC Hospital in St. Louis, MO in June 2018. 14. Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated ATEs’ primary duty was to provide assistance to healthcare provider staff in using healthcare-related software. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs provided “hands-off” interaction with the healthcare provider entity’s employees to help them use such software. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs had little discretion in the performance of their job and worked within closely-prescribed limits provided by HCI. More complex issues, such as technical issues with the software, were escalated to the next level of employees. 15. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs were paid solely on a salary basis. 16. HCI unlawfully classified Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs as “exempt” from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 17. Throughout the statutory period, Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated ATEs’ primary duty was not related to the management of the business operations of Defendant or its customers. 19. Throughout the statutory period, Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated ATEs’ primary duty was not the performance of work requiring advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning. 20. Throughout the statutory period, Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs did not perform work requiring invention, imagination, originality, or talent in a recognized field of artistic or creative endeavor. 21. Throughout the statutory period, Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs were not employed as computer systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, or similarly skilled computer employees. 22. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs did not perform job duties that would otherwise permit HCI to lawfully classify them as exempt under the FLSA. 23. Despite the fact that Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs did not meet any test for exemption, Defendant failed to pay them the requisite overtime rate of 1½ times their regular rate for hours worked over 40 per week. 24. HCI encouraged, required and/or permitted Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs to work more than 40 hours per week. Specifically, HCI regularly required Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs to work 12-hour shifts, 6 or 7 days per week. For example, during the workweek of March 12, 2018 to March 18, 2018, Plaintiff Gray worked approximately 84 hours but did not receive overtime compensation at 1½ times their regular rate for hours worked beyond 40 in that workweek. 26. Upon information and belief, Defendant did not inquire into whether its compensation practices with respect to Plaintiff and ATEs complied with the law. Defendant did not take affirmative steps to ensure that its compensation practices with respect to Plaintiff and ATEs complied with the law. 27. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs were subject to Defendant’s uniform policies and practices and were victims of Defendant’s schemes to deprive them of overtime compensation. As a result of Defendant’s improper and willful failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs in accordance with the requirements of the FLSA, Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs suffered lost wages and other damages. 28. Plaintiff brings Count I of this lawsuit pursuant to § 216(b) of the FLSA as a collective action on behalf of herself and the following class of potential opt-in litigants (the “FLSA Collective”): All individuals who currently work, or have worked, for Defendant as an ATE or any other similarly situated, salary-paid position during the applicable statute of limitations of period. 29. Plaintiff reserves the right to re-define the FLSA Collective prior to notice or collective certification, and thereafter, as necessary. 31. Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs worked in excess of 40 hours in any given workweek. Nonetheless, Defendant has operated under a scheme to deprive Plaintiff and the other members of the FLSA Collective of overtime compensation by failing to properly compensate them for all overtime worked. 32. Plaintiff also seeks to maintain this action as a class action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b), on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated ATEs who worked for Defendant in New York, Indiana, Minnesota, or Missouri, at any time within each respective state law’s applicable statute of limitations period.1 33. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs all worked under common employment policies, were subject to the same compensation scheme, and were subject to the same practices challenged in this action as described above. Class Definition 35. More than 40 ATEs were employed by Defendant who were subject to the same practices challenged in this action as alleged above and not paid overtime compensation for all time worked in excess of 40 in given workweeks. Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the numerosity requirements as each State Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 36. Members of each proposed State Class can be identified and located using Defendant’s payroll and personnel records. State Class members may be informed of the pendency of this action by direct mail, electronic mail, text message, and/or published and broadcast notice. Common Questions of Fact or Law 37. There are questions of fact and law common to each State Class member which predominate over questions affecting only individual members, if any. Plaintiff, the members of each State Class, and Defendant have a commonality of interest in the subject matter and the remedy sought. 38. If individual actions were required to be brought by each member of each State Class injured or affected, the result would be a multiplicity of actions, creating a hardship to the Court, the State Classes, and to the Defendant. Accordingly, a class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit and distribution of the common fund to which each State Class is entitled. Typicality 40. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of each State Class she seeks to represent because she is a member of each State Class, and her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of each State Class she seeks to represent. The interests of each State Class member will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her undersigned counsel. Plaintiff has hired competent attorneys who are experienced in class action litigation of this type and who are committed to the prosecution of this Action. Superiority 41. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of the parties is impracticable. Class action treatment will allow a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense if these claims were brought individually. 42. Moreover, as the damages suffered by each State Class member may be relatively small, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult for each State Class member to bring individual claims. 44. Plaintiff reasserts and reallege the allegations set forth in each of the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 45. Count I arises from Defendant’s violation of the FLSA, for its failure to pay overtime wages earned by Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs. 46. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 47. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an enterprise within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). 48. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(1) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1), in that the enterprise has had employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person and in that the enterprise has had and has an annual gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately stated). 50. Throughout the relevant period, Defendant violated the FLSA by routinely suffering or permitting Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs to work overtime hours per week without paying them overtime wages for these hours. 51. Throughout the relevant period, Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs worked in excess of 40 hours per week but were not paid an overtime premium of 1½ times their regular hourly rate for those additional hours. 52. Plaintiff and other ATEs are similarly-situated individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 53. The foregoing actions of Defendant violated the FLSA. 54. The conduct alleged above reduced HCI’s labor and payroll costs at the expense of Plaintiff and ATEs who should have received overtime payment for overtime hours worked. 55. Defendant has acted willfully and has either known that its conduct violated the FLSA or has shown reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct violated the FLSA. Defendant has not acted in good faith with respect to the conduct alleged herein. 56. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs were subject to HCI’s uniform policies and practices and were victims of HCI’s schemes to deprive them of overtime compensation. As a result of HCI’s improper and willful failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs in accordance with the requirements of the FLSA, Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs suffered lost wages and other damages. 58. Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs for actual damages, liquidated damages and equitable relief, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses. 59. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs are also entitled to injunctive relief to prevent Defendant from continuing its violation of the FLSA and other appropriate collective- wide injunctive relief. 60. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 61. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs that worked in New York during the applicable statute of limitations period (the “New York Class”) meet the requirements for certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 62. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Gray was employed by Defendant within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651. 63. Under New York law, an employee must be paid overtime, equal to 1½ times the employee’s regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week in the manner and methods provided by the FLSA. 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2. 64. By engaging in the above-alleged conduct, Defendant has failed to pay members of the New York Class proper overtime compensation as required by the New York Labor Law. 66. The conduct alleged above reduced HCI’s labor and payroll costs at the expense of Plaintiff and ATEs who should have received overtime payment for overtime hours worked. 67. Defendant has acted willfully and has either known that its conduct violated the New York Labor Law or have shown a reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct violated the New York Labor Law. Defendant has not acted in good faith with respect to the conduct alleged herein. 68. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the New York Labor Law, Gray and other members of the New York Class have suffered harm and are entitled to recoup their unpaid wages and other losses in an amount to be determined at trial, along with liquidated damages, interest and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs above. 70. Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class meet the requirements for certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 72. Pursuant to New York Labor Law art. VI, § 195(3), as of April 9, 2011, all employers are required to provide employees with a written statement with the payment of wages which lists, inter alia, the number of regular and overtime hours worked and overtime rate of pay. 73. Defendant willfully and systematically failed to provide Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class with the required notices or written statements pursuant to New York Labor Law art. VI, § 195(1) and (3). 74. Accordingly, Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class are entitled to recover from Defendant’s damages pursuant to New York Labor Law art. VI, § 198. 75. Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class also seek injunctive relief precluding Defendant from continued violations of these laws and affirmatively mandating its compliance with the provisions of the New York Labor Law. 76. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs above. 77. Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class meet the requirements for certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 79. Defendant has accepted and received the benefits of the work performed by Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the Class. 80. It is inequitable and unjust for Defendant to reap the benefits of Plaintiff’s and other members of the New York Class’s labor, which includes unpaid overtime hours and the pay due for spread of hours. 81. Plaintiff and other members of the New York Class are entitled to relief for this unjust enrichment in an amount equal to the benefits unjustly retained by Defendant, plus interest on these amounts. 82. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff and other similarly situated ATEs that worked in Indiana during the applicable statute of limitations period (the “Indiana Class”) meet the requirements for certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 84. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Gray was employed by Defendant within the meaning of IWPS §§ 22-2-2-3. 86. Additionally, under Indiana law, an employer must compensate their employees for all amounts due. Employers that fail to make payments of wages for all amounts due, such as withheld overtime compensation, shall be liable to the employee for the amount of unpaid wages, and if employer does not act in good faith, the court shall order liquidated damages equal to two (2) times the amount of wages due to the employee. IWPS § 22-2-5-2. 87. By engaging in the above-alleged conduct, Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiff and other members of the Indiana Class proper overtime compensation as required by the IWPS. 88. Gray and other members of the Indiana Class are victims of a uniform company- wide compensation policy. This uniform policy, in violation of the IWPS, has been applied to all members of the Indiana Class, and has deprived them of earned overtime compensation. 89. Defendant has acted willfully and has either known that its conduct violated the IWPS or has shown a reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct violated the IWPS. Defendant has not acted in good faith with respect to the conduct alleged herein. 90. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the IWPS, Gray and other members of the Indiana Class have suffered harm and are entitled to recoup their unpaid wages and other losses in an amount to be determined at trial, along with liquidated damages, interest and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 92. Plaintiff and other members of the Indiana Class meet the requirements for certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 93. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant, by its policies and actions, benefited from, and increased its profits by failing to pay Plaintiff and other members of the Indiana Class all wages due for work performed, including but not limited to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 94. Defendant has accepted and received the benefits of the work performed by Plaintiff and other members of the Indiana Class at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the Indiana Class. 95. It is inequitable and unjust for Defendant to reap the benefits of Plaintiff’s and other members of the Indiana Class’s labor, which includes unpaid overtime hours. 96. Plaintiff and other members of the Indiana Class are entitled to relief for this unjust enrichment in an amount equal to the benefits unjustly retained by Defendant, plus interest on these amounts. 97. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 99. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Gray was employed by Defendant within the meaning of the MFLSA §§ 177.23(5)-(7). 100. Under Minnesota law, an employee must be paid overtime compensation, equal to 1½ times the employee’s regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of 48 per week. INDIANA COMMON LAW UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND/OR QUANTUM MERUIT INDIANA WAGE PAYMENT STATUTE SECTION 22-2-2-4 DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME UNDER INDIANA LAW MINNESOTA FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT SECTION 177.25 DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME UNDER MINNESOTA LAW MISSOURI COMMON LAW UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND/OR QUANTUM MERUIT 119. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs above. 120. Plaintiff and other members of the Missouri Class meet the requirements for certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 121. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant, by its policies and actions, benefited from, and increased its profits by failing to pay Plaintiff and other members of the Missouri Class all wages due for work performed, including but not limited to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 122. Defendant has accepted and received the benefits of the work performed by Plaintiff and other members of the Class at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the Missouri Class. 123. It is inequitable and unjust for Defendant to reap the benefits of Plaintiff’s and other members of the Missouri Class’s labor, which includes unpaid overtime hours. 124. Plaintiff and other members of the Missouri Class are entitled to relief for this unjust enrichment in an amount equal to the benefits unjustly retained by Defendant, plus interest on these amounts. NEW YORK LABOR LAW SECTION 195 DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE COMPLETE WRITTEN STATEMENTS CONCURRENT WITH THE PAYMENT OF WAGES NEW YORK LABOR ARTICLE 6 AND 19 FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME UNDER NEW YORK LABOR LAW NEW YORK COMMON LAW UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND/OR QUANTUM MERUIT THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT SECTION 207 DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO PAY EARNED OVERTIME

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14. HII operates as an outbound call center and lead generator for Defendant Teladoc. 16. If a consumer is interested, HII (on behalf of Defendant Teladoc) will send the consumer a Teladoc contract to register for paid services, including a written agreement to sign up with Teladoc. 17. The agreement is between the consumer and Defendant Teladoc directly. 18. HII was given actual and apparent authority by Defendant Teladoc to bind the consumer with and was given the apparent authority to represent to others that they had partnered with Defendant Teladoc. 19. In addition, Defendant Teladoc ratified HII and its lead generators actions by accepting the benefits from HII and its lead generators telemarketing practice. 20. Defendant Teladoc knew or should have known that HII and its lead generators were making calls on Teladoc’s behalf and for their benefit in violation of the TCPA. 21. Defendant Teladoc should not be allowed to retain all of the financial windfalls of its unlawful telemarketing activities without being held liable for the violations of the TCPA. 23. Despite this warning, Defendant Teladoc has partnered with HII to generate leads for its own profits. 24. By the time Plaintiff Hale and Plaintiff Cline received calls by HII or its HII’s lead generators in March 2019, HII had already been sued specifically for Telephone Consumer Protection Act violations approximately 10 times. This was public record and Defendant Teladoc knew or should have known about HII’s past allegations of violating the TCPA when Defendant Teladoc contracted with HII to make telemarketing calls on its behalf. 25. Teladoc’s telemarketing partner HII has had other troubling lawsuits related to its telemarketing, and the telemarketing of its lead generators, who sell products on behalf of Defendant Teladoc. On November 2, 2018, the FTC posted a press release announcing that a Federal judge temporarily shut down Simple Health, a lead generator of HII, who had collected more than $100 million in revenue by “preying on Americans in search of health insurance, selling these consumers worthless plans that left tens of thousands of people uninsured.”2 On June 6, 2019 HII announced that it planned to acquire Simple Health. Multiple states have filed cease and desist orders against HII including the State of Montana in 2016,3 the State of Michigan,4 and the State of Arkansas.5 The State of Florida at one time denied HII’s licensure as a third party administrator.6 7 27. These actions against Teladoc’s telemarketer HII and its telemarketers were all brought prior to the calls received by the Plaintiffs on behalf of Defendant Teladoc. 28. Despite these other prior TCPA lawsuits and the multiple state investigations and litigation, Defendant Teladoc chose to contract with HII to sell their products and services on their behalf. 29. HII, as Defendant Teladoc’s lead generator, has a current D- rating with the Better Business Bureau that Defendant Teladoc could have researched before hiring them as their telemarketer.9 31. Defendant Teladoc knew or should have known about the allegations of its telemarketing partner prior to and during the partnership with HII. Legality of Unsolicited Autodialed and Prerecorded Calls 32. As explained by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) in its 2012 order, the TCPA requires “prior express written consent for all autodialed or prerecorded [solicitation] calls to wireless numbers and residential lines.” In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG No. 02-278, FCC 12-21, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2012). 33. Yet in violation of this rule, Defendant Teladoc hired HII and its lead generators who failed to obtain any express written consent from consumers prior to placing prerecorded and/or autodialed solicitation calls. 35. Defendant Teladoc through HII, has failed to implement, supervise, or maintain an internal do not call system whereby consumers would be removed from the calling lists once those consumers ask for the calls to stop. 36. Defendant Teladoc’s agent HII and its lead generators do not have internal Do Not Call policies, pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d), or they do not adhere to these policies. 37. As part of Defendant Teladoc’s screening process, they should have ensured that HII or its affiliates abide by the TCPA and DNC laws and should have regularly maintained sufficient oversight to ensure they were abiding by those laws since they were calling on behalf of the Defendant Teladoc. 38. On October 16, 2008, Hale registered her cellular phone number with the DNC in order to avoid receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls. 39. Hale uses her cell phone for personal use. 40. Hale’s cell phone number is not associated with a business. 41. Hale began receiving prerecorded calls from, or on behalf of Defendant Teladoc on her cellular phone since March of 2018. 43. For example, on March 12, 2019 Hale received 8 calls on behalf of Defendant Teladoc to her cellular phone. 44. Hale answered two calls on March 13, 2019. Hale specifically opted-out of receiving additional calls both by pressing the button that the prerecorded message indicated would end the calls, and also by asking a live agent to stop calling. 45. Hale received calls from or on behalf of Defendant Teladoc from the following numbers on March 13, 2019, 704-550-3351, 704-550-3336, 704-550-3324, 704-550-3299, 704- 550-3294, and 704-550-3279. 46. On March 25, 2019 Hale received calls from (737) 200-7360, (267) 371-5457, (267) 371-5425. 47. Hale has received the following calls from or on behalf of the Defendant: 704- 550—2956, 704-550-2603, 704-550-2145, 704-550-2144, 704-550-2257, 704-550-2275, 704- 550-2309, 704-550-2436, 704-550-2340, 704-550-2473, 704-550-255, 704-550-2544, 704-550- 2573, 704-550-2986, 704-550-3041, 704-550-3042, 704-550-3177, 704-550-3140, 704-550- 3245, 704-550-3245, 704-550-3255, 704-550-3279, 704-550-3294, 704-550-3299, 704-550- 3336, 704-550-3351, 550-2704-550-3153, 704-550-3227, 704-550-3324, 704-550-3356, 704- 550-3227, 704-550-3205, and 704-550-3424. For many of these calls, Hale pressed 0 to be opted out of future calls to no avail. 48. Despite the opt-out requests, Plaintiff Hale continued to receive prerecorded calls. 49. Hale became so frustrated by the intrusive calls, she called Teladoc’s telemarketer HII or its agents on March 26, 2019 twice. In both instances, Hale opted-out of receiving calls any more calls from Defendant Teladoc or its telemarketer HII. 51. On April 2, 2019, Hale answered a prerecorded call on behalf of Defendant Teladoc from the number (267) 756-2353 and pressed the button that would connect her with a live agent. The agent recognized Hale, referring to her by name, and proceeded to provide an insurance quote. 52. Hale acted like she was interested in getting a quote and provided a fake name Tonja Bond in order to find out who was behind the calls she was receiving so she could stop them once and for all. Once the insurance quote was provided, Hale asked to see the plan in writing and received an email directly from Teladoc’s telemarketing partner HII using the d/b/a MyBenefitsKeeper20 containing the insurance plan agreement: 53. The plan Hale was quoted included a $29.99 membership to Teladoc. 54. On July 19, 2019, Hale received a pre-recorded call on her cell phone from (603) 651-3934. The pre-recorded call stated “press 1 for your interest in healthcare, press 9 (or 0) if you want to be placed on the do not call list.” Hale had previously pressed 9 or 0 before for the exact same prerecorded messages to no avail as she had continued to receive calls, so this time she pressed 1 so she could identify this telemarketer in an attempt to finally get the calls to stop. 55. Hale was connected with an agent named Abel Zubair. Hale played along and gave the name Tonya Bond so she could find out which company he worked for or which company he was selling in order to stop the calls. The agent transferred her to the next agent Emily. The call got disconnected. 56. On July 19, 2019 Hale received text messages from 913-380-9221 regarding the disconnected call from Emily. 58. The application in the link from MyBenefitsKeeper contained an application for Teladoc, for a Teladoc plan which costs $19.99 per month. 59. Hale received another call from on July 29, 2019 from 919-379-5214 looking for Tonja, the name Hale gave when investigating the calls. Hale hung up the phone. 60. On August 1, 2019 Hale received a pre-recorded call about health insurance from 636-721-6750 and 708-856-8078. In each pre-recorded message, she pressed the number to be opted out of their system. 61. On August 5, 2019 Hale received a pre-recorded call from (435) 467-3329 about Quality Health Insurance. She pressed the digit to be put on their do not call list. 62. On August 6, 2019 Hale received a pre-recorded call from (435) 816-3042 which solicited for Quality Health Insurance. Hale again pressed the digit to be put on the do not call list. 63. On August 7, 2019 Hale received a pre-recorded call from (509) 547-6124 stating “This is Quality A Plus Insurance. If you are interested in talking to a licensed agent press 8. If not, press 4.” Hale pressed 4. 64. On August 15, 2019 Hale received a pre-recorded call from (954) 918-1345 from Quality Health Insurance. She pressed the digit to be opted out. 65. In total, Hale received well over 35 calls on her cellular phone on behalf of Defendant Teladoc from either HII, or HII’s agents on behalf of Teladoc, despite repeated requests for the calls to stop. 67. On December 22, 2011, Cline registered his cellular phone number with the DNC in order to avoid receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls. 68. Cline uses his cell phone for personal use. His cell phone number is not associated with a business. 69. At the time that Cline received the calls associated with this case, he was located in Pennsylvania but maintains his principal residence in Florida. 70. Cline began receiving autodialed and prerecorded calls from, or on behalf of Defendant Teladoc on his cellular phone in May of 2019. 71. The autodialed and prerecorded calls that Cline received were placed by spoofed numbers that were not in service when called back. 72. For example, on May 21, 2019, Cline received an autodialed call on behalf of Defendant Teladoc using phone number 754-218-9438. 754-218-9438 was not in service when Cline tried to call it back. 73. On June 28, 2019, Cline received another autodialed call on behalf of Defendant using phone number 202-089-4718. 202-089-4718 was not in service when Cline tried to call it back. 74. When Cline would answer the incoming calls, Cline noticed a significant pause before a live agent would come on the line, indicating the use of an autodialer. 75. The agent would begin the solicitation of an insurance quote, at which point Cline would tell the agent to stop calling him. 77. In response to his opt-out claims, the agents would consistently respond by hanging-up the phone. 78. Despite the multiple opt-out requests, Plaintiff Cline continued to receive autodialed and prerecorded calls on his cell phone. 79. On July 16, 2019, Plaintiff Cline received an autodialed call from 918-219-1898 on behalf of Defendant Teladoc to his cell phone using phone number 918-219-1898. Cline answered the call and was connected to a live agent after a significant audible pause, indicative that the call was made using an autodialer. 80. Cline spoke with a live agent and out of frustration and for the purposes of finally identifying the company behind these annoying calls, he decided to play along in order to find out who was calling him. Cline answered some qualifying questions for the purposes of his investigation and was connected with an agent named Barbara. 81. Cline spoke with the insurance agent named Barbara about getting an insurance quote. When he hesitated about purchasing the plan, which was never Cline’s intention in the first place, Barbara provided Cline with her direct phone number: 855-787-8595 extension 5410. 82. When Cline tried calling 918-219-1898 back, it was not in service. 83. On July 24, 2019, Cline called 855-787-8595 extension 5410 in order to determine exactly who was responsible for the multiple calls he was receiving. 84. Cline spoke with Barbara giving her a fake name John Cahill so that he could finally identify which company was part of this scheme. 86. The insurance application specifically lists Teledoc as part of Plaintiff’s intended coverage: 87. In total, Cline received well over 8 known calls on his cellular phone on behalf of Defendant Teladoc by its telemarketer HII, despite not giving them consent to call him and despite his repeated requests for the calls to stop. 88. The unauthorized telephone calls made on behalf of the Defendant, as alleged herein, have harmed both of the Plaintiffs in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy, and disturbed the use and enjoyment of their phones, in addition to the wear and tear on the phones’ hardware (including the phones’ battery) and the consumption of memory on the phones. 91. The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiffs’ attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against the Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. The Plaintiff’s anticipate the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 92. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are many hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 94. Adequate Representation: The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. The Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and the Defendant does not have defenses unique to either of the Plaintiffs. Plaintiff Hale, Plaintiff Cline and their counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel has any interests adverse to the Classes. 96. Plaintiff Hale and Plaintiff Cline repeat and reallege paragraphs 1 through 95 of this Complaint and incorporate them by reference. 97. Defendant Teladoc through its telemarketing partner HII or its agents, transmitted unwanted solicitation telephone calls to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class on behalf of Defendant Teladoc using a prerecorded voice message. 98. These prerecorded voice calls were made en masse without the prior express written consent of the Plaintiffs and the other members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class. 99. Defendant Teladoc, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class are each entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages, and up to $1,500 in damages, for each violation. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for TCPA Claims Arising From Calls Made by or On Behalf of Defendant Teladoc Defendant Teladoc Partnered with Telemarketers to Make Telemarketing Calls on Its Behalf Teladoc through their Marketing Partner HII Repeatedly Called Cline’s Cell Phone Without Hale’s Consent Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Hale and Cline and the Prerecorded No Consent Class) Teladoc through their Marketing Partner HII Repeatedly Called Hale’s Cell Phone Without Hale’s Consent

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60. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 61. Defendant is a “person” and “consumer reporting agency” as defined by sections 1681a(b) and (f) of the FCRA. 62. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by section 1681a(c) of the FCRA. 63. The above-mentioned reports are “consumer reports” as defined by section 1681a(d). 64. Pursuant to sections 1681n and 1681o, Defendant is liable for willfully and negligently violating the FCRA by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom a consumer report relates, in violation of section 1681e(b). ) SOLUTIONS, INC. ) d/b/a FIRST ADVANTAGE )

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a natural makeup and skincare retail company that operates www.weleda.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services, including the ability to browse products for delivery, including makeup and related cosmetic products, find information on promotions, as well as related goods and services available online. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in November 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to browse makeup and cosmetic products available for delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those specific Makeup and cosmetic products available for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 86. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

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10. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or its agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or with an artificial or prerecorded voice, which call was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient’s prior express consent, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 22. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 23. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Classes are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 24. Plaintiff and the The Classes are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 25. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 26. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 27. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the The Classes are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 3. On or about April 13, 2012, at approximately 12:03 p.m. Plaintiff received a telephone call on his cellular telephone from Defendant where Defendant used “an artificial or prerecorded voice” as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). 4. The telephone number Defendant called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1). 5. This telephone call constituted a call that was not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(i). 6. Plaintiff did not provide express consent to Defendant to receive calls on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). 7. Plaintiff did not provide “prior express consent” to Defendant to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone with an artificial or prerecorded voice as proscribed under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 8. This telephone call by Defendant was in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 9. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class and Subclass member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class and Subclass member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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(Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE (Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law) A. VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW 21. Briarwood Manor is “a licensed long term care nursing facility” located in Bellville, Texas that provides long-term care to “residents who are elderly or medically challenged.”2 23. Plaintiff Mertz was employed by Briarwood as a dietary cook from December 1, 2019 until March 2, 2021. 24. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt employees that were (and continue to be) paid by the hour. Specifically, Plaintiff Mertz was paid $13.25 per hour for his work as a dietary cook. 25. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, but were not paid overtime of at least one and one-half their regular rates for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 26. Nor were Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members paid for all hours worked. 27. When calculating Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ hours each pay period, Briarwood systematically deducted (and continues to deduct) time from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily on-the-clock hours in violation of the FLSA and Texas common law. 28. Moreover, Plaintiff Mertz was regularly required to work on his scheduled days off all while off-the-clock, and was only rarely permitted to submit time worked outside of his scheduled hours. 29. Briarwood intentionally deducted hours worked from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members in order to not pay the full and correct amount of overtime. 30. Briarwood’s systematic deduction of time from Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ hours worked for breaks they were unable to fully utilize caused Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members to work hours for which they were (and are) not compensated in violation of the FLSA and Texas common law. 32. Briarwood has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff. 33. Briarwood is aware of its obligation to pay for all hours worked and to pay the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked over forty (40) each week, but has failed to do so. 34. Because Briarwood did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours worked and time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Briarwood’s pay policies and practices violate the FLSA. 35. Because Briarwood did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for all hours they worked on behalf of Briarwood, Briarwood’s pay policies and practices also violate Texas common law. V. 36. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members incorporate by reference all paragraphs and allegations set forth in the statement of facts of this complaint as though fully and completely set forth herein. 37. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 54. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 55. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all of Briarwood’s employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they have not been paid. 56. Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Briarwood’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 57. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 37. 58. Briarwood’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members for all hours worked and overtime compensation at the rates required from the FLSA, results from generally applicable policies and practices of Briarwood and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Plaintiff or the individual FLSA Collective Members. 59. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 60. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members does not prevent collective treatment. 61. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 63. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Briarwood will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations. 64. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 65. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 37 and notice should be promptly sent. 66. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 67. Plaintiff Mertz further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D. Tex. June 29, 1983)). 68. VI. 68. The Texas Common-Law Class is defined as: 74. Plaintiff Mertz brings his Texas Common-Law Claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Briarwood to work in Texas since March 29, 2017. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004. 75. Class action treatment of the Texas Common Law Class Members is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Rule 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 76. The number of Texas Common-Law Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 77. Plaintiff Mertz’s claims and the claims of the Texas Common-Law Class share common questions of law and fact. 78. Plaintiff Mertz is a member of the Texas Common-Law Class, his claims are typical of the claims of the other Texas Common Law Class Members, and he has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other Texas Common Law Class Members. 80. Class certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 81. Accordingly, the Texas Common Law Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph § CLASS ACTION PURSUANT d/b/a BRIARWOOD MANOR § TO FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) § Defendant. §

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(Individual Claims for Violation of the AMW A) 10. Defendant does business in this district and a substantial part of the events alleged herein occurred in this District. 11. The witnesses to overtime violations alleged in this Complaint reside in this District. 12. The payroll records and other documents related to the payroll practices that Plaintiffs challenges are accessible in this District. 2. Upholding labor contracts and paying time-and-a-half for all hours over forty disincentives employers from tiring their workers with long hours, and promotes stability in the labor market. A forty-hour base work week leads to safer work, products and services for students. 3. Rather than following this longtime principle that has helped sustain our free-market system, the Pulaski County Special School District has a common policy that fails to pay its non-exempt contract employees the hourly amount they contract for, nor the lawful amount of overtime. Non-exempt contract employees are prorated and not paid the correct rate for hours they worked in the time it is due, nor paid the correct amount of overtime, thus leading to a myriad of issues for employees and the district. 4. Plaintiffs thus bring this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA") and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act, Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-4-201, et seq. ("AMWA"), for declaratory judgment, monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee as a result of Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiffs and other non-exempt contract employees lawful contracted rates and overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 5. Upon information and belief, for at least three (3) years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant has willfully and intentionally committed violations of the FLSA as described, infra. II. Jurisdiction and Venue 7. Plaintiffs' claims under the AM.WA form part of the same case or controversy and arise out of the same facts as the FLSA claims alleged in this Complaint. 71. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 72. Plaintiffs assert this claim for damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the AMWA, Arkansas Code Annotated§§ 11-4-201, et seq. 73. At all relevant times, Defendant was Plaintiffs> "employer» within the meaning of the AMWA, Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-4-203(4). 74. Arkansas Code Annotated§§ 11-4-210 and 211 require employers to pay all employees a minimum wage for all hours worked up to forty ( 40) in one week and to pay one and one-half (1.5) times regular wages for all hours worked over forty ( 40) hours in a week, unless an employee meets the exemption requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 213 and accompanying Department of Labor regulations. 75. 8. Therefore, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' AMW A claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 9. The acts complained of herein were committed and had their principal effect against Plaintiffs within the Central Division of the Eastern District of Arkansas; therefore, venue is proper within this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. DEFENDANT Class and Collective Action Complaint COMES NOW Plaintiffs Yolanda Richards, Norma L. Dixon, and Cynthia D'Abadie each individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through their attorneys Chris Burks and Brandon Haubert of WHLAW PLLC, and for their Class and Collective Action Complaint against Defendant Pulaski County Special School District ("Defendant"), he does hereby state and allege as follows: I. Introduction

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1. Plaintiff Dr. David George, doing business as Hammond Pet Hospital, brings this action to secure redress for the actions of defendants Product Slingshot, Inc., and Think 3D/Prelude, Inc., doing business as Forecast 3D, in sending or causing the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227 (“TCPA”), and the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, Ind. Code §24–5–0.5–1 et seq. (“IDCSA”). 10. On or about June 20, 2018, Hammond Pet Hospital received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine, promoting defendants’ services. 11. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 12. The fax refers to a web address, Forecast3D.com, which is registered to Product Slingshot, Inc. (Exhibit B). 13. Forecast3D.com states that the business is operated by Corey Weber and Donovan 2 USDC IN/ND case 2:18-cv-00296-JVB-JEM document 1 filed 08/10/18 page 2 of 11 Weber (Exhibit C). 14. Corey Weber and R. Donovan Weber conduct business via Product Slingshot, Inc., and Think 3D/Prelude, Inc. (Exhibit D). 15. Defendants Product Slingshot Inc., and Think 3D/Prelude Inc., are responsible for sending or causing the sending of the fax. 16. Defendants Product Slingshot Inc., and Think 3D/Prelude Inc., as the entities who products or services were advertised in the fax, derived economic benefit from the sending of the fax. 17. Defendants Product Slingshot Inc., and Think 3D/Prelude Inc., either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 18. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendants and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to plaintiff. 19. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 2. The TCPA and IDCSA expressly prohibit unsolicited fax advertising. Unsolicited fax advertising damages the recipients. The recipient is deprived of its paper and ink or toner and the use of its fax machine. The recipient also wastes valuable time it would have spent on something else. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving and sending authorized faxes, cause wear and tear on fax machines, and require labor to attempt to identify the source and purpose of the unsolicited faxes. 1 USDC IN/ND case 2:18-cv-00296-JVB-JEM document 1 filed 08/10/18 page 1 of 11 20. The fax does not contain an “opt out” notice that complies with 47 U.S.C. §227. 21. On information and belief, defendants have transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Illinois. 22. There is no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendants’ unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 23. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-22. 24. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 25. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: 3 USDC IN/ND case 2:18-cv-00296-JVB-JEM document 1 filed 08/10/18 page 3 of 11 Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 26. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 27. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 28. Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent. 29. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 38. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-22. 39. IC §24-5-0.5-2(a)(1)(B) defines as a “consumer transaction” subject to the IDCSA 6 USDC IN/ND case 2:18-cv-00296-JVB-JEM document 1 filed 08/10/18 page 6 of 11 an “unsolicited advertisement sent to a person by telephone facsimile machine offering a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other disposition of an item of personal property, real property, a service, or an intangible.” 40. IC §24-5-0.5-3 defines as a “deceptive act” in violation of the IDCSA “(19) The violation by a supplier of 47 U.S.C. 227, including any rules or regulations issued under 47 48. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons with Indiana fax numbers (b) who, on or after a date 2 years 7 USDC IN/ND case 2:18-cv-00296-JVB-JEM document 1 filed 08/10/18 page 7 of 11 prior to the filing of this action, (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of defendants Product Slingshot Inc., and Think 3D/Prelude Inc., promoting their goods or services for sale (d) where defendants do not have evidence of consent or an established business relationship prior to the sending of the faxes. 49. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 50. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether defendants engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; b. Whether defendants thereby engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of the IDCSA. 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 52. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 53. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendants are small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 54. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of 8 USDC IN/ND case 2:18-cv-00296-JVB-JEM document 1 filed 08/10/18 page 8 of 11 plaintiff and the class and against defendant for: a. Appropriate damages; b. Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; c. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. /s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs Heather A. Kolbus INTRODUCTION

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28. Formed in 2009, American Midstream is a growth-oriented master limited partnership formed to own, operate, develop, and acquire a diversified portfolio of midstream energy assets. The Company’s General Partner was solely responsible for supporting and conducting the business operations of American Midstream, which partnership lacked any employees of its own. 29. On August 1, 2011, American Midstream closed its IPO of 3,750,000 common units at an offering price of $21 per unit. After going public, American Midstream without fail declared a quarterly distribution of $0.4125 per common unit, or $1.65 per unit annually, which dividend was material to investors seeking a reliable return on their investments.1 31. By virtue of its status as the majority unitholder of the Company and its interested relationship with the General Partner, ArcLight had complete control over American Midstream. During this time, ArcLight ensured that the majority of American Midstream’s Board of Directors were all affiliated with ArcLight, i.e., the Director Defendants. In addition, ArcLight, through its power over the General Partner, had the ability to control the day-to-day operations of American Midstream, including whether to cut or suspend cash distributions to American Midstream unitholders. 32. Prior to the start of the Class Period, Defendants touted American Midstream’s strong results. For example, on April 26, 2018, the Company issued a press release announcing its quarterly distribution for its first quarter 2018, lauding it as the “twenty-seventh consecutive quarterly distribution since the Partnership’s initial public offering in 2011.” Furthermore, on May 15, 2018, American Midstream held a conference call with analysts and investors to discuss the Company’s first quarter 2018 results. On the call, Lynn L. Bourdon III (“Bourdon”), the then-current Chief Executive Officer of the General Partner, described the quarter as “record setting,” “driven by a combination of continued solid performance,” which the Company and General Partner “expect[ed] to carry forward.” 47. During the Class Period, Defendants materially misled the investing public, thereby purposely deflating the price of American Midstream’s common units, by publicly issuing false and/or misleading statements and/or omitting to disclose material facts necessary to make Defendants’ statements, as set forth herein, not false and/or misleading. These statements and omissions were materially false and/or misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and/or misrepresented the truth about American Midstream’s business, operations, and prospects as alleged herein. 48. At all relevant times, the material misrepresentations and omissions particularized in this Complaint directly or proximately caused, or were a substantial contributing cause, of the damages sustained by Plaintiff and other members of the Class. As described herein, during the Class Period, Defendants made, or caused to be made, a series of materially false and/or misleading statements about American Midstream’s financial well-being and prospects. These material misstatements and/or omissions had the cause and effect of creating in the market an unrealistically negative assessment of the Company and its financial well-being and prospects, thus causing the Company’s common units to be undervalued and artificially deflated at all relevant times. Defendants’ materially false and/or misleading statements during the Class Period resulted in Plaintiff and other members of the Class selling the Company’s common units at artificially deflated prices, thus causing the damages complained of herein. 50. The Defendants permitted American Midstream to release these false and misleading statements and failed to file the necessary corrective disclosures, which artificially deflated the value of the Company’s common units. 51. As set forth herein, the Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding American Midstream, their control over, receipt, and/or modification of American Midstream’s allegedly materially misleading statements and omissions, and/or their positions with the Company that made them privy to confidential information concerning American Midstream, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 52. The Defendants are liable as participants in a fraudulent scheme and course of conduct that operated as a fraud or deceit on those who sold American Midstream common units by disseminating materially false and misleading statements and/or concealing material adverse facts. The scheme deceived the investing public regarding American Midstream’s business, operations, and management and the intrinsic value of American Midstream common units and caused Plaintiff and members of the Class to sell American Midstream common units at artificially deflated prices. 59. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all former owners of American Midstream common units who sold common units, and were damaged thereby, during the period from July 27, 2018, through July 23, 2019, both dates inclusive (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are: Defendants; the Excluded D&Os; members of Defendants’ and the Excluded D&Os’ immediate families; the subsidiaries and affiliates of the Company, including the Company’s employee retirement and benefit plan(s) and their participants or beneficiaries, to the extent they made purchases through such plan(s); any entity in which Defendants or the Excluded D&Os have or had a controlling interest; and the legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns of any excluded person or entity. 61. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 62. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in securities class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with those of the Class. 63. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 65. During the Class Period, Defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or recklessly disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 66. Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: (a) Employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (b) Made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) Engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon Plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their transactions in American Midstream common units during the Class Period. 67. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, as a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct alleged herein, they sold American Midstream common units at artificially deflated prices. Plaintiff and the Class would not have sold American Midstream common units at the prices they did, if they had been aware that the market prices had been artificially and falsely deflated by Defendants’ misleading statements. 69. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. The Individual Defendants, as culpability participants, acted as controlling persons of American Midstream within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. By virtue of their positions and their power to control public statements about American Midstream, the Individual Defendants had the power and ability to control the actions of American Midstream and its employees. By reason of such conduct, Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. AMERICAN MIDSTREAM PARTNERS, LP, ARCLIGHT CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC STEPHEN W. BERGSTROM, JOHN F. For Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants For Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

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ILLINOIS WAGE AND HOUR AND WAGE PAYMENT LAWS OF THE FLSA CLASS 10. At all times relevant, Just Energy was an employer, as defined by the FLSA and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act in that, among other things, Just Energy controlled, directed and/or participated in the creation and maintenance of its classification policies as well as its Wage-Hour policies and practices; was involved in decisions pertaining to employees’ compensation; and had a material role in the compensation practices, decisions, policies and actions, including but not limited to those complained of herein. 11. Defendant Just Energy is a publicly traded company (Symbol JE) with more than 2 million customers in the U.S. and Canada. Just Energy is engaged in interstate commerce as that term is used in the FLSA. 4 12. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the Class, in their capacity as employees of Defendant Just Energy, were engaged in interstate commerce. 13. During the course of employment with Defendant Just Energy, employees working to promote the Company, such as the Plaintiff, were not exempt from minimum wage and/or overtime wages. However, the Plaintiff was paid commissions only after another Just Energy employee made the sale after Plaintiff’s initial promotional work, did not receive minimum wages for all hours worked, and did not receive overtime compensation as required by the FLSA and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act. 14. During the course of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant Just Energy, she and the Class routinely worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 15. Despite the fact that the Plaintiff and the Class were not exempt, Defendant did not track the Plaintiff’s or the Class’ work hours and did not pay Plaintiff and the Class the proper wages they were owed, including payment of minimum wage and payment of overtime wages for work in excess of 40 hours per week. 16. Defendant never informed Plaintiff and those similarly situated that they were required to pay for their uniforms, including a hat, windbreaker, shirt, fleece and winter coat, all bearing the Company’s identifying logo. 17. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to actual and liquidated damages for Defendant’s actions. 18. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs above. 5 19. Plaintiff seeks to maintain this suit as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C §216(b) on behalf of herself and all other persons doing promotional work for Just Energy and being classified as independent contractors at any time during the statutory period who give their consent in writing to become party plaintiffs ("FLSA Class"). 20. All putative members of the class are similarly situated because, inter alia, they have all had similar duties; performed similar tasks; been paid on a commissions basis; been entitled under the FLSA to be paid for all hours worked and paid overtime for all work in excess of 40 hours per week; and had such rights undermined and negated by Defendants’ unlawful practices and policies of classifying them as independent contractors. 21. Defendant has encouraged, permitted, and required Plaintiff and other members of the FLSA Class to work without pay and without overtime compensation. 22. Defendant has known that Plaintiff and other members of the FLSA Class have performed unpaid work and been deprived of overtime compensation. Nonetheless, Defendant has operated under a scheme to deny Plaintiff and other members of the FLSA Class all compensation for work in excess of 40 hours in a week. 23. Defendants' conduct, as alleged herein, was willful and has caused significant damage to Plaintiffs and other members of the FLSA Class. 24. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs above. 25. Under the FLSA, the Plaintiff and those similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as "The FLSA Class") were entitled to be paid minimum wages. The FLSA Class was also 6 entitled to be paid at the overtime rate by Defendant for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours each workweek. Plaintiff for example, worked 7 days a week and as much as 12 hours each day. 26. The overtime rate is computed by multiplying 1.5 times an employee’s regular hourly rate, which includes all nondiscretionary compensation paid to employees. 27. Defendant failed to compensate The FLSA Class per the FLSA minimum wage requirements for the hours that they worked for Defendant. 28. Defendant also failed to compensate The FLSA Class at the overtime rate for work performed in excess of 40 hours per week in violation of the FLSA. 29 Defendant’s violation of the FLSA for failure to pay The FLSA Class minimum and overtime wages was willful and deliberate. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s practices as described above were not approved in writing by the United States Department of Labor. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s practices were not based upon Defendant’s review of any policy or publication of the United States Department of Labor. 32. Due to Defendant’s knowing and willful violation of the FLSA, The FLSA Class is entitled to recover from Defendant their liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and the costs of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 33. Plaintiff also seeks to maintain this action as a class action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), on behalf of herself individually and on behalf of all other members of the Class who, during the relevant statute of limitations period, have worked for Defendant and who have been aggrieved, with respect to the claims plead in this Complaint. 7 34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) provides that a cause of action may be maintained as a class action if: a) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable; b) There are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; c) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses to the class; d) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and, e) A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Class Definitions 35. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following class: All persons doing promotional work for Just Energy in the state of Illinois who were classified as Independent contractors. Numerosity 36. Plaintiff satisfies the numerosity requirements as the proposed classes consist of potentially hundreds of class members. The proposed classes include all persons employed by Defendant in Illinois who did promotional work for the Company and who were not paid minimum wages and overtime wages. Since Defendant has numerous employees that were injured by Defendant’s actions the class will likely include more than 75 members. The proposed class can be identified and located using Defendant’s payroll and personnel records. Therefore, the class is so numerous that the joinder of all members is impracticable. Class members may be informed of the pendency of this action by direct mail based upon and/or published and broadcast notice. 8 Common Questions of Fact or Law 37. There are questions of fact and law common to each class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The common questions of law and fact arising from Defendants' actions include, without limitation, the following: a) Whether the class members have been misclassified as independent contractors; b) Whether class members share similar job duties; c) Whether Defendants paid class members for all hours worked; d) Whether Defendants paid Class members overtime; e) Whether Plaintiff and the Class regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week; f) Whether Defendants' practices violated the overtime and minimum wage provisions of the Illinois Wage and Hour Laws; and g) Whether Defendants' failure to pay minimum wages and overtime has been willful. 38. The questions set forth above predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons and a class action is superior with respect to consideration of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness and equity, to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Typicality 39. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class. Plaintiff suffered similar injuries as those suffered by other members of the Class she seeks to represent as a result of Defendant’s illegal activities as described herein. Adequacy 40. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class she seeks to represent because she is a member of the class, and her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of 9 the class she seeks to represent. The interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiff and her designated counsel. Plaintiff has hired competent attorneys who are experienced in class-action litigation of this type and who are committed to prosecuting this action. Superiority 41. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of the parties is impracticable. Class- action treatment will allow a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense if these claims were brought individually. Moreover, as the damages suffered by each class member may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult to bring individual claims. The presentation of separate actions by individual class members could create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and/or substantially impair, or impede the ability of class members to protect their interests. 42. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs above. 43. The members of the Class were entitled to minimum wages for the work they performed for Defendant Just Energy. 44. Defendant failed to pay the members of the Class such owed minimum wages, in violation of Illinois’ Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq. 10 45. Illinois’ Wage Payment and Collection Act § 820 ILCS 115/2, defines an employer as “any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee, for which one or more persons is gainfully employed.” As such, Defendant Just Energy meets the definition of an employer pursuant to Illinois’ Wage Payment and Collection Act. 46. By the above-alleged conduct, Defendant failed to pay the members of the Class compensation, including minimum wages, as required by the Illinois law. 47. The members of Class were not exempt from the payment of these wages pursuant to Illinois wage hour laws. 48. Defendant acted willfully in violating Illinois Law and the members of the Class were damaged by Defendant’s wrongful conduct as alleged herein. 49. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth in each of the paragraphs above. 50. The Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act provides that unless exempt, an employee must be paid by an employer overtime wages equal to 1.5 times the employee's regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week. Plaintiff and the Class were not exempt. 51. Illinois’ Wage Payment and Collection Act § 820 ILCS 115/2 defines an employer as “any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 11 employee, for which one or more persons is gainfully employed.” As such, Defendant Just Energy meets the definition of an employer pursuant to Illinois’ Wage Payment and Collection Act. 52. By the above-alleged conduct, Defendant failed to pay the members of Class compensation, including overtime compensation, as required by the Illinois law. 53. The members of Class were not exempt from the payment of these wages pursuant to Illinois wage hour laws. 54. Defendant acted willfully in violating Illinois Law and the members of Class were damaged by Defendants’ wrongful conduct as alleged herein. 8. This lawsuit arises out of Defendant’s practice of misclassifying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees as independent contractors. Plaintiff and the Class are employees: the Defendant tells them when to report to work, where they will be working and for how long they will work on any given day. Defendant also directs the work of the Plaintiff and others by giving them very precise and specific instructions on how Plaintiff and the Class must represent the Company and its products and services. The Company also requires that Plaintiff and others wear uniforms identifying them as representatives of Just Energy. Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the Class for knowingly and willfully refusing to pay them minimum wages for all hours worked, and for denying them overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours each workweek. 9. At all times relevant, the Plaintiff and the Class were non-exempt employees of Defendant Just Energy, as defined by the FLSA and Illinois State Wage-Hour laws. FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGES AND OVERTIME WAGES UNDER THE FLSA VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS WAGE HOUR LAWS FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGES VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS WAGE HOUR LAWS FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES

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(15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a): Class Claim) 169. Plaintiffs reallege Paragraph Nos. 1-162 as if fully set forth herein. 170. The FCRA requires CRAs to “maintain reasonable procedures designed to avoid violations of section 1681c.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a). 171. Defendant willfully violated Section 1681e(a) of the FCRA by failing to maintain reasonable procedures to avoid violating Section 1681c. Indeed, Defendant’s procedures failed to exclude adverse items of information from its consumer reports that antedate the consumer report by more than seven years, and are not records of criminal convictions. 172. Defendant knew or should have known about its obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well established in the plain language of the FCRA, in the promulgations of the Federal Trade Commission, and in well-established case law. 173. Defendant obtained or had available substantial written materials that apprised it of its duties under the FCRA. 174. Despite knowing of these legal obligations, Defendant acted consciously in breaching its known duties and deprived Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated individuals of their rights under the FCRA. 41. Among other things, the FCRA regulates the collection, maintenance, and disclosure of consumer reports by CRAs, including public record information. 42. Defendant investigates and reviews public record databases and maintains consumer files that contain public record information concerning, among other things, the alleged criminal record history of individuals. 43. From its files, Defendant sells consumer reports to employers wishing to investigate the criminal record history, or lack thereof, with regard to job applicants or current employees. 44. When a CRA furnishes a copy of a consumer’s report to the consumer or a third party, the CRA is required to exclude adverse items of information, including non-conviction criminal records, which antedate the report by more than seven years. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(5) and Cal. Civ. Code § 1786.18. 45. Under the FCRA, adverse items of information, such as non-conviction criminal records, which antedate the consumer report by more than seven years, may be included in a consumer report, but only for consumer reports used in connection with the employment of any individual at an annual salary which equal, or which may be reasonably expected to equal $75,000 or more. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b)(3). A. Checkr’s Practices as a Consumer Reporting Agency and Furnisher of Consumer Information for Employment Purposes. i. Checkr Reports Antiquated Information.

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19. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of the following Classes: (1) an “iOS 9 Purchaser Class” consisting of all persons or entities in the United States who purchased an iPhone or iPad with a cellular data plan with iOS 9 pre-installed for purposes other than resale or distribution, and (2) an “iOS 9 Upgrade Class” consisting of all persons or entities in the United States who upgraded an iPhone or iPad with a cellular data plan to iOS 9. 20. Plaintiffs also bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of the following California Business and Professions Code Subclasses: (1) an “iOS 9 California Claims Purchaser Class” consisting of all persons or entities who purchased an iPhone or iPad with a cellular data plan with iOS 9 pre-installed for purposes other than resale or distribution with respect to California Business & Professions Code 17200 claims, and (2) an “iOS 9 California Claims Upgrade Class” consisting of all persons or entities in the United States who upgraded an iPhone or iPad with a cellular data plan to iOS 9 with respect to California Business & Professions Code 17200 claims. 29. Plaintiffs reallege the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 30. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the proposed Class. 31. The UCL prohibits acts of unfair competition, including any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” 32. The UCL imposes strict liability. Plaintiffs do not have to prove Defendant intentionally or negligently engaged in unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts or practices. Instead, Plaintiffs only have to prove such acts or practices occurred. 46. Plaintiffs reallege the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the proposed Class. 48. Defendant Apple Inc. is a California company disseminating advertising from its California headquarters throughout the United States. 49. The FAL provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any . . . corporation . . . with intent . . . to dispose of . . . personal property . . . to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated . . . from this state before the public in any state, in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement . . . which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading . . . .” 57. Plaintiffs reallege the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the proposed Class. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (“UCL”) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S FALSE ADVERTISING LAW (“FAL”) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq.)

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51. Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates all allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 50 as though fully stated herein. 52. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, under the FLSA. 53. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant employed Plaintiff and continued to employ similarly situated servers. 54. As set forth above, Defendant has at all times material to this Complaint, utilized a policy and practice of paying its servers only $25.00 per 7- hour workday. 55. As set forth above, Defendant has at all times material to this Complaint, utilized a policy and practice of requiring their servers to perform side work that was not incidental to tip producing activities. 56. Defendant’s policy and practice violates the FLSA’s tip credit and minimum wage provisions. 58. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §255(a). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, DELMY CRUZ, on her own behalf and other similarly situated servers, demands judgment against Defendant, SALT & PEPPER CHEF, for unpaid minimum wages, an additional and equal amount of liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action, and any and all further relief that this Court determines to be just and appropriate. 59. Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates all allegations contained within Paragraphs 1 through 50 above as though fully stated herein. 60. Plaintiff and the other similarly situated servers are/were entitled to be paid the full minimum wage for each hour worked during their employment with Defendant within the last five (5) years. 61. During her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff and those similarly situated servers were only paid $25.00 per 7-hour work shift. 62. During her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff and those similarly situated servers were required to perform side work that was not incidental to tip producing activities. 63. Defendant willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated servers the full minimum wage for one or more weeks of work contrary to the MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. §216(b) VIOLATION OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, ART. X, § 24, CHAPTER 448 FLORIDA STATUTES

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14. On information and belief, Defendants received some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendants profit and benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 15. Plaintiff did not give prior express invitation or permission to Defendants to send the fax. 16. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles with opt-out language identical or substantially similar to the opt-out language of the fax advertisement attached hereto as Exhibit A to Plaintiff and at least 40 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission and without having an established business relationship as defined by the TCPA and its regulations because the opt-out language was not compliant. 17. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 18. Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A does not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 20. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 22. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar faxes or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 24. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 25. Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227. 27. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 30. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendants had an established business relationship because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 31. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 32. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.

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12. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, the subscriber of the cellular telephone number (360) ***-5824 (the “5824 Number”). The 5824 Number is, and at all times mentioned herein was, assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 26. Class Definition. Plaintiff brings this civil class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself individually and as a representative of the following class of persons (the “Class”) entitled to statutory damages under the federal TCPA: All persons in the United States who have never enrolled with ContextLogic, Inc.’s service and who were sent, during the four (4) years preceding the filing of the Class Action Complaint through the date on which class certification is granted, at least one SMS text message containing a Wish.com hyperlink by ContextLogic, Inc. or an affiliate, subsidiary, or agent of ContextLogic, Inc. 27. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from the Class. 28. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the definition of the Class (or add one or more subclasses) after further discovery. 29. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been impacted and harmed by the acts of Defendant or its affiliates or subsidiaries. 30. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class. 31. This action may properly be brought and maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b). This class action satisfies the numerosity, typicality, adequacy, commonality, predominance, and superiority requirements. 32. Upon application by Plaintiff’s counsel for certification of the Class, the Court may also be requested to utilize and certify one or more additional subclass in the interests of manageability, justice, or judicial economy. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-40 of this Class Action Complaint as if fully stated herein. 42. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute violations of the TCPA by Defendant, including but not limited to violations of each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227. 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-40 of this Class Action Complaint as if fully stated herein. 47. The foregoing acts and omissions by Defendant constitute knowing or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to violations of each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227. 48. As a result of alleged knowing or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and all Class members are entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA in the future. 49. As a result of Defendant’s knowing or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to, and do seek, treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every text message transmitted in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 50. Plaintiff and Class members also seek an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. KNOWING OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Herself and the Class Against Defendant) VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Herself and the Class Against Defendant)

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(Common Law Copyright Infringement / Unfair Competition) (Unjust Enrichment) 59. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 6. In the es specializi usic labels p g the Flamin d to the Blue nglows (indu in 2000). 60. The Pre-1972 Recordings, when created, were the novel product of mental labor embodied in material form; Plaintiffs and the Misappropriation Class thus have property rights in them as recognized by New Jersey common law. 61. By duplicating the Pre-1972 Recordings without authorization from Plaintiffs and Class Members, and publicly performing those Recordings to its users for their own gain, Defendants misappropriated the Recordings and infringed Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ property rights, whereby Plaintiffs and Class Members were damaged. 63. Defendants’ conduct, as described above, constituted a continuous and intentional pattern of misappropriation of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ property, justifying the imposition of punitive damages. Defendants are high-profile, large-scale media companies that are intimately familiar with the mechanics of the music industry and the requirements of intellectual property law. By knowingly misappropriating works without their owners’ permission and performing these works to millions of users of satellite and internet radio services, Defendants acted and continue to act maliciously and oppressively to injure Plaintiffs and Class Members by depriving them of compensation for the use of the Pre-1972 Recordings. Defendants’ continued misappropriation of the Pre-1972 Recordings was at a minimum done with wanton and willful disregard of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ rights in those Recordings, and the harm suffered by Plaintiffs and Class Members was foreseeable to Defendants. 64. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 66. Defendants’ conduct, as described above, constituted a continuous and intentional pattern of misappropriation of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ property, justifying the imposition of punitive damages. Defendants are high-profile, large-scale media companies that are intimately familiar with the mechanics of the music industry and the requirements of intellectual property law. By knowingly misappropriating works without their owners’ permission and performing these works to millions of users of satellite and internet radio services, Defendants acted and continue to act maliciously and oppressively to injure Plaintiffs and Class Members by depriving them of compensation for the use of the Pre-1972 Recordings. Defendants’ continued misappropriation of the Pre-1972 Recordings was at a minimum done with wanton and willful disregard of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ rights in those Recordings, and the harm suffered by Plaintiffs and Class Members was foreseeable to Defendants. 7. Arthu llowing fixtu tiff Arthur Sh and contract tiff Barbara S t rights in a p ndant Pandor nd, Californi roughout this ndant SiriusX York, New Y es as alleged tiffs bring th ow. A. Arthu

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14. The standard of care is the level at which the average, prudent provider in a given field of medicine—here, surgery and anesthesiology—would practice. It is how similarly qualified practitioners would have managed the patient’s care under the same or similar circumstances. 15. Surgeons and anesthesiologists concur that “filming sick people without asking threatens the very dignity of their personhood.”6 16. According to the director of the Office of Civil Rights for the Department of Health and Human Services: “Patients in hospitals expect to encounter doctors and nurses when getting treatment, not film crews recording them at their most private and vulnerable moments.”7 49. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4) on behalf of herself and the following Class: All women who underwent a surgical procedure in the Women’s Health Center at Sharp Grossmont Hospital between July 17, 2012 and June 30, 2013. 56. Plaintiff and the Class restate and incorporates herein by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. Defendants secretly filmed Plaintiff and the Class while they were unconscious or sedated undergoing medical procedures—without consent, and without protecting their privacy. 58. Plaintiff and the Class had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the operating rooms of Sharp Grossmont Hospital’s Women’s Health Center. 59. Doctors must obtain informed consent in order to provide medical treatment. “Consent is based on the disclosure of information and a sharing of interpretations of its meaning by a medical professional. The accuracy of disclosure, insofar as it is possible, is governed by the ethical requirement of truth-telling.”11 64. Plaintiff and the Class restate and incorporates herein by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 65. Defendants secretly filmed Plaintiff and the Class while they were unconscious or sedated undergoing medical procedures—without consent, and without protecting their privacy. 66. Plaintiff and the Class had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the operating rooms of Sharp Grossmont Hospital’s Women’s Health Center. 67. Defendants filmed patients’ genitalia and their medical procedures without their consent or any disclosure. Defendants’ conduct was outrageous and motivated by a commercial interest in disregard of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s privacy rights. 71. Plaintiff and the Class restate and incorporates herein by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Defendants intentionally video recorded and/or eavesdropped on Plaintiff’s and the Class’s confidential communications and medical procedures in the operating rooms of Sharp Grossmont Hospital’s Women’s Health Center by using an electronic device (hidden video cameras). 73. Plaintiff and the Class had a reasonable expectation that their medical procedures were not being video recorded. 74. Plaintiff and the Class had a reasonable expectation that their communications with medical personnel and their medical procedures were not being viewed by Sharp security personnel or by anyone not medically necessary for their care. 75. As reflected above, Defendant unlawfully recorded confidential information of Plaintiff and the Class and violated their privacy rights in violation of California Penal Code §§ 632 and 637.2. 78. Plaintiff and the Class restate and incorporates herein by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 79. The Defendants owed Plaintiff and the Class members a duty to use due care to ensure their freedom from manipulation, abuse, and invasion of privacy while undergoing surgery. 80. By seeking medical treatment at Sharp Grossmont, a special, confidential, and fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants and the Class members and Defendants was created, resulting in Defendants owing Plaintiff and the Class a duty to use due care. 81. The Defendants’ installation of hidden cameras that recorded their utterly-private medical procedures without disclosure or consent was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury would result to Plaintiff and the Class. 82. The Defendants’ conduct demonstrated a willful disregard for precautions to protect the protected health information, confidentiality, and privacy interests of Plaintiff and the Class. 83. The Defendants’ conduct as described above demonstrated a willful disregard for substantial risks to Plaintiff and Class members. 86. Plaintiff and the Class restate and incorporates herein by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. The Defendants owed Plaintiff and the Class members a duty to take reasonable protective measures to protect them and other patients from the risk of disclosure of protected health information, compromising photographs and videos, and invasion of privacy by properly warning, training, or educating Plaintiff and the Class members and others about how to avoid such a risk. 88. The Defendants breached their duty to take reasonable protective measures to protect Plaintiff, Class members, and other patients from the risk of disclosure of protected health information, compromising photographs and videos, and invasion of privacy, such as the failure to properly warn, train or educate Plaintiff, the Class members, and other patients about how to avoid such a particular. 89. The Defendants breached their duty to take reasonable protective measures to protect Plaintiff, Class members, and other patients from the risk of disclosure of protected health information, compromising photographs and videos, and invasion of privacy, by failing to supervise and stop their employees from recording their medical procedures, and failed to properly handle those recordings after they were completed. 91. Plaintiff and the Class restate and incorporates herein by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 92. Defendants’ extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to Plaintiff and the Class members. 93. Defendants’ outrageous conduct was not the type of ordinary physician examination or even rude or obnoxious behavior that women should be expected to tolerate. Rather, Defendants’ conduct exceeded all possible bounds of decency. 94. Defendants acted with intent or recklessness knowing that their female patients were likely to endure emotional distress given the relationship and trust placed in them by patients. 95. Defendants’ conduct caused suffering for Plaintiffs and the Class members at levels that no reasonable person should have to endure. 96. Plaintiff and the Class restate and incorporates herein by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. Defendants’ conduct negligently caused emotional distress to Plaintiff and the Class members. 98. Defendants could reasonably foresee that their actions would have caused emotional distress to Plaintiff and the Class members. A. The standard of care for the treatment of women’s health. A.  The standard of care for the treatment of women’s health. ..................... 4  B.  Defendants abused the trust of Plaintiffs and the Class and violated the standard of care. ................................................................... 5  C.  The recordings were not filmed for the medical care of Sharp’s patients. .................................................................................................... 6  D.  The recordings were revealed to the California Medical Board, but not to patients. .................................................................................... 7  E.  Sharp failed to secure the recordings to protect patient privacy after filming was complete. ...................................................................... 7  F.  Sharp publicly disclosed its gross invasion of privacy for the first time on or about April 5, 2019. ......................................................... 8  G.  The statute of limitations is tolled based on the continuing violations doctrine and fraudulent concealment. ..................................... 8  V.  COUNT III VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE §§ 632 AND 637.2 ................................................................................................................. 14  COUNT IV GROSS NEGLIGENCE ........................................................................ 15  Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN GROSS NEGLIGENCE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS INVASION OF PRIVACY – CAL. CONST., ART. 1, § 1 INVASION OF PRIVACY NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN, TRAIN, OR EDUCATE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS VI.  CAUSES OF ACTION .................................................................................... 12  COUNT I INVASION OF PRIVACY ....................................................................... 12  VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE §§ 632 AND 637.2

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18. Realty One Group is a real estate brokerage in 35 States throughout the U.S.1 19. Realty One Group is directly involved in the business development of each of its realtors, providing its realtors with Realty One training, coaching, technology and 24/7 support. 20. As one Realty One “Top Producer” stated in a video produced by Realty One “Lead generation is the heart of our business…even though we are called realtors or sales persons…the bottom line is that we are lead generators.”2 21. An essential part of Realty One Group’s marketing plan involves cold calling consumers to generate leads for their real estate services. At Realty One Group’s Direction, Realty One Group Realtors Texted Plaintiff Angell’s Cell Phone Number Without His Consent Using An Autodialer Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims

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20. Plaintiff Jose Reyes was employed by Defendants from on or about December 2008 to on or about February 2016. 21. In the course of his employment by Defendants, Plaintiff Jose Reyes performed physical labor including but not limited to the repair and maintenance of diesel trucks owned and utilized by Defendants in their landscaping, snow removal and maintenance business, as well as painting of lines in parking lots. Plaintiff Jose Reyes performed the aforesaid painting work in locations throughout Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York. 22. Plaintiff Jose Reyes regularly worked more than 9 hours per day from Monday through Friday and worked at least 4 hours on Saturday or Sunday every weekend. 23. Plaintiff Jose Reyes occasionally worked on holidays including Christmas and New Year’s Day. 24. Plaintiff Jose Reyes’ regular rate of pay ranged from $11 per hour in 2008 to $13.50 per hour at the termination of his employment in 2016. 25. Plaintiff Jose Reyes never received a premium rate of pay for time worked in excess of 40 hours in a week and for hours worked on Sundays. 26. On a limited number of occasions, Plaintiff Jose Reyes received a premium rate of pay for 5 hours worked on holidays. 27. Plaintiff Jose Reyes asked Defendants why he was not paid “time and a half” for overtime hours and, in response, was told “we don’t pay it.” Plaintiff Cleyber Dubon 28. Plaintiff Cleyber Dubon was employed by Defendants from on or about May 2003 to on or about October 2015. 29. In the course of his employment by Defendants, Plaintiff Cleyber Dubon performed physical labor including but not limited to landscaping and snow removal work at locations in Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Connecticut. 30. Plaintiff Cleyber Dubon regularly worked 10-12 or more hours per day at least six days per week and, during certain periods, seven days per week. 31. Plaintiff Cleyber Dubon’s regular rate of pay ranged from $12 per hour in 2003 to $15 per hour at the termination of his employment in 2016. 32. Plaintiff Cleyber Dubon never received a premium rate of pay for time worked in excess of 40 hours in a week and for hours worked on Sundays. 33. Plaintiff Cleyber Dubon asked Defendants why he was not paid “time and a half” for overtime hours and, in response, was told “in landscaping, we don’t pay overtime.” Facts Common to Both Plaintiffs 34. During Plaintiffs’ employment, Defendants did not post and keep posted a notice explaining the Fair Labor Standards Act, as prescribed by the United States Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, in a conspicuous place in their establishment such as would permit Plaintiff or other employees to observe readily a copy, as required by 29 40. Plaintiffs bring Count 1 as a collective action under the collective action provision of the FLSA as set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all current and former employees who have worked for Defendants in the State of Rhode Island within the past three years 7 of the filing of a consent to sue by such employee and the date of final judgment in this matter and who were, are or will be eligible for but did not receive overtime compensation. 41. Class Plaintiffs are situated similarly to Plaintiffs within the meaning of FLSA § 216(b) and, therefore, the First Count herein may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of FLSA . 42. This action is also maintainable as a collective action pursuant to FLSA § 216(b) because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 43. Questions of law and fact common to the collective action as a whole include, but are not limited to the following: a. Whether Defendants unlawfully failed and continue to fail to pay overtime compensation in violation of FLSA; and b. Whether Defendants unlawful failure to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiffs and Class Plaintiffs was willful. 44. The names and addresses of the Class Plaintiffs are available from Defendants and notice should be provided to Class Plaintiffs both by first class mail to their last known address and by workplace posting as soon as possible. VI. 45. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 44, above. 46. As described above, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs at least one and a half times a lawful, regular hourly wage for hours over forty worked in each week. 8 47. Defendants' failure to pay overtime wages as required by FLSA was willful and/or in bad faith, inasmuch as Defendants were aware or reasonably should have been aware of their obligation to pay Plaintiffs consistent with the FLSA and did not do so. 48. As a result of Defendants' unlawful conduct as described above, Plaintiffs suffered a loss of wages. 49. Plaintiffs restate, re-allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 44, above. 50. As described above, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs at least one and a half times a lawful, regular hourly wage for hours over forty worked in each week, for hours worked on Sundays and for hours worked on holidays. 51. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime wages as required by RIMWA was willful, inasmuch as Defendants were aware or reasonably should have been aware of their obligation to pay Plaintiffs consistent with RIMWA and did not do so. 52. As a result of Defendants' unlawful conduct as described above, Plaintiffs suffered a loss of wages. Plaintiff Jose Reyes

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13. Plaintiff is a natural person obligated, or allegedly obligated, to pay a debt owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, a creditor other than ACCT. 14. Plaintiff's obligation, or alleged obligation, owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, a creditor other than ACCT, arises from a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services that are the subject of the transaction were incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes – namely, a GE Capital personal credit card issued under a JCPenney label (the “Debt”). 15. On September 11, 2012, Plaintiff, through her counsel, sent a letter via certified mail to GE Capital notifying it that she was represented by an attorney with respect to the Debt and demanding that it cease all communications with Plaintiff and direct those communications instead to her counsel. See Notice of Representation to GE Capital, attached as Exhibit “A.” 16. GE Capital received Plaintiff’s notice of representation at 11:57 a.m. on September 14, 2012. See Tracking Number Results, attached as Exhibit “B.” 17. Upon information and belief, ACCT knew that Plaintiff was represented by counsel with respect to the Debt at the time GE Capital placed the Debt with ACCT. 18. In the alternative, GE Capital intentionally withheld the fact that Plaintiff was represented by counsel with respect to the Debt from ACCT. 19. At some point thereafter, despite its knowledge that Plaintiff was represented by counsel with respect to the Debt, GE Capital placed the Debt with ACCT for collection. 22. The Initial Communication does not definitively state whether the Debt is accruing interest, the rate of interest at which the interest is accruing, or the portion of the Debt that is principal and the portion of the Debt that is accrued interest or other fees. Id. 23. Upon information and belief, the Debt is accruing interest. 24. On January 15, 2013, the Debt had increased to $2,482.38. See January 15, 2013 Correspondence, attached as Exhibit “D.” 25. The Initial Communication is therefore susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. 26. The Initial Communication also falsely represents the character, amount, or legal status of the Debt, as prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 27. The Initial Communication also fails to state the amount of the Debt, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 28. ACCT failed to state the amount of the Debt within five days of the Initial Communication. 33. Upon information and belief, the Initial Communication is based on a standardized letter, form, or template. 34. Upon information and belief, ACCT sent an initial written communication based on the same standardized letter, form, or template as the Initial Communication to a large number of Washington consumers from whom ACCT attempted to collect debts over the one year period before this complaint was filed. 56. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in paragraphs 1- 55. 65. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in paragraphs 1- 55. 66. The FDCPA prohibits “[t]he false representation of—(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt…” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 67. ACCT violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by failing to state in the Initial Communication that the Debt was accruing interest. 68. The Initial Communication violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) because the “least sophisticated consumer” could “reasonably conclude that the balance was a fixed amount that would not be subject to further interest, late fees, or other charges,” or “just as reasonably determine that the balance would continue to grow over time as interest accrued.” Snyder v. Daniel N. Gordon, P.C., No. C11-1379 RAJ, 2012 WL 3643673, at *3 (W.D. Wash.). 69. In addition, or in the alternative, ACCT violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) by stating the amount of the Debt as a single sum rather than providing Plaintiff with a breakdown of the Debt’s accrued interest and other fees. 74. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in paragraphs 1- 55. 75. Under § 1692c of the FDCPA, a debt collector “may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt…if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). 76. ACCT violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) when it sent Plaintiff the Initial Communication despite its actual knowledge that Plaintiff was represented by an attorney with respect to the Debt and when it could readily ascertain the name and address of such attorney from GE Capital. 78. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in paragraphs 1- 55. 79. GE Capital is liable for ACCT’s violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2), because GE Capital had actual control over the manner by which ACCT collected the Debt from Plaintiff, and it intentionally withheld the name and address of Plaintiff’s attorney from ACCT. 80. In the alternative, GE Capital is liable for ACCT’s violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2), because GE Capital had actual control over the manner by which ACCT collected the Debt from Plaintiff, and it knew that ACCT would attempt to collect the Debt from Plaintiff in spite of its knowledge of Plaintiff’s attorney’s name and address. 81. In the alternative, GE Capital is liable for ACCT’s violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2), because GE Capital had actual control over the manner by which ACCT collected the Debt from Plaintiff, and it knew that ACCT would attempt to collect the debt from Plaintiff without inquiring whether Plaintiff was represented by an attorney with respect to the Debt. 82. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in paragraphs 1- 55. 83. The WCPA declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” RCW § 19.86.020. AMOUNT CURRENTLY DUE: $420.00 * * * * * GE Capital Retail Bank may continue to add interest and fees as provided in your agreement. Id. VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) ACCT VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) GE CAPITAL VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) ACCT VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) ACCT VIOLATION OF RCW § 19.86.020 GE CAPITAL

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(Cost of Insurance Charge) (Improving Expectations as to Future Mortality Experience) (Maintenance and Administrative Charges) 11. Plaintiff purchased from USAA Life Insurance Company a “Universal Life Insurance Policy” bearing policy number 3240875U4, with an effective date of January 20, 1992, and an initial specified amount of $25,000 (the “Policy”). A true and accurate copy of the Policy is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and incorporated herein by reference. 12. Plaintiff has always been both the “owner” and the “insured” under the Policy, which remains in force. 13. Defendant is the effective and liable insurer of the Policy, and policies meeting the class definition (the “Class Policies”). 14. The Policy “is a legal contract” between Plaintiff and Defendant. Ex. A at 5. 15. The entire contract between Plaintiff and Defendant consists of the Policy, the application, and any supplemental application. Ex. A at 5 & Accidental Death Benefit Rider (General Provisions) (“This rider is attached to and is part of the policy.”). 17. Only an officer of USAA Life has authority to waive or change a provision of the Policy, and then only in writing. Ex. A at 5. 18. USAA Life has issued and administered, and currently administers, all aspects of the Policy and Class Policies, including collecting premiums, and setting, assessing and deducting policy charges. 19. In addition to a death benefit, the Policy and Class Policies provide policyholders an investment, savings, or interest-bearing component, that accumulates value over time. Although the savings component in certain of the Class Policies may be identified by a different name, it is identified in the Policy and throughout this Complaint as the “cash value.” 20. Generally, like Plaintiff and class members, universal life insurance policyholders contribute premiums, the net amount of which, after a “Premium Deduction” charge is deducted, are deposited into the cash value of a policy, from which the insurer deducts monthly charges as authorized by the policy. 22. The Policy expressly defines the specific charges that USAA Life may assess and deduct from Plaintiff’s premium payments and the Policy’s cash value. USAA Life may assess and deduct only those charges allowed by the Policy. 23. The Policy authorizes USAA Life to take from the cash value a “Monthly Deduction:” The monthly deduction on each monthly anniversary shall be calculated as (1) plus (2) plus (3) where: 1) is the cost of insurance and the cost for any policy riders; 2) is the monthly policy maintenance charge, which is a flat charge per policy; and 3) is the monthly administrative charge, which is a flat charge per policy that is applied only during the first 12 policy months. Ex. A at 12. 24. The Policy authorizes Defendant to deduct a maintenance charge in the fixed, maximum amount of $2.50 per month. Ex. A at 2. The Policy expressly provides that the “maintenance charge” Defendant is authorized to take as part of the monthly deduction is a charge that “reimburses [USAA Life] for recurring administrative expenses related to the maintenance of the policy.” Ex. A at 4. 26. In addition to setting the fixed maximum amounts Defendant is authorized to deduct for the maintenance charge and administrative charge, the Policy expressly defines how the cost of insurance is calculated: The cost of insurance is calculated on each monthly anniversary. First, we divide the death benefit on the monthly anniversary by 1.0036748, and then we subtract the cash value. . . .We divide the resulting net amount at risk by 1000 and multiply that result by the applicable cost of insurance rate. Ex. A at 12. 27. Under the explicit terms of the Policy, USAA Life is authorized to use only the insured’s age, sex, rate class, and its expectations as to future mortality experience when determining the Policy’s cost of insurance rates: The cost of insurance rates for each Specified Amount are based on the insured’s age, sex, and rate class. Current cost of insurance rates are based on our expectations as to future mortality experience. . . .USAA LIFE guarantees that the cost of insurance rates will never be greater than those shown in the Table of Monthly Guaranteed Cost of Insurance Rates Found in the Policy Schedule page. Ex. A at 12. 28. Age, sex, and rate class are factors commonly used within the life insurance industry to determine the mortality expectations of an insured or group or class of insureds. 29. Because the Policy specifically identifies age, sex and rate class as the defining components of the cost of insurance rates, and expressly states that current cost of insurance rates are based on USAA Life’s expectations as to future mortality experience, the parties agreed that mortality expectations are what determine cost of insurance rates under the Policy. 31. Although the Policy and Class Policies authorize USAA Life to use only its “expectations as to future mortality experience” when determining cost of insurance rates, USAA Life uses other factors, not authorized by the Policy, when determining such rates, including without limitation, expense experience. 32. By including other factors in calculating cost of insurance rates, USAA Life knowingly causes those rates to be higher than what is explicitly authorized by the Policy and Class Policies. 33. By loading cost of insurance rates with unauthorized factors, USAA Life repeatedly and continuously breaches the Policy and Class Policies by impermissibly inflating those rates such that they substantially exceed USAA Life’s “expectations as to future mortality experience.” 34. The higher cost of insurance rates used by USAA Life cause the monthly cost of insurance charge to be greater than what is explicitly authorized by the Policy and Class Policies. Consequently, USAA Life withdraws from the cash value an amount for the cost of insurance that is greater than that authorized under the Policy and Class Policies. 35. Each of USAA Life’s past and future cost of insurance deductions from the cash values of Plaintiff and the class constitutes a separate breach of contract. 37. By loading cost of insurance rates with undisclosed expense experience factors, including without limitation maintenance and administrative expense factors, Defendant repeatedly and continuously breaches the Policy and Class Policies by impermissibly deducting amounts from the cash values of Plaintiff and the class in excess of the fixed and maximum maintenance charge and administrative charge amounts expressly authorized by the Policy and Class Policies. 38. Each of USAA Life’s past and future maintenance charge and administrative charge deductions from the cash values of Plaintiff and the class constitutes a separate breach of contract. 39. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breaches, therefore, Plaintiff and the class have been damaged and those damages are continuing in nature in that Defendant has deducted and will continue to deduct maintenance and administrative expenses from the cash values of Plaintiff and the class in amounts not authorized by the Policy and Class Policies. 40. The nature of USAA Life’s conduct is such that Plaintiff and each member of the class would be unaware that Defendant was engaging in wrongdoing by taking inflated charges and improper amounts from cash values. USAA Life possesses the actuarial information and equations underlying the computation of rates and charges for the Policy. The cost of insurance rates used to calculate cost of insurance charges are not disclosed to policy owners, nor are the components or factors that comprise those rates. And, even if they were, Plaintiff and the members of the class would lack the knowledge, experience, or training to reasonably ascertain how USAA Life calculated the rates and charges included in the Policy. 42. Plaintiff did not discover, nor could he have, through reasonable diligence, discovered the facts establishing USAA Life’s breaches or the harm caused thereby. 43. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3) and/or 23(c)(4), Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, and seeks to represent the following class: All persons who own or owned a life insurance policy issued or administered by Defendant, the terms of which provide or provided for: 1) an insurance or cost of insurance charge or deduction calculated using a rate that is determined based on Defendant’s expectations as to future mortality experience; 2) additional but separate policy charges, deductions, or expenses; 3) an investment, interest- bearing, or savings component; and 4) a death benefit. 45. Plaintiff’s claims satisfy the numerosity, typicality, adequacy, commonality and superiority requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, as set forth more fully herein. 46. The persons who fall within the class number in at least the hundreds and most likely thousands, and thus the numerosity standard is satisfied. Because class members are geographically dispersed across the country, joinder of all class members in a single action is impracticable. 47. Class members are readily ascertainable from information and records in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control. Notice of this action can readily be provided to the class. 49. The questions set forth above predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons, and a class action is superior with respect to considerations of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness, and equity to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims asserted herein. 50. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class in that Plaintiff and the class members all purchased policies containing the same or similar limitations on the amounts that Defendant could charge its policyholders under the express terms of the Policy and Class Policies. 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the proposed class, because his interests are aligned with, and not antagonistic to, those of the proposed class, and he is represented by counsel who are experienced and competent in the prosecution of class action litigation, and have particular expertise with class action litigation on behalf of owners of universal life insurance policies. 53. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully alleged herein. 54. Plaintiff and the class purchased life insurance policies—the Policy and Class Policies—from Defendant. 55. The Policy and Class Policies are valid and enforceable contracts between the Defendant and Plaintiff and class members. 56. Plaintiff and the class substantially performed their obligations under the terms of the Policy and Class Policies. 57. By including unauthorized and undisclosed factors in the monthly cost of insurance rates, Defendant impermissibly causes those rates to be higher for the Policy and the Class Policies. 58. Because Defendant calculates cost of insurance charges using monthly cost of insurance rates that are higher than those authorized by the Policy and Class Policies, Defendant has deducted and will deduct cost of insurance charges from the cash values of Plaintiff and the class in amounts greater than those authorized by their policies. 59. Defendant’s practice of deducting charges in amounts not authorized by the Policy and Class Policies constitutes a breach of the policies. 60. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff and the class have sustained damages that are continuing in nature in an amount to be determined at trial. 61. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully alleged herein. 63. By deducting unauthorized maintenance and administrative charges from the cash values of Plaintiff and the class, Defendant has breached and continues to breach the Policy and Class Policies. 64. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff and the class have sustained damages that are continuing in nature in an amount to be determined at trial. 65. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully alleged herein. 66. When setting monthly cost of insurance rates, the Policy and Class Policies authorize Defendant to consider only their expectations as to future mortality experience. 67. Although mortality expectations have generally improved because people are living longer today than when the Policy and Class Policies were initially priced, Defendant has, on information and belief, failed to lower monthly cost of insurance rates for the Policy and Class Policies. 68. Defendant’s failure to lower these rates even though their expectations of future mortality experience improved constitutes a breach of the Policy and Class Policies. 69. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff and the class have sustained damages that are continuing in nature in an amount to be determined at trial. 71. Plaintiff and the class had a property interest in the funds Defendant deducted from their cash values in excess of the amounts permitted by the terms of the Policy and Class Policies. 72. By deducting cost of insurance charges and expense charges in unauthorized amounts from the cash values of Plaintiff and the class, Defendant assumed and exercised ownership over, and misappropriated or misapplied, specific funds held in trust for the benefit of Plaintiff and the class, without authorization or consent and in hostility to the rights of Plaintiff and class members. 73. Defendant continues to retain these funds unlawfully without Plaintiff and class members’ consent. 74. Defendant’s wrongful exercise of control over the personal property of Plaintiff and class members constitutes conversion. 75. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the class have been damaged, and these damages are continuing in nature. 76. Although requiring expert testimony, the amounts of unauthorized cost of insurance charges and expense charges Defendant took from Plaintiff and the class are capable of determination, to an identified sum, by comparing Plaintiff’s actual cost of insurance charge each month to a cost of insurance charge computed using a monthly cost of insurance rate determined using Defendant’s expectations as to future mortality experience. 77. On behalf of himself and the class, Plaintiff seeks all damages and consequential damages proximately caused by Defendant’s conduct. 79. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully alleged herein. 80. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and the class, on the one hand, and Defendant, on the other, concerning the respective rights and duties of the parties under the Policy and Class Policies. 81. Plaintiff contends that Defendant has breached the Policy and Class Policies in the following respects: (a) By using unauthorized and undisclosed factors to compute the monthly cost of insurance rates under the Policy and Class Policies, Defendant impermissibly increased monthly cost of insurance rates for the Policy and Class Policies and, as a result, withdrew cost of insurance charges from the cash values of Plaintiff and the class in an amount greater than those authorized by the Policy and Class Policies. (b) By inflating monthly cost of insurance rates with unauthorized expense factors, including without limitation, maintenance and administrative expense factors, Defendant impermissibly deducted expenses from the cash values of Plaintiff and the class in amounts in excess of the fixed, maximum maintenance charges and administrative charges expressly authorized by the Policy and Class Policies. (c) By failing to reduce cost of insurance rates to reflect Defendant’s improving expectations as to future mortality experience. 82. Plaintiff therefore seeks a declaration of the parties’ respective rights and duties under the Policy and Class Policies and requests the Court to declare the aforementioned conduct of Defendant as unlawful and in material breach of the Policy and Class Policies so that future controversies may be avoided.

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12. The red rectangular box on which the "POPCORN" lettering is written comes as one piece in the delivered box. There is no way for the customer to have caused the problem. There is also no way to correct the problem. The door with the upside down lettering cannot be removed and reinstalled, at least not without ruining the machine. 13. The popcorn machine is purchased as a festive addition to parties and social occasions. It is obviously not acceptable to have upside down lettering on the primary facing of the machine — the side with the door where popcorn is removed. 14. The amount of time and effort spent to assemble the machine is substantial. Assembly usually takes over one hour for two persons. 15. The assembled product cannot be returned to Amazon without further substantial work. It is far too bulky to be shipped without being disassembled. The process of disassembling the machine, repacking it in a box (the original box is generally destroyed in the unpacking process), and shipping it to Amazon would take several hours. In most cases, it would not be possible to repack and ship the defective machine. 17. Amazon's representative confirmed that they were aware of the defect because they did not want or need a photograph to see the defect. 18. In disbelief, Plaintiff researched the defect and found numerous complaints from other victims, including complaints from other Amazon purchasers. 19-A-10123-7 10/7/2019 3:16 PM IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY 19. For example, these are several of the many identical comments: Allen Dunn 30. Plaintiff incorporates all paragraphs above and below as if set forth verbatim herein. 32. Despite knowing fell well about this defect, Amazon has not ceased marketing and selling the product. Each day, including the day of filing this Class Action Complaint, Amazon prominently displays the Great Northern popcorn machine with the "POPCORN" lettering with the correct side up. 33. Despite knowing full well that hundreds of customers will waste thousands of hours assembling the defective product, Amazon continues to sell the product. 34. Amazon has established a policy of not providing a refund for the defective product, knowing that customers will then be stuck with the assembled item because the alternative of disassembling the item, repacking it, and shipping it will only increase their harm. 35. But for the false photographs and promises made by Amazon in accordance with Defendant's uniform corporate practices and procedures, Plaintiff and the Class Members would not have obtained the defective product. 37. Plaintiff incorporates all paragraphs above and below as if set forth verbatim herein. 38. Amazon represented to Plaintiff and the Class that the Great Northern popcorn machine was not defective. Further, Amazon promised a full refund for defective products, a promise that it does not keep with the Great Northern popcorn machine because it requires victims to spend several hours of total labor in order to build, and then d.isassemble, repackage, and ship the defective product back to Amazon before a refund will be provided. Amazon is aware that almost no customer will go through this trauma in order to gain the refund. 39. These misrepresentations are false because Amazon in fact knows about the defect based on hundreds of complaints received since at least 2016. Further, Amazon knows it will not provide refunds for the defective product in a reasonable fashion. 41. Amazon knows that its misrepresentations are false because it in fact has been aware of the defects for years and has established the useless refund policy as a standard business practice. 42. Amazon intended for Plaintiff and the Class to rely upon the misrepresentation so that Plaintiff and Class Members would make the purchase or request the item as a gift from others despite Defendant's knowledge of the defect. 43. Plaintiff and the Class Members were unaware of the falsity of Amazon's misrepresentations until after they had assembled the defective popcorn machine and called for a refund. 44. Plaintiff and the Class Members relied upon the truth of Amazon's representations. Plaintiff and the Class Members would not have ordered or requested the popcorn machine had they known Amazon's representations were false. 45. Plaintiff and the Class Members had a right to rely upon Amazon's representations. 47. Plaintiff incorporates all paragraphs above and below as if set forth verbatim herein. 48. Unjust enrichment requires disgorgement of the funds Amazon has improperly obtained based on the fraudulent conduct described above. Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the Class, asserts a common law claim for unjust enrichment. 50. By means of Defendant's wrongful conduct alleged herein, Defendant knowingly engaged in practices which harmed Plaintiff and Members of the Class and that were unfair, unconscionable, and oppressive. Moreover, Defendant's conduct is improper and/or illegal as a matter of law. 51. Defendant knowingly received and retained wrongful benefits and funds from Plaintiff and Members of the Class. In so doing, Defendant acted with conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiff and Members of the Class. 53. Plaintiff and the Class Members have conferred a benefit upon Defendant in the form of payments and assembly work. 54. Defendant's unjust enrichment is traceable to, and resulted directly and proximately from, the conduct alleged herein. 55. Under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, as interpreted under Georgia law, it is inequitable for Defendant to be permitted to retain the benefits it has received, and is still receiving, without justification, by inducing Plaintiff and Class Members to purchase or receive the defective popcorn machine through misrepresentations and other wrongful conduct. Defendant's retention of such funds under circumstances making it inequitable to do so constitutes unjust enrichment. 56. The financial benefits derived by Defendant rightfully belong to Plaintiff and Members of the Class. Defendant should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund for the benefit of Plaintiff and Members of the Class all wrongful or inequitable proceeds. A constructive trust should be imposed upon all wrongful or inequitable sums received by Defendant traceable to Plaintiff and the Members of the Class. 7. Plaintiff received her Great Northern popcorn machine as a gift in September of 2019. The product came in a very large box. 8. On September 31, 2019, Plaintiff and her family opened the box and began the assembly process. The product comes in dozens of pieces and requires substantial assembly work. a After over one hour of work by two persons the product was fully assembled. The product stands nearly five feet tall and is over two feet wide in each horizontal dimension. 9.0 out of 5 starsDisappointed September 9, 2016 Color: BlackVerified Purchase Just received mine looks sharp except the door to the box is upside down. The box needs to be replaced, the cut out for electric is on the bottom, and the metal on the bottom of popper is dented by the cardboard packing , or a really ood discount! FRAUD INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION UNJUST ENRICHMENT

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46. For years, BMW has imported, distributed, marketed, advertised, warranted, serviced, repaired, sold and leased the Class Vehicles. Upon information and belief, it has sold directly or indirectly, through dealers and other retail outlets, thousands of Class Vehicles nationwide. 47. The Class Vehicles contain one or more defects that prevent their convertible tops from completely opening and closing; cause their convertible tops to become jammed into a fixed position; and cause the convertible top operation light to flash, the “top not locked” warning message to appear, and/or an alarm to sound. When this occurs, consumers cannot open the trunk lid and/or are unable to roll the windows up or down 48. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that BMW acquired its knowledge of the Convertible Top Defect through sources not available to Class Members, including but not limited to pre-release testing data, early consumer complaints about the defect to Defendant directly and its dealers, testing and investigations conducted in response to these complaints, replacement parts sales data, aggregate data about the Convertible Top Defect from BMW’s dealers, including high number of warranty reimbursement claims (contained in BMW’s warranty database), and from other internal sources that are only accessible to BMW. 50. BMW has a duty to disclose the Convertible Top Defect and the associated out-of-pocket repair costs to Class Vehicle owners and lessees, among other reasons, because the defect poses an unreasonable safety hazard; because BMW had and has exclusive knowledge or access to material facts about the Class Vehicles and convertible tops that were and are not known or reasonably discoverable by Plaintiff and Class Members; and because BMW has actively concealed the defect from its customers. 51. Hundreds, if not thousands, of purchasers and lessees of the Class Vehicles have experienced Convertible Top Defect. Complaints posted by consumers on the Internet demonstrate that the defect is widespread. The complaints also indicate BMW’s awareness of the defect and its potential danger (note that spelling and grammar mistakes remain as found in the original):  I have a 2004 645ci, and for some reason the top wont go down.. When i hit the button the green light comes on, and the windows drop...but the roof wont move. Its strange? Any reset? anyone have advise?  Like many frustrated owners but still loyal lovers of their pre-2012 650i convertible, I am at my wits end on my faulty top sensor leaving me stranded with window half down, top fully down, and 12 plus wasted days at an equally frustrated dealership. I have concluded my ONLY solution to fix this problem once and for all is to move up to a 2012. BUt, before I drop 100k plus on the new beauty..... 59. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated as members of the proposed Plaintiff Class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) and/or (b)(2). This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of those provisions. 60. The Class and Sub-Class are defined as: Nationwide Class: All current and former owners and lessees of any 2004- 2010 model year BMW E64 (6 Series Convertible) vehicles. California Sub-Class: All Members of the Nationwide Class who purchased or leased the subject vehicles in the state of California. 61. Excluded from the Class and Sub-Class are: (1) Defendant, any entity or division in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and its legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and the Judge’s staff; and (3) those persons who have suffered personal injuries as a result of the facts alleged herein. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class and Sub-Class definitions if discovery and further investigation reveal that the Class and Sub-Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 63. Typicality: The claims of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class in that the representative Plaintiff, like all Class Members, purchased and leased a Class Vehicle designed, manufactured, and distributed by BMW in which the convertible top is defective. The representative Plaintiff, like all Class Members, has been damaged by Defendant’s misconduct in that he has incurred or will incur the cost of replacing the convertible top and/or repairing the damage caused from the Class Vehicles and their defective convertible top. Furthermore, the factual bases of BMW’s misconduct are common to all Class Members and represent a common thread of fraudulent, deliberate, and negligent misconduct resulting in injury to all Class Members. 65. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class actions, including consumer and product defect class actions, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously 67. Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 68. The NJCFA protects consumers against “any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise . . . .” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. 69. Plaintiff and Class Members are consumers who purchased and/or leased Class Vehicles for personal, family, or household use. 70. Defendant engaged in unlawful conduct, made affirmative misrepresentations and material omissions, or otherwise violated the NJCFA. Specifically, Defendant was aware that the Class Vehicles suffered from a common defect resulting in failure of the convertible tops in the Class Vehicles, but purposefully failed to disclose this to Plaintiff and Class Members during the purchase of the vehicle or thereafter. Defendant failed to disclose the Defect with the knowledge that many Class Members may not discover the Defect until after the expiration of their warranties. 71. Defendant also engaged in unlawful conduct in violation of the NJCFA by making knowing and intentional omissions. Defendant purposefully and knowingly failed to disclose the Defect in the Class Vehicles in order to secure the sale of these vehicles at a premium price and also to mislead owners during the limited warranty period to avoid having to perform their contractual duties under the warranty. 73. Defendant intended that Plaintiff and all Class Members rely on the acts of concealment and omissions, so that they would purchase the Class Vehicles and not have the defects remedied under warranty. 74. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered an ascertainable loss. In addition to direct monetary losses to repair the Defect, which can be thousands of dollars, Plaintiff and Class Members have also suffered an ascertainable loss by receiving less than what was promised. 75. A causal relationship exists between Defendant’s unlawful conduct and the ascertainable losses suffered by Plaintiff and the Class Members. Had the Defect in the Class Vehicles been disclosed, consumers would not have purchased them, would have paid less for the Class Vehicles had they decided to purchase them, or would have presented their vehicles for repair of the Defect under warranty. 76. Plaintiff and the Classes incorporate by reference each proceeding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 78. These omissions and statements were made by Defendant with knowledge of their falsity, and with the intent that Plaintiff and Class Members rely on them. 79. Plaintiff and Class Members reasonably relied on these statements and omissions, and suffered damages as a result. 80. Plaintiff and the Classes incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 81. Every contract in New Jersey contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an independent duty and may be breached even if there is no breach of a contract’s express terms. 82. Defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, inter alia, failing to notify Plaintiff and Class Members of the Defect in the Class Vehicles, and failing to fully and properly repair this defect. 83. Defendants acted in bad faith and/or with a malicious motive to deny Plaintiff and Class Members some benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties, thereby causing them injuries in an amount to be determined at trial. 85. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s failure to disclose known defects and material misrepresentations regarding known defects, and the scope of the Warranty coverage in the Class Vehicles, BMW has profited through the sale and lease of said vehicles. 86. Additionally, as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s failure to disclose known defects and material misrepresentations regarding known defects in the Class Vehicles, Plaintiff and Class Members have incurred substantial costs to repair the defects, which requires the replacement of the defective parts with “updated” parts also sold by Defendant. As a result of having to purchase these “updated” parts to fix the Defect, plaintiff and class members have conferred an unjust substantial benefit upon BMW. 87. Moreover, as a direct and proximate result of defendant’s failure to disclose known defects and material misrepresentations regarding known defects in the Class Vehicles, BMW has profited to the extent that Plaintiffs and Class Members purchased and leased Defendant’s vehicles, purchased certified parts directly from the Defendant to repair the defects, and had to pay for repairs out of their own pocket that should have been covered under warranty. 88. BMW has therefore been unjustly enriched due to the known defects in the Class Vehicles through the use of funds that earned interest or otherwise added to Defendant’s profits when said money should have remained with Plaintiff and Class Members. 89. As a result of the Defendant’s unjust enrichment, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered damages. 91. Plaintiff brings this cause of action against Defendant on behalf of himself and on behalf of the members of the California Sub-Class. 92. Defendant is a “person” as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(c). 93. Plaintiff and Class Members are “consumers” within the meaning of California Civil Code § 1761(d). 94. By failing to disclose and concealing the defective nature of the Class Vehicles and their convertible tops from Plaintiff and prospective Class Members, Defendant violated California Civil Code § 1770(a), as they represented that their Class Vehicles and their convertible tops had characteristics and benefits that they do not have, and represented that their Class Vehicles and their convertible tops were of a particular standard, quality, or grade when they were of another. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(5) & (7). 95. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive acts or practices occurred repeatedly in Defendant’s trade or business, were capable of deceiving a substantial portion of the purchasing public, and imposed a serious safety risk on the public. 96. Defendant knew that its Class Vehicles and their convertible tops suffered from an inherent defect, were defectively designed or manufactured, would fail prematurely, and were not suitable for their intended use. 97. Defendant was under a duty to Plaintiff and the other Class Members to disclose the defective nature of the Class Vehicles and their convertible tops and/or the associated repair costs: BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the California Sub-Class) COMMON LAW FRAUD (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the California Sub-Class) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class) VIOLATION OF THE NJCFA (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class) Violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code section 1750 et seq. (On Behalf of the California Sub-Class)

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(Breach of Contract) (FLSA Retaliation) (FLSA – Unpaid Minimum Wage and Unpaid Wages) (FLSA – Unpaid Overtime) (NJWHL – Unpaid Overtime) (NJWCL – Unpaid Wages) (NJWHL – Untimely Payments) (NJWHL – Unpaid Minimum Wage) 36. Plaintiffs bring claims for relief as a collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all non-exempt employees, including cooks, food preparers, waiters, dishwashers and busboys, employed by the Defendants on or after the date that is three years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (“FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”). 37. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices and procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay them proper overtime compensation at the rate of one and one half times the regular hourly rate for work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. The claims of the Plaintiffs stated herein are essentially the same as those of the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 39. Plaintiffs also bring claims for relief pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt employees, including cooks, food preparers, waiters, dishwashers and busboys, employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class period”). 40. All said persons, including the Plaintiffs, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rate of pay for each Class member are also determinable from the Defendants’ records. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under F.R.C.P. Rule 23. 41. The proposed Class is so numerous that a joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendants; upon information and belief, there are in excess of twenty (20) Class Members. 43. The Plaintiffs are able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and have no interests antagonistic to the Class. The Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented plaintiffs in wage and hour cases. 45. Defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New Jersey wage laws. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the Complaint a degree of anonymity, which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing those risks. 47. Defendants own and operate three Turkish restaurants in New Jersey, which primarily serve food and drinks to the public. The restaurants are Cinar 1 located at 677 Palisade Avenue, Cliffside Park NJ 07010; Cinar 2 located at 632 Bloomfield Avenue, West Caldwell NJ 07006; and Cinar 3 located at 214 Kinderkamack Roacd, Emerson NJ 07630. 48. From approximately May 2015 to December 1, 2017, Ucar was employed by the Defendants as an Executive Chef. 49. Ucar would work, at minimum, five days per week for Defendants. 50. Ucar would work, at minimum, thirteen hours per day, from 9am to 10pm. 51. Defendants failed to provide Ucar with a wage notice, upon his hire or annually. 52. Defendants failed to provide Ucar with proper wage statements for each payment he received. 53. Upon sincere information and belief, Defendants failed to maintain time records as to Ucar’s hours worked. 54. From May 2015 through approximately December 2016, Ucar was paid the gross amount of $1,500.00 on a weekly basis by a combination of check and cash. 56. During Ucar’s employment with Defendants, Ucar worked over forty (40) hours per week. 57. Although Ucar worked over forty hours per week, Defendants never paid Ucar at the required overtime premium rate. 58. Ucar was a non-exempt employee. 59. From approximately January 1, 2017 to December 1, 2017, Defendants failed to regularly pay Ucar his contractual rate of $1,500.00 on a weekly basis. 60. From approximately January 1, 2017 to December 1, 2017, Defendants failed to regularly pay Ucar at the required minimum wage rate. 61. From approximately January 1, 2017 to December 1, 2017, Defendants failed to pay Ucar at the required overtime premium rate. 62. Ucar complained to Tunc about not being paid the amount he was owed. 63. No action was taken in response to Ucar’s complaints; rather, in retaliation for his complaints, Ucar was constructively terminated on or about December 1, 2017. 64. Other employees of the Defendants, including but not limited to: Hakan Hanegelioglu, Baris Turkmen, Ferdi Memli, Mehmet (last name currently unknown), Gokhan Bayrak and Nuh Demirel were also improperly paid. 65. Defendants knew that the foregoing acts violated the law, and that they would economically injure Plaintiff. 67. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as though they were fully set forth herein. 68. The FLSA requires covered employees, such as Defendants, to pay all employees their regular rate of pay for all hours worked. Plaintiff was not exempt from this requirement. 69. From approximately January 1, 2017 to December 1, 2017, Defendants failed to regularly pay Plaintiff at his weekly rate of $1,500.00 per week. 70. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay, Defendants violated the FLSA. 71. The foregoing conduct of Defendants constitutes willful violations of the FLSA. 72. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have significantly damaged Plaintiff and entitle him to recover the total amount of his unpaid wages, and an additional equal amount in liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. 73. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as though they were fully set forth herein. 74. By failing to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half (1.5) times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants have violated and continue to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a)(2). 76. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime caused Plaintiff to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants this unpaid overtime premium compensation, damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of the action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 77. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as though they were fully set forth herein. 78. Defendants intentionally and willfully regularly failed to pay and refused to pay Ucar minimum wage, in violation of New Jersey Wage Payment Law, N.J.S.A. § 34:11-4.7, the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56a, and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Regulations, N.J.A.C. § 12:56-1.2(a)6, from approximately January 1, 2017 to December 1, 2017. 79. Defendants’ willful violations entitle Plaintiff to his unpaid wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action to be determined by the court, plus interest. 80. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as though they were fully set forth herein. 82. Defendants’ willful violations entitle Plaintiff to the recovery of his unpaid overtime, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action to be determined by the court, plus interest. 83. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as though they were fully set forth herein. 84. The NJWCL provides a private cause of action to allow aggrieved employees, like Plaintiff, to demand and collect all “wages” due and owing to him. 85. From approximately January 1, 2017 to December 1, 2017, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff at his regular rate of $1,500.00 per week. 86. As a result, Plaintiff has been damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest. 87. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as though they were fully set forth herein. 88. NJWHL 34:11-4.2 requires that “every employer shall pay the full amount of wages due to his employees as least twice during each calendar month, on regular pay days designated in advances by the employer…” 90. As a result, Plaintiff has been damages in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest. 91. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as though they were fully set forth herein. 92. Defendants agreed by contract to pay Plaintiff $1,500.00 per week. 93. For a portion of Plaintiff’s employment, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff at his contractual rate of $1,500.00 per week, in breach of contract. 94. Plaintiff hereby repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as though they were fully set forth herein. 95. Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA states that it is a violation for any person to “discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act…” 96. During the course of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants, Plaintiff complained about being improperly paid. 97. Plaintiff was retaliated against for complaining, ultimately resulting in Plaintiff’s constructive termination.

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56. Plaintiff incorporates each of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §2702, is designed to protect the privacy interest of users of electronically transmitted information. See, S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. 58. eBay violated the Act by negligently, and/or recklessly, failing to protect the personal information it held through appropriate security measures. 59. eBay provides electronic communications between buyers and sellers of merchandise via its remote computing services. In order to access eBay’s buy/sell functions the class members were compelled to provide eBay with significant personal information. eBay failed to take commercially reasonable steps to protect this information in-spite of the known threat and known weakness of its internal security.

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19. In Defendant’s overzealous attempt to market its services, it placed (and continues to place) phone calls to consumers who never provided consent to call and to consumers having no relationship with Defendant. Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) these telemarketing calls without the prior express written consent of the call recipients. As such, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Class, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 20. Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his cellular telephone number via ATDS, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), dozens of times between August and September of 2015. Plaintiff never consented in any manner to receive these calls to his cellular telephone. 21. Plaintiff received all calls as described above on his cellular telephone assigned a number ending in 0952. 22. Plaintiff’s caller ID read “928-493-0104” whenever Defendant called his cellular phone. 23. Plaintiff answered several of the calls and interacted with Defendant’s automatic dialing system, pre-recorded message menu, and, on at least one occasion, a live operator. 25. Plaintiff has received auto-dialed marketing calls before. Plaintiff associated the momentary pause as a sign a computer had auto-dialed his number and then automatically routed the call to a Defendant’s computerized messaging system once Defendant’s system recognized the call had been answered. 26. The automated message stated there were problems with Plaintiff’s google profile – press #1 to speak with an agent, or #2 to be removed from the call list. 27. Plaintiff wanted the calls to stop and did not trust Defendant’s automated option to actually remove his number from the call list. Therefore, on at least one occasion, Plaintiff took steps to identify the company calling him so he could request to be removed from its call list. 28. On an occasion when Defendant called from 928-493-0104, Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with an “agent” after answering the call and processing through Defendant’s automated, pre-recorded voice system. 29. Defendant’s automated system then routed Plaintiff to a female operator who explained she worked for an “SEO company” Plaintiff later identified as Defendant. Plaintiff asked who the agent worked for and she told him she worked for “SEO Services.” She then provided a web address: www.seoservices.com 30. Plaintiff then requested a call-back number. At that point, Defendant’s agent immediately disconnected the call. 31. After the call, Plaintiff discovered www.seoservices.com linked back to Defendant’s website, and is actually owned by Defendant. Thus, Defendant directly placed the calls to Plaintiff or hired a call center to place the calls on its behalf. 33. Defendant continues to call Plaintiff without his express consent. 34. It was obvious to Plaintiff that Defendant was engaged in a marketing campaign wherein Defendant contacts a large number of consumers using an autodialer. 35. Based on the circumstances of the calls – including but not limited to, a signature pause before pre-recorded voice started speaking, the presence of a pre-recorded voice, and receipt of multiple calls over a short period of time – Plaintiff believed Defendants called his cellular telephone using an ATDS that automatically selected his number from a computer database. 36. On information and belief, Defendant’s ATDS called Plaintiff on every occasion. 37. Plaintiff understood the purpose of Defendant’s calls was to solicit business from Plaintiff because Defendant indicated it could enhance his website’s presence on the internet. 38. The telephone number Defendant called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which charges incur for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 39. Plaintiff is the regular carrier and exclusive user of the cellular telephone assigned the number ending in 0952. 40. The telemarketing calls Defendants placed to Plaintiff were an annoyance, interfered with his work by causing him to lose time with customers, and invaded Plaintiff’s privacy. 41. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1(A)(i). 42. Plaintiff did not provide Defendant with prior express written consent to receive calls to his cellular telephone utilizing an ATDS or artificial or pre-recorded voice, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3). 44. Plaintiff has reason to believe Defendant has called, and continues to call, thousands of wireless telephone customers to market their products and services. 45. Plaintiff’s overriding interest is ensuring Defendant ceases all illegal telemarketing practices and compensate all members of the Plaintiff Class for invading their privacy in the manner the TCPA was contemplated to prevent. 46. In order to redress injuries caused by Defendant’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits certain unsolicited voice and text calls to cell phones. 47. On behalf of the Plaintiff Class, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to cease all wireless telemarketing and spam activities and an award of statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 48. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of himself and the following classes defined as follows (the “Class”): All individuals in the United States who received a call made by or on behalf of Defendant to the individual’s cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system, or pre-recorded voice, or any other device having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, from October 16, 2013 to the date the Class is certified, where Defendant’s records fail to indicate prior express written consent from the recipient to make such call. 50. This suit seeks only damages, statutory penalties, and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. 51. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 52. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by Defendant’s acts in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using an ATDS, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of Plaintiff and the Class members. B. 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 69. Defendant made unsolicited and unauthorized calls using an ATDS or pre-recorded voice to Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ cellular telephones for the purpose of marketing products and/or services to Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class Members. 70. Defendant made the calls without prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members. 71. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitutes numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq. 72. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq., Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class Members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 73. Because Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class Members did not consent to the receipt of the aforementioned telephone solicitations, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members. A. CLASS ALLEGATIONS VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227

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10. Plaintiff expected that her telephone call would be private (i.e., neither recorded nor monitored) due to the sensitive and confidential nature of the conversation. 12. Plaintiff brings this class action for damages and other monetary relief on behalf of the following class: “All persons who placed calls to Defendant from California whose telephone conversations with Defendant were intentionally recorded without disclosure by Defendant at any time during the statute of limitations period through the date of final judgment in this action.” (the “Class”). 13. Excluded from the Class are governmental entities, Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and Defendant’s officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, co-conspirators, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns, and individuals bound by any prior settlement. Also excluded from the Class is any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their immediate families and judicial staff. 14. The proposed Class is so numerous that individual joinder of all its members is impracticable. Due to the nature of the trade and commerce involved, Plaintiff believes that the total number of Class members is at least in the tens of thousands and members of the Class are numerous and geographically dispersed across California. While the exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time, such information can be ascertained through appropriate investigation and discovery. The disposition of the claims of the Class members in a single class action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and to the Court. 7. In June, 2013, while located in California, Plaintiff called Abbott at (800) 986- 8800 from a wireless telephone in California. Plaintiff spoke to a customer service representative of Defendant to inquire about Defendant’s Similac infant formula products. 8. Plaintiff was not aware that the call was being recorded. Defendant did not, at any point during the telephone conversation with Defendant’s customer service representative, advise Plaintiff that the call was being recorded. Plaintiff did not give either express or implied consent to the recording. 9. After completing her call, Plaintiff learned that Defendant records all incoming telephone calls but does not disclose this to callers. Penal Code § 632.7

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(Against All Defendants For Violations of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder) (Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants) 16. OvaScience is a life science company developing proprietary products to improve the treatment of female infertility. The Company’s first product candidate is AUGMENT, which stands for autologous germline mitochondria energy transfer. The Company is designing AUGMENT to increase the success of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) by isolating fresh mitochondria from a woman’s own egg precursor cells and then adding the mitochondria into the woman’s egg during IVF. 18. According to the Company’s Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2012, the FDA will regulate an HCT/P as a 361 HCT/P if it meets all of the following criteria: (1) the HCT/P is minimally manipulated, (2) the HCT/P is intended for homologous use only, as reflected by the labeling, advertising, or other indications of the manufacturer's objective intent, (3) the manufacture of the HCT/P does not involve the combination of the cells or tissues with another article, with a few exceptions, and (4) either: (a) the HCT/P does not have a systemic effect and is not dependent upon the metabolic activity of living cells for its primary function, or (b) the HCT/P has a systemic effect or is dependent upon the metabolic activity of living cells for its primary function and (i) is for autologous use, (ii) is for allogeneic use in a first or second degree blood relative, or (iii) is for reproductive use. 25. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, OvaScience securities were actively traded on the NASDAQ or OTC. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by OvaScience or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 26. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 27. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 29. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 31. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 32. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 33. This Count is asserted against defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 34. During the Class Period, defendants engaged in a plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, pursuant to which they knowingly or recklessly engaged in acts, transactions, practices and courses of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; made various untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. Such scheme was intended to, and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; (ii) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of OvaScience securities; and (iii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase OvaScience securities at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, defendants, and each of them, took the actions set forth herein. 36. By virtue of their positions at OvaScience, defendants had actual knowledge of the materially false and misleading statements and material omissions alleged herein and intended thereby to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, defendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts as would reveal the materially false and misleading nature of the statements made, although such facts were readily available to defendants. Said acts and omissions of defendants were committed willfully or with reckless disregard for the truth. In addition, each defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that material facts were being misrepresented or omitted as described above. 37. Information showing that defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth is peculiarly within defendants’ knowledge and control. As the senior managers and/or directors of OvaScience, the Individual Defendants had knowledge of the details of OvaScience’s internal affairs. 39. During the Class Period, OvaScience securities were traded on an active and efficient market. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, relying on the materially false and misleading statements described herein, which the defendants made, issued or caused to be disseminated, or relying upon the integrity of the market, purchased shares of OvaScience securities at prices artificially inflated by defendants’ wrongful conduct. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class known the truth, they would not have purchased said securities or would not have purchased them at the inflated prices that were paid. At the time of the purchases by Plaintiff and the Class, the true value of OvaScience securities were substantially lower than the prices paid by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. The market price of OvaScience securities declined sharply upon public disclosure of the facts alleged herein to the injury of Plaintiff and Class members. 40. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, defendants knowingly or recklessly, directly or indirectly, have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 42. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 43. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of OvaScience, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of OvaScience’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information regarding OvaScience’s NDA submission to the FDA. 44. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to OvaScience’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by OvaScience which had become materially false or misleading. 46. Each of the Individual Defendants, therefore, acted as a controlling person of OvaScience. By reason of their senior management positions and/or being directors of OvaScience, each of the Individual Defendants had the power to direct the actions of, and exercised the same to cause, OvaScience to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein. Each of the Individual Defendants exercised control over the general operations of OvaScience and possessed the power to control the specific activities which comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class complain. 47. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by OvaScience. BACKGROUND

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14. Plaintiff brings this action as a state-wide class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the FRCP, on behalf of himself and all New Jersey consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who Defendants collected or attempted to collect a debt from, in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 17. A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates no unusual difficulties in the management of this class action. 18. A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as damages. 19. Defendant(s) have acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 20. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 22. The ZALE obligation is an open end loan as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:11C-2 and/or a retail charge account as defined at N.J.S.A. 17:16C-1 et seq. 23. The ZALE obligation arose out of a transaction, in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 24. Plaintiff incurred the ZALE obligation by obtaining goods and services which were primarily for personal, family and household purposes. 25. The ZALE obligation did not arise out of a transaction that was for non-personal use. 26. The ZALE obligation did not arise out of a transaction that was for business use. 27. The ZALE obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 28. ZALE is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). 29. At some time prior to December 10, 2020, the ZALE obligation was allegedly purchased by and/or sold to CVI SGP-CO. 30. At the time the ZALE obligation was purchased by and/or sold to CVI SGP-CO, the obligation was in default. 31. The principal purpose of CVI SGP-CO is the collection of debts which are in default at the time it allegedly purchases the debts. 32. CVI SGP-CO has obtained a license and/or has registered as a collection agency and/or as a debt collector with at least one State and/or State department or agency within the United States within the relevant period. 34. CVI SGP-CO is prohibited from using the word “Trust” in its name by N.J.S.A. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 72. Collection letters and/or notices, such as those sent by Defendants, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” 73. Defendant’s letter would cause the least sophisticated consumer to be confused about his or her rights. 74. Defendant’s letter would mislead the least sophisticated consumer to believe that Defendants could legally attempt to collect the debt. 75. Defendant’s letter would cause the least sophisticated consumer to believe that Defendants had the legal ability to attempt to collect the debt and that CVI SGP-CO had acquired the appropriate licenses or had otherwise complied with New Jersey regulations. 76. A violation of New Jersey laws, despite no private cause of action, can form the basis of a violation of the FDCPA. See Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, P.C., 777 F.Supp.2d 823 FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS

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94. Plaintiff brings this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) on behalf of Plaintiff and the following Class: All persons in the United States who directly purchased Dental Products from Henry Schein, Inc., Patterson Companies, Inc. or Benco Dental Supply Company at any time during the period from January 20, 2012 until the conduct challenged in this Complaint ends (“Class Period”). Henry Schein, Inc., Patterson Companies, Inc., and Benco Dental Supply Company and their subsidiaries are not included in the Class. Also excluded from the Class are federal and state entities that directly purchased Dental Products from one or more Defendants. 95. Members of the class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. The class includes thousands of private dental practices and dental laboratories. 96. Defendants’ alleged conduct applies generally to the class as a whole. A. THE DENTAL PRODUCTS INDUSTRY

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26. From November 2006 to February 2012, Lim was employed by Defendant AIA Recycling at AIA Recycling’s Greenville, Alabama facility. 27. Sometime in February 2012, Defendant AIA Recycling relocated Lim to Defendant Metal Source America’s LaGrange, Georgia facility. 28. From February 2012 to September 2014, Lim worked at the LaGrange, Georgia facility. 29. While Lim was working at the LaGrange facility, he received instructions directly from Metal Source America. 30. While Lim was working at the LaGrange facility, he received paychecks from AIA Recycling. 32. According to the Secretary of State of Georgia, Defendant Na Y Kim is the CFO and secretary of Metal Source America. 33. Based on information and belief, Na Y Kim has an ownership interest in both AIA Recycling and Metal Source America. 34. AIA Recycling’s principal place of business is 470 Cloverdale Road, Greenville, AL 36037. 35. Based on the website of Metal Source America, www.metalsourceamerica.com, it has three “yard locations,” and 470 Cloverdale Road, Greenville, AL 36037 is one of Metal Source America’s “yard locations.” 36. Throughout Lim’s employment with Defendants, all of his compensation came from a salary paid by Defendants. 37. Throughout Lim’s employment with Defendants, Lim was employed as a “Yard Employee” by Defendants. It is the intent of this collective action to apply to all of Defendants’ current/former “Yard Employees,” including machine operators, equipment operators, maintenance workers, and security guards from October 10, 2011 to the date of judgment in this action. 35 Lim’s principal duties while working for Defendants were comprised of performing yard duties connected with Defendants’ scrap metal recycling business, including operating equipment. 38. There are numerous “Yard Employees,” employed by Defendants, working in excess of forty hours per week and paid a salary, including machine operators, equipment operators, maintenance workers, and a security guards. 39. Lim and the putative class members are similarly situated in terms of job duties, pay, and compensation. 40. Lim did not have discretionary authority in his position as a “Yard Employee” for Defendants.

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21. Defendant is a beauty company, offering skincare, hair care and body care products for sale, and owns and operates the website, www.andalou.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout New York. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS and NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in June of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.andalou.com, with an intent to browse available skincare products. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to make his desired purchase. 26. The Website also contains a host of broken links. Plaintiff encountered broken links while attempting to view the Cannacell X-Foliate Scrub. This encounter ended Plaintiff’s browsing experience. 27. The Website also requires the use of a mouse to effectively browse and make a purchase, as well as to create an account. Yet Plaintiff cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. 28. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 29. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 85. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 86. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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25. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all wheelchair users who have attempted, or will attempt, to access Defendant’s facilities. 26. The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 27. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 28. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s facilities and/or services due to Defendant’s failure to make its facilities fully accessible and independently usable as above described. 30. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. INC., Defendant. Case No. Filed Electronically

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following Massachusetts subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant, during the relevant statutory period.” 21. There are hundreds of thousands of visually impaired persons in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually impaired. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 22. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website that denies blind persons access to the goods and services of the Website and the Restaurant. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse the Website and by extension the goods and services offered through the Website by Defendant. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 25. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 27. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 29. Defendant operates the Restaurant, a chain of ice cream cafes offering ice cream, coffee, and other desserts with 12 locations in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 30. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 31. Among the features offered by the Website are the following: (a) information about the Restaurant, allowing persons who wish to dine at the Restaurant to learn its locations, hours, and phone numbers; (b) a menu; (c) an online store, allowing users to purchase cakes, pies, and Cow Cards; (d) information about catering; and (e) information about the Restaurant’s history, employment opportunities, and donations. 32. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Restaurant, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. Defendant denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely navigating the Website. 35. The blind access websites by using keyboards in conjunction with screen reading software which vocalizes visual information on a computer screen. Except for a blind person whose residual vision is still sufficient to use magnification, screen reading software provides the only method by which a blind person can independently access the Internet. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, blind persons are unable to fully access websites and the information, products, and services contained therein. 36. There are well established guidelines for making websites accessible to blind people. These guidelines have been in place for several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium, which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility. The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including, but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard and not just a mouse; adding alternative text to non- text content; and adding headings so that blind people can easily navigate the site. Without these very basic components, a website will be inaccessible to a blind person using a screen reader. 38. Alternative text (“alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen reader can speak the alternative text while a sighted user sees the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. The images of cakes on the “Ready-To-Go Cakes” page lack alt-text. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. (Screen readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user.) In fact, screen readers cannot even recognize that the images exist. As a result, Plaintiff and blind customers are unable to determine what is on the Website, browse the site, and investigate the Restaurant’s products. 39. According to WCAG 2.0 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the Website. Plaintiff must tab through every menu option on the Website to reach the desired service. Additionally, in order for blind users to access the individual location links on the image map on the “Where to Find Us” page, they must tab through every menu option in both the header and the footer. Thus, the Website’s inaccessible design denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate the Website. 41. WCAG 2.0 Guideline 2.4.4 states that the purpose of each link must be determinable. Sighted users can ascertain the purpose of links by reading the link text and the surrounding descriptions and by recognizing the images that the links are embedded in. Blind users, however, must rely on a combination of screen reading software and proper coding to determine what sighted users can recognize at a glance. On the “Where to Find Us” page, the links to the Grubhub pages are incorrect labeled, so blind users cannot determine what the links are for. Thus, the Website is inaccessible to blind users attempting to use and browse the Website. 42. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Restaurant. 43. Plaintiff has made numerous attempts to browse the locations on the Website, most recently in January 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on the Website. These access barriers have caused the Website to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 45. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing it to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 46. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of the Website and the Restaurant. 47. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 50. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 51. The Restaurant is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). The Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. The Website is a service that is by and integrated with the Restaurant. Independent of the Restaurant, the Website is also a public accommodation. 52. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the Website. 53. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 55. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 56. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 57. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 59. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 60. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and the Restaurant in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 61. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 62. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 63. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 66. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension the Restaurant, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 67. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly.

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25. Widely recognized as Apple’s premier product line, iPhone is a line of industry- leading smartphones1 that debuted on June 29, 2007. In the years that followed, Apple released several successive versions of the iPhone on an approximately yearly basis. 26. On June 7, 2010, Apple’s then-CEO Steve Jobs introduced the iPhone 4, which he described as “the biggest leap since the original iPhone.”2 Within three days of the June 24, 2010 launch of the iPhone 4, Apple announced that it had sold roughly 1.7 million units.3 27. Apple launched its next generation iPhone—the iPhone 4S—on October 14, 2011. Over four million iPhone 4S’s were sold within the first three days of the device’s launch. Apple Senior Vice President of Worldwide Product Marketing Philip Schiller commented that these sales were “the most ever for a phone and more than double the iPhone 4 launch during its first three days.”4 Background

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55. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of all who purchased or otherwise acquired ADT common stock pursuant or traceable to the Registration Statement issued in connection with the IPO (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their families, the officers and directors and affiliates of Defendants, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 57. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 58. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. 59. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (a) whether Defendants violated the Securities Act; (b) whether the Registration Statement contained false or misleading statements of material fact and omitted material information required to be stated therein; (c) whether the prices of ADT securities were artificially inflated because of the Defendants’ conduct complained of herein; and (d) to what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the proper measure of damages. 60. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 61. Plaintiff incorporates all the foregoing by reference. 63. The Registration Statement contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading, and omitted to state material facts required to be stated therein. 64. Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff and the Class for the misstatements and omissions. 65. None of the Defendants named herein made a reasonable investigation or possessed reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements contained in the Registration Statement were true and without omissions of any material facts and were not misleading. 66. By reason of the conduct herein alleged, each Defendant violated or controlled a person who violated §11 of the Securities Act. 67. Plaintiff acquired ADT shares pursuant to the Registration Statement. 68. Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages. The value of ADT common stock has declined substantially subsequent to and due to Defendants’ violations. 69. At the time of their purchases of ADT shares, Plaintiff and other members of the Class were without knowledge of the facts concerning the wrongful conduct alleged herein and could not have reasonably discovered those facts prior to the disclosures herein. Less than one year has elapsed from the time that Plaintiff discovered or reasonably could have discovered the facts upon which this Complaint is based to the time that Plaintiff commenced this action. Less than three years has elapsed between the time that the securities upon which this Cause of Action is brought were offered to the public and the time Plaintiff commenced this action. 70. Plaintiff incorporates all the foregoing by reference. 71. By means of the defective Prospectus, Defendants promoted, solicited, and sold ADT shares to Plaintiff and other members of the Class. 73. Plaintiff did not know, nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could Plaintiff have known, of the untruths and omissions contained in the prospectus at the time Plaintiff acquired ADT shares. 74. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants violated §12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. As a direct and proximate result of such violations, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class who purchased ADT shares pursuant to the prospectus sustained substantial damages in connection with their purchases of the stock. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class who hold the common stock issued pursuant to the Prospectus have the right to rescind and recover the consideration paid for their shares, and hereby tender their common stock to Defendants sued herein. Class members who have sold their common stock seek damages to the extent permitted by law. 75. Plaintiff incorporates all the foregoing by reference. 76. This Cause of Action is brought pursuant to §15 of the Securities Act against all Defendants. 78. ADT, Apollo Global, and the Individual Defendants were culpable participants in the violations of §§11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act alleged in the First and Second Causes of Action above, based on their having signed or authorized the signing of the Registration Statement and having otherwise participated in the process which allowed the IPO to be successfully completed. For Violation of §11 of the Securities Act Against All Defendants Except Apollo Global For Violation of §15 of the Securities Act Against All Defendants For Violation of §12(a)(2) of the Securities Act Against All Defendants

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10. The landlord never took Plaintiffs to court over the alleged unpaid balance, much less obtained a judgment against them. 12. The lease was a form contract drafted entirely by the landlord with no option for the Plaintiffs to negotiate any terms other than the length ofthe tenancy. 13. On some date between June 10,2015 and July 17, 2015—^almost immediately after Plaintiffs moved out ofthe apartment—^the landlord assigned Plaintiffs' account to Defendant for collections. 14. On July 17, 2015, Defendant sent to each ofthe named Plaintiffs a collection letter, a true and accurate copyofwhichis attachedhereto as ExhibitA and incorporated fully herein by reference. Defendant sent the individual letters to Plaintiffs' new address (also in Annandale, Virginia), where they received them. 15. The collection letter states "Interest Due" of $19.93, and furthermore states, "Your unpaid principal balance will accrue interest as a rate of006.00 percent per annum." 16. This was false. In fact, there was no interest due, and no interest accruing. 17. Virginia law governing landlord-tenant relations does not automatically provide for interest on xmpaid balances, except where a landlord has obtained a judgment against a tenant, in which case the general Virginia post-judgmentinterest rate of6 percent would apply to any such judgment. 18. In Virginia, an awardofprejudgmentinterestis discretionary with the trier of fact, not mandatory. Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth, v. Blake Constr. Co., 275 Va. 41, 63 (2008). 20. Plaintiffs each individually experienced a measurable amount ofstress and anxietyat the idea that his or her balance would continueto grow as interestcontinuedto accrue. 21. In the alternative, even ifinterest were legally allowed to accrue, the collection letter falselyrepresentedthe amountofinterestowed. On informationand belief, Defendants' letter calculatedinterest startingfrom a date prior to the Plaintiffs' allegedbreach ofan obligationto pay their landlord,and thereby stated an amountof interestin excessofany amount that could possibly be due. 30. The classes Plaintiffs seek to represent (collectively, the "Class") are defined as follows: All (i) residents ofthe states ofVirginia, West Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, or South Carolina (ii) to whom letters of the same form or substantially similar form as Exhibit A were sent (iii) in an attempt to collect a debt arising out of a residential lease (iv) which were not returned imdelivered by the U.S. Post Office (v) during the one year period prior to the filing of the complaint in this action (the "Fourth Circuit Class"). All (i) residents of the Commonwealth of Virginia (ii) to whom letters of the same form or substantially similar form as Exhibit A were sent (iii) in an attempt to collect a debt arising out of a residential lease (iv) wMch were not returned undelivered by the U.S. Post Office (v) during the one year period prior to the filing ofthe complaint in this action (the "Virginia Sub-Class"). 31. Excluded from the Classes are Defendant's officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns. Also excluded from the Classes are any judges, justices, or judicial officers presiding over this matter and the members oftheir immediate families and judicial staff. 32. Plaintiffreserves the right to amend the Class definitions ifdiscovery and further investigation reveals that the Classes should be expanded or otherwise modified. 33. Plaintiffreserves the right to establish sub-classes as appropriate. 35. Numerositv: The proposed Classes are each so numerous that individual joinder ofall members is impracticable. 37. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical ofthe claims ofthe members ofthe Classes. Plaintiffs and all members ofthe Classes haye been similarly affected by Defendant's actions. 38. Adequacy ofRepresentation: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests ofthe Classes. Plaintiffs haye retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex and class action litigation. Plaintiffs and their counsel are committed to yigorously prosecuting this action on behalfofthe Classes and haye the financial resources to do so. 40. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-39. 41. Defendant is a "debt collector" as defined in the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) because it uses the mails in the business ofregularly collectingor attemptingto collect debts owed or due to another. 42. Plaintiffs and class members are obligated or allegedlyobligatedto pay a debt arising outof a transaction that isprimarily forpersonal, family, orhousehold purposes and is thus a "consumer" as defined in the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §1692a{3). 43. The FDCPA, 15U.S.C. §1692e,prohibits the use ofany false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection withthe collection of anydebt. 44. Themisrepresentations as setforth above in defendant's collection letter attached hereto as Exhibit A violated the FDCPA, specifically 15U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), and 1692f(l), to theinjury ofPlaintiffs and class members, andDefendant is thus liable toPlaintiffs and similarly situated class members in damages. 45. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-44. 46. The FDCPA, 15U.S.C. § 1692g,requires notificationofthe ability for a consumerto disputeor request verification ofallegeddebts within 30 days. 48. Moreover, by including an illegal amount ofinterest in the collection letter to Plaintiffs, Defendant misrepresented the actual amount alleged to be owed by Plaintiffs as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(l). 49. The misrepresentations set forth above in Defendant's collection letter attached hereto as Exhibit A violated the FDCPA, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1692g and § 1692g(a)(l), to the injury ofPlaintiffs and class members, and Defendant is thus liable to Plaintiffs and similarly situated class members in damages. 8. On June 10, 2015, Plaintiffs Sara Judith Garcia Galdamez, Jorge Armando Escobar Barillas, and Virginia de Jesus Pena Pozuelos (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiffs"), voluntarily moved out ofa rental apartment in the Fairmont Gardens apartment complex managed by Fairmont Residential, LLC in Annandale, Virginia, because their lease ended. At that time, they voluntarily turned over possession ofthe apartment to the landlord. The apartment in question had been Plaintiffs' primary residence. 9. After Plaintiffs moved out ofthe apartment, the landlord contended that they left behind an unpaid balance of$3,276.84, which allegedly consisted ofa certain amount ofunpaid rent, a certain amount ofunpaid utility bills, and charges for repair ofsome alleged minor damages to theapartment.^ Fair Debt Collectioii Practices Act 15 U.S.C. 1692e, 1692e(2)(A). 1692e(10). 1692f(l). Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 15 U.S.C» 1692g. 1692g(aKl).

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DOMINOS PIZZA, and SCOTT BOYLE, individually 3917 MIDLANDS ROAD STE. A

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11. The OBLIGATION arose out of a transaction, in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 12. Plaintiff incurred the OBLIGATION by obtaining goods and services which were primarily for personal, family and household purposes. 13. Plaintiff did not incur the OBLIGATION for business purposes. 14. The OBLIGATION is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 15. At some time prior to August 5, 2020, the OBLIGATION was placed with NATIONAL CREDIT SYSTEMS for the purpose of collection. 16. At the time the OBLIGATION was placed with NATIONAL CREDIT SYSTEMS for the purpose of collection, the balance was past due. 17. At the time the OBLIGATION was placed with NATIONAL CREDIT SYSTEMS for the purpose of collection, the obligation was in default. 18. Plaintiff caused to be delivered to Defendant a letter dated August 5, 2020, which were addressed to Defendant. SEE Exhibit A, which is fully incorporated herein by reference. 19. The August 5, 2020 letter was sent to Defendant in connection with the collection of the OBLIGATION. 21. After the date of the dispute, Defendant knew or should have known that the credit information concerning the OBLIGATION would be communicated to creditors and other persons. 22. The credit information communicated to these creditors and other persons did not indicate that the OBLIGATION was disputed. 23. The credit information communicated to these creditors and other persons concerning the OBLIGATION was false. 24. Defendant failed to communicate to any person that the OBLIGATION is disputed. 25. Since August 5, 2020, Defendant has communicated to at least one person, credit information which is known or should be known to be false. 26. NATIONAL CREDIT SYSTEMS knew or should have known that its actions violated the FDCPA. 27. Defendants could have taken the steps necessary to bring their actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 30. Plaintiff brings this action as a state-wide class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of himself and all Pennsylvania consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who were harmed by the Defendant’s conduct in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 31. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as: All Pennsylvania consumers for whom Defendant communicated to any person credit information which is known to be false and/or for whom Defendant failed to communicate to any person that a disputed debt was disputed as set forth herein. The class definition may be subsequently modified or refined. The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 33. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 34. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with its attempts to collect debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 35. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA in connection with Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 37. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing the character or legal status of the debt. 38. By failing to communicate that a disputed debt was disputed, Defendant made a false representation of the character or legal status of the debt. 39. By communicating credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false, Defendant made a false representation of the character or legal status of the debt. 40. Section 1692e(8) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from communicating to any person credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed. 41. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by communicating to any person credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false. 42. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by failing to communicate to any person that the OBLIGATION was disputed. 43. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by failing to communicate to one or more of the credit reporting bureaus that the OBLIGATION was disputed. 44. Section 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 45. By failing to communicate that the OBLIGATION was disputed as described herein, Defendant engaged in a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect the debt. 47. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 48. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to have the Defendant abide by its obligations under the FDCPA and those specifically found at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). 49. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have suffered harm as a direct result of the abusive, deceptive and unfair collection practices described herein. 50. Plaintiff has suffered damages and other harm as a direct result of the Defendants’ actions, conduct, omissions and violations of the FDCPA described herein. 51. Defendant’s failure to act as described herein caused harm to the credit of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 9. Plaintiff is, at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS

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14. Plaintiff seeks to bring this suit to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages pursuant to the applicable provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), individually, on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of those in the following collective: Current and former plumbers, who during the applicable FLSA limitations period, performed any work for Defendants as a plumber, or other similar position, and who consent to file a claim to recover damages for overtime compensation and liquidated damages that are legally due to them (“FLSA Plaintiffs”). 15. Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours in a workweek; and (5) were not paid the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked per workweek in excess of forty. 16. At all times relevant to the FLSA, Defendants are and have been aware of the requirements to pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to the rate of one and one- half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty. Indeed, Defendants were previously sued for, inter alia, substantially-similar, if not identical FLSA overtime violations to those alleged here, and a judgment was entered against Defendants to end that case. Nonetheless, Defendants purposefully and willfully continued to choose not to pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 6  17. Thus, Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully refusing to pay their employees proper overtime compensation at the statutorily-required rate for all hours worked per workweek above forty, in violation of the FLSA. 18. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to maintain this action as a class action pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), on behalf of himself, individually, as well as on behalf of all those who are similarly- situated whom Defendants subjected to violations of the NYLL and the NYCRR during the applicable statutory period. 19. Under FRCP 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must plead that: a. The class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable; b. There are questions of law or fact common to the class that predominate over any individual questions of law or fact; c. Claims or defenses of the representative are typical of the class; d. The representative will fairly and adequately protect the class; and e. A class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following FRCP 23 class: Current and former plumbers, who during the applicable NYLL limitations period, performed any work for Defendants in New York as a plumber or in a similar position (“Rule 23 Plaintiffs”). Numerosity 21. During the previous six years Defendants have employed, in total, at least forty employees who are putative members of this class. 7  Common Questions of Law and/or Fact 22. There are common questions of law and fact that govern the claims of each and every Rule 23 Plaintiff and that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the FRCP 23 class, including but not limited to the following: (1) the duties that Defendants required each Rule 23 Plaintiff to perform; (2) the manner of compensating each Rule 23 Plaintiff; (3) whether the Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours in a week; (4) whether Defendants failed to pay the Rule 23 Plaintiffs proper overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty in a week; (5) whether Defendants furnished the Rule 23 Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements on each payday containing the information required by NYLL § 195(3); (6) whether Defendants kept and maintained accurate records of hours that the Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked; (7) whether Defendants kept and maintained records with respect to the compensation that they paid to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs for each hour worked; (8) whether Defendants have any affirmative defenses to any of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ claims; (9) whether Defendants’ actions with respect to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs were in violation of the NYLL and its supporting regulations; and (10) if so, what constitutes the proper measure of damages. Typicality of Claims and/or Defenses 23. As described in the “Background Facts” section below, Defendants employed Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs within the meaning of the NYLL. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs whom he seeks to represent, as the Rule 23 Plaintiffs work and/or have worked for Defendants as plumbers, or in other similar positions, in New York, and Defendants do not and/or did not: properly pay them overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked in a week over forty; and/or provide them with accurate wage statements on each payday. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs enjoy the same 8  rights under the NYLL and the NYCRR to receive overtime wages at the statutorily-required rate of time and one-half their regular rates of pay for all hours worked each week over forty, and to be furnished with accurate wage statements on each payday. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs have all sustained similar types of damages as a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with the NYLL and its supporting regulations. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs all have suffered injury, including lack of compensation or under compensation, due to Defendants’ common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims and/or Defendants’ defenses to those claims are typical of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ claims and/or Defendants’ defenses to those claims. Adequacy 24. Plaintiff, as described below, worked the same or similar hours as the Rule 23 Plaintiffs throughout his employment with Defendants. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff overtime at the rate of time and one-half his regular rate of pay for all of his hours worked over forty in a week, and did not furnish Plaintiff with accurate wage statements on each payday, which is substantially similar to how Defendants paid and treated the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. Plaintiff fully anticipates providing discovery responses and testifying under oath as to all of the matters raised in this Complaint and that may be raised in Defendants’ Answer that pertain to him. Thus, Plaintiff would properly and adequately represent the current and former employees whom Defendants have subjected to the treatment alleged herein. 25. Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel has substantial experience in this field of law. 9  Superiority 26. Plaintiff has no, or very few, material facts relating to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ claims that are atypical of those of the putative class. Indeed, at all times during the relevant period, Defendants treated Plaintiff identically, or at the very least, substantially similarly, to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. 27. Any lawsuit brought by any plumber or person working in another similar position for Defendants in New York would be identical to a suit brought by any other similar employee for the same violations as alleged herein. Thus, separate litigation would risk inconsistent results. 28. Accordingly, the means of protecting the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ rights is superior to any other method, and this action is properly maintainable as a class action under FRCP 23(b)(3). 29. Defendant Triboro is a Brooklyn-based company that provides service and repair to water mains and sewers for commercial and residential buildings throughout the five boroughs of New York City and on Long Island. 30. Defendant Passalacqua is the owner of Triboro, as well as the individual who oversees its daily operations, who in that role manages and supervises all Triboro employees, including but not limited to Plaintiff and all of Triboro’s plumbers. Defendant Passalacqua has hiring and firing authority and exercises that authority routinely. Defendant Passalacqua is also responsible for determining the hours that plumbers are required to work, the amount of compensation paid to plumbers, and the method of compensating plumbers. He also is responsible for maintaining employment records for the business’s employees. To that end, Defendant Passalacqua personally hired Plaintiff, determined his rate of pay and work schedule, managed and 10  supervised Plaintiff’s day-to-day activities, including the work site to which Plaintiff would be assigned each day, and ultimately terminated Plaintiff’s employment. 31. Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a plumber from June 2005 through April 2, 2020 at which point he was furloughed for one month until his termination on May 2, 2020. 32. As a plumber, Plaintiff’s primary job duties consisted of installing and repairing basins, sewers, fire hydrants, sprinkler mains, and water mains at various work sites throughout the five boroughs of New York City and on Long Island. Specifically, the majority of Plaintiff’s job sites were in Brooklyn and Defendants’ principal place of business was and is located in Brooklyn. 33. Throughout at least the relevant period, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work, between forty-six and fifty-four hours per week from Monday through Friday during two weeks each month, and between fifty-six and one-half and sixty-six hours per week from Monday through Saturday during the other two weeks each month, for an average of 56.75 hours each week. 34. Specifically, from Monday through Friday, Defendants required Plaintiff to start his workday at 8:00 a.m., and to continue working until anywhere between 5:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., randomly receiving unscheduled thirty-minute breaks two or three days per week. On Saturdays, Defendants required Plaintiff to start his workday at 7:00 a.m. and to continue working until between 5:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. without any scheduled or uninterrupted breaks. 35. Thus, at all times throughout the relevant period, Defendants required Plaintiff to actually work, and Plaintiff did in fact work, a minimum of forty-six and as many as sixty-six hours in a week. 11  36. During the weeks when Plaintiff worked only five days per week from Monday through Friday, Defendants paid Plaintiff at the following rates of pay for the first forty hours that he worked each week and nothing additional for any hours worked in excess of forty per week: a. from at least the beginning of the relevant period through March 2016, at a rate of $20.00 per hour; b. from April 2016 through March 2018, at a rate of $22.50 per hour; and c. from April 2018 through April 2, 2020, at a rate of $25.00 per hour. 37. During the weeks when Plaintiff worked six days per week from Monday through Saturday, Defendants paid Plaintiff in the following manner: a. from at least the beginning of the relevant period through March 2016, at a rate $20.00 per hour for the first fifty hours worked in a week, and nothing additional for his hours worked beyond fifty; b. from April 2016 through March 2018, at a rate of $22.50 per hour for the first fifty hours worked in a week, and nothing additional for his hours worked beyond fifty; and c. from April 2018 through April 2, 2020, at a rate of $25.00 per hour for the first fifty-two hours worked in a week, and nothing additional for his hours worked beyond fifty-two. 38. At no time during the relevant period did Defendants pay Plaintiff at the rate of one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for the hours that he worked over forty in a week. 39. By way of example, for the pay period of October 18 through October 24, 2019, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work, a total of sixty-six hours according to the following schedule: 12  Friday, October 18, 2019: 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. without a scheduled or uninterrupted break; Saturday, October 19, 2019: 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. without a scheduled or uninterrupted break; Sunday, October 20, 2019: Off. Monday, October 21, 2019: 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. with a thirty-minute break; Tuesday, October 22, 2019: 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. without a scheduled or uninterrupted break; Wednesday, October 23, 2019: 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. with a thirty-minute break; and Thursday, October 24, 2019: 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. without a scheduled or uninterrupted break. For his work during this workweek, Defendants paid Plaintiff at his straight-time rate of $25.00 per hour for fifty-two hours of work, and nothing additional for the remaining fourteen hours that he worked. 40. Defendants paid Plaintiff on a weekly basis in both cash and check. 41. On each occasion when Defendants paid Plaintiff, Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff with a wage statement that accurately listed, inter alia, his actual hours worked for the week, or his overtime rate and overtime wages owed. 42. Defendants treated Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in the same manner described herein. 43. Defendants acted in this manner to maximize their profits and minimize their labor costs and overhead. 13  44. Each hour that Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked was for Defendants’ benefit. 45. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 46. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 47. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA, while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 48. As also described above, Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, yet Defendants failed to compensate them in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 49. Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. 50. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. 51. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violations of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 52. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 14  53. NYLL § 160 and 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2 require employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 54. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCRR, while Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCRR. 55. As also described above, Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, yet Defendants failed to compensate them in accordance with the NYLL’s and the NYCRR’s overtime provisions. 56. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one- half times their respective regular rates of pay. 57. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action are also entitled to liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violations of the NYLL’s and the NYCRR’s overtime provisions. 58. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 59. NYLL § 195(3) requires that employers furnish employees with wage statements containing accurate, specifically enumerated criteria on each occasion when the employer pays wages to the employee. 15  60. As described above, Defendants, on each payday, failed to furnish Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action with wage statements that accurately contained the criteria required under the NYLL. 61. Prior to February 27, 2015, pursuant to NYLL § 198(1-d), Defendants are liable to Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action in the amount of $100 for each workweek after the violation occurred, up to a statutory cap of $2,500. 62. On or after February 27, 2015, pursuant to NYLL § 198(1-d), Defendants are liable to Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-in to this action in the amount of $250 for each workday after the violation occurred, up to a statutory cap of $5,000. Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements in Violation of the NYLL Unpaid Overtime Under the FLSA Unpaid Overtime Under the NYLL and the NYCRR

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(Violation of NCWHA – Class Action) (Violation of FLSA – Collective Action) 10. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(1) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1), in that the enterprise has had employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person and in that the enterprise has had and has an annual gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately stated). 11. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff has been an employee within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 12. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff was an individual employee who was engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207. 13. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an employer within the meaning of Section 95-25.2(5) of the NCWHA, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.2(5). 15. ABNC is a beer and non-alcoholic beverage distributer with a distribution location in North Carolina. 16. In or about February 2016, ABNC hired Nix in the position of Warehouse Picker. 17. Nix worked in this position until on or about August 6, 2019, when his employment with ABNC terminated. 18. ABNC pays its warehouse employees an hourly rate, plus a performance bonus each paycheck based on the employee’s production. 19. During his tenure with ABNC, Nix regularly worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek including, but not limited to, the weeks of July 16, 2019 through July 31, 2019 and August 1, 2019 through August 15, 2019. For each pay period in which Nix worked overtime hours, ABNC consistently failed to pay Nix all of his earned overtime wages. 20. In addition to Nix, other ABNC’s warehouse employees have worked in excess of 40 hours per week during one or more workweeks during the 3 year period preceding the filing of this Complaint and have not been paid all overtime compensation due and owing to them. 21. At all times during the 3 year period preceding the filing of this Complaint, ABNC paid Nix an overtime rate equivalent to 1.5x Nix’s hourly payrate. 22. At all times during the 3 year period preceding the filing of this Complaint, ABNC did not include the additional compensation paid to Nix pursuant to the production bonus payment in its calculation of Nix’s regular rate of pay, as required by the FLSA. 24. At all times during the 3 year period preceding the filing of this Complaint, ABNC did not include the additional compensation paid to warehouse workers pursuant to the production bonus payment in its calculation of regular rates of pay for warehouse workers. 25. At all times during the 3 year period preceding the filing of this Complaint, ABNC provided a 40-minute meal period, plus two 10-minute breaks each workshift for Nix and other warehouse workers. 26. ABNC required Nix and other warehouse workers to clock out and clock in at the beginning and end of each 40-minute meal periods and each 10-minute break. 27. ABNC did not compensate Nix or other warehouse workers for the time spent on all breaks less than 20-minutes in length. 28. Nix and other similarly situated warehouse workers routinely worked 5 days per week and approximately 45 to 60 hours weekly. 29. Plaintiff brings Count I of his Complaint pursuant to the collective action provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. 30. Defendant employs warehouse employees in North Carolina. 32. Application of the aforementioned policies and practices are not dependent on the personal circumstances of individual warehouse workers, but rather affected Plaintiff and all putative collective action class members. Application of these policies or practices does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Plaintiff or those joining this lawsuit. Rather, the same policies or practices that resulted in the failure to pay overtime at the rates required by the FLSA applied to Plaintiff and all putative collective action class members. Accordingly, the class is properly defined as: All current and former North Carolina warehouse employees employed by Defendant within three years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 33. Defendant willfully violated the provisions of the FLSA by failing to pay all current and former North Carolina warehouse employees employed by Defendant within three years prior to the filing of this Complaint in compliance with the FLSA. 34. Plaintiff brings Count II of his Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the following class: All current and former North Carolina warehouse employees employed by Defendant within two years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 35. This action under NCWHA, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.6 and 95-25.7, is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 for failure to pay promised and earned wages for all hours worked by Plaintiff and members of the proposed class. 36. The proposed class is easily ascertainable. The number and identity of NCWHA class members are determinable from Defendant’s payroll records or records over which it has control. 38. There is a well-defined commonality of interest in the questions of law and fact involving and affecting the proposed class in that Plaintiff and all members of the proposed class have been harmed by Defendant’s failure to pay earned wages. The common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant maintained a policy and practice of refusing to pay Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class for breaks of 20 minutes or less; (b) whether Defendant maintained a policy and practice of failing to pay all hours worked by Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class; (c) whether Defendant failed to timely pay Plaintiff and members of the proposed class promised and earned regular wages for all hours worked on their regular pay days; and (d) whether the policies and practices described above violate NCWHA §§ 95-25.6 and 95-25.7. 39. The damages suffered by the named Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class arise from the same nucleus of operative facts. 41. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of all members of the class, and there are no known conflicts of interest between Plaintiff and members of the proposed class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is experienced and competent in both wage and hour and multi-plaintiff litigation. 42. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Individual joinder of all class members is impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because the loss, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual class members are modest, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual class members to redress the wrongs done to them. 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 43 of his Complaint. 45. Count I arises from Defendant’s violation of the FLSA, for its failure to pay all overtime wages earned by Plaintiff and members of the proposed collective class. 46. Defendant also violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff and members of the proposed collective class the correct overtime premium rate of pay as required by the FLSA for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 47. Defendant’s violation of the FLSA was willful. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 47 of his Complaint. 49. Count II arises from Defendant’s policy and practice of suffering or permitting Plaintiff and similarly situated employees to work without timely paying promised and earned wages for all hours worked in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.6 and 95-25.7. 50. Defendant violated N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.6 and 95-25.7 by failing to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees all promised and earned wage payments on the employees’ regular payday for all hours worked. 51. Defendant’s violation of the NCWHA was willful. 8. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 9. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendant has been an enterprise within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA 29 U.S.C. § 203(r).

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1. The Pop Warner Little Scholars program is a youth tackle football, cheer and 12 dance program founded in 1929. Pop Warner was incorporated as a national nonprofit 13 corporation in 1959. 10 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS MEMBERS: 11 (VIOLATION OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 et seq.; 11 14 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS MEMBERS: 15 2. Today, the Pop Warner program consists of eight regional conferences across 15 forty-two states and several countries. Each region consists of separate leagues, associations 16 and teams. 14 17 21 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS MEMBERS: 22 3 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS MEMBERS: 4 3 3. Upon information and belief, over 250,000 children participate in the Pop 18 Warner tackle football program per year. 36. Plaintiffs, Kimberly Archie, as survivor of decedent Paul Bright Jr., and Jo 4 Cornell, as survivor of decedent Tyler Cornell, brings this action on behalf of themselves 5 and pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) and on 6 behalf of the following class(es) of persons: The Participant Class: All persons, including deceased individuals, who participated in the Pop Warner youth tackle football program between 1997 to the present and are suffering or have suffered from brain injuries, damage or disease. 7 8 9 10 11 The Adult Class 12 All persons who enrolled their minor children in the Pop Warner tackle football program between 1997 to the present. 37. Excluded from the Classes are: (a) the officers and directors of any of Defendants; (b) any judge or judicial officer assigned to this matter and his or her 17 immediate family and staff; and 13 14 15 16 18 (c) any legal representatives, successor, or assign of any excluded persons or 19 entities. 20 38. This action is properly maintained as a class action because Plaintiffs can prove 21 the elements of each claim on a class-wide basis, using the same evidence that Plaintiffs 22 would use to maintain and prove and individual action. Thus, the action may be properly 23 maintained on behalf of each of the proposed Classes pursuant to FRCP 23. 39. The Members of each Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would 25 be impracticable. The precise number of Class Members is unknown at this time. However, 26 based on information and belief, the members of the Participant Class are made up of 27 hundreds of thousands of members evidenced by the estimate that approximately 250,000 24 28 -9- 4. This action arises from the failures of Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., 20 National Operating Committee on Standards Athletic Equipment and USA Football to 21 provide for the safety and health of minor child participants of the Pop Warner tackle 22 football program. 19 23 Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., National Operating Committee on Standards 24 Athletic Equipment and USA Football misrepresented material facts to Plaintiffs and the 25 Class Members and the public at large regarding the safety of Pop Warner tackle football, 26 including the safety of the equipment used by minor child participants. 2 7 / / / 28 7 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS MEMBERS: 8 7 INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS MEMBERS: 8

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13. Defendant Citizen’s Taxi Dispatch is a corporation in the business of providing student transportation services to school districts in and around DuPage County, Illinois. 14. Defendants maintain contracts with school districts in DuPage County, Illinois, including an agreement with Community Unit School District 200, which serves the communities of Wheaton, Illinois and Warrenville, Illinois. 4 15. Defendants also provide general taxi services to individuals in and around the DuPage County, Illinois area. The vast majority of the business involves servicing its contracts with school districts. 16. As part of its contracts with school districts, Defendants agrees to provide transportation to students in the school district requiring transportation from the student’s residence to a school, or vice versa. 17. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants from February 29, 2016 through September 2, 2016. 18. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants primarily to transport students to and from school pursuant to Defendants’ contracts with the school districts. 19. As a driver, Plaintiff performed a core function of Defendants’ business. 20. Defendants assigned Plaintiff a weekly schedule, which often did not change from week-to-week. This frequently resulted in Plaintiff picking-up and dropping-off the same students at the same times each week. 21. If a driver fails to complete a route as part of the driver’s schedule, he or she is subject to discipline, up to and including termination. 22. As a condition of employment, Defendants require their drivers to sign a contract with Citizen’s Taxi Dispatch, which mischaracterizes the driver as an “independent contractor.” These contracts are designed to conceal the true nature of the relationship between Defendants and their Illinois delivery drivers – that of employer and employee. 23. These contracts, drafted by Defendants, are contracts of adhesion. Drivers have no ability to negotiate the terms of the contracts. 5 24. Despite labelling the drivers as “independent contractors,” Defendants retain the absolute right to control and direct the work of its drivers. 25. Defendants control the manner in which drivers perform their jobs. For example: a. All drivers are required to complete a qualification process as a precondition of employment, including a detailed background check and drug screen; b. Drivers are subject to random drug testing throughout their employment with the company; c. Defendants assign drivers a weekly schedule, which largely does not change from week-to-week; d. Drivers have no authority to refuse or negotiate their route assignment; e. If a driver fails to complete a route as part of the driver’s schedule, he or she is subject to discipline, up to and including termination; f. If a driver is unable to drive a pre-assigned route on a particular day, he or she must find a replacement or substitute approved by Defendants; g. Defendants require drivers to pick-up and drop-off students at precise times; h. Drivers are not permitted to change or alter their weekly scheduled routes; i. Defendants often contact drivers during their shift to check on their location or the status of their assigned schedule; and j. Client complaints are communicated through Defendants rather than directly to drivers. 26. Defendants do not require drivers to obtain any certifications or licenses specific to transporting individuals or students. 6 27. Defendants require their drivers to rent a vehicle from Defendants to be able to fulfill its contracts with school districts. Defendants deduct the driver’s weekly rent from his or her paycheck. 28. Defendants pay the insurance for the vehicles that the drivers use. 29. Defendants retain the right to discipline or terminate drivers at will, as would an employer. 30. Defendants negotiate the price of routes directly with school districts. 31. Defendants apparently compensate drivers per mile driven, but the rate paid depends on the route taken. Defendants do not explain how the different rates are calculated or determined. 32. Defendants deducted certain expenses from drivers’ paychecks, including but not limited to: a. Weekly car rental payments; b. Tickets paid by the company; and c. Towing payments in retrieving the vehicle from a discharged employee. 33. Drivers were required to pay Defendants’ operating expenses, all of which should have been paid by Defendants, including, but not limited to: a. Weekly car rental payments; b. Delivery vehicle maintenance and repairs; c. Illinois toll payments; and d. Fuel. 7 34. Drivers regularly work in excess of forty (40) hours per week. Drivers classified as independent contractors are not compensated at an overtime rate of pay for work in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 35. Plaintiff seeks to prosecute the case on behalf of current and former Citizen’s Taxi Dispatch drivers who were improperly classified as independent contractors. 36. Plaintiff brings the FLSA claims a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and the remaining claims as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 37. For both collective and class action purposes, the proposed class consists of: All persons who have provided driver services directly to Citizen’s Taxi Dispatch in the State of Illinois at any time during the relevant statutory period, who were not treated as employees of Citizen’s Taxi Dispatch. 38. The relevant time period for Count I and II is for work performed within the past three (3) years preceding the filing of this Complaint. For Count III, the relevant time period is for work performed within the past ten (10) years preceding this lawsuit’s filing to the day of trial. For Count IV, the relevant time period is for work performed within the past five (5) years preceding this lawsuit’s filing. 39. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. 40. Common issues of law and fact predominate the claims of the entire Plaintiff Class. Specifically, all claims are based on a finding that Defendants misclassified its drivers as independent contractors when they were in fact employees. In short, the claims of the named Plaintiff are identical to the claims of the class members. 8 41. The named Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because all potential plaintiffs were subject to Defendants’ uniform practices and policies. Further, the named Plaintiff and the potential class plaintiffs have suffered the same type of economic damages as a result of Defendants’ practices and policies. 42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff’s counsel is competent and experienced in litigating large wage and hour class and collective actions. 43. A class action is the only realistic method available for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impractical for members of the Class to seek redress individually for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. Were each individual member required to bring a separate lawsuit, the resulting multiplicity of proceedings would cause undue hardship and expense for the litigants and the Court and create the risk of inconsistent rulings which could be contrary to the interest of justice and equity. 44. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 43 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 45. Defendants failed to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201. 46. For example, during the week beginning April 4, 2016, Plaintiff worked approximately fifty-six (56) hours for Defendants. During the week beginning May 16, 2016, 9 Plaintiff worked approximately fifty-four (54) hours for Defendants. Plaintiff was not paid a rate of one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for all time worked in excess of forty (40) in these weeks and all other weeks he worked over forty (40) hours. 47. During the course of their employment with Defendants, Plaintiff and others similarly situated drivers were not exempt from the maximum hour provisions of the FLSA, 29 51. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 50 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 52. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff at the overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per work week in violation of IMWL, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1 et seq. 53. Plaintiff seeks all overtime and other wages due, liquidated damages, statutory damages, prejudgment interest and any other damages due. 54. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 53 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 55. Defendants violate the IWPCA, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/1 et seq., by making unlawful deductions taken by Defendants from their pay. 56. Plaintiff seeks all unpaid wages as well as reimbursement for all unlawful deductions taken by Defendants from their pay. 57. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 58. As a result of Defendants’ mischaracterization of Plaintiff and those similarly situated as “independent contractors,” they are required to pay substantial sums of money for work-related expenses, including but not limited to weekly vehicle rent payments, Illinois toll payments, and delivery vehicle maintenance and repairs. 59. By misclassifying its employees as “independent contractors,” and further by requiring those employees to pay Defendants’ own expenses, Defendants have been unjustly enriched. Illinois Minimum Wage Law (Class Action under Federal Rule of Procedure 23) Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act 10 (Class Action under Federal Rule of Procedure 23) Unjust Enrichment (Class Action under Federal Rule of Procedure 23) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act – Overtime Wages (Collective Action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b))

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1. The amount of the debt; … 11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of North Dakota; b. to whom Defendant Alltran sent a collection letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. that states an amount owed for “Fees & Other Non-Collection Charges”; e. without explaining what these charges consist of; f. which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one days after the filing of this action. 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communication to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 21. Some time prior to February 18, 2020, Plaintiff allegedly incurred an obligation to the University of Northern Iowa. 22. The obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services were incurred for personal purposes, specifically personal educational services from the University of Northern Iowa. 23. The alleged University of Northern Iowa obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (5). 24. University of Northern Iowa is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (4). 25. University of Northern Iowa contracted with the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. 26. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation - February 18, 2020 Collection Letter 28. The collection letter states: Principal: $999.00 Interest: $218.82 Collection Cost: $413.04 Fees and Other Non-Collection Charges: $21.24 Total Balance: $1,652.10 29. The letter does not explain the term “Fees and Other Non-Collection Charges” and Plaintiff has no way of determining what the “Fees and Other Non-Collection Charges” may be. 30. Plaintiff has no basis to determine which “Fees and Other Non-Collection Charges” could impact the total balance in addition to interest and collection costs. 31. Furthermore, upon information and belief, the amount of the “Collection Cost” is not authorized by agreement or otherwise permitted. 32. Defendant unfairly attempted to collect an amount that is not provided in the contract or by law. 33. The letter further states, “Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater.” 34. In fact, however, there are no other charges that vary from day to day. 35. If Defendant is aware of “other charges” that would increase the balance, Defendant should clarify and explain them in the letter. 36. Plaintiff is unable to evaluate how much is owed, and what charges may actually be included in the overall balance at the time of payment. 38. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 39. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 40. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 41. Defendant violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of but not limited to §1692e (10); b. Falsely representing the amount of the debt in violation of § 1692e (2)(A); c. Falsely threatening to increase the balance of the debt when such action could not legally be taken or was not intended to be taken. 42. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 43. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 44. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 46. Defendant violated this section by a. Attempting to collect amounts not authorized by contract or by law in violation of § 1692f (1). 47. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 48. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 49. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 50. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – 51. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g by failing to properly state the amount owed. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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13. Recently, financial institutions have experienced an unprecedented number of Compromised Account Management System (“CAMS”) alerts on their members’ accounts from VISA and Account Data Compromise Alerts (“ADC alerts”) on their members’ accounts from MasterCard. CAMS and ADC alerts typically are issued by VISA and MasterCard when there is some event that jeopardizes the security of a financial institution’s customers’ accounts. 14. Numerous financial institutions have traced the large number of alerts issued for their customers’ accounts and discovered a common thread—Defendant. 15. The number of CAMS and ADC alerts received by many financial institutions have been among the largest (meaning most cards compromised) CAMS or ADC alerts they have ever received for a single event. 16. The alert Plaintiff received estimates the “exposure window” for the breach of Defendant’s computer systems runs from October 25, 2016 to January 19, 2017, meaning Defendant failed to prevent or stop hackers from accessing its system and stealing cardholder data for almost three months. 18. Defendant still has not made an offical public announcement regarding the breach of its data processing systems approximately four months since the breach began and one month after it ended. 19. The breach of Defendant’s data systems occurred through Defendant’s POS network, where hackers installed malware that allowed them to steal payment card data from remote locations as a card was swiped for payment. 20. The breach was made possible because Defendant disregarded the security of its POS network and the potential danger of a data breach, and failed to put in place reasonable systems and procedures to prevent the harm that its actions have caused. 21. Defendant knew the danger of not safeguarding its POS network as various high profile data breaches have occurred in the same way, including data breaches of Target, Home Depot, and, most recently, Wendy’s. 23. Defendant’s failure is particularly egregious because various state and federal statutes obligate Defendant to act reasonably in protecting the data of the members of Plaintiff and the Class. 24. First, the payment card industry (MasterCard, VISA, Discover, and American Express), long before the beach of Defendant’s data systems, issued Card Operating Regulations that: (1) are binding on Defendant; (2) required Defendant to protect cardholder data and prevent its unauthorized disclosure; (3) prohibited Defendant from storing such data, even in encrypted form, longer than necessary to process the transaction; and (4) mandated Defendant comply with industry standards. 26. The set deadline for businesses to transition their systems from magnetic-stripe to EMV technology was October 1, 2015, a deadline Defendant, on information and belief, did not meet. 27. Under the Card Operating Regulations that are binding on Defendant, businesses accepting payment cards but not meeting the October 1, 2015 deadline agree to be liable for damages resulting from any data breaches. 28. Third, the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council promulgates minimum standards, which apply to all organizations that store, process, or transmit payment card data. These standards are known as the Payment Card Data Security Standard (“PCI DSS”). PCI DSS is the industry standard governing the security of payment card data, although it sets the minimum level of what must be done, not the maximum. 30. Among other things, PCI DSS required Defendant to: properly secure payment card data; not store cardholder data beyond the time necessary to authorize a transaction; maintain up-to-date antivirus software and a proper firewall; restrict access to payment card data on a need-to-know basis; establish a process to identify and timely fix security vulnerabilities; assign unique identification numbers to each individual with access to its systems; and encrypt payment card data at the point of sale. 32. In 2007, the FTC published guidelines that establish reasonable data security practices for businesses. The guidelines note businesses should protect the personal customer information that they keep; properly dispose of personal information that is no longer needed; encrypt information stored on computer networks; understand their network’s vulnerabilities; and implement policies for installing vendor-approved patches to correct security problems. The guidelines also recommend that businesses consider using an intrusion detection system to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity indicating someone may be trying to hack the system; watch for large amounts of data being transmitted from the system; and have a response plan ready in the event of a breach. 33. The FTC also has published a document entitled “FTC Facts for Business,” which highlights the importance of having a data security plan, regularly assessing risks to computer systems, and implementing safeguards to control such risks. 34. The FTC has issued orders against businesses that failed to employ reasonable measures to secure customer data. These orders provide further guidance to businesses with regard to their data security obligations. 36. Defendant’s failure to employ practices and procedures reasonably capable of securing the cardholder data of the members of Plaintiff and the Class violated all of these statutory- and industry-imposed obligations and caused substantial damage to Plaintiff and the Class. 37. Indeed, the fact that cardholder data was left exposed for close to three months and the fact that Defendant continuously failed to detect this vulnerability demonstrates its complete lack of procedural and other safeguards with respect to its customers’ data. 39. As a result of the Defendant’s data breach, Plaintiff and class members have been forced to cancel and reissue payment cards, change or close accounts, notify members that their cards were compromised, investigate claims of fraudulent activity, refund fraudulent charges, increase fraud monitoring on potentially impacted accounts, and take other steps to protect themselves and their members. They also lost interest and transaction fees due to reduced card usage. Furthermore, debit and credit cards belonging to class members and Plaintiff—as well as the account numbers on the face of the cards—were devalued. 40. The financial damages suffered by Plaintiff and members of the class are massive and continue to increase. 42. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated Class members pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks certification of the following Class: All banks, credit unions, financial institutions, and other entities in the United States (including its Territories and the District of Columbia) that issued payment cards (including debit or credit cards) used by consumers to make purchases from Defendant while malware was installed on its payment card systems. 43. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; all employees of Defendant; all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class; government entities; and the judge to whom this case is assigned and his/her immediate family and his/her court staff. 45. Commonality and Predominance: All requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement are satisfied. This action involves common questions of law and fact, which predominate over any questions affecting individual Class members, including, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant engaged in the misconduct alleged; b. Whether Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and the class members and whether Defendant violated that duty; c. Whether Plaintiff and the class members were injured and suffered damages or other ascertainable loss as a result of Defendant’s conduct; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to relief and the measure of such relief. 46. Typicality: All requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) are satisfied. Plaintiff is a member of the Class, having issued payment cards that were compromised in the data breach of Defendant’s data systems. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the other Class members’ claims because, among other things, all Class members were comparably injured through Defendant’s conduct. 49. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief: All requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) are satisfied. Defendant, through its uniform conduct, acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class as a whole, making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate to the class as a whole. 50. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in every preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and the members of the class to take reasonable care in cardholder data, and to timely notify Plaintiffs in the case of a data breach. This duty arises from multiple sources. 53. Defendant’s common law duty also arises from the special relationship that existed between Defendant and the Class. Plaintiff and the Class entrusted Defendant with the cardholder data contained on the payment cards Plaintiff and the Class issued to their members. Defendant, as the holder and processor of that information, was the only party who realistically could ensure that its data systems were sufficient to protect the data it was entrusted to hold. 54. In addition to the common law, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45, further mandated Defendant to take reasonable measures to protect the cardholder data. Section 5 prohibits unfair practices in or affecting commerce, which requires and obligates Defendant to take reasonable measures to protect any cardholder data Defendant may hold or process. The FTC publications and data security breach orders described above further form the basis of Defendant’s duty. In addition, individual states have enacted statutes based upon the FTCA that also created a duty. 56. Defendant, by its actions, has breached its duties to Plaintiff and the class. Specifically, Defendant failed to act reasonably in protecting the cardholder data of the members of Plaintiff and the class members, and did not have reasonably adequate systems, procedures and personnel in place to reasonably prevent the disclosure and theft of the cardholder data of Plaintiff and the Class’s members. 58. In connection with the conduct described above, Defendant acted wantonly, recklessly, and with complete disregard for the consequences. 60. Because no statutes of other states are implicated, Georgia common law applies to Plaintiff and the Class’s negligence claim. 61. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in every preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 62. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits “unfair…practices in or affecting commerce” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice by retailers, restaurants and other businesses such as Defendant of failing to use reasonable measures to protect cardholder data. The FTC publications and orders described above also form the basis of Defendant’s duty. 64. Defendant’s violation of Section 5 of the FTCA (and similar state statutes) constitutes negligence per se. 65. Plaintiff and the class members are within the class of persons Section 5 of the FTCA (and similar state statutes) was intended to protect as they are engaged in trade and commerce and bear primary responsibility for reimbursing consumers for fraud losses. Moreover, Plaintiff and many class members are credit unions, which are organized as cooperatives whose members are consumers. 66. Moreover, the harm that has occurred is the type of harm the FTCA (and similar state statutes) was intended to guard against. Indeed, the FTC has pursued over fifty enforcement actions against businesses which, as a result of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive practices, caused the same harm suffered by Plaintiff and the class members. 68. Because no statutes of other states are implicated, Georgia common law applies to Plaintiff and the Class’s negligence per se claim. 69. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in every preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 70. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq., this Court is authorized to enter a judgment declaring the rights and legal relations of the parties and grant further necessary relief. Furthermore, the Court has broad authority to restrain acts, such as here, which are tortious and which violate the terms of the federal and state statutes described herein. 74. If an injunction is not issued, Plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury and lack an adequate legal remedy in the event of another data breach of Defendant’s data systems. The risk of another such breach is real, immediate, and substantial. If another breach of Defendant’s data systems occurs, Plaintiff will not have an adequate remedy at law because many of the resulting injuries are not readily quantified and they will be forced to bring multiple lawsuits to rectify the same conduct. 76. Issuance of the requested injunction will not disserve the public interest. To the contrary, such an injunction would benefit the public by preventing another data breach, thus eliminating the injuries that would result to Plaintiff, the Class, and the millions of consumers whose confidential information would be compromised. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Negligence Per Se Negligence

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15. Defendant is an online retailer of nutritional supplements for men and women. Through the Website, Defendant offers supplements designed to target inflammation and pain, stress, and low energy. Through the Website, customers can learn about the supplements, their active ingredients and intended effects, watch and read customer testimonials, and complete a purchase for delivery. 16. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its online retail services. Through the Website, customers can create an account, complete a purchase, manage account preferences and cancel an account. -7- 17. The Website is a commercial marketplace. The website is Defendant’s main point of sale. The Website is where customers create an account, and where they go to pause, cancel, modify and reactivate subscriptions. 18. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Fischler and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its meal delivery and nutritional counseling. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Fischler and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s meal delivery and nutritional counseling and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 19. Plaintiff Fischler cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 20. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about January 20, 2021, Plaintiff Fischler encountered multiple access barriers that denied him the enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the goods and services of Defendant’s meal delivery and nutritional counseling services. Because of these barriers he was unable to, substantially equal to sighted individuals: a. Know what is on the Website. This is due in part to the non-text images, which are not accompanied by the requisite alternative text. On the home page, almost every image is labeled “relief factor quick start package,” even when that is not what the image concerns. The videos are also inaccessible because they are hidden -8- behind unlabeled frames. Therefore, Plaintiff Fischler could not learn about the products or the free gifts with purchase equal to a sighted user. Plaintiff Fischler had difficulty learning about products because several links and pages are inaccessible to screen reader users. For example, a sighted user can click on products and access sublinks for other supplements including Relief Factor Calm and Relief Factor Energy. These pages are completely inaccessible to screen reader users because the “Products” link does not appear to be clickable and there is no alert when one clicks on it that any new information has loaded. Similarly, Plaintiff Fischler had difficulty learning the answers to frequently asked questions because there does not appear to be any way to expand them to access the answers. The questions are not labeled as clickable. However, with sighted assistance he was able to click on them and then navigate below using his arrow keys to find the answers. b. Navigate the Website. Plaintiff Fischler had difficulty navigating this Website using his screen reader. On the home page, there are several links labeled only “Order Now” which is confusing to screen reader users. The Website makes no use of ARIA, therefore there is no way for screen reader users to know if keystrokes have been effective. In several instances, links are not properly labeled as “clickable.” Therefore, screen reader users need sighted assistance to know where to click. Some links are not even detected. For example, Plaintiff Fischler was unable to find the link to email Defendant. Furthermore, tables with supplement information are not properly formatted for screen readers making it difficult to understand. As mentioned above, Plaintiff Fischler was unable to expand the “products” link at the top of the home page to shop for -9- Relief Factor Calm or Relief Factor Energy. Therefore, the only way to shop is through links on the home page, which are all labeled “order now.” c. Complete a purchase. Plaintiff Fischler had difficulty completing a purchase. After selecting “order now,” he is taken to a page with an unlabeled frame, which includes a video. However, there is no alert that there is a video, therefore Plaintiff Fischler could not find it without assistance from a sighted user. After selecting “next step,” he is taken to a page with a free gift. However, the options are not labeled as clickable and the radio buttons are not properly labeled. He needed sighted assistance to know how to interact. 21. Plaintiff Fischler was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant Website: a. Images are not properly labeled. b. Fieldset elements are not labeled with legend elements. c. Documents titles are blank. d. Tables are not properly labeled with row and column headers. e. Frames do not have a title. f. Form controls have no label and no programmatically determined name. g. Forms have fields without label elements or title attributes. h. Webpages have duplicate IDs which cause problems in screen readers. -10- i. Webpages have markup errors. j. Radio button groups are not contained in a fieldset element. k. Several links on a page share the same link text but go to different destinations. Defendant Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 22. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Fischler, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Fischler encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting Defendant’s Website and taking advantage of its meal delivery and nutritional counseling and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals. 23. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, learn about available products and add-ons, learn about the ingredients used and nutritional information and complete a purchase, as sighted users can. 24. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 25. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Fischler and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the -11- Website, Plaintiff Fischler alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Fischler, as a member of a protected class. 26. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 27. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 28. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Fischler seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Fischler to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.1 compliant; -12- b. Training Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies with the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 29. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 30. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 31. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 32. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. -13- 33. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied equal access to Defendant’s Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 34. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied equal access to Defendant’s Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 35. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied equal access to Defendant’s Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 36. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: a. Whether Defendant’s website is a place of “public accommodation”; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace; c. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; -14- d. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; e. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of their goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and f. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of their goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 37. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 38. Plaintiff Fischler will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 39. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members -15- predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 40. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 42. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 43. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace and a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s meal delivery and nutritional counseling. The Website is a service that is integrated with its meal delivery and nutritional counseling. 44. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). -16- 45. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 46. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 47. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Fischler, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 48. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Fischler requests the relief as set forth below. -17- 49. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace and constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s meal delivery and nutritional counseling. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these meal delivery and nutritional counseling. 51. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its New York meal delivery and nutritional counseling and the Website. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 52. Defendant is violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its meal delivery and nutritional counseling to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). 53. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components -18- to make its website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 54. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Defendant has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 55. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 56. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. -19- 57. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace and constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with those establishments. 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its meal delivery and nutritional counseling to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 61. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or -20- c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 62. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 63. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 64. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 65. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its meal delivery and nutritional counseling, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities -21- Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 66. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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13. The name “kombucha” comes from the common name for what is essentially a fermented tea drink. Kombucha, including O Organics Kombucha, is made of tea that ferments for up to a month while a “blob” of bacteria known as “scoby” (for symbiotic colony of bacteria and yeast) floats on top. The scoby then “eats” the sugar, acids, and caffeine in the tea, creating a cocktail of live microorganisms. Basic chemistry explains that the scoby converts the sugar into carbon dioxide and alcohol. 32. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of a Class consisting of all persons in the United States who purchased O Organics Kombucha beverages. 33. Plaintiff also seek to represent a subclass defined as all members of the Class who purchased O Organics Kombucha in California (the “California Subclass”). 34. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend or modify the Class definition with greater specificity or further division into subclasses or limitation to particular issues as discovery and the orders of this Court warrant. 43. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 44. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the proposed Class against Defendants. Plaintiff also brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the proposed California Subclass against Defendants. 45. Plaintiff and Class members are consumers who purchased O Organics Kombucha for personal, family or household purposes. Plaintiff and the Class are “consumers” as that term is defined by the CLRA in Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d). 46. Plaintiff and the Class members are not experts with the independent knowledge of the nature, level, or amount of alcohol and sugar found in O Organics Kombucha or kombucha beverages generally. Plaintiff and the Class members are not experts with the independent knowledge of the fermentation process or alcohol level of O Organics Kombucha or kombucha beverages generally. Plaintiff and the Class acted reasonably when they purchased O Organics Kombucha based on their belief that Defendants’ representations were true and lawful. 57. Plaintiff hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 58. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. Plaintiff also brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the proposed California Subclass against Defendants. 59. Defendants are subject to California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. The UCL provides, in pertinent part: “Unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising ….” 67. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 68. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. Plaintiff also brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed California Subclass against Defendants. 76. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. Plaintiff also brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed California Subclass against Defendants. 77. In connection with the sale of O Organics Kombucha, Defendants issue an express warranty that O Organics Kombucha contain a specified amount of grams of sugar per serving. Defendants also issue an express warranty that O Organics Kombucha “CONTAINS LESS THAN 81. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. Plaintiff also brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed California Subclass against Defendants. 88. Plaintiff bring this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class against Defendants. Plaintiff also brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed California Subclass against Defendants. 89. As discussed above, Defendants misrepresented that O Organics Kombucha was a non-alcoholic beverage and that O Organics Kombucha only had specified amounts of grams of sugar per serving, when, in fact, O Organics Kombucha is an alcoholic beverage and contains significantly more sugar (about 40 percent more) than advertised. 90. At the time Defendants made these representations, Defendants knew or should have known that these representations were false or made them without knowledge of their truth or veracity. 91. At an absolute minimum, Defendants negligently misrepresented and/or negligently omitted material facts about O Organics Kombucha. 92. The negligent misrepresentations and omissions made by Defendants, upon which Plaintiff and Class members reasonably and justifiably relied, were intended to induce and actually induced Plaintiffs and Class members to purchase O Organics Kombucha. 93. Plaintiff and Class members would not have purchased O Organics Kombucha, or would not have purchased the products on the same terms, if the true facts had been known. 94. The negligent actions of Defendants caused damage to Plaintiff and Class members, who are entitled to damages and other legal and equitable relief as a result. Breach of Express Warranty Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Fraud Negligent Misrepresentation Unjust Enrichment Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq. (Injunctive Relief Only) Violation of California’s False Advertising Law, California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq.

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67. In Footnote 1, herein, Plaintiffs make reference to a closely related claim currently being litigated in Florida District Court, Kohmetscher Case 9:19-cv-80281- DMM. Through that current claim, Defendants were put on notice of the devastating effects they will irreparably cause in the coming days if the rapid construction of the Soldier Creek towers is allowed to continue unabated. It is clear that local residents within three miles of these wind towers -- keep in mind there are only 40 wind towers in the related Nebraska case as opposed to 3.5x more (140) about to be erected in this Kansas with closer spacing and 3x higher population density – will suffer serious damages to include harm to their health and well being and diminution and intrusion upon their property. 68. It is clear that if, as the law and facts compel, the Court finds Defendant NextEra liable in any way, either in later adjudication in this case or in the Florida Kohmetscher case, the damages will be permanent and involve harm to cherished homes that money cannot adequately compensate. As such, NextEra cannot be given some sort of benefit of immunity or protected from the consequences of their irresponsible and premature construction efforts when they knew or should have known the harm to Plaintiffs and the Putative Class is, at a minimum, an open and ongoing question being adjudicated. 70. Plaintiffs bring on their behalf and the Putative Class these class claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) as follows: 71. The Class: all persons in the United States who currently reside on and lease or own residential property within three miles of a NextEra wind turbine in the final planning and/or construction phase as well as on behalf of Mr. Mattwaoshshe and all those similarly situation to his particularly heightened sovereign status. 72. Expressly excluded from the Class and Subclass are any individuals who have a current and valid contractual relationship with Defendant NextEra or its subsidiaries for an unexpired contract, license, lease, or easement for the purpose of operating a wind turbine or “wind farm” on or adjacent to their property; any members of the judiciary or their staff assigned to preside over this matter; any officer, director, or employee of Defendant; and any immediate family members of such officers, directors, or employees. 74. In terms of Commonality & Predominance, the questions of law and fact are overwhelmingly the same for the class and include some of the following serious issues: (a) Whether the effects of Defendant’s “wind farms,” including disturbing and incessant noise, vibrations, shadow flicker and strobe lighting, which have caused nausea, headaches, sleep deprivation, vertigo, dizziness, anxiety, and diminution of property values, among other harms, are a private nuisance; whether Defendant’s harmful acts were done knowingly and intentionally or done in contravention of a negligence standards of proof; and whether Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to certain forms of relief. Private Nuisance (on behalf of Plaintiffs and the other Class members) 75. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs and references made as if set forth herein. 76. Defendant NextEra’s current and soon-to-be completed construction of the Soldier Creek Wind project presents an imminent, irrevocable private nuisance by the Project’s components, equipment, movement, and effects on Plaintiffs and the Putative Class’ person and property, due to the proximity to Plaintiffs and the Putative Class’ properties. They pose a material and unreasonable invasion of interests in the private use and enjoyment of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’ lands and substantively interfere with their homes and property interests. 78. Defendant NextEra’s actions have caused actual physical discomfort to one of ordinary sensibilities with what they have done so far with the Project and with their contact in other locations following the same pattern once in the final planning and construction phases. Their conduct in the final planning and construction phase, and soon post construction phase absent injunctive relief, has been performed in a way that is offensive and intolerable, and out of character for the normally quiet, residential and rural bedroom community nature of the areas where Plaintiffs’ and the other putative Class members’ properties are located. Defendant NextEra and its subsidiaries know and understand the harms and negative effects that its turbines can have on nearby residents, and they nonetheless plan and construct their turbines too close to Plaintiffs’ and the Putative Class members’ homes and property with intent and reckless disregard. 79. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant NextEra’s and its subsidiaries misconduct described herein, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class members have and will increasingly suffer monetary damages, pecuniary losses, other significant harms, including negative mental and physical health and well being affects, anxiety, emotional distress, serious disruption of their lives, and loss and undesired radical transformation of the use and enjoyment of their homes and properties. Therefore, these quantifiable damages are subject to, and can be, proven at trial. Negligence (on behalf of Plaintiffs and the other Class members) 82. Defendant NextEra and its subsidiaries were required to exercise reasonable care to (1) mitigate the strife, anxiety, disruption, and oppressive and/or intimidating conduct they caused during the planning and construction phases of the project; (2) also to mitigate the imminent noise, vibration, and other inner bodily disturbances to persons and property or wildlife made by its wind towers and other construction; and (3) site its towers far enough away from Plaintiffs’ and the Putative Class’ homes, properties, work places, communities, and frequented locations so as to not have negative effects on the health, well being, comfort, or peace of mind of effected persons and property. NEXTERA SHOULD BE ENJOINED FROM FURTHER CONSTRUCTION UNTIL THE ONGOING NUISANCE CLAIM IS FULLY ADJUDICATED TO PREVENT THEIR WIDESPREAD HARM BEING REPEATED IN THIS KANSAS PROJECT

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12. Plaintiff Reed held this position until she was involuntarily terminated on or about March 29, 2019. Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals worked as Case Managers and in similar positions performing case management services for Defendants (collectively, “CM’s”). 13. Plaintiff McLinden was initially hired by one or both Defendants in 2005 as a staff nurse on the surgical unit at Pekin Hospital. She began her career as a Case Manager in or around 2008 until approximately 2011 when she left Pekin Hospital’s employ to pursue a nursing position at a different entity. Plaintiff McLinden returned to Pekin Hospital in approximately 2014 as a staff nurse on the surgical unit and she rejoined the Case Management department in approximately 2015, where she remained a full-time employee of Defendant through approximately December,2019. 14. As CM’s, Plaintiffs and the similarly situated individuals’ primary job duties were non- exempt, consisting of reviewing patients’ chart, interviewing patients, and discharge planning and set up for needed services. 15. From approximately June, 2016 to approximately February, 2018, Plaintiffs were paid an hourly rate for their work as a Case Manager and were paid overtime for time worked beyond a forty-hour work week; and were additionally paid “on-call pay” for time worked during evenings and weekends every other week. 17. At that time, Plaintiffs and the similarly situated individuals were classified as exempt from federal and state overtime laws by Defendants. 18. Defendants permitted Plaintiffs and the similarly situated individuals to work more than forty (40) hours per week without overtime pay. Just weeks after changing Plaintiffs’ compensation classification to exempt, Defendants instituted a ‘Pilot Project’ which essentially combined two job titles into one, requiring Plaintiffs to work even more overtime hours than before their classification was changed to exempt. 19. Plaintiff Reed typically started her workday at approximately 8:00 a.m., and although her workday was scheduled to end at or around 4:30 p.m., she frequently, at least three to four times weekly, worked 12 hours or more in a given work day and often worked from her home until 8:00 p.m. or later. 20. Plaintiff McLinden worked her regular shift plus overtime and encountered criticism from Defendants for not being willing or capable of accessing information remotely from her home via the internet so she could continue working after she left the hospital grounds. As a result, it was common that in any given work week, Plaintiffs estimate that they worked at least approximately fifty (50) hours (or more) without receiving any straight time or overtime compensation for the additional amount of time worked beyond forty hours in a work week. 21. Plaintiffs also remained on-call in the evenings and weekends every other week without additional pay. 23. Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals were working unpaid overtime hours because they required Plaintiffs and others to work overtime hours in order to complete all of their work assignments and meet Defendants’ pre-determined goals. 24. Plaintiffs’ supervisors were also aware that Plaintiffs worked overtime because they were regularly included in conversations, emails and texts with Plaintiffs, at times outside of their regularly scheduled hours. 25. Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals complained to Defendants’ management that they were not being properly compensated for overtime. Specifically, Plaintiffs complained that their work duties and responsibilities had not changed since they had been misclassified as non-exempt, and because the nature of the working conditions, Plaintiffs suggested on multiple occasions that Defendants should change their classification status back to non- exempt, and Defendants should pay them and other CM’s an overtime premium for the time they worked beyond forty hours per work week. Defendants ignored these requests and did not address these complaints. 27. Defendants continued to deny overtime compensation to Plaintiff Reed and those similarly situated thereafter. 28. Upon information and belief, although they had a legal obligation to do so, Defendants did not make, keep, or preserve adequate or accurate records of the time worked by Plaintiffs and the similarly situated individuals. 29. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, restate and incorporate by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 30. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals working with each of the three UnityPoint Pekin, UnityPoint Proctor and UnityPoint Methodist Hospitals. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiffs’ signed consent forms are attached as Exhibit 1. As this case progresses, it is likely that other individuals will also join this case as opt-in plaintiffs. 31. The employees similarly situated are: FLSA Collective Class: All persons who are, have been, or will be employed by either Defendant or both Defendants as Case Managers or other similar job positions, and whose primary job responsibilities were to provide discharge planning or case management services, at any time from three years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the entry of judgment, and whose compensation classification was identified as ‘exempt’ and/or who were denied overtime pay at one and one half times their regular hourly rate for any time worked beyond forty hours in a work week. 32. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Class worked or work in excess of forty (40) hours during at least one workweek within the applicable statutory period. 34. Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 35. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and the similarly situated individuals. Accordingly, notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective Class members. There are other similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who have suffered from Defendants’ practice of denying overtime pay and who would benefit from the issuance of court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ records. 36. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Class restate and incorporate by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 37. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, requires employers to pay non-exempt employees one and one- half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per workweek. 39. Defendants’ actions, policies, and practices described above violate the FLSA’s overtime requirement by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Class the required overtime pay. 40. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Class have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of income and other damages. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Class are entitled to liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs incurred in connection with this claim. 41. By failing to accurately record, report, and/or preserve records of hours worked by Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Class, Defendants have failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and other conditions and practice of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 42. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Defendants knew, or showed reckless disregard for the fact, that their compensation practices were in violation of these laws. COUNT I – VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME (on behalf of Plaintiffs and similarly situated individuals)

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58. Plaintiffs bring the First Cause of Action, an FLSA overtime claim, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked as Home Managers and similar titles for ACS statewide between October 27, 2013, in accordance with the tolling agreement, and the date of final judgment in this matter, who did not receive overtime compensation or compensation for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek and who elect to opt in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 59. ACS is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Home Managers. 60. Consistent with ACS’ policy and pattern or practice, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective were not paid proper overtime compensation when they worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. 61. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective perform or performed substantially the same primary duties. 62. All of the work that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed has been assigned by ACS, and/or ACS has been aware of all of the work that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed. 63. As part of its regular business practice, ACS has intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to 9 Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. This pattern, practice, and/or policy includes, but is not limited to: a. willfully failing to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective proper overtime compensation for hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek; b. willfully misclassifying Plaintiffs and the FLSA collective as exempt from the protections of the FLSA; and c. willfully failing to record all of the time that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have worked for the benefit of ACS. 64. ACS is aware or should have been aware that federal law required it to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective compensation and/or overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 65. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective perform or performed the same primary duties. 66. ACS’ unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 67. The FLSA Collective consists of many similarly situated current and former Home Managers who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. Those similarly situated employees are known to ACS, are readily identifiable, and can be located through ACS’ records. Notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 68. Plaintiffs bring the Second Cause of Action, the Indiana WPA claim, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and a class of all persons who are or have been employed as Home Managers and similar titles for ACS between October 10 27, 2013, in accordance with the tolling agreement, and the date of final judgment in this matter (the “Rule 23 Class”). 69. The members of the Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 70. Upon information and belief, the size of the Rule 23 Class is at least 40 individuals. Although the precise number of such employees is unknown, the facts on which the calculation of that number depend are currently within the sole control of ACS. 71. ACS has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Rule 23 Class as a whole. 72. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the Rule 23 Class that predominate over any questions only affecting them individually. These common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, whether ACS violated the Indiana WPA by failing to pay members of the Rule 23 Class all wages owed within the time period prescribed by law, and the nature and extent of the class-wide injury and the measure of damages for those injuries. 73. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class they seek to represent. 74. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class enjoy the same statutory rights under the Indiana WPA, including the right to receive all wages owed within the time period prescribed by law. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have all sustained similar types of damages as a result of ACS’s failure to comply with the Indiana WPA. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have all been injured in that they have not received all wages owed within the time period prescribed by law as a result of ACS’s common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. 11 75. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Rule 23 Class. Plaintiffs understand that, as Class Representatives, they assume a fiduciary responsibility to the class to represent its interests fairly and adequately. Plaintiffs recognize that, as Class Representatives, they must represent and consider the interests of the class just as they would represent and consider their own interests. Plaintiffs understand that, in decisions regarding the conduct of the litigation and its possible settlement, they must not favor their own interests over the interests of the class. Plaintiffs recognize that any resolution of a class action must be in the best interest of the class. Plaintiffs understand that, in order to provide adequate representation, they must be informed of developments in litigation, cooperate with class counsel, and testify at a deposition and/or trial. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions and employment litigation. There is no conflict between Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class members. 76. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The members of the Rule 23 Class have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of ACS’s violations of the Indiana MWA. The individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to conduct a thorough examination of ACS’s timekeeping and compensation practices and to prosecute vigorously a lawsuit against ACS to recover such damages. In addition, class litigation is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that could result in inconsistent judgments about ACS’s practices. 77. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 12 78. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class have been victims of ACS’ common pattern, practice, and/or policy that violates their rights by denying them wages they are owed. 79. Home Managers were uniformly classified as salaried and exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA. 80. Home Managers frequently worked more than 40 hours per workweek. 81. ACS was aware that Home Managers frequently worked more than 40 hours per workweek. 82. ACS did not pay Home Managers overtime compensation when they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. Instead, Home Managers received no payment or payment at a rate less than their regular rate. 83. Home Managers frequently were required to pick up shifts for hourly employees or other Home Managers. Home Managers were paid the rate the missing employee was to be paid, either another Home Manager’s rate or an hourly employee’s rate. 84. When Home Managers missed more than a few hours of work, their salaries were docked in an amount proportional to the work missed. 85. ACS did not pay Home Managers any wages for the mandatory time spent working outside of regularly scheduled hours, such as time spent attending mandatory trainings and meetings, and training other ACS staff. 86. ACS required Home Managers to transport ACS clients to their medical appointments. When these appointments were scheduled outside of their regularly-scheduled shifts, ACS did not pay any wages for the time Home Managers spent transporting ACS’ clients. 13 87. ACS subjected Home Managers to ACS’ policy that Home Managers replace any missing funds from ACS’ clients’ accounts. 88. ACS did not keep accurate records of all the hours Home Managers worked. 89. Home Managers’ primary duties were routine, non-exempt tasks including, but not limited to: a. taking patients to appointments, b. purchasing groceries, c. washing laundry, d. housekeeping, e. cleaning, f. cooking meals, g. unskilled nursing care, h. assisting patients with personal hygiene, i. bathing patients, j. shampooing and combing patients’ hair, k. brushing teeth, l. trimming patients’ nails, m. dressing patients, and n. providing patients with medication. 90. Home Managers spent the majority of their time performing the same or similar tasks as hourly non-exempt employees. 91. Home Managers’ primary duties did not differ substantially from the duties of hourly non-exempt employees. 92. Home Managers’ primary duties did not include: 14 a. hiring; b. firing; c. supervising; or d. directing the work of other employees. 93. Home Managers’ primary duties were not directly related to ACS’ management or general business operations. 94. Home Managers’ primary duties did not include the exercise of discretion or independent judgment regarding matters of significance. 95. Home Managers: a. were not involved in planning ACS’ long or short-term business objectives; b. could not formulate, affect, implement or interpret ACS’ management policies or operating practices; c. did not carry out major assignments that affected ACS’ business operations; d. did not have authority to commit ACS in matters that have significant financial impact; and e. could not waive or deviate from ACS’ established policies or procedures without prior approval. 96. Home Managers’ primary duties were manual in nature. 97. The performance of manual duties occupied the majority of Home Managers’ working hours. 98. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 15 99. ACS failed to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective the overtime compensation to which they are entitled under the FLSA. 100. ACS has engaged in a widespread pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA, as described in this Collective Action Complaint. 101. At all relevant times, ACS has been an employer engaged in commerce and/or the production or sale of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(b), (d), (r), and (s). 102. The overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the supporting regulations, apply to ACS and protect Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 103. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective were ACS’ employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 104. ACS has failed to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA. 105. ACS has engaged in a policy and/or practice of requiring Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective to replace missing funds from ACS’ clients’ accounts. 106. The cost of replacing the missing funds contributed to Plaintiffs Gallant, Hasenour and Blankenberger being paid less than the full overtime pay rate, in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et. seq. and 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. 107. ACS’ violations of the FLSA, as described in this Complaint, have been willful and intentional. ACS was aware or should have been aware that the practices described in this Complaint were unlawful. 108. ACS has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its compensation of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. 16 109. Because ACS’ violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 110. As a result of ACS’ willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have suffered damages by being denied overtime compensation in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 111. As a result of the unlawful acts of ACS, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recover such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. Fair Labor Standards Act–Overtime Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective) Indiana Wage Payment Act – Unpaid Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class) 112. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 113. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have been employees within the definition of the definition of the Indiana WPA. 114. At all times relevant, ACS employed Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class within the definition of the Indiana WPA. 115. ACS engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and practice of violating the Indiana WPA, as detailed in this Complaint. 116. ACS violated the Indiana WPA, in relevant part, by failing to pay Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class all wages owed within the time period prescribed by the Indiana WPA, Indiana Code 22-2-5-1. 17 117. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover all unpaid wages, plus double the amount of wages due, plus all attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.

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16. Prior to the collection activity hereinafter described, plaintiff had listed herself as a credit reference for her son, Jeffrey Silverman, to obtain student loans from Sallie Mae for his attendance at the University of Iowa (“the debt”). 17. Plaintiff listed contact phone numbers on her son’s application for the debt which did not include her cell phone number at issue in the instant complaint. 18. Beginning April 20, 2016, Navient called Plaintiff multiple times on her cell phone from telephone numbers 617-762-5962 and 607-271-6199, among others, including but not limited to the aforesaid April call and another call in May 2016 reflected in the screen captures from Plaintiff’s cell phone attached hereto as Ex. “A”. 2. National Sub-Class: All cellular telephone subscribers in the United States who from September __, 2012 to the present (the “Class Period”) (1) received an autodialed call from Navient on their cellular telephone number without their “prior express consent” regarding a debt they do not owe; and (2) directed Navient not to call their cellular telephone number; and (3) thereafter received an autodialed call from Navient on their cellular telephone number. Excluded from the Classes are persons who provided prior express consent to receive calls from Navient, unless that prior express consent had been revoked. Further excluded are Defendant and its subsidiary(ies), officers, directors, employees, partners and co-venturers. Also excluded are any federal, state, or local governmental entities, any judicial officer presiding over this action and the members of his/her immediate family and judicial staff, and any juror assigned to this action. 20. Neither plaintiff, nor anyone else with authority to consent on Plaintiff’s behalf, ever provided Navient with “prior express consent” to call plaintiff on her cellular telephone number. 21. Each of the unwanted autodialed calls at issue occupied Plaintiff’s cellular telephone line, even when the call was not answered, rendering the line unavailable for Plaintiff to use for any other purpose and creating a significant and material safety risk by making the line unavailable for emergency use. Plaintiff considered these unwanted autodialed calls to be intrusive, annoying and an invasion of her privacy. 22. Navient’s corporate policy is structured to continue to make autodialed calls to cellular telephone numbers of non-borrowers like the Plaintiff, despite its knowledge that these individuals are non-borrowers that have not provided Navient with prior express consent to make such autodialed calls, and despite these individuals’ instructions to stop calling. 23. Defendant Navient followed its corporate policies when attempting to communicate with the Plaintiff by initiating autodialed calls to her cellular telephone number, as described herein. 24. Defendant Navient has been the recipient of numerous complaints from non- debtors across the country, similar to those alleged in this action by Plaintiff. 25. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on her own behalf and behalf of the following Classes of similarly-situated persons defined as follows: 26. The Classes satisfy the FED. R. CIV. P. 23 numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, superiority and ascertainability requirements. 27. Plaintiff does not know the exact size or identities of the members of the proposed Class, since such information is in the exclusive control of Defendant and its agents. However, Plaintiff reasonably believes that the Classes encompass at minimum many thousands of consumers. 29. The joinder of all members of the Classes is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The identities of the Class members can be readily ascertained from Navient and its agents’ call records. 30. There are well-defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. Common question of law and fact raised in this action concerning the Classes’ claims include the following: (a) Whether the calls made to Plaintiff and members of the Classes’ cellular telephone numbers were made using an automated telephone dialing system or predictive dialer as defined by the TCPA and the FCC; (b) Whether the calls by Navient to the Plaintiff and members of the Classes’ cellular telephone numbers were made with prior express consent; (c) Whether such calls were made by or on behalf of Navient; (d) Whether such calls were made for an emergency purpose; (e) Whether Navient violated the TCPA; (f) Whether Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to damages, declaratory relief and/or injunctive relief as a result of Defendant’s violations of the TCPA; (g) Whether Navient’s conduct was willful or knowing; and (h) Whether the calls Navient makes are for the purpose of collecting debts owed to or guaranteed by the United States government. 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained able counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes, including claims under the TCPA. Plaintiff’s interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, the interests of the Classes. 33. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Classes predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members, including legal and factual issues relating to liability and damages. 34. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Classes would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. 35. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class wide relief is essential to compel Defendant to comply with the TCPA. Since the damages, or statutory damages, suffered by individual members of the Classes may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for the members of the Class individually to redress the wrongs done to them. The Classes are readily definable, and prosecution of this action as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitious litigation. Plaintiff will encounter no difficulty in managing this action as a class action. 37. The allegations above are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference. 38. Plaintiff and the members of the Class and Sub-Class are “called part[ies]” under the TCPA. 39. The foregoing acts and omissions of defendant constitute numerous and multiple strict liability violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to 47 U.S.C.§227(b)(1)(iii), by each and every call made in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C.§227(b)(1)(B). 40. The TCPA provides Plaintiff and the Non-Borrower Call Class with a private right of action against Defendant Navient for its strict liability violations of the TCPA, as described herein, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Plaintiff and the Non-Borrower Call Class are entitled to both injunctive relief and statutory damages of $500 per call made by Navient in violation of the TCPA. 41. Plaintiff and the Non-Borrower Call Class are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on an equitable basis to be paid through a “common fund,” or similar theory. 42. The allegations above are re-alleged and incorporated herein by reference. 44. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple willful or knowing violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to 47 U.S.C.§227(b)(1)(iii) by each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C.§227(b)(1)(B). 45. “Willful” is defined as “the conscious and deliberate commission or omission of such act, irrespective of any intent to violate any . . . rule or regulation of the Commission . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 312 (f)(1). 46. Defendant intentionally and voluntarily made at least two (2) calls to plaintiff’s cell phone 47. Defendant willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA with respect to Plaintiff and the Willful or Knowing Call Class by voluntarily placing non-emergency calls to the cellular telephone number of the Plaintiff using an automated telephone dialing system with knowledge that it did not have the prior express consent of the Plaintiff, and after being instructed to stop calling. 48. The TCPA provides Plaintiff with a private right of action against Defendant Navient for its willful and/or knowing violations of the TCPA, as described herein, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Plaintiff are entitled to both injunctive relief and statutory damages of up to $1,500 per call made by Navient that willfully or knowingly violated of the TCPA. STRICT LIABILITY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT WILLFUL OR KNOWING VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

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18. Plaintiffs have never ordered AUQI-Q from nor done business with Defendants. 19. The text message provides promotional content for Defendants’ products or services and was sent with the goal of enticing Plaintiffs to utilize its products and services and to contact Defendants to learn more about them. 20. The Text is impersonal in nature and the message utilizes boilerplate language. Thus, on information and belief, the Text was sent to recipients en masse. 21. Additionally, the Text was sent using a short code telephone number. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and upon such information and belief aver, that short code telephone numbers are used by companies, such as Defendants, to message consumers en masse. The use of short code is indicative of non-human messaging because people do not have cellular phones with short codes. 22. Based on the foregoing, no human directed the text message to Michelle’s cellular number; rather, Michelle’s number was called using a random or sequential number generator with the capacity to store or produce those numbers. In other words, on information and belief, Defendants sent or transmitted, or had sent or transmitted on its behalf, the Text to Michelle’s cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) and the FCC. 23. Plaintiffs never provided her cellular telephone number to Defendants. 25. Plaintiffs never provided their prior express written consent to Defendants to send or transmit the Text or any other advertisement or telemarketing to her cellular telephone. 26. As a result of receiving the Text, Plaintiffs incurred expenses to their wireless service, wasted data storage capacity, suffered the nuisance, waste of time, and aggravation that accompanies receipt of such unauthorized advertisements, and was subjected to an intrusion upon her seclusion and invasion of privacy. 27. On information and belief, Defendants sent the Text, or other text messages, en masse to a list of thousands of randomly generated cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS. 28. On information and belief, Defendants sent the Text, or other text messages, to Plaintiffs and the Class members using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers without human intervention. 29. On information and belief, Plaintiffs and the Class members did not provide Defendants with prior express written consent to receive such text messages and, as a result, incurred expenses to their wireless services, wasted data storage capacity, suffered the aggravation that accompanies receipt of such unauthorized advertisements, and were subjected to an intrusion upon seclusion. 31. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiffs are informed and believes, and upon such information and belief aver, that the number of persons and entities of the Classes is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and upon such information and belief aver, that the number of Class members is at least forty (40) based on Defendants’ use of automated and impersonal text message content sent via a telephone number with an automated message center. 33. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of all Class members. Plaintiffs received the same or substantially similar unsolicited text messages as the other Class members sent by or on behalf of Defendants advertising the availability or quality of goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. Plaintiffs are making the same claims and seeking the same relief for themselves and all Class members based upon the same federal statute. Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to Plaintiffs and all the Class members by sending Plaintiffs and each member of the Class the same or other text messages. 34. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiffs are interested in this matter, have no conflicts, and have retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 36. As stated, the TCPA prohibits the use of auto-dialers to make any call to a cellular telephone number in the absence of an emergency or the prior express consent of the person being called. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The FCC has further clarified that, except for calls made by tax-exempt nonprofit organizations or health care messages, any telephone call using an automatic telephone dialing system that includes or introduces an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing must have prior express written consent as provided at 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8) to be compliant with the TCPA. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) (emphasis added). 37. Michelle received at least one text from Defendants on November 5, 2020. The Text is an advertisement as defined by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(1) because it promotes Defendants’ property, goods, or services. 38. The Text was an impersonal advertisement from Defendants and sent to Michelle’s cellular telephone. 39. Plaintiffs provided neither their prior express consent nor their prior express written consent to receive such text. 40. Based on the foregoing, on information and belief, Defendants sent the same or substantially similar texts to the Class members en masse without their prior express consent or prior express written consent. 41. Defendants sent the Text, or had it made and sent on their behalf, using an automatic telephone dialing system or device which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. 43. By sending such texts to Plaintiffs and the Class, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

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(Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, on Behalf of the California Subclass) (Violations of California’s False Advertising Law, on Behalf of the California Subclass) (Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, on Behalf of the California Subclass) 71. Plaintiff Cooper incorporates by reference and realleges herein all paragraphs alleged above. 72. This cause of action is brought pursuant to California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750-1785 (the “CLRA”). 73. Plaintiff Cooper and the other members of the California Subclass are “consumers,” as the term is defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d), because they bought the Products for personal, family, or household purposes. 74. Plaintiff Cooper, the other members of the California Subclass, and Defendant have engaged in “transactions,” as that term is defined by California Civil Code §1761(e). 82. Plaintiff Cooper incorporates by reference and realleges herein all paragraphs alleged above. 83. As alleged more fully above, Defendant has falsely advertised the Products by falsely claiming that the Products are unqualifiedly naturally derived, green, and environmentally sound. 84. At all material times, Defendant engaged in a scheme of offering the Products for sale to Plaintiff Cooper and the other members of the California Subclass within the State of California and nationwide through, inter alia, commercial marketing and advertising, the Internet, the Products’ packaging and labeling, and other promotional materials and offers for sale of the Products. 85. The misrepresentations and non-disclosures by Defendant of the material facts detailed above constitute false and misleading advertising, and therefore constitute a violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq. 86. Said advertisements and inducements were made within the State of California and come within the definition of advertising contained in the FAL in that such promotional materials were intended as inducements to purchase the Products and are statements disseminated by Defendant to Plaintiff Cooper and the other California Subclass members that were intended to reach Plaintiff Cooper and the other California Subclass members. Defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, that these representations were misleading and deceptive. 87. The above acts of Defendant did and were likely to deceive reasonable consumers, including Plaintiff Cooper and the other members of the California Subclass, by obfuscating the nature, quality, and ingredients of the Products, in violation of the “misleading” prong of the FAL. 90. Plaintiff Cooper incorporates by reference and realleges herein all paragraphs alleged above. 91. By committing the acts and practices alleged herein, Defendant has violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210, as to the California Subclass as a whole, by engaging in unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair conduct. 92. Defendant has violated the UCL’s proscription against engaging in unlawful conduct as a result of: (a) violations of the CLRA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(5), (a)(7), and (a)(9), as alleged above; and (b) violations of the FAL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq., as alleged above. 93. Defendant’s acts and practices described above also violate the UCL’s proscription against engaging in fraudulent conduct. A. The Products

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(By Plaintiffs Mowery and Raisor) (FLSA Overtime Violations) (By Plaintiff Smith) (FLSA Overtime Violations) (By Named Plaintiff Mowery) (Missouri Overtime Violations) 107. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 108. Plaintiff Mowery brings this claim for violation of Missouri Revised Statute §290.505, on behalf of herself, the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 21 U.S.C. § 216(b), and all members of the Missouri Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 109. At all times relevant, Defendant was an employer covered by Missouri Revised Statute §290.505. 110. Defendant violated Missouri Revised Statute §290.505 by failing to pay all overtime compensation to its hourly workers including Plaintiff Mowery, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Missouri Class. 111. Specifically, among other things, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff Mowery and the Missouri Class for all rest breaks and failed to count such time as hours worked. This practice has resulted in an underpayment of overtime premiums due to Plaintiff Mowery, the Opt-Ins, and the Missouri Class. 112. Defendant’s violations of Missouri Revised Statute §290.505 injured Plaintiff Mowery, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Missouri Class members in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to that statute. 113. Defendant, having violated Missouri Revised Statute §290.505, is liable “for the full amount of the wage rate and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, less any amount actually paid to the employee by the employer and for costs and such reasonable attorney fees as may be allowed by the court or jury.” 22 (By Named Plaintiff Smith) (Wisconsin Overtime Violations) 114. Plaintiff Smith incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 115. Plaintiff Smith brings this claim for violation of the Wisconsin overtime compensation law, Wis. Adm. Code DWD 274.03, on behalf of himself, the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and all members of the Wisconsin Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 who were employed by Defendant through a staffing company. 116. At all times relevant, Defendant was an employer covered by the Wisconsin overtime compensation law, Wis. Adm. Code DWD 274.03. 117. Defendant violated the Wisconsin overtime compensation law, Wis. Adm. Code DWD 274.03, by failing to pay all overtime compensation to its hourly workers including Plaintiff Smith, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Wisconsin Class. 118. Specifically, among other things, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff Smith and the Wisconsin Class for all rest breaks and failed to count such time as hours worked. This practice has resulted in an underpayment of overtime premiums due to Plaintiff Smith, the Opt-Ins, and the Wisconsin Class. 119. Pursuant to Wis. Adm. Code DWD 272.12(2)(c), “[r]est periods of short duration, running less than 30 minutes…must be counted as hours worked.” Defendant did not count all of the Wisconsin Class’ rest breaks as hours worked for purposes of determining overtime compensation eligibility. 23 120. Defendant’s violations of the Wisconsin overtime compensation law injured Plaintiff Smith, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Wisconsin Class members in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to that statute. 121. Defendant, having violated the Wisconsin overtime compensation law, is liable for the underpaid wages, liquidated damages, attorney fees, and costs. Wis. Stat. § 109.03(5). (By Named Plaintiff Raisor) (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4113.15) 101. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully written herein. 102. Plaintiff Raisor brings this claim for violation of Ohio Revised Code 4113.15, on behalf of herself, and all members of the Ohio Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 103. At all times relevant, Defendant was Plaintiff Raisor and the Ohio Class’ employer for purposes of overtime compensation owed. 104. Defendant violated Ohio Revised Code § 4113.15, by failing to pay all wages owed, including overtime compensation, to its hourly workers including Plaintiff Raisor and the Ohio Class within thirty days of their regularly scheduled payday. 105. The number of hours and minutes actually worked by Plaintiff Raisor and the Ohio Class is reflected in time-clock records maintained by Defendant. 106. Ohio Revised Code Ann. § 4113.15 provides that Defendant, having violated § 4113.15, “is liable to the employee in the amount equal to six per cent of the amount of the claim still unpaid and not in contest or disputed or two hundred dollars, whichever is greater.” (By Named Plaintiff Raisor) (Ohio Overtime Violations) (Joint Employer Collective) (Wisconsin Class) 20. At all times relevant, Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA and Ohio, Missouri, and Wisconsin wage payment and/or wage and hour laws. 21. At all times relevant, Defendant was a joint-employer of Plaintiff Smith and all other employees working for Defendant through any staffing company. Specifically, Defendant directed and controlled the daily work of Defendant Smith and all other putative class members working for Defendant through any staffing company. 22. Defendant’s hourly employees include Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, Missouri Class, and Wisconsin Class. 23. At all times relevant, Defendant was an enterprise within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), and an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). 24. On information and belief, Defendant had annual gross volume of sales or business done of not less than $500,000 during all times relevant. 25. At all times relevant, Defendant employed two or more employees who engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce. For example, such employees engaged in business transactions for Defendant across state lines and/or produced goods that Defendant sold to customers in more than one state. 26. At all times relevant, Defendant employed two or more employees who handled, sold, and/or worked on goods or materials that were moved in or produced for commerce by any person. For example, such employees handled goods or materials that were moved in or produced for commerce, such as personal protection equipment, computers, computer related 5 devises, telecommunications devices, products sold by Defendant to its customers, and sales transaction devises or equipment. Defendant’s Failure to Pay for Compensable Rest Breaks 27. Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class are current or former non-exempt hourly employees of Defendant. 28. Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class frequently worked more than forty (40) hours in a single workweek, entitling them to overtime compensation under the FLSA, Ohio law, Missouri law, and Wisconsin law. 29. Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class were not paid for all the overtime compensation they earned. 30. Specifically, Defendant has a policy that applies to all hourly employees of not paying those employees for all rest breaks. That is, while it pays for certain rest break time, it does not pay for other rest break time during the workday. 31. Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class for all rest breaks has resulted in them not being paid all overtime premium owed for all overtime hours worked pursuant to the FLSA, Ohio law, Missouri law, and Wisconsin Law. 32. Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class have each worked a substantial number of uncompensated hours during the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, which has resulted in significant unpaid overtime wages. 6 33. Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class were regularly scheduled to work 40 hours a week or more. Thus, by failing to pay Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class for short rest breaks, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class for all their overtime in most or all of the weeks in which they worked over 40 hours in a workweek. 34. Plaintiffs, the putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class were required to clock-out or were otherwise clocked out for numerous short breaks during their respective workdays, generally in duration of less than 20 minutes. 35. Plaintiffs, the Opt-Ins, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class were generally paid for two short rest breaks in an eight-hour shift. However, unpaid breaks of 20 minutes or less, other than those two paid breaks, were generally unpaid due to Defendant’s company-wide practices and policies (the “Unpaid Break Time”). 36. Plaintiffs are not subject to any arbitration agreement with a class or collective action waiver. 37. The putative collective action members, the Ohio Class, the Missouri Class, and the Wisconsin Class are not subject to any arbitration agreement with a class or collective action waiver. 45. Plaintiff Smith incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 46. Plaintiff Smith and the putative joint employer collective action members are current and/or former employees of Defendant. 47. Plaintiff Smith brings this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability” prescribed by the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer … by any one or more employees for and in behalf of [herself] or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 48. The putative joint employer collective action members who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff Smith with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations consist of: All present and former hourly employees working through a staffing company at Defendant’s retail stores, manufacturing facilities, and distribution centers throughout the United States during the period measured from three years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who: (1) did not sign an arbitration agreement containing a class or collective action waiver with Defendant; (2) were not paid for breaks in time of less than 20 minutes during their respective workdays; and, as a result, (3) were not paid time and one-half their respective regular rates of 9 pay for all hours worked over 40 during each and every seven day workweek in the relevant time period. 49. Such persons are “similarly situated” with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations in that all were hourly employees of Defendant, all were subjected to and injured by Defendant’s unlawful practice and/or policy of failing to pay its employees for all hours worked due to unpaid breaks in time less than 20 minutes during the workday, and all have the same claims against Defendant for unpaid wages and overtime compensation as well as for liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 50. Conditional certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that such persons may be sent a Court-authorized notice informing them of the pendency of this action and giving them the opportunity to “opt in.” 51. Plaintiff Smith cannot yet state the exact number of similarly-situated persons, although it is estimated to be a class consisting of thousands of employees. Such persons are readily identifiable through the payroll records Defendant has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and corresponding state laws. 70. Plaintiff Smith incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 71. Plaintiff Smith also brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and other members of a class of persons employed by Menard through a staffing company who assert claims under the laws of the State of Wisconsin (the “Wisconsin Class”), defined as: All present and former hourly employees working through a staffing company at Defendant’s retail home improvement stores, manufacturing facilities, and distribution centers in Wisconsin during the period measured from two years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who: (1) took rest breaks and were not paid for such breaks; and, (2) were not paid an overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of 40 in any workweek, including time spent on rest breaks. 72. The Wisconsin Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff Smith cannot yet state the exact number of class members but avers, upon information and belief, that it consists of at least hundreds of people. The number of class members as well as their identities are ascertainable from the payroll records Defendant has maintained, or was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Wisconsin law. 73. There are questions of law or fact common to the Wisconsin Class, including but not limited to: Whether Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff Smith and other class members for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek; and, 15 Whether Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff Smith and other class members for rest break time and failure to count such time as hours worked is lawful. 74. Plaintiff Smith’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Wisconsin Class. Plaintiff Smith’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of other class members. 75. Plaintiff Smith will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Wisconsin Class. Plaintiff Smith’s interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of other class members. Plaintiff Smith’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action litigation, including wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Wisconsin Class in this case. 76. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Wisconsin Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 77. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 16 78. Plaintiffs Mowery and Raisor incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 79. Plaintiffs Mowery and Raisor bring this claim for violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on behalf of themselves and the Opt-Ins who have joined or will join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) who were directly employed by Defendant. Plaintiffs Mowery and Raisor’s written consents to becoming a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) will be been filed with this Court. Furthermore, by filing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs Mowery and Raisor consent to join this FLSA collective action proceeding for unpaid overtime wages. 80. The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees be paid at a rate of one and one- half times their regular rate for every hour worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 81. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs Mowery and Raisor overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 82. Instead, Defendant has a companywide policy of failing to pay its employees for short breaks in time of less than 20 minutes during the workday which routinely resulted in Plaintiffs working hours for which they were not compensated, including hours in excess of 40 in a workweek for which they were not paid time and one-half their respective regular rates of pay. 83. Defendant’s practices resulted in Plaintiffs Mowery and Raisor receiving less overtime compensation than they were owed. 84. By engaging in these practices, Defendant willfully violated the FLSA and regulations thereunder that have the force and effect of law. For example, Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs Mowery and Raisor worked overtime hours for which they 17 were not paid overtime compensation due to its practice and/or policy of not paying for breaks in time of less than 20 minutes during the workday. 85. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs Mowery and Raisor were injured in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid overtime compensation” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or Plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 86. Plaintiff Smith incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 87. Plaintiff Smith brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on behalf of himself and the Opt-Ins who have joined or will join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) who were employed by Defendant through a staffing company. Plaintiff Smith’s written consent to becoming a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) will be filed with this Court. Further, by filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff Smith’s consent to join this FLSA collective action proceeding for unpaid overtime wages. 88. The FLSA requires that non-exempt employees be paid at a rate of one and one- half times their regular rate for every hour worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 89. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff Smith overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 18 90. Instead, Defendant has a companywide policy of failing to pay its employees for short breaks in time of less than 20 minutes during the workday which routinely resulted in Plaintiff Smith working hours for which they were not compensated, including hours in excess of 40 in a workweek for which they were not paid time and one-half their respective regular rates of pay. 91. Defendant’s practices resulted in Plaintiff Smith receiving less overtime compensation than they were owed. 92. By engaging in these practices, Defendant willfully violated the FLSA and regulations thereunder that have the force and effect of law. For example, Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff Smith worked overtime hours for which they were not paid overtime compensation due to its practice and/or policy of not paying for breaks in time of less than 20 minutes during the workday. 93. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs were injured in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid overtime compensation” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or Plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 94. Plaintiff Raisor incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 19 95. Plaintiff Raisor brings this claim for violation of the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, on behalf of herself, the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and all members of the Ohio Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 96. At all times relevant, Defendant was an employer covered by the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 97. Defendant violated the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, by failing to pay all overtime compensation to its hourly workers including Plaintiff Raisor, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class. 98. Specifically, among other things, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff Raisor and the Ohio Class for all rest breaks and failed to count such time as hours worked. This practice has resulted in an underpayment of overtime premiums due to the Plaintiff Raisor, the Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class. 99. Defendant’s violations of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03 injured Plaintiff Raisor, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class members in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to that statute. 100. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.10(A) provides that Defendant, having violated § 4111.03, is “liable to the employee[s] affected for the full amount of the overtime wage rate, less any amount actually paid to the employee[s] by the employer, and for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court.” 20 Defendant’s Status as an “Employer”

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(FLSA Overtime Violations) 11. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant employed Plaintiff and other similar situated correctional officers in a non-exempt hourly capacity. 13. Defendant’s correctional officers are responsible for the custody and discipline of detainees held at Defendant’s facilities. 14. Among other duties, the correctional officers search for contraband and provide security, count, feed, and supervise detainees. Defendant Fails to Compensate Correctional Officers for Completing Security Screenings Before Each Shift 15. At the beginning of each shift, prior to clocking in, Defendant requires Plaintiff and other similarly situated correctional officers to undergo a security screening. 16. During the security screening the correctional officers empty their pockets, remove their shoes, belts, and jackets and all metal objects, empty their bags, and submit any personal items in their possession for inspection. 17. The correctional officers then walk through a metal detector before reclaiming their possessions and donning their shoes, belts, and jackets. 18. Defendant requires the correctional officers to undergo this screening for the purposes of safety, and to prevent officers from inadvertently or intentionally bringing contraband into the prison. 19. Keeping weapons and other contraband out of the prison is necessarily tied to the correctional officers’ work of providing prison security and searching for contraband. 20. Thus, undergoing security screenings is integral and indispensable to the officers’ principal job-related activities. 21. Defendant, however, fails to compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated correctional officers for time spent undergoing pre-shift security screenings. 23. Defendant’s failure to compensate Plaintiff and the similarly situated correctional officers resulted in unpaid overtime in violation of the FLSA. See, Aguilar, et al. v. Management & Training Corporation, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 3339 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2020) (pre-shift security screenings of corrections officers are integral and indispensable under Busk and therefore must be counted as hours worked for purposes of computing overtime). 24. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 25. Defendant maintains private prison facilities nationwide. 26. Plaintiff bring this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that an action to recover the liability prescribed by the FLSA may be maintained against any employer by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated. 27. The Potential Opt-Ins who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations consist of: All current and former correctional officers employed by Defendant at any of its locations in Colorado within the three years preceding this action. 29. Conditional certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that such persons may be sent a Court-authorized notice informing them of the pendency of this action and giving them the opportunity to “opt in.” 30. The persons similarly situated to Plaintiff are readily identifiable through the payroll records Defendant was required to maintain pursuant to the FLSA. 31. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 32. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on behalf of himself and the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s written consent to become a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) is being filed with the Court as Exhibit 1 to this Complaint. 33. The FLSA requires that Defendant’s non-exempt hourly employees receive overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 34. Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins should have been paid overtime compensation at the rate of one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 35. Defendant failed to pay the overtime compensation to Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins. 37. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins were injured in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid overtime compensation” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the Defendants, and costs of the action.”

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30. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated under rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)-23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32. Classes A, B and C are hereinafter referred to collectively as the Classes. 33. Numerosity: The Classes are so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 34. Upon information and belief there are, at a minimum, tens of thousands of class members of Classes A and B and at least thousands of class members of Class C. 35. Upon information and belief, the Classes’ sizes and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to Defendant’s fax and marketing records. 37. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class A. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of Class A are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 38. Plaintiff and members of Class A each received at least one fax advertisement, advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, which contained an opt-out notice that was identical or substantially similar to the opt-out notice contained in the fax attached hereto as Exhibit A, which Defendant sent or caused to be sent without Plaintiff’s and the members of Class A’s express permission or invitation. 39. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class B. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of Class B are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 40. Plaintiff and members of Class B each received at least one fax advertisement, advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, which contained an opt-out notice that was identical or substantially similar to the opt-out notice contained in the fax attached hereto as Exhibit A 41. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class C. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of Class C are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 42. Plaintiff and members of Class C each received at least one fax advertisement, advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which Defendant sent or caused to be sent without Plaintiff’s and the members of Class C’s express permission or invitation. 44. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class A predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: (a) Whether Defendant’s conduct of sending and/or causing to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class A fax advertisements without Plaintiff’s and members of Class A’s express invitation or permission, which advertised the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services and which contained an opt-out notice that was substantially similar to the opt-out notice contained in the fax attached hereto as Exhibit A, by facsimile, computer or other device violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and/or the regulations thereunder; (b) Whether Defendant’s conduct of sending and/or causing to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class A unsolicited fax advertisements, which advertised the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services and which contained an opt-out notice that was identical or substantially similar to the opt- out notice contained in the fax attached hereto as Exhibit A, by facsimile, computer or other device, was knowing or willful; (c) Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages, triple damages and costs for Defendant’s acts and conduct; and (d) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class A are entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from continuing to engage in their unlawful conduct. 47. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Classes and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, TCPA litigation and class action litigation. 49. Injunctive Relief: Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Classes as a whole. 50. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 51. By Defendant’s conduct, described above, Defendant committed more than ten-thousand (10,000) violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) against Plaintiff and the members of Class A to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class A were unsolicited and did not contain a notice meeting the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D) and/or 47 C.F.R. § 52. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) in an amount greater than five million dollars ($5,000,000), jointly and severally from the Defendant. 54. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 55. By Defendant’s conduct described above, Defendant committed more than ten-thousand (10,000) violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) against Plaintiff and the members of Class B to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class B were either unsolicited and did not contain a notice meeting the requirements of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iii) and/or § 227(b)(2)(D) , or were solicited and did not contain a notice meeting the requirements of 47 C.F.R. § 56. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) in an amount greater than five million dollars ($5,000,000) from the Defendant. 57. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly sent and/or caused to be sent fax advertisements which did not contain a notice meeting the requirements of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iii) to Plaintiff and the members of Class B, Plaintiff requests an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations. 59. By Defendant’s conduct, described above, Defendant committed numerous violations of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570c(a) against Plaintiff and the members of Class C to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of Class C were unsolicited by Plaintiff and the members of Class C; 60. Accordingly, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570c(d), Plaintiff and the members of Class C are entitled to statutory damages in an amount to be determined at trial, and the attorneys fees and costs of this action. 61. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 62. As described above, upon information and belief, Defendant committed numerous violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570c(a). 63. Accordingly, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52- 570c(d), Plaintiff and the members of the Classes are entitled to an injunction against Defendant, prohibiting Defendant from committing further violations of the above- mentioned statutes and regulations. 64.1200(a)(3)(iii) as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iv). 64.1200(a)(3)(iii);

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For Unjust Enrichment 11. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following Class: All citizens of the United States living abroad that had investment accounts managed by UBS frozen, converted to cash, or closed without timely notification. Excluded from the Class are: (a) Defendant, its subsidiaries and affiliates, officers, directors, and employees; (b) the judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the judge’s immediate family; and (c) all persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class. 12. The Class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all affected persons would be impracticable. Although the exact number of Class members is unknown, because of the broad geographic reach of UBS’s operations, and the large number clients, the Class is expected to include many hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals. 15. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are highly experienced in consumer protection class action litigation. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action on behalf of the Class and will adequately represent the interests of the Class. 16. The common questions of law and fact present in this action predominate over any individual issues, if any, that may exist as to the members of the Class. 17. A class action is superior to other methods of fairly and efficiently adjudicating this litigation. While not inconsequential, the damages as to any individual litigant are such that individual litigation is likely not feasible. Furthermore, the very nature of the claim – that Defendant has failed to notify the Class that their investment vehicles no longer have the potential to earn investment income – many Class members may not even be aware that they have a claim. Accordingly, for most Class members, a class action is the only mechanism by which they could reasonably expect to vindicate their rights. 26. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if set forth fully herein. 27. There exists a contractual relationship as between Defendant and Plaintiff and members of the Class. 28. By virtue of this contractual relationship, Defendant acts as fiduciary to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, and owe fiduciary duties to them as account holders. 29. As alleged herein, Defendant has breached its fiduciary duties by intentionally and/or negligently failing to meaningfully disclose that the company would no longer be holding accounts of customers living abroad in IRA accounts as originally agreed upon, and instead would be cashing in the customers funds. 30. By changing the nature of the account from an IRA that was earning money to an all cash account, Defendant then restricted the ability of the Plaintiff and the Class to earn any investment income. 31. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct as described herein, Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 33. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if set forth fully herein. 34. There exists a contractual relationship between Defendant and Plaintiff and members of the Class. 35. As a component of their contractual relationship, Defendant owed Plaintiff and the Class a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the creation and ongoing fulfillment of its contractual duties. 36. UBS breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by changing the accounts from an IRA, which would be expected to produce investment income, to cash accounts, without providing meaningful notice of this change. 37. UBS was aware or should have been aware that Plaintiff and the Class were investing their money with UBS with the goal and expectation that there would be an opportunity to earn investment income. 38. By changing the accounts, UBS made fundamental and material changes to the contracts it had with Plaintiff and the Class, such that the contract failed of its essential purpose. 39. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct as described herein, Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 41. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if set forth fully herein. 42. UBS is in the business of maintaining custody of funds owned by people and entities like Plaintiff. 43. By providing UBS with custody of their funds, Plaintiff and the Class conferred a benefit upon UBS. 44. By unilaterally declining to fulfill its contractual obligations, UBS continued to derive the benefits of maintaining custody of Plaintiff and the Class’ funds without providing any corresponding benefit to Plaintiff and the Class. 45. The financial benefits of maintaining custody of Plaintiff and the Class’ funds, which include interest, investment opportunity, use as collateral, and other good and valuable benefits, rightly should inure to the benefit of Plaintiff and the Class. 46. Given Defendant’s failure to meaningfully provide notice of the nature of the change of the nature of Plaintiff and the Class’ accounts, and the fact that Plaintiff and the Class would no longer be earning any investment income, it would be improper and inappropriate to permit UBS to retain this benefit. 47. Accordingly, equity and good conscious require that the benefits at issue be restored to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 49. Defendant is engaged in the conduct of business, trade, commerce and/or the furnishing of service as that language is used in N.Y. GBL § 349. 50. Defendant’s conduct as described herein constitute deceptive acts or practices as that language is used in N.Y. GBL § 349. 51. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct as described herein, Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 52. Defendant’s conduct as described herein was marked by a wrongful motive in utter disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and the Class, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages. 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if set forth fully herein. 54. Defendant had a duty to make full and complete disclosures to Plaintiff and the Class with respect to the nature of their accounts and any changes thereto. 55. As set forth in more detail herein, Defendant UBS had a duty to provide meaningful notice to Plaintiff and the Class that their accounts were being modified in a way that adversely affected their investment opportunity. 56. The omitted information was material to Plaintiff and the Class. 57. As set forth in more detail herein, Defendant UBS declined to provide meaningful notice to Plaintiff and the Class that their accounts were being modified in a way that adversely affected their investment opportunity. 59. Plaintiff and the Class reasonably relied upon Defendant’s silence on this point and believed that the status of their account had not materially changed. 60. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct as described herein, Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 61. Defendant’s conduct as described herein was marked by an evil motive in utter disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and the Class, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages. 62. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if set forth fully herein. 63. Defendant had a duty to make full and complete disclosures to Plaintiff and the Class with respect to the nature of their accounts and any changes thereto. 64. As set forth in more detail herein, Defendant UBS had a duty to provide meaningful notice to Plaintiff and the Class that their accounts were being modified in a way that adversely affected their investment opportunity. 65. The omitted information was material to Plaintiff and the Class. 67. Plaintiff and the Class reasonably relied upon Defendant’s silence on this point and believed that the status of their account had not materially changed. 68. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct as described herein, Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 69. Defendant’s conduct as described herein was wholly reckless and in utter disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and the Class, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages. 70. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as if set forth fully herein. 71. There exists a contractual relationship between Defendant and Plaintiff and members of the Class as referenced herein. 72. Pursuant to that contractual relationship, Defendant was obligated to: a. Safely maintain custody of Plaintiff and the Class’ funds; b. Follow Plaintiff and the Class’ instructions with respect to the custody and placement of those funds; c. Refrain from taking any steps to negatively impact the value of Plaintiff and the Class’ investments; d. Refrain from altering the nature of Plaintiff and the Class’ investments without their express consent; and, e. Otherwise ensure the security and best use of those funds under the circumstances. 74. Defendant’s conduct herein constitutes a breach of Defendant’s obligations under the contract. 75. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct as described herein, Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages in an amount to be proven at trial. Breach Of Contract COUNT I For Breach of Fiduciary Duty For Fraudulent Misrepresentation/Omission For Violation of Section 349 of the New York General Business Law For Negligent Misrepresentation/Omission For Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

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15. By Spring 2020, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, which can cause the disease COVID-19, spread rapidly around the world. 17. Since that time, at least three separate COVID-19 vaccines have been developed and authorized for use in the United States. The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (“EUA”) for the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine on December 1, 2020. One week later, the FDA issued a second EUA for the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine. Finally, the FDA issued an EUA for the Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccine on February 27, 2021. 18. On August 23, 2021, the FDA issued full approval for the Pfizer vaccine Comirnaty for individuals 16 years of age and older. Pfizer’s EUA also remains in place. 19. To date, the FDA has not yet issued any other approvals for either the Moderna or Johnson & Johnson vaccine. B. United’s Vaccine Mandate 20. On August 6, 2021, United’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Scott Kirby announced that all employees would be required to receive a COVID-19 vaccine within five weeks of the FDA granting full approval of a vaccine, or five weeks after September 20, 2021, whichever came first. 21. As noted, the FDA approved Pfizer’s COVID-19 Comirnaty vaccine on August 23, 2021. 23. Employees are required to upload a copy of their vaccination record to a United database called Flying Together by September 27, 2021. See Thomas Pallini, United is the first US airline to require all employees be vaccinated against COVID-19, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/united-requiring-us-employees-get-covid-19-vaccine- 2021-8. 24. Employees who do not upload a copy of their vaccination record showing a COVID-19 vaccination will be terminated. 25. United’s mandate is absolute—there is no alternative for periodic testing, mask wearing, or social distancing, even for employees who have already had COVID-19 and still enjoy immunity from the disease. Employees must choose vaccination or termination. Or, as discussed below, employees who are “accommodated” for religious or health reasons may choose what will likely be several years of unpaid leave without benefits: effectively, termination. 26. This policy from United contrasts with the Federal Government’s recent announcement that the Department of Labor is developing a rule to require certain large employers to mandate vaccination or periodic testing for its employees. United is not offering the option of periodic testing, either in general or for employees who receive an accommodation. 28. When United announced the vaccine mandate, it stated that employees could request accommodations for religious or health reasons. See Daniella Genovese, United Airlines vaccine mandate driven by delta variant, hospitalization data, CEO Scott Kirby says, FOXBUSINESS (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/united-ceo-scott-kirby- pushed-vaccine-mandate-driven-by-hospitalization-data. This is in line with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) guidance on private employers issuing such mandates. See What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws §§ K.1 & K.2., EEOC (May 28, 2021), https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know- about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws. 29. However, United’s CEO Mr. Kirby also threatened employees “to be very careful about” requesting such accommodations. Mr. Kirby stated that there would be very “few people that get through the medical and religious exemption process”—describing such employees derisively as “all [of a] sudden decid[ing] ‘I’m really religious.’” Mr. Kirby threatened those employees by stating that they are “putting [their] job[s] on the line” if they request such accommodations. See Decl. of Kimberly Hamilton, attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 30. In addition to Mr. Kirby’s threats, United has placed substantial and unconscionable pressure on its employees. One of the many examples of such pressure, some of which are more specifically discussed below, occurred in early-September when United began sending postcards to all employees who had not yet provided proof of vaccination. 32. According to United, this vaccination mandate is aimed at increased safety. See Leslie Josephs, United will require its U.S. employees to be vaccinated, a first for country’s major airlines, CNBC (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/06/united-airlines-vaccine- mandate-employees.html. Yet United does not require any passenger flying on its planes, or interacting with its staff, to be vaccinated. See David Koenig, United Airlines will require US employees to be vaccinated, AP NEWS (Aug. 6, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/united-airlines- vaccine-mandate-employees-frontier-e8eef8e8f11d4924b81768484e5401a1. Nor does it require its employees from other countries to be vaccinated, even though those employees work and come in contact with United crews from the United States. Id. The mandate does not apply to regional airline partners that fly United customers on shorter routes that feed United’s mainlines. See Josephs, supra ¶ 32. And the mandate does not apply to pilots from other airlines allowed to ride in the “jumpseat” of the aircraft (in the cockpit) with United flight officers. See Jumpseat Committee Update, A. The COVID-19 Pandemic and Response

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24. Defendant operates ADAM BAUMGOLD in New York located at 104 East 81st Street, New York, NY 10028. 25. These Art Galleries constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Art Galleries provide to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to: find information about art gallery location and hours, information about artwork, events, art descriptions, inquire about pricing and other products available online and in art gallery’s for purchase, and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant 26. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.adambaumgoldgallery.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The goods and services offered by Defendant include but are not limited to the following: information about artwork, events, art descriptions, inquire about pricing and other products available online and in art gallery’s for purchase, and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in December 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods and services of Defendant’s physical locations in New York by being unable to learn more information about information about artwork, events, art descriptions, inquire about pricing and other products available online and in art gallery’s for purchase, and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant 32. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Art Galleries on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 33. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 37. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 39. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s physical locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 49. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 52. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Defendant’s Art Galleries are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Art Galleries. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 58. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 62. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 63. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 66. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 69. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 70. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 74. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 78. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 79. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 82. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 83. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 88. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 89. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 92. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 93. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 96. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 98. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

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12. In January of 2018, Defendant transmitted by telephone facsimile machine two unsolicited faxes to Plaintiff. (See Ex. A.) 13. On January 15, 2018 at 3:00 PM, Plaintiff received an unsolicited fax from Defendant. 14. On January 30, 2018 at 2:51 PM, Plaintiff received another unsolicited fax from Defendant. 15. True and accurate copies of the January 15, 2018 facsimile and the January 30, 2018 facsimile are attached hereto as Exhibit A. 16. Dental City profited from and received the benefits of marketing of its products and is a responsible party under the JFPA. 17. Defendant created or made Exhibit A, which Defendant knew or should have known advertises Defendant’s goods or products (namely, its dental equipment and products) that Defendant intended to and did in fact distribute to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes. 18. Exhibit A is part of Defendant’s work or operations to market Defendant’s goods or services, which are performed by Defendant and/or on behalf of Defendant. Therefore, Exhibit A constitutes material furnished in connection with Defendant’s work or operations. 19. Plaintiff has never invited or given permission to Defendant to send the faxes, nor did Plaintiff have any prior relationship with Defendant at the time the faxes were sent (or at any other time). 24. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action for claims under the JFPA, on behalf of the following two classes: Junk Fax Class: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action through the date on which notice is sent to the Class, (2) were sent, by Defendant or on Defendant’s behalf, (3) a telephone facsimile message substantially similar to Exhibit A, (4) from whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express permission or invitation to send those faxes in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express permission to fax the Plaintiff. No Opt-Out Notice Class: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action through the date on which notice is sent to the Class, (2) were sent, by Defendant or on Defendant’s behalf, (3) a telephone facsimile message substantially similar to Exhibit A, (4) which did not display an opt-out notice. 33. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 34. The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 35. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 6. This case challenges Defendant’s practice of sending unsolicited fax advertisements. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Junk Fax Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Opt-Out Notice Class)

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10. In June 2017, Plaintiff purchased his Restore Products at the Sutherland’s store located in Cass County, Missouri. 11. Plaintiff purchased several Restore Products, including Restore Deck Start Wood Primer, Restore 2X, and Restore 4X. 12. Plaintiff purchased four gallons of Restore Deck Start Wood Primer; Plaintiff paid $37.89 for each gallon. 13. Plaintiff purchased four gallons of Restore 2X; Plaintiff paid $33.97 for each gallon. 14. Plaintiff purchased three one-gallon containers of Restore 4X; Plaintiff paid $34.25 for each gallon. 15. Plaintiff also purchased one five-gallon container of Restore 4X; Plaintiff paid $137 for the container. 16. In total, Plaintiff spent $527.19 on Restore Products. 17. Plaintiff completed applying the Restore Products to his cedar wooden deck in September 2017. 18. By May 2018, the Restore Products already were detaching from several spots on the deck. Plaintiff repaired those spots. 20. Below are a series of illustrative photographs of Plaintiff’s deck; the pictures were taken in August 2019: 23. Rust-Oleum markets its Restore 4X product as the “Ultimate Refinish” that is “4X thicker than ordinary paint” and a “premium ultra solid coating.” According to Rust-Oleum, Restore 4X “[r]efinishes weathered surfaces” and “[c]onceals hairline cracks.” Restore 4X purports to provide “[s]uperior coverage” and “long lasting protection.”2 24. Similarly, Rust-Oleum markets its Restore 2X as being “2X thicker than ordinary paint” that “requires only one coat for total coverage.”3 25. According to Rust-Oleum, Restore 2X provides “superior water repellency” with special “algae and mildew resistant coating.”4 26. Restore 2X also purportedly has “NeverWet Properties Inside” designed to “extend[] the life of your deck.”5 27. Plaintiff also purchased and applied Restore Deck Start Wood Primer. Restore Deck Start Wood Primer is a compatible product with Restore 4X and Restore 2X. 28. The label of Deck Start Wood Primer states that it “simplifies prep & promotes topcoat adhesion;” Rust-Oleum’s marketing materials make the same assertion.6 30. Rust-Oleum also asserts that Deck Start Wood Primer “works on weathered and worn wood.”8 31. As outlined above, Rust-Oleum’s representations are false because Restore Products: a. Separate, crack, peel, bubble, flake, pucker, chip and otherwise prematurely fail shortly after application; b. Are not superior to ordinary deck paint or stain; c. Cannot withstand harsh weather; d. Do not provide “superior water repellency”; and e. Do not contain special “algae and mildew resistant coating.” 32. Similarly, Rust-Oleum knew about these conditions related to Restore Products and omitted the information and/or concealed it from consumers. Rust-Oleum’s Knowledge 33. Rust-Oleum knew or should have known about the defects in its Restore Products. Indeed, Rust-Oleum previously defended litigation concerning several offerings within its Restore family of products. 35. Although technically the MDL encompassed different Restore products than those at issue here, the claims in that case also concerned the products’ adhesive qualities and durability, superiority to other products, and ability to withstand flaking, bubbling, and peeling. 36. Thus, the earlier litigation put Rust-Oleum on notice about the quality of its Restore products, and the company knew or should have known about the defects in its other Restore products, including those at issue here. Consumer Complaints About Rust-Oleum’s Products 37. Customer complaints about Rust-Oleum’s products are rampant, demonstrating that Plaintiff’s experience with Rust-Oleum’s products is not unique. 38. In late September 2019, one customer wrote: “I bought the Restore 4x and applied it in October 2016 (I live in Florida). Fast forward 2 years and my deck has started to peel and crack. Horrible product. Pressure washed the deck a month ago and 1/3 of the paint just blew off. Ugghhhhhh. I won’t be buying this product again…”10 39. Another customer wrote: Rust-oleum Restore DO NOT USE THIS PRODUCT IT IS TERRIBLE! Unfortunately I didn’t take heed of all the negative reviews on the failure of this product. early summer of 2018 I prepped my deck as the instructions said and applied it to the deck. Looked great all summer but early spring 2019 I could see how the finish starting to flake off from spots all over. It was not in any particular place and not in well used spots. The pictures I have added to this post were taken today 09/08/19. There are areas all over the deck that have flaked off. I have no idea what I’m going to do it looks awful. I understand there is a class action suit against Rust-oleum for the failure of this product and wish I could get some kind of resolve from the company to fix this mess.11 10 https://www.deckstainhelp.com/class-action-lawsuit-against-rust-oleum-deck-restore/#more-7196 (Casie 46. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following Class: All persons who purchased Restore Products in Missouri between October 17, 2014 to the present. 47. Excluded from the proposed class is Rust-Oleum; any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of Rust-Oleum; any entity in which Rust-Oleum has a controlling interest; any officer, director, or employee of Rust-Oleum; any successor or assign of Rust-Oleum; anyone employed by counsel for Plaintiff in this action; any judge to whom this case is assigned, his or her spouse, and all persons within the third degree of relationship to either of them, as well as the spouses of such persons; members of the judge’s staff; and anyone who purchased Restore Products for the purpose of resale. 48. Numerosity. Rust-Oleum sells Restore Products in Missouri through major retailers. Members of the proposed class likely number in the hundreds or thousands and are thus too numerous to practically join in a single action. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, supplemented by published notice (if deemed necessary or appropriate by the Court). 50. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the proposed class. Plaintiff and the proposed class purchased Restore Products that contain the same defects, giving rise to substantially the same claims. 51. Adequacy. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the proposed class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class he seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiff will prosecute this action vigorously by monitoring and directing the actions of class counsel. The interests of members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. 53. In the alternative, the proposed class may be certified because: a. the prosecution of separate actions by the individual members of the proposed class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual class members which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Rust- Oleum; b. the prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other class members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; and c. Rust-Oleum has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the proposed class, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with respect to the members of the proposed class as a whole. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the proposed class, hereby re-alleges the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 55. Declaratory relief is intended to minimize “the danger of avoidable loss and unnecessary accrual of damages.” 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2751 (3d ed. 1998). 57. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the Court may “declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 58. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Restore Products are defective as set forth herein. The defective nature of Restore Products is material and requires disclosure to all consumers who purchased them. 59. The declaratory relief requested herein will generate common answers that will settle the parties’ controversy. There is an economy to resolving these issues as they have the potential to eliminate the need for continued and repeated litigation. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the proposed class, hereby re-alleges the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 61. The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (“the MMPA”) provides that “[t]he act, use or employment by any person of any deception . . . [or] unfair practice, or the concealment . . . of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce . . . is declared to be an unlawful practice.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020.1. 63. Under the MMPA, the term “merchandise” is broadly defined to include “any objects . . . or services.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020.4. Rust-Oleum’s Restore Products are “merchandise” within the scope of the MMPA. 64. The MMPA authorizes private causes of action, and class actions. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.025.1; 407.025.2. Plaintiff and members of the proposed class are individuals entitled to bring suit and recover under the MMPA. 65. Plaintiff purchased his Restore Products for personal use at his residence. 66. When Rust-Oleum designed, developed, manufactured, marketed, and sold Restore Products, it was involved in the conduct of trade and commerce under the MMPA. 67. At the time Rust-Oleum developed, manufactured, marketed, and sold Restore Products, it knew or should have known that they were defective. 68. Nonetheless, Rust-Oleum concealed its knowledge of the defects from consumers like Plaintiff and class members, and instead sold Restore Products as ordinary for normal use. 69. Furthermore, Rust-Oleum misrepresented the characteristics of Restore Products. 70. Rust-Oleum’s misrepresentations, omissions and concealments of material fact constitute unfair and/or deceptive practices in violation of the MMPA. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the proposed class, hereby re-alleges the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 73. As a result of its wrongful and fraudulent acts and omissions, as set forth above, Rust-Oleum obtained monies that rightfully belong to Plaintiff and the class members to the detriment of the Plaintiff and the class members. 74. Rust-Oleum appreciated, accepted and retained the non-gratuitous benefits (i.e. profits) conferred by Plaintiff and the class members who had no knowledge of the defective characteristics of Restore Products. 75. Plaintiff and the class members either (1) paid a higher price for Restore products which actually had lower value or no value at all, or (2) paid Rust-Oleum monies for Restore Products that Plaintiff and the class members would not have purchased had they been aware of the defective characteristics of Restore Products. 76. It would be inequitable and unjust for Rust-Oleum to retain these wrongfully obtained profits. 77. Rust-Oleum’s retention of these wrongfully-obtained profits would violate the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. 79. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the proposed class, hereby re-alleges the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 80. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-314, which codifies section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), imposes an implied warranty of merchantability on the sale of goods by a merchant. 81. Under Missouri law, a plaintiff may recover under the provisions of section 400.2- 314 by proving: a. that a merchant sold goods; b. which were not “merchantable” at the time of sale; c. injury and damages to the plaintiff or his property; d. caused proximately and in fact by the defective nature of the goods; and e. notice to the seller of the injury. Metty v. Shurfine Cent. Corp., 736 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 82. Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-104, Rust-Oleum is a merchant because it is “a person who deals in goods of the kind.” 83. Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-105, which codifies UCC section 2-105, Restore Products are a good, and Rust-Oleum’s sale of Restore Products to Plaintiff was the sale of goods by a merchant. 84. Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-314, to be “merchantable” goods must be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” 86. As a factual and proximate result of the defective nature of Restore Products, Plaintiff suffered injury and damages. 87. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to recover for Rust-Oleum’s violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-314. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Plaintiff individually and on behalf of the class) Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq. (Plaintiff individually and on behalf of the class) Plaintiff’s Purchase and Experience with Restore Products Unjust Enrichment (Plaintiff individually and on behalf of the class) Violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practice Act (“MMPA”) (Plaintiff individually and on behalf of the class)

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14. Faherty owns and operates stores throughout the United States, including locations at 133 Prince Street, New York, New York and 351 Bleecker Street, New York, New York. It sells, at these stores, shorts, shoes, dresses, jumpsuits, outerwear, blankets, accessories and similar items. 15. Faherty’s Website is heavily integrated with its stores, serving as a gateway to them. Through the Website, Faherty’s customers are, inter alia, able to: learn information about the company; learn about stores’ locations and hours of operation; the items for sale in the stores and online, including available sizes, the materials used, details about the items, and care instructions; purchase items for delivery; learn about the return policy; learn about the “Bestsellers”; purchase a gift card; learn about items on sale; and sign up for the mailing list. 17. Plaintiff Fischler cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 20. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Fischler, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Faherty offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Fischler encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting Faherty’s stores and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals. 22. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 23. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Fischler and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Fischler alleges that Faherty has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Fischler, as a member of a protected class. 24. Faherty therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 25. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 27. Although Faherty may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Faherty lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 30. Faherty has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 31. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Faherty’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Faherty’s stores, during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 32. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Faherty’s stores, during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 33. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Faherty’s stores, during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 35. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Faherty has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 36. Plaintiff Fischler will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Faherty has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 38. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 41. Faherty’s stores are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Faherty’s stores. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 42. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 45. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Fischler, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 47. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 49. Faherty’s State of New York stores constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Faherty’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Faherty. Faherty’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these stores. 50. Faherty is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its stores and the Website. Faherty is a “person” within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 51. Faherty is violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Faherty makes available to the non- disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). 53. Faherty’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Faherty has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 54. Faherty discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Faherty’s Website and its stores under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Faherty from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 56. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 57. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 58. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 59. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Faherty’s New York City locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the meaning of the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 61. Faherty is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its stores in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 62. Faherty is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Faherty makes available to the non- disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 64. As such, Faherty discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Faherty from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. As Faherty’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 67. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that Faherty denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its stores, which Faherty owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Faherty, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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FLSA OVERTIME WAGES 10. Cantor Fitzgerald is a brokerage company servicing the financial and real estate markets, employing thousands of employees in offices worldwide. 12. Upon information and belief, during the period from 2008 through the present, Cantor Fitzgerald employed more than 50 similarly situated persons nationwide in office locations including, but not limited to, Newport Beach, CA, Atlanta, GA, New York, NY, Rochelle Park, NJ, King of Prussia, PA, and Las Vegas, NV, in a similar capacity, comprising the putative class. 13. The putative class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 14. The names of all potential members of the putative class are not known or knowable without defendants’ records or discovery. 15. Plaintiff and all members of the putative class constitute “employees” as that term is defined under 29 U.S.C. § 203(e), New York Labor Law § 651, and case law interpreting these statutes. 16. The payments made to plaintiff and other members of the putative class by defendants constitute wages as that term is defined under FLSA and NYLL. 18. Adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other Class members not parties to the adjudication. 20. Steven Puente is a member of the Class and his claims are typical of those of the Class, and he will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 21. Steven Puente’s interests do not conflict with those of the Class. 22. Steven Puente will fairly and adequately represent the Class, and has retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation. 23. Steven Puente is not aware of any other proceeding arising out of the issues in this action. 24. This Court is the appropriate forum for the instant action as defendants have their headquarters in this District, and all activities at issue took place here. 25. Steven Puente anticipates no difficulty in the management of this class action. 26. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 27. The Class members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of defendants’ common, uniform, unlawful, and unfair personnel policies and practices. 28. Defendants have computerized payroll and personnel data that will make calculation of damages for specific Class members relatively simple. 29. The propriety and amount of compensatory and liquidated damages are issues common to the Class. 31. Plaintiff collectively brings the claims in this Complaint arising out of the FLSA on behalf of himself and similarly situated persons who are nationwide current and former employees of Cantor Fitzgerald since the date three years prior to the filing of the complaint. 32. Upon information and belief, the FLSA Collective consists of in excess of fifty (50) similarly situated current and former nationwide employees of Cantor Fitzgerald who have been victims of defendants’ common policy and practices in violation of their rights under the FLSA by, inter alia, willfully denying them overtime wages. 33. As part of its regular business practice, defendants have intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly harmed plaintiff, the Class, and the FLSA Collective by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA and the NYLL, which policy and pattern or practice includes the following: Failing to pay employees the applicable overtime rate for all time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 34. Defendants have engaged in their unlawful conduct pursuant to a corporate policy of minimizing labor costs and denying employees compensation. 35. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been intentional, willful, and in bad faith, and has caused significant damage to the plaintiff, the Class, and the FLSA Collective. 37. As a standard practice, Cantor Fitzgerald and failed to pay overtime to plaintiffs, the Class and the FLSA Collective for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours. The exact accounting of how many hours were inadequately compensated can only be determined for each plaintiff and the FLSA Collective upon completion of discovery. 38. In or about January 2008, plaintiff, Steven Puente, was employed by Cantor Fitzgerald as a Junior Voice Support Analyst, an information technology position, with job functions which included information technology installation and technical support for Cantor Fitzgerald and its affiliates. 39. As a Voice Support Analyst, Mr. Puente performed installation and technical support functions – installing, maintaining, supporting, and repairing communication and computer software and hardware – for Cantor Fitzgerald and its affiliates. 40. From January 2008 through 2013, Espeed paid Mr. Puente’s salary. 41. Beginning on or about January 2014 through the present, BGC has paid Mr. Puente’s salary. 43. From January 2008 through the present, Mr. Puente worked in excess of 40 hours per week, but was not paid statutory overtime pay for overtime hours worked. 44. Since January 2008 through the present, Mr. Puente has held the same position and has performed essentially the same job functions. 45. Upon information and belief, Cantor Fitzgerald failed to post and keep posted notices explaining the overtime provisions of the FLSA and New York State Labor laws in conspicuous places in every establishment where plaintiff and other information technology employees were employed so as to permit them to readily observe a copy. 46. Upon information and belief, Cantor Fitzgerald failed to comply with the record-keeping requirements of the FLSA and New York State Labor laws with respect to overtime hours worked by plaintiff and other information technology employees. 47. In or about January 2014, Cantor Fitzgerald acknowledged that Mr. Puente’s position as Junior Voice Support Analyst, and other positions within his information technology department, were nonexempt and had been misclassified as exempt. 49. In or about February 2014, Mr. Puente and his coworkers submitted to their supervisors and Human Resources detailed records of their overtime during the requested six-year period. 50. Mr. Puente provided Cantor Fitzgerald with records documenting his unpaid overtime from 2008-2014, which totaled in excess of $100,000. 51. During the period February through November 2014, Mr. Puente’s and his coworkers’ supervisors repeatedly inquired as to the status of payment. 52. Human Resources responded that they were working on it and requested additional time records and updates from Mr. Puente and his coworkers. 53. On or about November 20, 2014, Mr. Puente wrote directly to the Human Resources Director, Patricia Dreste, to inquire about payment and, receiving no response, Mr. Puente wrote again to Ms. Dreste on December 1, 2014 and January 12, 2015. 54. On or about January 12, 2015, Ms. Dreste replied stating “we are working on this,” and “I am doing my best to resolve this in the next week.” 55. Two months later, on or about March 13, 2015, Ms. Dreste, with Mr. Viola on the line, called Mr. Puente and advised that Cantor Fitzgerald was prepared to pay him two years of overtime totaling $51,528 for the period 2012-2014. 56. When Mr. Puente asked Ms. Dreste why Cantor Fitzgerald was not paying unpaid overtime for the entire six year period, Ms. Dreste was unable to answer the question. 58. Mr. Puente elected not to sign the proposed Acknowledgment because the proposed payment of two years of overtime did not include all the unpaid overtime during the time period Cantor Fitzgerald misclassified him as exempt. 59. Upon information and belief, Cantor Fitzgerald made similar offers of partial payment to Mr. Puente’s coworkers and unlawfully required that they sign an Acknowledgement of full payment. 60. Upon information and belief, Cantor Fitzgerald engaged in a pattern and practice of unlawfully requiring similarly situated individuals to sign purported waivers or acknowledgement forms as a condition of receiving partial payment of overtime, which waivers are invalid and contrary to law. 61. Upon information and belief, Cantor Fitzgerald engaged in a pattern and practice of willfully failing to pay its information technology employees overtime pay in full. 62. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-61 as if fully set forth herein. 63. This claim is brought individually on behalf of the named plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 65. Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to compensate plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for overtime wages. 66. Defendants willfully and intentionally failed to compensate plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for overtime wages. 67. As a result of defendant’s willful and unlawful violations of the FLSA, plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, liquidated damages, and pre- and post- judgment interest. 68. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-67 as if fully set forth herein. 69. This claim is brought individually on behalf of the named plaintiff and the Class. 70. The NYLL requires that employers pay employees one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours during any work week. 71. Defendants violated the NYLL by failing to compensate plaintiff and the Class for overtime wages. 72. Defendants willfully and intentionally failed to compensate plaintiff and the Class for overtime wages. 9. Plaintiff brings this action as a collective action pursuant to FLSA on behalf of those non-managerial employees who elect to opt-in to this action (the “FLSA Collective”) and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23, on behalf of a class of all past, present and future non-managerial information technology employees who perform installation and technical support functions – installing, maintaining, supporting, and repairing communication and computer software and hardware, for Cantor Fitzgerald except those who elect to opt out of this action (the “Plaintiffs” or “Class”). COLLECTIVE AND CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS NYLL OVERTIME WAGES

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(Cal. Wage Order No. 4-2001; Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Herself and the California Class) (California Wage Payment Provisions, Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 202, & 203, Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Herself and the California Class) (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Herself and the FLSA Collective) 17. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all persons who have worked for Defendant as Recruiters in any state other than Pennsylvania, at any time within the three years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of the final disposition of this action (the “FLSA Period”). This group is hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective.” 18. The proposed FLSA Collective includes: all current and former Recruiters who performed recruiting services for Defendant and were or are classified as exempt from overtime within three years of the filing of their consent to join. 19. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of all persons who have worked for Defendant in California as exempt-classified Recruiters at any time within the four years prior to the date of the filing of this Complaint through the date of the final disposition of this action (the “California Class Period”). 20. The California Class is hereinafter referred to as the “State Law Class.” 31. Defendant employs Account Managers who are responsible for working directly with Defendant’s clients. Account Managers obtain all of the information regarding the position that a client is trying to fill. Clients advise Account Managers of the specific credentials and qualifications required of a candidate. Account Managers in turn provide this information to Talent Acquisition Managers and Recruiting Managers. 32. Defendant’s Talent Acquisition Managers and Recruiting Managers supervise Recruiters and inform Recruiters of a client’s hiring needs. 48. Plaintiff brings the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Claims for Relief for violation of California’s wage and hour and unfair competition laws as a class action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3), on behalf of all California class members, defined in paragraph 19. 49. Numerosity (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)) – The California Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that during the California Class Period, Defendant has employed at least 50 persons who satisfy the definition of the California Class. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all members of the California Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 68. California law requires an employer, such as Defendant, to pay overtime compensation to all nonexempt employees for all hours worked over 40 per week, or over eight per day. 69. Under California law, Plaintiff and the California Class are nonexempt employees entitled to be paid overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked. 70. Throughout the California Class Period, and continuing through the present, Plaintiff and the California Class worked in excess of eight hours in a workday and/or 40 hours in a workweek. 71. During the California Class Period, Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and the California Class as exempt from overtime pay entitlement and failed and refused to pay them overtime premium pay for their overtime hours worked. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the California Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 74. California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 require Defendant to pay its employees all wages due within the time specified by law. California Labor Code § 203 provides that if an employer willfully fails to timely pay such wages, the employer must continue to pay the subject employees’ wages until the back wages are paid in full or an action is commenced, up to a maximum of 30 days of wages. 75. Plaintiff and all California Class members who ceased employment with Defendant are entitled to unpaid compensation, but to date have not received such compensation. 76. More than 30 days have passed since Plaintiff and certain California Class members left Defendant’s employ. 77. As a consequence of Defendant’s willful conduct in not paying compensation for all hours worked, Plaintiff and California Class members whose employment ended during the class period are entitled to 30 days’ wages under Labor Code § 203, together with interest thereon and attorneys’ fees and costs.

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1. The amount of the debt; 11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of all individuals: a. with addresses in the State of New Jersey; b. to whom Defendant Paramount sent an initial letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. providing multiple addresses; e. without identifying which address is the correct one to send a written dispute to; and f. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 20. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 21. Some time prior to June 2, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to non-party CF Medical, LLC. 22. This alleged debt was incurred as a financial obligation that was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (5), specifically for personal medical services. 23. CF Medical, LLC is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (4). 24. According to the letter received by Plaintiff, CF Medical, LLC placed the account with the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. 25. Defendant Paramount collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of itself or other creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation - June 2, 2020 Collection Letter 26. On or about June 2, 2020, Defendant Paramount sent Plaintiff a collection letter. A true and accurate copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit A. 27. The letter ostensibly provides the notices as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g regarding disputing the debt. 29. None of the three addresses are specifically identified as the correct address where to send a written dispute. 3. A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any 30. The consumer is therefore confused as to how to properly dispute the debt and exercise his rights under § 1692g. 31. Upon information and belief, disputes sent to one or more of these addresses will not be honored by Defendant. 32. This renders that address(es) as misleading the consumer into believing a proper dispute can be sent there. 33. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 34. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 35. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 36. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 37. Defendant violated said section: a. By providing multiple addresses and not identifying which one should be used to dispute the debt in violation of §1692e (10). 39. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 4. portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt- collector; 40. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 41. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 42. Defendant violated this section by providing multiple addresses and not identifying which one should be used for disputing the debt. 43. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 44. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 45. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 46. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – 47. Defendant violated this section by providing multiple addresses and not identifying which one should be used for disputing the debt thereby failing to provide the proper notice required by §1692g in an initial collection letter. 48. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 5. A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 6. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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(Fed R. Civ. P. 23 Class Action Claims) Violation of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Laws and Regulations, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a, et seq. [Failure to Pay Overtime Time Wages] (29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Collective Action Claims) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. [Failure to Pay Overtime Wages] (29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Individual Claims) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. [Unlawful Tip Retention] (29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Individual Claims) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. [Failure to Pay Overtime Wages] (29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Collective Action Claims) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. [Unlawful Tip Retention] (Individual Claims) Violation of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Laws and Regulations, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a, et seq. [Failure to Pay Overtime Time Wages] (Individual Claims) Violation of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Laws and Regulations, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a, et seq. [Unlawful Tip Retention] 10. Defendants have operated and controlled an enterprise engaged in commerce as defined under the FLSA. 11. Defendants have generated over $500,000.00 in revenue per year. 12. Defendants had two (2) or more employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce. 14. Defendants were the “employer” of the hourly-paid restaurant workers including Plaintiff within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1(g) and N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1a. 15. The hourly-paid restaurant workers including Plaintiff were “employees” of Defendants within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1(h) and N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1b. 16. Defendants “suffered or permitted” the hourly-paid restaurant workers including Plaintiff to work and thus “employed” them within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §203(g) and N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1(f). 17. Defendants, directly or indirectly, hired the hourly-paid restaurant workers including Plaintiff and determined the rate and method of the payment of their wages. 18. Defendants controlled the work schedules, duties, protocols, applications, assignments and conditions of employment of the hourly-paid restaurant workers including Plaintiff. 19. Defendants established payroll on a bi-weekly basis. 20. Defendant required hourly-paid restaurant workers to perform work for over forty (40) hours a week. 21. To the extent Defendants paid hourly-paid restaurant workers for hours in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, such payments were made at their regular hourly rates, rather than time-and-a-half of that rate as required by the FLSA and NJWHLR. 23. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff regularly worked over forty (40) hours a week. 24. Plaintiff’s final hourly rate was $13.00 before he was separated from the company. 25. Plaintiff regularly shared cash tips paid by customers with other hourly-paid restaurant workers. 26. Plaintiff regularly received cash tips of approximately $50 during each bi-weekly payroll period. 27. To the extent Defendants paid Plaintiff for hours in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, such payments were made at his regular hourly rate, rather than time-and-a-half of that rate as required by the FLSA and NJWHLR. 28. As a result of Defendants’ common unlawful policies, the hourly-paid restaurant workers were not compensated overtime at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for work performed over 40 hours per week. 29. While employed by Defendants, the hourly-paid restaurant workers including Plaintiff shared and received cash tips paid by customers. 30. However, Defendants retained the credit card tips and catering tips paid by customers without distributing them to the hourly-paid restaurant workers, in violation of the FLSA and NJWHLR. 31. The hourly-paid restaurant workers have been subjected to the common unlawful policies and practices of Defendants as stated herein that violated the FLSA and NJWHLR. 33. Defendants’ violations of the above-described federal and state wage and hour statutes and regulations were willful, arbitrary, unreasonable and in bad faith. 34. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 35. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, as an opt-in representative action, for and on behalf of all hourly-paid restaurant workers who have been affected by Defendants’ common policies and practices which include failing to properly pay overtime wages and unlawfully retaining tips, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”) and attendant regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 516, et seq. 36. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on behalf of: All hourly-paid restaurant workers employed by Defendants at any time from three (3) years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of judgment. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 37. Plaintiff brings this collective action against Defendants to recover unpaid overtime wages, unlawfully kept tips, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 38. The collective action further alleges a willful violation of the FLSA and seeks an additional, third year of limitations. 40. Certification of the collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because the employees described herein are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The class of employees on behalf of whom Plaintiff brings this collective action are similarly situated because they were subject to the same or similar unlawful practices and policies as stated herein and their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories. 41. The employment relationships between Defendants and every collective member are the same and differ only by name, location, and rate of pay. 42. Plaintiff anticipates that there will be no difficulty in the management of this litigation. This litigation presents claims under the FLSA, a type that have often been prosecuted on a class wide basis, and the manner of identifying the collective and providing any monetary relief to it can be effectuated from a review of Defendants’ records. 43. Plaintiff and the putative FLSA collective members demand a trial by jury. 44. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 45. Plaintiff also seeks to maintain this action pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 23, as an opt-out class action, for and on behalf all hourly-paid restaurant workers who have been affected by Defendants’ common policies and practices which include failing to properly pay overtime wages and unlawfully retaining tips, in violation of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Laws and Regulations (“NJWHLR”), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a et seq. 47. Plaintiff brings this Rule 23 class action as to the NJWHLR claims against Defendants to recover unpaid overtime time wages, pre- and post- judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25 and 12:56-1.5. 48. The members of the Rule 23 class are so numerous that joinder of all class members in this case would be impractical. The Rule 23 class members should be easy to identify from Defendants’ computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records. 49. There is a well-defined community of interest among the Rule 23 class members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions affecting each individual class member. These common legal and factual questions, include, but are not limited to, the following: whether the Rule 23 class members were properly compensated overtime wages at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for work performed over 40 hours per week; and whether Defendants unlawfully retained tips without distributing them to the Rule 23 class members. 50. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Rule 23 class members in that they and all other class members suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ common and systemic payroll policies and practices. All of the class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein. Any lawsuit brought by an employee of Defendants would be identical to a suit brought by any other employee for the same violations and separate litigation would cause a risk of inconsistent results. 52. Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the class members and have retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of nationwide wage and hour class actions. Plaintiff and his counsel do not have interests that are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the class members. 53. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each class member. Plaintiff’s claim arises from the same legal theories as all other class members. Therefore, this case will be more manageable and efficient as a Rule 23 class action. Plaintiff and his counsel know of no unusual difficulties in this case. 54. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 class members demand a trial by jury. 55. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 57. Plaintiff regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per week. 58. Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff for all hours worked as alleged herein. 59. Defendants failed to properly pay Plaintiff overtime wages at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times his regular rate of pay for all hours he worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 60. Defendants’ conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional, unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith. 61. Because Defendants willfully violated the FLSA, a three (3) year statute of limitations shall apply to such violation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 62. As a result of Defendants’ uniform and common policies and practices described above, Plaintiff was illegally deprived of overtime wages earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 63. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 65. Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per week. 66. Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members for all hours worked as alleged herein. 67. Defendants failed to properly pay Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members overtime wages at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for all hours they worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 68. Defendants’ conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional, unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith. 69. Because Defendants willfully violated the FLSA, a three (3) year statute of limitations shall apply to such violation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 70. As a result of Defendants’ uniform and common policies and practices described above, Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members were illegally deprived of overtime wages earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 71. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 72. Plaintiff regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per week. 73. Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff for all hours worked as alleged herein. 75. Defendants’ conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional, unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith. 76. As a result of Defendants’ uniform and common policies and practices described above, Plaintiff was illegally deprived of overtime wages earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, pre and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25 and 12:56-1.5. 77. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 78. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 class members regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per week. 79. Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff the Rule 23 class members for all hours worked as alleged herein. 80. Defendants failed to properly pay Plaintiff the Rule 23 class members overtime wages at a rate not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for all hours they worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 81. Defendants’ conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional, unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith. 83. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 84. Pursuant to the amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the omnibus budget bill, “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018,” enacted on March 23, 2018, employers “may not keep tips received by its employees for any purposes, including allowing managers or supervisors to keep any portion of employees’ tips, regardless of whether or not the employer takes a tip credit.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2)(B). 85. Fact Sheet # 15 of the U.S. Department of Labor concerning the application of the FLSA to employees who receive tips provides that “[a] tip is the sole property of the tipped employee regardless of whether the employer takes a tip credit.” See Fact Sheet # 15 (Revised April 2018). 86. Plaintiff regularly received more than $ 30 a month in cash tips. 87. Defendants retained the credit card tips and catering tips paid by customers without distributing them to Plaintiff, in violation of the FLSA. 88. Defendants’ conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional, unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith. 89. Because Defendants willfully violated the FLSA, a three (3) year statute of limitations shall apply to such violation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 91. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 92. Pursuant to the amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in the omnibus budget bill, “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018,” enacted on March 23, 2018, employers “may not keep tips received by its employees for any purposes, including allowing managers or supervisors to keep any portion of employees’ tips, regardless of whether or not the employer takes a tip credit.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2)(B). 93. Fact Sheet # 15 of the U.S. Department of Labor concerning the application of the FLSA to employees who receive tips provides that “[a] tip is the sole property of the tipped employee regardless of whether the employer takes a tip credit.” See Fact Sheet # 15 (Revised April 2018). 94. Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members regularly received more than $ 30 a month in cash tips. 95. Defendants retained the credit card tips and catering tips paid by customers without distributing them to Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members, in violation of the 99. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 100. N.J.S.A.12:56-8.4 (b) provides that “[g]ratuities shall be the property of the tipped employee.” 101. Plaintiff regularly received more than $ 30 a month in cash tips. 102. Defendants retained the credit card tips and catering tips paid by customers without distributing them to Plaintiff, in violation of the NJWHLR. 103. Defendants’ conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional, unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith. 104. As a result of Defendants’ uniform and common policies and practices described above, Plaintiff was illegally deprived of tips earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, pre and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25 and 12:56-1.5.

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16. This action is properly maintainable as a collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and as a Class Action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 17. This action is brought on behalf of the Named Plaintiffs and a class consisting of similarly situated employees who worked for Defendants as butchers, meat and poultry handlers, cleaners, packagers and related jobs. 18. The Named Plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs who elect to opt-in as part of the collective action and putative class members are all victims of the Defendants’ common policy and / or plan to violate the NYLL and FLSA by failing to provide overtime wages, at the rate of one and one half times the regular rate of pay, for all time worked in excess of 40 hours in any given week pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, failing to provide spread of hours compensation on days when the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class worked shifts longer than ten hours in one day, pursuant to Title 12 NYCRR §146.16(a), and failing to provide accurate paystubs and wage statements pursuant to NYLL §§ 198-1(d) and 195 and 12 NYCRR § 146-2.2 and 2.3 . 19. The putative class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The size of the putative class is believed to be in excess of 50 employees. In addition, the names of all potential members of the putative class are not known. 20. The questions of law and fact common to the putative class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. These questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, whether the Defendants (a) failed to pay overtime wages, at the rate of one and -5- one half times the regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in any given week in violation of federal and state law; (b) failed to provide spread of hours compensation to the Named Plaintiffs and the putative class when they worked shifts in excess of ten hours in one day; and (c) failed to provide the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class with accurate paystubs and wage statements. 21. The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are typical to the claims of other members of the putative class. The Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class were all subject to Defendants’ policies and willful practices of failing to pay their employees all earned overtime wages and spread of hours compensation, and failing to provide accurate paystubs and wage statements. The Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class thus have sustained similar injuries as a result of the Defendants’ actions. 22. The Named Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the putative class. The Named Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in complex wage and hour collective and class action litigation. 23. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class lack the financial resources to adequately prosecute separate lawsuits against Defendants. A class action will also prevent unduly duplicative litigation resulting from inconsistent judgments pertaining to the Defendants’ policies. 24. Upon information and belief, beginning in or around June 2010, the Defendants employed numerous individuals as butchers, meat and poultry handlers, packagers, cleaners and in other related jobs. 25. Upon information and belief, Defendant I&D Glatt has engaged and continues to -6- engage in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA at all times relevant herein, in that it: (i) has had and continues to have an annual gross volume of sales of not less than $500,000 at all times relevant to this action; and (ii) has had and continues to have employees working with and/or selling goods and materials that have been shipped into this state from other states. 26. The payments made to the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class by Defendants constitute “wages” as that term is defined under Article 6 and Article 19 of the New York Labor Law. 27. Upon information and belief, while working for Defendants, the Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class were regularly required to perform work for Defendants in excess of forty hours each week, without receiving overtime compensation as required by applicable federal and state law. 28. Upon information and belief, while working for Defendants, the Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class were regularly required to work shifts which exceeded ten hours in one day, without receiving spread of hours compensation as required by applicable state law. 29. Upon information and belief, while working for Defendants, the Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class were not provided with accurate paystubs or wage statements as required by applicable state law. 30. Plaintiff Sanchez worked for Defendants at the Brooklyn location as a butcher and meat packer from approximately July 2009 to December 2014. From July 2009 through 2012, Plaintiff Sanchez normally worked 6 days per week. His schedule was typically as follows: Mondays and Tuesdays he worked from approximately 5:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.; Wednesdays and -7- Thursdays, he normally worked from 5:30 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. and Fridays from 5:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.. From approximately 2012 through 2014, his schedule remained the same, except for having to work Sundays from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Plaintiff Sanchez was paid a flat weekly rate of approximately $400 to $840 per week in cash without an accurate paystub. 31. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Sanchez was sent to perform work at the W. Hempstead location. Plaintiff Sanchez performed the same work and was paid the exact same way regardless of which location he worked at. 32. Plaintiff Edgar Delgado worked for Defendants at the Brooklyn location as a butcher from approximately June 2011 to January 2016. He usually worked 5 days per week, from approximately 5:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. Plaintiff Delgado was paid a flat weekly rate of approximately $500 to $700 per week in cash without an accurate paystub. 33. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Delgado was also sent to perform work at the W. Hempstead location. Plaintiff Delgado performed the same work and was paid the exact same way regardless of which location he worked at. 34. The Named Plaintiffs know that other members of the putative class was were paid the same way as the Named Plaintiffs because they often spoke amongst themselves about their wages. 35. The Named Plaintiffs and, upon information and belief, other members of the putative class typically worked in excess of forty hours each week they were employed by Defendants. 36. The Named Plaintiffs and, upon information and belief, other members of the putative class typically worked shifts that exceeded ten hours in one day. 37. The Named Plaintiffs and, upon information and belief, other members of the putative class were paid in cash and did not receive paystubs accurately reflecting the hours -8- worked and wages paid each week, nor did they receive wage statements. 38. Upon information and belief, Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and applicable State law by failing to maintain proper and complete timesheets or payroll records. 39. Upon information and belief, Defendant David Yizhaky was an officer, director, president, vice president, and/or owner of I&D Glatt, and (i) had the power to hire and fire employees for the company; (ii) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment for the company; (iii) determined the rate and method of payment for Defendants’ employees; and (iv) maintained employment records for I&D Glatt. 40. Upon information and belief, Defendant David Yizhaky dominated the day-to-day operating decisions of I&D Glatt, made all major personnel decisions for I&D Glatt, and had complete control of the alleged activities of I&D Glatt which give rise to the claims brought herein. 41. Upon information and belief, Defendant David Yizhaky was a supervisor, officer and/or agent of I&D Glatt, who acted directly or indirectly in the interest of I&D Glatt, and is an employer within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act. David Yizhaky, in his capacity as an officer, director, president, vice president, and/or owner, actively participated in the unlawful method of payment for I&D Glatt employees. 42. Upon information and belief, Defendants operate as part of an integrated enterprise that employed or jointly employed the Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class at all relevant times. 43. Defendants are a single and/or joint employer under New York Labor Law in that they share a common business purpose and ownership, maintain common control, oversight and direction over the operations of the work performed by the Named Plaintiffs and putative class, -9- including payroll practices. Upon information and belief, individual Defendant has had substantial control of the Named Plaintiffs’ and members of the putative class’ working conditions and over the unlawful policies and practices alleged herein. 44. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 43 hereof. 45. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 207, “no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 46. I&D Glatt is an employer, within the meaning contemplated, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 47. David Yizhaky is an employer, within the meaning contemplated, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 48. The Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative collective action are employees, within the meaning contemplated, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §203(e). 49. The Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative collective action, during all relevant times, engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or were employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 50. 29 U.S.C. §213 exempts certain categories of employees from minimum wage obligations. None of these exemptions apply to the Named Plaintiffs or other similarly situated -10- employees. 51. Upon information and belief, Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative collective overtime wages at a rate of one and one-half times the normal rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in any given week. 52. Upon information and belief, the failure of Defendants to pay the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative collective their rightfully owed wages was willful. 53. By the foregoing reasons, Defendants are liable to the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative collective in an amount to be determined at trial, plus liquidated damages in the amount equal to the amount of unpaid wages, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs. 54. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 53 hereof. 55. I&D Glatt is an employer, within the meaning contemplated, pursuant to New York Labor Law Article 19 § 651(6) and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 56. David Yizhaky is an employer, within the meaning contemplated, pursuant to York Labor Law Article 19 § 651(6) and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 57. The Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class are employees, within the meaning contemplated, pursuant to New York Labor Law Article 19 § 651(5) and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 58. 12 NYCRR §142-2.2 requires that “[a]n employer shall pay an employee for -11- overtime at a wage rate of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate….” 59. New York Labor Law Article 19 § 663, provides that “[i]f any employee is paid by his employer less than the wage to which he is entitled under the provisions of this article, he may recover in a civil action the amount of any such underpayments, together with costs and such reasonable attorney’s fees.” 60. Named Plaintiffs and, upon information and belief other members of the putative class, worked more than forty hours a week while working for Defendants. 61. Named Plaintiffs and, upon information and belief other members of the putative class, did not receive overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in any given week. 62. Consequently, by failing to pay to the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class overtime compensation, Defendants violated New York Labor Law Article 19 § 663 and 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2. 63. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ failure to pay overtime compensation to the Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class was willful. 64. By the foregoing reasons, Defendants have violated New York Labor Law Article 19 § 663 and 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2 and are liable to the Named Plaintiffs and members of the putative class action in an amount to be determined at trial, plus damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 65. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 64 hereof. -12- 66. Title 12 NYCRR §146.16(a) requires that, “[o]n each day on which the spread of hours exceeds 10, an employee shall receive one additional hour of pay at the basic minimum hourly rate.” 67. The Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class worked more than 10 hours in a day. 68. Upon information and belief, Defendants did not pay the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class an additional hour’s pay when they worked more than 10 hours in a day. 69. Consequently, by failing to pay to the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class an additional hour’s pay when they worked more than 10 hours in a day, Defendants violated 12 NYCRR § 146-1.6(a). 70. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ failure to pay “spread of hours” compensation for work performed by the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class after 10 hours in a day was willful. 71. By the foregoing reasons, Defendants have violated 12 NYCRR § 146-1.6(a), and are liable to the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs 72. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 71 hereof. 73. Pursuant to New York Labor Law §§ 198-1(d) and 195 and 12 NYCRR § 146-2.2 and 2.3, an employer is required to provide its employee with a paystub that accurately reflects the rate of pay, the hours worked and the amounts deducted. The paystubs must include: the -13- employee’s rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate of pay, if the employee is subject to overtime regulations; the basis of wage payment (per hour, per shift, per week, piece rate, commission, etc.); any allowances the employer intends to claim as part of the minimum wage including tip, meal, and lodging allowances; the regular pay day; the employer’s name and any names under which the employer does business (DBA); the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business and, if different, the employer’s mailing address ; and the employer’s telephone number. 74. According to New York Labor Law § 198-1(d), Plaintiffs are entitled to $100 for every week in which they did not receive a pay stub. 75. The Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class did not receive accurate paystubs each week that they worked. 76. By the foregoing reasons, Defendants violated New York Labor Law §§ 198-1(d) and 195 and 12 NYCRR § 146-2.2 and 2.3 and are liable to the Named Plaintiffs and other members of the putative class in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs. WHEREFORE, the Named Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who were employed by IND GLATT, INC. and I&D GLATT 2, INC. d/b/a I&D GLATT or any other entities affiliated with or controlled by IND GLATT, INC. and I&D GLATT 2, INC. d/b/a I&D GLATT and DAVID YIZHAKY, demand judgment: (1) on their first cause of action, against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial, plus liquidated damages in the amount equal to the amount of unpaid wages, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, -14- (2) on their second cause of action against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial, plus liquidated damages, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs; (3) on their third cause of action against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial, plus liquidated damages, interest, attorneys, fees and costs; (4) on their fourth cause of action against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial, plus liquidated damages, interest, attorneys, fees and costs; and (5) Any other and further relief the Court may deem appropriate. Dated: New York, New York June 23, 2016 FLSA OVERTIME COMPENSATION NEW YORK OVERTIME COMPENSATION NEW YORK IMPROPER PAY STUBS AND DOCUMENTATION NEW YORK STATE SPREAD OF HOURS COMPENSATION

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates SKYLINE Cruises as well as the SKYLINE website, offers it to the public and it offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its Cruises. 21. Defendant operates SKYLINE Cruises in New York. At least one of these Cruises disembarks from a New York City pier. 22. These Cruises constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Cruises provide to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of services including Cruise locations and hours, information about cruise line services, including its Yachts and cruises, special pricing offers, privacy policies, promotional information, online reservations and other services. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Cruises. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Cruises and the numerous facilities, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical Cruise locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Cruises on its Website and other important information about the Cruises locations and hours, information about cruise line services, including its Yachts and cruises, special pricing offers, privacy policies, promotional information, online reservations and other services. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and learn about Defendant’s operations as sighted individuals do. 32. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s Cruise locations and hours, information about cruise line services, including its Yachts and cruises, special pricing offers, privacy policies, promotional information, online reservations and other services. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Cruises are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Cruises. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 81. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 85. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

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21. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the four proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendants to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 22. The class concerning the ATDS claim for revocation of consent, to the extent prior consent existed (hereafter “The ATDS Revocation Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendants to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had revoked any prior express consent to receive such calls prior to the calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 8. Beginning in or around June of 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -3803, -1080, -1636, and -7511 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendants’ services. 9. Defendants used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a toy and game manufacturer, and owns and operates the website, www.mattel.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS and NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the toys section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. This was an issue on Defendant’s Website particularly in the games section. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 29. Finally, the Website requires the use of a mouse to effectively browse. Plaintiff, however, is unable to do so because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the pointer from one visual spot on the page to another, and Plaintiff relies exclusively on keyboard functions to navigate the Web. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 40. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 77. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 78. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 80. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 82. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 83. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 88. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 89. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 91. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 92. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 93. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 96. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 97. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 99. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 100. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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15. Cintas employed Plaintiff, Mark Cassingham, as a Technician at its San Jose, California branch. Cintas employed Plaintiff in that capacity since January 29, 2016 to May 19, 2017, and at all times, paid him by the hour, most recently at the rate of $22.00 per hour. 16. Cintas employs Plaintiff and other Technicians to install, repair, and maintain fire alarm systems in accordance with established NFPA standards, manufacturer’s specifications, local jurisdictional codes that exceed NFPA standards, and OSHA and other safety regulations. 17. Cintas provides Plaintiff and other Technicians with a “Service Philosophy” policy when they are hired, which requires them to follow all of the current policies, procedures, and practices as defined by Cintas’ operation manual. This document is in Cintas’ possession. 41. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on his own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former Technicians who worked for Cintas at any time after August 29, 2014 and through the date of Judgment. (Hereinafter referred to as the “Collective.”) Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 42. Excluded from the proposed Collective are Cintas’ executives, administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside sales persons. 46. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on their own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former Technicians who worked for Cintas at any time after August 29, 2014 and through the date of Judgment. (hereinafter referred to as the “Rule 23 Nationwide Class”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 47. The members of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class are so numerous that joinder of all Rule 23 Nationwide Class members in this case would be impractical. Plaintiff reasonably estimates there are thousands of Rule 23 Nationwide Class members. Rule 23 Nationwide Class members should be easy to identify from Cintas’ computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records. 59. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on their own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former Technicians who worked for Cintas in California at any time after August 29, 2013 and through the date of Judgment. (hereinafter referred to as the “Rule 23 California Class”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 60. The members of the Rule 23 California Class are so numerous that joinder of all Rule 23 California Class members in this case would be impractical. Plaintiff reasonably estimates there are hundreds of Rule 23 California Class members. Rule 23 California Class members should be easy to identify from Cintas’ computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records. 61. Commonality. There is a well-defined community of interest among Rule 23 California members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions affecting individual members of the Rule 23 California Class. These common legal and factual questions, include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the pre- and post-shift time spent by the Rule 23 California Class members on the preparation of Inspection Reports is compensable time; b. Whether the pre- and post-shift time spent by the Rule 23 California Class members travelling to the first worksite of the day is compensable time; c. Whether the pre- and post-shift time spent by the Rule 23 California Class members travelling from the last worksite of the day is compensable time; and d. Whether Cintas’ failure to compensate the Rule 23 California Class members for these essential work activities amounts to a violation of California labor and employment laws. 72. Plaintiff incorporates all other paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 73. At all times relevant to this action, Cintas was an employer under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) of the FLSA, subject to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 74. At all relevant times to this action, Cintas has engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA. 89. Plaintiff incorporates all other paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 95. Plaintiff incorporates all other paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. CALIFORNIA: Failure To Pay Overtime (California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class CALIFORNIA: Failure To Pay Minimum Wage (California Labor Code §§ 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1194.2 and 1198) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class CALIFORNIA: Unlawful and/or Unfair Competition Law Violations (California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class 123. Plaintiff incorporates all other paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 124. California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. prohibits unfair competition in the form of any unlawful, unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent business practices. 125. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and as a representative of all others subject to Cintas’ unlawful acts and practices. 126. During all relevant times, Cintas committed unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent acts as defined by California Business & Professions Code § 17200. Cintas’ unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business practices include, without limitation, failing to pay overtime wages, failing to pay overtime wages at the correct rate, failing to pay minimum wages, failing to pay wages at the designated rate, and failing to provide employees with accurate wage statements. 127. As a result of these unlawful and/or unfair and/or fraudulent business practices, Cintas reaped unfair benefits and illegal profits at the expense of Plaintiff and the California Class. Cintas must disgorge these ill-gotten gains and restore to Plaintiff and the California Class Members all wrongfully withheld wages, including, but not limited to minimum wages and overtime compensation. 128. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the members of the California Class, respectfully requests that judgment be awarded to provide restitution and interest, and the relief requested below in the Prayer for Relief. NATIONWIDE: Failure To Pay Overtime (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective

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30. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through twenty nine (29) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 31. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 32. Class C consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the New York State and who received telephone messages from the Defendant's collection representatives within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; (a) which stated that the messages were from “The Law Firm of Richard J. Boudreau & Associates LLC but which failed to qualify that the debt had not been reviewed by an attorney and / or that the telephone messages did not qualify that the persons leaving the messages were non-attorneys at the firm; (b) the messages were left concerning the seeking payment of an alleged debt; and (c) that Plaintiff asserts that the messages contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(3) and 1692e(10). 33. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: -8- (a) Based on the fact that form telephonic messages and form collection letters are at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (b) There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any question(s) affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN

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14. Plaintiff Cheryl Martin is 65 years old, and resides in the Harold area of Floyd County, Kentucky. The Affidavit of Plaintiff Cheryl Martin, setting forth the relevant facts, is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 15. Plaintiff Cheryl Martin retained Stanville (Floyd County) attorney Eric C. Conn to represent her in her claim for Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits. 16. Plaintiff Cheryl Martin was awarded SSD benefits on or about November 3, 2009, as a result of serious injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. 17. On or about May 22, 2015, she received a letter from the Social Security Administration suspending her benefits. The letter indicated that her benefits were suspended because “there was reason to believe fraud was involved in certain cases including evidence from Bradley Adkins, Ph.D., Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D., Frederic Huffnagle, M.D., or David P. Herr, D.O.” A redacted copy of the letter from the Social Security Administration is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 18. On or about May 22, 2015, Plaintiff Cheryl Martin also received a “Notice of Appeals Council Action”, in which she was advised that Social Security was redetermining her disability case without evidence from Frederic Huffnagle, M.D. She was advised that she had ten (10) days to submit additional evidence to the Appeals Council, after which her case would be remanded to an Administrative Law Judge to await a new hearing, during which time she Case: 7:15-cv-00046-ART-HAI Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/30/15 Page: 4 of 14 - Page ID#: 4 5 would receive no Social Security Disability payments.1 A redacted copy of the Notice of Appeals Council Action sent to Plaintiff Cheryl Martin is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 19. Prior to receiving her disability benefits, Plaintiff Cheryl Martin had worked for approximately 40 years. 20. Until now, Plaintiff Cheryl Martin had been receiving approximately $1,100.00 per month in Social Security Disability benefits. 21. Plaintiff Cheryl Martin was diagnosed with lung cancer after she began receiving her benefits. She currently has fourth-stage cancer, which has metastasized to her lymph nodes, and she has been advised that her prognosis is poor, with approximately a five percent chance of surviving her cancerous condition. 22. In order to combat her cancer, Plaintiff Cheryl Martin is prescribed approximately 22 medications, the monthly out-of-pocket expenses for which exceed $600.00. 23. Plaintiff Cheryl Martin does not believe that she can afford her necessary medications without the $1,100.00 per month that she is receiving from Social Security Disability. 24. Due to the severity of her condition, the immediate loss of benefits and inability to pay for her medications will create an imminent threat of death for the Plaintiff. 25. Due to the severity of her condition, the Plaintiff cannot go without her medications for an indeterminate period of time waiting for a hearing to be scheduled by the Social Security Administration. 1 The fax number provided on the “Notice of Appeals Council Action” was not, as of the date of this filing a working number, and efforts to send faxes to the number were unsuccessful. Case: 7:15-cv-00046-ART-HAI Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/30/15 Page: 5 of 14 - Page ID#: 5 6 26. Plaintiff Robert Martin is 51 years old, and resides in the Wayland area of Floyd County, Kentucky. The Affidavit of Plaintiff Robert Martin, setting forth the relevant facts, is attached hereto as Exhibit D. 27. Plaintiff Robert Martin retained Stanville (Floyd County) attorney Eric C. Conn to represent him in his claim for Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits. 28. Plaintiff Robert Martin was awarded SSD benefits on or about June 11, 2009, as a result of serious injuries he sustained in an automobile accident. 29. On or about May 19, 2015, he received a letter from the Social Security Administration suspending his benefits. The letter indicated that his benefits were suspended because “there was reason to believe fraud was involved in certain cases including evidence from Bradley Adkins, Ph.D., Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D., Frederic Huffnagle, M.D., or David P. Herr, D.O.” A redacted copy of the letter from the Social Security Administration is attached hereto as Exhibit E. 30. On or about May 22, 2015, Plaintiff Robert Martin also received a “Notice of Appeals Council Action”, in which he was advised that Social Security was redetermining his disability case without evidence from Frederic Huffnagle, M.D. He was advised that he had ten (10) days to submit additional evidence to the Appeals Council, after which his case would be remanded to an Administrative Law Judge to await a new hearing, during which time she would receive no Social Security Disability payments. A redacted copy of the Notice of Appeals Council Action sent to Plaintiff Robert Martin is attached hereto as Exhibit F. Case: 7:15-cv-00046-ART-HAI Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/30/15 Page: 6 of 14 - Page ID#: 6 7 31. Until now, Plaintiff Robert Martin had been receiving approximately $1,400.00 per month in Social Security Disability benefits. 32. Plaintiff Robert Martin was diagnosed with colon cancer after he began receiving his benefits. He had a portion of his colon removed, and has also been diagnosed with a tumor in his right lung. 33. Plaintiff Robert Martin is on Medicare, and has been advised that the suspension of his benefits may cause him to lose his medical coverage. 34. Plaintiff Robert Martin relies upon Social Security Disability funds to pay for his out of pocket medical expenses. 35. Plaintiff Robert Martin does not have any source of income other than his benefits. Given his dire economic situation, if his benefits are suspended Plaintiff Robert Martin believes that he will become homeless, as he cannot afford his home payment without his benefits. 36. Due to the severity of his medical condition, the immediate loss of benefits and inability to pay for his medications will create an imminent threat that his condition will worsen, or that he could potentially succumb to his illness. 37. Due to the severity of his medical and economic conditions, the Plaintiff cannot go without his medications for an indeterminate period of time waiting for a hearing to be scheduled by the Social Security Administration. 38. The Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (3) on behalf of themselves and the following Class: Case: 7:15-cv-00046-ART-HAI Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/30/15 Page: 7 of 14 - Page ID#: 7 8 All persons, formerly clients of Eric C. Conn, who were receiving Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits during or prior to May 2015, and whose benefits are being suspended, without a pre-suspension hearing, by the Social Security Administration based on the fact that evidence was provided during the persons’ original disability cases by one or all of the following medical witnesses: Bradley Adkins, Ph.D; Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D.; Frederic Huffnagle, M.D.; David Herr, 44. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 45. The allegations set forth herein on behalf of the Plaintiffs, both individually and on behalf of the Class, present actual controversies pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution. 46. The actual controversies set forth herein are ripe for adjudication. 47. The Plaintiffs, both individually and on behalf of the Class, have legally cognizable interests in the outcome of the case and are entitled to relief herein. 48. As set forth herein, the Plaintiffs, both individually and on behalf of the class, seek a declaratory judgment from this Court that the Defendant’s actions violated: (i) the Social Security Act and regulations promulgated thereunder; (ii) the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution; and (iii) the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitutuib, 49. The following paragraphs set forth the essence of the Plaintiffs’ claims, and the Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend as necessary. Social Security Act & Regulations Promulgated Thereunder 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq 50. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. Case: 7:15-cv-00046-ART-HAI Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/30/15 Page: 10 of 14 - Page ID#: 10 11 51. The Plaintiffs, both individually and on behalf of the Class, seek a declaratory judgment from this Court that the Defendant’s actions described herein violated the Social Security Act and relevant regulations promulgated thereunder. 52. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(u), the Social Security Commissioner shall only redetermine a case “if there is a reason to believe that fraud or other fault was involved in the application.” 53. There is no evidence that Plaintiffs knew about, or participated in any alleged fraud, and yet Social Security has taken the draconian step of suspending their benefits, potentially for a year or more while awaiting a new ALJ hearing, without providing any opportunity to rebut that the medical evidence in their record is fraudulent and inaccurate. 54. Defendant has acted by removing medical evidence from Plaintiffs’ records and placing the extremely difficult burden of obtaining new medical evidence based on the time of the original disability finding within ten days or have their cases remanded for an ALJ hearing, during which time they will receive no benefits. 55. As such, Defendant is proposing to make a new decision based on evidence not in the record, and pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 404.992, Defendant is therefore required to provide Plaintiffs with notice of the proposed action and right to a hearing before further action is taken. 56. Defendant is taking the position that Plaintiffs’ disability claims were decided in error and in effect their eligibility “does not exist” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 423. Therefore, in accordance with that provision, Plaintiffs are entitled to continue receiving benefits until such time that their claims are properly redetermined. Case: 7:15-cv-00046-ART-HAI Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/30/15 Page: 11 of 14 - Page ID#: 11 12 Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution 57. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 58. The Plaintiffs, both individually and on behalf of the Class, seek a declaratory judgment from this Court that the Defendant’s actions described herein violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 59. Plaintiffs’ claims for Social Security Disability benefits are based on payments Plaintiffs made over the course of their working lives. Plaintiffs therefore have a property interest in these benefits that are protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 60. At a minimum, Due Process requires that Plaintiffs be afforded adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of their protected interest. 61. Although Plaintiffs eligibility for SSD benefits is not initially based on financial need, the immediate suspension of these benefits will deprived them of the necessities of life. 62. For the named Plaintiffs here, and for many other SSD recipients, these benefits are often their only source of income, and typically provide a standard of living below the federal poverty line. 63. Conversely, providing an opportunity to be heard prior to suspending these benefits would cause Defendant little administrative burden, as they will have to provide these same hearings at a later time. 64. Providing pre-suspension hearings will not substantially fiscally burden Defendant, as any later determination of ineligibility will result in overpayments which Plaintiffs will be required to repay. Case: 7:15-cv-00046-ART-HAI Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/30/15 Page: 12 of 14 - Page ID#: 12 13 65. Defendant has also violated Plaintiffs due process rights by failing to follow the Social Security Act and regulations promulgated thereunder as outlined above. Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 66. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 67. The Plaintiffs, both individually and on behalf of the Class, seek a declaratory judgment from this Court that the Defendant’s actions described herein violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. 68. The Plaintiffs are all members of a class of persons receiving Social Security Disability benefits. 69. The Defendant has suspended the Plaintiffs’ benefits without a pre-suspension hearing, allegedly on the basis of fraudulent activity on the part of Eric C. Conn and the enumerated medical witnesses. 70. The Defendant has not alleged any wrongdoing by the Plaintiffs. 71. Choosing to suspend the benefits only for these named Plaintiffs, without a pre- suspension hearing, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT 28 U.S.C. §§2201-2202

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PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (Referral) BRITTANY PHILLIPS, AMBER NORENO- MIDDLEBROOKS, and other similarly-situated individuals, 1. Unusually large number of parties. 10. Existence of highly technical issues and proof. 2. Unusually large number of claims or defenses. 3. VALIDITY OR INFRINGEMENT OF THE SAME PATENT, COPYRIGHT OR TRADEMARK INCLUDED IN AN EARLIER NUMBERED PENDING SUIT. 3. Factual issues are exceptionally complex 4. Greater than normal volume of evidence. 4. APPEALS ARISING OUT OF THE SAME BANKRUPTCY CASE AND ANY CASE RELATED THERETO WHICH HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY THE SAME BANKRUPTCY JUDGE. 5. Extended discovery period is needed. 6. Problems locating or preserving evidence 7. Pending parallel investigations or actions by government. 8. Multiple use of experts. 9. Need for discovery outside United States boundaries. IV. ORIGIN (PLACE AN “X “IN ONE BOX ONLY) TRANSFERRED FROM MULTIDISTRICT APPEAL TO DISTRICT JUDGE 1 ORIGINAL JURISDICTIONAL STATUTES UNLESS DIVERSITY) (IF COMPLEX, CHECK REASON BELOW) OTHER STATUTES - "4" MONTHS DISCOVERY TRACK 375 FALSE CLAIMS ACT 376 Qui Tam 31 USC 3729(a)

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21. The spread of COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (“WHO”) on March 11, 2020. 51. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated as a nationwide Class, defined as follows: All persons and businesses who served as an agent in relation to, and provided assistance to a client in relation to, the preparation and/or submission of a client’s PPP loan application to Pacific Premier Bank which resulted in a loan being funded under the PPP.Plaintiff further brings this action on behalf of a subclass of individuals defined as follows: California Subclass. All persons and businesses in California who served as an agent in relation to, and provided assistance to a client in relation to, the preparation and/or submission of a client’s PPP loan application to Pacific Premier Bank which resulted in a loan being funded under the PPP. 61. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 62. Plaintiff and the Class represent individuals who are “agents” as defined by the SBA regulations for the PPP. 63. Plaintiff and the putative Class have assisted clients with the process of preparing applications, and applying for, PPP loan funds. Defendants, despite the clear command of the SBA’s PPP regulations, have refused to make these payments. An actual controversy has arisen between Plaintiff and the Class, on one hand, and Defendants on the other, wherein Defendants deny by their refusal to pay that they are obligated to pay Plaintiff’s and the Class’s “agent” fees pursuant to PPP regulations. 65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 66. Based on information and belief, Defendants entered into an agreement with the SBA in connection with the loans funded in the PPP. 67. The agreements required that Defendants would adhere to all PPP rules and regulations and incorporate these requirements by reference. Defendants and the SBA understood that agents involved in the preparation and submission of PPP loan applications would need to be compensated. 68. The SBA’s PPP regulations specifically require that PPP lenders pay the fees of any “agent” that assists with the PPP loan application process, within limits. 69. Defendants understood that Plaintiff and the Class were intended beneficiaries in this agreement. Nevertheless, Defendants have refused to live up to their end of the bargain, and have uniformly refused to pay agent fees to Plaintiff and the Class. 71. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 72. Pursuant to California Business & Professions Code § 17200, “any unlawful, unfair…business act or practice” is prohibited in the State of California. This statute creates a private right of action based on any unlawful or unfair act committed in the course of business, particularly where it provides the unlawful actor with an unfair business advantage. Local, state and/or federal law can serve as the basis for an “unlawful…business act or practice[.]” 73. The SBA’s PPP regulations specifically provide that “lenders” who provide loans under the program will be responsible for paying “agent” fees, within prescribed limits. 74. Defendants have uniformly refused to pay these fees to Plaintiff and the Class. As a result, Defendants have engaged in unlawful conduct that has cost Plaintiff and the Class millions of dollars in fees, collectively. 75. Defendants have also engaged in “unfair” business practice through this conduct, as well as set forth above. 76. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing acts and practices, Defendants have received, or will receive, income, profits, and other benefits, which they would not have received if they had not engaged in the violations of Section 17200 described in this Complaint. 78. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 79. Unjust enrichment, or restitution, may be alleged where a Defendant unjustly obtains and retains a benefit to the Plaintiff’s detriment, where such retention violates fundamental principles of equity, justice, and good conscience. 80. Here, Defendants have obtained millions of dollars in benefits in the form of PPP loan origination fees. A portion of those fees were to be paid to agents, like and including Plaintiff, who assisted in their clients’ PPP loan applications. But Defendants are refusing to pay those fees, in contravention of PPP regulations. 81. Principles of justice, equity, and good conscience demand that Defendants not be allowed to retain these agent fees. Defendants have fallen short in their duties as lenders, and during a crisis no less. As a result, Plaintiff and the putative Class have been unable to obtain the agent fees due to them. 82. Accordingly, Defendants must disgorge the portion of any and all PPP origination fees that they have retained to the extent they are due to Plaintiff and the putative Class in their capacities as agents. 83. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. COMPETITION LAW (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.)

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(Violations of California’s Environmental Marketing Claims Act) On Behalf of the California Sub-Class (Violations of California’s False Advertising Law) On Behalf of the California Sub-Class (Breach of Express Warranty) On Behalf of the Class (Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices In Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act) On Behalf of the California Sub-Class (Violation of California Organic Products Act) On Behalf of the California Sub-Class 100. Plaintiff McBride incorporates by reference the allegations set forth above. 101. Plaintiff Baharestan is a “person” within the meaning of Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111910(a). 102. Defendant has violated and continues to violate the provisions of COPA, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 110838, as described above. 103. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 111910(a) provides for injunctive relief for any violation of COPA and affords standing to “any person” to enforce such violations. That Section provides, in part: any person may bring an action in superior court pursuant to this section and the court shall have jurisdiction upon hearing and for cause shown, to grant a temporary or permanent injunction restraining any person from Case3:15-cv-03578 Document1 Filed08/04/15 Page29 of 36 (Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law) On Behalf of the California Sub-Class 106. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege herein all paragraphs alleged above. 107. By committing the acts and practices alleged herein, Defendant has violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210, as to the California Sub-Class as a whole, by engaging in unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair conduct. 108. Defendant has violated the UCL’s proscription against engaging in unlawful conduct as a result of: a. its violations of the CLRA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(5), (a)(7), and (a)(9), as alleged above; b. its violations of the FAL, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq., as alleged above; Case3:15-cv-03578 Document1 Filed08/04/15 Page30 of 36 (Violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act – RCW §§ 19.86, et seq.) On Behalf of the Washington Sub-Class 118. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege herein all paragraphs alleged above. 119. This claim arises under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code (“RCW”) §§ 19.86, et seq. (“CPA”). 120. At all relevant times, Defendant engaged in “trade” and/or “commerce” within the meaning of RCW § 19.86.010. 121. The CPA broadly prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or business. RCW § 19.86.020 122. Defendant made uniform representations that the Products were of a particular standard, quality, or grade when they were not, and, as set forth above, made false and/or misleading statements regarding the “natural” quality and characteristics of the Products that, as set forth above, were unfair and deceptive, had and continue to have the capacity to deceive the public, cause injury to Plaintiff McIntyre and the Washington Class, and were made in violation of the CPA. 123. As alleged above, Defendant has violated the CPA by making false representations on the Products’ packaging and in marketing (as detailed herein) that the Products are “natural,” when in fact they contain highly processed and/or non-natural ingredients. 124. This type of information is relied upon by consumers in making purchasing decisions and is fundamental to the decision to purchase the Products. 125. Defendant has represented and continues to represent its Products in a deceptive and misleading manner as described herein. These representations were important to reasonable consumers, such as Plaintiff and members of the Washington Class, in deciding whether to purchase the Products. Defendant knew or should have known these representations were patently false and/or misleading. 126. Plaintiff McIntyre and members of the Washington Class have each been directly and proximately injured by the conduct of Defendant, and such injuries include economic injury Case3:15-cv-03578 Document1 Filed08/04/15 Page33 of 36 25. Each year, consumers purchase billions of dollars’ worth of “natural” products. In 2010, U.S. consumers purchased $10.9 billion worth of natural/organic personal care and household products; up from $10.4 billion in 2009.1 Given this strong demand for “natural” products, it is not surprising that Defendant labels its Products as “natural.” 26. Seeking to profit on consumers’ desire to locate and use natural, environmentally sound, non-abrasive, and non-injurious detergent alternatives to standard offerings, Defendant markets the Products as “natural,” derived from plants, and free from harmful chemicals, providing environmental and safety benefits that traditional detergents do not. 1 Natural Products Association, http://www.npainfo.org/NPA/About_NPA/NPA/AboutNPA/AbouttheNaturalProductsAssociation .aspx?hkey=8d3a15ab-f44f-4473-aa6e-ba27ccebcbb8 (last visited June 30, 2014). Case3:15-cv-03578 Document1 Filed08/04/15 Page7 of 36 67. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated individuals within the United States (the “Class”), defined as follows: All United States residents who purchased the Products within the United States during the period from January 23, 2011 through the date of the Preliminary Approval Order. Excluded from the Nationwide Class are any of Defendant’s officers, directors, or employees; officers, directors, or employees of any entity in which Defendant currently has or has had a controlling interest; and Defendant’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns. 68. Additionally, Plaintiff Baharestan brings this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated Californians (the “California Sub-Class”), defined as follows: Case3:15-cv-03578 Document1 Filed08/04/15 Page21 of 36 72. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth above. 73. Plaintiffs and the Class members formed a contract with Defendant at the time Case3:15-cv-03578 Document1 Filed08/04/15 Page23 of 36 80. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege herein all paragraphs alleged above. 81. This cause of action is brought pursuant to California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750-1785 (“CLRA”). 82. Plaintiff Baharestan and the other members of the California Sub-Class are “consumers,” as the term is defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d), because they bought the Products for personal, family, or household purposes. 83. Plaintiff Baharestan, the other members of the California Sub-Class, and Defendant have engaged in “transactions,” as that term is defined by California Civil Code §1761(e). 84. The conduct alleged in this Complaint constitutes unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts and practices for the purpose of the CLRA, and the conduct was undertaken by Defendant in transactions intended to result in, and which did result in, the sale of goods to consumers. 85. As alleged more fully above, Defendant has violated the CLRA by falsely representing to Plaintiff Baharestan and the other members of the California Sub-Class that the Case3:15-cv-03578 Document1 Filed08/04/15 Page26 of 36 91. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege herein all paragraphs alleged above. 92. As alleged more fully above, Defendant has falsely advertised the Products by falsely claiming that the Products are unqualifiedly naturally derived and environmentally sound. 93. Plaintiff Baharestan and the other members of the California Sub-Class have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s violations of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq. 94. Pursuant to California Business and Professions Code §§ 17203 and 17535, Plaintiff Baharestan and the California Sub-Class seek an order of this Court that includes, but is not limited to, an order requiring Defendant to: a. remove and/or refrain from making representations on the Products’ packaging representing that the Products provide an unqualified level of “natural” benefits; and b. remove and/or refrain from making representations on the Products’ packaging representing that the Products are unqualifiedly naturally derived and unqualifiedly made from plants. 95. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege herein all paragraphs alleged above. 96. As alleged more fully above, Defendant has falsely advertised the Products by falsely claiming that the Products are unqualifiedly natural, unqualifiedly naturally derived, and unqualifiedly made from plants. 97. Plaintiff Baharestan and the other members of the California Sub-Class have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s violations of Case3:15-cv-03578 Document1 Filed08/04/15 Page28 of 36 A. Defendant Deceives Consumers By Falsely Labeling the Products as “Natural.”

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12. During the applicable statute of limitations period, Apple Bus provided school transportation services throughout several states, including the State of Missouri. 13. During the applicable statute of limitations period, Apple Bus employed Plaintiffs and others similarly situated as school bus drivers in connection with Defendant’s business. Plaintiffs were employed on an hourly basis throughout the entirety of their employment with Apple Bus and were paid—or were supposed to be paid—every two weeks for the hours they worked during the previous two-week period. 14. While employed at Defendant, Plaintiffs performed various work-related tasks in addition to driving their normal school bus routes. These additional tasks included, among other things, cleaning and refueling the buses, training, filling in for other drivers who were sick or otherwise unable to drive, and driving for school field trips and school sporting events. 15. Plaintiffs’ rates of pay differed depending on the particular task(s) they performed. 16. Plaintiffs relied on Apple Bus to properly pay them based upon the particular task(s) they performed during particular pay periods. 18. The form for regular “routes” was printed on white paper and titled “Transportation Service Order”; the form for “trips” was printed on white paper and titled “Daily Bus Movement Report”; the form for “training” was printed on orange paper; and the form for “extra work” was printed on blue paper. 19. These forms required employees to write down, among other things, the particular task they performed, the date they rendered performance, and the number of hours or fractions of an hour they spent performing the task. 20. Apple Bus utilized these forms to determine how much bill school districts for transporting students. 21. Apple Bus also used these forms to determine how much to pay employees like Hibdon and Cassidy. 22. Because these forms were used to determine her pay, Plaintiffs carefully and painstakingly completed each form to ensure they would be paid correctly. 23. In reality, while Apple Bus may have used these forms to determine how much to pay employees, it did not pay employees in strict accordance with the hours these forms showed. Instead, Apple Bus intentionally and routinely paid employees less than the information on these forms warranted. 25. Apple Bus did in fact utilize the flexibility these pre-printed forms provided to underpay its employees. Time and time again, Plaintiffs looked at their paychecks and found those paychecks did not reflect the hours they had worked, but instead reflected fewer hours and/or a lesser rate of pay. The total dollar amount was less—and in some cases, far less—than Plaintiffs expected and were entitled to receive. 26. Plaintiffs complained to their supervisors and/or other management employees on multiple occasions about this discrepancy to no avail. Supervisors would accuse Cassidy of falsifying hours or failing to turn in the proper form and refuse to afford her any relief. This was a standard practice at Apple Bus. Whenever an employee complained about a pay discrepancy, Apple Bus would challenge the employee’s integrity and the veracity of the information the employee submitted. This was intended to intimidate the employee so as to stop him or her from continuing to press his or her claim for additional compensation or complaining in the future. 27. At some point, Cassidy recognized that Apple Bus could not be trusted to pay her properly. As a result, Cassidy began maintaining her own, separate time records so she could better establish the pay she was entitled to receive. She thought that by presented detailed information about the hours she worked and the tasks she performed, Apple Bus would be forced to do the right thing. Yet, even when Cassidy presented these records to Apple Bus, it balked at paying her properly. 29. In those rare instances when Apple Bus actually agreed to correct Plaintiffs’ hours, the correction would take several weeks and require considerable effort on Plaintiffs’ parts. And then, even though Plaintiffs received additional compensation, it was difficult if not impossible to reconcile the additional compensation they received with the hours they recorded. It appeared Apple Bus was merely throwing a little money their way in the hope that they would shut up and go away. 31. Second, there were pay periods when Plaintiffs worked forty hours or less (so they would not qualify for overtime pay) but worked more hours than they were paid for. To the extent Plaintiffs worked hours for which they were not paid, they worked for free for those hours, and therefore worked for less than the Missouri minimum wage per hour. Hibdon recalls the end of the 2017 school year as being a time period she worked numerous unpaid hours. In Cassidy’s case, from January 7, 2018 to January 20, 2018, she worked a total of 85.25 hours, but she was only paid for 47.75 hours for a total wage of $580.15. Plaintiffs are in the process of identifying additional times when they were not paid for the hours they worked, which also resulted in Plaintiffs being paid less than the Missouri minimum wage. 33. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on their own behalves and on behalf of all individuals who are presently employed by Apple Bus on a non-exempt hourly basis or were employed by Apple Bus on a non-exempt hourly basis at any time during the applicable statute of limitations period. Excluded from the putative class are all of Defendant’s executives, administrators, professional employees, and outside sales persons. 34. A collective action is appropriate because, under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the putative class members are similarly situated to Plaintiffs, in that they worked in the same or similar positions, were subjected to the same unlawful practice, policy, or plan, and their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories. 35. The working relationships between Apple Bus and the members of the putative class differ from class member to class member only in name, location, exact job duties, and rate of pay. These relationships are otherwise exactly the same. The key issue in the collective action––whether Apple Bus intentionally and routinely shaved and continues to shave hours from employees’ reported time to avoid paying overtime compensation in accordance with the FLSA––does not vary substantially from class member to class member. 36. Defendant’s malfeasance is likely provable through examination of its own business records. If Defendant billed school districts for a certain number of employee hours and paid employees for a lesser number of hours, this shows or strongly suggests Defendant shaved hours from the pre-printed forms employees were required to submit. 38. In addition to bringing this lawsuit as a collective action under the FLSA, Plaintiffs also bring this lawsuit as a state-wide class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 39. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalves and on behalf of all individuals in the State of Missouri who are presently employed by Apple Bus on a non- exempt hourly basis or were employed by Apple Bus on a non-exempt hourly basis at any time during the applicable stature of limitations period. Excluded from the class are all managerial employees of Apple Bus and its corporate affiliates. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify this class definition as discovery or other case circumstances warrant. 40. Although the exact number of class members is presently unknown, it is estimated that there are at least 40 individuals in the State of Missouri that fall within the class definition. This class easily satisfies the numerosity requirement for class certification. 42. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of members of the class, all of whom are current or former employees of defendant Apple Bus. 43. Plaintiffs are members of the class they seek to represent, and the claims they advance on their own behalves are identical to the claims asserted on behalf of the class. 44. Plaintiffs are adequate class representatives in that, as members of the class and former employees of Apple Bus, their interests are entirely aligned with those of the class. 45. There are no individual conflicts that prevent Plaintiffs from adequately representing the class. 46. Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation. 47. Class certification is proper because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions that may affect only individual members of the class. The putative class members are or were employees of Apple Bus, which unlawfully underpaid all class members, and unlawfully benefited from all class members’ work. 48. A class action presents a superior form of adjudication over individual litigation. 50. The class action is manageable. The proposed class represents an identifiable community that can be readily identified, and the relief sought is one that can be overseen by the Court. 51. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the forgoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 52. Plaintiffs are members of a class that meets the requirements for certification and maintenance of a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 53. Defendant is an “employer” and Plaintiffs are “employee[s]” under § 290.500 RSMo. 54. Section 290.502 RSMo. requires employers to pay employees minimum wages for all hours worked. Section 290.505 RSMo. requires employers to pay employers to pay employees one and one half times their regular rate for all hours worked over forty (40) per work week. Section 290.527 RSMo. provides that employers who violate the provisions of this act are liable to the affected employee for unpaid wages, liquidated damages, costs, attorney’s fees, and other appropriate relief. 56. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and the class have sustained and will continue to sustain damages in the form of lost wages, unpaid overtime and other damages. 57. Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and the class for actual damages, liquidated damages, recovery of attorney’s fees and costs, and prejudgment interest as allowed by law. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court will enter judgment in their favor against Defendant for (1) an award of compensatory damages; (2) liquidated damages as allowed by § 290.527 RSMo.; (3) attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by § 290.527 RSMo.; (4) prejudgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; and (5) for such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 58. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the forgoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 59. At any and all times relevant hereto, Apple Bus was an “enterprise engaged in commerce” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 60. At any and all times relevant hereto, Apple Bus was an “employer” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 62. During the applicable statute of limitations period, Plaintiffs and class members were not paid for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week in violation of the maximum hours provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). 63. At all times relevant hereto, the action of Apple Bus to not pay for all hours worked over 40 in a week was willful in that among other things: a. Apple Bus knew the FLSA required it to pay time and one-half for all hours worked over 40 in a week; b. Apple Bus failed to maintain true and accurate time records; and c. Apple Bus intimidated employees who questioned whether they were being paid for all hours worked by falsely accusing employees of fabricating hours and/or failing to timely submit the required forms. 64. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and class members have sustained and will continue to sustain damages in the form of lost wages, unpaid overtime and other damages. 65. Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and the class for actual damages, liquidated damages, recovery of attorney’s fees and costs, and prejudgment interest as allowed by law. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court will enter judgment in their favor and in favor of the class and against Defendant for (1) an award of compensatory damages; (2) liquidated damages as allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216; (3) attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216; (4) prejudgment and post-judgment interest as provided by law; and (5) for such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 67. An implied employment agreement existed between Plaintiffs and class members, on one hand, and Defendant, on the other hand, the terms of which included, but were not limited to, an agreement by Plaintiffs and class members to perform services as employees of Apple Bus and an implied agreement by Apple Bus to pay plaintiffs a lawful rate for all work performed. 68. The agreement was made between parties capable of contracting and contained mutual obligations and valid consideration. Plaintiffs and class members performed all conditions precedent, if any, required to them under the implied agreement. 69. Defendant failed and refused to perform its obligations in accordance with the terms and conditions of the implied agreement by failing to compensate Plaintiffs and the class for all time worked on behalf of Defendant. 70. Plaintiffs and class members were thereby damaged in an amount yet to be determined. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court will enter judgment in their favor and in favor of the class and against Defendant for compensatory damages and pre- and post- judgment interest as provided by law and for such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 71. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiffs and the class conferred a benefit upon Defendant by working on its behalf without being compensated at a lawful rate for all work performed. 74. Defendant accepted and retained the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for it to retain such benefit without repayment of its value. 75. Plaintiffs and class members have thereby been damaged. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment in their favor and in favor of the class and against Defendant and pray for compensatory damages, pre- and post-judgment interest as provided by law, and for such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 76. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the forgoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 77. Defendant has been enriched or has benefited by its deficient payments to Plaintiffs and the class for work performed. Such enrichment or benefit was incurred by Defendant at the expense of Plaintiffs and class members who were not fully compensated at a lawful rate for their work. 78. Plaintiffs and the class reasonably expected to be compensated in accordance with the law. 79. Defendant intentionally and with bad faith failed to pay Plaintiffs and the class at the proper lawful rate for all hours worked and for time worked. 80. It is unjust for Defendant to retain the benefits from the unpaid work performed by Plaintiffs and the class. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment in their favor and in favor of the class and against Defendant and prays for compensatory damage, pre- and post-judgment interest as provided by law and for such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a clothing company, and owns and operates the website, l-r-g.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in August of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, l-r-g.com, with an intent to browse available shirts, tees, shorts, pants, fleece, jackets, hats, socks, backpacks, wallets, and sunglasses. Plaintiff was not able to experience shopping like that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which ultimately barred Plaintiff from continuing to complete a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. This was an issue on Defendant’s Website particularly in the accessories section. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 28. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 86. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 97. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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27. The named Plaintiff in this action is representative of a much larger class of persons who were insured by the Farmer’s Insurance Group, who had claims for PIP and/or Med-Pay benefits through the Farmer’s Insurance Group, and were paid the lesser of paid medical vs. the contractually agreed upon incurred medical. 28. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as individuals and on behalf of all members of the following class: All persons located in the State of Texas who were policyholders of automobile insurance through any of the named Defendants, and any related entities, who carried Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits and / or Medical Payment (Med-Pay) benefits, and who presented claims for benefits pursuant to the policy, and who were paid less than the incurred medical expenses as prescribed in the policy (the "Class"). 29. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Ultimately, the precise number of Class members must be the subject of discovery, but Plaintiffs allege that the numbers for the Class are at least in the thousands. 31. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of all Class members in that they all maintained policies of auto insurance with the Farmer’s Insurance Group, and presented claims for benefits. 32. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and are not in conflict with the interests of Class members. Further, Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel and counsel will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. 33. Plaintiffs assert that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), the Farmer’s Insurance Group actions apply generally to the Class and that, if necessary, final injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate for the Class as a whole. 34. Plaintiffs assert that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), the questions of law and/or fact common to the Class members predominate over the question of individual members, and that this class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of these claims, as individual class members may not decide to individually prosecute their claims with the Farmer’s Insurance Group given the length of time and expenses associated with such lengthy litigation. INSURANCE COMPANY; TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE; MID- CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY;

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19. PDQ failed to adequately secure its POS systems, placing the purchasing information of its customers at risk and resulting in the Data Breach. 21. At all relevant times, PDQ was well-aware, or reasonably should have been aware, that the Customer Data collected, maintained, and stored in the POS systems is highly sensitive, susceptible to attack, and could be used for wrongful purposes by third parties, such as identity theft and fraud. 22. It is well known and the subject of many media reports that Customer Data is highly coveted and a frequent target of hackers. Despite the frequent public announcements of data breaches at retailers and restaurant chains, PDQ maintained an insufficient and inadequate system to protect the Customer Data of Plaintiff and the Class members. 23. Customer Data is a valuable commodity because it contains not only payment card numbers but PII as well. A “cyber blackmarket” exists in which criminals openly post stolen payment card numbers, social security numbers, and other personal information on multiple underground Internet websites. Customer Data is valuable to identity thieves because they can use victims’ personal data to open new financial accounts and take out loans in another person’s name, incur charges on existing accounts, or clone ATM, debit, or credit cards. 24. Legitimate organizations and the criminal underground alike recognize the value of Consumer Data contained in a merchant’s data systems; otherwise, they would not aggressively seek or pay for it. For example, in “one of 2013’s largest breaches . . . not only did hackers compromise the [card holder data] of three million customers, they also took registration data [containing PII] from 38 million users.”8 26. PDQ was, or should have been, fully aware of the significant volume of daily credit and debit card transactions at PDQ restaurants, amounting to tens of thousands of daily payment card transactions, and thus, the significant number of individuals who would be harmed by a breach of PDQ’s systems. 27. Unfortunately, and as alleged below, despite all of this publicly available knowledge of the continued compromises of Customer Data in the hands of other third parties, such as retailers and restaurant chains, PDQ’s approach to maintaining the privacy and security of the Customer Data of Plaintiff and Class members was lackadaisical, cavalier, reckless, or at the very least, negligent. C. PDQ Had Notice of Data Breaches Involving Malware on POS Systems 28. In 2017, PDQ officials declined to disclose average store or companywide revenue figures in an interview with Jax Daily Record; however, industry consulting firm Technomic projects the firm grossed about $100 million in sales in 2015, up 250 percent from $28.5 million in 2013.6 28. A wave of data breaches causing the theft of retail payment card information has hit the United States in the last several years.9 In 2016, the number of U.S. data breaches surpassed 1,000, a record high and a forty percent increase in the number of data breaches from the previous year.10 The amount of payment card data compromised by data breaches is massive. For example, it is estimated that over 100 million cards were compromised in 2013 and 2014.11 28. On October 8, 2017, Plaintiff purchased food at an affected PDQ restaurant in Pinellas Park, Florida, using his payment card. 29. PDQ operates PDQ restaurants, a restaurant chain, which is “a hybrid of fast casual, with fresh and daily made food and sauces and no walk-in freezers, and fast food — but without burgers. The menu focuses on fried and grilled chicken tenders and sandwiches, fries and hand spun milkshakes.”7 29. On October 31, 2017, Plaintiff purchased food again at an affected PDQ restaurant in Pinellas Park, Florida, using his payment card. 30. Before transmitting customer data over the merchant’s network, POS systems typically, and very briefly, store the data in plain text within the system’s memory.14 The stored information includes “Track 1” and “Track 2” data from the magnetic strip on the payment card, such as the cardholder’s first and last name, the expiration date of the card, and the CVV (three number security code on the card).15 This information is unencrypted on the card and, at least briefly, will be unencrypted in the POS terminal’s temporary memory as it processes the data. 16 30. Plaintiff paid for one of the aforementioned purchases with his Wells Fargo reward Visa, and paid for the other with his Chase reward Visa. 32. The two payment cards Plaintiff used and which were compromised in the Data Breach were connected to a Visa rewards program. When Plaintiff learned of the breach, Plaintiff notified Wells Fargo and Chase. As a result, Plaintiff's cards were canceled. While Plaintiff is awaiting Plaintiff’s new rewards credit cards, Plaintiff has to use alternative methods of payment and, thus, has lost the opportunity to accrue those rewards. Additionally, Plaintiff has several accounts set to autopay using these cards that will need to be reset, in addition to the hassle of having to replace cards. B. PDQ and Its Customer Data Collection Practices 32. A 2016 report by Verizon confirmed the vast majority of successful breaches leverage legitimate credentials to gain access to the POS environment. Once attackers gain access to the POS devices, they install malware, usually a RAM scraper, to capture payment card data.21 33. Intruders with access to unencrypted Track 1 and Track 2 payment card data can physically replicate the card or use it online. Unsurprisingly, theft of payment card information via POS systems is now “one of the biggest sources of stolen payment cards.”22 For example, in 2013, hackers infiltrated Target, Inc.’s POS system, stealing information from an estimated 40 million payment cards in the United States. In 2014, over 7,500 self-checkout POS terminals at Home Depots throughout the United States were hacked, compromising roughly 56 million debit and credit cards.23 34. Likewise, POS systems at more than 1,000 Wendy’s restaurants were infiltrated with malware, resulting in the theft of payment cards data for approximately six months.24 35. Given the numerous reports indicating the susceptibility of POS systems and consequences of a breach, PDQ was well aware or should have been aware of the need to safeguard its POS systems. D. PDQ Failed to Comply with Industry Standards 37. The payment card networks (MasterCard, Visa, Discover, and American Express), data security organizations, state governments, and federal agencies have all implemented various standards and guidance on security measures designed to prevent these types of intrusions into POS systems. However, despite PDQ’s understanding of the risk of data theft via malware installed on POS systems, and the widely available resources to prevent intrusion into POS data systems, PDQ failed to adhere to these guidelines and failed to take reasonable and sufficient protective measures to prevent the Data Breach. 38. Security experts have recommended specific steps that retailers should take to protect their POS systems. For example, four years ago, Symantec recommended “point to point encryption” implemented through secure card readers, which encrypt credit card information in the POS system, preventing malware that extracts card information through the POS memory while it processes the transaction.25 Moreover, Symantec emphasized the importance of adopting EMV chip technology. Datacap Systems, a developer of POS systems, recommended similar preventative measures.26 39. The major payment card industry brands set forth specific security measures in their Card (or sometimes, Merchant) Operating Regulations. Card Operating Regulations are binding on merchants and require merchants to: (1) protect cardholder data and prevent its unauthorized disclosure; (2) store data, even in encrypted form, no longer than necessary to process the transaction; and (3) comply with all industry standards. 41. The PCI DSS “was developed to encourage and enhance cardholder data security” by providing “a baseline of technical and operational requirements designed to protect account data.”28 PCI DSS sets the minimum level of what must be done, not the maximum. 42. PCI DSS 3.2, the version of the standards in effect at the time of the Data Breach, impose the following mandates on PDQ: 29 43. Among other things, PCI DSS required PDQ to properly secure and protect payment card data; not store cardholder data beyond the time necessary to authorize a transaction; maintain up-to-date antivirus software and a proper firewall; protect systems against malware; regularly test security systems; establish a process to identify and timely fix security vulnerabilities; and encrypt payment card data at the point of sale. 45. Despite PDQ’s awareness of its data security obligations, PDQ’s treatment of PCD and PII entrusted to it by its customers fell far short of satisfying PDQ’s legal duties and obligations, and included violations of the PCI DSS. PDQ failed to ensure that access to its data systems was reasonably safeguarded, failed to acknowledge and act upon industry warnings, and failed to use proper security systems to detect and deter the type of attack that occurred and is at issue here. E. PDQ Failed to Comply With FTC Requirements 46. Federal and State governments have likewise established security standards and issued recommendations to temper data breaches and the resulting harm to consumers and financial institutions. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has issued numerous guides for business highlighting the importance of reasonable data security practices. According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored into all business decision-making.31 48. The FTC recommends that companies not maintain cardholder information longer than is needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access to sensitive data; require complex passwords to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor for suspicious activity on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have implemented reasonable security measures.33 49. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to adequately and reasonably protect customer data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data as an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from these actions further clarify the measures businesses must take to meet their data security obligations. 50. PDQ’s failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data constitutes an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. 52. Despite understanding the consequences of inadequate data security, PDQ failed to comply with PCI DSS requirements and failed to take additional protective measures beyond those required by PCI DSS. 53. Despite understanding the consequences of inadequate data security, PDQ operated POS systems with outdated operating systems and software; failed to enable point-to- point and end-to-end encryption; and, failed to take other measures necessary to protect its data network. F. The PDQ Data Breach 54. PDQ understands the importance of protecting personal information: “PDQ values the relationship we have with our guests and understands the importance of protecting personal information.”34 55. Further, massive data breaches have plagued the restaurant industry, including national restaurant chains such as Wendy’s, Arby’s, Chipotle, Popeye’s, Noodles & Co., and P.F. Chang’s. 56. Based on the data breaches within the restaurant industry, and PDQ’s own acknowledgment of the importance of protecting personal information as stated above, PDQ knew or should have known that its systems were at risk for a similar malware data breach. 58. PDQ believes “the attacker gained entry through an outside technology vendor’s remote connection tool.”36 59. The malware allowed the thieves to download and steal copies of PDQ customers’ Customer Data. 60. The breach became public on June 22, 2018, through PDQ’s announcement. The announcement came almost one year after the Data Breach began, and two months after the Data Breach was detected. PDQ provided only the following information about the breach. The announcement in full37 was: Important Information for our Guests On Data Breach 83. Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of Plaintiff’s self and as a representative of all others who are similarly situated. Pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), (b)(3) and (c)(4), Fed. R. Civ. P., Plaintiff seeks certification of a Nationwide class defined as follows: All persons residing in the United States who made a credit or debit card purchase at any affected PDQ location during the period of the Data Breach (the “Nationwide Class”). 85. Excluded from each of the above Classes are PDQ and any of its affiliates, parents or subsidiaries; all employees of PDQ; all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class; government entities; and the judges to whom this case is assigned and their immediate family and court staff. 86. Plaintiff hereby reserves the right to amend or modify the class definition with greater specificity or division after having had an opportunity to conduct discovery. 87. Each of the proposed Classes meets the criteria for certification under Rule 23(a), (b)(2), (b)(3) and (c)(4). 88. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Consistent with Rule 23(a)(1), the members of the Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that the joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, the proposed Class includes potentially millions of customers whose data was compromised in the Data Breach. Class members may be identified through objective means. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. mail, electronic mail, internet postings, and/or published notice. 90. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Consistent with Rule 23(a)(3), Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of other Class members. Plaintiff is a consumer who used Plaintiff’s payment cards at an affected PDQ location and had Plaintiff’s card compromised as a result of the Data Breach. Plaintiff’s damages and injuries are akin to other Class members and Plaintiff seeks relief consistent with the relief of the Class. 92. Superiority. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Consistent with Rule 23(b)(3), a class action is superior to any other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, and no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. The quintessential purpose of the class action mechanism is to permit litigation against wrongdoers even when damages to individual plaintiffs may not be sufficient to justify individual litigation. Here, the damages suffered by Plaintiff and the Class are relatively small compared to the burden and expense required to individually litigate their claims against PDQ, and thus, individual litigation to redress PDQ’s wrongful conduct would be impracticable. Individual litigation by each Class member would also strain the court system. Individual litigation creates the potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of a single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 93. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. Class certification is also appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) and (c). Defendant, through its uniform conduct, acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate to the Class as a whole. 95. Finally, all members of the proposed Classes are readily ascertainable. PDQ has access to information regarding which of its restaurants were affected by the Data Breach, the time period of the Data Breach, and which customers were potentially affected. Using this information, the members of the Class can be identified and their contact information ascertained for purposes of providing notice to the Class. A. Consumer Plaintiff’s Transactions BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT (ON BEHALF OF CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (ON BEHALF OF CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE (ON BEHALF OF CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND NEGLIGENCE (ON BEHALF OF CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (ON BEHALF OF CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, CONSUMER PLAINTIFF AND VIOLATIONS OF THE OF THE FLORIDA UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201, et seq. (ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONWIDE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFF AND THE

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26. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, individually and on behalf of the stockholders of Livongo common stock who are being and will be harmed by Defendants’ actions described herein (the “Class”). The Class specifically excludes Defendants herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation or other entity related to, or affiliated with, any of the Defendants. 34. Livongo provides an integrated suite of solutions for the healthcare industry in North America. The Company solutions promote health behavior change based on real-time data capture supported by intuitive devices and insights driven by data science. The Company offers a platform that provides cellular-connected devices, supplies, informed coaching, data science- enabled insights, and facilitates access to medications. Its products include Livongo for Diabetes, Livongo for Hypertension, Livongo for Prediabetes and Weight Management, and Livongo for Behavioral Health by myStrength. The Company was formerly known as EosHealth, Inc. and changed its name to Livongo Health, Inc. in 2014. Livongo Health, Inc. was incorporated in 2008 and is headquartered in Mountain View, California. 35. The Company has shown steady financial success evidenced by its stock performance and financial data. In fact, as recently as August 4, 2020, the day before the announcement, Livongo’s stock price was as high as $150.00 per share, approximately $20 more per share than the consideration in the Proposed Transaction. 36. The Company’s most recent pre-announcement 10-Q indicated sustained and solid financial performance. For example, in a May 6, 2020 press release announcing its Fiscal 2020 Q1 financial results, Defendant Burke promoted the Company’s positive financial results, “Livongo is well positioned to provide assistance to some of the most vulnerable populations during the COVID-19 pandemic - people with chronic conditions - and our remote monitoring, digitally powered and real-time personal coaching capabilities, and access to telehealth services are well suited to track vital signs of interest in maintaining the health of our Members.” 37. Defendant Burke went on to comment on a strong future outlook for Livongo, “We are pleased to announce our relationship with the Government Employees Health Association, Inc. (GEHA), to provide the Livongo for Diabetes, Hypertension, and Diabetes Prevention solutions for federal employees, retirees, and their dependents that receive GEHA medical coverage.” Aiding and Abetting the Board’s Breaches of Fiduciary Duty (Against Livongo, Teladoc, and Merger Sub) 120. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 121. Defendants Livongo, Teladoc, and Merger Sub all knowingly assisted the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the Proposed Transaction, which, without such aid, would not have occurred. 122. As a result of this conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have been and will be damaged in that they have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for their shares. 123. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Company Background

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21. Defendant is an archery range that operates its archery range as well as the Website to the public. The archery range is located at 303 5th Ave, New York, New York. Defendant’s archery range constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s archery range provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to find information about the archery range location and hours, information about archery, reservations, tournaments, to inquire about pricing and other products available online and in the archery range for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by the Defendant. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen- reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring on September 2, 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information on the location and hours of the archery range, information about archery, reservations, tournaments, inquiries about pricing and other products available online and in the archery range for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently locate Defendant’s archery range’s locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Defendant’s archery range is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s archery range. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 71. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 73. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 74. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

lose

(Declaratory Relief) 113. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 112 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 114. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Burtsbees.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Burtsbees.com, which Burt’s Bees owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 115. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) 26. Defendants, The Clorox Company and The Burt’s Bees Products Company, control and operate Burtsbees.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 27. Burtsbees.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to personal care products, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 28. Among the features offered by Burtsbees.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Burt’s Bees on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase personal care products including skin care, makeup, lip care, and body and hair care products; and (c) learning about career opportunities, promotions, where to find a retailer, shipping information, and about the company. 30. Burt’s Bees denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Burtsbees.com by preventing them from freely navigating Burtsbees.com. 31. Burtsbees.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 32. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Burtsbees.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Burtsbees.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 34. Furthermore, Burtsbees.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Burtsbees.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 35. Burtsbees.com also lacks accessible forms. Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping cart because the shopping cart form does not specify the purpose of the shopping cart. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping cart. Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping carts and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Burtsbees.com. 36. Other issues with the website include: (a) The search option is not readable and is skipped by the screen-reader; (b) The offer for “free ground shipping” at the top of the home page is skipped by the screen-reader; (c) Some offers are completely missed such as the offer for “free stuff” if you join the mailing list. Screen-reader users simply hear the word “image” and then the submit button 38. Burtsbees.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Burtsbees.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Burtsbees.com. 39. Due to Burtsbees.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Burtsbees.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Burtsbees.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Burtsbees.com. 41. Plaintiff, Lucia Marett, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Burtsbees.com, most recently in October 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Burtsbees.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually- impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase a lip balm product. 42. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Burtsbees.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 43. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Burtsbees.com. 44. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 45. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Burtsbees.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Burtsbees.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Burtsbees.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Burtsbees.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 49. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 51. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Burtsbees.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Burtsbees.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Burtsbees.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Burtsbees.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 52. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Burt’s Bees has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Burtsbees.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 54. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 55. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 56. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 57. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 58. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 60. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Burtsbees.com. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 62. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 63. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 65. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Burt’s Bees who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Burtsbees.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Burtsbees.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 69. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 70. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 74. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 75. Burtsbees.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 76. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Burtsbees.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Burtsbees.com, causing Burtsbees.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 80. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 82. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 83. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Burtsbees.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 84. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 86. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 87. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 88. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 91. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 92. Burtsbees.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 93. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Burtsbees.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 94. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Burtsbees.com, causing Burtsbees.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 96. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 97. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 98. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 99. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 100. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

win

(Class Action Claim for Violation of the AMWA) (Collective Action Claim for Violations of the FLSA) (Individual Claim for Violation of the AMWA) (Individual Claim for FLSA Overtime Violations) 25. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated in this section. 26. Plaintiff worked for Defendants in the maintenance/housekeeping and janitor/maintenance hourly-paid positions that are standard in Defendants' 650 retail travel centers and travel plazas. 27. Plaintiff worked at Defendants' location 7801 Alcoa Rd., Benton, AR 72019. 28. Throughout Plaintiff's employment, Defendants classified Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees as non-exempt and paid Plaintiff an hourly rate. 29. It was Defendants' commonly applied practice to pay Plaintiff and other hourly- paid employees for fewer than all of the hours than the number of hours they actually performed labor for Defendants. 30. Specifically, Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees were required to work and subject to Defendants' policy or practice of regularly making deductions for purported meal breaks despite Plaintiff and the others similarly situated employees not actually taking bona fide meal breaks; and also Plaintiff and the other similarly situated employees had to perform off the clock work for Defendants while not clocked-in. 32. Defendants required Plaintiff and other hourly-paid maintenance/housekeeping/janitor workers to continue working during their regularly scheduled lunch shift breaks. 33. Further, Plaintiff and other hourly-paid maintenance/housekeeping/janitor workers had to continue working up to thirty (30) minutes or more after their regularly scheduled shifts ended. 34. Defendants did not permit Plaintiff and other hourly-paid workers to stay clocked- in after the scheduled end time of their shifts. 35. At times, Defendant's manager(s) edited time sheets to reflect Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, took lunch breaks when, in fact, they had not, and to alter Plaintiff's end times to the financial advantage of Defendants. 36. As a result of these policies, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees a lawful minimum wage for all hours worked and a proper overtime premium for all of the hours Plaintiff, etc., worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a week. 37. At all relevant times herein, Defendants failed to accurately record all of the time worked off-the-clock by Plaintiff and other hourly-paid workers and failed to properly compensate all of the off-the-clock hours. 39. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants was aware of the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. V. 40. Plaintiff brings his claims for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 41. The FLSA Collective consists of all persons who were, are, or will be employed by Defendants as hourly-paid maintenance/janitor /housekeeping workers at any time within the applicable statute of limitations period. 42. The relevant time period dates back three years from the date on which Plaintiff' Class and Collective Action Complaint was filed herein and continues forward through the date of judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 43. The members of the proposed Hourly FLSA Collective are similarly situated in that they share these traits: a. They were classified by Defendants as non-exempt from the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA; b. They were paid hourly rates; and c. They were subject to Defendants' common policy of requiring employees to work time for which they were not compensated. 45. Defendants can readily identify the members of the Section 16(b) Collective, which encompasses all hourly-paid plant workers within the past three years. 46. The names and physical and mailing addresses of the FLSA collective action Plaintiff are available from Defendants, and a Court-approved Notice should be provided to the FLSA collective action Plaintiffs via first class mail and email to their last known physical and electronic mailing addresses as soon as possible, together with other documents and information descriptive of Plaintiff's FLSA claim. B. AMWA Rule 23 Classes 47. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated who were employed by Defendants within the State of Arkansas, bring this claim for relief for violation of the AM.WA as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 48. Plaintiff proposes to represent all persons who were, are, or will be employed by Defendants as similarly situated hourly-paid maintenance/janitor/housekeeping workers within Arkansas at any time within the applicable statute of limitations period. 49. Upon information and belief, Defendants employ or have employed within the statutory period more than forty ( 40) hourly employees within Arkansas. Therefore, the proposed Hourly AMW A Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 60. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 62. During the relevant time period, Defendants unlawfully refrained from paying Plaintiff a lawful minimum wage for all hours worked and an overtime premium for hours over forty per week. 63. Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff all overtime wages owed was willful. 64. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for monetary damages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, for all violations that occurred within the three (3) years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 65. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated in this section. 66. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, asserts this claim for damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 67. At all relevant times, Defendants have and continue to be an "employer" of Plaintiff and all those similarly situated within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U .S.C. § 203. 68. Defendants classified Plaintiff and all similarly situated members of the Hourly FLSA Collective as non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 69. Despite the entitlement of Plaintiff and those similarly situated to minimum wage and overtime payments under the FLSA, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and all those similarly situated a lawful minimum wage for all hours worked and an overtime rate of one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked over forty ( 40) in each one-week period. 71. Like Plaintiff, these hourly-paid cleaning workers regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a week. 72. Because these employees are similarly situated to Plaintiff, and are owed unpaid wages and overtime for the same reasons, the opt-in class may be properly defined as: All hourly-paid employees in the housekeeping/janitor and housekeeping/ maintenance positions within the past three years. 73. Defendants willfully failed to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and to others similarly situated. 74. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and all those similarly situated for monetary damages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, for all violations that occurred within the three (3) years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 75. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated in this section. 76. Plaintiff asserts this claim for damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the AM.WA, Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 11-4-201, et seq. 77. At all relevant times, Defendants were Plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of the AM.WA, Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-4-203(4). 79. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff a lawful minimum wage for all hours worked and an overtime premium for hours over forty per week, as required under the AMW A. 80. Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff a lawful minimum wage for all hours worked and an overtime rate of pay for hours worked over forty ( 40) in a given week was in violation of the 84. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated in this section. 86. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continues to be, an "employer" of Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class within the meaning of the AMW A, Arkansas Code Annotated§ 11-4-203(4). 87. Defendants classified Plaintiff and all members of the AMW A Class as non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the AMW A. 88. Despite the entitlement of Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class to minimum wage and overtime payments under the AMW A, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class for all hours worked, including an overtime rate of one and one- half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked over forty ( 40) in each one-week period. 89. Plaintiff proposes to represent the AM.WA liability class of individuals defined as follows: All hourly-paid employees in the housekeeping/janitor and housekeeping/ maintenance positions in Arkansas within the past three years. 90. Defendants willfully failed to pay a lawful minimum wage and overtime wages to Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class. A. FLSA § 216(b) Class

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45. Defendants provide water transfer and completion services. Defendants offer these services to oil field operators across the country. They specialize in frac, flowback and pit to pit water transfer, but also offer an array of completion fluids and engineering services. They provide their services to over 20 of the top oil and gas companies including, Hess, Plymouth, Sundance, and SM Energy.2 47. Defendants dispatch field technicians and other manual laborers to its customers’ oil fields. Defendants also hire manual labors to work on its “yard” which is where its vehicles and other equipment are stored. 48. Defendants pay their manual labors a day rate only without regard to actual hours worked. 49. Plaintiffs and Class Members typically work over forty hours per week. 50. Defendants never pay time and a half for hours worked over forty. 51. Plaintiffs bring this action as an FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all persons who were or are employed by Defendants as manual laborers within the three (3) years preceding the filing of this complaint to the present. 52. Plaintiffs have actual knowledge, through conversations with their co-workers, that a class of similarly situated Class Members exists who have been subjected to Defendants’ policy of not paying the overtime rate for all hours worked over forty. 53. Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiffs in that they all performed manual labor, were paid on a day rate and were victims of the same violations of the FLSA. 54. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime at the rates required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices and does not depend on personal circumstances of individual Class Members. 55. The experience of Plaintiffs, with respect to their employment classification and pay, is typical of manual laborers across Defendants’ business. 57. Like Plaintiffs, all Class Members are entitled to receive overtime. 58. The claims of all Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendants that caused harm to all Class Members. 59. The names and addresses of the Class Members are available from Defendants’ records. To the extent required by law, notice will be provided to these individuals by first class mail or by the use of techniques and a form of notice similar to those customarily used in representative actions. 60. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among the individual Class Members in proportion to the number of hours they worked, damages for each individual can be easily calculated using a simply formula. 61. Between May 17, 2010 and May 17, 2013, Defendants employed at least thirty- five (35) manual laborers paid on a day rate. 62. Between May 17, 2010 and May 17, 2013, Defendants employed at least twenty- five (50) manual laborers paid on a day rate. 63. Between May 17, 2010 and May 17, 2013, Defendants employed at least twenty- five (100) manual laborers paid on a day rate. 64. Between May 17, 2010 and May 17, 2013, Defendants employed at least twenty- five (150) manual laborers paid on a day rate. 65. Between May 17, 2010 and May 17, 2013, Defendants employed at least twenty- five (200) manual laborers paid on a day rate. 67. As such, the class of similarly situated employees is properly defined as follows: All of Defendants’ current and former manual laborers paid on a day rate basis between May 17, 2010 and the date notice is issued. 68. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference. 69. This count arises from Defendants’ violation of the FLSA for their failure to pay Plaintiffs and Class Members overtime based on FLSA’s time-and-a-half formula. 70. For each hour worked in excess of forty (40) each week, Plaintiffs and Class Members were entitled to be paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 71. By failing to pay overtime based on that formula, Defendants violated and continue to violate the FLSA. 72. No exception contained in the FLSA, its implementing regulations, or recognized by any Court of the United States permits an employer in the position of Defendants to skirt its obligation to pay overtime to an employee situated in the position of Plaintiffs and Class Members. 74. In fact various employees complained to Defendants about the fact that they were not receiving overtime, yet the Defendants continued on with their illegal pay practices. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME (COLLECTIVE ACTION)

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15. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through fourteen (14) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 16. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 17. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant’s records reflect resided in New York who received a communication from Defendant within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; and the communication -4- was served in a jurisdiction other than a jurisdiction in which the Plaintiff resides, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5), 1692e(10), 1692f, and 1692i(a)(2). 18. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: (a) Based on the fact that a form communication is at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. (b) There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any question(s) affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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1. The amount of the debt; 11. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals; b. to whom Client Services sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. that including deceptive accounting of the actual balance owed; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 4 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and 1692g. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 17. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal 5 issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. § l692e and §1692g. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 6 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 2. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to February 16, 2018, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Chase Bank. 22. The Chase Bank obligation arose out of transactions in which the funds obtained from the creditor were used primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 23. The alleged Chase Bank obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 24. Chase Bank is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 25. Chase Bank or a subsequent owner of the Chase Bank debt contracted with the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. 26. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – February 16, 2018 Collection Letter 27. On or about February 16, 2018, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial contact notice (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Chase Bank. See Exhibit A. 7 28. When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication send the consumer a written notice containing: (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty- day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 29. The required disclosures set forth in 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a) are more commonly known as the “G Notice”. 3. A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt-collector; 30. The FDCPA further provides that ''if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period . . . that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed . . . the debt collector shall cease collection . . . until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt . . . and a copy of such verification is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.'' 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 31. Although a collection letter may track the statutory language, ''the collector nevertheless violates the Act if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory 8 fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty.'' Russell v. EQUIFAX A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (''It is not enough for a debt collection agency to simply include the proper debt validation notice in a mailing to a consumer-- Congress intended that such notice be clearly conveyed.''). Put differently, a notice containing ''language that 'overshadows or contradicts' other language informing a consumer of her rights . . . violates the Act.'' Russell, 74 F.3d at 34. 32. The top of the letter states: Balance due at Charge Off: $1,915.77 Interest Post Charge Off: $0.00 Other Charges Post Charge Off: $0.00 Payments Made Post Charge Off: $0.00 Balance Due: $1,878.77 33. Defendant deceptively lists multiple balances due without an account for the change in amounts. 34. Defendant should be aware of a payment being made and properly accounted for. 35. Plaintiff incurred an informational injury as Defendant falsely stated the amounts owed. 36. Defendant’s false statement overshadowed Plaintiff’s §1692g right to dispute or validate the debt as he was uninformed as to what amount he actually owed. 37. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 38. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 9 39. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 4. A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 40. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 41. Defendant violated §1692e : a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 42. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 43. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 44. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 45. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – 10 46. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, by not clearly stating the amount owed and deceived the consumer not to exert its rights under the FDCPA. 47. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 5. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty- day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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18. The Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax imposes a tax on the “gross receipts” received by “Resort hotels” from occupants of a “transient lodging establishment.” The Clark County Code defines “gross receipts” to include the total amount of “rent” received and any forfeited deposits valued in money. § 4.08.005(8). The Clark County Code defines “rent” as “the amount charged for a sleeping room/space in a transient lodging establishment,” including, inter alia, “payment processing fees, check-in fees, accommodation fees, facility fees, access fees, charges for additional overnight guests, late check-out fees, and utility surcharges.” § 19. Treasure Island is a “Resort hotel” as defined by the Clark County Code § 20. Defendants are responsible for paying the Combined Transient Lodging Tax. Clark County Code § 4.08.010 states that the transient lodging tax “shall be collected from every operator,” and “constitutes a debt owed by the operator.” 21. While the tax “may be collected from the paying transient guests,” “[t]he operator is liable to Clark County for the tax whether or not it is actually collected from the paying transient guest.” Clark County Code § 4.08.010(c) (emphasis added). 22. Because Defendants are responsible for paying the Combined Transient Lodging Tax, they were acting for their own benefit, and not as agents of Clark County, when they charged Plaintiff and the Class the tax. 23. The Clark County Code permits hotel operators to reduce their tax liability under § 4.08.010 by retaining 2 percent for themselves, as an incentive for timely remission to the taxing authorities. 25. In 1998, the ITFA imposed a national moratorium on states and their political subdivisions from imposing any new taxes on Internet access: (a) Moratorium.—No State or political subdivision thereof may impose any of the following taxes: (1) Taxes on Internet access. ITFA § 1101(a)(1). 26. Following a series of extensions which maintained the ITFA on a continuous basis, on July 15, 2014, the United States House of Representatives (“House”) voted to pass the Permanent Internet Tax Freedom Act (H.R. 3086; 113th Congress) (“PITFA”), a bill that amended the ITFA to make permanent the ban on state and local taxation of Internet access, among other things. On June 9, 2015, the House voted and approved H.R. 235, the PITFA, which makes permanent the ban on federal, state, and local taxation of email and Internet access originally enacted in the ITFA. PITFA was passed by Congress and the ITFA became permanent law on February 24, 2016. The ITFA’s moratorium on the taxation of Internet access has been continuous from 1998 to the present, subject to the exceptions provided for in the ITFA, none of which are applicable to the Defendants. 28. The ITFA, provides for two general categories of exceptions for the provision of “Internet access services”: (1) a so called “grandfather” exception; and (2) limited exceptions for Internet Service Providers. 29. The grandfather provision provides that the ITFA does not prohibit states and their political subdivisions from imposing a tax on Internet access if the tax was “generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 1, 1998.” ITFA § 1104. The grandfather clause originally permitted 13 states, later reduced to seven, that directly taxed Internet access in 1998 – Hawaii, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin – to continue to do so. Neither the Defendants nor Clark County generally imposed and actually enforced a tax on Internet access prior to October 1, 1998. Upon information and belief, prior to bundling Internet access with the goods and services included in the Resort Fee, Defendants did not impose a tax on the sale of Internet access. 30. Neither the Defendants nor the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax meet the “grandfather” exception to the ITFA because, among other things, the tax is not now, nor has it ever been, a tax on Internet access or included a tax on Internet access that is “generally imposed.” Clark County Code § 1104(a)(1). Furthermore, neither the State of Nevada nor Clark County has “generally collected” tax on Internet access or made any “rule or other public proclamation” that the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax applies to Internet access services. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 32. Defendants do not fall within the scope of the exceptions for Internet Service Providers because they are not telecommunications carriers engaged in the provision of a telecommunication service, persons engaged in the business of providing an Internet access service; persons engaged in the business of providing an Internet information location tool; or similarly engaged in the transmission, storage, retrieval, hosting, formatting, or translation of a communication made by another person, without selection or alteration of the communication, within the meaning of the ITFA. See ITFA § 1101(d). 33. The ITFA specifically mandates that where a business can, as Defendants can here, reasonably identify the portion of the bundle that constitutes charges for Internet access, the business may not tax the entire bundle: “If charges for Internet Access are aggregated with and not separately stated from the charges for telecommunications or other charges that are subject to taxation, then the charges for Internet access may be subject to taxation unless the Internet access provider can reasonably identify the charges for Internet access from its books and records kept in the regular course of business.” ITFA § 1106(a). 35. The introduction of “resort fees” charged by hotels and resorts in the United States began as a way for hotel owners and operators to increase revenues. 36. Properties in Las Vegas, such as Treasure Island, were among the first to realize that the demand for Wi-Fi and Internet access was increasing and that, by bundling Internet access into a mandatory Resort Fee that included other goods and services that were of lesser value and were otherwise previously provided for free, they could increase their profits by charging a high mandatory per-night fee. 37. In an attempt to generate more revenues from Plaintiff and members of the Class, Defendants began bundling Internet access charges into Resort Fees that included other goods and services of minimal value. 38. The charges for Internet access included in the Resort Fee charged by Defendants and on which Plaintiff and the Class paid the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax, have a monetary value that is less than the full amount of the Resort Fee paid, but greater than $0, and, upon information and belief, can be reasonably identified from Defendants’ books and records kept in the regular course of business. 39. Treasure Island has 2,884 rooms. 4.08.005(18). From the beginning of the Class Period1 through January 14, 2017, the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax applicable to Resort hotels including Treasure Island was 12 percent. See Clark County Code 4.08.010, Table 4.08.010(a). From January 15 through February 28, 2017, the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax applicable to Treasure Island was 12.5 percent. On March 1, 2017, the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax applicable to Resort hotels including Treasure Island that are within the “primary gaming corridor” area, as defined by Clark County Code § 4.08.005(16), increased to 13.38 percent. 41. As set forth in this image from the Treasure Island website, the Treasure Island Resort Fee includes “WiFi Internet Access.” The Treasure Island website states that Internet Access is valued at $25 to $99 per day: 42. As set forth in the above image from the Treasure Island website showing a sample room quotation, Treasure Island charges the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax to its $35.00 Resort Fee. 44. Upon information and belief, Treasure Island did not charge the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax on these stand-alone internet access charges. D. The ITFA Requires that Defendants Identify the Amount of Their Resort Fees that Are for Non-Taxable Internet Access and Apply the Combined Transient Lodging Only to the Taxable Amount. 45. After bundling internet access into their Resort Fees, Defendants began charging Plaintiff and members of the Class the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging tax on these amounts. 46. Defendants can reasonably identify the portion of their Resort Fees that constitutes internet access. 47. Indeed, as noted above, upon information and belief, Defendants did not charge the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax on their stand-alone internet access charges that were in effect prior to their bundled Resort Fees. 48. Accordingly, Defendants violated the ITFA by failing to identify the amount of their Resort Fees that constitutes internet access, subtracting this amount from their Resort Fee, and then charging Plaintiff and members of the Class the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax on this reduced amount. 49. Defendants’ behavior resulted in Plaintiff and members of the Class paying tens of millions of dollars in unlawful and erroneous taxes. E. The ITFA Requires Defendants to Identify the Amount of Their Resort Fee that is Attributable to Internet Access and to Apply the Combined Transient Lodging Tax Only to the Portion of the Resort Fee that Includes Taxable Goods and Services Which Excludes Internet Access. 51. Defendants can reasonably identify the portion of their Resort Fee that constitutes Internet access. As alleged, upon information and belief, Defendants did not charge the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax on their stand-alone Internet access charges that were in effect prior to the time that they began to charge Resort Fees that included Internet access. Accordingly, Defendants violated the ITFA by failing to identify the portion of their Resort Fee that constitutes Internet access, subtracting this amount from their Resort Fee, and then charging Plaintiff and members of the Class the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax on the taxable portion. 52. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and members of the Class paid unlawful and erroneously-charged taxes on Internet access in violation of the ITFA. V. 53. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of the following proposed Class (the “Treasure Island Class”): Treasure Island Class: All persons and entities that paid the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging tax on the portion of a Resort Fee charged by Treasure Island that constitutes charges for Internet access, during the period beginning November 22, 2013 and continuing until such time the illegal conduct alleged herein has ceased. 54. The proposed Treasure Island Class is referred to herein as the "Class.” 56. Plaintiff seeks to represent the Class for any damages and injunctive relief, and assert his claims on behalf of both themselves and the Class members they seek to represent. 57. The numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is satisfied here because the members of the proposed Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all its members is impracticable. Although the exact number Class member is unknown at this time, there are believed to total at least tens of thousands of members of each Class nationwide. Therefore, the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is met. 58. The commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied because there are questions of law or fact common to Plaintiff and the other Class members, including: (a) Whether Defendants charging the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax on Internet access charges bundled within Resort Fees violated the ITFA; (b) Whether Defendants can reasonably identify the portion of their Resort Fees that constitute charges for Internet access; (c) The proper measure and appropriate formula to be applied in determining damages for the injuries sustained by the Class; and (d) Whether Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled to declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief. 60. Plaintiff’s counsel have identified and thoroughly investigated the claims set forth herein, and are highly experienced in the management and litigation of class actions and complex litigation. Plaintiff’s counsel have extensive knowledge of the applicable law and possess the resources to commit to the vigorous prosecution of this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the other Class members. Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a)(4). 61. This action also meets the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and other Class members, making final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the proposed Class appropriate. 63. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-62 as though fully set forth herein, and bring this Cause of Action against all Defendants. 64. The ITFA as amended, bars states and their political subdivisions from imposing taxes on Internet access and requires businesses to disaggregate charges for Internet access from other fees subject to taxation when calculating and collecting tax due. 65. Despite the prohibition on taxation of Internet access, Defendants improperly and illegally applied the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax on the portion of the Resort Fee that constitutes charges for Internet access. 66. Defendants could reasonably identify the amounts that they charged Plaintiff and the Class for Internet access but, in violation of the ITFA, failed to subtract that amount from their Resort Fee when calculating and applying the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax due on the taxable portion of their Resort Fee. 67. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the ITFA, Plaintiff and the Class were damaged in the amount of the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax that they paid on the value of Internet access included in the Resort Fee, together with interest on that amount. 68. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-67 as though fully set forth herein, and bring this Cause of Action against all Defendants. 69. Section 4.08.055 of the Clark County Code states that the “[t]he operator [of a hotel] shall refund any over-collection of the combined transient lodging tax to the occupant.” 71. Plaintiff and members of the Class are “occupant[s]” within the meaning of the Clark County Code. 72. Defendants charged, and Plaintiff paid, the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax on the portion of the Resort Fee that constitutes charges for Internet access. 73. Defendants could reasonably identify the amounts they charged Plaintiff and the Class for Internet access but, in violation of the ITFA, failed to subtract that amount from their Resort Fee when calculating and applying the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax due on the taxable portion of their Resort Fee. 74. The ITFA prohibits states and their political subdivisions from imposing taxes on charges for Internet access and requires business, like Defendants, to disaggregate charges for Internet access from other taxable charges when calculating and collecting tax from customers such as Plaintiff and the Class. 75. Tax amounts collected from Plaintiff and the Class by Defendants for Internet access were “over-collected” and Defendants is required to refund those amounts to Plaintiff and the Class. 76. In violation of Section 4.08.055 of the Clark County Code, Defendants have not refunded the tax amounts that they over-collected for Internet access to Plaintiff and the Class. 77. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the Clark County Code, Plaintiff and the Class were damaged in the amount of Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax charged by Defendants for Internet access, together with interest on that amount. 79. The Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“Nevada DTPA”), NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.0903, et seq., prohibits deceptive trade practices. 80. NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.0923 provides that a person engages in a “deceptive trade practice” if, in the course of business or occupation, the person “[v]iolates a state or federal statute or regulation relating to the sale or lease of goods or services.” 81. Defendants engaged in deceptive trade practices in violation of the Nevada DTPA by charging Plaintiff tax on Internet access in violation of a federal statute or regulation relating to the sale or lease of goods or services, namely, the ITFA. 82. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.600 provides a cause of action to any person who is injured by a violation of a deceptive trade practice as defined by the Nevada DTPA. 83. Defendants’ violations as set forth above occurred in the course of business; specifically in the course of renting hotel rooms to Plaintiff and the Class. 84. Plaintiff and the Class suffered ascertainable losses caused by Defendants’ violations of the Nevada DTPA, namely overpayment of taxes resulting from Defendants’ application of the Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax to the portion of their Resort Fees that constitute charges for Internet access. 85. Defendants’ violations of the Nevada DTPA are continuing, and, if not enjoined, present a continuing risk to Plaintiff, the Class, and the general public. 86. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violations of the Nevada DTPA, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered injury-in-fact and/or actual damage. 88. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-87 as though fully set forth herein, and bring this Cause of Action against all Defendants. 89. As set forth above, Plaintiff and the Class entered into contracts with Defendants to pay Resort Fees to Defendants in exchange for the provision of goods and services, including Internet access. 90. Pursuant to those contracts, Plaintiff and the Class paid Defendants Resort Fees and charges listed by Defendants as taxes on those Resort Fees. 91. In charging taxes on Resort Fees, Defendants created the objectively justified expectation that all charges designated as taxes were valid and compliant with all relevant laws and regulations. 92. Despite the prohibition on state and local taxes imposed by the ITFA, Defendants charged Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class taxes for Internet access in violation of the 96. As set forth above, Defendants collected from Plaintiff and the Class tax amounts in excess of that required to be collected under the Clark County Code. 97. Pursuant to Clark County Code §§ 4.08.040 and 4.08.055, Defendants are entitled to retain two (2) percent of the taxes collected from Plaintiff and the Class for Internet access and must remit the remainder to the Department. 98. By doing so, Defendants received money from Plaintiff and the Class to which they had and have no right at law or in equity. 99. It would be inequitable for Defendants to retain any such monies that they had no legal right to charge and they ought to in equity and good conscience return such money to Plaintiff. A. The Clark County Combined Transient Lodging Tax Contractual Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Money Had and Received Unjust Enrichment 105. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-104 as though fully set forth herein, and bring this Cause of Action against all Defendants. 106. Under Clark County Code Section 4.08.040, Defendants may retain for themselves a percentage of the Combined Transient Lodging Tax they collect. 107. Upon information and belief, Defendants retain the permitted amount of tax that they collect and, therefore, wrongfully obtain a legal benefit. 108. Defendants collected these amounts to the detriment of Plaintiff and the Class, and thus appreciated the benefit. 109. Defendants retained funds that in good conscience and equity they should not be entitled to retain. 110. As a result, Defendants are unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class. 111. Defendants’ profits from their wrongful conduct in over-collecting and retaining the taxes. Plaintiff and the Class therefore seek full disgorgement and restitution of the amounts Defendants retained as a result of their unlawful and/or wrongful conduct alleged herein. Violation of the Clark County Code, Section 4.08.005, et seq. Violation of the Internet Tax Freedom Act Violations of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598.0903, et seq., Pursuant to NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.600

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15. On July 7, 2018, Infosys filed its annual report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2018 with the SEC (the “2018 20-F”). The 2018 20-F contained signed certifications pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) signed by Defendants Parekh and Ranganath attesting to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material changes to the Company’s internal controls over financial reporting, and the disclosure of all fraud. 16. The 2018 20-F stated that Infosys’s Board “on January 12, 2018 adopted the revised Code of Conduct and Ethics which is applicable to all officers, directors and employees and is posted on our website at www.infosys.com. The Code of Conduct and Ethics is filed as an exhibit to this Annual Report on Form 20-F.” The Code of Conduct and Ethics stated the following regarding records and disclosures, in pertinent part: The integrity of our financial transactions and records is critical to the operation of our business. Our shareholders’ trust is based on their confidence in the accurate recording of our financial transactions. Additionally, as a listed company, we are bound by certain standards for accurate financial reporting and we are required to have appropriate internal controls and procedures. If you have responsibility for or 5 any involvement in financial reporting or accounting, you should have an appropriate understanding of, and you should seek in good faith to adhere to, relevant accounting and financial reporting principles, standards, laws, rules and regulations and the company’s financial and accounting policies, controls and procedures. If you are a senior officer, you should seek to ensure that the internal controls and procedures in your business area are in place, understood and followed. * * * Infosys is committed to provide full, fair, accurate, timely and clear disclosures in reports and documents that we file with, or submit to our regulators and in our other public communications. To enable this, we must ensure that we comply with our disclosure controls and procedures, and our internal control over financial reporting. 28. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of all persons other than Defendants who acquired Infosys securities publicly traded on the NYSE during the Class Period, and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of Infosys, members of the Individual Defendants’ immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Officer or Director Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 12 29. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Infosys securities were actively traded on the NYSE. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds, if not thousands of members in the proposed Class. 30. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 32. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: • whether the Exchange Act were violated by Defendants’ acts as alleged herein; • whether statements made by Defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented material facts about the financial condition and business of Infosys; • whether Defendants’ public statements to the investing public during the Class Period omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; • whether the Defendants caused Infosys to issue false and misleading SEC filings during the Class Period; 13 • whether Defendants acted knowingly or recklessly in issuing false and SEC filing • whether the prices of Infosys’s securities during the Class Period were artificially inflated because of the Defendants’ conduct complained of herein; and • whether the members of the Class have sustained damages and, if so, what is the proper measure of damages. 33. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 34. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that: • Infosys ADSs met the requirements for listing, and were listed and actively traded on the NYSE, a highly efficient and automated market; • As a public issuer, Infosys filed periodic public reports with the SEC; • Infosys regularly communicated with public investors via established market communication mechanisms, including through the regular dissemination of press releases via major newswire services and through other wide-ranging public disclosures, such as communications with the financial press and other similar reporting services; and 14 • Infosys was followed by a number of securities analysts employed by major brokerage firms who wrote reports that were widely distributed and publicly available. 35. Based on the foregoing, the market for Infosys securities promptly digested current information regarding Infosys from all publicly available sources and reflected such information in the prices of the ADSs, and Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 36. Alternatively, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to the presumption of reliance established by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), as Defendants omitted material information in their Class Period statements in violation of a duty to disclose such information as detailed above. 37. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 38. This Count is asserted against Defendants is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 39. During the Class Period, Defendants, individually and in concert, directly or indirectly, disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 40. Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: • employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; 15 • made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or • engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of Infosys securities during the Class Period. 41. Defendants acted with scienter in that they knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of Infosys were materially false and misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated, or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the securities laws. These Defendants by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts of Infosys, their control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of Infosys’s allegedly materially misleading statements, and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Infosys, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 42. Individual Defendants, who are the senior officers and/or directors of the Company, had actual knowledge of the material omissions and/or the falsity of the material statements set forth above, and intended to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, acted with reckless disregard for the truth when they failed to ascertain and disclose the true facts in the statements made by them or other Infosys personnel to members of the investing public, including Plaintiff and the Class. 43. As a result of the foregoing, the market price of Infosys securities was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the falsity of Defendants’ statements, Plaintiff 16 and the other members of the Class relied on the statements described above and/or the integrity of the market price of Infosys securities during the Class Period in purchasing Infosys securities at prices that were artificially inflated as a result of Defendants’ false and misleading statements. 44. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class been aware that the market price of Infosys securities had been artificially and falsely inflated by Defendants’ misleading statements and by the material adverse information which Defendants did not disclose, they would not have purchased Infosys securities at the artificially inflated prices that they did, or at all. 45. As a result of the wrongful conduct alleged herein, Plaintiff and other members of the Class have suffered damages in an amount to be established at trial. 46. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and are liable to the plaintiff and the other members of the Class for substantial damages which they suffered in connection with their purchase of Infosys securities during the Class Period. 47. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of Infosys, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of Infosys’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information about Infosys’s misstatement of revenue and profit and false financial statements. 17 49. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Infosys’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by Infosys which had become materially false or misleading. 50. Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Individual Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and public filings which Infosys’s disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period concerning Infosys’s results of operations. Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants exercised their power and authority to cause Infosys to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein. The Individual Defendants therefore, were “controlling persons” of Infosys within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In this capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct alleged which artificially inflated the market price of Infosys securities. 51. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by Infosys. For Violations of Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants Materially False and Misleading Statements Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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(Violation of M.G.L. c. 93A on behalf of Plaintiff and the Classes) 13. Defendant provides cameras and other equipment for rent for various periods of time to its customers. 14. To rent equipment from Defendant, customers go to the www.lensprotogo.com website, select the equipment they want to rent, select the dates/number of days they want to rent the equipment and select to either have the equipment shipped to them or to pick up the equipment at a participating store. 15. Defendant’s website prominently and repeatedly advertised and represented that it would ship all of the rented equipment for “FREE”. 17. On September 18, 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website to rent a Canon camera from September 23-27, 2019. During the process, Defendant’s website indicated that he had the choice to either (i) pick up the rental at a store, or (ii) have the camera shipped to his home. Defendant’s website indicated that either option included “FREE SHIPPING”. Plaintiff chose the shipped to home option. 24. Defendant was renting that same camera, for the same period of time, for $120 plus tax (instead of the $155 plus tax charged to Plaintiff) for a customer who picked up the camera at a participating shop. As a result, Defendant in fact charged Plaintiff $35.00 more for the camera he rented solely because Plaintiff had the camera shipped to his home. In other words, the Defendant in fact charged the Plaintiff $35.00 for the camera to be shipped to his home, despite Defendant’s repeated promises and representations that shipping was “FREE”. 25. This demonstrates that shipping was not in fact “FREE” as Defendant prominently and repeatedly claimed on its website. Rather, Defendant had included the cost of shipping within the higher price of the rental itself while still telling customers that shipping was “FREE”. As a result of this unfair, deceptive and misleading practice, Plaintiff paid $35.00 for shipping which Plaintiff had promised would be “FREE”. 27. The Defendant charged the Plaintiff $35.00 to ship the camera to him. It was an unfair and deceptive practice, in violation of c. 93A, § 2, for the Defendant to do so. 28. Defendant’s practice of advertising FREE SHIPPING but charging more for shipped items was not limited to Plaintiff. Defendant universally advertised FREE SHIPPING on all its equipment rentals on its website for all customers and then charged those customers who chose to have the equipment shipped to them a higher price for the rentals than it charged customers who chose to pick up the equipment. Defendant charged all it customers who had the equipment shipped to them for shipping despite its repeated and consistent representations that it was providing “FREE SHIPPING”. Plaintiff’s claim and the claim of all members of the proposed Classes arise from a single course of conduct engaged in by Defendant. 29. Defendant made the false and misleading representations that its rentals included FREE SHIPPING from its headquarters in Massachusetts. 30. Defendant decided and determined to make its false and misleading representations that its rentals included FREE SHIPPING at Defendant’s headquarters in Massachusetts. 32. Defendant’s unfair, false, deceptive and misleading practices of representing all its rentals as including FREE SHIPPING and charging more for shipped rentals did not vary based on where the customer lived or had the rental shipped to them. 33. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above. 34. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and G.L. c. 93A, §§ 2, 9, on behalf of himself and a class (the “Nationwide Class”) of: All persons in the United States who have rented equipment from Defendant and who selected the shipping delivery option, between August 18, 2016 and the date, presently unknown to Plaintiff, when LensPro ceased making the false representation on its website that shipping was free. 36. The Nationwide Class and Massachusetts Subclass are referred to herein as the “Classes”. 37. Excluded from the Classes is Defendant and its officers, directors, partners, employees, any affiliated companies or entities Defendant controls. 38. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Classes. 39. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 40. Plaintiff is similarly situated to the members of the Classes because, like each member of the Classes, Plaintiff rented equipment that was represented as having FREE SHIPPING when in fact Defendant charged Plaintiff and the members of the Classes for shipping. 41. Tens of thousands of consumers have rented equipment from Defendant through Defendant’s website which is accessible to consumers throughout the United States. The Defendant has told Plaintiff, through counsel, that Defendant has rented cameras and other equipment to over 3,500 customers located in Massachusetts since October 2015. See Exhibit B at 5. The members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. 48. Plaintiff incorporates the forgoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 49. At all relevant times, Defendant was engaged in trade or commerce within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 51. As alleged above, Defendant conducted these actions from its headquarters in Massachusetts, and therefore it is liable under 93A to all members of the Nationwide Class regardless of whether they reside in or received the rental in Massachusetts. 52. Defendant’s conduct was objectively false, misleading and deceptive, and had the capacity to deceive reasonable consumers under the circumstances. The fact that Defendant charged more for rentals when a customer selected the FREE SHIPPING option was a material fact that a reasonable consumer would attach importance at the time of purchase. 54. The violations of Chapter 93A by Defendant in connection with its representing rentals as including FREE SHIPPING as described herein were done willfully, knowingly, and in bad faith. 55. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct in connection with its false, misleading and deceptive FREE SHIPPING representations alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Classes were injured. 57. On October 18, 2019, Plaintiff, through counsel, sent a demand letter (the “Demand Letter”), pursuant to G.L. c. 93A, to Defendant regarding its unfair, false, deceptive and misleading representations to customers that all equipment rentals came with FREE SHIPPING when in fact Defendant charged a higher price for shipped rentals. The Demand Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 58. In the Demand Letter, Plaintiff demanded relief under c. 93A for himself and all customers of Defendant in the United States to whom Defendant had shipped the rented equipment. Plaintiff demanded that Defendant pay each such customer in the amount that customer had paid Defendant for shipping the equipment, or the minimum $25 statutory damages under c. 93A, whichever was greater. 59. On November 15, 2019, Defendant, through counsel, responded to Plaintiff’s demand letter (the “Response Letter”). A copy of the Response Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 61. As a result of the conduct described herein, Defendant violated Chapter 93A and is liable to Plaintiff and the members of the Classes for the amount Defendant charged each of them for shipping, or $25, whichever is greater. Defendant’s False and Misleading Representations of “FREE SHIPPING”

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22. Defendant offers the https://www.bailey44.com/ website, Defendant’s Website, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with its physical location. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to access: spa/hot springs goods and services, including 44-hr Flash Sale, Icons, Jackets, Tops, Dresses, Bottoms, Sale, Shop All, as well as size chart, returns, shipping, and contact us, and information about products and services which are available online and in retail stores for purchase. 23. Based on information and belief, it is Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff and Class Members, along with other blind or visually impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore, specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated within Defendant’s stores. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers on its website, Plaintiff and other visually impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal and full access to Defendant’s stores and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through Defendant’s Website. Defendant’s Barriers on https://www.bailey44.com/ Deny Plaintiff and Class Members’ Access 24. Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen reading software. However, Plaintiff is a proficient user of the JAWS screen-reader as well as Mac’s VoiceOver and she uses both to access the internet. Plaintiff has visited https://www.bailey44.com/ on several separate occasions using the JAWS and/or VoiceOver screen-readers. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a Nationwide Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), the Nationwide Class is initially defined as follows: all legally blind individuals who have attempted to access Defendant’s website by the use of a screen reading software during the applicable limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action. 54. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 50, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 55. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., provides: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 60. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 50, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 61. Defendant’s location is a “business establishment” within the meaning of the California Civil Code § 51 et seq. Defendant generates millions of dollars in revenue from the sale of its services in California through its store’s location and related services and https://www.bailey44.com/ is a service provided by Defendant that is inaccessible to customers who are visually impaired like Plaintiff and Class Members. This inaccessibility denies visually impaired customers full and equal access to Defendant’s facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Defendant is violating the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51 et seq., in that Defendant is denying visually impaired customers the services provided by https://www.bailey44.com/. These violations are ongoing. 62. Defendant’s actions constitute intentional discrimination against Plaintiff and Class Members on the basis of a disability in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civil Code § 51 et seq. in that: Defendant has constructed a website that is inaccessible to Plaintiff and Class Members; maintains the website in this inaccessible form; and has failed to take adequate actions to correct these barriers even after being notified of the discrimination that such barriers cause. Violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff, the Nationwide Class and the California Class) Violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class)

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12. All of the Defendants conspired, jointly caused, knowingly participated and/or aided and abetted each other in the wrongful conduct described hereinafter so as to be jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for each of the acts, omissions, breaches, malfeasance and causes of action set forth herein. 24. Defendants operate a company that purports to offer credit repair services to its customers for a fee. Unfortunately for consumers, Defendants utilized (and continued to utilize) a sophisticated telephone dialing system to call individuals en masse promoting its services. 25. Defendants obtained these telephone numbers (i.e., leads) by purchasing marketing lists containing consumers’ telephone numbers and by capturing numbers used to call or submit web inquiries to Defendants. 26. Unfortunately, in Defendants’ overzealous attempt to market its services, it placed (and continue to place) phone calls to consumers who never provided consent to call and to consumers having no relationship with Defendants. Worse yet, Defendants placed (and continues to place) repeated and unwanted calls to consumers whose phone numbers are listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. Consumers place their phone numbers on the Do Not Call Registry for the express purpose of avoiding unwanted telemarketing calls like those alleged here. 27. Defendants knowingly made (and continue to make) these telemarketing calls without the prior express written consent of the call recipients and knowingly continue to call them after requests to stop. As such, Defendants not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Class, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 28. Over six years ago on or about June 11, 2008, Plaintiff registered her cellular phone number ending in 6312 with the National Do Not Call Registry. 56. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and the following classes defined as follows (the “Class”): “Robocall Class”: All individuals in the United States who received a call made by or on behalf of Defendants to the individual’s cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system, or pre-recorded voice, or any other device having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, from October 16, 2013 to the date the Class is certified, where Defendants’ records fail to indicate prior express written consent from the recipient to make such call. 76. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 77. Defendants made unsolicited and unauthorized calls using an ATDS or pre- recorded voice to Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ cellular telephones for the purpose of marketing products and/or services to Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class Members. 78. Defendants made the calls without prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class Members. 79. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq. 83. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 84. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 85. The TCPA’s implementing regulation—47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)—provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c). A. CLASS ALLEGATIONS VIOLATION OF TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“DNC Claim” On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) VIOLATION OF TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“Robocall Claim” On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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11. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 12. Some time prior to March 17, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (“CREDITOR”). 13. The JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. obligation arose out of a consumer transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal or family purposes. 14. The alleged JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 15. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 16. At some point, JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. or a purchaser, assignee, or subsequent creditor sold the debt to the Defendant. 17. Defendant then decided to contact Plaintiff about the debt via written correspondence in an attempt to collect the alleged debt. 18. However, rather than preparing and mailing a collection letter on its own, Defendant sent information regarding Plaintiff and the Debt to a commercial mail house (“mail house”). 20. Defendant disclosed to the mail house: a. Plaintiff status as a debtor; b. the fact that Plaintiff allegedly owed $6,877.75 to JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.; and c. other highly personal pieces of information. 21. The mail house then populated some or all of this information into a pre-written template, printed, and prepared the letter for mailing to Plaintiff’s residence in New York. 22. The FDCPA defines “communication” at 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” 23. The sending of an electronic file containing information about Plaintiff’s purported debt to a mail house is therefore a communication. 24. Defendant’s communication to the mail house was in connection with the collection of a Debt since it involved disclosure of the Debt to a third-party with the objective being communication with, and motivation of, the consumer to pay the alleged Debt. 25. Plaintiff never consented to having her personal and confidential information, concerning the Debt or otherwise, shared with anyone else. 26. In limiting disclosures to third parties, the FDCPA states, at 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b): “Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.” (emphasis added). 28. Due to Defendant’s communication to this mail house, information about Plaintiff - including her name, the amount allegedly owed, and Plaintiff’s home address - are all within the possession of an unauthorized third-party. 29. If a debt collector “conveys information regarding the debt to a third party - informs the third party that the debt exists or provides information about the details of the debt - then the debtor may well be harmed by the spread of this information.” Brown v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 804 F.3d 740, 743 (6th Cir. 2015). 30. Defendant unlawfully communicates with the unauthorized third-party mail house solely for the purpose of streamlining its generation of profits without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to such third-party. 31. In its reckless pursuit of a business advantage, Defendant disregarded the known, negative effect that disclosing sensitive information to an unauthorized third-party has on consumers. 32. As a result of the Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA, the Plaintiff was harmed. Plaintiff was harmed by being subjected to abusive collection practices, from which she had a substantive right to be free, by having her privacy invaded, and by having her private and protected information shared and disseminated with unauthorized parties. 33. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3): 35. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect debts. 36. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 37. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s practice, of sharing debtor’s personal and protected information with its mail house, violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c and 1692f. 38. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 39. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 42. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 43. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 44. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. 45. Pursuant to Section 15 U.S.C. §1692c of the FDCPA: “Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.” (emphasis added). 46. The Defendant violated said provision by conveying Plaintiff’s information to its mail house in connection with the collection of Plaintiff’s debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692c. 47. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692c et seq. of the FDCPA, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 48. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 49. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 50. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f by using unfair means in connection with the collection a debt, to wit, knowingly disclosing sensitive information about Plaintiff’s debt to third parties not expressly authorized under the FDCPA. 51. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692c et seq.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a Entertainment Venue and Casino that operates EMPIRE CITY CASINO as well as the EMPIRE CITY CASINO website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. 22. Defendant operates EMPIRE CITY CASINO (its “Casino”) in New York, at 810 Yonkers Avenue, Yonkers, NY 10704. 23. Its Casinos constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Casinos provide to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including Casino locations and hours, access to its Player Login online portal, information pertaining to its raceway and casino, including information on the various slot machines and gaming platforms it offers at its physical locations, and related goods and services. 25. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Casinos. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Casinos and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Casinos on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 32. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Casinos are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Casinos. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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(Asserted On Behalf Of Nationwide Class) VIOLATIONS OF MAGNASSON-MOSS ACT – EXPRESS WARRANTY (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312) 21. This action is brought as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of Plaintiff and all other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23(B)(2)-(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 22. The Class (“Class”) that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows: NATIONWIDE CLASS – During the fullest period allowed by law, all persons and entities nationwide that purchased an Oven, to wit: an LG 6.3 cu. ft. Capacity Electric Single Oven Range, further known as LRE3083ST, LRE3083SW, or LRE3083SB 1 Both species of relief, i.e. damage and injunctive, are primary in this case. Damages are necessary if class members are to purchase a conforming oven, and injunctive relief is necessary to rectify class members’ misconduct under Jewish law and advise class members of their peril. 7 23. The Class excludes: (1) LG, any entity in which LG has a controlling interest, and its legal representatives, officers, directors, employees, assigns, and successors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff or immediate family; (3) Class Counsel; and (4) claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress. 24. Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of the following Sub-Class, as more fully set forth below, and, to the extent appropriate, in the alternative to the claims asserted on behalf of the Nationwide Class: OHIO SUB-CLASS – During the fullest period allowed by law, all persons and entities in the State of Ohio that purchased an Oven, to wit: an LG 6.3 cu. ft. Capacity Electric Single Oven Range, further known as LRE3083ST, LRE3083SW, or LRE3083SB The Ohio Sub-Class excludes: (1) LG, any entity in which LG has a controlling interest, and its legal representatives, officers, directors, employees, assigns, and successors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff or immediate family; (3) Class Counsel; and (4) claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress. 25. Representative Plaintiff reserves the right to amend and modify his class definitions, or create additional sub classes, as this case evolves. 26. Numerosity/Impracticability of Joinder: The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. The proposed Class includes, at a minimum, thousands of members. 27. Commonality and Predominance: There are common questions of law and fact present here. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to the following: a. whether LG engaged in a pattern of fraudulent, deceptive and misleading conduct targeting the public through the marketing, advertising, promotion and/or sale of Product as Sabbath compliant; 8 b. whether LG’s acts and omissions violated CSPA; c. whether LG made material misrepresentations of fact or omitted material facts to Plaintiff and the Class in the course of the marketing, promotion, advertising and sale of Ovens, which material misrepresentations or omissions operated as deceit upon Plaintiff and the Class; d. whether, as a result of LG’s misconduct, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to equitable relief under CSPA and, if so, the nature of such relief; and e. whether, as a result of LG’s misconduct, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to damage relief under CSPA and, if so, the nature of such relief; 28. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class he seeks to represent. Plaintiff and all Class members have been or may be injured by the same wrongful practices in which Defendant has engaged. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the Class members, and are based on the same legal theories. 29. Adequacy: Plaintiff is a representative who will fully and adequately assert and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained Class counsel who are experienced and qualified in prosecuting class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests that are contrary to or conflicting with the Class. Plaintiff suffered helplessness in contending with LG prior to being alerted to the availability of class action relief; and he is anxious to see justice done. 30. Injunction: LG has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class and, as such, preliminary and final injunctive relief with regard to the members of the Class as a whole is appropriate. 9 31. R.C. 1345.09(D) as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Ohio specifically permits any consumer to obtain an injunction upon a showing of an ongoing CSPA violation, as is present here. 32. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 33. The Ovens are “consumer products” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 34. Plaintiffs, Class, and Sub-Class members are “consumers” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 35. Defendant is a “supplier” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4). 36. Defendant is a “warrantor” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5). 37. Defendant provided Plaintiffs, Class and Sub-Class members with “written warranties” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6). 38. Section 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) provides that a consumer who is damaged by the failure of the supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this title, or a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief in any court of competent jurisdiction in any state. 39. When Plaintiff and the members of the Class purchased their Ovens, Defendant expressly warranted under its Warranty that it would “repair or replace your product, at LG’s option, if it proves to be defective in material or workmanship.” Exhibit 3. 10 40. Defendant breached these express warranties (and continues to breach these express warranties) because it did not (and does not) repair or replace, or cover the expenses associated with affording class members the benefit of, a “Sabbath Mode.” LG further breached these express warranties because the Sabbath Mode in the Ovens was defective at the time of sale, LG knew that the defect was present and that Plaintiff and class members could not detect its presence, and LG did not disclose the defective or repair the defect prior to each or any sale. 41. In its capacity as a supplier and/or warrantor, and by the conduct described herein, any attempt by Defendant to limit its express warranties in a manner that would exclude or limit coverage for the defective Sabbath Mode that was present as of the time of sale is unconscionable, and any such effort to disclaim or otherwise limit liability or warranty coverage for the defects at issue is null and void. 42. All jurisdictional prerequisites have been satisfied. 43. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the Class members suffered damages caused by Defendant’s breach of the express warranties and are entitled to recover damages, including but not limited to repair, replacement or diminution of value, equitable relief, and attorneys fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310. 44. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 11 45. The Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, O.R.C. § 1345.02, prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in connection with a consumer transaction. For example, the Act prohibits suppliers from representing that goods have characteristics, uses or benefits they do not have; that their products or goods are of a particular standard, quality, or grade they are not; that the products or goods have been supplied in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not; that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval, or affiliation that the supplier does not have; and that the transaction involves a warranty, rights, remedies, or obligations if that representation is false. Defendant’s actions as described throughout this Complaint violate each of these provisions. 46. The Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, O.R.C. § 1345.03, also prohibits unconscionable acts or practices in connection with a consumer transaction, which includes the circumstances at issue here, where Defendant has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of consumers reasonably to protect their interests because of the consumers’ ignorance of the latent Sabbath Mode defect in particular. 47. Defendant is a “supplier” as that term is defined in O.R.C. § 1345.01(C). 48. Plaintiff and all others in the Ohio Sub-Class are “consumers” as that term is defined in O.R.C. § 1345.01(D). 49. Defendant’s conduct alleged above constitutes unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable acts and practices in connection with a consumer transaction in violation of O.R.C. § 1345.02 and § 1345.03. The unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable acts and practices occurred before, during, and after the transactions. 50. Defendant’s conduct as alleged above constitutes an act or practice previously declared by Ohio courts to violate Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act and was committed after 12 the decisions containing these determinations were made available for public inspection under division (A)(3) of O.R.C. § 1345.05. The applicable rule and Ohio court opinions include those cited and referenced in Nessle v. Whirlpool Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56940 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2008) (Held: “[p]laintiff does cite to several Ohio cases . . . Plaintiff's claim for OCSPA violations is able to withstand Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.”). 51. Defendant’s conduct caused damages to Plaintiff and the consumers in the Ohio Sub-Class as alleged. 52. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the consumers in the Ohio Sub-Class are entitled to recover damages and attorneys fees pursuant to O.R.C. § 1345.09. 53. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Ohio Sub-Class are entitled to injunctive relief. See the first sentence of R.C. 1345.09 (“For a violation of Chapter 1345 of the Revised Code, a consumer has a cause of action and is entitled to relief as follows . . .”), coupled with subsections (B) and (D) thereof (“Any consumer may seek a declaratory judgment, an injunction, or other appropriate relief against an act or practice that violates this chapter.”) 54. Plaintiff Brian Thomas Foley re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 55. As an express warrantor and manufacturer, LG had certain obligations under the O.R.C. 1302.26, U.C.C. § 2-313, to conform the Ovens to the express warranties. 56. When Ohio Plaintiff and the members of the Sub-Class purchased their Ovens Defendant expressly warranted under its Warranty that it would “repair or replace your product, at LG’s option, if it proves to be defective in material or workmanship.” 13 57. The defects at issue in this litigation were present at the time of sale to Plaintiff and members of the Ohio Sub-Class. 58. Defendant breached these express warranties (and continues to breach these express warranties) because it did not (and does not) repair or replace, or cover the expenses associated with affording class embers the benefit of, a “Sabbath Mode.” LG further breached these express warranties because the Sabbath Mode in the Ovens was defective at the time of sale, LG knew that the defect was present and that Plaintiff and class members could not detect its presence, and LG did not disclose the defect or repair the defect prior to each or any sale. 59. Pursuant to the express warranties, LG was obligated to pay for or reimburse Plaintiff and the Ohio Sub-Class members for costs incurred or to be incurred in ameliorating the defect at issue. 60. Pursuant to the express warranties, LG also was obligated to repair the defects. 61. LG has failed and refused to conform the Ovens to the express warranties and LG’s conduct, as discussed throughout this Complaint, has voided any attempt on its part to disclaim liability for its actions. 62. Plaintiff and Ohio Sub-Class members have performed each and every duty required of them under the terms of the warranties, except as may have been excused or prevented by the conduct of LG or by operation of law in light of LG’s unconscionable conduct described throughout this Complaint. 63. LG received timely notice of breach from Star-K, which represents Plaintiff and class members as to Sabbath Mode (indeed LG knew or was grossly negligent in not knowing of the defects prior to offering the Ovens for sale) and, notwithstanding such notice, LG has failed and refused to offer an effective remedy. 14 64. In its capacity as a supplier and/or warrantor, and by the conduct described herein, any attempt by Defendant to limit its express warranties in a manner that would exclude or limit coverage for the defective Sabbath Mode that was present as of the time of sale is unconscionable and any such effort to disclaim or otherwise limit liability or warranty coverage for the defects at issue is null and void. 65. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class members suffered damages caused by Defendant’s breach of the express warranties and are entitled to recover damages, including but not limited to repair, replacement or diminution of value, and equitable relief. 66. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 67. LG impliedly represented and warranted that the LG Ovens were free of defects, merchantable, and fit for their intended purpose. LG breached these representations and implied warranties. Ovens were unfit for their intended use and were not of merchantable quality as warranted by LG. 68. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class members suffered damages caused by Defendant’s tortious breach implied warranty and they are therefore entitled to recover damages, including but not limited to repair, replacement or diminution of value, and equitable relief. 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 15 70. Defendant owed Plaintiff and the Ohio Sub-Class a non-delegable duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to properly design, engineer, and manufacture the Sabbath Mode against foreseeable hazards and malfunctions and to design, engineer and manufacture said feature so that it would prevent the Oven from heating up upon cooling while Sabbath Mode was engaged.. 71. Defendant also owes a continuing duty to notify Plaintiff and the Ohio Sub-Class of the problem at issue and to repair the defects or replace the unit. 72. The foreseeable hazards and malfunctions include, but are not limited to, the difficulty and extra expense of replacing the Sabbath Mode or replacing the unit in its entirely if necessary. 73. Plaintiff and the Ohio Sub-Class were not and could not reasonably have been aware of the defects described above and their latent shortcomings. 74. There existed at all relevant times alternative Sabbath Modes which were both technically and economically feasible for LG to employ and institute. 75. Defendant did not design, engineer, or manufacture the Ovens with reasonable care. 76. As to Defendant’s manufacture of the Ovens, the defective Sabbath Mode differed in a material way from Defendant’s obligatory design specifications as promulgated by Star-K, accepted by LG, and represented by LG (to the Star K and the Class) to be satisfied. 77. The Ovens were defective as herein alleged at the time they left Defendant’s factories. 78. Defendant breached its duty owed to Plaintiff and the Ohio Sub-Class to design, manufacture, and engineer the Ovens against such foreseeable hazards and malfunctions. 16 79. As a direct and proximate result of this breach, Plaintiff and the Ohio Sub-Class have suffered damages. 80. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Ohio Sub-class are entitled to recover damages, including but not limited to repair, replacement or diminution of value and equitable relief. AND LG ELECTRONICS ALABAMA, INC 201 JAMES RECORD RD SW BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY IN TORT (Tortious Breach of Warranty) BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY (O.R.C. § 2-313) COUNT 2 (Ohio Sub-Class) VIOLATION OF OHIO CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT (O.R.C. § 1345.01) NEGLIGENT DESIGN/ENGINEERING/MANUFACTURING individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated Plaintiffs v.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers (713) 422-2421 and (516) 590-0554, confirmed to be Defendant’s numbers. 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 8. Beginning in or around April 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -0106 and -5154, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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