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Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq.) on behalf of Autodialer Class Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq. and 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(d)) on behalf of the NDNC Class Statutory Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq.) on behalf of the Autodialer Class. Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq. and 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(d)) on behalf of the NDNC Class Case: 2:18-cv-00377-GCS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 04/24/18 Page: 14 of 18 PAGEID #: 14 - 15 - 27. Plaintiff Blevins is the owner and sole proprietor of Interior Creations, a small business that performs home remodeling and improvement projects. 28. Plaintiff Blevins is the exclusive user of the telephone assigned the number Case: 2:18-cv-00377-GCS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 04/24/18 Page: 7 of 18 PAGEID #: 7 - 8 - ending in 3503 and the account holder of record for that account. For several years, the number has been registered with the NDNC. 29. On April 3, 2018, at 12:14 p.m. EDT, Plaintiff Blevins received two unsolicited text messages on his cellular telephone: 30. Plaintiff Blevins responded to the text message, asking “Who is this and what’s your company name?” Blevins received a response saying “My name is Bryce and I work with Premium!” Case: 2:18-cv-00377-GCS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 04/24/18 Page: 8 of 18 PAGEID #: 8 - 9 - 31. In order to gain more information regarding the source of the text message, Plaintiff Blevins asked, “Got a website? I’ll check it out.” Blevins then received a response from “Bryce” directing him to “www.pmfus.com.” 32. On information and belief, www.pmfus.com is the website owned and operated by PMF. On this website, PMF states: Premium Merchant Funding's mission is to provide a broad array of services and solutions for small businesses. PMF offers merchant cash advances, small business loans, SBA loans, equipment financing, factoring, purchase order financing and commercial mortgages nationwide. We will find you the best option for your business regardless of bad credit, high risk business types or financial issues. PMF also offers credit card processing, personal and business credit repair, payroll services and SEO & Web development. 33. Plaintiff Blevins has never contacted PMF for any purpose, and has no business relationship with it. 34. Plaintiff Blevins received all calls as described above on his cellular telephone assigned a number ending in 3503. 35. Plaintiff Blevins understood the purpose of PMF’s text message was to market Defendant’s services and solicit business from him. 36. Plaintiff Blevins did not consent to being texted by PMF for telemarketing purposes and the text received from Defendant was an intrusion into Plaintiff’s privacy and caused Plaintiff Blevins annoyance and an unnecessary expenditure of his time and efforts. 37. PMF is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person,” as defined by 47 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 44. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the following classes (the “Classes”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 45. Plaintiff proposes the following Class definitions, subject to amendment as appropriate: (1) The Robotexting Class: All persons in the United States and its Territories who, within four years prior to the commencement of this litigation until the class is certified, Case: 2:18-cv-00377-GCS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 04/24/18 Page: 10 of 18 PAGEID #: 10 - 11 - received one or more telemarketing texts on their cellular telephone from or on behalf of Premium Merchant Funding One, LLC, sent via an automated telephone dialing system, for whom Premium Merchant Funding One, LLC for whom cannot demonstrate that it had written, prior express consent for such texts. (2) The NDNC Class: All persons in the United States and its Territories whose telephone numbers were on the National Do Not Call Registry, but who received more than one telephone solicitation telemarketing call or text message from or on behalf of Premium Merchant Financing with a 12-month period, since April 23, 2014. 46. Plaintiff Blevins is a member of, and will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of, these Classes. 47. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest, Defendant’s agents and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned, and any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 48. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Classes, but Plaintiff reasonably believes Class members number, at minimum, in the hundreds in each class. 49. Plaintiff and all members of the Classes have been harmed by the acts of the Defendant, including, but not limited to, the invasion of their privacy, annoyance, waste of time, the use of their cell phone battery, and the intrusion on their cellular telephone that occupied it from receiving legitimate communications. 50. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 51. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. 52. Additionally, the disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. Case: 2:18-cv-00377-GCS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 04/24/18 Page: 11 of 18 PAGEID #: 11 - 12 - 53. Further, all members of the Class can be identified through records maintained by Defendant and/or its telemarketing agents and/or telephone carriers. 54. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. 55. The questions of law and fact, referred to above, involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. 56. Such common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system in sending text messages to Class members’ telephones to promote PMF’s goods or services. b. Whether agents operating on behalf of Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system in sending text messages to Class members’ cell phones; c. Whether the Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express written consent (i.e., written consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated), to send such texts; d. Whether Defendant or its agent sent more than one text to any customer in a twelve month period; e. Whether Defendant or its agent maintained necessary procedures for compliance with the National Do Not Call Registry; f. Whether the Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; g. Whether the Defendant is liable for statutory damages; and h. Whether the Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct Case: 2:18-cv-00377-GCS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 04/24/18 Page: 12 of 18 PAGEID #: 12 - 13 - in the future. 57. As a person who received non-emergency telephone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system without his prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member who also received such phone calls. 58. As a person whose telephone number was placed on the National Do Not Call List and who received more than one text message in a twelve month period, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of the NDNC Class. 59. Further, Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 60. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the other members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. 61. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive and would have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 62. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Case: 2:18-cv-00377-GCS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 04/24/18 Page: 13 of 18 PAGEID #: 13 - 14 - 63. PMF violated the TCPA by sending, or causing to be sent via an agent, text messages to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and members of the Autodialer Class using an automated dialer without their prior express written consent. 64. As a result of the Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 65. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants’ violation of the TCPA in the future. 66. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 67. PMF violated the TCPA by sending, or causing to be sent via an agent, text messages to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and members of the Autodialer Class using an automated dialer without their prior express written consent. 68. As a result of the Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 69. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. 70. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 71. PMF violated the TCPA and the Regulations by making, or having its agent make, two or more telemarketing text messages within a 12-month period on PMF’s behalf to Plaintiff and the members of the NDNC Class while those persons’ phone numbers were registered on the National Do Not Call Registry. 72. As a result of the Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 73. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. 74. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 75. PMF knowingly and/or willingly violated the TCPA and the Regulations by making, or having its agent make, two or more telemarketing text messages within a 12-month period on PMF’s behalf to Plaintiff and the members of the NDNC Class while those persons’ phone numbers were registered on the National Do Not Call Registry. 76. As a result of the Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Case: 2:18-cv-00377-GCS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 04/24/18 Page: 15 of 18 PAGEID #: 15 - 16 - 77. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. Plaintiff Blevins

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17. Defendants operate an electrical construction and maintenance business, whose customers are primarily or exclusively local electric power utilities. 18. Defendants provide construction and maintenance services on a power utility’s distribution systems. 19. During the past three years, at any given time, LVU and JGC employed approximately thirty (30) Field Construction Workers in Pennsylvania, including Plaintiffs and the Classes. Factoring in turnover, LVU and JGC employed well in excess of forty (40) Construction Workers in Pennsylvania over the last three years. 20. As employees of LVU and JGC, Plaintiffs and the Classes performed various type of electrical construction and maintenance work on electrical distribution power systems for local power utilities. 21. From approximately April 2017 through approximately late December 2017, Plaintiff Steele typically worked a range of approximately 40-50 hours per week for JGC, averaging approximately 45 hours per week. 23. Plaintiff Steele was illegally classified as an independent contractor and paid on a day-rate basis. Plaintiff Steele never received an overtime premium for hours worked over forty in a workweek. 24. Since approximately early 2016, Plaintiff Ramos was employed by LVU and JGC. Plaintiff Ramos typically worked a range of approximately 45-60 hours per week for LVU and JGC, averaging approximately 53 hours per week. 25. Plaintiff Ramos’ work for Defendants included constructing, maintaining, and installing electrical equipment on a power utility’s distribution systems. 26. From approximately early 2016 through approximately November 2018, Plaintiff Ramos was illegally classified by LVU and JGC as an independent contractor and paid on a day- rate basis. Plaintiff Ramos never received an overtime premium for hours worked over forty in a workweek. 27. Since approximately December 2018, Plaintiff Ramos has been classified as an employee of LVU. As a classified employee, Plaintiff Ramos is paid on an hourly basis, but still does not receive any overtime premium for the hours he works over forty in a workweek. 28. The Classes were similarly classified as either independent contractors or exempt employees, and in any case were not provided any overtime premium for hours worked over forty in a workweek. Employer Status 30. Defendants supervised the work of Plaintiffs and the Classes and had the ability to control and did control the manner in which that work was performed. 31. Plaintiffs and the Classes enjoyed no opportunity for profit or loss based on managerial skill. Rather, they were paid purely on an hourly or day-rate basis and exercised no managerial duties or skill. 32. Plaintiffs and the Classes provided no significant investment in equipment or materials required for their work. Plaintiffs and the Classes did not employ helpers or any other employee. 33. The work of Plaintiffs and the Classes did not require special skill. Rather, their work was routine electrical construction work. 34. The working relationship between Defendants and Plaintiffs/Classes was in a nature of a permanent relationship. Day to day and week to week, Plaintiffs and the Classes were regularly employed by Defendants as Field Construction Workers. 36. At all relevant times, Andrew was a principal of, and owned an interest in, JGC and LVU. 37. Andrew directed the work of Plaintiffs and the Classes at both JGC and LVU. 38. Andrew had the power to, and did, hire, fire and discipline Field Construction Workers at both JGC and LVU. 39. As described herein, Andrew exercised supervisory authority over Plaintiffs and the Classes. Furthermore, Andrew also exercised discretionary control over payroll decisions with respect to Plaintiffs and the Classes. Thus, Andrew also was an employer within the meaning of the FLSA and the PMWA. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012); Schneider v. IT Factor Prods., No. CIV.A. 13-5970, 2013 WL 6476555 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2013). Individual Liability – Christina Miklos 40. At all relevant times, Christina was a principal of, and owned an interest in, JGC and LVU. 41. Christina directed the work of Plaintiffs and the Classes at both JGC and LVU. 42. Together with Andrew, Christina had the power to, and upon information and belief, did, hire, fire and discipline Field Construction Workers at both JGC and LVU. 43. Christina controlled payroll decisions of JGC and LVU, including the decision not to pay Plaintiffs and the Classes overtime compensation. 45. As described herein, Christina exercised supervisory authority over Plaintiffs and the Classes. Furthermore, Christina also exercised discretionary control over payroll decisions with respect to Plaintiffs and the Classes. Thus, Andrew also was an employer within the meaning of the FLSA and the PMWA. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012); Schneider v. IT Factor Prods., No. CIV.A. 13-5970, 2013 WL 6476555 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2013). Single Employer/Joint Employers 46. At any given point in time within the last three years, one or more of JGC and LVU (“Corporate Employers”) directly employed Plaintiffs and the Classes. 47. To the extent there was overlap in the operation of Corporate Employers, they were together functionally integrated in that they utilized the same or similar construction equipment, tools, and labor relations personnel. Corporate Employers each implemented and carried out the same labor relations policies including the salary basis compensation of Plaintiff. Corporate Employers each exhibited common ownership and control, including through Andrew and Christina. Thus, Corporate Employers constitute a single employer. N.L.R.B. v. Browning- Ferris Indus. of Pennsylvania, Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982). 48. Alternatively, even if Corporate Employers are not functionally integrated such that they constituted “one integrated enterprise,” id, Corporate Employers jointly employed Plaintiffs and the Classes because Corporate Employers through Andrew and Christina or other agents, shared or co-determined control over Plaintiffs and the Classes with respect to the terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 1124; 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b). Successor Employer/Alter-Ego/Shareholder Distributions 50. LVU has operated the electrical construction business owned, controlled and managed by Andrew and Christina from approximately 2019 through present, and has continued to provide the same related electrical construction services as had JGC. 51. LVU continued JGC’s management structure, through at least Andrew and Christina. 52. LVU generally continued to employ the same or similar employees as had JGC. 53. LVU generally continued to operate out of the same physical location(s) as JGC. 54. LVU generally continued to serve the same or similar customers as JGC, including PPL, an electric utility. 55. LVU generally possessed the same or similar assets as JGC. 56. LVU had actual or constructive knowledge of the potential wage and hour liabilities of JGC, through at least the continuity described above and the circumstances described in this Complaint. 57. JGC does not itself have the ability to pay the judgment requested in this action. 58. LVU is liable as a successor employer for JGC’s wage and hour liability under federal and state law. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network, 748 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2014). 59. Alternatively, LVU and JGC are mere alter-egos of each other. 60. In or about 2018, was dissolved by the New Jersey Secretary of State. 62. In or about 2017, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry (“DLI”) investigated Defendants concerning their classification of their field construction employees as independent contractors under various state labor laws. 63. As opposed to true independent contractors, only employees enjoy the protections of numerous federal and state labor laws which regulate an employee’s wages. Unless otherwise exempt, pursuant to the FLSA and PMWA, employees enjoy the right to receive overtime pay when they work more than forty hours in a workweek. 64. It is well established that construction workers such as Defendants’ Field Construction Workers, are not exempt employees. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.3. The Pennsylvania Construction Workplace Misclassification Act, 43 P.S. §§ 933.1 -- 933.17 (“Act 72”) further clarifies the employment relationship under state law. 65. In or about 2017, DLI found that field construction workers performing services for JGC were employees as a matter of law under and thus that JGC had misclassified their construction employees as independent contractors. 66. As a result of its investigation, DLI assessed fines against JGC. 67. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff Steele complained on the job to Andrew that he was not receiving overtime pay, even though he was working more than 40 hours a week. Others also made similar complaints to Andrew. 69. To date, Defendants have willfully refused not only to pay the assessed fines, but have also willfully refused to reclassify their field construction workers as non-exempt employees or to pay them overtime wages when they work over forty hours in a workweek. 70. Defendants do not maintain accurate records of the actual hours that Plaintiffs and FLSA Class Members worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek as required by the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2, 516.5(a), 516.6(a)(1). 71. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and FLSA Class Members were not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. 72. Defendants are sophisticated businesses with access to knowledgeable human resource specialists and competent labor and employment counsel. 73. Defendants have acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions by failing to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class overtime pay when worked. 74. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the FLSA Class defined above. 75. Plaintiffs desire to pursue their FLSA claims individually and on behalf of any individuals who opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 77. The similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and may be located through Defendants’ business and human resource records. 78. Defendants employ many FLSA Class Members. These similarly situated employees may be readily notified of this action through direct U.S. mail and/or other appropriate means, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages (or, alternatively, interest), and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 79. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the Pennsylvania Class defined above. 80. The members of the Pennsylvania Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are in excess of thirty (30) members of the Pennsylvania Class. 81. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Pennsylvania Class because there is no conflict between the claims of Plaintiffs and those of the Pennsylvania Class, and Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Pennsylvania Class. Plaintiffs’ counsel are competent and experienced in litigating wage and hour and other complex labor matters, including class and collective actions like this one. 83. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Pennsylvania Class in the following ways, without limitation: (a) Plaintiffs are members of the Pennsylvania Class; (b) Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same policies, practices and course of conduct that form the basis of the claims of the Pennsylvania Class; (c) Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the same legal and remedial theories as those of the Pennsylvania Class and involve similar factual circumstances; (d) there are no conflicts between the interests of Plaintiff Steele and the Pennsylvania Class Members; and (e) the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are similar to the injuries suffered by the Pennsylvania Class members. 84. Class certification is appropriate under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the Pennsylvania Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. 85. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein because it will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The Pennsylvania Class is readily identifiable from Defendants’ own employment records. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Pennsylvania Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Pennsylvania Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 87. Without a class action, Defendants will retain the benefit of their wrongdoing, which will result in further damages to Plaintiffs and the Pennsylvania Class. Plaintiffs envision no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 88. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 89. The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated for all hours worked at a rate of not less than $7.25 per hour. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1). 90. LVU is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because LVU is an “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 91. During all relevant times, LVU is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 92. JGC is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because JGC is an “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 93. At all relevant times, JGC is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 95. At all relevant times, Andrew is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 96. Christina is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because Christina is an “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), as he exercised supervisory control over Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class and accordingly acted in the interest of LVU and JGC. Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012). 97. At all relevant times, Christina is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 98. During all relevant times, Plaintiff Steele and the FLSA Class were covered employees of Defendants, and as such were entitled to the above-described FLSA’s protections. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). Employment by LVU and JGC Violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (On Behalf of the Pennsylvania Class) 105. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 106. The Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968 (“PMWA”) requires that covered employees be compensated for all hours worked. See 43 P.S. § 333.104(a) and 34 PA. CODE § 231.21(b). 107. The PMWA also requires that covered employees be compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at Overtime Rate. See 43 P.S. § 333.104(c) and Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (On Behalf of the FLSA Class)

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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4111.03) 18. Defendants are home health care businesses. 19. Plaintiff La’Shauna Purse has been employed by Defendants since March 2017. 20. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a home health aide. 21. Other similarly-situated employees were employed by Defendants as home health aides. 22. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were employed by Defendants as non-exempt employees under the FLSA. 23. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were paid an hourly wage. 5 (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) 24. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides worked more than 40 hours per week, but Defendants failed to pay them overtime compensation for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. 25. Rather than paying overtime compensation, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were only paid straight time for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. (Failure to Keep Accurate Records) 26. Defendants failed to make, keep and preserve accurate records of the unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides. (Defendants Willfully Violated the FLSA) 27. Defendants knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. 28. Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 29. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All current and former home health aides employed by Amara Home Care at any time between April 18, 2015 and the present. 30. The amount of overtime hours Plaintiff and other similarly situated home health aides worked are reflected on their time sheets and pay stubs. 6 31. Plaintiff estimates, that on average she worked between fifteen (15) and twenty (20) overtime hours per week. 32. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, by upon information and belief, avers that is consists of at least 50 persons. 33. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. 34. These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 35. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as: All current and former home health aides employed by Amara Home Care at any time between April 18, 2015 and the present. 36. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least 50 persons. 7 37. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendants failed to pay overtime compensation to their home health aides for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; and (b) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff La’Shauna Purse and other members of the class for Defendants’ violation of R.C. 4111.03 and 4111.10. 38. The claims of the named Plaintiff La’Shauna Purse are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Named Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendants, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other Ohio Class members. 39. Named Plaintiff La’Shauna Purse will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Her interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 40. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendants’ liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 41. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are 8 sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 42. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 43. Defendants’ practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the FLSA, 29 46. Plaintiff in corporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 47. Defendants’ practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the OMFWSA,

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37. As set forth below, the proposed Class satisfies the requirements for a class action. 39. Plaintiff is a member of the Class he seeks to represent, as detailed in the factual background and the claims for relief section of this complaint. The averments of fact and questions of law are common to the Class. 40. The Class is believed to include well over thirty thousand members. The Class is so numerous and spread out across the State of Texas that joinder of all members is impracticable. 41. A Texas statute governs this action. Also, the standardized lease agreements used by GREYSTAR and SVFC in carrying out their management and lessor duties, which leases are forms promulgated by the Texas Apartment Association, are governed by Texas common law and the Texas Property Code. 43. GREYSTAR and SVFC engaged in a common course of conduct giving rise to the legal rights sought to be enforced by Class members. The same claims are involved. Individual questions, if any, pale by comparison to the numerous common questions that predominate. 45. Class members have been damaged by Defendants' misconduct. Class members have been charged and have paid excessive amounts, allowing Defendants to impermissibly profit by adding extra fees or other surcharges for water and wastewater. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other Class members. Plaintiff was charged impermissible Utility Connection Fees. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff is familiar with the basic facts underlying the Class members’ claims. 48. Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the other Class members they seek to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation and intends to prosecute this action vigorously. 49. Plaintiff’s counsel have successfully prosecuted complex class actions, including two similar class action cases involving similar apartment tenant utility billing issues as in this case. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class members. 50. The class action device is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of Plaintiff and the Class members. The relief sought per individual Class member is small given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the potentially extensive litigation necessitated by Defendants' conduct. Furthermore, it would be virtually impossible for Class members to seek redress on an individual basis. Even if Class members themselves could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. 52. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the Class as a whole. 53. For the reasons stated herein, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.

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24. Named Plaintiffs and Class Members were employed by Defendants at call centers in New York and elsewhere in the United States. 25. Throughout their tenures, named Plaintiffs and Class Members worked hours for which they were not paid, including hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a week. 27. Named Plaintiffs and Class Members also performed work after their scheduled shift and after they were logged out of Defendants' phone system or "queue." 28. Named Plaintiffs and Class Members were not compensated by Defendants for all the hours they were suffered or permitted to work because Defendants only paid employees for the time they were logged into Defendants' phone system. 29. Defendants knew Named Plaintiffs and Class Members were not being paid based on the actual hours they were suffered or permitted to work because they tracked the arrival and departure of Named Plaintiffs and Class Members' using identification swipe cards. 30. The net effect of Defendants' pay policy and practice was to willfully deprive Named Plaintiffs and the Class Members of their regular rate of pay for all hours worked. as well as overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40). 31. in addition, Defendants paid Named Plaintiffs and Class Members non- discretionary bonusesicommissions. Defendants failed to account for these bonusicommissions in calculating Named Plaintitls and Class Members' overtime pay. 32. Further, Defendants failed to pay agreed-upon commissions to Named Plaintitls and Class Members according to tenns of their commission plan, in violation of the New York Labor Law. 33. Defendants' policy is not to ensure that it pays regular pay. overtime pay and accrued commissions to its employees according to state and federal law. 35. Defendants' policy of not properly paying its employees is long-standing and. upon information and belief, has been in effect for at least six (6) years. 36. Defendants' deprivation of proper regular pay, overtime pay and accrued commissions as required by the FLSA and New York Labor Law is willfuL 37. In addition, Defendants do not maintain accurate time records with respect to Named Plaintiffs and Class Members, as required by the FLSA and New York Labor Law. 38. Named Plaintiffs and Class Members reallege the above paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 39. Defendants willfully violated their obligations under the FLSA and are liable to Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. 40. Named Plaintiffs and Class Members reallege the above paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 41. Defendants willfully violated their obligations under the New York Labor Law and are liable to Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated.

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12. On Whitepages alone, just on one spoofed phone number that Zip Capital Group uses 954-204-0916, there are over 500 spam reports. 13. On October 16, 2018 at 10:13 AM, Plaintiff received a phone call to his cell phone number from Defendant using phone number 480-653-8635. Phone number 480-653- 8635 is a spoofed phone number that Defendant uses to place telemarketing calls, and when called back it is not in service. 14. On October 17, 2018 at 10:04 AM, Plaintiff received another phone call to his cell phone number from Defendant, this time using phone number 480-343-2033. Phone number 480-343-2033 appears to be another spoofed phone number that Defendant uses to place telemarketing calls. When 480-343-2033 is dialed, it doesn’t ring at all. An automated messages states, “The wireless customer you are calling is not available.” 15. On October 18, 2018 at 10:57 AM, Plaintiff received a prerecorded call to his cell phone number from Defendant, again using phone number 480-653-8635. When Plaintiff answered the call, he heard a recorded voice message. 16. On October 19, 2018 at 3:52 PM, Plaintiff received a second prerecorded call to his cell phone number from Defendant, this time using phone number 480-462-5153. When Plaintiff answered the call, he heard the same prerecorded voice message he had heard the previous day. When he finally got through to a live agent, Plaintiff confirmed that the telemarketer is Zip Capital Group and was given the callback phone number 949-396-1159. 18. Plaintiff has never had a relationship with Zip Capital Group and has never consented to any contact from Defendant. Simply put, Zip Capital Group did not obtain Plaintiff’s prior express written consent to place prerecorded solicitation telephone calls to him on his cell phone number. 19. The unauthorized telephone calls made by Zip Capital Group, as alleged herein, have harmed Plaintiff in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy, and disturbed Kempton’s use and enjoyment of his phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phones’ hardware (including the phones’ battery) and the consumption of memory on the phone. 20. Seeking redress for these injuries, Kempton, on behalf of himself and Class of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits prerecorded telephone calls to cellular telephones. 22. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 23. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Class such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 25. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest adverse to the Class. 26. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant’s business practices apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiffs. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Prerecorded No Consent Class) 27. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 26 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 29. These prerecorded voice calls were made en masse without the prior express written consent of Plaintiff and the other members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class. 30. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class are each entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages, and up to $1,500 in damages, for each violation. 9. As explained by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) in its 2012 order, the TCPA requires “prior express written consent for all autodialed or prerecorded [solicitation] calls to wireless numbers and residential lines.” In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG No. 02-278, FCC 12-21, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2012). Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Arising From Prerecorded Voice Solicitation Calls Made by Zip Capital Group Zip Capital Group Markets its Services by Placing Prerecorded Calls to Consumers’ Cellular Phone Numbers Without Consent Zip Capital Group Repeatedly Called Plaintiff’s Cell Phone Number Without Plaintiff’s Consent

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10. When the Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT began working with the Defendants she was told that she would be paid $10.00 per hour for all work and Plaintiff agreed to be hired at that rate. 12. The Defendant LISA HERRGUTH were at all times material hereto, an owner, officer, manager, and/or employee of the Defendant AIDING HEARTS. 13. The Defendant LISA HERRGUTH exercises significant control over the operations of the Defendant AIDING HEARTS. She had and has supervisory duties, participates in and/or sets employee policies, and, at all times, acted in the interest of the Defendant AIDING HEARTS in relation to the Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons. 14. Each of the Defendants were individually, jointly, and/or alternatively an employer of the Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons. 15. Defendants operated as a single enterprise or alternatively, some combination of these Defendants operated as a single enterprise. 16. At all times, federal and Michigan laws required that the Defendants compensate the Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at wage rates in amounts that met or exceeded the minimum wage rate. 17. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the federal minimum wage rate is $7.25 per hour. 19. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons, for all hours worked and regularly paid her less than the amount of wages she earned. 20. During and after her employment with the Defendants, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT requested that she be paid for all hours worked. 21. Despite her requests, the Defendants refused to compensate Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT for all hours worked. 22. Throughout the time of her employment, the Defendants failed to maintain proper records of their employees’ work time and had a policy or practice, which applied to all employees, of not investigating disputed hours and not paying employees’ for those hours. 23. As a result of not paying employees’ for all hours worked, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the federal or state minimum wage rates. 24. During her employment, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons were required to travel to several different patient homes located throughout central Michigan within a single day. 26. Throughout the time that she worked for the Defendants, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons were required to use their own vehicles to drive clients to and from client appointments, meetings, errands, etc. 27. During her employment with the Defendants, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT requested that she be reimbursed for gas and mileage for travel to and from work assignments. 28. Despite her requests, the Defendants refused to reimburse Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT for gas or mileage to and from her work assignments. 29. Throughout the time of her employment, the Defendants maintained a policy, which applied to all employees, of not paying employees’ gas or mileage for travel to, from, and between work assignments. 30. As a result of Defendants’ policy, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons incurred the costs of gas and mileage, which are a necessary business expense of Defendants operations. 31. As a result of not reimbursing employees’ for gas and mileage, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the federal or state minimum wage rates. 33. Defendants never reimbursed Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT or similarly situated persons for the cost of the supplies. 34. As a result of Defendants’ policy, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons incurred the cost of supplies, which are a necessary business expense of Defendants operations. 35. As a result of not reimbursing employees’ for necessary supplies, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the federal or state minimum wage rates. 36. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act, Defendants are required to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons compensation not less than one and one- half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours during a single workweek. 37. Throughout the time that she worked for the Defendants, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons would be required to work more than forty (40) hours in a workweek and were not paid at the required overtime rates. 39. When travel time is included within her workweek, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons, regularly worked more than 40 hours during a workweek. 40. Despite her requests, the Defendants refused to pay the Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT for travel time and as a result, failed to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated persons compensation not less than one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours during a single workweek. 41. In violation of the federal and Michigan law, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated individuals, for all hours worked and at proper wage rates for overtime hours worked. 54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 52 as fully stated herein. 55. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons were Defendants’ employees within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C §201 et. seq. 57. In violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C §201 et. seq., Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the federal minimum wage rate. 58. Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of failing and/or refusing to compensate Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at federal minimum wage rates 59. Defendants knowingly, intentionally, and willfully failed to pay REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the federal minimum wage rate. 60. As a result of Defendants conduct Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons are entitled to an award of damages including but limited to compensatory damages, liquidated damages, punitive damages, costs, attorneys fees, prejudgment interest and other damages as followed by law and equity. 61. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 59 above as though fully stated herein. 63. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were the employer of the Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. 64. In violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq., Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the federal overtime rate of one and one-half times their normal rate of pay when working more than forty (40) hours during a week. 65. Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of failing and/or refusing to compensate Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the federal overtime rate of one and one-half times their normal rate of pay when working more than forty (40) hours during a week. 66. Defendants knowingly, intentionally, and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the federal overtime rate of one and one-half times their normal rate of pay when working more than forty (40) hours during a week. 68. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 66 above as fully stated herein. 69. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and similarly situated persons were Defendants’ employees within the meaning of the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.411 et seq. 70. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were the employer of the Plaintiff and similarly situated persons within the meaning of the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.411 et seq. 71. In violation of the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.411 et seq., Defendants failed to pay plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the Michigan minimum wage rate for all hours worked. 72. Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of failing and/or refusing to compensate Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at Michigan minimum wage rates. 74. As a result of Defendants’ conduct Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons are entitled to an award of damages including but limited to compensatory damages, liquidated damages, punitive damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, prejudgment interest and other damages as followed by law and equity. 75. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 73 above as though fully stated herein. 76. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons were Defendants’ employees within the meaning of the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.411 et seq. 77. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were the employer of the Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons within the meaning of the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.411 et seq. 79. Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of failing and/or refusing to compensate Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the state’s overtime rate of one and one-half times their normal rate of pay when working more than forty (40) hours during a week. 8. The Defendant AIDING HEARTS is, and was engaged in the business of providing in-home care to clients. 80. Defendants knowingly, intentionally, and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons at the Michigan overtime rate of one and one-half times their normal rate of pay when working more than forty (40) hours during a week. 81. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT and similarly situated persons are entitled to an award of damages including but not limited to compensatory damages, liquidated damages, punitive damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, prejudgment interest and other damages as allowed by law and equity. 9. In the spring and summer of 2018, Plaintiff REBECCA WOLCOTT was employed by the Defendants as a home health aide. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Overtime) FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Minimum Wage) WORKFORCE OPPORTUNITY WAGE ACT (Minimum Wage) WORKFORCE OPPORTUNITY WAGE ACT (Overtime)

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23. A cryptocurrency is a digital asset designed to work as a medium of exchange or a store of value or both. Cryptocurrencies leverage a variety of cryptographic principles to secure transactions, control the creation of additional units, and verify the transfer of the underlying digital assets. 24. Bitcoin was the world’s first decentralized cryptocurrency. It is also the largest and most popular cryptocurrency, with a market capitalization of approximately $126 billion. Bitcoin spawned a market of other cryptocurrencies that, together with Bitcoin, have a current market capitalization of approximately $192 billion. (The term “bitcoin” can refer to both a computer protocol and a unit of exchange. Accepted practice is to use the term “Bitcoin” to label the protocol and software, and the term “bitcoin” to label the units of exchange.) 26. Blockchains act as the central technical commonality across most cryptocurrencies. While each blockchain may be subject to different technical rules and permissions based on the preferences of its creators, they are typically designed to achieve the similar goal of decentralization. 27. Accordingly, blockchains are generally designed as a framework of incentives that encourages some people to do the work of validating transactions while allowing others to take advantage of the network. In order to ensure successful validation, those completing the validation are also required to solve a “Proof of Work” problem by expending computational resources which has the effect of making the blockchain more accurate and secure. For Bitcoin, those who validate the blockchain transactions and solve the “Proof of Work” program are rewarded with newly minted bitcoin. This process is colloquially referred to as “mining.” 28. Mining is one method by which an individual can acquire cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. A second and more common manner is to obtain cryptocurrencies from someone else. This is often accomplished by acquiring it through an online “cryptocurrency exchange.” 29. Online cryptocurrency exchanges are one place to purchase Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. These exchanges are similar to traditional exchanges in that they provide a convenient marketplace to match buyers and sellers of virtual currencies. 30. In April 2013, there were only seven cryptocurrencies listed on coinmartketcap.com, a popular website that tracks the cryptocurrency markets. As of this filing, the site monitors more than 2,000 cryptocurrencies. 32. Ethereum is the second-most popular cryptocurrency, with a market capitalization of approximately $16 billion. The Ethereum blockchain functions similarly to the Bitcoin blockchain insofar as its miners act as the validators of the network. Miners of the Ethereum blockchain are paid for their services in the form of newly minted ether. (The term “Ethereum” refers to the open software platform built on top of the Ethereum blockchain, while the term “ether” is the unit of account used to exchange value within the Ethereum “ecosystem,” i.e., the overall network of individuals using Ethereum or participating in the development of its network.) 33. Unlike Bitcoin’s blockchain, Ethereum was designed to enable “smart contract” functionality. A smart contract is a program that verifies and enforces the negotiation or performance of a contract. Smart contracts can be self-executing and self-enforcing, which theoretically reduces the transaction costs associated with traditional contracting. 34. As an example of how a smart contract works, consider a situation where two people want to execute a hedging contract. They each put up $1,000 worth of ether. They agree that, after a month, one of them will receive back $1,000 worth of ether at the dollar exchange rate at that time, while the other receives the rest of the ether. The rest of the ether may or may not be worth more than it was at the beginning of the month. 36. In order to enable widespread adoption and standardized protocols for smart contracts, the Ethereum community has created certain out-of-the box smart contracts called Ethereum Request for Comments (“ERCs”). 37. An ERC is an application standard for a smart contract. Anyone can create an ERC and then seek support for that standard. Once an ERC is accepted by the Ethereum community, it benefits Ethereum users because it provides for uniform transactions, reduced risk, and efficient processes. The most widespread use of ERCs is to allow individuals to easily launch and create new digital tokens. C. ERC-20 Tokens 38. ERC-20 is an application standard that the creator of Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin, first proposed in 2015. ERC-20 is a standard that allows for the creation of smart-contract tokens on the Ethereum blockchain, known as “ERC-20 tokens.” 39. ERC-20 tokens are built on the Ethereum blockchain, and therefore they must be exchanged on it. Accordingly, ERC-20 tokens are functionally different than cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum because they do not operate on an independent blockchain. 40. ERC-20 tokens all function similarly by design—that is, they are compliant with the ERC-20 application standard. Some properties related to ERC-20 tokens are customizable, such as the total supply of tokens, the token’s ticker symbol, and the token’s name. All ERC-20 tokens transactions, however, occur over the Ethereum blockchain; none of them operates over its own blockchain. 42. Between 2014 and 2016, Bitcoin’s price fluctuated between $200 and $800. During this same time frame, ether’s price fluctuated between roughly $1 and $10. 43. By the end of 2016, interest in cryptocurrencies began to accelerate, with prices growing at a rate historically unprecedented for any asset class. Over the course of 2017 alone, bitcoin’s price increased from approximately $1,000 to approximately $20,000. Ethereum’s growth was even more startling. On January 1, 2017, Ethereum was trading at approximately $8 per ether. Approximately one year later, it was trading at over $1,400 per ether—a return of approximately 17,000 percent over that period. 44. Seeking to capitalize on the growing enthusiasm for cryptocurrencies, many entrepreneurs sought to raise funds through initial coin offerings, or ICOs, including ICOs for newly created ERC-20 tokens, such as the QSP tokens. Many of these issuers improperly chose not to register their securities offerings with the SEC in order to save money and not “open their books” to the SEC, even though investors thereby were denied access to critical information they would have received from an SEC-registered offering. As a result investors, including investors in QSP, were denied access to important information before making their investment decision. 46. Over 2017 and 2018, nearly $20 billion was raised through ICOs, none of which was registered with the SEC. Of the approximately 800 ICOs launched between 2017 and 2018, the vast majority were issued using the ERC-20 protocol. 47. Like most ICOs, ERC-20 ICOs were typically announced and promoted through public online channels. Issuers, including Quantstamp, typically released a “whitepaper” describing the project and terms of the ICO. These whitepapers advertised the sale of tokens or coins through the ICO. They typically advertised the creation of a “new blockchain architecture.” 48. The whitepapers typically contained vastly less information than a registration statement filed with the SEC would have included. For example, whitepapers often did not include a “plain English” description of the offering; a required list of key risk factors; a description of important information and incentives concerning management; an explanation of how the proceeds from the offering would be used; and a standardized format that investors could readily follow. 49. When tokens were sold through an ERC-20 ICO, the issuer usually asserted that such tokens entitled their holders to certain rights related to a venture underlying the ICO, such as the right to use certain services provided by the issuer. In almost all cases, these tokens could also be traded, thereby giving investors a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others (that is, the people operating the issuer whose efforts will impact the value of those tokens on the secondary market). 51. Prior to its November 2017 ICO, Quantstamp published a whitepaper. Casting the Quantstamp protocol as a solution to the “smart contract security problem,” the whitepaper described the Quantstamp protocol as “the first smart contract security-auditing protocol.” The whitepaper asserted that Quantstamp would create a “scalable cost-effective system to audit all smart contracts on the Ethereum network” and that over time they expected “every Ethereum smart contract to use the Quantstamp protocol to perform a security audit because security is essential.” The whitepaper touted its team of software testing experts who “collectively have over 500 Google Scholar citations.” 52. QSP was launched through use of the ERC-20 protocol. At launch, 1 billion tokens were created through use of the ERC-20 protocol. 53. Quantstamp retained approximately 35 percent of those tokens. Quantstamp sold the remaining 65 percent of the tokens during QSP’s ICO, which Quantstamp organized and ran. Over its three day ICO, from November 17 to November 19, 2017, Quantstamp raised approximately $31 million in proceeds. 58. Misleadingly, Quantstamp also promoted itself as being similar to Ethereum and Bitcoin, which are not securities nor required to be registered with the SEC. Quantstamp’s stated “goal is to create a permissionless and decentralized network much like Ethereum and Bitcoin.” And Quantstamp’s co-founder Steven Stewart has expressly compared QSP tokens to those cryptocurrencies: “Ether is used for fueling token transfers and other state changes. We are committed to exclusively using QSP to fuel our protocol.” Indeed, in the QSP whitepaper, Quantstamp represented to investors that “we are extending Ethereum with technology designed to ensure the security of smart contracts.” Indeed, the whitepaper claimed Quantstamp protocol would one day “become part of the Ethereum protocol” itself. 59. At the time of the QSP ICO, Quantstamp took advantage of the market’s lack of understanding and awareness concerning how cryptocurrencies worked. In the face of promises that the Quantstamp protocol would one day “become part of the Ethereum protocol” able to “audit all smart contract projects on Ethereum,” and considering the new technology at issue and Quantstamp’s other statements, many individuals were understandably unaware that QSP tokens had fundamentally different features than other cryptocurrencies, which the SEC has determined are not securities. Moreover, the Quantstamp whitepaper was ambiguous about how it would use the proceeds of the QSP ICO, stating only that “all proceeds received by Quantstamp may be spent freely by Quantstamp absent any conditions, save as set out herein.” 61. In its whitepaper, Quantstamp also sought to emphasize the utility rather than security token characteristics of QSP tokens. Quantstamp stated that “Quantstamp tokens are sold as a functional good” and that “[a]s of the date of publication of this paper, the Tokens have no known potential uses outside of the Quantstamp ecosystem and are not permitted to be sold or otherwise traded on third-party exchanges.” Of course, Quantstamp did list QSP tokens on third party exchanges within days after its ICO, and then repeated its’ instruction that QSP tokens were “not permitted to be sold or otherwise traded on third-party exchanges” in its retrospective legal disclaimer, at which point those statements were almost surely false. 62. Prior to April 3, 2019, when the SEC released its Framework, it was therefore unclear to a reasonable investor that QSP was a security. For example, in March 2018, investors sought clarification from Quantstamp on reddit to “help us investors to get this more clear” regarding how the SEC might impact QSP tokens. Quantstamp responded evasively, saying that “Quantstamp has retained top legal counsel from the beginning and conservatively followed and will continue to follow the regulatory guidance at every step” without further elaboration. 64. Other thought leaders in the space, such as the lawfully registered broker-dealer Coinbase, opined in late 2016 that “we have considered the question of whether issuance of a Blockchain Token prior to the existence of a system would constitute a security. We have not found conclusive law on the subject, but believe that the better view is that a non-security Blockchain Token does not become a security merely because the system as to which it has rights has not yet been created or completed.” 65. In sum, before the SEC issued its Framework on April 3, 2019, a reasonable investor would not have concluded that ERC-20 tokens like the QSP token were generally securities subject to the securities laws. On the contrary, they were confronted with representations both from token issuers and from cryptocurrency discussions that led them reasonably to believe they were not investing in securities. G. The QSP Tokens Are Securities 66. QSP tokens are securities because they constituted an investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others. At issuance, as described above, it was not clear that the QSP tokens were securities as defined under federal and state securities laws. Quantstamp acted as if the QSP tokens were not securities, for example, by not ensuring that a registration statement was filed with the SEC, which would have provided important disclosures to investors of the risks inherent in these investments, including their speculative nature. 68. By contrast, Quantstamp issued a substantial portion of the total stock of QSP tokens at issuance, at very little economic cost to Quantstamp’s founders. The creation of QSP tokens thus occurred through a centralized process, in contrast to Bitcoin and Ethereum. This would not have been apparent at issuance, however, to a reasonable investor. Rather, it was only after the passage of time and disclosure of additional information about the issuer’s intent, process of management, and success in allowing decentralization to arise that a reasonable purchaser could know that he or she had acquired a security. Purchasers were thereby misled into believing that QSP was something other than a security, when it was a security. 70. In the Framework, the SEC cautioned potential issuers: “If you are considering an Initial Coin Offering, sometimes referred to as an ‘ICO,’ or otherwise engaging in the offer, sale, or distribution of a digital asset, you need to consider whether the U.S. federal securities laws apply.” The SEC explained the basics of the Howey test. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Howey case and subsequent case law have found that an “investment contract” exists when there is the investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others. The so-called “Howey test” applies to any contract, scheme, or transaction, regardless of whether it has any of the characteristics of typical securities. The focus of the Howey analysis is not only on the form and terms of the instrument itself (in this case, the digital asset) but also on the circumstances surrounding the digital asset and the manner in which it is offered, sold, or resold (which includes secondary market sales). Therefore, issuers and other persons and entities engaged in the marketing, offer, sale, resale, or distribution of any digital asset will need to analyze the relevant transactions to determine if the federal securities laws apply. Investors who bought QSP tokens invested money or other valuable consideration, such as bitcoin and ether, in a common enterprise—Quantstamp. Investors had a reasonable expectation of profit based upon Quantstamp’s efforts, including, among other things, Quantstamp obtaining listing of QSP tokens on various cryptocurrency exchanges. a. QSP Token Purchasers Invested Money 72. Investors invested traditional and other digital currencies, such as bitcoin and ether, to purchase the QSP tokens. QSP tokens were listed on many cryptocurrency exchanges, and those cryptocurrency exchanges permitted investors to purchase QSP with bitcoin and ether. b. QSP Token Investors Participated In A Common Enterprise 73. The SEC Framework states: “In evaluating digital assets, we have found that a ‘common enterprise’ typically exists.” This is “because the fortunes of digital asset purchasers have been linked to each other or to the success of the promoter’s efforts.” 74. The QSP tokens are no different. Investors were passive participants in the QSP token ICO and the profits of each investor were intertwined with those of both Quantstamp and of other investors. Quantstamp was responsible for supporting QSP, pooled investors’ assets, and controlled those assets. Quantstamp also retained a significant stake in QSP, thus sharing in the profits and risk of the venture. 80. The SEC Framework clarifies that investors purchased the QSP tokens with a reasonable expectation of profits. 81. According to icodrops.com screenshots of the Quantstamp ICO, Quanstamp’s Team & Advisors were personally allocated 20 percent of the QSP tokens, thus benefitting from holding the same digital asset as the purchasers: 83. Investment analysis of QSP tokens clearly indicates tokens were viewed as intended to provide a return on investment: analysts were “bullish” on QSP tokens because of factors such as “growth potential,” the “strong team,” the “constrained supply” and the likelihood of the tokens being listed on additional exchanges in the future. 87. The SEC Framework provides that the “inquiry into whether a purchaser is relying on the efforts of others focuses on two key issues: Does the purchaser reasonably expect to rely on the efforts of an [Active Participant]? Are those efforts ‘the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise,’ as opposed to efforts that are more ministerial in nature?” 91. This dependency, however, on the managerial efforts of Quantstamp was not apparent at issuance to a reasonable investor. Considering the limited available information about how QSP was designed and intended to operate, if such an investor were even able to interpret the relevant law at the time, a reasonable investor lacked sufficient bases to conclude whether QSP was a security until the platforms at issue, and its relevant “ecosystem,” had been given time to develop. In the interim, the investor lacked the facts necessary to conclude—let alone formally allege in court—that the token she had acquired was a security. It was only after the passage of some significant amount of time, and only with more information about Quantstamp’s intent, process of management, and lack of success in allowing decentralization to arise, that an investor could reasonably determine that a token that was advertised as something other than a security was a security all along. 92. Investors’ profits in QSP tokens were to be derived from the managerial efforts of others, specifically Quantstamp and its co-founders and development teams. QSP token investors relied on the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts of Quantstamp and their executive and development teams to manage and develop the projects funded by the QSP ICO. 93. Indeed, one of the few statements on the cover page of the QSP whitepaper is that “[o]ur team is made of up of software testing experts who collectively have over 500 Google Scholar citations.” 95. Quantstamp touts their broader team as well, stating “[w]e are a diverse and talented team of PhDs and security professionals with a wealth of experience. We come from companies like Google, Facebook, Apple, Goldman Sachs, BMW, Visa, and MathWorks. Together, we are here to do some of the best work of our careers, driving smart contract security while defining a new standard in blockchain security.” 96. One self-described token holder, explaining how “value is accrued to the QSP token,” stated that “Quantstamp isn’t shy about the caliber of their team, and rightfully so. Their team is filled with security PHD’s (with a huge amount of publications behind them combined) and software engineers/business team with impressive experience in the industry.” 97. Under this Framework, however complex the resolution of the issue would strike a reasonable investor, QSP satisfies most if not all of the factors described as relevant to its determination that a digital asset is a security. Quantstamp created QSP tokens from thin air. Quantstamp represented that it would develop a “Quantstamp ecosystem,” (i.e., the overall network of individuals using QSP or participating in the development of its network) that would increase the value of QSP tokens. Plaintiff and the Class reasonably expected Quantstamp to provide significant managerial efforts, to develop and improve the QSP ecosystem, to develop and sustain a supportive network, and to secure listings at exchanges through which QSP tokens could be traded or liquidated. And Quantstamp represented that it would provide significant managerial efforts to achieve these objectives and make the issued ERC-20 token a success. H. The SEC Has Concluded That Tokens Such As QSP Are Securities A. The First Cryptocurrency: Bitcoin Unregistered Offer and Sale of Securities Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 581-33 (Quantstamp) 128. Plaintiff realleges the allegations above. 129. The Texas Securities Act forbids the offer or sale of unregistered securities. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 581-7(A)(1). Any person who unlawfully offers or sells an unregistered security “is liable to the person buying the security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity for rescission or for damages if the buyer no longer owns the security.” Id. art. 581-

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1.5 times the regular rates for which they were employed. 31. Frontier is a provider of inspection services to pipelines, pipeline stations, terminals, gathering, utilities, tank storage and other energy related fields. 33. Rivera provided pipeline inspection services to Kinder-Morgan, Inc. in the Riverside area through Frontier. 34. Prior to being employed by Frontier, Rivera provided inspection services to Kinder- Morgan through another inspection services company. 35. Prior to being employed by Frontier, Rivera was paid by the hour and was paid overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek and for hours worked in excess of 8 and 12 hours in a workday. 36. In Summer 2018, Rivera was told that Kinder-Morgan was terminating its contract with its previous inspection service provider. 37. Rivera was told that he needed to sign a contract with Frontier in order to keep working for Kinder-Morgan. 38. The contracts provided to Rivera and other California Class Members stated that they were now exempt employees and would not receive overtime. 39. For example, Rivera’s contract with Frontier stated: 40. Exhibit B to Rivera’s contract clarified his “day rate.” 42. Rivera’s contract with Frontier became effective on July 1, 2018. 43. After being employed by Frontier, Rivera no longer received overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek or in excess of 8 or 12 hours in a workday, even though his work duties remained the same. 44. Rivera and the FLSA and California Class Members were misclassified as exempt employees during the relevant statutory time period. 45. Rivera knows other employees Frontier who are similarly situated in that they were not properly paid overtime for the hours they worked in excess of 40 in a workweek and/or 8 and 12 in a workday. 46. These individuals should be notified of their right to join this lawsuit to collect back wages. 47. Rivera incorporates all other allegations. 48. Frontier has violated, and is violating, section 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by employing day rate workers in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA for workweeks longer than 40 hours without compensating such day rate employees for work in excess of 40 hours per week at rates no less than 49. Frontier knowingly, willfully, or in reckless disregard carried out this illegal pattern and practice of failing to pay the day rate workers overtime compensation. 50. Frontier’s failure to pay overtime compensation to these day rate workers was neither reasonable, nor was the decision not to pay overtime made in good faith. 51. Accordingly, Rivera and all those who are similarly situated day rate workers are entitled to overtime wages under the FLSA in an amount equal to 1.5 times their rate of pay, plus liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. 53. The California Labor Code requires that all employees, including Rivera and the California Class, receive time and one-half overtime premium compensation for hours worked over 8 in one day. CAL. LAB. CODE § 510 (2017); IWC Wage Order 16-2001. 54. Despite working over 8 hours a day as part of their normal and regular shift, Rivera and the California Class did not receive any overtime compensation for all hours worked over 8 in one day. 55. The California Labor Code also requires that all employees, including Rivera and the California Class, receive two times the overtime premium compensation for hours worked over 12 in one day. CAL. LAB. CODE § 510 (2017); IWC Wage Order 16-2001. 56. Although Rivera and the California Class occasionally worked over 12 hours in one day, they did not receive the “double time” compensation required by California law. 57. The California Labor Code requires that all employees, including Rivera and the California Class, receive two times the overtime premium compensation for hours worked over 8 in one day, in the seventh day of a workweek. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 510, 551–52 (2017); IWC Wage Order 16-2001. 58. Although Rivera and the California Class regularly worked 7 days a week, for at least 12 hours a day, they did not receive the “double time” compensation required by California law for all hours over 8 worked on the seventh day. 59. This pattern, practice, and uniform administration of corporate policy regarding illegal employee compensation is unlawful and entitles Rivera and the California Class to recover unpaid balance of the full amount of overtime wages owing, including liquidated damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, and costs of suit pursuant to California Labor Code section 1194. 60. Rivera incorporates all other allegations. 62. Although the California Labor Code requires that all employees, including Rivera and the California Class, receive two, 30-minute meal-period breaks when employed for 10 hours per day, Rivera and the California Class did not receive two meal-period breaks for each day worked, despite working shifts of 12 hours or more. CAL. LAB. CODE § 512; IWC Wage Order 16-2001. 63. As a pattern and practice, Frontier did not provide Rivera and the California Class with meal-period breaks, and did not provide proper compensation for this failure as required by California law. 64. Although the California Labor Code requires that all employees, including Plaintiff and the California Class, receive a 10-minute rest period for every 4 hours worked, Rivera and the California Class did not receive any rest periods during their shifts of 12 or more hours. CAL. LAB. CODE § 512; IWC Wage Order 16-2001. 65. As a pattern and practice, Frontier did not provide Rivera and the California Class with rest-period breaks, and did not provide proper compensation for this failure as required by California law. 66. Rivera and the California Class are entitled to receive compensation, at their regular rate of pay, of one hour for each day they were denied their lawfully required meal- and rest-periods. CAL. LAB. CODE § 512; IWC Wage Order 16-2001. 67. Frontier’s policy fails to provide Rivera and the California Class with the legally mandated meal period breaks. Such a pattern, practice, and uniform administration of corporate policy as described herein is unlawful and creates an entitled to recovery by Rivera and the California Class in a civil action, for the balance of the unpaid compensation pursuant to Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512, and applicable IWC Wage Orders. 69. California Labor Code section 226 requires Frontier to keep accurate records regarding the rates of pay for their California employees and provide that information to Rivera and the California Class with their wage payment. 70. Because Frontier pay Rivera and the California Class a day rate instead of an hourly rate with proper overtime pay, it did not maintain accurate records of Rivera and the California Class’ daily hours, gross wages earned, net wages earned, and the applicable hourly rates, and did not provide that information to Rivera and the California Class with their wages. 71. This pattern, practice, and uniform administration of corporate policy is unlawful and entitles Rivera and the California Class to recover all damages and penalties available by law, including interest, penalties, attorney fees, and costs of suit. CAL. LAB. CODE § 226(e). 72. Rivera incorporates all other allegations. 73. At all relevant times, Frontier was required to pay Rivera and the California Class all wages owed in a timely fashion at the end of employment pursuant to California Labor Code sections 201 to 204. 74. As a result of Frontier’s alleged California Labor Code violations, Frontier regularly failed to pay Rivera and the California Class their final wages pursuant to California Labor Code sections 201 to 204, and accordingly Frontier owes waiting time penalties pursuant to California Labor Code section 203. 75. The conduct of Frontier, in violation of Rivera and the California Class’ rights, was willful and was undertaken by the agents, employees, and managers of Frontier. 76. Frontier’s willful failure to provide Rivera and the California Class the wages due and owing them upon separation from employment results in a continuation of wages up to 30 days from the time the wages were due. 77. Therefore, Rivera and the California Class who have separated from employment are entitled to compensation pursuant to California Labor Code section 203. 79. Frontier has engaged, and continues to engage, in unfair and unlawful business practices in California by practicing, employing, and utilizing the employment practices outlined above by knowingly denying employees: (1) overtime wages required under federal law; (2) overtime wages required by California law; (3) meal- and rest-period break wages; and (4) accurate wage statements. 80. As a result of Frontier’s failure to comply with federal and state law, Frontier has also violated the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, et. seq., which prohibits unfair competition by prohibiting any unlawful or unfair business actions or practices. 81. The relevant acts by Frontier occurred within the 4 years preceding the filing of this action. 82. On information and belief, Frontier has engaged in unlawful, deceptive, and unfair business practices, pursuant to California’s Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq., including those set forth above, depriving Rivera and the California Class of minimum working condition standards and conditions under California law and IWC Wage Orders as set forth above. 83. Rivera and the California Class are entitled to restitution for at least the following: restitution for unpaid overtime wages and unpaid California Labor Code § 203 continuation wages. 84. Rivera and the California Class are also entitled to permanent injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting Frontier from engaging in the violations and other misconduct referred to above. 85. Frontier is also liable for fees and costs pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and other applicable law. 86. Dozens of employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice and policy which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 87. Frontier required the FLSA Class Members to perform job duties similar to those performed by Rivera, including the requirement that they work overtime without overtime pay. 88. Frontier paid these Inspection Workers in the same manner as it paid Rivera and did not properly compensate them for all hours worked as required by the FLSA. 90. The FLSA Class Members were all paid on a day rate basis and were regularly required to work in excess of 40 hours per week without payment of overtime. 91. Accordingly, the employees who were victimized by Frontier’s unlawful compensation practices are similarly situated to Rivera. 92. Frontier’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA result from generally applicable policies and practices and do not depend on the personal circumstances of the FLSA Class Members. 93. Thus, Rivera’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Class Members. 94. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Class Members do not prevent collective treatment. 95. All of the FLSA Class Members, regardless of their precise job requirements or rates of pay, are entitled to be properly compensated for all unpaid overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 96. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 97. Rivera brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the California Class. 98. Numerosity: The proposed California Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Rivera is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that during the relevant time period, Frontier employed dozens of people who satisfy the definition of the California Class. COMPENSATION FOR MISSED MEAL AND REST PERIODS

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(“Unfair” Business Practices in Violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.—On Behalf of All Classes) (“Unlawful” Business Practices in Violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.—On Behalf of All Classes) 22. A phishing attack is a scheme by cyber criminals to try to get people to share personal and financial data, such as W-2s during the upcoming tax season. In 2016, the IRS warned that criminals were targeting company payroll departments. 23. One phishing variation is known as a “spoofing” email that will contain the actual name of the company’s chief executive officer (“CEO”) or another executive; however, it is sent by a person pretending to be the CEO. The email will go to a company office employee and will request a list of employees and information, such as social security numbers. 46. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint and restates them as if fully set forth herein. 47. Defendant requested and came into possession of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ PII, and had a duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting such information from unlawful intrusion. Defendant’s duty arose from, among other things, the legal requirements and its relationship with its employees. 48. Defendant had a duty to have procedures in place to detect and prevent the improper access and misuse of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ PII, and a duty to timely notify Plaintiffs of a data breach of their PII. Defendant also had a duty to adequately train personnel regarding the protection of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ PII. The breach of security, unauthorized access, and resulting injury to Plaintiffs’ and the Class were reasonably foreseeable, particularly in light of its inadequate data security policies and procedures and lack of training and widely reported spoofing incidents. 52. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint and restates them as if fully set forth herein. 53. The UCL defines unfair business competition to include any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” act or practice, as well as any “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading” advertising. Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200. 54. A business act or practice is “unlawful” if it violates any established state or federal law. 55. SRG’s practices were unlawful and in violation of Civil Code § 1798.81.5(b) because SRG failed to take reasonable measures in protecting Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ PII, as alleged herein. 56. SRG’s practices were also unlawful and in violation of Civil Code § 1798.82 because SRG unreasonably delayed informing Plaintiffs and Class members about the breach of security after SRG knew the breach occurred. 57. Plaintiffs reserve the right to identify other violations of law as the facts develop. 60. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint and restates them as if fully set forth herein. 61. The UCL defines unfair business competition to include any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” act or practice, as well as any “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading” advertising. Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200. 65. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint and restates them as if fully set forth herein. 66. Employees of Defendant SRG provided their PII in connection with their employment with SRG in order to verify their identity, receive compensation, and in order for SRG to have complete employee records for tax purposes, among other things. 67. Plaintiffs and the Employee Class members provided various forms of PII to SRG as a condition precedent to their employment with SRG, or in connection with employer sponsored benefits. 68. Understanding the sensitive nature of PII, SRG implicitly promised Plaintiffs and the Employee Class members that it would take adequate measures to protect their PII. 74. Plaintiff Annie Fulton hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint and restates them as if fully set forth herein. 75. Defendant conducts business in California and owns computerized data that includes the PII of California residents, including Plaintiff’s PII. 76. Plaintiff Annie Fulton was a California resident at the time she worked for Defendant. 77. Defendant’s information security systems were breached in January 2017, however, Defendant did not inform Plaintiff and the California Employee Class until sometime in late March 2017. 81. Plaintiffs Cary Berger, Christine Willetts, Ruth Phelps, and Irene Sung hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint and restates them as if fully set forth herein. 82. Defendant conducts business in Massachusetts and owns computerized data that includes the PII of Massachusetts residents, including Plaintiffs’ PII. 83. Plaintiffs were at all relevant times residents of Massachusetts. 84. Defendant’s information security systems were breached in January 2017, however, Defendant did not inform Plaintiffs until sometime in late March 2017. 85. By failing to timely disclose to Plaintiffs and each member of the proposed Massachusetts Employee Class that their PII was reasonably believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized person, Defendant violated Mass. Gen. Laws §§ 93H-1, et seq. Defendant failed to notify Plaintiffs and the proposed Massachusetts Employee Class of the 2017 data breach in the most expedient time possible and unreasonably delayed notifying those affected since law enforcement did not determine notification would hinder a criminal investigation. 86. Defendant could have notified Plaintiffs and the proposed Massachusetts Employee Class sooner had it implemented and maintained adequate policies and procedures. 88. Plaintiff Kimberly Carboni hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint and restates them as if fully set forth herein. 89. Defendant conducts business in Florida and owns computerized data that includes the PII of Florida residents, including Plaintiff’s PII. 90. Plaintiff was at all relevant times a resident of Florida. 91. Defendant’s information security systems were breached in January 2017, however, Defendant did not inform Plaintiff until sometime in late March 2017. 92. By failing to timely disclose to Plaintiff and each member of the proposed Florida Employee Class that their PII was reasonably believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized person, Defendant violated Fla. Sta. §§ 501.171, 292.0041, 282.318(2)(i), et seq. Defendant failed to notify Plaintiff and the proposed Florida Employee Class of the 2017 data breach in the most expedient time possible and unreasonably delayed notifying those affected since law enforcement did not determine notification would hinder a criminal investigation. 93. Defendant could have notified Plaintiff and the proposed Florida Employee Class sooner had it implemented and maintained adequate policies and procedures. 94. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of Fla. Sta. §§ 501.171, 292.0041, 282.318(2)(i), et seq., Plaintiff and Florida Employee Class members have been injured. Plaintiff and Florida Employee Class members are therefore entitled to damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Breach of Implied Contract—On Behalf of the Nationwide Employee Class Negligence—On Behalf of All Classes Violation of the Security Breach Notification Law, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.171, 292.0041, 282.318(2)(i), et seq.—by Kimberly Carboni on Behalf of the Florida Employee Class Violation of the Security Breach Notification Law, Mass. Gen. Laws §§ 93H-1, et seq.—by Cary Berger, Christine Willetts, Ruth Phelps, and Irene Sung on Behalf of the Massachusetts Employee Class Violation of the Security Breach Notification Law, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-61, 75-65, et seq.—by Emmalyne Owens on Behalf of the North Carolina Employee Class Violation of the Security Breach Notification Law, Cal. Civil Code § 1798.82—by Annie Fulton on Behalf of the California Employee Class What is a Phishing Attack?

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73. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs.

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26. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)-23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for Defendant’s violations of the TCPA and FDCPA. 27. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of thousands of individuals (“the TCPA Class”) defined as follows: All persons in the United States, from four years prior to the filing of the instant Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint, to whom 9 Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system to send an identical or substantially similar text message to that received by Plaintiff. 28. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of thousands of individuals (“the FDCPA Class”) defined as follows: All persons in the United States, from one year prior to the filing of the instant Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint, to whom Defendant has sent an identical or substantially similar message to that received by Plaintiff and to whom Defendant did not send a notice telling them they could dispute the debt and the steps to dispute the debt. 29. Numerosity: The Classes are so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the Classes’ members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 30. Upon information and belief each of the Classes contains thousands of members at a minimum. 31. Upon information and belief, the Classes’ size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to Defendant’s call records. 32. Members of the Classes may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in the class actions, such as by 10 published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to the Classes and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court. 33. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 34. Upon information and belief, Defendant, using an automatic telephone dialing system within the meaning of the TCPA, made, initiated and/or caused to be initiated at least one text message, identical or substantially similar to the text messages described above that Defendant sent to Plaintiff, to each member of the TCPA Class, without obtaining the Plaintiff’s and each member of the Classes’ prior express consent. 35. Upon informaiton and belief, Defendant, made, initiated and/or caused to be initiated at least one text message, identical or substantially similar to the text messages described above that Defendant sent to Plaintiff, to each member of the FDCPA Class and Defendant did not send Plaintiff or any member of the FDCPA class a notice telling them they could dispute the debt and the steps to dispute the debt. 11 36. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of common questions of fact and law affecting the Plaintiff and members of the Classes. 37. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and the TCPA Class predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: a. Whether Defendant’s conduct of using an automatic telephone dialing system within the meaning of the TCPA, to make, initiate or cause to be initiated at least one text message to Plaintiff and each member of the TCPA Class, without obtaining their prior express consent, violated the TCPA? b. Whether Plaintiff and the members of the TCPA Class are entitled to statutory damages from Defendant under the TCPA? c. Whether Defendant’s violations of the TCPA were willful or knowing? d. Whether Plaintiff and the members of the TCPA Class are entitled to up to triple statutory damages under the TCPA from Defendant for Defendant’s willful and knowing violations of the TCPA? 12 e. Whether Plaintiff and the members of the TCPA Class are entitled to a permanent injunction under the TCPA enjoining Defendant from continuing to engage in its unlawful conduct? 38. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and the FDCPA Class predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: a. Whether Defendant’s conduct of making an initial communication of sending a text message in an attempt to collect a debt without sending the requisite notices under 15 U.S.C. 1692g within five days thereafter violated the FDCPA? b. Whether Plaintiff and the members of the FDCPA Class are entitled to statutory damages from Defendant under the FDCPA? c. Whether Plaintiff and the members of the FDCPA Class are entitled to actual damages from Defendant under the FDCPA? d. Whether Plaintiff and the members of the FDCPA Class are entitled to costs of litigation including a reasonable attorney fee pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3)? 39. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent 13 and protect the interests of the members of the Classes and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, class action litigation, and TCPA and FDCPA litigation. 40. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Classes. While the aggregate damages that may be awarded to the members of the Classes are likely to be substantial, the damages awarded to individual members of the Classes are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the Classes to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff does not know of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced against Defendant by any member of the Classes. The likelihood of the individual members of the Classes prosecuting separate claims is remote. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent, or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. In contrast, the conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the Classes. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty 14 to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 41. Injunctive Relief: Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 42. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 43. By Defendant’s above-described conduct, Defendant committed thousands of violations of the TCPA against Plaintiff and the members of the TCPA Class. 44. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the TCPA Class are entitled to statutory damages from Defendant under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) of greater than $5,000,000 and an injunction against Defendant ordering it to cease its violations of the TCPA. 45. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly violated the TCPA, Plaintiff and the members of the TCPA Class request an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as 15 authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations, which amounts to greater than $15,000,000. 46. The unsolicited text messages Defendant sent to Plaintiff and the FDCPA Class were an “initial communications” from Defendant in connection with collection of alleged debts. 47. Defendant failed to send Plaintiff and the FDCPA Class a written notice of their rights within five days after the “initial communication”, as is required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 48. Any procedures maintained (i.e., actually employed or implemented) by Defendant to avoid errors under the FDCPA failed to provide the required disclosures. 49. Defendant violated the FDCPA by not advising Plaintiff and the FDCPA Class of their rights pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) in Defendant’s initial communications or within five days of the initial communications. 50. Accordingly, Defendant committed thousands of violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 51. Plaintiff and the FDCPA Class seek damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k and their costs of litigation including, but not limited to a reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3). 16

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66. Named Plaintiff seeks to bring this suit to recover overtime compensation and liquidated damages from Defendants under the applicable provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), on their own behalf as well as on behalf of those in the following collective: FLSA Collective: Current and former employees of Defendants who, at any time within three years prior to filing date of this Collective and Class Action Complaint through the date of final disposition (“Collective Period”), worked for the Defendants as non-exempt Workers and were subject to Defendants’ policy and pattern or practice of failing to properly pay premium overtime compensation for all hours worked beyond 40 per week and who elect to opt into this litigation. 67. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate the Named Plaintiff and the putative FLSA Collective Members (“Collective Members”). 68. Consistent with Defendants’ policy and pattern or practice, the Named Plaintiff and the Collective Members have not been paid any premium overtime compensation for hours worked beyond 40 in any single work week. 13 69. All of the work that the Named Plaintiff and the Collective Members have performed involved tasks that have been assigned by Defendants, and/or Defendants have been aware of all of the work that they have performed. 70. Defendants have exercised sufficient supervision, direction and control over the Plaintiff and Collective Members by, inter alia, (1) assigning them job duties and responsibilities; and (2) controlling all of the terms and conditions of their employment, including their compensation, as well as policies and practices they were required to follow. 71. As part of their regular business practices, Defendants have intentionally imposed unlawful policies and practices upon the Named Plaintiff and the Collective Members, which include, but are not limited to: a) willfully failing to pay them premium overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek; and b) willfully failing to record all of the time that they have worked for the benefit of the Defendants; and c) willfully directing the preparation and distribution of paystubs omitting the number of hours that each employee worked during the pay period; and d) deducting some time each week from the number of hours actually worked by each employee, and then multiplying that number of hours by the straight time rate. 72. Defendants’ unlawful conduct pled herein constitutes a corporate policy or practice of minimizing labor costs by failing to properly compensate the Named Plaintiff and the Collective Members for the overtime hours they have worked. 14 73. Defendants are aware or should have been aware that Federal law required them to pay the Named Plaintiff and the Collective Members overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 74. The Named Plaintiffs and the Collective Members perform or performed the same or similar primary duties. 75. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been systematic, widespread, repeated, and consistent. 76. There are many similarly situated current and former employees who have been denied overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. This notice should be sent to the Collective Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 77. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendants’ records. 78. The Named Plaintiff brings this action as a Class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and the following defined Classes: 15 “Rule 23 Class”: Workers employed by the Defendants at any time within six years prior to the filing date of this Class action complaint through the date of final disposition (“Class Period”) of this action and who were subject to Defendants’ policy and pattern or practice of (i) manually reducing their hours, thereby denying them overtime premiums for all of the hours they worked in excess of 40 hours per week; and/or (ii) improperly paying them at straight time for overtime hours; and/or (iii) failing to provide proper wage notices and keep proper records as required by the NYLL; and/or (iv) failing to provide annual wage notices as required by the NYLL. 79. Excluded from the Rule 23 Class are Defendants, Defendants' legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individuals who have, or who at any time during the class period had, a controlling interest in Defendants, and all persons who shall submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion. 80. The Members of the Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all Members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, the size of the Rule 23 Class is over 50 individuals. Although the precise number of such employees is unknown, the data necessary to ascertain this with precision is within the exclusive possession and control of the Defendants. 81. Defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, thereby making final injunctive relief appropriate or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Rule 23 Classes as a whole. 82. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the Rule 23 Class that predominate over any questions only affecting them individually and include, but are not limited to, the following: 16 a. Whether Defendants unlawfully required Members of the proposed class to work off the clock, thereby denying them overtime premiums under the NYLL; b. Whether Defendants unlawfully reduced the number of hours the Members worked in their own payroll system; c. Whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay appropriate overtime compensation to Members of the proposed class in violation of NYLL; d. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the proposed class within the meaning of New York law; e. Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time and pay records for all hours worked by the Named Plaintiff and the proposed class; f. Whether Defendants failed to furnish the Named Plaintiff and the proposed class with annual wage notices, as required by the NYLL; g. Whether Defendants failed to furnish the Named Plaintiffs and the proposed class Members with proper wage statements with every payment of wages, as required by the NYLL; h. Whether Defendants’ policy of failing to pay the Named Plaintiffs and Class Members was instituted willfully or with reckless disregard of the law; and i. The nature and extent of class-wide injury and the measure of damages for those injuries. 83. The claims of the Named Plaintiff is typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class he seeks to represent. Named Plaintiff and all of the Rule 23 Class Members work, or have worked, for Defendants as Workers. The Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members enjoy the same 17 statutory rights under the NYLL, including the right to be appropriately compensated for all hours worked, to be paid overtime compensation, and to receive legally required wage notices. The Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members have all sustained similar types of damages as a result of Defendants' failure to comply with the NYLL. The Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members have all been injured in that they have been uncompensated or undercompensated due to Defendants' common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. 84. The Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Members of the Rule 23 Class; understands that as Class representative, he assumes a fiduciary responsibility to the Class to represent its interests fairly and adequately; recognizes that as Class representative, he must represent and consider the interests of the Class just as he would represent and consider his own interests; understands that in decisions regarding the conduct of the litigation and its possible settlement, he must not favor his own interests over those of the Class; recognizes that any resolution of a Class action must be in the best interests of the Class; and understands that in order to provide adequate representation, he must be informed of developments in litigation, cooperate with Class counsel, and testify at depositions and/or trial. The Named Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex Class actions and employment litigation. There is no conflict between the Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members. 85. A Class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The Members of the Rule 23 Class have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendants' violations of the NYLL, as well as their common 18 and uniform policies, practices, and procedures. Although the relative damages suffered by individual Rule 23 Class Members are not de minimis, such damages are small compared to the expense and burden that this litigation will require. The individual Plaintiff lacks the financial resources to conduct a thorough examination of Defendants' timekeeping and compensation practices and to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against Defendants to recover such damages. In addition, class litigation is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments with respect to Defendants' practices. 86. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 87. Consistent with their policies and patterns or practices as described herein, Defendants harmed the Named Plaintiff, individually, as follows: Rigoberto Quiridumbay 88. Defendants did not pay Quiridumbay the proper overtime compensation for all of the time that he was suffered or permitted to work each workweek. 89. Plaintiff Quiridumbay began working for the Defendants on or about January 10, 2014 until September 11, 2016. 19 90. From the beginning of his employment until April 30, 2014, Mr. Quiridumbay worked Sunday through Friday, inclusive from 8:00AM until 6:00PM. 91. From on or about May 1, 2014 until February 29, 2016, Mr. Quiridumbay worked Sunday through Friday, inclusive, from 3:30 AM until 1:30 PM. 92. From on or about March 1, 2016 until his termination, Mr. Quiridumbay worked Sunday through Friday, inclusive, from 8:00 AM until 4:00 PM. 93. Throughout his employment with the Defendants, Mr. Quiridumbay was paid on a salary basis. 94. From the beginning of his employment with Defendants until on or about August 31, 2014, Mr. Quiridumbay was paid $510.00 per work week. 95. From on or about September 1, 2014, until on or about February 29, 2016, Plaintiff Quiridumbay was paid $625.00 per work week. 96. From on or about March 1, 2016, until his termination, Plaintiff Quiridumbay was paid $675.00 per work week. 97. Throughout the duration of his employment Quiridumbay received paystubs from Defendants which did not show any of the hours he worked. 20 98. Upon information and belief, Defendants failed to keep accurate records of wages earned or of the hours worked by Quiridumbay. 99. Defendants failed to furnish Quiridumbay with proper annual wage notices, as required by the NYLL. 100. Defendants failed to furnish Quiridumbay with proper wage statements with every payment of wages, as required by the NYLL. FEDERAL FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM (FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME) 101. The Named Plaintiff hereby incorporates all preceding paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth at length. 102. The overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and the supporting federal regulations, apply to Defendants and protect the Named Plaintiff and the Members of the FLSA Collective. 103. Defendants have failed to pay the Named Plaintiff and the Members of the FLSA Collective overtime wages to which they have been entitled under the FLSA - at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay - for all hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 21 104. Defendants' unlawful conduct, as described in this Collective and Class Action Complaint, has been willful and intentional. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that the practices described in this Collective and Class Action Complaint were unlawful. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the compensation of the Named Plaintiff and the Members of the FLSA Collective. 105. Because Defendants' violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 106. As a result of Defendants' violations of the FLSA, Named Plaintiff and the Members of the FLSA Collective have been deprived of overtime compensation in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). NEW YORK STATE LABOR LAW AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM (FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME) 107. The Named Plaintiff hereby incorporates all preceding paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth at length. 108. At all times herein pertinent, Named Plaintiff and Members of the Rule 23 Class were employees of Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law. 22 109. Defendants are joint employers of the Named Plaintiff and Members of the Rule 23 Class within the meaning of the New York Labor Law. 110. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the New York Labor Law and its supporting regulations apply to Defendants. 111. Defendants have failed to pay the Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the New York Labor Law. 112. By Defendants’ failure to pay the Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members’ premium overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, they have willfully violated the New York Labor Law Article 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 113. Due to Defendants’ violations of the New York Labor Law, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 23 NEW YORK STATE LABOR LAW AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM (FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROPER WAGE STATEMENTS) 118. The Named Plaintiff hereby incorporates all preceding paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth at length. 119. Defendants have willfully failed to furnish Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class members with statements with every payment of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), listing: the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; net wages; the regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate or rates of pay; and the number of regular and overtime hours worked. 25 120. Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class members with the wage statements required by the NYLL, Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 121. Due to Defendants' willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members are entitled to statutory penalties of two hundred fifty dollars for each work day that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with proper wage statements, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-d). NEW YORK STATE LABOR LAW AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, AND EACH OF THEM (FAILURE TO PROVIDE PROPER ANNUAL WAGE NOTICES) 114. The Named Plaintiff hereby incorporates all preceding paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth at length. 115. Upon information and belief, Defendants have willfully failed to furnish the Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members with annual wage notices as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), in English or in the language identified by each employee as their primary language, at the time of hiring, and on or before February first of each subsequent year of the employee's employment with the employer, a notice containing: the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; any "doing business as" names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 116. Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Named Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class Members with the annual wage notices required by the NYLL, Defendants have 24 willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 117. Due to Defendants' willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members are entitled to statutory penalties of fifty dollars for each work day that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with proper annual wage notices, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b).

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CitetheU.S. Civil StatuteundeTv/hich\ousa'efilwg(DoiiotciteJurisdictionalst<i{utesuttless<iiversity}: 28 U.S:C. §1332(d)(2)(A) Briefdescription ofcause: Breach of contract, unjust enrichment, class action

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(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 78. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 79. Defendants and their agents made unsolicited text message calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class en masse without their prior express consent. 80. Defendants made the text message calls, or had them made on their behalf, using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. 81. Defendants and their agents utilized equipment that made, or had made on their behalf, the text message calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 83. Should the Court determine that Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class.

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(Declaratory Relief Pursuant To 28 U.S.C §2201) 23. On August 21, 2015 Plaintiff Cowen’s minor son, Jarrett Cowen sustained an injury which required medical attention. He was transported by ambulance to the emergency room at Lake Regional Hospital, Osage Beach, Missouri. The medical personal at Lake Regional recommended that he be transported by helicopter to the University of Missouri Hospital in Columbia Missouri, approximately 60 miles away. On August 21, 2015, Defendants transported Plaintiff Cowen’s son to University of Missouri Hospital in Columbia Missouri. 24. No express oral or written contract was agreed to between Plaintiff Cowen and Defendants regarding the price Defendants would charge for the transportation of Jarrett Cowen, and Defendants did not state the price Defendants charged for their services. Nor did Plaintiff Cowen agree to any price or other consideration to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendants for transportation. 25. Defendants transported Jarret Cowen and minor, without any agreement regarding the prices Defendants would charge for that transportation. 26. Following the transport, Defendants billed Plaintiff Cowen a total of $47,128.30 and itemized this charge as $28,038.70 as the Helicopter Rotor Base charge, along with an additional $19,089.60 for 60 miles of transport. See Exhibit A, September 4, 2015 Invoice. 28. Plaintiff Cowen’s medical insurance provider paid Defendants $4,955.17. See Exhibit B, October 27, 2015. 29. On June 15, 2016 Defendants billed Plaintiff Cowen $42,172.53, the charged amount and demanded payment. See Exhibit C, June 15, 2016. 30. On July 29, 2016 Defendants informed Plaintiff Cowen that they would initiate collection efforts stating: “Without you[r] participation to resolve your account, it will be sent to a professional Collection Agency. Keep in mind that the agency may report this account to national credit bureau’s as a BAD DEBT and add all legally allowed interest and fees.” See Exhibit D, July 29, 2016. 31. On January 24, 2017, Defendants placed the “debt” with “MediCredit Inc.” a collection agency for collections and charged Plaintiff Cowen an additional $5,938.82 in “interest”, for a total of $48,111.35. See Exhibit E, January 24, 2017. 32. Plaintiff Keith Kranhold is the executor of the Estate of Kenneth Kranhold. 33. On November 14, 2015 Plaintiff’s decedent Kenneth Kranhold sustained an injury requiring medical attention. As a result of the injury Kenneth Kranhold was unconscious and remained so until his death on November 18, 2015. 34. On November 14, 2015 Kenneth Kranhold was admitted to Yavapai Hospital, Prescott, Arizona from which he was transported by Defendants to Banner Thunderbird Medical Center, Glendale, Arizona, approximately 68 miles. 36. Defendants transported Kenneth Kranhold, deceased, without any agreement regarding the price Defendants would charge for that transportation. 37. Following the transport, Defendants billed decedent Plaintiff Kranhold a total of $54,999.00 and itemized this charge as $25,258.61 as the Helicopter Rotor Base charge, along with an additional $29,740.39 for 68 miles of transport. See Exhibit F, December 24, 2015 Invoice. 38. The Defendants’ invoice was submitted to Plaintiff Kranhold’s decedent’s health insurance provider Compass Rose Health Plan and claims and administered by United Healthcare (UMR) (collectively “Kranhold Medical Insurance Provider”). 39. Kranhold’s Medical Insurance Provider paid Defendants $12,612.25. See Exhibit G, March 30, 2016. 40. On September 13, 2016 Defendants billed the Estate of Kenneth Kranhold $42,386.75. See Exhibit H, September 13, 2016. 41. Defendants have threatened the initiation of collection efforts if they are is not paid $42,386.75. 42. Neither Plaintiff Kranhold, nor Plaintiff Kranhold’s decedent ever agreed to pay the prices charged by the Defendants for the transportation services provided. 44. Plaintiffs reserve the right to redefine the Proposed Class prior to class certification. 45. The members of the Proposed Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 46. The exact number of Class members is unknown as such information is in the exclusive control of Defendants. However, due to the nature of the trade and commerce involved, Plaintiffs believe the Proposed Class consists of thousands of Class Members. 48. The claims and defenses of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims and defenses of the Proposed Class. Plaintiffs and all members of the C lass have been charged by the Defendants prices for transportation mileage and helicopter rotor base that they did not agree to prior to transportation of patients. 50. A class action provides a fair and efficient method for the adjudication of this controversy for the following reasons: a. The common questions of law and fact set forth herein predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members; b. The Class is so numerous as to make joinder impracticable but not so numerous as to create manageability problems; c. There are no unusual legal or factual issues which would create manageability problems; d. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications against Defendants when confronted with incompatible standards of conduct; and e. Adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class could, as a practical matter, be dispositive of any interest of other members not parties to such adjudications, or substantially impair their ability to protect their interests. 51. Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class incorporate the preceding and succeeding paragraphs as though set forth herein at length. 53. In all instances, Defendants seek assistance form the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class to obtain third party payment for the charged amounts. 54. In the event there is no third party payment or that payment is less than the charged amounts Defendants demand payment (“balance bill”) and initiate detrimental collection efforts against Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class. 55. In the event Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class do not pay Defendants the charged amounts, Defendants threaten collection, report the unpaid charged amount as Bad Debt to credit reporting agencies, accrue interest and fees, and ultimately suit in state court for the amounts charged, or for the purpose of coercing Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class in compromise payments that they do not owe, and Defendants cannot legally collect. 56. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief for the purposes of determining questions of actual controversy between the Plaintiffs, the Proposed Class and Defendants. 57. Defendants have acted in a uniform manner in failing to enter into a contract with respect to the price it would charge for transportation services before rendering their services, balance bill the Plaintiffs and the Class, in the event the charged amounts are not paid, and engage in collection efforts. 59. Defendants have demanded payment of the charged amounts from the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class, and have threatened or initiated collection efforts against the Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class. 60. There is an actual dispute and controversy between Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class, and Defendants as to whether Defendants can demand payment for services concerning which no price was agreed, can engage in collection efforts where no legally enforceable contract exists, can impose interest and costs of collection on Plaintiffs and the Class, and whether any attempt by Defendants to collect the amounts charged under the circumstances is prohibited by the preemption provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 USC §41713. 61. Plaintiffs and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. 63. Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class further seek a prospective order from the Court requiring Defendants to: (1) cease charging for the transporting of patients without an express agree as to the rates for mileage and helicopter rotor base; and (2) to cease Defendants’ attempts to collect outstanding bills for which no express agreement as to price exists from Plaintiff and the Members of the Proposed Class. 64. Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class seek the disgorgement by Defendants of all sums collected by the Defendants from third party payers, and the Proposed Class who have paid any amounts charged by the Defendants and other relief as set forth in the prayer below. 65. Defendants collection efforts, damage the credit of Plaintiffs and the Class, cause they to incur legal fees and litigation expenses, expose Plaintiffs and the Class to claims for interest on unpaid Defendants’ charges and vexing and harassing collection efforts. As a result of Defendants’ practices as described above, Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class have suffered, and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm and injury.

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20. Defendant is a homeopathic products company, and owns and operates the website, www.hylands.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.hylands.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse homeopathic products for purchase and delivery, view recipes, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in November 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 92. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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(Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) (Declaratory Judgment) (Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act) 12. The Google Play Store (“Google Play”) is one of the largest retailers of digital content in the world. Google Play sells all varieties of digital content (e.g., music, movies, TV shows, audio books, and Apps) that can be downloaded on any device with the Android operating system. 13. Google sells Apps through Google Play which may be accessed directly from certain devices (such as, e.g., Samsung Galaxy phones or Samsung tablets). 14. Google offers Apps in many genres, including travel, business, education, Case No. 3 30. Ilana Imber-Gluck, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated California residents, pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks certification of the following Class: All persons in the United States who paid for an unauthorized purchase of Game Currency made by their minor children (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, and the Judge to whom this case is assigned, any immediate family members thereof. 31. The Class is numerous and geographically dispersed such that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. The proposed Class contains many thousands of members. Plaintiff believes there are thousands of members of the Class whose names and addresses are in Google’s records. 32. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. The common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Whether Google sold Game Currency; Case No. 10 41. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges herein the foregoing allegations. 4 See Google’s Terms of Service: https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/; incorporated into Google Play terms of service: https://play.google.com/intl/en- US_us/about/play-terms.html. Case No. 13 51. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges herein the foregoing allegations. 52. At all times relevant hereto, there was in full force and effect the California Case No. 14 62. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges herein the foregoing allegations. 63. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and the Class members and in her capacity as a private attorney general against Google for its unlawful, unfair, fraudulent, and/or deceptive business acts and practices pursuant to California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq., which prohibits unlawful, unfair and/or fraudulent business acts and/or practices. 64. Plaintiff asserts these claims as a representative of an aggrieved group and as a private attorney general on behalf of the general public and other persons who have expended funds that Google should be required to reimburse under UCL § 17200, et seq. 65. This claim is predicated on the duty to refrain from unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business practices. Plaintiff and the Class members hereby seek to enforce a general proscription of unfair business practices and the requirement to refrain from deceptive conduct. 66. The UCL § 17200, et seq. prohibits acts of “unfair competition.” As used in this section, “unfair competition” encompasses three distinct types of misconduct: (a) Case No. 16 75. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges herein the foregoing allegations. 76. Plaintiff and the Class have conferred benefits on Google by paying for the Game Currency purchased by their minor children without their knowledge or permission. Case No. 17 82. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges herein the foregoing allegations. 83. Google’s contracts with Plaintiff and the Class included a term, implied at law in all contracts, requiring the parties to exercise “good faith and fair dealing” in all duties relating to the performance of the contract. By engaging in the misconduct alleged herein, Google has breached its contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing with Plaintiff and the Class. 84. Plaintiff has adequately pled all of the elements for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which are: (a) an agreement between the parties; (b) plaintiff’s performance under the agreement; (c) defendant’s engagement in conduct separate and apart from the performance of obligations under the agreement without good faith and for the purpose of depriving plaintiff of rights and benefits under the contract; and (d) damages to plaintiff. 85. The agreement between Plaintiff and the Class on the one hand, and Google on the other hand, are the “Terms & Conditions” that each member of the Class agreed to Case No. 18 Unjust Enrichment/Restitution Violation of Business and Professions Code §17200, et seq.

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17. Rice Energy is an oil and natural gas company operating primarily in Pennsylvania and Ohio in the Marcellus, Utica, and Upper Devonian Shales and employs oilfield personnel to carry out its work. 18. Many of these individuals worked for Rice Energy performing the same or substantially similar job duties as Plaintiff who are/were misclassified by Rice Energy as so-called independent contractors in connection with Rice Energy’s oilfield operations. While exact job titles and job duties may differ, these employees are subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work. Specifically, Rice Energy classified the Putative Class Members as independent contractors and paid them a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) and failed to provide them with overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 19. For example, Plaintiff has worked exclusively for Rice Energy since approximately October 2015 as an oilfield contractor/flowback operator. Throughout his employment with Rice Energy, he was classified as an independent contractor and paid on a day-rate basis. 21. The work Plaintiff performed was an essential party of Rice Energy’s core business. 22. During Plaintiff’s employment with Rice Energy while he was classified as an independent contractor, Rice Energy and/or the company it contracted with exercised control over all aspects of his job. Rice Energy did not require any substantial investment by Plaintiff in order for him to perform the work required of him. Rice Energy determined Plaintiff’s opportunity for profit and loss. Plaintiff was not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other individuals working in his same job position) to perform his job duties. Plaintiff has worked exclusively for Rice Energy as an independent contractor since approximately October 2015. 23. Indeed, Rice Energy and/or the company it contracted with controlled all of the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Plaintiff. 24. Rice Energy ordered the hours and locations Plaintiff worked, tools used, and rates of pay received. 25. Even though Plaintiff often worked away from Rice Energy’s offices without the presence of a direct Rice Energy supervisor, Rice Energy still controlled all aspects of Plaintiff’s job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance with Rice Energy’s and/or its client’s policies and procedures. 27. Plaintiff did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and insurance. 28. Plaintiff was economically dependent on Rice Energy during his employment. 29. Rice Energy set Plaintiff’s rates of pay, his work schedule, and prohibited him from working other jobs for other companies while he was working on jobs for Rice Energy. 30. Rice Energy directly determined Plaintiff’s opportunity for profit and loss. Plaintiff’s earning opportunity was based on the number of days Rice Energy scheduled him to work. 31. Very little skill, training, or initiative was required of Plaintiff to perform his job duties. 32. Indeed, the daily and weekly activities of the Putative Class Members were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by Rice Energy and/or its clients. Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Rice Energy and/or its clients, including the tools to use at a job site, the data to compile, the schedule of work, and related work duties. The Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the pre- determined parameters. Moreover, the job functions of the Putative Class Members were primarily manual labor/technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. The Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management duties. Finally, for the purposes of an FLSA overtime claim, the Putative Class Members performed substantially similar job duties related to servicing oil and gas operations in the field. 34. Plaintiff has worked exclusively for Rice Energy since approximately October 2015 as an independent contractor. Plaintiff was not employed by Rice Energy on a project-by-project basis. In fact, while Plaintiff was classified as an independent contractor, he was regularly on call for Rice Energy and/or its clients and was expected to drop everything and work whenever needed. 35. All of the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities performed by each person. 36. The Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. The Putative Class Members all worked in excess of 40 hours each week and were often scheduled for 12 hour shifts for weeks at a time. Instead of paying them overtime, Rice Energy paid the Putative Class Members a day-rate. Rice Energy denied the Putative Class Members overtime for any and all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 37. Rice Energy’s policy of failing to pay its independent contractors, including Plaintiff, overtime violates the FLSA, the PMWA, and the Ohio Wage Laws because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non-exempt job duties. 38. It is undisputed that the Putative Class Members are maintaining and working with oilfield machinery, performing manual labor, and working long hours out in the field. 39. Because Plaintiff (and Rice Energy’s other independent contractors who were paid a day-rate) was misclassified as an independent contractor by Rice Energy, he should receive overtime for all hours that he worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek. 64. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Defendant imposed on Plaintiff were likewise imposed on the members of the Classes. 65. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA, and the state wage laws of Pennsylvania and Ohio. 66. Numerous other individuals who worked with Plaintiff indicated they were improperly classified as independent contractors, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. 67. Based on his experiences and tenure with Defendant, Plaintiff is aware that Defendant’s illegal practices were imposed on the members of the Classes. 68. The members of the Classes were all improperly classified as independent contractors and not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 69. Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the members of the Classes. 70. Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the members of the Classes. 71. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the various members of the Classes do not prevent class or collective treatment. 73. A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 74. Absent this Action, many members of the Classes likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendant will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor laws. 75. Furthermore, even if some of the members of the Classes could afford individual litigation against Defendant, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 76. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 78. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff and the members of the Classes sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s illegal and uniform employment policy. 79. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective or class action. 80. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective and class action treatment. X.

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17. In June 2007, Defendant FitFlop Ltd. began selling the FitFlop Footwear in the United States. At the same time, Defendant launched a major advertising campaign to promote FitFlop Footwear. 18. FitFlop Limited, Brand Slam, and Marcia Kilgore produced, designed, advertised, sold and marketed FitFlop Footwear purchased by United States consumers. Even after Defendants established FitFlop USA in 2010, decision-making relating to the advertising, marketing, design and research and development for FitFlop Footwear continued to be done by FitFlop Limited, Brand Slam and Marcia Kilgore. 19. According to testimony by Ms. Kilgore, from the launch until today she is the person most knowledgeable about FitFlop Footwear’s advertising and marketing materials. Additionally, Ms. Kilgore creates the content for and personally approves every advertisement by FitFlop about FitFlop Footwear. 21. FitFlop’s website describes how Ms. Kilgore – “the FITFLOP boss” – launched FitFlop: “In 2005 with one booming business under her belt, one in the works [Soap & Glory], and with time with her kids taking priority over time on the treadmill, Kilgore realised that there must be thousands of women like her who were looking for the ‘cliff-notes’ version of toning. Two years, and several rounds of R&D later, she launched FITFLOP.”9 22. Defendants sell FitFlop Footwear to consumers in the United States through authorized retailers such as Macy’s, Victoria’s Secret, and Nordstrom. Beginning in 2012, Defendants began selling their FitFlop Footwear directly to consumers in the United States through their ecommerce website as well. 23. Defendants, led by Marcia Kilgore, maintain strict control over any advertising for FitFlop Footwear. Defendants do not permit retailers to create their own advertisements for FitFlop Footwear. Retailers are required to use Defendants’ standardized marketing materials for FitFlop Footwear. 24. Like their competitors in the so-called “toning shoes” footwear market, Defendants claim that instability created by FitFlop Footwear’s patent-pending Microwobbleboard™ design (essentially three different densities of foam rubber made of a chemical called ethylene vinyl acetate (“EVA”)), results in increased toning, increased muscle activity, and reduction of joint strain. 61. Pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Glaberson brings this action on behalf of herself and members of a Class defined as: All persons who purchased FitFlop Footwear in New Jersey until the date notice is provided to the Class. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their officers, directors and employees, and those who purchased FitFlop Footwear for the purpose of resale or who assert claims for personal injury. 62. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the proposed Class contains thousands of purchasers of FitFlop Footwear who have been damaged by Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. The true number of Class members is known by the Defendants, however, and thus potential Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by first class mail, electronic mail, and/or published notice. 64. Typicality. Plaintiff Glaberson’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class because, inter alia, all Class members were injured through the uniform misconduct described above, were subject to Defendants’ deceptive statements, including deceptive claims that accompanied each and every pair of FitFlop Footwear sold. Plaintiff Glaberson is advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of herself and all members of the Class. 65. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff Glaberson will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff Glaberson has retained highly competent counsel and experienced class action attorneys to represent her interests and that of the Class. Plaintiff Glaberson and her counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action. Plaintiff has no adverse or antagonistic interests to those of the Class. Plaintiff Glaberson is willing and prepared to serve the Court and the Class members in a representative capacity with all of the obligations and duties material thereto and is determined to diligently discharge those duties by vigorously seeking the maximum possible recovery for Class members. 67. Unless a Class is certified, Defendants will retain monies received as a result of its conduct that were taken from Plaintiff Glaberson and Class members. Unless a class-wide injunction is issued, Defendants will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Class and the general public will continue to be deceived. 69. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 70. The Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) was enacted and designed to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive and fraudulent business practices. N.J. Stat. Ann. §56:8-1 et. seq. 71. N.J. Stat. Ann. §56:8-2 provides: The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice . . . . 72. Plaintiff, other members of the Class, and Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of the CFA. 74. Defendants, through their advertisements, used unconscionable commercial practices, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, and misrepresentation in violation of the CFA in connection with the marketing of FitFlop Footwear, as alleged above. 75. Defendants also knowingly concealed, suppressed and consciously omitted material facts to Plaintiff and other members of the Class knowing that consumers would rely on the advertisements and packaging to purchase FitFlop Footwear, including by concealing scientific studies and data that did not support their claims. 76. The misrepresentations and omissions were material and were intended to, and likely to, deceive a reasonable consumer. 77. The foregoing acts, omissions and practices directly, foreseeably and proximately caused Plaintiff and other members of the Class to suffer an ascertainable loss in the form of, inter alia, monies spent to purchase FitFlop Footwear, and they are entitled to recover such damages, together with appropriate penalties, including treble damages, attorneys’ fees and costs of suit. 78. The CFA is, by its terms, a cumulative remedy, such that remedies under its provisions can be awarded in addition to those provided under separate statutory schemes. 79. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 80. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class. 82. All conditions precedent to Defendants’ liability under this contract have been performed by Plaintiff and the Class. 83. Defendants breached the terms of this contract, including the express warranties, with Plaintiff and the Class by not providing FitFlop Footwear that could provide the benefits described above. Such express warranties breached by Defendants include the FitFlop Footwear representations set forth above, including in ¶¶ 26-29, 31-45, as well as in Exhibits A- E attached to this Complaint. 84. As a result of Defendants’ breach of their contract, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in the amount of the purchase price of the FitFlop Footwear they purchased. Breach of Express Warranty Violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act

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25. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and a class of all others similarly situated. This action is brought and is properly maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). 26. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class (“Class”) defined as follows: All individuals and entities in California insured by Defendant and whose insurance covers a vehicle with private-passenger physical damage coverage, including collision or physical damage other than collision coverage, who made a first-party claim that was adjusted by Defendant as a total loss and who received an actual cash value payment from Defendant that did not include sales tax and/or Vehicle Title and Registration Fees. 27. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its subsidiaries and affiliates, its officers, directors and member of their immediate families and any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, the legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns of any such excluded party, the judicial officer(s) to whom this action is assigned, and the members of their immediate families. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class and/or to add subclasses if necessary before this Court determines whether certification is appropriate. A. Numerosity 70. The allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 71. This count is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of itself and on behalf of the Class. 72. Plaintiff was party to a contract, the Insurance Policy, with Defendant as described herein. See Exhibit A. All Class members were parties to an Insurance Policy with Defendant containing materially identical terms. 73. Plaintiff and all Class members made claims determined by Defendant to be total losses under the Insurance Policy and determined by Defendant to be covered claims. 74. Defendant, in paying the total loss claim, determined that Plaintiff and each Class member complied with the terms of their insurance contracts, and fulfilled all duties and conditions under the Insurance Policy necessary to be paid on the total loss. 79. The allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference. 80. This count seeks declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2201-2202. 81. This count is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of itself and all members of the Class. 82. Plaintiff was party to a contract, the Insurance Policy, with Defendant as described herein. See Exhibit A. All Class members were parties to an Insurance Policy contract with Defendant containing materially identical terms. 83. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that an insured is unconditionally entitled to sales tax and Vehicle Title and Registration Fees in a FTLP to pay a vehicle’s ACV under the insurance policies that govern Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ contractual relationships with Defendant. A. USAA’s Policy Requires the Payment of Actual Cash Value for Total Loss Vehicles CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT DECLARATORY RELIEF

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INJUNCTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) (brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws of other states and the District of Columbia to the extent New York consumer protection laws are inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the New York Class) Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further allege as follows: Plaintiffs brings these claim on behalf of themselves and the other members of the Nationwide Class for an injunction for violations of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices Law

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26. Definition of Class. The class consists of all individuals who: a. Are Medicaid recipients with an intellectual or developmental disability; b. Need an institutional level of care provided in a Medicaid-certified ICF in the State of Washington; and c. Qualify for and desire DDA home and community-based habilitative services which they are not receiving. 27. Size of Class. The class of Medicaid recipients who qualify for, have requested, and are not receiving home and community-based services administered by DDA is expected to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Defendants have identified as many as ninety-one DDA clients as waiting for residential habilitative services in the community, while only a handful of these individuals have been offered these services. 45. In 2013, DSHS retained a private consultant, Navigant Healthcare, to conduct an independent review of its supported living program. Navigant’s November 11, 2013 report documented that there was a waitlist for supported living services. It went on to explain, “DDA manages the wait list to prioritize those with the highest levels of need. Due to budget constraints, only individuals whose needs fall into levels 4 through 6 are generally admitted into the program.” 46. Navigant interviewed three supported living providers regarding DDA rate setting and documented the following: “Providers also discussed the challenge they face due to high staff turnover. They associated low reimbursement rates with an inability to pay competitive wages and high staff turnover. Specifically, the hourly ISS [(Instruction and Support Services)] rates have been decreasing since 2009 while the Washington State minimum wage has increased. In addition, the high turnover puts pressure on their training budgets as they must train all new staff.” 62. Plaintiffs re-allege the paragraphs above. 63. Plaintiffs and the putative class are all “qualified individuals with a disability” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Plaintiff and class members have not been provided services they would need to live in an integrated setting in the community. 67. Plaintiffs re-allege the paragraphs above. 68. Plaintiffs and putative class members are qualified individuals with disabilities under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a). Defendants’ agencies, HCA and DSHS, receive federal financial assistance. 69. Defendants violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations by denying Plaintiffs and putative class members access to integrated community- based programs appropriate to meet their needs, thereby requiring that Plaintiffs and putative class members be confined in segregated institutions in order to receive the services that they need, or suffer risk of institutionalization. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT WITH DISABILITIES ACT

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11. Reimer Law denies for want of knowledge the allegations contained in Paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 3 12. Reimer Law admits that Mr. White co-signed several student loans for which his son was the Borrower and denies for want of knowledge the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 13. Reimer Law denies for want of knowledge the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and further answering admits that Reimer Law filed a collection suit to resolve certain outstanding debts. 14. Reimer Law denies for want of knowledge that the Student Loans were taken out primarily for personal, family or household purposes, including Mr. White's son's college education. 15. Reimer Law denies for want of knowledge the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 16. Reimer Law denies for want of knowledge the allegations contained in Paragraph 16 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 17. Reimer Law admits that it filed lawsuits to resolve Mr. White and his son's outstanding debts and further answering, admits that the complaint in the civil lawsuit speaks for itself. 18. Reimer Law admits that it caused Mr. White to be served at his address in Jenera, Ohio and that the summons and complaint for each of the collection suits speaks for themselves. 20. Defendant Reimer Law admits that it is a law firm that at certain times represents clients protecting their legal and equitable interests and to resolve outstanding debts, and denies as stated the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 21. Reimer Law admits that it is a law firm that at certain times represents clients protecting their legal and equitable interests and to resolve outstanding debts, and denies the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 22. Reimer Law denies the allegations and conclusions of law contained in Paragraph 22 of Plaintiff's Complaint and further denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. 23. Reimer Law denies the allegations and conclusions of law contained in Paragraph 23 of Plaintiff's Complaint and further denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. 24. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 24 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Reimer Law admits that White is attempting to assert certain class claims on behalf of himself and others, but denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. 25. In response to the allegations contained in Paragraph 25 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Reimer Law admits that White is attempting to assert certain class claims on behalf of himself and others, but denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. 26. Reimer Law denies the allegations and conclusions of law contained in Paragraph 26 of Plaintiff's Complaint, denies that the identity of each individual member of the class can be ascertained from the Reimer Law firm's business records and/or from public records and denies that the Plaintiff has any evidence to support the allegation that the proposed class is so 5 numerous. It is purely speculative. Further answering, denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. 27. Reimer Law denies the allegations and conclusions of law contained in Paragraph 27 of Plaintiff's Complaint and denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. Reimer Law further denies that there are any questions of law and fact in common to the proposed class that predominate over questions affecting any individual member, or legal or factual basis to support a class action. 28. Reimer Law denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable and further answering states that it contains legal conclusions to which either requires no response or are denied. 29. Reimer Law denies the allegations and conclusions of law contained in Paragraph 29 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. 30. Reimer Law denies the allegations and conclusions of law contained in Paragraph 30 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. 31. Reimer Law denies for want of knowledge whether Plaintiff's attorney is competent and experienced in consumer protection and class action litigation and further answering denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. 32. Reimer Law denies the allegations and conclusions of law contained in Paragraph 32 of Plaintiff's Complaint, and denies that any class exists or is properly certifiable. Defendant Reimer Law further denies there is any legal or factual basis to support a class action.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a jewelry company that owns and operates www.nialaya.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in July of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.nialaya.com, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number (214)659-5024 and (954)780-8831confirmed to be Defendant’s number. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 52. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury. Respectfully Submitted this 6th Day of March, 2020. 8. Beginning in or around October 16, 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -7919, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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13.   Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, the subscriber of the cellular telephone number (267) ***-1810 (the “1810 Number”). The 1810 Number is, and at all times mentioned herein was, assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 33.   Class Definition. Plaintiff brings this civil class action on behalf of herself individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The “Class” which Plaintiff seeks to represent is comprised of and defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received one or more SMS text message(s) from Hot Topic, Inc. and/or an affiliate, subsidiary, or agent of Hot Topic, Inc. to a cellular telephone through the use of an automatic dialing system and who did not provide prior express written consent to receive such SMS text message(s). 34.   Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from the Class. 35.   Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the definition of the Class (or add one or more subclasses) after further discovery. 36.   Plaintiff and all Class members have been impacted and harmed by the acts of Defendant and/or their affiliates or subsidiaries. 37.   This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. 38.   This action may properly be brought and maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b). This class action satisfies the numerosity, typicality, adequacy, commonality, predominance and superiority requirements. 39.   Upon application by Plaintiff’s counsel for certification of the Class, the Court may also be requested to utilize and certify subclasses in the interests of manageability, justice and/or judicial economy. 40.   Numerosity. The number of persons within the Class is substantial, believed to amount to tens of thousands of persons dispersed throughout the United States. It is, therefore, impractical to join each member of the Class as a named Plaintiff. Further, the size and relatively modest value of the claims of the individual members of the Class renders joinder impractical. Accordingly, utilization of the class action mechanism is the most economically feasible means of determining and adjudicating the merits of this litigation. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

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MediCopy offers a FREE encrypted portal for the secure delivery of protected health information. If interested, please email contact@medicopy.net. √ FREE Release of Information Services √ FREE Disability/FMLA Form Completion Exhibit A. The Faxes provide no opt-out instructions. 11. During July and August, 2019, Defendant sent three unsolicited facsimiles to Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device. See Exhibit A. 12. The Faxes appear to be identical and state, in part, the following: 13. Defendant’s website, www.MediCopy.net (last visited 10/17/19), contains the following: Home / What We Offer 5 Taking a fresh approach to traditional Release of Information services by offering innovative support to patients, requesting parties and HIM departments alike. MediCopy strives to make the Release of Information experience as reliable and efficient as possible by providing simple and secure HIM solutions. We offer full-service Release of Information services tailored to Hospitals & Health Systems, as well as Physicians & Group Practices. Our objective is to assist in the integral role of patient care by providing security and privacy safeguards during the transfer and handling of medical records - all while providing exceptional customer service. 14. The Faxes advertise the commercial availability and/or quality of Defendant’s new encrypted portal. 15. The Faxes are advertisements under the TCPA and regulations implementing the 21. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the TCPA on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendant, and (3) from whom Defendant did not obtain “prior express invitation or permission” to send fax advertisements, or (4) with whom Defendant did not have an established business relationship, or (5) where the fax advertisements did not include an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii) regarding any claimed established business relationship. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its employees and agents, and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes, but is not limited to, the Faxes sent to Plaintiff. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 22. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 23. Commonality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)): Common questions of law and fact apply to the claims of all class members. Common material questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Whether the Faxes and other faxes sent during the class period constitute advertisements under the TCPA and its implementing regulations; (b) Whether Defendant meets the definition of “sender” for direct TCPA liability, meaning a “person or entity on whose behalf a facsimile unsolicited 7 advertisement is sent or whose goods or services are advertised or promoted in the unsolicited advertisement,” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(10); (c) Whether Defendant had prior express invitation or permission to send Plaintiff and the class fax advertisements; (d) Whether the faxes contain an “opt-out notice” that complies with the requirements of § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and the effect of the failure to comply with such requirements; (e) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the future; (f) Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to statutory damages; and (g) Whether the Court should award treble damages. 24. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of Defendant advertising the availability or quality of Defendant’s property, goods or services during the Class Period. Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. Defendant has acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar fax or faxes which did not contain the proper opt- out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 25. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 8 26. Predominance and Superiority (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)): Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because: (a) Proof of Plaintiff’s claims will also prove the claims of the class without the need for separate or individualized proceedings; (b) Evidence regarding defenses or any exceptions to liability that Defendant may assert and attempt to prove will come from Defendant’s records and will not require individualized or separate inquiries or proceedings; (c) Defendant has acted and is continuing to act pursuant to common policies or practices in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members; (d) The amount likely to be recovered by individual class members does not support individual litigation. A class action will permit a large number of relatively small claims involving virtually identical facts and legal issues to be resolved efficiently in one proceeding based upon common proofs; and (e) This case is inherently manageable as a class action in that: (i) Defendant identified persons to receive the fax transmissions and it is believed that Defendant’s and/or Defendant’s agents’ computers and business records will enable Plaintiff to readily identify class members and establish liability and damages; (ii) Liability and damages can be established for Plaintiff and the class with the same common proofs; 9 (iii) Statutory damages are provided for in the statute and are the same for all class members and can be calculated in the same or a similar manner; (iv) A class action will result in an orderly and expeditious administration of claims and it will foster economies of time, effort and expense; (v) A class action will contribute to uniformity of decisions concerning Defendant’s practices; and (vi) As a practical matter, the claims of the class are likely to go unaddressed absent class certification. Claim for Relief for Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 27. The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 28. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 29. Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The TCPA as amended by the JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following, among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): 10 (1) A statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements—knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt- out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; (2) A statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful—thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; (3) A statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender—thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; (4) The opt-out language must be conspicuous. The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act. The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶ 31 of its 2006 Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006. The requirements of (3) above are contained in § (b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice Requirements via § (b)(2)(D)(ii). Compliance with the Opt- Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult nor costly. The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon consumers and businesses, giving them the right, and means, to stop unwanted fax advertisements. 30. 2006 FCC Report and Order. The TCPA, in § (b)(2) of the Act, directed the FCC to implement regulations regarding the TCPA, including the TCPA’s Opt-Out Notice 11 Requirements and the FCC did so in its 2006 Report and Order, which in addition provides, among other things: A. The definition of, and the requirements for, an established business relationship (EBR) for purposes of the first of the three prongs of an exemption to liability under § (b)(1)(C)(i) of the Act and provides that the lack of an “established business relationship” precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (see 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 8-12 and 17-20); B. The required means by which a recipient’s facsimile telephone number must be obtained for purposes of the second of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(ii) of the Act, and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (see 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 13-16); and C. The things that must be done in order to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements for the purposes of the third of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (see 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 24-34). As a result thereof, a sender of a faxed advertisement who fails to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements cannot claim the exemption from liability contained in § (b)(C)(1) of the Act. 31. The Faxes. During July and August 2019, Defendant sent the Faxes via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Faxes 12 constituted advertisements under the Act and the regulations implementing the Act. Defendant failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Faxes. The Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and Defendant is precluded from sustaining the EBR safe harbor as to Plaintiff and other members of the class because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendant violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Faxes via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes these Faxes and all others sent during the four years prior to the filing of this case through the present. 32. Defendant’s Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendant has sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the TCPA and its implementing regulations that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and without complying with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendant violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendant may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 33. The TCPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendant’s violations of the Act, and provides for 13 statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 34. The TCPA is a strict liability statute, so Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 35. Defendant knew or should have known that (a) Plaintiff and the other class members had not given prior express invitation or permission for Defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the availability or quality of Defendant’s property, goods or services; (b) Defendant transmitted or caused to be transmitted the Fax advertisements; (c) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (d) Defendant’s transmission of unsolicited advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice was unlawful. 36. Defendant’s actions caused damages to Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving Defendant’s junk faxes caused Plaintiff and the other recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of Defendant’s faxes. Moreover, Defendant’s faxes occupied Plaintiff's and the other class members’ telephone lines and fax machines. Defendant’s faxes cost Plaintiff and the other class members time, as Plaintiff and the other class members and their employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing, and routing Defendant’s unauthorized faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on Plaintiff's and the other class members’ business or personal activities. Defendant’s faxes intruded into Plaintiff's and other class members’ seclusion and violated their right to privacy, including their interests in being left alone. Finally, the injury and property damage sustained by Plaintiff and the other class members from the sending of Defendant’s advertisements occurred outside of Defendant’s premises. 14

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by 47 41. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 43. PSI and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 44. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant or their agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 45. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 47. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: i. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint, PSI made any call(s) (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to the Class members using any ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; ii. Whether PSI called non-customers of PSI for marketing purposes; iii.Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation(s); and iv. Whether PSI should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 48. As a person who received numerous calls from Defendant in which Defendant used an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 50. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 51. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those that would be presented in numerous individual claims. 52. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 53. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 54. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 55. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 58. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 59. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 60. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 62. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 63. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 65. As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 66. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 67. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers confirmed to be Defendant’s number. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 20. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 8. Beginning in or around March of 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -5325, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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11. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communication to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to August 25, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. 22. The Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 23. Specifically, the Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. debt, was a credit card used for personal, family and household purchases. 24. The alleged Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 25. Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 26. Defendant PRA, a debt collector and the subsequent owner of the Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. debt, is collecting the alleged debt. 28. On or about August 25, 2020, Defendant PRA sent the Plaintiff a debt collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. See Exhibit A. 29. The Letter states a balance of $ 4,820.96. 30. The Letter offers two options regarding the balance: Either pay the full amount or select a “savings plan” that allows the consumer to pay the balance for a discounted amount. 31. Below the offer to pay in full, the letter states: “Your Account will be considered paid-in-full after your final payment is successfully posted.” 32. Below the offer to pay the discounted amount, the letter states: “The savings will be applied to the balance and your account will be considered paid-in-full for less than the full balance after your final payment is successfully posted.” 33. Below both offers, the Letter includes a sentence that states: “Within approximately 30 days of your final payment successfully posting, we will request that the three major credit reporting agencies delete our tradeline related to your account from your credit bureau report.” 35. Upon Defendant’s request to delete the tradeline from the credit bureaus upon final payment, the account will no longer appear on the credit report of the Plaintiff in any form. 36. Therefore, there is no consequence to Defendant’s earlier statements in the Letter that the account will be “considered” paid in full or “paid in full for less than the full balance,” because in either scenario, the account will simply not appear on Plaintiff’s credit report. 37. The earlier statements are deceptive and misleading, because they propose to offer a benefit of considering the account “paid-in-full,” which essentially does not exist, because the account will be deleted entirely upon final payment. 38. Just the fact that letter at all states that there is a status for each type of payment option is misleading, when in fact either option results in a complete wiping away of the account having existed at all. 40. Plaintiff incurred an informational injury because the Defendants falsely describe the effects of full payment as opposed to less than full payment. 41. As a result of Defendants deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 42. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 43. Defendants debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 44. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 46. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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35. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ Spring term began with the first day of classes on or about January 13, 2020.5 36. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ Spring term was scheduled to conclude with the last day of classes on April 28, 2020 and exams taking place April 30th through May 6th.6 37. Accordingly, Defendants’ Spring semester was scheduled and contracted to consist of approximately 112 days. 39. Defendants’ Spring Break was scheduled to begin March 9, 2020 and to conclude on March 13th; however, it was extended through March 20th.8 40. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendants announced on March 11, 2020 that Spring Break would be extended by one additional week, with no academic instruction the week of March 16, 2020 and course instruction resuming on March 23, 2020 but provided via remote delivery, rather than in-person instruction through at least April 6, 2020. Moreover, all events of more than 50 attendees were cancelled and all visiting speakers were required to be cancelled or postponed.9 41. On March 18, 2020, the University announced that “For the health and well-being of our campus community, beginning 5 p.m. on Thursday, March 19 through at least April 6, Highsmith Student Union, Brown Dining Hall, certain residence halls where approved students with qualified exceptions reside, and the Health and Counseling Center will be the only facilities open on the UNC Asheville campus and access will be restricted to faculty, staff and students. All other facilities, including Ramsey Library, the Student Recreation Center, and Justice Center will be closed at least through April 6.”10 42. On March 20, 2020, the University extended its remote instruction through the end of the semester.11 43. However, Defendants have refused and continue to refuse to offer any pro-rated tuition discounts as a result of moving classes online. 45. Likewise, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Fees Class have been and will be deprived of utilizing services for which they have already paid, as set forth in Paragraph 29 above. 46. To date, Defendants have not announced any plans to discount these fees. 47. As of the drafting of this Complaint, Defendant has announced that it will be offering full pro-rata refunds for room and board, dating back to March 16, 2020. Accordingly, this action does not seek to certify an On-Campus Housing Class or a Meals Class at this time. However, Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this complaint to plead such additional causes of action should Defendant fail to process the promised credits and/or calculate the credits in an inadequate manner. 48. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and as a class action, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following Classes: The Tuition Class: All people who paid tuition for or on behalf of students enrolled in classes at the University for the Spring 2020 semester who were denied live in-person instruction and forced to use online distance learning platforms for the latter portion of that semester. The Fees Class: All people who paid fees for or on behalf of students enrolled in classes at the University for the Spring 2020 semester. 50. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of his claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 51. This action has been brought and may be properly maintained on behalf of the Class proposed herein under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Numerosity: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) 52. The members of the Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that individual joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes there are thousands of members of the Class, the precise number being unknown to Plaintiff, but such number being ascertainable from Defendants' records. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. mail, electronic mail, internet postings, and/or published notice. Commonality and Predominance: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) 55. Plaintiff is an adequate Class representative because his interests do not conflict with the interests of other members of the Class she seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation; and Plaintiff intends to prosecute the action vigorously. The Class’s interests will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. Superiority: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) 56. A class action is superior to any other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, and no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by Plaintiff and other Class members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be required to individually litigate their claims against Defendants, so it would be impracticable for members of the Class to individually seek redress for Defendants' wrongful conduct. 57. Even if Class members could afford individual litigation, the Court system likely could not. Individualized litigation creates a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, comprehensive supervision by a single court, and finality of the litigation. Certification of Specific Issues: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) 59. The University has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other Class members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as described herein, with respect to the Class members as a whole. 60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 61. Plaintiff brings this count on behalf of himself and other members of the Tuition Class. 62. Plaintiff and the Tuition Class entered into contracts with the University which provided that Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class would pay tuition for or on behalf of students and, in exchange, the University would provide live in-person instruction in a physical classroom. 63. Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class fulfilled their end of the bargain when they paid tuition for the Spring 2020 semester either out-of-pocket or by using student loan financing, or otherwise. 64. The University breached the contract with Plaintiff and the Tuition Class by moving all classes for the Spring 2020 semester to online distance learning platforms, without reducing or refunding tuition accordingly. 65. The University retained tuition monies paid by Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class, without providing them the full benefit of their bargain. 67. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach, Plaintiff and the Tuition Class are legally and equitably entitled to damages, to be decided by the trier of fact in this action, to include but not be limited to disgorgement of the difference between the value of the online learning which is being provided versus the value of the live in-person instruction in a physical classroom that was contracted for. 68. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 69. Plaintiff brings this count on behalf of himself and other members of the Tuition Class. 70. The University has received a benefit at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class to which it is not entitled. 71. Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class paid substantial tuition for live in-person instruction in physical classrooms and did not receive the full benefit of the bargain. 72. Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class conferred this benefit on Defendants when they paid the tuition. 73. Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class did not confer this benefit gratuitously. 74. Defendants have realized this benefit by accepting such payment. 76. Equity and good conscience require that the University return a portion of the monies paid in tuition to Plaintiff and other members of the Tuition Class. 77. Defendants should be required to disgorge this unjust enrichment. 78. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 79. Plaintiff brings this count on behalf of himself and other members of the Fees Class. 80. Plaintiff and the Fees Class entered into contracts with the University which provided that Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class would pay certain fees for or on behalf of students and, in exchange, the University would provide access and services related to those fees, such as access to student activities, athletics, wellness centers, libraries, etc. 81. Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class fulfilled their end of the bargain when they paid these fees for the Spring 2020 semester either out-of-pocket or by using student financing, or otherwise. 82. The University breached the contract with Plaintiff and the Fees Class by moving all classes for the Spring 2020 semester to online distance learning platforms, constructively evicting students from campus, and closing most campus buildings and facilities. 83. The University retained fees paid by Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class, without providing them the full benefit of their bargain. 85. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' breach, Plaintiff and the Fees Class are legally and equitably entitled to damages, to be decided by the trier of fact in this action, to include but not be limited to disgorgement of the pro-rata amount of fees that was collected but for which access and services were not provided. 86. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 87. Plaintiff brings this count on behalf of himself and other members of the Fees Class. 88. The University has received a benefit at the expense of Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class to which it is not entitled. 89. Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class paid substantial student fees for on campus benefits and services and did not receive the full benefit of the bargain. 90. Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class conferred this benefit on Defendants when they paid the fees. 91. Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class did not confer this benefit gratuitously. 92. Defendants have realized this benefit by accepting such payment. 93. Defendants have retained this benefit, even though Defendants have failed to provide the access and services for which the fees were collected, making Defendants' retention unjust under the circumstances. 94. Equity and good conscience require that the University return a pro-rata portion of the monies paid in fees to Plaintiff and other members of the Fees Class. BREACH OF CONTRACT (Plaintiff and Other Members of the Tuition Class) BREACH OF CONTRACT (Plaintiff and Other Members of the Fees Class) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Plaintiff and Other Members of the Fees Class) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Plaintiff and Other Members of the Tuition Class)

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10. The Mortgage secured the purchase of Plaintiff’s personal residence located at 2227 Harbor Drive, Fort Wayne, Indiana 46804. USDC IN/ND case 1:19-cv-00129-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 03/29/19 page 2 of 11 3 11. The Mortgage secured the repayment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note in the amount of $176,000.00 (the “mortgage loan”). 12. This indebtedness is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) as it arises out of a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 13. On May 1, 2009, Plaintiff defaulted on the mortgage loan by failing to make monthly payments. 14. On March 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. 15. Simultaneously with the voluntary petition, Plaintiff filed his Chapter 13 plan. Plaintiff’s plan provided: 16. Plaintiff’s Chapter 13 Plan was confirmed on December 28, 2010 (the “Confirmed Plan”). 17. On November 19, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court entered an Order of Discharge for the benefit of Plaintiff under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). 18. Plaintiff’s discharge by operation released Plaintiff’s personal liability on indebtedness owed on Plaintiff’s mortgage loan. 19. On February 16, 2019, Defendant became the new servicer of Plaintiff’s mortgage loan. 20. On February 21, 2019, Defendant mailed Plaintiff a “Payment Reminder Notice.” See Exhibit A. USDC IN/ND case 1:19-cv-00129-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 03/29/19 page 3 of 11 4 21. The Payment Reminder Notice stated: Your mortgage payments are past due, which puts you in default of your loan agreement. If you have recently mailed your payments, please disregard this letter. As of the date of this letter, you owe the following:  Number of months past due: 117  Total monthly payments due: $180,895.59  Accumulated late charges: $1,500.75  Total amount due: $182,396.34 (emphasis added). 22. Defendant’s post-discharge collection practice(s) have caused Plaintiff emotional distress consistent with believing he remained liable to Defendant on this mortgage loan. 28. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 29. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Putative Class”). A. Numerosity. 30. On information and belief, Defendant mailed letters in an identical format as the Payment Reminder Notice to Indiana consumers on no less than 40 occasions. 31. The exact number of members of the Putative Class are unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. B. Typicality. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Putative Class. 33. On information and belief, Defendant’s business records will show that they mailed mailed letters in an identical format as the Payment Reminder Notice to Indiana consumers. 34. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the members of the Putative Class because Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Class are entitled to damages as result of Defendant’s conduct. C. Commonality and Predominance. 35. There are common questions of fact and law with the claims of Plaintiff and the Putative Class. USDC IN/ND case 1:19-cv-00129-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 03/29/19 page 6 of 11 7 36. These common questions of fact and law are whether Defendant sought to collect discharged mortgage debt. 37. These common questions of fact and law are subject to common proof through review of Defendant’s business records. 38. These common questions of fact and law are answerable for the entirety of the Putative Class. 39. These common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Putative Class. D. Superiority and Manageability. 40. This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. 41. Joinder of all parties is impracticable. 42. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution of Defendant’s post-discharge collection practices. 43. Even if individual members of the Putative Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties and courts. 44. By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 45. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. E. Adequate Representation. USDC IN/ND case 1:19-cv-00129-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 03/29/19 page 7 of 11 8 46. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent and protect the interests of the Putative Class. 47. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer class action litigation. 48. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 9. On December 14, 2006, Plaintiff executed a mortgage in favor of American Brokers Conduit. 9. Property to Be Surrendered to Secured Creditor Name Description of Property BAC Home Loans Servic Real estate located at 2227 Blue Harbor Dr., Fort Wayne, IN

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(Declaratory Relief) 112. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 111 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 113. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Beyonce.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Beyonce.com, which Parkwood owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 114. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) 25. Defendant, Parkwood Entertainment LLC, controls and operates Beyonce.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 26. Beyonce.com is a commercial website that offers products, information and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse merchandise, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Beyonce.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Beyonce on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase the various lines of Beyonce merchandise; and (c) The ability to view images of Beyonce, learn about Beyonce’s music and purchase albums, learn about tours and purchase tickets, and join for exclusive access among other features. 28. This case arises out of Parkwood’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Beyonce.com. Due to Parkwood’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Beyonce.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Beyonce, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Beyonce.com. 29. Parkwood denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Beyonce.com by preventing them from freely navigating Beyonce.com. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Beyonce.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Beyonce.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Beyonce.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Beyonce.com, these forms include search fields to locate Beyonce merchandise and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 34. Furthermore, Beyonce.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Beyonce.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 36. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Beyonce.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 37. Beyonce.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Beyonce.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Beyonce.com. 39. Beyonce.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Beyonce.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Beyonce.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 40. Plaintiff, Mary Conner, has made numerous attempts to visit, browse, and complete a purchase on Beyonce.com, most recently in December 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Beyonce.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to learn about the artist, join, and purchase the Holidayonce Embroidered Pullover Hoodie. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Beyonce.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 42. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Beyonce.com. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 45. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Beyonce.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury- in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of Defendant’s conduct. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Beyonce.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Beyonce.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 47. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Beyonce.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Beyonce.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 50. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Beyonce.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Beyonce.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Beyonce.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Beyonce.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 51. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Parkwood has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Beyonce.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 55. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 56. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 58. Beyonce.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 59. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Beyonce.com. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 62. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 64. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Parkwood who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Beyonce.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Beyonce.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 69. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 71 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 73. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 74. Beyonce.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 75. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Beyonce.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Beyonce.com, causing Beyonce.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 79. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Beyonce.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 83. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 86. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 88. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 91. Beyonce.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 92. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Beyonce.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 93. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Beyonce.com, causing Beyonce.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 95. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 96. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the Defendant shall reside . . .” 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations.

lose

40. The allegations in all previous paragraphs are incorporated by reference as though fully set forth here. 41. Defendants owed a duty to all Plaintiffs and Class Members to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture and distribution of the Sleeper. 42. Defendants had a heightened duty of care to all Plaintiffs and the Class Members because of the great danger associated with the Sleeper and the especially high risk of injury to infants. 43. Defendants breached that duty when they failed to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and integrity of the Sleeper. 44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ failure take appropriate steps to ensure the safety of the Plaintiffs and the Class Members have suffered legal injury and damages, 8 in an amount to be proven at trial, including, but not limited to diminution of value of real estate, loss of income and other economic loss, and loss of enjoyment of real property. 45. The injuries were caused by the joint negligence of the Defendants. 46. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs allege that their injuries were the result of Defendants’ joint negligence in: a. Failing to properly manufacture and/or distribute the Sleeper; b. Failing to properly inspect the Sleeper to assure that all parts were fit for their intended purpose; c. Acting in a careless and negligent manner: d. Failing to promulgate, implement, and enforce proper rules and regulations to ensure the safe manufacture and distribution of the Sleeper, which would have prevented the injuries; e. Failing to take appropriate action to avoid or mitigate the defect; f. Negligently implementing policies and procedures to safely manufacture and distribute the Sleeper; g. Failing to ensure that the Sleeper was free from defects and/or in proper working order; h. Failing to timely warn; i. Failing to provide appropriate instructions; j. Acting in a manner that justifies imposition of punitive damages; and k. Such other acts and omissions as will be shown at the trial of this matter. 47. The consideration of common questions of fact and law will conserve judicial resources and promote a fair and consistent resolution of these claims. 9 48. The injuries to Plaintiffs and the Class Members were also caused by or aggravated by the fact that Defendants failed to take necessary actions to mitigate the danger of the mold. 49. Furthermore, the injuries would not have occurred had the Defendants exercised a high degree of care. Plaintiffs, therefore, plead the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 50. Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to a judgment finding Defendants liable to Plaintiffs and the Class Members for damages suffered as a result of Defendants’ acts and omissions. 51. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, reallege each and every allegation set forth above. 52. Defendants owed a duty to all Plaintiffs and Class Members to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture and distribution of the Sleeper. 53. Defendants had a heightened duty of care to all Plaintiffs and the Class Members because of the great danger associated with manufacturing items for infants. 54. Defendants breached their legal duty to Plaintiffs and the Class, failed to exercise reasonable care, and acted with reckless, willful, and wanton disregard for the property and economic interests of others, including Plaintiffs and the Class Members, in the negligent manufacture and distribution of the Sleeper. 55. Defendants knew or should have known that their wanton or reckless conduct would foreseeably result in defects in the Sleeper, causing injuries to the Plaintiffs and Class Members. 10 56. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants wanton or reckless conduct, Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered legal injury and damages, in an amount to be proven at trial. 57. Defendants’ wanton or reckless conduct, as described herein, entitles Plaintiffs and Class Members to punitive damages. 58. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, reallege each and every allegation set forth above. 59. Defendants’ conduct with regard to the manufacture and distribution of the Sleeper is governed by numerous state and federal laws, and permits issued under the authority of these laws. 60. These laws and permits create statutory standards that are intended to protect and benefit Plaintiffs and the Class Members. 61. Defendants’ violations of these statutory standards constitute negligence per se under Alabama law. 62. Defendants’ violations of these statutory standards proximately caused Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ injuries, warranting compensatory and punitive damages. Negligence Per Se. Negligence. Wantonness.

lose

(Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 22. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Woktowalk.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in Wok to Walk Restaurants, during the relevant statutory period.” 23. There are hundreds of thousands of visually impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 24. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons’ access to the goods and services of Woktowalk.com and Wok to Walk Restaurants. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Woktowalk.com and by extension the goods and services offered through Defendant’s website to Wok to Walk Restaurants. 26. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Wok to Walk has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Woktowalk.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 27. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 29. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 30. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 31. Wok to Walk operates Wok to Walk Restaurants, a fresh, nutritious, quick and flexible Asian cuisine with exotic flavors for every diet operating 3 locations throughout the United States, all of which are located in the state of New York. 32. Woktowalk.com is a service and benefit offered by Wok to Walk and Wok to Walk Restaurants throughout the United States, including New York State. Woktowalk.com is owned, controlled and/or operated by Wok to Walk, LLC. 33. Woktowalk.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale that are available in Wok to Walk restaurant locations. The online store allows the user to browse menu items, order its selection of wok style noodle, rice and topping options with Wok to Walk’s specialty sauces such as Bangkok, Shanghai, Hot Asia and many more; learn about the Wok to Walk’s story, concept and values, find its restaurant locations; and perform a variety of other functions. 35. This case arises out of Wok to Walk’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to Woktowalk.com, including the goods and services offered by Wok to Walk restaurants through Woktowalk.com. Due to Wok to Walk’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Woktowalk.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Wok to Walk Restaurants, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Woktowalk.com. 36. Wok to Walk denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Woktowalk.com by preventing them from freely navigating Woktowalk.com. 37. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as shopping, banking, etc., for sighted and blind persons. 39. There are well-established guidelines for making websites accessible to blind individuals. These guidelines have been in place for at least several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility. The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including, but not limited to: adding invisible alt-text to graphics; ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard and not just a mouse; ensuring that image maps are accessible, and adding headings so that blind people can easily navigate the site. Without these very basic components a website will be inaccessible to a blind person using a screen reader. 40. Woktowalk.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible forms, inaccessible image maps, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling; the denial of keyboard access; and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 42. Similarly, Woktowalk.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image to allow user interaction. Visual details on this single image highlight different "hot spots," which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various "hot spots." The image maps on Woktowalk.com do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and blind individuals. 43. Woktowalk.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Woktowalk.com, these forms include search fields to locate menu items, fields that specify the number of items desired, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to the lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot easily make purchases or inquiries as to Wok to Walk’s menu items, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 45. Woktowalk.com thus contains access barriers that deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Woktowalk.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Wok to Walk restaurants in New York State. 46. Plaintiff AMANIE RILEY has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Woktowalk.com, most recently in August 2016, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website, causing Woktowalk.com to be inaccessible and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 48. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Woktowalk.com contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 49. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Woktowalk.com and Wok to Walk Restaurants. 50. Wok to Walk engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 52. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 53. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 54. Wok to Walk Restaurants located in New York State and throughout the United States are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). Woktowalk.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Wok to Walk Restaurants. Woktowalk.com is a service that is by and integrated with these restaurants. 55. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because they own and operate Wok to Walk Restaurants. 56. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I) it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 58. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 59. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 62. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 63. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Woktowalk.com and Wok to Walk Restaurants in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 64. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 67. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 70. Wok to Walk Restaurants located in New York State and throughout the United States are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Woktowalk.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Wok to Walk Restaurants. Woktowalk.com is a service that is by and integrated with these restaurants. 71. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because they own and operate the Wok to Walk Restaurants and Woktowalk.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 72. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Woktowalk.com, causing Woktowalk.com and the services integrated with Wok to Walk Restaurants to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 74. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 76. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 78. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Woktowalk.com and Wok to Walk Restaurants under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 81. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 82. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof …” 86. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision” 87. Wok to Walk Restaurants located in New York State are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Woktowalk.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Wok to Walk Restaurants. Woktowalk.com is a service that is by and integrated with these restaurants. 88. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because they own and operate Wok to Walk Restaurants and Woktowalk.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 90. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 91. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby…” 92. Specifically, under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside …” 93. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 96. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 97. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of … disability … directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 98. Wok to Walk Restaurants located in New York State and throughout the United States are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). Woktowalk.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Wok to Walk Restaurants. Woktowalk.com is a service that is by and integrated with these restaurants.

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15. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 35. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 36. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA. 37. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(3)(B). 38. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 39. Additionally, as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) to ensure that Defendant’s violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future. 40. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 41. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1 - 34 as if fully set forth herein. 42. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA. Negligent Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Willful Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a piano retailer that operates FAUST stores (its “Stores”) as well as the FAUST website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. 21. Defendant operates FAUST stores across the United States, including its retail location in New York located at 207 West 58th Street, New York, NY 10019. 22. These Stores constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s stores provide to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including Store locations and hours, the ability to browse the products available for rent or purchase, find information on different pianos, and related goods available both in Stores and online. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Stores. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Stores and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s Stores on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s physical locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Stores are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Stores. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 85. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Breach of Contract – By Plaintiff on behalf of the Class, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Negligent Misrepresentation – By Plaintiff on behalf of the Class, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Unjust Enrichment/Quasi Contract – By Plaintiff on behalf of the Class, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of District of Columbia’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code Ann. §§ 28-3901, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of District of Columbia Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of California Business and Professions Code, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of California Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 13- 101, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Maryland Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) 115. Plaintiff and the Maryland Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 116. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the Maryland Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 117. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 118. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 119. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the Maryland Subclass. (Violation of Delaware’s Consumer Fraud Act, Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 2511, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Delaware Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of West Virginia’s Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W.Va. Code Ann. §§ 46A-1-101, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of West Virginia Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) 184. Plaintiff and the West Virginia Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 185. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the West Virginia Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 186. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 187. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 188. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the West Virginia Subclass. (Violation of Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 42- 110a, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Connecticut Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 407.010, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Missouri Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) 135. Plaintiff and the Missouri Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 136. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the Missouri Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 137. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 138. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 139. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the Missouri Subclass. (Violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of California Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Illinois Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) 105. Plaintiff and the Illinois Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 106. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the Illinois Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 107. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 108. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 109. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the Illinois Subclass. (Violation of Rhode Island’s Unfair Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Act, Ri. Gen. Laws §§ 6-13.1-1, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Rhode Island Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) 164. Plaintiff and the Rhode Island Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 165. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the Rhode Island Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 166. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 167. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 168. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the Rhode Island Subclass. (Violation of Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Law, 9 Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 9, §§ 2451, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Vermont Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) 174. Plaintiff and the Vermont Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 175. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the Vermont Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 176. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 177. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 178. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the Vermont Subclass. (Violation of Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 45.50.471, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Alaska Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 501.201, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Florida Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of Michigan’s Consumer Protection Act, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.901, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Michigan Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) 125. Plaintiff and the Michigan Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 126. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the Michigan Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 127. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 128. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 129. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the Michigan Subclass. (Violation of North Dakota’s Consumer Fraud statute, N.D. Cent. Code §§ 51-15-01, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of North Dakota Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) 154. Plaintiff and the North Dakota Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 155. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the North Dakota Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 156. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 157. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 158. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the North Dakota Subclass. (Violation of Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-1521, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Arizona Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of Georgia’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10- 1-370, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of Georgia Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) (Violation of New Jersey’s Unfair Trade Practices Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-19, et seq. – By Plaintiff on behalf of New Jersey Subclass, against Defendant and Does 1-100) 139. Plaintiff and the New Jersey Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 140. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the New Jersey Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 141. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 142. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 143. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the New Jersey Subclass. 18. Plaintiff purchased a new, 2012 model Samsung Smart TV, an Affected Smart TV, in the state of California, for family or household purposes. 19. Defendant manufactured the television purchased by Plaintiff and used advertising and marketing to educate the consuming public, including Plaintiff, about Smart TV technology. That technology included but was not limited to smart televisions’ new and unique ability to access video streaming apps, including YouTube, directly on its Smart TVs. 37. Plaintiff and the Class repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 38. Defendant offered its specific models of Affected Smart TVs to consumers for specific prices. Those prices were based on the complete product and functionality the consumer would purchase. Defendant’s offer promised, as evinced by Defendant’s advertising, packaging, promoting, etc., that the Affected Smart TV being purchased included access to the YouTube app via the Affected Smart TV for the life of the product. 39. Defendant intended Plaintiff and the Class to be the beneficiary of the promised performance of its Affected Smart TVs; namely, that Affected Smart TVs would provide access to YouTube without additional expense for the life of the product. 40. Plaintiff and the Class accepted Defendant’s offer by purchasing Affected Smart TVs and paying Defendant’s requested price. 41. Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiff and the Class on June 26, 2017, when its Affected Smart TVs stopped providing access to YouTube. 42. Defendant further breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to offer any no-cost solution to restore access to YouTube on Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Affected Smart TVs. 43. Plaintiff and the Class incurred damages resulting from Defendant’s breach including but not limited to a diminution of value of each and every Affected Smart TV due to the loss of YouTube functionality on those devices. 44. Plaintiff and the Class repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 49. Plaintiff and the Class repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 50. Defendant made multiple, uniform material misrepresentations to Plaintiff and the Class; specifically, that one of the world’s most popular video streaming apps, YouTube, would be available on Affected Smart TVs for the life of the products. YouTube functionality for the life of the product was a material misrepresentation not only due to the popularity of YouTube as a video streaming app, but especially because, unlike other video streaming apps available on Affected Smart TVs, YouTube app functionality on Affected Smart TVs came without the additional subscription expenditure required to access similar video streaming apps such as Netflix and Hulu. 55. Plaintiff and the Alaska Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 56. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That representation to Plaintiff and the Alaska Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of Alaska Stat. Ann. § 45.50.471(b)(4). 60. Plaintiff and the Arizona Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 61. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That representation to Plaintiff and the Arizona Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 62. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 63. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 64. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the Arizona Subclass. 65. Plaintiff and the California Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 70. Plaintiff and the California Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 71. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That material representation to Plaintiff and the California Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess which was unfair. 72. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 73. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 74. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the California Subclass requiring restitution. 75. Plaintiff and the Connecticut Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 80. Plaintiff and the Delaware Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 81. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That representation to Plaintiff and the Delaware Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 82. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 83. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 84. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the Delaware Subclass. 85. Plaintiff and the District of Columbia Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 90. Plaintiff and the Florida Subclass repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if set forth in full herein. 91. Defendant represented through advertising, marketing, packaging and by educating the consuming public about the then-emerging Smart TV product segment, that its Affected Smart TVs would have access to YouTube for the life of the product. That representation to Plaintiff and the Florida Subclass represented characteristics, uses and benefits that Defendant’s Affected Smart TVs did not possess in violation of law. 92. Defendant intended that consumers would rely on the characteristics, uses and benefits it represented regarding its Affected Smart TVs. 93. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive representations occurred in trade or commerce. 94. Defendant’s representation was unfair and deceptive resulting in an ascertainable economic injury to Plaintiff and the Florida Subclass.

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(Overtime Compensation Due Under 29 U.S.C. § 207) 26. Plaintiff re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 25 above and incorporates them here by reference. 28. Specifically, Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated current and former employees for all overtime hours worked through its custom, policy, and/or practice of misclassifying its Store Managers in Georgia as exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 29. Defendant’s actions in failing to compensate Plaintiff and persons similarly situated in accordance with the FLSA were willful, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), and committed with a conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals. 30. As a result of Defendant’s violation of the FLSA, Plaintiff and all similarly situated individuals are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated damages as well as prejudgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs of suit, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), all in amounts to be determined at trial.

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1. The amount of the debt; 10. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant Harris sent an initial collection letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. providing multiple addresses; e. without identifying the correct address to which to send a dispute; and f. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 12. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 13. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and its respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 14. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. 4 15. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 16. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well- defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, 5 complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 17. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 18. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 19. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 2. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 20. Some time prior to December 4, 2020, Plaintiff allegedly incurred an obligation to The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York (“Columbia”). 21. The obligation arose out of a transaction involving a medical debt to Columbia in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, were incurred solely for personal purposes, specifically personal medical care. 6 22. The alleged Columbia obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 23. Columbia is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (4). 24. Upon information and belief, Columbia contracted with the Defendant Harris to collect the alleged debt. Therefore, Harris is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6). 25. Defendant Harris collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – December 4, 2020 Collection Letter 26. On or about December 4, 2020, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter regarding the alleged debt owed to Columbia. See Letter attached as Exhibit A. 27. The letter ostensibly provides the notices as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g regarding disputing the debt. 28. However, there are three addresses listed for Defendant in two different cities and states: a. 111 West Jackson Blvd, Suite 400, Chicago, IL, 60604 b. P.O. Box 21418, New York, NY 10087 c. P.O. Box 5462, Chicago, IL 60680 29. None of the three addresses are specifically identified as the correct address to which to send a dispute. 3. A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt- collector; 30. Plaintiff was therefore confused as to how to properly dispute the debt and exercise her rights under § 1692g. 31. Upon information and belief, disputes sent to one or more of these addresses will not be honored by Defendant. 7 32. Listing these incorrect addresses(es) misled Plaintiff into believing a proper dispute can be sent there. 33. Plaintiff was therefore unable to straightforwardly dispute the debt resulting in wasted time. 34. Plaintiff was therefore unable to evaluate her options of how to handle this debt. 35. Because of this, Plaintiff expended time, money, and effort in determining the proper course of action. 36. These violations by Defendant were knowing, willful, negligent and/or intentional, and Defendant did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such violations. 37. Defendant’s collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm, inter alia, because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with the legally protected right not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action regarding the collection of any consumer debt. 38. Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and unfair representations with respect to its collection efforts were material misrepresentations that affected and frustrated Plaintiff's ability to intelligently respond to Defendant’s collection efforts because Plaintiff could not adequately respond to Defendant’s demand for payment of this debt. 39. Defendant’s actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to properly respond or handle Defendant’s debt collection. 4. A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion 10 thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 40. Plaintiff was confused and misled to her detriment by the statements in the dunning letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to her detriment. 41. Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for Defendant’s statutory violations. 8 42. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 43. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. 44. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 45. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 46. Defendant violated said section by deceptively and/or misleadingly providing multiple addresses and not identifying which one should be used to dispute the debt, in violation of § 1692e (10). 47. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 48. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. 49. In the alternative, Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 5. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 50. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 9 51. Defendant violated this section by unfairly providing multiple addresses and not identifying which one to use for disputing a debt. 52. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 53. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. 54. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 55. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – 56. Defendant violated this section by providing multiple addresses and not identifying which one to use for disputing the debt, thereby failing to provide the proper notice required by §1692g in an initial collection letter. 57. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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23. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member of the four proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 24. The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 9. Beginning on or around September 5, 2017, and continuing through December of 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff Abante on Plaintiff Abante’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -7511, -1636, -7210, -0106, -7447, -1080, and -3803 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff Abante to purchase Defendant’s services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiffs and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5).  An order for injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendants in the future.  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class and the ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  An order for injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendants in the future.  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiffs and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  An order for injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendants in the future.  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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5.1 Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following classes, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 5.2 The Class consists of: (a) All individuals with addresses in the state of Washington; (b) Who were sued by Portfolio in a Washington Court; (c) In a case where Portfolio was represented by Defendant Suttell; (d) Where the complaint failed to state the name of the original creditor; and (e) Where the lawsuit was filed within one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before the date that this Court certifies the class. 6.1 Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 6.2 Sometime in February of 2018, Defendants served Ms. Knutson with a filed summons and complaint in the Pend Oreille County District Court. 6.3 Defendants’ filed complaint omits any reference to the original account creditor, other than the last four digits of a sixteen-digit account number. 6.4 Plaintiff did not recognize the last four digits of the account that Defendants attempted to collect. 6.5 Plaintiff did not know what account, if any, had been sold or assigned to Portfolio for collection. 7.1 Plaintiff repeat, reiterate, and incorporate the allegations contained in the paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 7.2 Defendant’s failure to disclose the name of the original creditor is material because it may impact how a consumer chooses to respond to a lawsuit. 7.3 Defendant’s failure to disclose the identity of the original creditor constitutes a concrete informational injury that is particularized to the state-court defendant who receives the lawsuit. 7.4 Defendant’s debt collection effort violated section 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA, which prohibits any false, deceptive, or misleading representation by a debt collector. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C §1692e et seq.

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11. Plaintiff was employed as a Collector for Enova from September 2012 through August 2016. 12. During her employment, Plaintiff regularly worked forty (40) hours or more per week. 13. During the period beginning June 7, 2014 and continuing through the present, Enova failed to pay Plaintiff and other employees at the appropriate overtime rate required by the FLSA and IMWL. 14. Specifically, Defendant failed to properly calculate the overtime rate at which it compensated Plaintiff and other for their hours worked in excess of forty (40) in individual workweeks. 15. Defendant paid Plaintiff and other employees a commission for months where they met certain performance goals. 16. When it calculated the overtime rate applicable to Plaintiff and other employees, Defendant failed to include in the “regular rate” all commission payments it paid to employees during the same pay period. 17. As a result of Defendant’s miscalculation of the overtime rate between June 7, 2014 and the present, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other employees all overtime wages due to them, in violation of the FLSA and IMWL. 18. A sample payroll record revealing the improper calculation (and violation of the FLSA and IMWL) is attached as Exhibit A. 4 19. Plaintiff seeks to represent all employees who have been paid less than the statutory overtime rate for all overtime for all hours worked in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 20 U.S.C. § 207 from June 7, 2014 through the present. 20. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 for and on behalf of the following class: All persons who (1) were paid an hourly rate plus commissions; (2) worked during the period of time beginning on June 7, 2014 through the present; (3) worked over forty (40) hours per week in any one week; and (4) were compensated at less than the required overtime rate for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek due to Defendant’s failure to include earned commissions when calculating the overtime wages due. 21. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. Plaintiff believes that the putative class numbers in excess of 900 individuals over the statutory timeframe. 22. Common issues of law and fact predominate the claims of the entire putative class. Specifically, all claims are predicated on a finding that Defendant failed to properly calculate the overtime rate due to its employees, resulting in an underpayment in violation of the FLSA. In short, the claims of the named Plaintiff are identical to the claims of the class members. 23. The named Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because all potential plaintiffs were subject to Defendant’s uniform practices and policies. Further, the named Plaintiff and the putative class plaintiffs have suffered the same type of economic damages as a result of Defendant’s practices and policies. 5 24. Finally, a class action is the only realistic method available for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impractical for members of the Class to seek redress individually for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. Were each individual member required to bring a separate lawsuit, the resulting multiplicity of proceedings would cause undue hardship and expense for the litigants and the Court, and create the risk of inconsistent rulings, which would be unjust and inequitable. 25. Plaintiff re-states and incorporates paragraphs 1 – 24 as though fully set forth herein. 26. This Count arises from Defendant’s violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., for its failure to pay McCollum and all putative class members at the correct overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek between June 7, 2014 and the present. 27. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this action may be maintained by a plaintiff who has been damaged by Defendant’s failure to comply with 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 – 207. Plaintiff attaches as Exhibit B her Notice of Consent to Become a Party Plaintiff in a Collective Action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 28. All past and present employees of Defendant who worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week between June 7, 2014 and the present and who did not receive overtime pay at a rate equal to one and one-half times their “regular rate,” where such regular rate included all concurrent commission payments, are similarly situated to the Plaintiff, in that Defendant applied its compensation policies, which violate the FLSA, on company-wide bases for at least all putative class members. 6 29. Defendant’s failure to pay all overtime wages due for hours worked over forty (40) per workweek, is a willful violation of the FLSA, since Defendant’s conduct shows that it either knew that its conduct violated the FLSA or showed reckless disregard for whether its actions complied with the FLSA. 30. The Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the putative class members, as set forth above. 31. For all members of the putative class to become fully aware of their right to join this cause of action, a certain period of time, as determined by this Court, is necessary to send notice to the entire putative class, as well as certain additional time for those members to file consent forms with this Court as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 32. The members of the putative class who are still employed by Defendant may be reluctant to raise individual claims for fear of retaliation. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Shirley McCollum, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated individuals, known and unknown, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order as follows: a) Awarding judgment for back pay equal to the amount of all unpaid overtime compensation earned between June 7, 2014 and the present; b) Awarding liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime compensation found due pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); c) Awarding prejudgment interest with respect to the amount of unpaid overtime compensation; d) Awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing this action; e) Entering an injunction precluding Defendant from violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.; and f) Awarding such additional relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 7 33. Plaintiff re-states and incorporates paragraphs 1 – 32 as though fully set forth herein. 34. This Count arises from Defendant’s violation of the IMWL, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/1, et seq., for its failure to pay the Plaintiff and putative class members all overtime wages owed for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek between June 7, 2014 and the present. 35. Pursuant to the IMWL, for all weeks during which the Plaintiff and the putative class members worked in excess of forty (40) hours and received commission payments, they were entitled to be compensated at an overtime rate which accounted for their commission payments in determining the “regular rate.” 36. Defendant violated the IMWL by failing to compensate the Plaintiff and the putative class members with all overtime wages due for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Shirley McCollum, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons, known and unknown, respectfully requests that this Court enter an order as follows: a) Determining that this action may be maintained as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and/or 23(c)(4); b) Appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative and her Counsel as Class Counsel; c) Awarding judgment in an amount equal to all unpaid back pay owed to Plaintiff and all others similarly situated pursuant to the IMWL for time worked between June 7, 2014 and the present; 8 d) Awarding prejudgment interest on the back pay in accordance with 815 ILL. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Collective Action) ILLINOIS MINIMUM WAGE LAW (Class Action)

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(FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: UNPAID OVERTIME WAGES) (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Collective Action Members) (PENNSYLVANIA MINIMUM WAGE ACT: UNPAID OVERTIME WAGES) (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Members of the PMWA Class) 15. Defendant PrimeCare employed Plaintiff Kathy Moore and the Collective Action Members as therapists. 16. Defendant operated within correctional facilities throughout Pennsylvania. 18. Defendant maintains control, oversight, and discretion over the operation of its medical services within the correctional facilities, including its employment practices with respect to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 19. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were compensated via an hourly rate. 20. Plaintiff Kathy Moore was hired at a rate of $50.00 per hour. Sometime during her employment with PrimeCare, Plaintiff Kathy Moore was given one raise of $0.50 per hour. 21. Consistent with Defendant’s policy, pattern and/or practice, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek without being paid overtime wages, in violation of the FLSA and Pennsylvania Law. 22. Specifically, Plaintiff Kathy Moore regularly worked 70 or more hours per week as a therapist but was never paid overtime for hours worked over 40 per week. 23. The number of shifts that Plaintiff and each individual Collective Action Member worked and how many hours worked per shift, per week can be ascertained from Defendant’s records. 24. Defendant assigned and is aware of all of the work that the Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members have performed. 26. During the Collective Action Periods, the primary job duties of Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members did not include hiring, firing, disciplining, or directing the work of other employees or exercising meaningful independent judgment or discretion. 27. Pursuant to a centralized, company-wide policy, pattern and/or practice, Defendant classified Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members as exempt from coverage of the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 28. Upon information and belief, Defendant did not perform a person-by-person analysis of the job duties of Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members when making the decision to classify all of them uniformly as exempt from the overtime protections of the FLSA. 29. Defendant was willful and in reckless disregard of its obligations under the FLSA when it scheduled Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members over 40 hours a week without providing overtime compensation. 30. Defendant’s unlawful conduct, as described above, was willful or in reckless disregard of the applicable wage and hour laws pursuant to Defendant’s centralized, company- wide policy, pattern, and practice of attempting to minimize labor costs by violating the FLSA and Pennsylvania law. 30. Defendant’s willful violations of the FLSA and Pennsylvania law are further demonstrated by the fact that throughout the Collective Action Period, and continuing to the present, Defendant failed to maintain accurate and sufficient time records for Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. Defendant acted recklessly or in willful disregard of the FLSA and Pennsylvania law by instituting a policy and/or practice that did not allow Plaintiff or the Collective Action Members to record all hours worked. 31. Section 13 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 213, exempts certain categories of employees from the overtime pay requirements set forth under 29 U.S.C. § 2017(a)(1) of the FLSA. None of the aforementioned FLSA exemptions apply to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 32. Due to the foregoing, Defendant’s failure to pay overtime wages for work performed by Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members in excess of 40 hours per workweek was willful and has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 34. Defendant is liable under the FLSA and PMWA for, inter alia, failing to pay premium overtime wages to Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. 35. Upon information and belief, there are at least dozens of similarly situated current and former therapists who have not been paid premium overtime wages in violation of the FLSA and/or PMWA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join. Thus, notice should be sent to the Collective Action Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 36. The similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s records. 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all Collective Action Members, reallege and incorporate by reference the previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 38. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce or the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 40. Defendant has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as described in this Complaint. 41. Plaintiff has consented in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 42. The overtime wage provisions set forth in 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., apply to Defendant. 43. At all relevant times and continuing to the present, Defendant has had a policy and practice of refusing to pay premium overtime compensation to its therapists and similarly situated employees in comparable positions but holding different titles, for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 44. As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant has violated and, continues to violate, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a). 45. As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to record, report, credit, and compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members, Defendant failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a). 47. Due to Defendant’s (a) failure to provide enough labor budget funds, (b) failure to take into account the impact of the underfunded labor budgets on the job duties of Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members, (c) actual knowledge that the primary duties of Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were manual labor and other non-exempt tasks, (d) failure to perform a person-by-person analysis of Plaintiff’s and the Collective Action Members’ job duties to ensure that they were performing primarily exempt job duties, and (e) policy and practice that did not allow Plaintiffs and Collective Action Members to record all hours worked, Defendant knew and/or showed reckless disregard that its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 48. As a result of Defendant’s FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Collective Action Members, is entitled to (a) recover from Defendant unpaid wages for all of the hours worked, as premium overtime compensation, (b) recover an additional, equal amount as liquidated damages for Defendant’s willful violations of the FLSA, and, (c) recover unreasonably delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 49. Defendant’s violations of the FLSA have been willful, thus a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 51. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Collective Action Members were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the PMWA, and Defendant was an employer within the meaning of PMWA. 52. The overtime wage provisions of the PMWA and its supporting regulations apply to Defendant. 53. Defendant willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights and the rights of the Collective Action Members by failing to pay the overtime rate legally required of not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of regular pay for all hours worked by them in excess of 40 in a workweek in violation of the PMWA and its regulations. 54. As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of the PMWA, Plaintiff and Collective Action Members are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, liquidated damages and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, including the employer’s share of FICA, FUTA, state unemployment insurance, and any other required employment taxes, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to the PMWA. 55. Defendant’s PMWA violations have caused Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.

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24. Despite this difficulty and risk, Plaintiff plans to return to Defendant’s facilities, as she lives near and visits Defendant’s facilities for goods and services. Specifically, Plaintiff visits Defendant’s facilities in order to purchase boxes and other supplies for moving and storage. Furthermore, Plaintiff intends to return to Defendant’s facilities to ascertain whether those facilities remain in violation of the ADA. 25. As a result of Defendant’s non-compliance with the ADA, Plaintiff’s ability to access and safely use Defendant’s facilities has been significantly impeded. 26. Plaintiff will be deterred from returning to and fully and safely accessing Defendant’s facilities, however, so long as Defendant’s facilities remain non-compliant, and so long as Defendant continues to employ the same policies and practices that have led, and in the future will lead, to inaccessibility at Defendant’s facilities. 27. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff will continue to be unable to fully and safely access Defendant’s facilities in violation of her rights under the ADA. 28. As an individual with a mobility disability who is dependent upon a wheelchair, Plaintiff is directly interested in whether public accommodations, like Defendants’ facilities, have architectural barriers that impede full accessibility to those accommodations by individuals with mobility-related disabilities. II. Defendant’s Facilities are Public Accommodations Operated by Defendant 29. Defendant is engaged in the operation, management and development of self- storage properties throughout the United States. 31. While Defendant does own some of the properties in its network of retail moving stores, it is primarily engaged in operating and managing properties for other companies that have entered into agreements to license, sell, and distribute Defendant and its subsidiaries’ products and services on properties not owned by Defendant. 32. Defendant is a party to numerous “property management agreements” which designate the Defendant as the “Manager” of retail moving stores, tasked with the responsibility of managing and operating the properties and their respective facilities. 33. These property management agreements specify in detail that Defendant has “the sole and exclusive duty and authority to fully manage the Property and supervise and direct the business and affairs associated or related to the daily operation thereof”.2 35. As the operator, owner and/or manager of their properties, Defendant employs centralized policies, practices and procedures with regard to the operation, maintenance, design, construction, and/or alteration of its facilities. 36. To date, Defendant’s centralized policies and practices have systematically and routinely violated the ADA by failing to ensure that Defendant’s facilities are readily accessible and independently usable, by failing to remove architectural barriers, and by failing to maintain and operate facilities so that the accessible features of Defendant’s facilities are maintained. I. Plaintiff Has Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendant’s Facilities.

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1. Whether Defendant’s employees and agents such as managers, bell staff, doormen, concierges, transportation providers, security personnel, front desk and other staff are trained to assist blind and vision-impaired guests with basic needs such as: completing the hotel registration; learning about and completing service requests like laundry, dry cleaning, valet, shipping, room service, etc.; reviewing the hotel bill and charges; counting and identifying currency; using a signature guide or template in conjunction with their credit card; using a passcard-type of key; luggage rooms, business center, gym or health club, lounge facilities, rest rooms; orienting guests to hotel and guest room layouts; location of fire alarms, emergency exits and equipment; heating and air conditioning controls; TV remote controls; message retrieval system; automated wake- up systems; and safe deposit box. 2. Whether Defendant accepts guide dogs and, if so, if there are any charges associated with the guide dogs, their policies with respect to guide dogs and if there are any rest areas for guide dogs. 25. Defendant owns and operates a hotel in the City of New York. This location also offers dining and entertainment options, including on-site restaurants, room service and lobby lounges. 26. Defendant’s Website offers features to the public that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that it offers about their hotel. The Website is heavily integrated with their hotel, serving as their gateway. 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Defendant’s Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. During Plaintiff’s last visit to the Website occurring in March, 2019, Plaintiff was not able to determine from the reservation system on the Website what ADA compliant features, if any, the hotel offers and whether the guest rooms have handicap accessible facilities or communications equipment in the guest rooms suitable to blind or visually-impaired persons. As a result, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York City by being unable to learn any information about the accessibility features of the hotel or its guest rooms. Defendant Must Include Information Relating to ADA Compliant Rooms and Handicap Accessibility Features Through Its Website Reservation System 31. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website reservation system have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information on the Website reservation system relating to the accessibility of the hotel and guest rooms for blind and visually-impaired people and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from reserving a room at the hotel, staying at the hotel and using the facilities of the hotel including restaurants and attending events. 32. If the hotel and the Website reservation system were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through visiting the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the lack of information on accessibility features available on the reservation system on the Website that result in making the services and facilities of the hotel inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. If the ADA-required information is included on the Website reservation system, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently determine through use of the Website if Defendant’s hotel and guest rooms are ADA compliant and if the facilities described relating the facilities and communications equipment in guest rooms are acceptable to the Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website and the inclusion of information on the Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system to make such information fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 4. Whether or not emergency exit signs are compliant with ADAAG1 requirements and emergency evacuation plans and information are provided in braille and large print. 40. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining the Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of including the information required under the ADA regulations on the Website reservation system in order to make its facilities and guest rooms equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website reservation system to obtain information relating to ADA accessibility of the hotel and their guest rooms, violating their rights. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant have violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system so individuals with disabilities can independently assess if Defendant’s hotel or guest rooms meet the accessibility needs of the Plaintiff and the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 5. Whether or not all accessible signage complies with the requirements of the ADAAG. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s hotel. The Website is a service that is integrated with the Defendant’s hotel and is a gateway thereto. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, and, as a result, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 6. Whether or not the stairs, escalators and elevators comply with ADAAG standards, such as braille for floor numbers in the elevator and a verbal annunciator for each floor. 60. Defendant’s physical hotel is located in the State of New York and constitute a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. The Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, causing the Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden." 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for including the ADA-required information on websites making such websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website reservation system include the ADA-required information would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that does not contain the ADA- required information on its reservation system making their hotel inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failed to take actions to correct the lack of the ADA-required information in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 7. Whether or not the hotel has removed or protected protruding objects which protrude more than 4” into walkways and hallways such as drinking fountains, fire extinguishers, and planters and if they provide cane detectable warnings for the underside of stairways. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 75. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and the Website is a service that is integrated with their establishments. 77. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update the Website and remove access barriers to its hotel by failing to include the ADA- required information on its reservation system, causing the services integrated with their physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non- disabled public. 78. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 79. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that does not contain the ADA- required information on its reservation system making their hotel inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failed to take actions to correct the lack of the ADA-required information in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 8. Whether or not the guest rooms contain tactile and large print thermostat controls and talking/large print clocks. 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 85. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Website and Compliance with Requirement to Describe Accessibility Features VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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16. On or about May 29, 2013 at approximately 6:20 p.m. PST, Defendants contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 4164 via an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”), as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 17. This ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 18. On or about May 30, 2013 at approximately 3:10 p.m. PST, Defendants again contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number via an 27. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 28. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who received any telephone call/s from Defendants or their agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 29. Defendants and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 30. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in at least the following ways: Defendants, either directly or through their agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using an ATDS, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 44. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 45. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 46. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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12. In or about February 2001, Mazzei instituted the Mazzei Action against HomEq. 13. The lawsuit instituted by Mr. Mazzei in February 2001 was extraordinarily lengthy. Judge John Sprizzo, the original federal judge assigned to the case, did not permit discovery on the state claims raised by Mazzei until 2006, and prohibited any class discovery until May of 2008, seven years after the institution of the lawsuit. 14. Thereafter, Judge Sprizzo passed away, and the matter was assigned to this Court. A. Mazzei’s Motion To Enjoin Defendant’s Destruction Of Fee- Splitting Data I. THE MAZZEI ACTION

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10. In order for Defendant LoanCare to place autodialed and/or prerecorded calls to consumers, it must have prior express consent before it may place such calls to a consumer. 11. Yet in violation of this rule, Defendant fails to obtain consent prior to making autodialed and/or prerecorded collection calls to cellular telephone numbers such as Plaintiff’s cell phone number, which, on information and belief, it obtained through skip tracing. 16. In early 2018, Plaintiff began receiving repeated autodialed and/or prerecorded calls to her cellular phone number from LoanCare primarily using phone number 800-909-9525. 17. LoanCare has left many prerecorded voicemails for Plaintiff, identifying itself as being LoanCare, and asking Plaintiff to call 800-909-9525. 18. Plaintiff has answered calls from LoanCare, but she was unable to speak with a live agent. 19. For example, in the beginning of December, 2018, Plaintiff called 800-909-9525. The automated system asked for Plaintiff’s loan number, which she does not have, and her social security number. There was no way for her to speak with a live agent using LoanCare’s automated system since she is not affiliated with LoanCare. 20. Plaintiff believes she has received dozens of autodialed and/or prerecorded calls from Defendant. 25. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action through class certification (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant) called, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone, (3) using the same equipment used to call Plaintiff and/or a prerecorded voice message, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to call Plaintiff, or (b) Defendant did not obtain prior express consent. 31. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 30 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 32. Defendant and/or its agents made unwanted collection telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using an autodialer and/or prerecorded message. 33. These collection telephone calls were made en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class to receive such collection telephone calls. 34. Defendant did not have prior express consent from the Plaintiff to call her. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims LoanCare Places Autodialed and/or Prerecorded Collection Calls to Consumers’ Cellular Phone Numbers Without Consent LoanCare Repeatedly Called Plaintiff’s Cell Phone Number Using an Autodialer and/or Prerecorded Message Without Plaintiff’s Consent Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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16. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a construction worker. Plaintiffs’ primary duty was to travel to job sites in Defendant’s company truck and complete heavy construction work using rigs, cement, and steel. 17. From the beginning of Plaintiff’s employment to present, Defendant paid Plaintiff an hourly rate of $20 an hour. 19. Defendant tracks Plaintiff’s hours by requiring him to punch in and out on a time card. 20. Additionally, Plaintiff is allowed to punch in before driving the company truck to the job site, but is required to punch out right after leaving the job site and before dropping the truck back off- leaving morning travel time paid, but travel time home unpaid. 21. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and other construction workers were paid on a hourly basis, and were not paid overtime compensation for hours they worked over 40 in a workweek. They were only paid overtime compensation for hours they worked over 45 in a workweek. 22. During the relevant time period, as a matter of company policy and practice, Plaintiff and other construction workers regularly worked more than 40 hours per week and were not paid the correct overtime compensation. 23. Through its unlawful actions, Defendant deprived Plaintiff and other construction workers of overtime wages owed to them. 24. Defendant acted willfully in failing to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff and other construction workers for hours they worked over 40 in a workweek. Defendant knew or should have known that construction workers were required to be classified as non-exempt employees under the FLSA and paid overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 24. As set forth above, Defendant’s failure to pay overtime compensation to employees who have worked for Defendant as construction workers and who have not received overtime compensation during the three-year period preceding the filing of this Complaint violates the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207. This claim is brought by the named Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 26. The claims under the FLSA meet the requirements for collective action certification set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 27. Dynasty has engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as detailed in this Complaint. 28. All potential opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated, because they were all employed by Dynasty as construction workers, primarily performed the same or similar job duties, Dynasty classified all of them as exempt under the FLSA and did not pay them overtime, and Dynasty’s compensation practices are uniform as to all potential plaintiffs, and result in the alleged violation of the FLSA. 29. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-28 as if alleged fully here.

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Breach of Express Warranty 190. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 191. Defendant provided the Plaintiff and Class Members an express warranty in the form of written and oral affirmations of fact, on their website and on the Products, promising and representing that their Products are not pasteurized and never heated. 192. The above affirmations of fact were not couched as "belief” or "opinion," and were not "generalized statements of quality not capable of proof or disproof." 193. These affirmations of fact became part of the basis for the bargain and were material to the transaction for the Plaintiff's and Class Members' transactions. 194. Plaintiff and Class Members reasonably relied upon Defendant’s affirmations of fact and justifiably acted in ignorance of the material facts omitted or concealed when they decided to buy Defendant’s Products. 195. Upon information and belief, Defendant was given opportunities to cure its default but did not. 196. Contrary to Defendant’s affirmations of fact, Defendant breached the express warranty because the Products are pasteurized through the application of high pressure and subjected to an increase in temperature as a result of the production process and are not “never heated.” 197. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff and the Class Members have been damaged in the amount paid for Defendant’s products, together with interest thereon from the date of purchase. Violation of New York GBL § 349 110. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 111. Defendant represents that their products are not pasteurized. 112. Defendant represent through their website and on the Products that their products are not pasteurized. 113. Defendant’s representations that its Products are not pasteurized is not limited to conduct with respect to Plaintiff and has a broader impact on consumers at-large. 114. Defendant’s acts or practices are not unique to the parties. 115. All consumers purchasing Defendant’s products are subject to the same representations of Defendant. 116. Defendant’s acts or practices are consumer-oriented. 117. Defendant’s representations that its Products are not pasteurized deceived the public into believing its Products were not treated in a way that is reasonably certain to achieve destruction or elimination of the most resistant microorganisms of public health significance that are likely to occur in the juice. 118. Defendant’s representations that its Products are not pasteurized is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 119. Plaintiff relied upon Defendant’s representations. 120. Defendant’s representations that its Products are not pasteurized is material because whether or not a product is pasteurized effects a consumer's decision whether to purchase the Products. 121. Plaintiff observed the representations on the website of defendant and on the Product of defendant that the Product was not pasteurized prior to purchasing the Product. 122. As a result of Defendant’s representations that its Products were not pasteurized, Plaintiff paid more for the Product than he would have paid had he known that the Product was pasteurized. 123. As a result of Defendant’s acts and practices, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to monetary damages, injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of defendants’ unlawful conduct, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs. Violation of New York GBL § 349 by Omission 124. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 125. Defendant fails to reveal that the temperature of its Products increase as a result of the production process on their website and on the Products. 126. Defendant’s failure to reveal that the temperature of its Products increases is not limited to conduct with respect to Plaintiff and has a broader impact on consumers at- large. 127. Defendant’s acts or practices are not unique to the parties. 128. All consumers purchasing Defendant’s Products are subject to the same omissions of Defendant. 129. Defendant’s acts or practices are consumer-oriented. 130. Defendant’s omissions that its Products are subjected to an increase in temperature deceived the public into believing its Products are never heated and do not experience a rise in temperature during the production process. 131. Defendant’s omissions that its Products are subjected to an increase in temperature are likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 132. Defendant’s omissions that the temperature of its Products increase as a result of the production process is material because whether or not the Product is heated or experiences a rise in temperature effects a consumer's decision whether to purchase the product. 133. Prior to purchasing the product, Plaintiff observed that the representations on the website of defendant and on the Product of defendant did not indicate the temperatures of the product increased. 134. Plaintiff relied upon Defendant’s omissions. 135. As a result of Defendant’s omissions that the temperature of the Product did not increase and that the product was not heated, Plaintiff paid more for the Product than he would have paid had he known that the Product is heated and that its temperature increases during the production process. 136. As a result of Defendant’s acts and practices, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to monetary damages, injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs. Violation of New York GBL § 349 Violation of New York GBL § 350 137. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 138. Defendant’s Product labels and advertising on their website indicate their products are never heated. 139. Defendant’s labels and advertising that its Products are never heated is not limited to conduct with respect to Plaintiff and has a broader impact on consumers at-large. 140. Defendant’s labeling and advertising is not unique to the parties. 141. All consumers purchasing Defendant’s Products are subject to the same labels and advertising of defendant. 142. Defendant’s labeling and advertising of its Products is consumer-oriented. 143. Defendant’s representations in its labels and advertising that its Products are never heated deceived the public into believing the temperature of its Products does not increase. 144. Defendant’s labels and advertising stating that its Products are never heated is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 145. Defendant’s labeling and advertising that its Products are not heated is material because whether or not a product experiences a rise in temperature during the production process affects a consumer's decision whether to purchase the Product. 146. Plaintiff observed the labels and advertising on defendant’s website indicating that the Products were never heated prior to purchasing the Product. 147. Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s labels and advertising. 148. As a result of Defendant’s labeling and advertising that its Products are never heated, Plaintiff paid more for the Products than he would have paid had he known that the products were heated and that its temperature increases as a result of the production process. 149. As a result of Defendant’s labeling and advertising, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to monetary damages, injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs. Unjust Enrichment 205. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 206. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and consumers nationwide, brings a common law claim for unjust enrichment. 207. Defendant’s conduct violated, inter alia, New York General Business Law 392-b by: a) putting upon an article of merchandise, bottle, wrapper, package, label or other thing, containing or covering such an article, or with which such an article is intended to be sold, or is sold, a false description or other indication of or respecting the kind of such article or any part thereof; and b) selling or offering for sale an article, which to their knowledge is falsely described or indicated upon any such package, or vessel containing the same, or label thereupon, in any of the particulars specified. 208. Defendant’s unlawful conduct as described in this complaint, including but not limited to the representation of its Products as not pasteurized and never heated, allowed Defendant to knowingly realize substantial revenues from selling their Product at the expense, and to the detriment and/or impoverishment, of the Plaintiff and Class Members, and to Defendant’s benefit and enrichment. Defendant has thereby violated fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. 209. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred significant financial benefits and paid substantial compensation to Defendant for Products that were not as Defendant represented. 210. Under common law principles of unjust enrichment, it is inequitable for Defendant to retain the benefits conferred by Plaintiff and Class Members' overpayments. 211. Plaintiff and Class Members seek disgorgement of all profits resulting from such overpayments and establishment of a constructive trust from which Plaintiff and Class Members may seek restitution. Violation of New York GBL § 350 by Omission 163. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 164. Defendant’s labels and advertising on their website fail to reveal that the temperature of its Products increase as a result of the production process. 165. Defendant’s labels, which fail to reveal that the temperature of its Products increase, is not limited to conduct with respect to Plaintiff and has a broader impact on consumers at-large. 166. Defendant’s labeling is not unique to the parties. 167. All consumers purchasing Defendant’s Products are subject to the same labels of Defendant. 168. Defendant’s labeling is consumer-oriented. 169. Defendant’s omissions that the temperature of their Products increase deceived the public into believing their Products are never heated. 170. Defendant’s omissions that the temperature of their Products increase is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 171. Defendant’s omissions that the temperature of their Products increase is material because whether or not the Product is heated effects a consumer's decision whether to purchase the Product. 172. Plaintiff observed that the Product’s labels and advertising did not indicate the temperatures of the products increase prior to purchasing the Product. 173. Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s labels and advertising. 174. As a result of Defendant’s omissions that the temperature of their Products did not increase, Plaintiff paid more for the Products than he would have paid had he known that the Products are heated. 175. As a result of Defendant’s labeling and advertising, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to monetary damages, injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability 198. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 199. Defendant is in the business of manufacturing, producing, distributing, and selling juice. 200. Under the Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranty of merchantability, Defendant warranted to Plaintiff and the Class Members that the Products are not pasteurized and never heated. 201. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability in that the Products are not unpasteurized and not in fact, “never heated.” 202. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability in that the Products do not conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the Product containers or labels or literature. Any reasonable consumer would not accept the product if they knew that the product is pasteurized and not in fact, “never heated.” 203. The inability of the product to meet the label description was wholly due to Defendant’s fault and without Plaintiff’s fault or neglect, and was solely due to the Defendant’s manufacture and distribution of the Products to the public. 204. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff and the Class Members have been damaged in the amount paid for the products, together with interest thereon from the date of purchase. Violation of New York GBL § 350 150. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 151. Defendant’s Product advertising on their website indicate their products are not pasteurized. 152. Defendant’s advertising that its Products are not pasteurized is not limited to conduct with respect to Plaintiff and has a broader impact on consumers at-large. 153. Defendant’s labeling and advertising is not unique to the parties. 154. All consumers purchasing Defendant’s Products are subject to the same labels and advertising of defendant. 155. Defendant’s labeling and advertising of its Products is consumer-oriented. 156. Defendant’s representations in its advertising on its website that its Products are not pasteurized deceived the public into believing its products were not treated in a way that is reasonably certain to achieve destruction or elimination of the most resistant microorganisms of public health significance that are likely to occur in the juice. 157. Defendant’s advertising that its Products are not pasteurized is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 158. Defendant’s advertising that its Products are not pasteurized is material because whether or not a Product is pasteurized effects a consumer's decision whether to purchase the Product. 159. Plaintiff observed the advertising on defendant’s website indicating that the Products were not pasteurized prior to purchasing the Product. 160. Plaintiff relied on Defendant’s advertising that its Products are not pasteurized. 161. As a result of Defendant’s advertising that its Products are not pasteurized, Plaintiff paid more for the Products than he would have paid had he known that the products 162. As a result of Defendant’s labeling and advertising, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to monetary damages, injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs. Fraud 176. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 177. Defendant represents that the Products are not pasteurized and never heated. 178. Defendant’s representations that their Products are not pasteurized and never heated is material because whether or not a product is pasteurized and heated effects a consumer's decision whether to purchase the product. 179. Defendant knew their representation that their Products were not pasteurized was false because Defendant did not include the applicable warning statement on its Products, which is required where a product is not pasteurized. 180. Defendant’s claims that its Products are never heated are inconsistent with the increase in temperature experienced by the Products during the production process. 181. Defendant does not inform consumers that by using high pressure processing, its products experience an increase in temperature, become hotter and are heated. 182. Defendant believed that since their products were not pasteurized through a process which caused a direct increase in their product’s temperature, it could accurately claim their products are never heated. 183. Defendant knew that their Products were subjected to an increase in temperature as a result of pasteurization through the application of high pressure, as opposed to an alternative pasteurization methods, which relies upon causing a direct increase in a product’s temperature. 184. Consumers are unlikely to be aware of pasteurization methods which are not based on causing a direct increase in the temperature of the products. 185. Defendant’s claims that its products are never heated are made to mislead consumers to believe its products are not pasteurized. 186. Defendant intentionally represented that their Products were not pasteurized and never heated because consumers will pay a premium for products purporting to be unpasteurized and never heated. 187. Plaintiff had reason to rely, and did rely, upon Defendant’s representations that its Products were not pasteurized and never heated. 188. Plaintiff suffered injury through payment of a premium price for Defendant’s product as a result of Defendant’s representations that their Products were not pasteurized and never heated. 189. As a result of Defendant’s fraud, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to monetary damages, injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs. 10. The Products sold in retail locations are identical to those sold from Defendant’s website. 11. The Green Juices and the Half Pint Juices have similar packaging, labeling and advertising with respect to material information disclosed thereupon. 12. Defendant represents that all Products are “Never heated to preserve freshness and nutritional value.” 13. Defendant represents that all Products are “High Pressure Processed.” 14. Defendant’s website states that “High pressure processing (HPP) is an alternative to pasteurization.” 15. Defendant’s website states that “High pressure applied to the outside of the bottle eliminates any harmful bacteria without ever heating the juice inside.” 16. Defendant’s website states “Our product is not pasteurized, but it is pressurized through a unique technology known as high pressure processing (HPP).” 17. Defendant’s Products are manufactured by using cold-press juicers to hydraulically extract juice from the produce to which it is applied. 18. The Products are then subjected to high pressure processing. 19. To utilize high pressure processing, the juice bottles are loaded into a cylindrical pressure vessel. 2. Defendant is a producer and seller of juices bearing the name “Daily Greens.” 20. The cylinder is then loaded into a high-pressure chamber. 21. Water is added to the cylindrical pressure vessel and the vessel is closed. 22. The contents of the juice bottles are pressurized at levels up to 87,000 pounds per square inch (“psi”) (600) megapascal (“MPa”). 23. Once the maximum required pressure is achieved, it is sustained for a specified period. 24. The pressure is then increased to the processing target pressure. 25. The product is held at the target pressure for 3 to 10 minutes. 26. The pressure is applied uniformly in all directions simultaneously. 27. The act of compression during this process increases the temperature of the products approximately 3 °C for every 100 MPa. 28. This increase in temperature results in the juice products becoming hotter. 29. After the pressure holding time, the pressure is released. 3. Defendant produces at least two product lines, identified as “Green Juices” and “Half Pints” (collectively, the “Products”). 30. Juices which undergo high pressure processing after being cold-pressed have a shelf life ranging from 30 to 45 days. 31. Juices which are only produced through the use of a cold-press have a shelf- life from 72 to 96 hours. 32. In the context of juice products, pasteurization is a processing method that is reasonably certain to achieve destruction or elimination of the most resistant microorganisms of public health significance within the juice product. 33. Defendant’s Products are pasteurized through the application of high pressure. 34. As a result of being pasteurized through the application of high pressure, Defendant’s Products are rendered safer for human consumption than if the Products were only cold-pressed. 35. Pasteurization of juice products can be carried out by causing a direct increase of the temperature of a juice product such that it is reasonably certain to achieve destruction or elimination of the most resistant microorganisms of public health significance within the juice product. 36. Consumers are not generally aware of methods of pasteurization which are not based on causing a direct increase in the temperature of the juice products. 37. By describing their products as “never heated,” Defendant is taking advantage of consumers who associate the absence of a process which causes a direct increase in temperature of the Products with the non-occurrence of pasteurization. 38. By describing their products as “not pasteurized,” Defendant is taking advantage of consumers who lack awareness of other methods of pasteurization which are not based on causing a direct increase in the temperature of the products. 39. Where a juice product has not been pasteurized, it is required by law to bear a warning label informing the consumer of risks associated with its consumption. 4. Defendant’s Green Juices are available in various flavors and blends, with the following names: Harmony – Sweet Greens, Morning Greens – Orange + Probiotics, Elevate – Smooth Greens, Renew – Hydrating Greens and Vitality – Spicy Greens. 40. Defendant has knowledge that its Products are pasteurized since its products do not contain a warning label which would be required if its products were not pasteurized. 41. Defendant’s representations of its Products as never heated gives consumers the impression its products are not pasteurized. 42. Defendant does not inform consumers that by using high pressure processing, the temperature of its Products increases, and the Products are not, therefore, “never heated.” 43. Defendant labels their Products as “never heated” because consumers associate such a designation as indicative of a product which has not been pasteurized. 44. As a result of being pasteurized through the application of high pressure, Defendant’s Products are not consistent with the claims, representations and warranties provided by Defendant. 45. Defendant presents the Products as cold-pressed yet does not disclose their Products are pasteurized and heated. 46. Defendant’s representations of its Products as not pasteurized and never heated imply that its Products contain a greater number of pathogenic microorganisms than they actually possess. 47. Defendant does not inform consumers that by using high pressure processing, its Products are pasteurized and heated. 48. Defendant markets their Products to the public as unpasteurized and not heated. 49. Defendant labels their Products as unpasteurized and not heated because consumers associate such a designation as indicative of a product which has not been treated beyond being cold-pressed. 5. The Green Juices are sold in 12 ounce bottles. 50. Consumers seek out juice products that are not pasteurized because they desire a product that has been as minimally processed and treated as possible. 51. Consumers pay a premium price for juice products that are not pasteurized due in part to its limited shelf-life. 52. Consumers seek juice products which are not treated beyond being cold- pressed and therefore contain a greater number of pathogenic microorganisms. 53. Consumers pay a premium price for unpasteurized and unheated juice because they desire a product that has been as minimally processed and treated as possible. 54. By prolonging the expiration date of the product, high pressure processing can remove the volatility from a low-margin business, because entire batches of cold- pressed juices would no longer need to be discarded after three days. 55. Defendant possesses superior knowledge vis-à-vis consumers of the processes by which its products are made. 56. Consumers cannot discover the true nature of Defendant’s Products from reading the labels on the Products. 57. Consumers seek juice products which are not subjected to an increase in temperature as a result of the production process, beyond the initial cold-pressing of the juice. 58. Defendant possesses superior knowledge vis-à-vis consumers of the processes by which its products are made. 59. Consumers cannot discover the true nature of Defendant’s Products from reading the labels on the Products. JURISDICTION and VENUE 6. Defendant’s Half Pint Juices are available in various flavors and blends, with the following names: Dragon Power, Green Thing and Carrot Kick. 60. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 USC § 1332(d)(2). 61. Upon information and belief, the aggregate amount in controversy is in excess of $5,000,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs. 62. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant conducts and transacts business in the State of New York, contracts to supply goods within the State of New York, and supplies goods within the State of New York. 63. Venue is proper because Plaintiff and many class members reside in the Eastern District of New York and Defendant has, at all relevant times, been doing business in the Eastern District of New York, and throughout the state. 64. A substantial part of the events or omissions which give rise to the claims herein occurred in the Eastern District of New York. 7. The Half Pint Juices are sold in 8 ounce bottles. 75. Defendant falsely advertises and misrepresents to its consumers, including Plaintiff and Class Members, through its Products’ packaging, labeling and website, including Plaintiff and Class Members, that its Products are not pasteurized and never heated. 76. These material misrepresentations, mislabeling and omissions induced Defendant’s consumers, including Plaintiff and Class Members, to purchase the Products at a premium price. 77. To their detriment, Plaintiff and Class Members relied on Defendant’s false and misleading misrepresentations, mislabeling and omissions. 78. Defendant’s statements and practices are false, deceptive and misleading because the Products are not never heated and are pasteurized. 79. Plaintiff brings this matter on behalf of himself and those similarly situated. As detailed in this complaint, Defendant orchestrated deceptive marketing and labeling practices. Defendant’s customers were uniformly impacted by and exposed to this misconduct. Accordingly, this Complaint is uniquely situated for class-wide resolution, including injunctive relief. 8. Defendant’s Products are sold to consumers at traditional brick-and-mortar retail locations throughout the country. 80. The class is defined as all consumers who purchased the Products at any time during the period within the applicable statute of limitations. 81. The Class is properly brought and should be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(a), satisfying the class action prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 82. Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of consumers who are Class Members as described above who have been damaged by, inter alia, Defendant’s deceptive and misleading practices. 83. The questions of law and fact common to the Class Members which predominate over any questions which may affect individual Class Members include, but are not limited to: (a) Whether Defendant is responsible for the conduct alleged herein which was uniformly directed at all consumers who purchased its Products; (b) Whether Defendant’s misconduct set forth in this complaint demonstrates whether Defendant has engaged in unfair, fraudulent, or unlawful business practices with respect to the advertising, marketing, and sale of its Products; (c) Whether Defendant’s false and misleading statements concerning its Products and its concealment of material facts regarding the Products were likely to deceive reasonable consumers; (d) Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to injunctive relief; and (e) Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to money damages under the same causes of action as the other Class Members. 84. Plaintiff is a member of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of each Class Member, in that, every member of the Class was susceptible to the same deceptive, misleading conduct and purchased Defendants’ Products. Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the same causes of action as the other Class Members. 85. Plaintiff is an adequate Class representative because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class Members he seeks to represent; his claims are common to all members of the Class and he has a strong interest in vindicating his rights; he has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation and they intend to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff has no interests which conflict with those of the Class. The Class Members' interests will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and his counsel. Defendant has acted in a manner generally applicable to the Class, making relief appropriate with respect to Plaintiff and the Class Members. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would create a risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications. 86. The Class is properly brought and should be maintained as a class action under Rule 23(b) because a class action is superior. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), common issues of law and fact predominate over any other questions affecting only individual members of the class. The Class issues fully predominate over any individual issue because no inquiry into individual conduct is necessary, just a narrow focus on Defendant’s deceptive and misleading product marketing and labeling practices. 87. A class action is superior to the other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because: (a) The joinder of thousands of individual Class Members is impracticable, cumbersome, unduly burdensome, and a waste of judicial and/or litigation resources; (b) The individual claims of the Class Members may be relatively modest compared with the expense of litigating the claim, thereby making it impracticable, unduly burdensome, and expensive-if not totally impossible- to justify individual actions; (c) When Defendant’s liability has been adjudicated, all Class Members' claims can be determined by the Court and administered efficiently in a manner far less burdensome and expensive than if it were attempted through filing, discovery, and trial of all individual cases; (d) This class action will promote orderly, efficient, expeditious, and appropriate adjudication and administration of class claims; (e) Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action; (f) This class action assures uniformity of decisions among Class Members; and (g) The Class is readily definable and prosecution of this action as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitious litigation. 9. Defendant’s Products are sold directly to consumers by Defendant from its website. 97. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. Defendant represents through its website and on its Products that their products are never heated. 99. Defendant’s representations that its Products are never heated are not limited to conduct with respect to Plaintiff and has a broader impact on consumers at-large. 100. Defendant’s acts or practices are not unique to the parties. 101. All consumers purchasing Defendant’s products are subject to the same representations of Defendant. 102. Defendant’s acts or practices are consumer-oriented. 103. Defendant’s representations that its Products are never heated deceived the public into believing the temperature of its Products does not increase. 104. Defendant’s representations that its Products are never heated are likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances. 105. Defendant’s representation that its Products are never heated is material because whether or not a product is heated effects a consumer's decision whether to purchase the product. 106. Plaintiff observed the representations that the Products were never heated prior to purchasing the Products. 107. Plaintiff relied upon Defendant’s representations. 108. As a result of Defendant’s representation that its Products were never heated, Plaintiff paid more for the Products than he would have paid had he known that the Products were heated and experienced an increase in temperature as a result of the production process. 109. As a result of Defendant’s acts and practices, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to monetary damages, injunctive relief, restitution, disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, interest, and attorney’s fees and costs. TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

lose

1. Maltodextrins, GMO Compass, http://www.gmo- compass.org/eng/database/ingredients/148.maltodextrins.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2014). 2. See id. 28. Defendant manufactures, distributes, markets, advertises, and sells the Products aforementioned in paragraph one (1) throughout the State of California and in this judicial District, which uniformly claim to be “All Natural,” when in fact, they are not, because they contain unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients, including but not limited to, maltodextrin and/or dextrose. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page5 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 29. Through a variety of advertising, including the front packaging of the Products, Defendant has made untrue and misleading material statements and representations regarding the Products, which have been relied upon by Plaintiff and members of the Class. 3. Notice of the Federal Trade Commission, Comments of Consumers Union on Proposed Guides for Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 CFR § 260, Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/greenguiderevisions/00289-57072.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2014). Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page7 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 being “All Natural” are misleading and likely to deceive reasonable consumers because the Products are not “All Natural” due to being made with unnatural ingredients. 30. Defendant’s “All Natural” statement prominently displayed on the front of the box for the Products’ and on the front of each individual packaging for the Products is untrue, misleading, and likely to deceive reasonable consumers, such as Plaintiff and members of the Class, because the Products are not “All Natural,” due to the presence of unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients in the Products. 31. Defendant unlawfully markets, advertises, sells and distributes the Products to California purchasers in California grocery stores, food chains, mass discounters, mass merchandisers, club stores, convenience stores, drug stores and/or dollar stores, as being “All Natural.” 32. All of the Products’ packaging uniformly and consistently states that the Products are All Natural on the front of the box for each of the Products and on the front of each individual packaging for the Products that come inside each box. 33. As a result, all consumers within the Class, including Plaintiff, who purchased the Products were exposed to the same “All Natural” claim in the same location on the front box and individual packaging for the Products. 34. Unfortunately for consumers, they were charged a price premium for these alleged All Natural Products over Products that did not claim to be “All Natural.” 35. Defendant’s All Natural representations convey a series of express and implied claims which Defendant knows are material to the reasonable consumer, and which Defendant intends for consumers to rely upon when choosing to purchase the Products. B. Maltodextrin and Dextrose Are Not Natural 36. Maltodextrin and dextrose are unnatural, synthetic, and/or an artificial ingredient, and its presence in the Products causes the Products to not be “All Natural.” Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page6 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 37. Maltodextrin is a saccharide polymer that is produced through partial acid and enzymatic hydrolysis of corn starch.1 The acid hydrolysis process is specifically deemed to be a relatively severe process that renders an ingredient no longer “natural.”2 38. Dextrose is enzymatically synthesized in a similar manner, crystallizing D-glucose with one molecule of water. 39. Synthetic chemicals are often used to extract and purify the enzymes used to produce maltodextrin and dextrose. The microorganisms, fungi, and bacteria used to produce these enzymes are also often synthetically produced. 40. Despite all these unnatural ingredients, Defendant knowingly markets the Products as “All Natural.” C. Defendant Deceptively Markets the Products as “All Natural” to Induce Consumers to Purchase the Products 41. A representation that a product is “All Natural” and/or “Natural” is material to a reasonable consumer. According to Consumers Union, “Eighty-six percent of consumers expect a ‘natural’ label to mean processed foods do not contain any artificial ingredients.”3 42. Defendant markets and advertises the Products as “All Natural” to increase sales of the Products and Defendant is well-aware that claims of food being “All Natural” are material to consumers. Despite knowing that maltodextrin and/or dextrose are not natural ingredients, Defendant has engaged in a widespread marketing and advertising campaign to portray the Products as being “All Natural.” 43. Defendant engaged in this misleading and deceptive campaign to charge a premium for the Products and take away market share from other similar products. As stated herein, such representations and the widespread marketing campaign portraying the Products as 44. Reasonable consumers frequently rely on food label representations and information in making purchase decisions. 45. Here, Plaintiff and the other Class members reasonably relied to their detriment on Defendant’s misleading representations and omissions. Defendant’s misleading affirmative statements about the “naturalness” of its Products obscured the material facts that Defendant failed to disclose about the unnaturalness of its Products. 46. Plaintiff and the other Class members were among the intended recipients of Defendant’s deceptive representations and omissions. 47. Defendant made the deceptive representations and omissions on the Products with the intent to induce Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ purchase of the Products. 48. Defendant’s deceptive representations and omissions are material in that a reasonable person would attach importance to such information and would be induced to act upon such information in making purchase decisions. Thus, Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ reliance upon Defendant’s misleading and deceptive representations and omissions may be presumed. The materiality of those representations and omissions also establishes causation between Defendant’s conduct and the injuries sustained by Plaintiff and the Class. 49. Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive misrepresentations and omissions are likely to continue to deceive and mislead reasonable consumers and the general public, as they have already deceived and misled Plaintiff and the other Class members. 50. In making the false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Defendant knew and intended that consumers would pay a premium for “All Natural” labeled products over comparable products that are not labeled “All Natural” furthering Defendant’s private interest of increasing sales for its Products and decreasing the sales of products that are truthfully offered as “All Natural” by Defendant’s competitors, or those that do not claim to be “All Natural.” Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page8 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 51. As an immediate, direct, and proximate result of Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Defendant injured Plaintiff and the other Class members in that they: a) paid a sum of money for Products that were not as represented; b) paid a premium price for Products that were not as represented; c) were deprived the benefit of the bargain because the Products they purchased were different than what Defendant warranted; d) were deprived the benefit of the bargain because the Products they purchased had less value than what was represented by Defendant; e) did not receive Products that measured up to their expectations as created by Defendant; f) ingested a substance that was other than what was represented by Defendant; g) ingested a substance that Plaintiff and the other members of the Class did not expect or consent to; h) ingested a product that was artificial, synthetic, or otherwise unnatural; i) ingested a substance that was of a lower quality than what Defendant promised; j) were denied the benefit of knowing what they ingested; k) were denied the benefit of truthful food labels; l) were forced unwittingly to support an industry that contributes to environmental, ecological, and/or health damage; m) were denied the benefit of supporting an industry that sells natural foods and contributes to environmental sustainability; and n) were denied the benefit of the beneficial properties of the natural foods promised. 52. Had Defendant not made the false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Plaintiff and the other Class members would not have been economically injured. 53. Among other things, Plaintiff and the other Class members would not have been denied the benefit of the bargain, they would not have ingested a substance that they did not expect or consent to. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page9 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 54. Plaintiff and the other Class members did not obtain the full value of the advertised Products due to Defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions. Plaintiff and the other Class members purchased, purchased more of, or paid more for, the Products than they would have done, had they known the truth about the Products’ unnaturalness. 55. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct. D. Plaintiff’s Purchase and Reliance on the “All Natural” Statement 56. Plaintiff has purchased one or more of the Products during the Class Period, including, but not limited to, a purchase made during 2013 from a Whole Foods market located in Alameda County, California, for the purchase price of approximately $3.00 to $4.00. 57. The Products purchased by Plaintiff claimed to be “All Natural” on the front packaging, which Plaintiff perceived, read, and relied on in making Plaintiff’s decision to purchase the Products. Plaintiff interpreted the “All Natural” claim to mean that the Tortilla Chips did not contain any unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients. 58. Subsequent to purchasing the Products, Plaintiff discovered that they contain maltodextrin and/or dextrose, which are unnatural and/or synthetic ingredients, and thus, the Products containing these unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients are not “All Natural.” E. Plaintiff Has Suffered Economic Damages 59. Plaintiff and members of the Class would not have purchased the Products had they known that they were not “All Natural.” 60. Likewise, if Plaintiff and members of the Class had known the Products contained unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients, they would not have purchased them. 61. Defendant’s “All Natural” statement related to the Products is material to a consumer’s purchase decision because reasonable consumers, such as Plaintiff and members of the Class, care whether products contain unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients, and thus attach importance to an “All Natural” claim when making a purchasing decision. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page10 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11 62. As a result of purchasing the Products that claim to be “All Natural,” but contain maltodextrin and/or dextrose, Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered economic damages. 63. Defendant’s “All Natural” advertising for the Products was and is false, misleading, and/or likely to deceive reasonable consumers. Therefore, the Products are valueless, worth less than what Plaintiff and members of the Class paid for them, and/or are not what Plaintiff and members of the Class reasonably intended to receive. 64. Plaintiff and the Class seek damages equal to the aggregate purchase price paid for the Products during the Class Period because the Products are worthless due to not being “All Natural,” due to the presence of unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients. 65. Moreover, Plaintiff and members of the Class paid a price premium for the “All Natural” Products, over other similar products that do not claim to be “All Natural.” 66. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 67. This action is maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 68. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and Cal. Civil Code § 1781, Plaintiff brings this class action and seeks certification of the claims and certain issues in this action on behalf of a Class defined as: all California residents who have purchased for personal use one or more of the following products: (1) Kettle Brand TIAS All Natural Nacho Cheddar Tortilla Chips; (2) Kettle Brand TIAS All Natural Zesty Ranch Tortilla Chips; (3) Kettle Brand TIAS All Natural Salsa Picante Tortilla Chips; (4) Kettle Brand TIAS All Natural Sweet Baja Barbeque Tortilla Chips; or Kettle Brand TIAS All Natural Chili Con Queso Tortilla Chips, Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page11 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 from January 9, 2010, through and to the date notice is provided to the Class. 69. Excluded from the Class are governmental entities, Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and Defendant’s officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, co-conspirators, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns. Also excluded from the Class is any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their immediate families and judicial staff. 70. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if further information and discovery indicates that the Class definition should be narrowed, expanded or otherwise modified. 71. Numerosity: The Class comprises many thousands of persons throughout the State of California. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims in a Class Action will benefit the parties and the Court. 72. Commonality: The questions of law and fact common to the Class have the capacity to generate common answers that will drive resolution of this action. Common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a) Whether Defendant’s practices and representations related to the marketing, labeling and sales of the Products in California were unfair, deceptive, fraudulent, and/or unlawful in any respect, thereby violating Cal. Bus. & Prof. C. §§ 17200, et seq.; b) Whether Defendant’s practices and representations related to the marketing, labeling and sales of the Products in California were unfair, deceptive and/or unlawful in any respect, thereby violating Cal. Bus. & Prof. C. §§ 17500, et seq.; c) Whether Defendant violated Cal. Civ. C. §§ 1750, et seq. with its practices and representations related to the marketing, labeling and sales of the Products within California; d) Whether the Products are “All Natural;” e) Whether the ingredients contained in the Products are “All Natural;” Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page12 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 f) Whether the claim “All Natural” on the Products’ packaging and advertising is material to a reasonable consumer; g) Whether the claim “All Natural” on the Products’ packaging and advertising is false to a reasonable consumer. h) Whether the claim “All Natural” on the Products’ packaging and advertising is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer; i) Whether the claim “All Natural” on the Products’ packaging and advertising is misleading to a reasonable consumer; j) Whether a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived by a claim that a product is “All Natural” where the product contains unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients; and k) Whether Defendant’s conduct as set forth above injured consumers and if so, the extent of the injury. 73. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims, and Defendant’s defenses thereto, are typical of the claims of the Class, as the representations made by Defendant are consistent and uniform and are contained in the advertisements and labels that every member of the Class was necessarily exposed to in purchasing the Products. Thus, there exists a presumption that all Class members relied upon said uniform and consistent advertising and representations to their detriment. Additionally, all members of the Class have the same or similar injury (loss of purchase price) based on Defendant’s false and misleading marketing and advertising. 74. Adequacy: Plaintiff does not have any conflicts with any other members of the Class, and will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Plaintiff Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in both consumer protection and class action litigation. 75. Predominance: As set forth in detail herein, common issues of fact and law predominate because all of Plaintiff’s claims are based on a uniform false and misleading advertising message which all class members were necessarily exposed to. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page13 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14 76. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The expense and burden of individual litigation would make it impracticable or impossible for Class members to prosecute their claims individually. Absent a class action, Defendant will likely retain the benefits of its wrongdoing. Because of the small size of the individual Class members’ claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a representative action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses and Defendant will be allowed to continue these violations of law and to retain the proceeds of its ill-gotten gains. The trial and litigation of Plaintiff’s claims are manageable. Individual litigation of the legal and factual issues raised by Defendant’s conduct would increase delay and expense to all parties and the court system. The class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of a single, uniform adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. The benefits of proceeding as a class action, including providing a method for obtaining redress for claims that would not be practical to pursue individually, outweigh any difficulties that might be argued with regard to the management of this class action. 77. Plaintiff re-alleges and fully incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein verbatim. 78. Throughout the Class Period Defendant engaged in a public advertising and marketing campaign representing that the Products are “All Natural,” despite the fact that the Products contain unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients. 79. Defendant’s advertisements and marketing representations are misleading, untrue, and likely to deceive reasonable consumers. 80. Defendant engaged in its advertising and marketing campaign with intent to directly induce customers to purchase the Products based on false claims. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page14 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 15 81. In violation of California Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq., Defendant disseminated, or caused to be disseminated, the deceptive Products’ labeling and advertising representations. 82. Defendant’s labeling and advertising representations for the Products are by their very nature unfair, deceptive and/or unlawful within the meaning of California Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq. 83. The representations were at all material times hereto likely to deceive reasonable consumers, including Plaintiff and members of the Class. 84. Defendant violated California Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq., in making and disseminating the deceptive representations alleged herein. 85. Defendant knew or should have known that the representations were false, misleading, and likely to deceive reasonable consumers, such as Plaintiff and members of the Class. 86. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and similarly situated California purchasers of the Products have suffered economic damages. 87. Plaintiff was injured in fact and lost money as a result of Defendant’s conduct of improperly advertising the Products as described herein. 88. Plaintiff would not have purchased the Products but for Defendant’s misleading statements about the Products. 89. Pursuant to Bus. & Prof. Code § 17535, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated California purchasers, seeks an order of this Court requiring Defendant to restore to purchasers of the Products all monies that may have been acquired by Defendant as a result of such false, unfair, deceptive and/or unlawful acts or practices. Plaintiff and members of the Class seek declaratory relief, restitution for monies wrongfully obtained, disgorgement of ill- gotten revenues and/or profits, injunctive relief enjoining Defendant from disseminating its untrue and misleading statements, and other relief allowable under California Business & Professions Code Section 17535. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page15 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16 90. Furthermore, as a result of Defendant’s violations of the FAL, Plaintiff and similarly situated California purchasers of the Products are entitled to restitution for out-of-pocket expenses and economic harm. 91. Pursuant to Civil Code § 3287(a), Plaintiff and similarly situated California purchasers of the Products are further entitled to pre-judgment interest as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct. The amount on which interest is to be calculated is a sum certain and capable of calculation, and Plaintiff and similarly situated California purchasers of the Products are entitled to interest in an amount according to proof. 92. Plaintiff re-alleges and fully incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein verbatim. 93. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and members of the general public, pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., which provides that “unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or deceptive business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter I (commencing with Section 17500) as Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” 94. In its marketing and advertising, Defendant makes false and misleading statements regarding the uses and benefits of the Products. 95. Specifically, Defendant has represented that their Products are “All Natural,” when in fact the Products contain unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients. 96. The misrepresentations Defendant makes about the Products constitutes an unfair and fraudulent business practice within the meaning of California Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq. 97. Defendant committed “unfair” and/or “fraudulent” business acts or practices by, among other things: (1) engaging in conduct where the utility of such conduct, if any, is Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page16 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17 outweighed by the gravity of the consequences to Plaintiff and members of the Class; (2) engaging in conduct that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to Plaintiff and members of the Class; and (3) engaging in conduct that undermines or violates the spirit or intent of the consumer protection laws alleged herein. 98. As detailed above, Defendant’s unfair and/or fraudulent practices include disseminating false and/or misleading representations regarding the Products. 99. Defendant is aware that the claims it made about the Products are false, misleading, and likely to deceive reasonable consumers. 100. Plaintiff would not have purchased the Products but for Defendant’s misleading statements about the Products. 101. Plaintiff was injured in fact and lost money as a result of Defendant’s conduct. 102. Plaintiff has standing to pursue this claim as Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth herein. 103. Defendant’s business practices, as alleged herein, are unfair because: (1) the injury to consumers is substantial; (2) the injury is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) consumers could not reasonably have avoided the information because Defendant intentionally misled the consuming public by means of the claims made with respect to the Products as set forth herein. 104. Defendant’s business practices as alleged herein are fraudulent because they are likely to deceive customers into believing the Products have characteristics, uses and benefits they do not have. 105. In addition, Defendant’s use of various forms of advertising media to advertise, including the Products’ labeling, call attention to, or give publicity to, the sale of goods or merchandise which are not as represented in any manner, which constitutes unfair competition, unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising, and an unlawful business practice within the meaning of Business & Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page17 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18 106. Defendant’s wrongful business practices constituted a continuing course of conduct of unfair competition since Defendant is marketing and selling the Products in a manner likely to deceive the public. 107. Defendant has peddled its misrepresentations through advertising in California, including the Products’ labeling. 108. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendant’s legitimate business interests, other than the conduct described herein. 109. Plaintiff and the putative members of the Class were misled into purchasing the Products by Defendant’s deceptive and fraudulent conduct as alleged herein. 110. Defendant had an improper motive (profit before accurate marketing) in its practices related to the deceptive labeling and advertising of the Products, as set forth above. 111. The use of such unfair and fraudulent business acts and practices was under the sole control of Defendant, and was deceptively hidden from members of the general public in Defendant’s marketing, advertising and labeling of the Products. 112. As purchasers and consumers of Defendant’s Products, and as members of the general public who purchased and used the Products, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to bring this class action seeking all available remedies under the UCL. 113. Pursuant to California Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of the Class, seeks an order of this Court for injunctive relief and disgorging and restoring all monies that have been acquired by Defendant as a result of Defendant’s business acts or practices described herein. Plaintiff, the Class, and the general public may be irreparably harmed or denied an effective and complete remedy in the absence of such an order. 114. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the UCL, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to restitution for out-of-pocket expenses and economic harm. 115. Pursuant to Civil Code § 3287(a), Plaintiff and the Class are further entitled to pre- judgment interest as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unfair and fraudulent conduct. The amount on which interest is to be calculated is a sum certain and capable of calculation, and Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to interest in an amount according to proof. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page18 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19 A. Defendant’s Advertising of the “All Natural” Products Negligent Misrepresentation (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class) 150. Plaintiff re-alleges and fully incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein verbatim. 151. Defendant has represented that their Products are “All Natural,” when in fact the Products contain unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients. 152. Defendant had no reasonable grounds for believing its representations were true. 153. Defendant should have known about the Products’ misrepresentations. 154. In making these representations to Plaintiff and the Class, Defendant intended to induce Plaintiff and the Class to purchase the Products. 155. At all times herein, Plaintiff and the Class were unaware of the falsity of the Products’ statements. 156. Plaintiff and the Class reasonably acted in response to the statements made by Defendant when they purchased the Products. 157. As a proximate result of Defendant’s negligent misrepresentations, Plaintiff and Class members purchased the Products. 158. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class have been economically damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. Violation of the Unlawful Prong of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class) 116. Plaintiff re-alleges and fully incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein verbatim. 117. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and members of the Class pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., which provides that “unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or deceptive business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter I (commencing with Section 17500) as Part 3 of Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code.” 118. As detailed above, Defendant’s unlawful practices include disseminating false and/or misleading representations about the Products. 119. Specifically, Defendant has represented that their Products are “All Natural,” when in fact the Products contain unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients. 120. Plaintiff would not have purchased the Products, but for Defendant’s misleading statements about the Products. 121. Plaintiff was injured in fact and lost money as a result of Defendant’s conduct. 122. Plaintiff paid for the Products, but did not receive what he reasonably expected. 123. Plaintiff has standing to pursue this claim as Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth herein. 124. Defendant’s business practices, as alleged herein, are unfair because: (1) the injury to consumers is substantial; (2) the injury is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) consumers could not reasonably have avoided the information because Defendant intentionally misled the consuming public by means of the claims made with respect to the Products as set forth herein. 125. In its marketing and advertising, Defendant makes false and misleading statements regarding the uses and benefits of the Products. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page19 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20 126. Such marketing, advertising and sale of the Products by Defendant is unlawful because (1) they are violating sections 1770(a)(5), 1770(a)(7) and 1770(a)(9) of the CLRA, California Civil Code section 1750, et seq.; and (2) they are violating the FAL, California Business & Professions Code section 17500, et seq. 127. Because Defendant’s business conduct in advertising, marketing and selling the Products using false and misleading statements, in violation of the CLRA, FAL, and/or other federal and state laws or regulations, it constitutes a per se violation of the “unlawful” prong of the UCL. 128. As purchasers and consumers of Defendant’s Products, and as members of the general public who purchased and used the Products, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and bring this class action seeking all available remedies under the UCL. 129. Pursuant to California Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, seeks an order of this Court for injunctive relief and disgorging and restoring all monies that may have been acquired by Defendant as a result of such unlawful business acts or practices. Plaintiff, the Class and the general public may be irreparably harmed and/or denied an effective and complete remedy in the absence of such an order. 130. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the UCL, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to restitution for out-of-pocket expenses and economic harm. 131. Pursuant to Civil Code § 3287(a), Plaintiff and the Class are further entitled to pre- judgment interest as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful business conduct. The amount on which interest is to be calculated is a sum certain and capable of calculation, and Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to interest in an amount according to proof. Violation of the Unfair and Fraudulent Prongs of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class) Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500 et seq. (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class) Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act – Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class) 132. Plaintiff re-alleges and fully incorporates by reference all allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein verbatim. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page20 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21 133. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. (the “CLRA”). 134. Defendant has represented that their Products are “All Natural,” when in fact the Products contain unnatural, synthetic, and/or artificial ingredients. 135. This cause of action seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief pursuant to California Civil Code § 1782. 136. Defendant’s actions, representations, and conduct have violated the CLRA, because they extend to transactions that are intended to result, or that have resulted, in the sale of goods to consumers. 137. Plaintiff and all members of the Class are “consumers” as that term is defined by the CLRA in California Civil Code § 1761(d). 138. Defendant sold the Products, which are “goods” within the meaning of California Civil Code § 1761(a), to Plaintiff and other members of the Class during the Class Period. 139. Plaintiff is an individual who purchased the Products for personal use. 140. The purchases of the Products by Plaintiff and California purchasers of the Products were and are “transactions” within the meaning of Civil Code §1761(e). 141. Defendant’s marketing, labeling and advertising and sales of the Product within California violated the CLRA in at least the following respects as set forth in detail above: a. In violation of Civil Code §1770(a)(5), Defendant represented that the Products have characteristics, ingredients, uses, and benefits which they do not have; b. In violation of Civil Code §1770(a)(7), Defendant represented that the Products are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, which they are not; c. In violation of Civil Code §1770(a)(9), Defendant advertised the Products with an intent not to sell the Products as advertised; and d. In violation of Civil Code §1770(a)(16), Defendant represented that the subject of the sale of the Products has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page21 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 22 142. Defendant knew or should have known about the Products’ misrepresentations. 143. Defendant’s actions as described herein were done with conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, and Defendant was wanton and malicious in its concealment of same. 144. Defendant’s wrongful business practices constitute a continuing course of conduct in violation of the CLRA. 145. Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class have suffered injury in fact and have lost money as a result of Defendant’s misrepresentations. 146. Plaintiff seeks an award of restitution and actual damages in accordance with the provisions of the CLRA. 147. Plaintiff also seeks equitable relief in the form of an order for injunctive relief: a) Requiring Defendant to make full restitution of all monies wrongfully obtained as a result of the conduct described above; b) Requiring Defendant to disgorge all ill-gotten gains flowing from the conduct described above; and c) Enjoining Defendant from engaging, using, or employing its advertising and marketing tactics to sell the Products, as described above. 148. Pursuant to the notice requirements under the CLRA, on January 9, 2014, Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter via U.S.P.S. Certified Mail, notifying Defendant in writing of the particular violations of the CLRA, and demanding that Defendant take certain corrective actions within the mandated thirty (30) day time period. In the event Defendant fails to adequately respond within the thirty (30) day time period, Plaintiff intends to amend this Complaint to include a request for punitive damages and statutory damages pursuant to the CLRA. 149. Pursuant to the CLRA, Plaintiff separately seeks, and is entitled to, costs, attorney’s fees, and any other applicable relief allowable under the CLRA. Case3:14-cv-00136-EDL Document1 Filed01/09/14 Page22 of 24 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23

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17. Defendant LG Electronics USA, Inc. holds itself out to the public as a manufacturer of safe, cutting-edge, and easy-to-use home appliances, including washing machines. Defendant is in the business of manufacturing, producing, distributing, and/or selling washing machines throughout the United States. 19. Defendant manufactures thousands of washing machines each year, a substantial portion of which are sold or offered for sale in New Jersey. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sold, either directly or indirectly, thousands of its Defective Washing Machines nationwide and in the State of New Jersey. 20. Defendant makes numerous express warranties about the quality of its washing machines. For example, the Defendant claims that its Digital Appliance Division (of which front load washing machines are key products) “creates innovative products that improve people’s daily lives in countries around the globe.” Defendant also advertises that it’s front load washing machines are superior for their “clean and convenient washing at the touch of a button,” and that customers get the “benefit of good washing performance with minimal damage to your wash.” Defendant also makes statements in the front load washing machine owner’s manuals such as: a) “Washing ball enhances the wash performance and reduces damage to the clothing. The jets spray and help tumble clothes to enhance washing performance while maintaining fabric care.” b) “This front load washer requires longer cycle time and gets clothes much cleaner, yet is more gentle on the fabrics, than top load washers.” 22. Upon information and belief, Defendant manufactured and distributed the Defective Washing Machines intending that consumers would purchase them, regardless of the place of purchase or the location in which customers would use them. The Defective Washing Machines were placed into the stream of commerce and were distributed, offered for sale and sold to Plaintiffs, Class members, and other purchasers in New Jersey and elsewhere in the United States. 23. Defendant intended for customers to believe its statements and representations about its Washing Machines and to trust that its high-end washing machines were and are of first-rate quality. 26. Defendant LG Electronics USA manufactured, marketed, advertised, warranted and sold, either directly or through their authorized distribution channels, the Defective Washing Machines suffering from the Mold and Mildew Problems alleged herein. The Mold and Mildew Problems in Plaintiffs’ Washing Machines 27. On April 25, 2006, the Plaintiffs purchased the LG WM2277HS Model Front Loading Washing Machine from a Home Depot store in Florida. Plaintiffs quickly noticed that the washing machine emitted an odorous foul smell and was producing mold and mildew. 29. Plaintiffs have only used HE (high efficiency) detergent in their LG washing machine. According to the Owner’s Manual for Plaintiff’s washing machine, “HE detergents are formulated specifically for front load washers and contain suds reducing components.” The Defective Washing Machines contain compartments for detergent and liquid fabric softener. Plaintiff’s Owner’s Manual for their LG front load washer provides that “liquid or powdered detergent may be used” in the washing machine. 30. The Mold and Mildew Problems appear to be especially persistent when using liquid HE (high efficiency) detergents (in comparison to the use of powder HE detergent). The repairperson with whom Ms. Harper spoke advised her that she should discontinue using the liquid HE and should use only powder HE instead. The repairperson told her that the liquid HE detergent has a tendency to "gum up" the parts in the washer. 31. Plaintiffs have continued to experience the Mold and Mildew Problems even after they switched to using powder HE detergents exclusively. 33. Plaintiffs bring this suit as a class action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”) pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3). Subject to additional information obtained through further investigation and/or discovery, the foregoing definition of the Class may be expanded or narrowed by amendment or amended complaint. Plaintiffs seeks to represent the following Class: All persons in the United States who purchased and/or who own any of the Defective Washing Machines that are subject to the Mold and Mildew Problems. 34. In the alternative, and only in the event that the Court determines that New Jersey law shall not be applied to the claims of all Class members regardless of where they reside, Plaintiffs seek certification of the following sub- class: All persons who purchased, in the State of Florida, any of the Defective Washing Machines that are subject to the Mold and Mildew Problems. 36. Plaintiffs and the Class incorporate by reference each proceeding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 37. Plaintiffs and members of the Class are consumers who purchased one or more Defective Washing Machines for personal, family or household use. 38. New Jersey has enacted its Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. §§ 56:8-1 et seq., to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive or fraudulent business practices, unfair competition and false advertising. Other states have enacted similar consumer protection provisions. New Jersey and other states throughout the nation also provide consumers with a private right of action under these statutes. 40. In violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, Defendant has affirmatively misrepresented and knowingly concealed, suppressed and failed to disclose material facts with the intent that others rely upon such concealment and deception in connection with its production, manufacture, and/or sale of the Defective Washing Machines. 41. The conduct of Defendant, as set forth above, constitutes unfair, fraudulent and/or deceptive trade practices prohibited under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. 42. As a result of Defendant’s unfair, fraudulent and/or deceptive trade practices, Plaintiffs and members of the Class have suffered an ascertainable loss of monies and/or property. 43. Plaintiffs and the Class incorporate by reference each proceeding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 44. Florida state law – specifically, FLA. STAT. § 501.201, et seq. – prohibits deceptive and unfair trade practices. 46. Plaintiffs and Class members have been aggrieved and have suffered an injury as a result of Defendant’s deceptive practices. 47. Plaintiffs and the Class repeat and incorporate by reference each and every paragraph of this complaint as though fully set forth at length herein. 48. Defendant expressly warranted that the Defective Washing Machines would, inter alia, actually work to clean clothes. Defendant also expressly warranted that both liquid and powder HE detergents were suitable for use in its Defective Washing Machines. 49. Defendant breached these express warranties because, as a result of the Mold and Mildew Problems, the Defective Washing Machines do not effectively clean clothes, and are not suitable for the use of liquid HE detergents. 50. Plaintiffs provided Defendant with notice of its breach of express warranties within a reasonable time after discovering that breach. Specifically, Plaintiffs called Defendant when they first became aware of the Mold and Mildew Problem. In response, Defendant sent out a repairperson who was unable to satisfactorily correct the problem. Plaintiffs then called Defendant a second time to complain and left a voice-mail message expressing their dissatisfaction. To this date, Plaintiffs have not yet received a response from Defendant. 52. Plaintiffs and the Class repeat and incorporate by reference each and every paragraph of this complaint as though fully set forth at length herein. 53. As manufacturers and/or distributors of the Defective Washing Machine Products, Defendants are “merchants,” within the meaning of the New Jersey commercial code governing the implied warranty of merchantability. 54. The Defective Washing Machines are “goods” as defined by the New Jersey commercial code provisions governing the implied warranty of merchantability. 55. Implied in the sale of the Defective Washing Machines is a warranty of merchantability that requires, inter alia, that the Washing Machines pass without objection in the trade and are fit for the ordinary purposes for which Washing Machines are used. 56. Defendant impliedly represented and warranted that the Defective Washing Machines were fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, i.e., cleaning clothes. 58. Plaintiffs provided Defendant with notice of its breach of warranties within a reasonable time after discovering that breach. Specifically, Plaintiffs called Defendant when they first became aware of the Mold and Mildew Problem. In response, Defendant sent out a repairperson that was unable to satisfactorily correct the problem. Plaintiffs then called Defendant a second time to complain and left a voice-mail message explaining their dissatisfaction. To this date, Plaintiffs have not yet received a response from Defendant. 59. All Defective Washing Machine Products were manufactured and distributed with the same Mold and Mildew Problems and were, therefore, not of merchantable quality at the time that they were distributed into the stream of commerce by Defendant. 60. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of said warranties, Plaintiffs and Class members were injured and are therefore entitled to damages. 61. Count V is being plead in the alternative to Counts I through IV. 62. Defendant caused the Defective Washing Machines to be distributed in the stream of commerce with knowledge that the Machines would be purchased by consumers who possessed a reasonable expectation that the Washing Machines would be free from material defects such as the Mold and Mildew Problems. 64. Defendant has further benefited, directly or indirectly, by avoiding the costs associated with correcting the Mold and Mildew Problems, making repairs, and recalling the Defective Washing Machine Products. 65. Defendant has and continues to retain that economic benefit at the expense of Plaintiffs and Class members. 66. Principles of equity and good conscience make it unjust for Defendant to retain the benefit conferred on it by consumers of the Defective Washing Machines, and Defendant should be required to pay Plaintiffs and Class members for this benefit. BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY Defendant LG Electronics USA and its Defective Washing Machines UNJUST ENRICHMENT VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT VIOLATIONS OF THE FLORIDA DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT

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14. Defendants made (or had made on their behalf) telephone calls to Plaintiff’s and the members of the Classes’ telephones without consent. Defendants have made thousands of calls through the phone numbers (302) 394-6888, (954) 334-3110, and (305) 260-6112, among others. 15. In making unsolicited calls to the telephones of the Classes, Defendants utilized an “automated dialing system” that places outbound calls automatically through the use of a computerized or other mechanical process. 17. The Newport Beachside Hotel & Resort is owned, operated, and/or marketed by Defendants, along with interrelated non-party entities. 18. Defendants repeatedly made (or directed to be made on their behalf) unsolicited phone calls to Plaintiff’s and the other putative members of the Classes’ telephones in violation of the TCPA. 19. Neither Plaintiff Zelaya, nor the other members of the putative Classes, ever consented to have Defendants make phone calls to them. 20. Based on the fact that neither Plaintiff nor other members of the putative Classes ever consented to receive calls from Defendants, and that they did not provide their phone numbers to Defendants in any capacity, Defendants only could have obtained those telephone numbers by purchasing lists of phone numbers from a third party and/or by simply dialing numbers at random. 22. Plaintiff first began receiving calling from Defendants in October 2010, and received subsequent calls in April 2011, May 2011, and June 2011. On June 8, 2011, Plaintiff contacted Defendants and spoke with a hotel manager, informed him of the ongoing and unwanted telemarketing calls, and requested that they stop. 23. Notwithstanding these requests, Defendants called Plaintiff again in August 2011. Thereafter Plaintiff received a communication from Defendants’ counsel that indicated that he would no longer receive telemarketing calls from Defendants. However, again, Plaintiff received numerous additional calls from Defendants. 24. For example, on January 25, 2012, Defendants called Plaintiff and informed him that he was the “winner” of a promotional package that included a free trip to Orlando or Las Vegas. The telemarketer additionally informed Plaintiff that the offer related to a promotion to celebrate Newport's 40th anniversary and its recent extensive renovation. 25. Plaintiff received a second call from Defendants on that very same day that repeated the “promotional offer,” but adding that both Visa and MasterCard sponsored the offer. The telemarketer also informed Plaintiff that to receive the offer Plaintiff needed to attend a 90- minute tour of Newport Beachside Hotel and Resort and that Plaintiff should contact Newport’s reception manager Gabriela Rojas. 27. On February 9, 2012, Defendants placed yet another call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, this time from (305) 260-6112. The telemarketer told Plaintiff that he was the winner of an award consisting of a free dinner package at Hotel Kitchen VIP 305, a restaurant in the Newport hotel, and that to claim the award Plaintiff, he needed to visit the hotel. 28. Defendants placed additional calls to Plaintiff on March 28th and March 31st. 29. Each time Defendants called Plaintiff, he informed them that he as listed on the National Do Not Call Registry, he asked Defendants to place his information on their internal do not call list, and asked them to mail him a copy of their TCPA/Do-Not-Call policy. 30. Defendants never provided Plaintiff with a copy of their TCPA/Do-Not-Call policy, as requested. 31. Defendants made, or had made on their behalf, the calls to Plaintiff using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator and to dial such numbers. 32. Plaintiff did not submit his phone number to Defendants or any other entity that stated, directly or indirectly, that he would receive phone calls from Defendants, let alone phone calls promoting time-share or resort opportunities. 33. Plaintiff never consented to, requested, or otherwise desired or permitted Defendants to make telephone calls to his cellular phone, nor did Plaintiff provide Defendants or their agents with his cellular telephone number. 35. Plaintiff’s experience is corroborated by numerous consumer complaints appearing online, which indicate that Defendants placed calls to consumers without permission on a repeat basis. 36. Defendants each were aware that the above-described telephone calls were being made either by them directly, or made on their behalf, and that the telephone calls were being made to consumers who had not consented to receive them. 38. Numerosity: The exact number of the members of the Classes is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants have made telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Classes. Members of the Classes can be identified through Defendants’ records. 39. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Classes, in that Plaintiff and the members of the Classes sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. 40. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 44. Defendants made thousands of unsolicited phone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and other members of the Newport Call and Newport Opt-Out Classes using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. 45. Specifically, Defendants utilized an automatic telephone dialing system to make telephone calls to Plaintiff and the other members of the Newport Call and Newport Opt-Out Classes without human intervention. Defendants’ equipment qualifies as an automatic telephone dialing system because it is equipment, combining software and hardware aspects, that has the capacity to store or produce numbers and dial numbers at random, in sequential order, or from a database of numbers, and likewise has the capacity to make telephone calls, that, when answered, create a new outbound call and direct the called party to a live operator. Defendants’ equipment can accomplish all these functions without human intervention. 47. Defendants’ phone calls were also made to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and other members of the Newport Opt-Out Class after they had expressly requested to no longer receive any future calls from Defendant, and therefore, any calls made following such a request were done without prior express consent. 48. Defendants have, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendants’ illegal conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Newport Call and Newport Opt-Out Classes suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive unsolicited calls on their cellular phones and, under section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each violation of the Act. 49. Should the Court determine that Defendants’ misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Newport Call and Newport Opt- Out Classes. 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 51. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may,” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 53. 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(e), provides that §64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers to the extent described in the Commission’s Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03- 153, ‘Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,’” which Report and Order in turn, provides as follows: The Commission's rules provide that companies making telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers must comply with time of day restrictions and must institute procedures for maintaining do-not-call lists. For the reasons described above, we conclude that these rules apply to calls made to wireless telephone numbers. We believe that wireless subscribers should be afforded the same protections as wireline subscribers. 55. Defendants violated § 64.1200(c) by initiating telephone solicitations to wireless and residential telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiff and the Newport Do Not Call Class, who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. These consumers requested not to receive calls from Defendants, as set forth in § 64.l200(d)(3). 56. Defendants and/or their agents made more than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiff and members of the Newport Do Not Call Class within a 12-month period, without their prior express consent to receive such calls. Plaintiff and members of the Newport Do Not Call Class never provided any form of consent, at any time, to receive telephone calls from Defendants. 57. Plaintiff and members of the Newport Do Not Call Class expressly requested that Defendants no longer place calls to them, after which Defendants failed to place Plaintiff and members of the Newport Do Not Call Class on Defendants’ internal do-not-call list (or failed to do so within its stated seven day time period). 59. Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Newport Do Not Call Class received more than one telephone call within a 12-month period made by or on behalf of the Defendants in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Newport Do Not Call Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are each entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of § 64.1200. 60. To the extent Defendants’ misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of Plaintiff and the Newport Do Not Call Class. Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Newport Do Not Call Class) Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff, the Newport Call Class, and the Newport Opt-Out Class)

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11. On or about November 27, 2018, Defendant sent an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 12. Exhibit A is an invitation to an educational program to discuss the sacroiliac joint as a cause of low back pain, stating “we will review the SI joint as a potential cause of LBP, the diagnosis of SI joint pain and treatment options for patients with SI joint problems.” 19. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendant, (3) from whom Defendant did not obtain “prior express invitation or permission” to send fax advertisements, and (4) where the fax advertisements did not include an opt-out notice compliant with 47

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1 5. Plaintiff and others similarly situated worked as employees for Sprint. 17. Plaintiff and others similarly situated had or have the primary duty of servicing wireless communication equipment for individuals and small businesses. The FLSA requires covered employers, such as Sprint, to compensate all non- exempt employees for hours worked and no less than one and one-half times the regular rate of 18. pay for work performed more than forty (40) hours per workweek. When calculating the rate of pay, it shall include all nondiscretionary compensation. 19. Sprint classified Plaintiff and all others similarly situated at all its office locations as nonexempt employees who are eligible for overtime pay under the FLSA. Regardless the Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, primary job duties entitle them to overtime pay under the FLSA and for full compensation for hours worked. 20. Sprint provided centralized human resource, timekeeping, and payroll services for Plaintiff and others similarly situated at its offices located in Overland Park, Kansas, Georgia, Florida and Kentucky. However, regardless of location, Plaintiff and other similarly situated, routinely worked in excess of forty hours per workweek during their employment with Sprint without 21. receiving overtime compensation or their full compensation for hours worked as required under the FLSA. 22. Under its policy/practice, Sprint failed to properly pay the Plaintiff and others similarly situated overtime pay for work performed in excess of forty hours per week and their full compensation for hours worked. Instead, and as policy/practice, Sprint would routinely require Plaintiff and other similarly situated to report forty hours per work week on its time keeping systems, or Sprint would simply report these hours on their behalf in the same system and would routinely under report hours actually worked. 24. This illegal policy occurred through the weeks of Plaintiffs employment with Sprint as well as the weeks of other similarly situated employees who also routinely worked more than forty hours per workweek and routinely were underpaid for actual hours reported. On average, the Plaintiff Oliphant would work his assigned hours with overtime per week, but due to Sprint's policy/practice, was only being paid for forty hours if his work time included overtime and was not receiving any overtime pay for hours worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek. Plaintiffs co-employees at the Nebraska; Iowa and Minnesota offices were subject to this similar policy/practice. 25. Sprint was aware, or should have been aware, that Plaintiff and others similarly situated performed work that required payment of overtime compensation and full compensation for hours worked. 26. Sprint's conduct was willful and in bad faith. 27. Regardless of location, Sprint routinely suffered and permitted Plaintiff and others similarly situated to work more than forty (40) hours per week and did not correctly pay them the overtime compensation that they were due, nor did they pay them for their actual hours worked. 28. Upon information and belief, Sprint did not keep accurate records of these hours worked by Plaintiffs and other similarly situated as required by law. 29. re-allege and incorporate by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiffs files this action of himself and all individuals similarly situated. 31. During the applicable statutory period, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek without receiving overtime compensation for their overtime hours worked nor full compensation for hours actually worked. 32. Sprint failed to preserve records relating to these hours worked as required by 29 36. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated reallege and incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference as if sully set forth herein. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §207, requires employers to pay employees one and one- 37. half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per workweek. 38. Sprint suffered and permitted Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective to routinely work more than forty (40) hours per week without overtime compensation. 39. Sprint's actions, policies, and/or practices as described above violate the FLSA's overtime requirement by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective at the required overtime rate. 40. Sprint knew, or showed reckless disregard for the fact, that it failed to pay these individuals overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA. 41. As the direct and proximate result of Sprint's unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered, and will continue to suffer, a loss of income and other damages. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to liquidated damages and attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with this claim. 42. By failing to accurately record, report, and/or preserve records of hours worked by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective, Sprint has failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and other conditions ; and practice of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §201, et. seq. 43. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §255(a) as Sprint knew, or showed reckless disregard for, the fact that its compensation practices were in violation of these laws. 45. The Plaintiff was an hourly employee and was not compensated for hours actually worked in after turning in his time the defendant would adjust the hours worked down on a regular basis to avoid overtime and regular time. DAKOTA OLIPHANT, being first sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is the Plaintiff in the above and foregoing cause of action, has read the above Complaint, knows the allegations therein and that the same are true as he positively believes. Dakota Oliphant, PlctinW SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J_b_ day of J u-L/ Oliphant. ? 2018 by Dakota Notary Public' USm GENERAL NOTARY - State of Nebraska Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated

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20. Plaintiff seeks to bring this suit to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages pursuant to the applicable provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), individually, on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of those in the following collective: Current and former hourly employees, who during the applicable FLSA limitations period, performed any work for Defendants, and who consent to file a claim to recover damages for overtime compensation, as well as liquidated damages, which are legally due to them (“FLSA Plaintiffs”). 21. Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours in a workweek; and (5) were not paid 7 the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked per workweek in excess of forty. 22. At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been aware of the requirements to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet they purposefully and willfully chose and choose not to do so. Thus, all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims to Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation for all hours worked per workweek above forty in violation of the FLSA. 23. In addition, Plaintiff seeks to maintain this action as a class action pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), individually, on his own behalf, as well as on the behalf of those who are similarly situated whom, during the applicable limitations period, Defendants also subjected to violations of the NYLL and NYCRR. 24. Under FRCP 23(b)(3), Plaintiff must plead that: a. The class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable; b. There are questions of law or fact common to the class that predominate over any individual questions of law or fact; c. Claims or defenses of the representative are typical of the class; d. The representative will fairly and adequately protect the class; and e. A class action is superior to other methods of adjudication. 25. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following FRCP 23 class: Current and former hourly employees of Defendants who, at any time during the applicable NYLL limitations period, performed any work for Defendants within the State of New York (“Rule 23 Plaintiffs”). 8 Numerosity 26. During the NYLL Statutory Period Defendants have, in total, employed at least forty employees that are putative members of this class. Common Questions of Law and/or Fact 27. There are questions of law and fact common to each and every Rule 23 Plaintiff that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the FRCP 23 Class, including but not limited to the following: (1) the duties that Defendants required and require each Rule 23 Plaintiff to perform; (2) the manner of compensating each Rule 23 Plaintiff; (3) whether Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked and work in excess of forty hours per week; (4) whether Defendants failed or fail to pay Rule 23 Plaintiffs at the statutorily required rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek; (5) whether Defendants furnished and furnish Rule 23 Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements on each payday containing the information that NYLL § 195(3) requires; (6) whether Defendants furnished and furnish Rule 23 Plaintiffs with accurate wage notices upon hire containing the information that NYLL § 195(1) requires; (7) whether Defendants kept and maintained accurate records of hours that Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked; (8) whether Defendants kept and maintained records with respect to the compensation that they paid to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs; (9) whether Defendants have any affirmative defenses to any of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ claims; (10) whether Defendants’ actions with respect to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs were in violation of the NYLL and the NYCRR; and (11) if so, what constitutes the proper measure of damages. 9 Typicality of Claims and/or Defenses 28. As described in the “Background Facts” section below, Defendants employed and/or employ Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs within the meaning of the NYLL. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs whom he seeks to represent, as the Rule 23 Plaintiffs work and/or have worked for Defendants as hourly employees, and Defendants failed and fail to: (1) pay them overtime pay at one and one-half times their straight-time wage for all hours worked in a week over forty; (2) provide them with accurate wage statements on each payday; and (3) provide them with any wage notice upon hire. 29. Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs have all sustained similar types of damages as a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with the NYLL and NYCRR. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Plaintiffs all have suffered injury, including lack of compensation or under-compensation, due to Defendants’ common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims and/or Defendants’ defenses to those claims are typical of the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ claims and/or Defendants’ defenses to those claims. Adequacy 30. Plaintiff, as described below, worked the same or similar hours as the Rule 23 Plaintiffs throughout his employment with Defendants. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff at the statutorily required rate of one and one-half times his regular hourly wage for all hours worked over forty in a week, did not furnish Plaintiff with accurate wage statements on each payday, and did not furnish Plaintiff with a wage notice upon hire, which is substantially similar to how Defendants paid and treated the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. Plaintiff fully anticipates providing discovery responses and testifying under oath as to all of the matters raised in this Complaint and that will 10 be raised in Defendants’ Answer. Thus, Plaintiff would properly and adequately represent the current and former employees whom Defendants have subject to the treatment alleged herein. 31. Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel has substantial experience in this field of law. Superiority 32. Plaintiff has no, or very few, material facts relating to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ claims that are atypical of those of the putative class. Indeed, at all relevant times herein, Defendants treated Plaintiff identically, or at the very least, substantially similarly, to the Rule 23 Plaintiffs. 33. Any lawsuit brought by an employee of Defendants would be identical to a suit brought by any other employee for these same violations. Thus, separate litigation would risk inconsistent results. 34. Accordingly, this means of protecting Rule 23 Plaintiffs’ rights is superior to any other method, and this action is properly maintainable as a class action under FRCP 23(b)(3). 35. Subject to the time periods pertaining to the transferring of ownership between the two entity Defendants as explained above in the paragraphs below, Defendants Anthem and AAT are two privately-owned entities that install(ed), lease(d), and perform(ed) maintenance services on special effects equipment, servicing venues, clubs, and events throughout New York City, primarily in Manhattan, as well as out-of-state locations such as Florida, California, Nevada, Illinois, and Texas. 36. From the beginning of all relevant times herein until on or about January 1, 2016, Defendants Poulos, Lodi, and Ojeda owned, operated, and/or managed Defendant AAT, overseeing its operations on a daily basis, and were ultimately responsible for all matters with 11 respect to hiring, firing, and disciplining AAT’s employees, as well as determining employees’ rates and methods of pay and hours worked. 37. From at least January 16, 2013 to the present, Defendant Poulos has owned, operated, and/or managed Defendant Anthem, overseeing its operations on a daily basis, and being ultimately responsible for all matters with respect to hiring, firing, and disciplining Anthem’s employees, as well as determining employees’ rates and methods of pay and hours worked. 38. On or about January 1, 2016, Defendants Lodi and Ojeda sold their ownership shares of AAT to Defendant Poulos, who then merged AAT’s business into Anthem, which as the successor entity of Defendant AAT, assumed liability for all debts, legal obligations, and claims against it. 39. Defendants employed Plaintiff to work as an hourly audio technician first at AAT and then at Anthem, collectively, from in or about April 2014 to on or about August 28, 2017. Defendants Poulos, Lodi, and Ojeda hired him. Throughout his employment, Plaintiff’s primary duties consisted of installing audio systems, sound systems, and point of sale systems at business venues, clubs, and restaurants throughout New York as well as out of state. 40. From the start of his employment in April 2014 until in or around August 2015, Defendants AAT, Poulos, Lodi, and Ojeda paid Plaintiff a straight-time rate of $20.00 per hour and an overtime rate of $30.00 per hour for hours worked in excess of forty-five per week. 41. From in or around September 2015 until his termination in or around December 2017, first Defendants AAT, Poulos, Lodi, and Ojeda, and then after the sale, Defendants Anthem and Poulos paid Plaintiff a straight-time rate of $24.00 per hour and an overtime rate of $36.00 per hour for hours worked in excess of forty-five per week. 12 42. Throughout his employment, Defendants usually required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work, from forty-five to sixty hours per week from 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. to at least 5:00 p.m. each day, for at least five days a week. Occasionally, when completing complex installation projects, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work, as many as seventy to ninety hours in a week. 43. By way of example only, during the week of December 5 through December 11, 2016, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work, five days, for at least fourteen hours each day, for a total of 70.90 hours. 44. In exchange for his work, Defendants paid Plaintiff, as they paid all FLSA Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Plaintiffs pursuant to the same policy or practice, overtime at the rate of time and one- half his straight-time rate only for those hours that Plaintiff worked per week in excess of forty- five. Thus, for the hours that Plaintiff worked per week between forty and forty-five, Defendants paid Plaintiff at his straight-time rate only. This occurred during each week of Plaintiff’s employment. 45. For example, during the week of December 5 through December 11, 2016 when, as described above, Plaintiff worked 70.90 hours, Defendants should have paid Plaintiff for forty hours at his straight time rate of $24.00, or $960.00, and for 30.9 hours at his overtime rate of $36.00, or $1,112.40, for a total of $2,072.40 for this week. Yet, instead, for this week, Defendants paid Plaintiff for forty-five hours at his straight hourly wage, or $1,080.00, and 25.9 hours at his overtime hourly rate, or $900.00, for a total of $2,012.40, which is $60.00 less than what Plaintiff should have received for that workweek. 46. By way of a second example, during the week of September 21 through September 27, 2015, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff did work a total of sixty hours and 13 forty-five minutes. For this work, Defendants should have paid Plaintiff for forty hours at his straight time rate of $24.00, or $960.00, and for twenty hours and forty-five minutes at his overtime rate of $36.00, or $747.00, for a total of $1,707.00 for this week. Yet, Defendants paid Plaintiff for forty-five hours at his straight hourly wage, or $1,080.00, and fifteen hours and forty-five minutes at his overtime hourly rate, or $567.00, for a total of $1,647.00, which, as in the above paragraph, is $60.00 less than what Plaintiff should have received for that workweek. 47. Defendants paid Plaintiff on a weekly basis. 48. On each occasion when they paid Plaintiff, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with a wage statement that accurately listed, inter alia, his straight and overtime pay for all hours worked for that week, computed at the proper rates of pay for every hour worked. 49. Upon hire, Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with any wage notice, let alone one containing that accurately contained, inter alia, the rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other, allowances claimed, or the regular pay day on which he would be paid. 50. Defendants treated Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in the same manner described herein. 51. Defendants acted in this manner to maximize their profits and minimize their labor costs and overhead. 52. Each hour that Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked was for Defendants’ benefit. 53. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 14 54. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 55. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA, while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA. 56. As also described above, Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, yet Defendants failed to compensate them in accordance with the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 57. Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. 58. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. 59. Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violations of the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 60. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-into this action, repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 61. NYLL § 160 and 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2 require employers to compensate their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek. 62. As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCRR, while Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-into this action, are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCRR. 15 63. As also described above, Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-into this action, worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, yet Defendants failed to compensate them in accordance with the NYLL’s and the NYCRR’s overtime provisions. 64. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-into this action, are entitled to their overtime pay for all hours worked per week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay. 65. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-into this action, are also entitled to liquidated damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees for Defendants’ violations of the NYLL’s and the NYCRR’s overtime provisions. 66. Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-into this action, repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 67. NYLL § 195(3) requires that employers furnish employees with wage statements containing accurate, specifically enumerated criteria on each occasion when the employer pays wages to the employee. 68. As described above, Defendants, on each payday, failed to furnish Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-into this action, with accurate wage statements containing all of the criteria required under the NYLL. 69. Prior to February 27, 2015, pursuant to NYLL § 198(1-d), Defendants are liable to Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-into this action, in the amount of $100 for each workweek after the violation occurred, up to a statutory cap of $2,500. 16 70. On or after February 27, 2015, pursuant to NYLL § 198(1-d), Defendants are liable to Plaintiff, Rule 23 Plaintiffs, and any FLSA Plaintiff who opts-into this action, in the amount of $250 for each workday after the violation occurred, up to a statutory cap of $5,000. Failure to Furnish Proper Wage Statements in Violation of the NYLL Unpaid Overtime Under the NYLL and the NYCRR Unpaid Overtime Under the FLSA

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15. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 16. Beginning in or around November of 2018, Plaintiff began receiving numerous autodialed and pre-recorded calls on her cellular phone ((XXX) XXX-2511) from ARM. When Plaintiff did not pick up the phone, ARM left a prerecorded voicemail informing her that it was ARM calling and that Plaintiff should call ARM back at 888-548-8829. There was at least one number that appeared in Plaintiff’s caller ID for these calls: 888-548-8829. This number appears to be associated with ARM. Most recently, Plaintiff received calls from ARM at this number on December 10, 2018 at 12:50 PM and December 18, 2018 at 3:07 PM. 17. Plaintiff requested that the calls stop many times. ARM continued to call her cellular phone anyway. 18. ARM is, and at all times mentioned herein was a “person”, as defined by 47 26. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”). 27. Plaintiff proposes the following Class definitions, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons in the United States who received a call from ARM from an automated telephone dialing system and/or utilizing a prerecorded voice on or after November 1, 2014, for whom ARM cannot provide evidence that the Class member provided ARM his or her cellular telephone number. Collectively, all these persons will be referred to as “Class members.” Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest, Defendant’s agents and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 29. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class or Subclass, but on information and belief, the number of Class and Subclass members at minimum is in the thousands. 30. Plaintiff and all members of the Class and Subclass have been harmed by the acts of Defendant, including, but not limited to, the invasion of their privacy, annoyance, waste of time, depletion of their cellular phone battery, and the intrusion on their cellular telephone that occupied it from receiving legitimate communications. 31. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 32. The joinder of all Class and Subclass members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the judicial economy of the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The Class and Subclass can be identified easily through records maintained by Defendant. 51. As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system and an artificial or prerecorded voice, without her prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA and Rules, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class and Subclass member. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and Subclass, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class or Subclass. 52. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes, including claims under the TCPA. 54. Defendant has acted on grounds applicable to the Class and Subclass, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class and Subclass as a whole appropriate. Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 56. The foregoing acts and omissions of ARM constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 57. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class and Subclass are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 59. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 60. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 61. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 62. Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ. MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO. 0:19cv60205 STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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10. While certain types of calls may be within the letter of the law for calls placed to landline (“wireline”) telephones, the same calls to cellular (“wireless”) telephones violate the 1 http://greaterstcloudjobspot.com/company/2497/New-Partners-Teleservices/ 2 https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/195027197 3 http://greaterstcloudjobspot.com/company/2497/New-Partners-Teleservices/ 4 http://newpartners.com/direct-contact.php 4 TCPA where they are made without prior express written or oral consent. As explained by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) in its 2012 order: Additionally, we note that many commenters expressed concern about obtaining written consent for certain types of autodialed or prerecorded calls, including debt collection calls, airline notification calls, bank account fraud alerts, school and university notifications, research or survey calls, and wireless usage notifications. Again, such calls, to the extent that they do not contain telemarketing messages, would not require any consent when made to residential wireline consumers, but require either written or oral consent if made to wireless consumers and other specified recipients. [Emphasis added]. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 (Feb. 15, 2012). 11. Yet in violation of this rule, Defendants fail to obtain any prior express consent (oral or written) to make the pre-recorded calls described herein to cellular telephone numbers. 12. Consumer complaints regarding Defendants' invasive and repetitive calls are legion. As a sample, consumers have complained as follows: • “I've had at least one call each day from this number 303-816-3334 for weeks and it won't stop! Even when asked to hit #1 on phone to stop it, they're still calling and it's quite annoying.”5 • called incessantly by this number. called it back and requested to be taken of their list (option on the menu tree). Blocked number but calls still get through”6 • “I've gotten several hangups from this number, so I called back and the message identifies them as "New Partners Teleservices," and it says they're doing opinion polls. They do claim to have an internal no call list, but we'll see.”7 • “This phone number has been calling me daily (sometimes multiple times a 5 http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-303-816-3334 6 Id. 7 Id. 5 day) for the past 3 weeks. I've never answered and they've never left an actual voicemail. Today there was a 2 second voicemail that was nothing but static. I finally blocked their number, apparently they can't take a hint.”8 • “They call every day! Company called Individual Health Quotes.”9 • “they call my phone number at least 4 times a day without leaving a message. I called the number back and told them to remove my number from their call list in which the lady replied “I'm sorry I can't do that” and then hung up on me.”10 • “Have told them am on on dnc - they keep calling sometes [sic] 3x's a day; have hit 1 on their recording, they keep right on calling.”11 13. In placing the calls that form the basis of this Complaint, Defendants utilized an ATDS in violation of the TCPA. Specifically, the hardware and software used by Defendants has the capacity to generate and store random numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention or as Defendants call it “Auto-calling programs.”12 Defendants’ automated dialing equipment also is, or includes features substantially similar to, a predictive dialer, meaning that it is capable of making numerous phone calls simultaneously and automatically connecting answered calls to then available callers and disconnecting the rest (all without human intervention). Indeed, individuals do not individually dial each number that Defendants call. 14. When placing these calls to consumers, Defendants failed to get the prior express 8 Id. 9 http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-515-509-2555 10 http://www.bbb.org/chicago/business-reviews/home-health-services/individual-health-quotes- in-chicago-il-88703412/complaints 11 http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-315-834-1568 12 http://newpartners.com/direct-contact.php 6 oral or written consent required by the TCPA from cellular telephone owners/users as required by the TCPA to make such calls. 15. Furthermore, Defendants call these consumers who have no “established business relationship” with Defendants. 16. Finally, even when consumers try to opt out of future calls by requesting to never be called again, Defendants continue to call them. 17. Defendants knowingly made (and continue to make) telemarketing calls to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the call recipients. As such, Defendants have not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and other members of the putative Classes, they have also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 18. Beginning in approximately January, 2016, Plaintiff began to receive pre- recorded telephone calls from Defendants on his cellular telephone. The calls were from phone number 636-923-8774. 19. Each call that Plaintiff received was pre-recorded and contained the following message, “You have reached New Partners Teleservices. We place calls on behalf of many political and non-profit clients and organizations. If you would like to be removed from our calling list, please press 1 now.” 20. Plaintiff pressed ‘1’ every time he received a call from Defendants in order to remove his telephone number from their call list. Upon pressing ‘1’, he would then be prompted to enter in his telephone number, which Plaintiff would do, and he would then hear a pre- recorded message indicating that it would take up to 10 days for his number to be removed. 21. Despite his attempts to get his phone number removed from Defendants’ call list, 7 Plaintiff received approximately one pre-recorded call from Defendants each month consistently up to August 2016. 22. At no time did Plaintiff consent to the receipt of pre-recorded calls to his cellular telephone from Defendants, nor did he ever provide prior oral or written express consent to Defendants for such calls to be placed. 23. By making unauthorized pre-recorded telephone calls as alleged herein, Defendants have caused consumers actual harm and cognizable legal injury. This includes the aggravation and nuisance and invasions of privacy that result from the receipt of such calls, in addition to a loss of value realized for the monies consumers paid to their wireless carriers for the receipt of such calls. Furthermore, the calls interfered with Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ use and enjoyment of their cellphones, including the related data, software, and hardware components. Defendant also caused substantial injury to their phones by causing wear and tear on their property, consuming battery life, and appropriating cellular minutes. 24. In order to redress these injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Classes of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited pre-recorded calls to cellular telephones. 25. On behalf of the Classes, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unsolicited and unauthorized pre-recorded calling activities and an award of statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 26. For the purposes of making the repeated, harassing calls to Plaintiff and the other Class members, Defendants were agents and alter egos of one another and acted for the other’s benefit. They each knew about the calls, authorized and ratified the making of the calls, received the benefits of the calls, and profited from the calls. On information and belief, both Defendants 8 were also aware of the fact 27. Plaintiff Greene brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of himself and the two classes defined as follows: Pre-recorded No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who (1) Defendants called, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone, (3) using a pre-recorded voice or messages, and (4) for whom Defendants claim they obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendants claim they supposedly obtained prior express consent to call the Plaintiff. Pre-recorded Stop Class: All persons in the United States who (1) Defendants called, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone, (3) using a pre-recorded voice or messages, (4) after the person pressed “1” when prompted to during Defendants’ recorded message. 28. The following people are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiffs’ counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. Plaintiff anticipates the potential need to amend the class definitions following class discovery. 29. On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 30. There are several questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. Common questions for the Class members that may be 9 answered in a single stroke include but are not limited to the following: a. whether Defendants’ conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; b. whether Defendants utilized an automatic telephone dialing system or a pre- recorded messages to make the calls to members of the Classes; c. whether members of the Classes are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendants’ conduct; d. whether Defendants obtained prior express written consent to contact any class members on their cellular telephones; e. whether pressing “1” when prompted revoked any consent to be called 31. The factual and legal bases of Defendants’ liability to Plaintiff and to the other members of the Classes are the same, resulting in the same injuries to the Plaintiff and to all of the other members of the Classes, including the annoyance and aggravation associated with such pre-recorded calls as well as the loss of cellular plan minutes and temporary inability to enjoy and use their cellphones, as a result of the transmission of the pre-recorded calls alleged herein. Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes have all suffered harm and damages as a result of Defendants’ unlawful and wrongful conduct of placing pre-recorded calls. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes as all members of the Classes are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct. Plaintiff, like other members of the Classes, received unsolicited pre-recorded calls from Defendants. Plaintiff is advancing the same claims and legal theory on behalf of himself and all absent members of the Classes. 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff’s claims are made in a representative capacity on behalf of the other members of the Classes. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other members of the proposed Classes and is subject to no unique defenses. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and 10 class actions. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest adverse to those of the other members of the Classes. 33. The suit may be maintained as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted, and/or have refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief appropriate. Specifically, injunctive relief is necessary and appropriate to require Defendants to discontinue placing unsolicited and unauthorized pre-recorded calls to the public and to honor opt-out requests. Likewise, Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to the Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes in placing the pre-recorded calls at issue, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Classes. 34. In addition, this suit may be maintained as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because a class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Absent a class action, most members of the Classes would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive, and will have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. The claims asserted herein are applicable to all consumers throughout the United States who received an unsolicited and unauthorized pre-recorded call from Defendants, many of whom had expressly revoked any consent by pressing “1” when prompted. The injury suffered by each individual class member is relatively small in comparison to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the 11 complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Defendants’ conduct. It would be virtually impossible for members of the Classes individually to redress effectively the wrongs done to them. Even if the members of the Classes could afford such litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties, and to the court system, presented by the complex legal and factual issues of the case. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 35. Adequate notice can be given to the members of the Classes directly using information maintained in Defendants’ records or through notice by publication. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 37. Defendants made unsolicited and unwanted telemarketing calls to telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Pre-recorded No Consent Class on their cellular telephone in an effort to sell their products and services using a pre-recorded voice as defined in the TCPA. 38. Defendants made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. 39. Defendants utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Pre-recorded No Consent Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 12 40. Defendants failed to obtain any prior express written consent from Plaintiff and other called parties that included, as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8)(i) a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure informing the person signing that: (A) By executing the agreement, such person authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the signatory telemarketing calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (B) The person is not required to sign the agreement (directly or indirectly), or agree to enter into such an agreement as a condition of purchasing any property, goods, or services. 41. Defendants also failed to obtain any prior express oral consent of the persons receiving its pre-recorded telephone calls. 42. By making unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and members of the Pre- recorded No Consent Class’s cellular telephones using a pre-recorded voice, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) by doing so without prior express consent. 43. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Pre-recorded No Consent Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones and, under Section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 44. Should the Court determine that Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Pre-recorded No Consent Class. 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 13 46. Defendants made unsolicited and unwanted pre-recorded calls to telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Pre-recorded Stop Class on their cellular telephone after the cellphone users had pressed “1” to opt out of Defendant’s system. By pressing “1” as prompted, Plaintiff and the other members of the Pre-recorded Stop Class clearly revoked any prior express consent that they may arguably have ever provided to be called. 47. Defendants made the telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse. 48. Defendants utilized equipment that made the telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Pre-recorded Stop Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 49. By making unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Pre- recorded Stop Class’s cellular telephones using a pre-recorded voice after they requested to no longer receive such calls, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) by doing so without prior express consent. 50. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Pre-recorded Stop Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones, the temporary inability to use their phones, lost time and data, wear and tear on their phones and the batteries, and, under Section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 51. Should the Court determine that Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Pre-recorded Stop Class. 14 7. Defendant New Partners Consulting is a Washington D.C.-based political and corporate consulting firm with more than 160 staff members and several offices throughout the United States. 8. Defendant New Partners Teleservices is a Minnesota-based affiliate or subsidiary of Defendant New Partners Consulting and operates inbound and outbound contact centers. On information and belief, New Partners Teleservices has a 120 seat call center in Eveleth, Minnesota,1 recently opened a new contact center in Melrose, Minnesota,2 and also operates an “At Home Agent (AHA)” program which allows employees to work from home.3 9. Defendant New Partners Consulting specifically notes that Defendants offer clients services including “auto-calling programs” that utilize an ATDS.4 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Pre-Recorded No Consent Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Pre-Recorded Stop Class)

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23. The California class may be appropriately maintained as a class action under Rule 23 because all of the prerequisites set forth under Rule 23 are met. 24. Members of the California class are so numerous that joinder of all such members is impracticable. Although exact size of the California class is unknown, it is believed and alleged that the number of persons currently employed as Field Case Managers by Genex in the State of California number more than 50, and over the past four years, it is believed and alleged that Genex has employed more than 200 persons as Field Case Managers in the State of California. The number of current and former California-based employees of Genex is so numerous that joinder is impracticable if not impossible. 32. Plaintiff re-asserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 31, above excepting those paragraphs that are inconsistent with this cause of action brought pursuant to the FLSA. 38. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 37 above, excepting those paragraphs that are inconsistent with this cause of action brought pursuant to California law. 39. The Genex Employees employed by Defendant are subject to the terms and conditions of the California Labor Code and California Wage Orders, found in the California Code of Regulations, at Title 8, Section 11000, et seq., as amended. 47. Plaintiff reasserts and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 46, above excepting those paragraphs which are inconsistent with this cause of action for violations of the California Business and Professions Code § 17200. 48. Section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. 49. Defendants have engaged in, and continue to engage in the unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business practices alleged hereinabove in violation of Section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code. 50. These challenged policies and practices have harmed the named Plaintifs, the members of the California class and the general public. OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACTION OF 1938 (On Behalf of the FLSA Employees As Against Defendant) OF CALIFORNIA LAW (On Behalf of the California Class Only) PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 17200 (On Behalf of the California Class Only)

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10. Plaintiffs bring a collective action against their former employers for unpaid wages and overtime compensation owed to them and all other similarly situated employees, current and former, of Defendants’ who worked for the Defendants, at any time during the three year period before this Complaint was filed up to the present (the “FLSA Class Members”). These class members should be informed of the pendency of this action and appraised of their rights to join this action. 11. While working for Svensk, the FLSA Class members were employees as that term is defined by 29 U.S.C. §203(e), and were engaged in interstate commerce in that the materials used to perform pool services, and the vehicles driven to get to the pools, are articles that traveled through interstate commerce. 13. At all times pertinent to this claim, Fernbach was an officer and director, and operator of Svensk acting as a manager in relation to Svensk’s employees, including, without limitation, setting pay, pay policies, and work schedules. Thus Fernbach is an employer within the meaning of Section 29 U.S.C. §203(d). 14. During the Collective Action Timer Period, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the other FLSA Class Members for all hours worked in violation of the FLSA. 15. During the Collective Action Time Period, Defendants failed to pay overtime to the FLSA class Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, in violation of the FLSA. 16. Plaintiffs and other FLSA Class Members are non-exempt employees under the FLSA. 17. As part of their regular business practices, Defendants have intentionally, willfully and repeditly harmed Plaintiffs and other FLSA Class Members by engaging in a pattern, practice or policy of violating the FLSA on a class wide basis. Defendants’ actions were willful and with knowledge because the Defendant has been sued before for violating the 30. Plaintiffs, individually, together, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 29 above as though fully set forth herin. 31. This is an action against Defendants for willful violations of the FLSA, including 29 U.S.C. §§206, 207 et. seq. 32. From October 2018 to October 2019, Plaintiff Wallen worked for Defendants continuously in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 33. From March 19, 2018 through December 2, 2019, Plaintiff Shakes worked for Defendants continuously in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 34. For the entire length of the Plaintiffs’ employment by Defendants, neither Plaintiff was paid for the time he spent working in excess of forty (40) hours per week, in violation of the FLSA’s overtime requirement. 35. The FLSA Class Members worked at various times for the Defendants, during the Collective Action Period. 37. By failing to compensate Shakes, Wallen, and the other FLSA Class Members, for the time they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (either at their regular rate or overtime rate), Defendants have willfully violated the provisions of the FLSA. 38. Defendants’ actions were willful and purposeful as they were well aware of the FLSA’s requirements for payment of all hours worked and for payment of overtime wages at the overtime rate for non-exempt employees, such as Shakes and Wallen, and those similarly situated. They are willful and purposeful because Defendants are aware of the FLSA’s requirements based on former FLSA actions against them. 39. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay employees at a time-and-a-half rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a given workweek are applicable to Defendants or Plaintiff and the other FLSA Class Members. 40. Defendants failed to make, keep and/or preserve adequate records of the Plaintiffs’ and the other FLSA Class Members wages, work hours, pay, and other conditions and practice of employment maintained by Defendants in violation of 29 U.S.C. §211(c). 41. Defendants failed to keep adequate, and accurate, payroll records that include all information required to be maintained by employers under Federal Law pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2 and 516.5. 7. Wallen worked for Defendants as a pool service technician from October 2018 to October 20th 2019. 8. Shakes worked for Defendants as a pool service technician from March 19, 2018 to December 2, 2019. 9. During the time perio9d from March 19, 2018 to December 2, 2019 (the “Collective Action Time Period”) Shakes, Wallen and those similarly situated employees, current and former, worked as pool technicians, pool repair technicians and pool service technicians. VIOLATION OF THE FLSA (Against Both Defendants)

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103. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 104. With respect to the Plaintiff's Class, this claim is brought on behalf of a class of; (a) all persons in the State of New York; (b) for whom Central Credit Services LLC left a message, (c) that did not identify that the call was for collection purposes; (d) made in 19- connection with Central Credit Services LLC's attempt to collect a debt; (e) which the said messages violate the FDCPA; (f) during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this initial action and ending 21 days after the service of the initial complaint filed in this action. 105. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Central Credit Services LLC and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 106. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of Central Credit Services LLC, and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 107. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's messages, such as the above said messages, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and 1692e(11). 108. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 109. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 20- 110. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The single issue of whether class members received phone messages that lacked information required by the FDCPA is common to the class members and predominates over any individual issue. The exact script of the messages need not be common to the class members, since it is the lack of information that is relevant.14 The principal issues are whether the Defendant's messages, such as the above said messages violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and 1692e(11). (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating 14 Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., 2008 WL 5479111, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2008). 21- this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. 111. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the said messages violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692d(6), 1692e(10), and/or 1692e(11) is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 112. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a 22- class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 113. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 11. Upon information and belief, on a date better known by Defendant, Defendant began to attempt to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff. 12. Within the one year immediately preceding the filing of this complaint, the Defendant attempted to contact the Plaintiff on multiple occasions via telephone and left numerous messages in an attempt to collect the alleged obligation. 13. The following is an example of one such message that Plaintiff received on or about May 12, 2016: Name is Roger, callback number is 18003397650, calling from Central Credit Services. 14. At the time Plaintiff received the said messages, he did not know the identity of the callers. 15. At the time Plaintiff received the said messages, he did not know that the call concerned 3- the collection of a debt. 16. Each of the messages is a "communication" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).1 17. Each of the above messages uniformly failed to identify the callers as debt collectors attempting to collect a debt. 18. The messages left by Defendant was deceptive and harassing per se in that they secreted the identity of the Defendant in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). 19. Upon information and belief, it is the regular practice of the Defendant to leave messages to be conveyed to ‘consumers' which do not meaningfully identify themselves, and/or do not identify themselves as a debt collector. 20. The only way for Plaintiff and/or any least sophisticated consumer to obtain the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages, was to place a return call to the telephone number provided in the messages and speak with a debt collector employed by Central Credit Services LLC, and to provide the debt collector with personal information. 21. The Defendant intended that the messages have the effect of causing Plaintiff, and other least sophisticated consumers, to place return calls to the telephone number provided in the messages and to speak with their debt collectors, and then provide those debt collectors with their personal information, as the sole means of obtaining the identity of the caller leaving the messages, and to ascertain the purpose underlying the messages. 22. Scores of federal court decisions - including the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals and all the District Courts that have considered the issue within the State of New York - (17 decisions to date) uniformly hold that the FDCPA requires debt collectors to provide 1 Dauval v. MRS BPO, L.L.C., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189109, 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 47 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2013); Foti v. NCO Fin. Sys., 424 F.Supp.2d 643, 655–56 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (holding that a message with enough information to entice a return call being left with a third party or on a voice mail is a “communication” under the FDCPA). 4- meaningful identification of itself in messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating the name of the debt collection company and stating the nature and/or purpose of the call.2 23. At all times relevant to this action, Central Credit Services LLC was aware of the substantial weight of legal authority requiring it to provide meaningful identification of itself in messages left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating the nature and/or purpose of the call.3 24. At all times relevant to this action, Central Credit Services LLC willfully, deliberately, and intentionally chose not to provide meaningful identification of itself in the messages it left for consumers, such as the said messages, by accurately stating the nature and/or purpose of the call. 25. The Defendant's act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff is conduct the natural consequences of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse a person in connection with the collection of a debt and is in violation of the FDCPA. 26. The Defendant's act of leaving the said messages for Plaintiff constitutes the use of a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection 2 Leyse v. Corporate Collection Servs., (2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67719 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006)) (The court followed Foti, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 655-56 and West v. Nationwide Credit, 998 F. Supp. 642, 644 (W.D.N.C. 1998) in finding that a phone call to a debtor's neighbor that the defendant had a "very important" matter to address was "regarding a debt" because the content of the phone call was "with respect to" the Defendant's efforts to collect on plaintiff's alleged arrearage and since a phone message that "advised the debtor that the matter required immediate attention, and provided a specific number to call to discuss the matter" was a communication under the FDCPA "given that the obvious purpose of the message was to provide the debtor with enough information to entice a return call. The court noted "Were this Court to determine that [the debt collectors] Messages did not constitute communications "regarding [Plaintiff's] debt", the Court would be creating an exception to swallow the rule. Under such an exception, debt collectors would be able to abuse and harass consumers with phone calls and other forms of correspondence so long as there is no express mention of the consumers' debts. The court also found: "A message left by a debt collector which does not state that it pertains to a financial matter could reasonably pertain to a host of issues - including family or medical matters - which may be viewed by a consumer as much more pressing, than a debt owed. The apparent purpose of these messages is to be vague enough to provoke the recipient to return the calls in haste. Leaving a message that deceptively entices a consumer to communicate with a debt collector when he is caught off guard is precisely the kind of abuse the FDCPA intended to prevent.") (emphasis added) 3 Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[B]ecause the FDCPA is a remedial statute aimed at curbing what Congress considered to be an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards abusing debtors, it is logical for debt collectors repeat players likely to be acquainted with the legal standards governing their industry to bear the brunt of the risk."); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As the Supreme Court has held in the general context of consumer protection—of which the [FDCPA] is a part—'it does not seem unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.'") (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 393, 85 S. Ct. 1035, 13 L. Ed. 2d 904 (1965)). 5- of a debt and is in violation of the FDCPA. 27. The FDCPA secures a consumer's right to have a debt collector cease further communications with the consumer. By failing to meaningfully identify itself, disclose the purpose of its call and state that Central Credit Services LLC is a debt collector in a manner understandable to the least sophisticated consumer, the Defendant has engaged in conduct designed to deprive consumers of their right to have a debt collector cease further communications. 28. It is Defendant's policy and practice to leave messages for consumers with third parties, such as the above said messages, that violate the FDCPA by, inter alia: (a) Failing to provide meaningful disclosure of Central Credit Services LLC's identity; (b) Failing to disclose that the call is from a debt collector; and (c) Failing to disclose the purpose or nature of the communication, i.e. an attempt to collect a debt. 29. Upon information and belief, such messages, as alleged in this complaint, number at least in the hundreds. 30. Upon information and belief, the purpose of these messages is to be vague enough to provoke the recipient to return the calls in haste. A message left by a debt collector which does not state that it pertains to collection of a debt could reasonably pertain to a host of issues – including family or medical matters – which may be viewed by a consumer as much more pressing, than a debt owed. Leaving a message that deceptively entices a consumer to communicate with a debt collector when he is caught off guard is precisely the kind of abuse the FDCPA intended to prevent. 6- 31. A message leaving any information concerning a debt is a "communication." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). "Any information" is construed broadly in favor of consumers and includes a callback number or a reference number.4 32. It is a communication whether it is from a conversation directly between a consumer and a debt collector or indirectly, such as by a message left on a telephone answering device, or with a third party.5 33. Defendant Central Credit Services LLC, failed to provide Plaintiff with the notices required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), namely, by failing to advise Plaintiff that the communication was from a debt collector or that the Defendant was attempting to collect a debt.6 34. Defendant has engaged in a pattern of leaving messages without disclosing that the communication is from a debt collector. 35. The said telephone messages are in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692d(6), 1692e(10) and 1692e(11) for failing to indicate that the messages were from a debt collector which constitutes a deceptive practice. 36. On or about April 27, 2016, Defendant Central Credit Services LLC sent the Plaintiff a collection letter. 37. The said April 27, 2016 letter from Central Credit Services LLCwas an effort to collect on a consumer debt. 4 Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2008) aff'd by Edwards v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc., 584 F.3d 1350, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22500, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 179 (11th Cir. Ga. 2009); Stinson v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42266, *7 (E.D. Va. June 12, 2006). 5 West v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 642, 643 (W.D. N.C. 1998); Foti v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., 424 F.Supp.2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (infra); Wideman v. Monterey Fin. Srvs., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38824 (W.D.Pa May 7, 2009); Belin v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47953, 2006 WL 1992410, 5 (M.D.Fla., 2006). 6 Sclafani v. BC Servs., Inc., No. 10-61360-CIV, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115330, 2010 WL 4116471, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2010) ("If [the defendant] could not leave voice messages that simultaneously complied with the multiple applicable provisions of FDCPA, it should not have left the offending voice messages.") 7- 38. The said collection letter was confusing to the Plaintiff and is likely to be misconstrued by the “least sophisticated consumer” since it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 39. The Second Circuit stated in Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2016) “The question presented is whether a collection notice that states a consumer's "current balance," but does not disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees, complies with this provision. We hold that Section 1692e requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. 40. The holding of the Second Circuit is that Section 1692e of the FDCPA requires every debt collector in every collection letter “to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees”. 41. However, if the “CURRENT BALANCE” will never increase and the holder of the debt will always accept payment of the amount set forth in full satisfaction of the debt then the Second Circuit alternatively stated: “We hold that a debt collector will not be subject to liability under Section 1692e for failing to disclose that the consumer's balance may increase due to interest and fees if the collection notice either accurately informs the consumer that the amount of the debt stated in the letter will increase over time, or clearly states that the holder of the debt will accept payment of the amount set forth in full satisfaction of the debt.” Id. at 817. 42. The Second Circuit in Avila did not “hold that a debt collector must use any particular disclaimer” Id. 43. However, the Second Circuit did address all the possible scenarios: 1) If the “current balance” could increase over time, then the collection notice must disclose that the “balance might increase due to interest and fees”. Id. 2) If the “current balance” is 8- currently increasing, then the collection notice must disclose that the amount of the debt stated, “in the letter will increase over time”. Id. 3) If the “current balance” will never increase and the debt collector is always willing to accept this "specified amount" in "full satisfaction" of the debt, then the debt collector must state so clearly. However, if a debt collector is willing to accept a “specified amount” in full satisfaction of the debt only if payment is made by a specific date, then the debt collector must simplify the consumer's understanding by so stating, while advising that the amount due could increase by the accrual of additional interest or fees if payment is not received by that date. 44. In this case, the “CURRENT BALANCE” was increasing due to interest per the creditor’s contract. Nevertheless, the collection notice did not disclose that the amount of the debt stated in the letter “could” or “will” increase over time. 45. The Plaintiff, as well as the “least sophisticated consumer” was unsure as to whether or not the said account was accruing interest. 46. The “CURRENT BALANCE” in this case was for an amount that included original principal, fees, and contractual interest. 47. The Plaintiff was left uncertain as to whether the “CURRENT BALANCE” was accruing interest as there was no disclosure that indicated otherwise. 48. The FDCPA requires debt collectors, when notifying consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees; failure to include such disclosures would harm consumers such as the Plaintiff who may hold the reasonable but mistaken belief, that timely payment will satisfy their debts and it would abrogate the Congressional purpose of full and fair disclosure to consumers that is embodied in Section 1692e. 9- 49. Prior to Defendant Central Credit Services LLC’s collection of the said American Express account, the account was previously being collected by Nationwide Credit, Inc., who had also sent a letter to the Plaintiff on or about February 23, 2016. 50. The balance stated in the said February 23, 2016 letter from Nationwide Credit, Inc. was $13,947.84, and in addition to that balance, interest was accruing daily as evident from the Defendant’s April 27, 2016 letter, which reflected an increase in the balance to an amount of $14,729.48. 51. A reasonable consumer could be misled into believing that he or she could pay his or her debt in full by paying the amount as listed in the April 27, 2016 letter. 52. In fact, however, since as shown by the difference in the amount between the February 23, 2016 letter from Nationwide Credit, Inc., and the new increased amount in the April 27, 2016 letter, which reflected that interest was accruing daily, a consumer who pays the balance due as stated in the letter, would be left unaware as to whether or not the debt has been paid in full. 53. In fact, however, since as shown by the difference in the amount between the February 23, 2016 letter and the new increased amount in the April 27, 2016 letter, which reflected that interest was accruing daily, a consumer who pays the balance due as stated in the letter, would be left unaware as to whether or not the debt has been paid in full. 54. The debt collector could still seek the interest and fees that had accumulated after the notice was sent, but before the balance was paid, or sell the consumer’s debt to a third party, who itself could seek the post charge-off interest and fees from the consumer.7 55. Where a debt collector mails a debtor various different letters which show that interest is accruing daily, yet the debt collector “is willing to accept a specified amount in full 7 See Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) 10- satisfaction of the debt if payment is made by a specific date [it must] simplify the consumer's understanding by so stating, while advising that the amount due would increase by the accrual of additional interest or fees if payment is not received by that date.”8 However, if the debt collector intended on waiving the interest accruing it must clearly state that the interest is being waived. 56. The said collection letters at issue were increasing daily due to interest, but the April 27, 2016 letter specifically, failed to disclose that the balance would continue to increase due to interest and fees, or in the alternative, the April 27, 2016 letter failed to disclose that the balance was actually not increasing due to the interest being waived. 57. In any event, Defendant’s said April 27, 2016 letter was “misleading” and “confusing” within the meaning of Section 1692e of the FDCPA. Absent a disclosure by the holder of the debt that the interest accruing since the previous letter is waived, even if the debtor pays the “Amount of Debt” the Defendant and or the creditor could still seek the interest accruing since the previous letter, or sell the consumer’s debt to a third party, which itself could seek the accrued interest from the consumer.9 58. Waiver of interest even when it has been made explicitly has not prevented debt- collectors from continuing to illegally charge the waived interest. 59. At the bare minimum, a debt collector must make clear even to the unsophisticated consumer that it intends to waive the accruing post charge-off interest. 60. A debt collector must disclose, that the balance due may change over time. 61. To the extent that the Creditor or the Defendant intended to waive the automatically accrued and accruing interest, it was required to disclose that in the most conspicuous of terms. 8 id. 9 Avila, at *10-11. 11- 62. If the “CURRENT BALANCE,” will never increase and the debt collector is always willing to accept this "specified amount" in "full satisfaction" of the debt, then the debt collector must clearly state that the holder of the debt will always accept payment of the amount set forth in “full satisfaction” of the debt. 63. Defendant was required to include a disclosure that the automatically accrued interest was accruing, or in the alternative, the Defendant was required to disclose that the creditor has made an intentional decision to waive the automatically accruing interest and will always accept this "specified amount" in "full satisfaction" of the debt nonetheless it did not make any of those disclosures in violation of 1692e. 64. If interest was waived, the letter would need to contain that disclosure and clearly state that no interest is accruing on this account in order to provide full and fair disclosure to consumers of the actual balance as is embodied in Section 1692e. 65. The Second Circuit adopted a safe harbor disclaimer stating "that requiring such disclosure best achieves the Congressional purpose of full and fair disclosure to consumers that is embodied in Section 1692e. It also protects consumers such as the Plaintiff, who may hold the reasonable but mistaken belief that timely payment will satisfy their debts."10 66. Because the statement of the “CURRENT BALANCE” that included original principal, fees, and contractual interest, without notice that the accruing interest was expressly waived can mislead the least sophisticated consumer into believing that payment of the amount stated will clear her account, the FDCPA requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to expressly disclose that the amount of the debt stated in the letter will increase over time, or clearly state that the holder of the debt 10 Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) 12- will always accept payment of the amount set forth in full satisfaction of the debt. Id. at 817. 67. Requiring such disclosure best achieves the Congressional purpose of full and fair disclosure to consumers that is embodied in Section 1692e. It also protects consumers such as the Plaintiff, who may hold the reasonable, but mistaken belief that timely payment will satisfy their debts and it protects them from other debt collectors seeking further interest on this debt in the future. 68. According to the Second Circuit’s finding that the “CURRENT BALANCE” must contain a full and fair disclosure, if a credit card account was being charged interest, pursuant to a contract and the interest was intended to be waived, disclosure of such a waiver is necessary or the consumer would not know what the balance is. "[i]n fact, however, if interest is accruing daily, [or was not expressly waived] a consumer who pays the ‘current balance’ stated on the notice will not know whether the debt has been paid in full. The debt collector could still seek the [accruing or unwaived] interest and fees that accumulated after the notice was sent but before the balance was paid, or sell the consumer's debt to a third party, which itself could seek the interest and fees from the consumer."11 69. The 8th Circuit in Haney v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., No. 15-1932, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17287 (8th Cir. Sep. 21, 2016) clearly explains that merely not including interest in post charge off statements is not express waiver of interest, and the debt collector or creditor can seek the interest in the future. 70. In fact, in this case the Plaintiff is still not sure whether there was any intent to waive the interest. There was definitely no express waiver and disclosure of waiver is mandatory 11 Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) 13- if interest was originally accruing per the contract. The consumer could not know what the real balance is. 71. The intent to waive a contractual right must be unmistakably manifested and may not be inferred from doubtful or equivocal acts.12 A waiver of a contract right does not occur by negligence, oversight or thoughtlessness and cannot be inferred from mere silence.13 72. Failure to disclose such a waiver of the automatically accruing interest is in of itself deceptive and “misleading” within the meaning of Section 1692e. The Defendant knew that the balance would increase due to interest, fees and/or disbursements. 73. According to the Second Circuit in Avila, any debt that was accruing interest and fees would need full and complete disclosure which would either clearly state that the balance “may” or “will” increase over time or clearly state that the debt is “static” and holder of the debt will always accept payment of the amount set forth in “full satisfaction” of the debt. 74. The “CURRENT BALANCE” is for an amount that includes original principal, fees, and contractual interest. 75. Since interest was accruing on this debt, the collection notice must inform the consumer that the amount of the debt stated in the letter may increase over time. 76. Collection letters failing to reference the accrual of interest or waiver of interest are subject to two different interpretations as to the accumulation of interest, rendering them deceptive under § 1692e(10). 77. “None of the letters provided further detail regarding when or how the balance had been 12 Navillus Tile, Inc. v. Turner Const. Co., 2 A.D.3d 209, 770 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep’t 2003). 13 Acumen Re Management Corp. v. General Sec. Nat. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 3890128, at *6 (S.D. N.Y. 2012), reconsideration denied, motion to certify appeal granted, 2012 WL 6053936 (S.D. N.Y. 2012). 14- calculated, whether it included interest, or whether interest continued to accrue. The court finds that the "least sophisticated consumer" could have read these letters in at least two different ways. On one hand, an unsophisticated consumer could reasonably conclude that the balance was a fixed amount that would not be subject to further interest, late fees, or other charges. On the other, an unsophisticated consumer could just as reasonably determine that the balance would continue to grow over time as interest accrued. One of those meanings would necessarily be inaccurate. Therefore, the court finds that Defendants' letters were deceptive as a matter of law. Courts in other districts have reached the same conclusion on similar facts. The court grants Ms. Snyder's motion for summary judgment on this issue.” Snyder v. Gordon, No. C11-1379 RAJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120659, at *8-9 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2012); Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, 817 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[I]n considering whether a collection notice violates Section 1692e, we apply the "least sophisticated consumer" standard...Under this standard, a collection notice is misleading if it is "open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.”) 78. “The Court therefore finds that [the debt collectors] letters to [the debtor] are subject to two different interpretations as to the accumulation of interest, rendering them deceptive under § 1692e(10) … The logic [applies] to stated outstanding debt and the need for consumers to be aware that this debt may be dynamic or static. They are concerned with a consumer's inability to discern whether an amount owed may grow with time, regardless of whether offers to settle are on the table or not. As [plaintiff] states, this information is relevant in a consumer's payment calculus, especially when some debts must be paid at the expense of others. And, of course, the existence of settlement offers would be entirely 15- irrelevant to these considerations for the many consumers who are unable to take advantage of them...Plaintiff's claim is not that the stated balance was not itemized, but that it was unclear whether it was subject to future interest.” Michalek v. ARS Nat'l Sys., No. 3:11-CV-1374, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142976, at *16-17 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011). 79. The Plaintiff and the least sophisticated consumer could conclude from the said collection letter, that the “CURRENT BALANCE” is static and that his or her payment of the amount due would satisfy the debt irrespective of when payment was remitted. However, absent a disclosure by the holder of the debt that clearly stated that the holder of the debt would accept payment of the amount set forth in “full satisfaction” of the debt then even if the debtor pays the “CURRENT BALANCE” the Defendant and or the creditor could still seek the automatic interest that accumulated after the breach of contract, or sell the consumer’s debt to a third party, which itself could seek the automatic interest and from the consumer. (Avila, at *10-11.) 80. The said April 27, 2016 letter was deceptive and misleading as it merely identified the “CURRENT BALANCE,” yet failed to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. 81. The Plaintiff was left uncertain as to whether the “CURRENT BALANCE” was accruing interest as there was no disclosure that indicated otherwise. 82. A reasonable consumer could read the notice and be misled into believing that he or she could always pay his or her debt in full by paying the amount listed on the notice. 83. In fact, however, since interest is accruing daily, or since there are undisclosed late fees, a consumer who pays the “CURRENT BALANCE” stated on the notice will not know whether the debt has been paid in full. 16- 84. The debt collector could still seek the interest and fees that accumulated after the notice was sent but before the balance was paid, or sell the consumer’s debt to a third party, which itself could seek the interest and fees from the consumer. 85. The statement of a “CURRENT BALANCE” without notice that the amount is already increasing due to accruing interest or other charges, would mislead the unsophisticated consumer into believing that payment of the amount stated will clear his or her account. 86. The FDCPA requires debt collectors, when notifying consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees; failure to include such disclosures would harm consumers such as the Plaintiff who may hold the reasonable but mistaken belief, that timely payment will satisfy their debts and it would abrogate the Congressional purpose of full and fair disclosure to consumers that is embodied in Section 1692e. 87. Collection notices that state only the “CURRENT BALANCE,” but do not disclose that the balance might increase due to interest and fees, are “misleading” within the meaning of Section 1692e. 88. The Plaintiff and the least sophisticated consumer would be led to believe that the “CURRENT BALANCE” is static and that his or her payment of the amount due would satisfy the debt irrespective of when payment was remitted. 89. A consumer who pays the “CURRENT BALANCE” stated on the collection letter will be left unsure as to whether or not the debt has been paid in full, as the Defendant could still attempt to collect on any interest and fees that accumulated after the letter was sent but before the balance was paid. 90. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) for misrepresenting the amount of the 17- debt owed by the Plaintiff. 91. A debt collector, when notifying a consumer of his or her account balance, must disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. 92. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (2) The false representation of – the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or (10) the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. 93. Defendant's April 27, 2016 letter is in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt and for misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed by the Plaintiff. 94. Plaintiff suffered injury in fact by being subjected to unfair and abusive practices of the Defendant. 95. Plaintiff suffered actual harm by being the target of the Defendant's misleading debt collection communications. 96. Defendant violated the Plaintiff’s right not to be the target of misleading debt collection communications. 97. Defendant violated the Plaintiff's right to a truthful and fair debt collection process. 98. Defendant used materially false, deceptive, misleading representations and means in its attempted collection of Plaintiff's alleged debt. 18- 99. Defendant's communications were designed to cause the debtor to suffer a harmful disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to the Defendant's collection efforts. 100. The FDCPA ensures that consumers are fully and truthfully apprised of the facts and of their rights, the act enables them to understand, make informed decisions about, and participate fully and meaningfully in the debt collection process. The purpose of the FDCPA is to provide information that helps consumers to choose intelligently. The Defendant's false representations misled the Plaintiff in a manner that deprived him of his right to enjoy these benefits, these materially misleading statements trigger liability under section 1692e of the Act. 101. These deceptive communications additionally violated the FDCPA since they frustrate the consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his or her response. 102. Plaintiff seeks to end these violations of the FDCPA. Plaintiff has suffered damages including but not limited to, fear, stress, mental anguish, emotional stress and acute embarrassment. Plaintiff and putative class members are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, including, declaratory relief, and damages. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by the Plaintiff 114. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) one hundred and thirteen (113) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. 115. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of two classes. 116. The first class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York who received telephonic messages from Defendant within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; (a) the telephone call was placed to a the consumer's home or similar party seeking payment of a consumer debt by leaving a message for the Plaintiff; and (b) the Plaintiff asserts that the telephone message was in violation 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692e(11), and 1692f. 117. The second class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about April 27, 2016; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts 23- that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt and for misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed by the Plaintiff.

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(Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) 23. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of Xilinx (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 25. Xilinx is a technology company that designs and develops programmable devices and associated technologies. In additional to its programmable platforms, Xilinx also provides design services, customer training, field engineering and technical support. 72. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 73. Section 14(a)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any [S-4] or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1). 74. As set forth above, the S-4 omits information required by SEC Regulation G, 17 C.F.R. § 244.100, which independently violates Section 14(a). SEC Regulation G, among other things, requires an issuer that chooses to disclose a non-GAAP measure to provide a presentation of the “most directly comparable” GAAP measure and a reconciliation “by schedule or other clearly understandable method” of the non-GAAP measure to the “most directly comparable” GAAP measure. 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(a). 75. The failure to reconcile the non-GAAP financial measures included in the S-4 violates Regulation G and constitutes a violation of Section 14(a). 77. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 78. SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes in registration statements that contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a). 79. Regulation G similarly prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes by “mak[ing] public a non-GAAP financial measure that, taken together with the information accompanying that measure . . . contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the presentation of the non-GAAP financial measure . . . not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(b) (emphasis added). 80. Defendants have issued the S-4 with the intention of soliciting shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the S-4, which fails to provide critical information regarding, amongst other things, the financial projections for the Company. 88. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 89. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Xilinx within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as directors and/or officers of Xilinx, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the S-4 filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 90. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the S-4 and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 91. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the Exchange Act violations alleged herein and exercised the same. The S-4 at issue contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Transaction. They were thus directly involved in preparing the S-4. I. The Proposed Transaction

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(Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) (Virgin Islands FLSA Class Action) 33. From May 2019 until December 2019, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a laborer in the Virgin Islands. 34. Throughout the time Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, Defendant paid Plaintiff and those similarly situated “straight time” or their regular hourly rates, without overtime premiums, when they worked in excess of 8 hours per day and/or 40 hours per week and/or worked six or more consecutive days. 35. Upon information and belief, regardless of the location of the job/contracts on which Defendant employed laborers within the relevant time periods, Defendant paid all laborers under the same scheme, namely it paid laborers either day rates only or paid them solely their regular hourly rates (“straight time”), without overtime premiums when they worked in excess of 40 hours per week, in excess of 8 hours per day, or when they worked six or more consecutive days. 36. Plaintiff and the putative class members have not been properly compensated for all the hours they worked for Defendant as a result of Defendant’s corporate policy and practice of whereby it fails to pay legally-mandated overtime compensation. 37. Defendant has maintained these illegal corporate policies for at least 10 years and has been repeatedly sued regarding the same FLSA violations alleged here. See, e.g., Eagle v. Schear Construction, LLC, et al., 2:2013cv00797, D.E. 1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2013); Perales v. Schear Construction, LLC2, et al., 2:2009cv00669, D.E. 1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2009). 39. As a result of Defendant’s corporate policy Plaintiff and the putative class members were not properly compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of eight (8) per day or forty (40) in a workweek, or when the worked six or more workdays within a workweek, as required by the FLSA and Virgin Islands FLSA. 40. Defendant has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff. 41. Defendant is aware of its obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of eight (8) per day and forty (40) each week to Plaintiff and the putative class members, but has failed to do so. 42. Because Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and the putative class members time and a half for all hours worked in excess of eight (8) per day and/or forty (40) in a workweek and/or when he worked six or more consecutive days, Defendant’s pay policies and practices violate the FLSA as well as the Virgin Islands FLSA. C. 43. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 44. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of Defendant’s hourly-paid employees hired to perform work anywhere in the United States or its territories within the last three years, who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the manner in which they were paid. 45. Other similarly situated employees of Defendant have been victimized by Defendant’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 46. The FLSA Collective Members are defined as: ALL 54. Plaintiff brings his Virgin Islands FLSA Claims as class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by the Defendant in the Virgin Islands since June 2017. 55. Class action treatment of Plaintiff and the Virgin Island FLSA Class Members’ claims is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 56. The number of Virgin Islands FLSA Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 57. Plaintiff is a member of the Virgin Islands FLSA Class, his claims are typical of the claims of the other Virgin Islands FLSA Class Members, and he has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other Virgin Islands FLSA Class Members. 58. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Virgin Islands FLSA Class Members and their interests. 60. Accordingly, the Virgin Islands FLSA Class should be certified as: 61. Defendant violated provisions of Sections 7 and 15 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 215(a)(2), by employing individuals in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA for workweeks longer than forty (40) hours without compensating such non-exempt employees for all of the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at rates at least one and one-half times the regular rates for which they were employed. 62. Defendant knowingly, willfully, and with reckless disregard carried out its illegal pattern of failing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees the proper amount of overtime compensation for all hours worked over forty each week. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 64. Defendant is comprised of sophisticated parties and is a sophisticated employer, and therefore knew (or should have known) its pay policies were in violation of the FLSA. 65. Defendant’s violations of the FLSA were committed in reckless disregard of its obligations thereunder and its obligations under the various contracts under which it performed the subject work. 66. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members, on the other hand, are (and were) unsophisticated employees who trusted Defendant to pay them according to the law. 67. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members are entitled to be paid overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek pursuant to the FLSA in an amount equal to one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay, plus liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Claimant hereby incorporates and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 42 and 54 through 60, above. 69. Sarmiento, on behalf of himself and the Virgin Islands FLSA Class, further brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) for back wages, interest and treble damages under 24 V.C.I. §1 et. seq. 70. Defendant violated 24 V.C.I. §20(a)(2) by failing to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty during each workweek. 72. Defendant violated 24 V.C.I. §20(a)(1) by failing to by failing to pay Plaintiff and those similarly situated one and one-half times his regular rate of pay when he worked more than 5 consecutive days. 73. Defendant’s violations of the Virgin Islands FLSA were repeated, willful and intentional. 74. Plaintiff has been damaged by said violations of the Virgin Islands FLSA. 75. Pursuant to Plaintiff and the Virgin Islands FLSA Class for their unpaid overtime compensation, plus their attorneys' fees and costs. VIRGIN ISLANDS FLSA CLASS

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(Declaratory Relief) Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 86 of this (Violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202) Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 68 of this 10. organizations. CoreLogic represents that its data includes more than 3.3 billion 11. property and financial records spanning more than 40 years. CoreLogic represents its data includes more than 99 percent of U.S. 12. property records. CoreLogic’s data includes photographs of real property created by 13. Plaintiff and the Class. CoreLogic represents its data includes more than two million multiple 14. listing systems-based active property listings. On information and belief, these listings include photographs of real property created by Plaintiff and the Class. CoreLogic offers three MLS technology products under its 15. MarketLinx® line: Fusion™, Innovia™ and Matrix™. CoreLogic products allow users of its MLS products to upload 17. professional photographers. See “A Picture is Worth a Thousand Dollars. True or False?” at http://www.redfin.com/research/reports/special- reports/2010/a_picture_is_worth_a_thousand_dollars_true_or_false.html accessed on July 14, 2013. Adding additional photographs to a listing increases the price that can 18. be obtained for a property. See Benefield, at al., On the Relationship Between Property Price, Time-on-Market, and Photo Depictions in a Multiple Listing Service, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2011. Copyright Management Information and the Adoption of the DMCA All of the photographs at issue in this lawsuit created by Plaintiff and 19. the Class contained “copyright management information” (sometimes referred to as “CMI”) as that term is defined in 17 U.S.C. §1202(c). 17 U.S.C. §1202 was first considered by Congress in 1998 as part of 20. legislation designed to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty (CT) and Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The text of Article 12 of the CT and Article 19 of the WPPT are 22. any person performing any of the following acts … having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement … (ii) to distribute, import for distribution, broadcast or communicate to the public, without authority, works or copies of works knowing that electronic rights management information has been removed or altered without authority.” Both the WPPT and CT define “rights management information” as 23. “information which identifies the work, the author of the work, the owner of any right in the work, or information about the terms and conditions of use of the work, and any numbers or codes that represent such information, when any of these items of information is attached to a copy of a work or appears in connection with the communication of a work to the public.” Several bills with different names were introduced in the House of 25. information were expressed further in the Report’s discussion of the language proposed for Section 1202. This section does not mandate the use of CMI, nor does it prescribe the choice of any particular type of CMI for those who do use it. It merely protects the integrity of CMI if a party chooses to use it in connection with a copyrighted work by prohibiting its deliberate deletion or alteration. Furthermore, this section imposes liability for specified acts. It does not address the question of liability for persons who manufacture devices or provide services. The DMCA was debated on the Senate floor on May 14, 1998. During 27. protection the law provides against piracy. In statements and remarks before both House and Senate, members of Congress repeatedly extolled the benefits of the DMCA for the protections against piracy it would provide. The protection of copyright management information integrity, and the prohibition against alteration, removal or falsification of copyright management information, implements Congress’ goal of preventing piracy. As adopted, 17 U.S.C. §1202(c) provides: 29. copyright protection the moment the photograph was created, and copyright management information (such as the name of the author or copyright owner) was added to help maintain control of the photos and prevent copyright infringement. One important purpose of copyright management information is to 31. falsified, Plaintiff and the Class may find it difficult or impossible to enforce their rights under the Copyright Act. For instance, Plaintiff and Class members may find it more difficult or impossible to prove that their works were copied or used without permission when copyright management information has been removed, altered or falsified. Additionally, subsequent infringers may claim that their copyright infringement was innocent, because the copyright management information on the infringing copy was removed, altered or falsified. Further, it may be difficult or impossible for a copyright owner to trace an infringer’s profits from an infringing copy that has copyright management information removed, altered or falsified. At the time photographs are uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product, 33. variety of tags can be included in metadata. Digital cameras record the current date and time a photograph is created and save this data in metadata. Camera settings, the model and make of camera, image orientation (rotation), aperture, shutter speed, focal length, metering mode, and ISO speed information are also stored in metadata, as is a thumbnail for previewing the picture on the camera's LCD screen, in file managers, or in photo manipulation software. Such information can be used to identify the author or copyright owner of a photograph. Metadata also stores copyright information, such as the name of 34. photographer and copyright owner, and permissions, if any, granted for use or reserved to the owner. For example, the permissions tag might contain the words “all rights reserved” to indicate to anyone who might encounter that image file that all rights for the use of the image were reserved by the copyright owner and any further use requires the owner’s permission. Embedding metadata in image files is a standard technical measure 35. used by Plaintiff and the Class Members to identify and protect their copyrighted works. Image metadata was developed pursuant to a broad consensus of 37. extremely small when compared to the size of the digital image of the photograph which may be a hundred times (e.g. 6.4 MB) larger or more. All digital images uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product contained 38. copyright management information metadata. Example of Plaintiff’s Copyright Management Information And Removal, Alteration Or Falsification By CoreLogic Robert Stevens is an accomplished real estate and architectural 39. photographer who works in South Florida. On August 9, 2009, Stevens created an aerial photograph of a 40. residential condominium building located at 3800 N. Ocean Drive, Singer Island, Florida known as Resort at Singer Island. Stevens processed the image and, since he created it, he has licensed it for a fee to several real estate agents and brokers who have marketed condominium units for sale at 3800 N. Ocean Drive. The image in .jpg format that Stevens created and Stevens licensed to 42. for his use in connection with marketing properties at 3800 N. Ocean Drive. Mr. O’Brien uploaded the image, with all metadata intact, to his listings with the Realtors’ Association of the Palm Beaches (“RAPB”), a South Florida MLS. RAPB is a client of CoreLogic and uses a CoreLogic MLS product to operate its MLS business. Stevens is not a member of RAPB or any other multiple listing service. 45. management information metadata Stevens had embedded in his images. Figure 3 (and Exhibit 3) shows a screenshot of 3800 N. Ocean Dr. downloaded from RealQuest® stripped of all copyright management information metadata. CoreLogic knew or had reasonable grounds to know that removal or 46. alteration of Stevens’ copyright management information would induce, enable, facilitate or conceal copyright infringement. Any use of Stevens’ copyrighted images without his permission would constitute copyright infringement. In fact, CoreLogic’s removal of Stevens’ copyright management 48. embedded copyright management information in the metadata of their images. This copyright management information metadata was present at the time it was uploaded to an MLS operated or maintained by CoreLogic. On information and belief, CoreLogic removed, altered and/or falsified this copyright management information after it was uploaded to an MLS operated or maintained by CoreLogic. For instance, copyright management information in metadata was 50. was present in photographs of 915 Fawntail St., San Marcos, CA 92078 taken by a professional real estate photographer. After the photographs were uploaded to an MLS operated or maintained by CoreLogic, the copyright management information metadata embedded in those images was stripped out. Upon information and belief, CoreLogic stripped out the copyright management information metadata. CoreLogic then copied one or more of these images into its RealQuest® database and sold access to the database and reports produced by the database without the photographer’s permission or authority and without compensation to the photographer. CoreLogic knew that it did not own the copyrights for the photographs 51. uploaded to an MLS via a product that CoreLogic had custody or control of. CoreLogic knew that it did not have any written authorization from the 52. copyright owner to remove or alter copyright management information for the photographs uploaded to an MLS via a product that CoreLogic had custody or control of. CoreLogic made no attempt to contact the photographers for 54. because CoreLogic violated 17 U.S.C. §1202 by removing, altering and/or falsifying copyright management information of Plaintiff and Class for the photographs uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product. The Class is defined as all persons or entities that hold the copyright in 55. one or more images stored in a digital file with metadata containing copyright management information that was uploaded to a multiple listing service via a product in the custody or control of CoreLogic. Excluded from the Class are (a) defendant and any entity in which any defendant has a controlling interest; (b) the employees, officers and directors of those identified in subparagraph (a); (c) the heirs, successors, assigns and legal representatives of the persons identified in subparagraph (b) above; and (d) a multiple listing service. Plaintiff reserves the right to request creation of subclasses. Plaintiff 56. also reserves the right to expand the Class or any subclass to include a multiple listing service. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a 58. and/or entities in the Class are so numerous that their joinder is impractical. Defendant represents over 2 million active MLS listings with photographs uploaded via a product in the custody or control of CoreLogic. Existence and Predominance of Common Question of Law and Fact-- 61. an adequate representative of the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff’s interests do not in any way conflict with the interests of the members of the Class that he seeks to represent. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel experienced in complex class action litigation and experienced in actions for copyright violations to represent him. Injunctive Relief--Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2): CoreLogic has acted or 62. refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. Common Questions Predominate--Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3): As set 63. forth above, the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Superior Method--Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3): A class action is 65. prosecution of separate actions is not strong given the relatively small amount of damages that may be recovered as compared to the costs of litigating an individual lawsuit. Plaintiff is aware of no litigation concerning the same claims against 66. CoreLogic. It is desirable to concentrate the litigation in the Southern District of 68. anticipates no undue difficulty in the management of this litigation as a class action. As set forth above, determination of the common issues set forth above can be proven on a common basis and will result in a judgment in favor of the Class and monetary relief that may be awarded on a common basis Additionally, any award of injunctive relief would apply to the Class as a whole. 69. complaint as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiff and members of the Class hold the copyright in one or more 70. images stored in a digital file with metadata containing copyright management information that was uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product. Without the authority of Plaintiff and the Class, CoreLogic 72. to remove or alter copyright management information from digital images uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. §1202(b). CoreLogic intentionally removed or altered copyright management 73. information from digital images that are owned by Plaintiff and the Class after the images were uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product in violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202(b)(1). CoreLogic distributed copyright management information knowing 74. that the copyright management information had been removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law with respect to digital images that are owned by Plaintiff and the Class that were uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product in violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202(b)(2). CoreLogic distributed copies of works knowing that the copyright 75. management information had been removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law with respect to digital images that are owned by Plaintiff and the Class that were uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product in violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202(b)(3). CoreLogic removed or altered copyright management information 77. from digital images that are owned by Plaintiff and the Class after having reasonable grounds to know that it will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal infringement of copyright in violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202(b). CoreLogic knowingly provided copyright management information 78. that is false with respect to digital images that are owned by Plaintiff and the Class that were uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product in violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202(a)(1). CoreLogic knowingly distributed copyright management information 79. that is false with respect to digital images that are owned by Plaintiff and the Class that were uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. §1202(a)(2). CoreLogic provided or distributed false copyright management 8. companies submit listings to facilitate the exchange of information about one another’s listings so agents can cross company lines to sell one another’s houses and can show clients all houses on the market, not just those homes listed with their own company.” Mid-America Real Estate Co. v. Iowa Realty Co., No. 4:04-CV- 10175, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10155, 2004 WL 1280895, at *2 (S.D. Iowa 2004). Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”) organizations typically require 80. information from digital images with respect to digital images that are owned by Plaintiff and the Class that were uploaded to a CoreLogic MLS product with the intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202(a). The profits attributable to CoreLogic’s violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202 82. members’ photographs are very lucrative and generate millions in revenues each year. CoreLogic did not request permission of Plaintiff and the Class to use 83. their images for CoreLogic’s non-MLS products. CoreLogic’s 2013 revenues were over $1.3 billion. CoreLogic is 85. Class members will suffer irreparable harm by depriving them of the right to identify and control the reproduction and/or distribution of their copyrighted works, to receive licensing revenue, and to pursue copyright infringement remedies. The balance of hardships tips in favor of Plaintiff and the Class because CoreLogic will not be damaged if it is required to comply with 17 U.S.C. §1202. Plaintiff and the Class members are therefore entitled to an injunction barring CoreLogic from violating 17 U.S.C. §1202 and impounding any device or product that is in the custody or control of CoreLogic and that the court has reasonable cause to believe was involved in a violation of 17 U.S.C. §1202. Plaintiff and the Class pray for relief as set forth in the Prayer below. 86. 87. complaint as if fully set forth herein. An actual controversy exists between the Plaintiff and the Class 89. CoreLogic’s actions are unlawful and, specifically, that CoreLogic violated their rights under 17 U.S.C. § 1202. To the extent CoreLogic argues it had authority from Plaintiff and 90. Class to undertake any of the actions set forth in 17 U.S.C. §1202(b)(1), (2) or (3) without compensation to Plaintiff and the Class, a declaration that any such authority has been revoked as a result of this lawsuit or has expired. A declaration that CoreLogic did not request permission from Plaintiff 91. and the Class to use their photographs in connection with any non-MLS CoreLogic products. CoreLogic Data and MLS Products “A multiple listing service is a common database where member Plaintiff and the Class have brought this case against CoreLogic

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14. The front labels of the Products represent that they are free of preservatives. But all of the Products contain one or more of the preservatives citric acid, phosphoric acid, and ascorbic acid. 15. By representing that the Products have “No Preservatives,” Defendants sought to capitalize on consumers’ preference for less processed foods and drinks with fewer additives and the association between such products and a wholesome way of life. Consumers are willing to pay more for less processed products with no additives because of this association as well as the perceived higher quality, health and safety benefits associated with preservative-free foods. 16. The marketing research firm Mintel reports that more and more Americans are concerned to avoid food containing preservatives: Foods bearing “free-from” claims are increasingly relevant to Americans, as they perceive the products as closely tied to health. New research from Mintel reveals that 84 percent of American free-from consumers buy free-from foods because they are seeking out more natural or less processed foods. In fact, 43 percent of consumers agree that free-from foods are healthier than foods without a free-from claim, while another three in five believe the fewer ingredients a product has, the healthier it is (59 percent). Among the top claims free-from consumers deem most important are trans-fat-free (78 percent) and preservative-free (71 percent).1 1 http://www.mintel.com/press-centre/food-and-drink/84-of-americans-buy-free-from-foods- because-they-believe-them-to-be-more-natural-or-less-processed (last accessed 07/05/2017) 6 17. And alternet.org reports research showing that most Americans are prepared to pay a premium price for such healthier options: Not only are consumers increasingly seeking out wholesome foods, they are willing to pay a premium for them. According to Nielsen’s 2015 Global Health & Wellness Survey that polled over 30,000 people online, 88 percent of Americans are willing to pay more for healthier foods. Global sales of healthy food products are estimated to reach $1 trillion by 2017, according to Euromonitor. When it comes to what consumers will be seeking out more of over the coming year, it may amount to single word. “Just think of the word no," Seifer said. "No preservatives, no additives, no growth hormones."2 18. Given these trends, Defendants had a natural interest in misrepresenting their Products as free of preservatives despite the presence of citric acid, phosphoric acid, and ascorbic acid, as this misrepresentation provided a clear marketing advantage over competitors that do not engage in such deceptive conduct. Citric Acid, Phosphoric Acid, and Ascorbic Acid Are Preservatives 19. Citric acid, phosphoric acid, and ascorbic acid are preservatives as the term is defined by the FDA in 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(5): “The term chemical preservative means any chemical that, when added to food, tends to prevent or retard deterioration thereof, but does not include common salt, sugars, vinegars, spices, or oils extracted from spices, substances added to food by direct exposure thereof to wood smoke, or chemicals applied for their insecticidal or herbicidal properties.” 20. The MacMillan Dictionary defines “tends” as “to usually do a particular thing,” as in “He tends to exaggerate” or “The gym tends to get very busy at around six o’clock.”3 The scientific evidence and FDA statements cited below establishes that citric, phosphoric, and 2 http://www.alternet.org/food/8-food-trends-watch-2016 (last accessed 07/05/2017) 3 http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/tend (last accessed 07/05/2017) 7 ascorbic acids all tend to prevent or retard the deterioration of food. And this remains the case regardless of the subjective purposes for which these substances were added to the Products. Citric, phosphoric and ascorbic acids do not fall into any of the regulatory exemptions from the definition of a preservative. Citric Acid Is A Preservative 21. Citric acid is a preservative. The FDA expressly classifies citric acid as a preservative. Citric acid is identified as a preservative in its Overview of Food Ingredients, Additives, and Colors, on the FDA’s website: Types of Ingredients What They Do Examples of Uses Names Found on Product Labels Preservatives Prevent food spoilage from bacteria, molds, fungi, or yeast (antimicrobials); slow or prevent changes in color, flavor, or texture and delay rancidity (antioxidants); maintain freshness Fruit sauces and jellies, beverages, baked goods, cured meats, oils and margarines, cereals, dressings, snack foods, fruits and vegetables Ascorbic acid, citric acid, sodium benzoate, calcium propionate, sodium erythorbate, sodium nitrite, calcium sorbate, potassium sorbate, BHA, BHT, EDTA, tocopherols (Vitamin E) http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/FoodAdditivesIngredients/ucm094211.htm. (last accessed 07/05/2017) 22. The FDA’s classification of citric acid as a preservative is further confirmed by its Warning Letter, dated October 6, 2010, to the manufacturer of the Chiquita brand "Pineapple Bites with Coconut" and "Pineapple Bites": “The ‘Pineapple Bites’ and ‘Pineapple Bites with Coconut’ products are further misbranded within the meaning of section 403(k) of the Act [21 U.S.C. 343(k)] in that they contain the chemical preservative ascorbic acid and citric acid but their 8 labels fail to declare these preservatives with a description of their functions. 21 50. Plaintiff NASERI seeks to represent the following class: All individuals who made retail purchases of the Products in New York during the applicable limitations period for personal consumption and not resale, and/or such subClass as the Court may deem appropriate. (“the Class”) 15 51. The proposed Class excludes current and former officers and directors of Defendants, members of the immediate families of the officers and directors of Defendants, Defendants’ legal representatives, heirs, successors, assigns, and any entity in which they have or have had a controlling interest, and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. 52. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the Class definition based on facts learned in the course of litigating this matter. 53. This action is proper for class treatment under Rules 23(b)(1)(B) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the exact number and identities of other Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are thousands of Class members. Thus, the Class is so numerous that individual joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 54. Common questions of law and fact arise from Defendants’ conduct described herein. Such questions are common to all Class members and predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These include: a. whether labeling “No Preservatives” on Products containing citric acid, phosphoric acid, and ascorbic acid was false and misleading; b. whether Defendants deprived Plaintiff and the Class of the benefit of their bargain because the Products purchased were different from, and had less value than, what Defendants warranted; c. whether Defendants must disgorge any and all profits it has made as a result of its misconduct; and d. whether Defendants should be barred from marketing the Products as having “No Preservatives.” 16 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class members because Plaintiff and the other Class members sustained damages arising out of the same wrongful conduct, as detailed herein. Plaintiff and other Class members purchased Defendants’ Products and sustained similar injuries arising out of Defendants’ conduct in violation of New York State law. Defendants’ unlawful, unfair and fraudulent actions concern the same business practices described herein irrespective of where they occurred or were experienced. The injuries of the Class were caused directly by Defendants’ unfair and deceptive practices. In addition, the factual underpinning of Defendants’ misconduct is common to all Class members and represents a common thread of misconduct resulting in injury to all members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the members of the Class and are based on the same legal theories. 56. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and pursue the interests of the Class and has retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting class actions. Plaintiff understands the nature of his claims herein, has no disqualifying conditions, and will vigorously represent the interests of the Class. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel have any interests that conflict with or are antagonistic to the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has retained highly competent and experienced class action attorneys to represent his interests and those of the Class. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and Plaintiff and counsel are aware of their fiduciary responsibilities to the Class and will diligently discharge those duties by vigorously seeking the maximum possible recovery for the Class. 57. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by any individual class member are too 17 small to make it economically feasible for an individual class member to prosecute a separate action, and it is desirable for judicial efficiency to concentrate the litigation of the claims in this forum. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will avoid the potentially inconsistent and conflicting adjudications of the claims asserted herein. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 58. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) are met, as Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 59. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) are met, as questions of law or fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 60. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interest of all members of the Class, although certain Class members are not parties to such actions. 61. Defendants’ conduct is generally applicable to the Class as a whole and Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, equitable remedies with respect to the Class as a whole. As such, Defendants’ systematic policies and practices make declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 18 62. Plaintiff NASERI realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 63. Plaintiff NASERI brings this claim on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class for an injunction for violations of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices Law (“NY 71. Plaintiff NASERI realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 72. Plaintiff NASERI brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class for violations of NY GBL § 349. 73. Defendants’ business act and practices and/or omissions alleged herein constitute deceptive acts or practices under NY GBL § 349, which were enacted to protect the consuming public from those who engage in unconscionable, deceptive or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce. 74. The practices of Defendants described throughout this Complaint, were specifically directed to consumers and violate the NY GBL § 349 for, inter alia, the following reasons: 20 a. Defendants knowingly and falsely represented and advertised that the Products have “No Preservatives” with an intent to cause Plaintiff and members of the Class to believe that they do not contain preservatives; b. Defendants caused Plaintiff and the Class to suffer a probability of confusion and a misunderstanding of legal rights, obligations and/or remedies by and through their conduct; c. Defendants made material representations and statements of fact to Plaintiff and the Class that resulted in Plaintiff and the Class reasonably believing the represented or suggested state of affairs to be other than what they actually were. 75. The practices employed by Defendants, whereby Defendants advertised, promoted, and marketed their Products as having “No Preservatives” were unfair, deceptive, and misleading and are in violation of NY GBL § 349. 76. Under the circumstances, Defendants’ conduct in employing these unfair and deceptive trade practices were malicious, willful, wanton and outrageous such as to shock the conscience of the community and warrant the imposition of punitive damages. 77. Defendants’ actions impact the public interest because Plaintiff and members of the Class were injured in exactly the same way as thousands of others purchasing the Products as a result of and Defendants’ generalized course of deception. 78. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices were directed at consumers. 79. The foregoing deceptive acts and practices proximately caused Plaintiff and other members of the Class to suffer actual damages in the form of, inter alia, monies spent to purchase the Products. Plaintiff and other members of the Class are entitled to recover compensatory 21 damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and any other relief the Court deems appropriate. Damages can be calculated through expert testimony at trial. 80. Plaintiff NASERI realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs and further alleges as follows: 81. Plaintiff NASERI brings this claim individually, as well as on behalf of members of the class, for violations of NY GBL § 350. 82. Defendants have been and/or is engaged in the “conduct of … business, trade or commerce” within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350. 83. New York Gen. Bus. Law § 350 makes unlawful “[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce.” False advertising includes “advertising, including labeling, of a commodity … if such advertising is misleading in a material respect,” taking into account “the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in light of … representations [made] with respect to the commodity …” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-a(1). 84. Defendants caused to be disseminated throughout New York, through advertising, marketing and other publications, statements that were untrue or misleading. 85. Defendants’ affirmative misrepresentations that the Products contain “No Preservatives” were material and substantially uniform in content, presentation, and impact upon consumers at large. Consumers purchasing the Products were, and continue to be, exposed to Defendants’ material misrepresentations. 22 86. Defendants have violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350 because their “No Preservatives” misrepresentations were material and likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. 87. Plaintiff NASERI and members of the Class have suffered an injury, including the loss of money or property, as a result of Defendants’ false and misleading advertising. 88. Pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350-e, Plaintiff NASERI and members of the Class seek monetary damages (including actual damages and minimum, punitive, or treble and/or statutory damages pursuant to GBL § 350-a(1)), injunctive relief, restitution and disgorgement of all monies obtained by means of Defendants' unlawful conduct, interest, and attorneys' fees and costs. 89. Plaintiff NASERI realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 90. Defendants intentionally made materially false and misleading representations regarding the composition of the Products. 91. Plaintiff and members of the Class reasonably relied on Defendants’ false and misleading representations. They did not know, and had no reason to know, that the Products contained preservatives, and they would not have purchased the Products had they known. 92. Defendants knew and intended that Plaintiff and the Class would rely on its misrepresentations. 93. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured as a result of Defendants’ fraudulent conduct. 23 94. Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and members of the Class for damages sustained as a result of Defendants’ fraud. COMMON LAW FRAUD DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 350 (FALSE ADVERTISING LAW) DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT) Defendants Market Their Products As Free of Added Preservatives Even Though They Contain Citric Acid, Phosphoric Acid, And Ascorbic Acid INJUNCTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 (DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT)

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10. After Triage placed Mr. Kwiatkowski at Exeter Hospital, Plaintiffs French, Cross, Jordan and Burke underwent procedures in the cardiac catheterization laboratory at Exeter Hospital and were exposed to hepatitis C by Mr. Kwiatkowski. 11. Upon information and belief, prior to arriving at Exeter Hospital, staff members at some of the hospitals where Mr. Kwiatkowski had previously worked reported that Mr. Kwiatkowski often told stories about himself that later proved to be false. For example, Mr. Kwiatkowski frequently claimed that: a. he played baseball at the University of Michigan; b. his fiancée had died under tragic circumstances; and c. he suffered from cancer. 12. Upon information and belief, prior to coming to Exeter Hospital, Mr. Kwiatkowski was terminated by another hospital for falsifying information on a timesheet. 13. Upon information and belief, prior to coming to Exeter Hospital, on at least two occasions, needles were found in a restroom outside the cardiac catheterization laboratory at a hospital where Mr. Kwiatkowski worked. After Mr. Kwiatkowski left that hospital, no further such incidents occurred. 15. Upon information and belief, Mr. Kwiatkowski tested positive for hepatitis C in June 2010. 16. Hepatitis C is a blood-borne viral disease that is primarily transmitted by exposure to infected blood. Left untreated, hepatitis C causes inflammation of the liver and can lead to cirrhosis and/or liver cancer. 17. Upon information and belief, in October 2011, after Mr. Kwiatkowski had been working in its cardiac catheterization laboratory for six months, Exeter Hospital hired Mr. Kwiatkowski as a full time cardiac catheterization laboratory technician. 18. Upon information and belief, in or about May 2012, medical staff at Exeter Hospital learned that several patients had tested positive for hepatitis C. Further investigation revealed that all of these patients had undergone recent procedures in Exeter Hospital’s cardiac catheterization laboratory. 19. Upon information and belief, in June 2012, Mr. Kwiatkowski fled the state of New Hampshire and was subsequently admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Massachusetts. 20. As of July 13, 2012, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services has announced that 32 people, including Mr. Kwiatkowski and Mr. Fowler, associated with the Exeter Hospital cardiac catheterization laboratory have tested positive for hepatitis C. 21. Over 1,200 patients, associated with Exeter Hospital in New Hampshire have been tested and 32 patients have been identified who are infected with the same strain of hepatitis C as Mr. Kwiatkowski. 22. On July 24, 2012, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services announced that over 6,000 more Exeter Hospital patients will be tested for hepatitis C. 23. Upon information and belief, Triage has placed Mr. Kwiatkowski in hospitals in several other states. 24. Upon information and belief, hundreds of patients in Kansas, Maryland, and Georgia have begun the testing process. 25. Upon information and belief, Michigan, Arizona and New York are currently identifying hospitals where Mr. Kwiatkowski may have worked. 27. The Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 26 as if fully set forth herein. 28. Triage owed a duty of care to the Plaintiffs to protect them against harm from its employee, Mr. Kwiatkowski. Triage is responsible for protecting members of the public, including the Plaintiffs, that Mr. Kwiatkowski would be expected to encounter. 29. Triage failed to exercise reasonable care when it hired Mr. Kwiatkowski in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the job Mr. Kwiatkowski was to perform at Exeter Hospital and other hospitals. Triage failed to exercise the degree of care required related to the severity of risk to the Plaintiffs. 30. Triage knew or should have known of Mr. Kwiatkowski’s likelihood of causing harm to the Plaintiffs when it hired Mr. Kwiatkowski. Triage failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that could have found Mr. Kwiatkowski’s likelihood of causing harm to the Plaintiffs. 31. Triage’s breach of its duty was the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries. 32. The Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 32 as if fully set forth herein. 33. Triage owed a duty of care to the Plaintiffs to protect them against harm from its employee, Mr. Kwiatkowski. Triage is responsible for protecting members of the public, including the Plaintiffs, that Mr. Kwiatkowski would be expected to encounter. 35. Triage knew or should have known of Mr. Kwiatkowski’s likelihood of causing harm to the Plaintiffs when it retained Mr. Kwiatkowski. Triage failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that could have found Mr. Kwiatkowski’s likelihood of causing harm to the Plaintiffs. 36. Triage’s breach of its duty was the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries. 37. The Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 36 as if fully set forth herein. 38. Triage owed a duty of care to the Plaintiffs to protect them against harm from its employee, Mr. Kwiatkowski. Triage is responsible for protecting members of the public, including the Plaintiffs, that Mr. Kwiatkowski would be expected to encounter. 39. Triage failed to exercise reasonable care in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the job Mr. Kwiatkowski was to perform at Exeter Hospital. Triage failed to exercise the degree of care required related to the severity of risk to the Plaintiffs. 40. Triage knew or should have known of Mr. Kwiatkowski’s likelihood of causing harm to the Plaintiffs when it supervised Mr. Kwiatkowski. Triage failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that could have found Mr. Kwiatkowski’s likelihood of causing harm to the Plaintiffs. 41. Triage’s breach of its duty was the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries. 42. The Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 41 as if fully set forth herein. 43. Triage owed a duty of care to the Plaintiffs to protect him against harm from its employee, Mr. Kwiatkowski. Triage is responsible for protecting members of the public, including the Plaintiffs, that Mr. Kwiatkowski would be expected to encounter. 44. Triage failed to exercise reasonable care in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the job Mr. Kwiatkowski was to perform at Exeter Hospital. Triage failed to exercise the degree of care required related to the severity of risk to the Plaintiffs. 46. Triage’s breach of its duty was the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries. 47. The Plaintiffs repeat and re-alleges each of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 46 as if fully set forth herein. 48. Triage made intentional misrepresentations concerning Mr. Kwiatkowski’s qualifications and employment record. 49. Such misrepresentations allowed Mr. Kwiatkowski to pose a danger to patients, including the Plaintiffs, who were treated in Exeter Hospital’s cardiac catheterization laboratory during all relevant times. 50. As a result of Triage’s misrepresentations, the Plaintiffs suffered injuries. 8. The Defendant, Triage Staffing Inc. (hereinafter “Triage”), employs and places health care workers known as “travelers.” Triage hires these “travelers” and places them to work at hospitals around the United States on a contract basis for short durations of time, often approximately 13 weeks. Such “travelers” often provide short-term staffing assistance to hospitals that Triage contracts with. 9. Upon information and belief, Triage hired one David Kwiatkowski as a traveling cardiac catheterization laboratory technician and, in March 2011, placed Mr. Kwiatkowski at Exeter Hospital in Exeter, New Hampshire.

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10. Defendant contacted Plaintiff on or around July 2018 in an effort to solicit its business. 11. Defendant’s messages constituted “telephone solicitation” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) and “unsolicited advertisement” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 12. Defendant used an “telephone facsimile machine” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. 13. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 16. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendant to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously consented to receiving such messages 17. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendant to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously provided their telephone facsimile number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 18. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 8. Beginning in or around July 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his telephone facsimile numbers ending in -3052, in an effort to sell or solicit its services. 9. Defendant contacted Plaintiff via facsimile from telephone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendant, including without limitation (632)201-2142. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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(42 U.S.C. §1981) 10. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 requires employers to complete and maintain a Form I-9 for each of their employees, whether such employees are U.S. citizens or noncitizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324A. 11. Both employees and employers must complete Form I-9. An employee must provide the employer with acceptable documents confirming both his identity and employment authorization. 12. Acceptable documents for Form I-9 verification are listed on the form and include, among others, a federal Employment Authorization Document (“EAD”). The EAD proves an individual is allowed to work in the United States for a specific time period. By itself an EAD establishes both identity and employment authorization. No further proof is necessary to satisfy the documentation requirement of Form I-9 and prove that the employee is authorized to work in the United States. 14. On June 15, 2012, the Secretary of DHS announced that the agency, through its exercise of prosecutorial discretion, would not seek to remove certain immigrants brought to the United States as children but instead consider them for grants of deferred action. The initiative is known as DACA. 15. Deferred action under DACA is a discretionary grant of authorized stay in the United States by the federal government. Deferred action under DACA is valid for a period of two years and is renewable for additional two-year periods. 16. DACA recipients are eligible to obtain federal work authorization and work in the United States. Work authorized DACA recipients possess an EAD and a Social Security number. 17. DACA’s purpose, as explained by President Obama was to “[stop] expel[ling] talented young individuals who . . . [have] been raised as Americans; understand themselves to be part of this country . . . [and] who want to staff our labs, or start new businesses or defend our country.”1 18. As of January 31, 2020 USCIS had approved 825,623 initial applications for DACA.2 20. Defendant M&T intentionally discriminates against noncitizen applicants for employment in the United States on the basis of alienage by utilizing a facially discriminatory policy and/or practice that categorically denies the opportunity to enter employment contracts to lawfully present noncitizens who are authorized to work in the U.S., and whose valid federal work authorization contains a future expiration date. 21. M&T further subjects noncitizen applicants to employment discrimination on the basis of alienage by imposing additional requirements that are not imposed on U.S. citizen applicants, and rejects the noncitizen applicants who cannot satisfy the additional requirements. 22. On or about March 14, 2018, M&T denied Ms. Kodra’s application for a job as a retail branch manager within the Bank’s Management Development Program on the basis of these policies and practices, because she was a noncitizen with a valid EAD, and despite the fact that Ms. Kodra was authorized to work in the United States. 23. In January 2018, Ms. Kodra applied for a position as a retail branch manager within the Management Development Program of M&T’s Student, Graduate and Professional Training Programs. Ms. Kodra submitted her application through Defendant M&T’s online job application portal for students. 24. M&T’s job listing for the retail branch manager position stated that an applicant must be “Authorized to work in the U.S. on a full-time, permanent basis without additional sponsorship." 26. During the last week of January 2018, M&T’s Banking Officer-Management Development Program Recruiter, Jessica Vicario, emailed Ms. Kodra to say that Ms. Kodra’s initial application qualified her for the next phase of the application process, which was a telephone interview. 27. On February 1, 2018, Ms. Vicario interviewed Ms. Kodra by telephone and stated that she was impressed by Ms. Kodra’s application. 28. Also on February 1, 2018, following the telephonic interview, Ms. Vicario sent a follow-up email to Ms. Kodra. In the email, Ms. Vicario asked Ms. Kodra to review the various positions available and submit her top five position requests. 29. In response to Ms. Vicario’s post-interview email, Ms. Kodra emailed Ms. Vicario on February 19, 2018 to express her interest in the retail branch manager position in either the Philadelphia or the New York office. 30. On February 22, 2018, Ms. Vicario acknowledged receipt of Ms. Kodra’s February 19, 2018 email and requested that Ms. Kodra complete the online application through a link Ms. Vicario provided. Ms. Vicario explained that submitting the application via this online platform allowed for coordinated communication between the scheduling team, the hiring managers and rest of the team. 31. On March 4, 2018, Ms. Kodra completed the online application and answered affirmatively that she had work authorization. That same day, Ms. Kodra sent an email to Ms. Vicario to confirm that she had completed the online application. Ms. Kodra asked Ms. Vicario if there were any additional steps Ms. Kodra needed to take in the hiring process. 33. On March 12, 2018, Ms. Kodra responded by email to Ms. Vicario confirming her request for employment in “Upstate New York (Hudson Valley)” and stated, “I will not require sponsorship. I have employment authorization and expect to have it until 2020.” 34. On March 14, 2018 Ms. Vicario sent an email to Ms. Kodra that stated: “Unfortunately, we require that candidates have permanent work authorization for consideration in the Management Development Program.” 35. If Ms. Kodra did not belong to a class of non-citizens whose work authorization has a future expiration date, M&T would have entered into an employment contract with Ms. Kodra for the retail branch manager position with the Management Development Program. 36. DACA recipients are not the only class of noncitizens who possess federal work authorization but are ineligible to work for M&T because of its facially discriminatory policy and/or practice that discriminates on the basis of alienage. M&T’s requirements for entering into a work contract also discriminate against work-authorized asylees, deferred action recipients, trafficking survivors and relatives of visa holders, among other classes of noncitizens who are authorized to work in the United States and whose valid federal work authorization contains a future expiration date. 38. Ms. Kodra is a member of the Class. 39. Upon information and belief, the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all of them is impracticable. M&T is a large corporation with offices throughout the eastern United States, USCIS has approved over 800,000 applications for DACA, and there are thousands of individuals who, despite having work authorization, do not meet M&T’s requirements for employment. Ms. Kodra does not know the precise number of Class members because this information is within the possession of M&T. 40. Questions of law and fact are common to the Class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Common questions include, among others: (1) whether it is M&T’s policy or practice to reject job applicants or terminate current workers who are authorized to work in the United States because they are not United States citizens and because they possess valid work authorization that is limited in duration; (2) whether M&T’s policy, as set forth above, deprives Plaintiff and the Class of the right to contract for work in the United States in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) whether Ms. Kodra and the Class are entitled to back-pay relief; (4) whether Ms. Kodra and the Class suffered harm by reason of M&T’s unlawful policy; (5) whether Ms. Kodra and the Class are entitled to compensatory damages; (6) whether Ms. Kodra and the Class are entitled to punitive damages; (7) whether equitable and injunctive relief for the Class is warranted; and (8) the scope of a resulting permanent injunction. 42. Ms. Kodra will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class. Ms. Kodra has no conflict with any Class member. Ms. Kodra is committed to the goal of altering M&T’s hiring policies and practices to end discrimination against Ms. Kodra and those who are similarly situated by virtue of their noncitizenship and legal authorization to work in the United States. 43. Ms. Kodra has retained competent counsel experienced in complex employment discrimination class actions. 44. The precise number of individuals affected by M&T’s unlawful policy and practice is ascertainable through M&T’s records and therefore the proposed class is ascertainable. 45. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(2) because M&T has acted and/or refused to act on grounds that are generally applicable to the Class, which makes declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole appropriate. M&T has refused to hire and/or has terminated noncitizens ostensibly because they are not citizens or are noncitizens whose federal work authorization is limited as to duration of time. The Class members are entitled to injunctive relief to end M&T’s common, uniform, unfair, and discriminatory policy and/or practice including priority instatement and other relief that will make Class members whole. 47. Plaintiff Ms. Kodra incorporates by reference the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 48. Ms. Kodra brings this claim on her own behalf and on behalf of the Class. 49. Ms. Kodra is a person within the jurisdiction of the United States. 50. Ms. Kodra is not a citizen of the United States. 51. Ms. Kodra is lawfully present and authorized to work in the United States. 52. Defendant M&T intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff and the Class on the basis of alienage by denying them contracts to work or deterring them from pursuing employment opportunities because they are noncitizens whose federal work authorization is time limited and despite their legal authorization to work in the United States. 53. M&T’s intentional discrimination against Plaintiff and the Class has interfered with their right to make and enforce work contracts. 55. Ms. Kodra and Class members have no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law to redress the wrongs alleged in this Complaint, and the injunctive relief sought in this action is the only means to secure complete and adequate relief. Ms. Kodra and the Class she seeks to represent now suffer, and will continue to suffer, irreparable injury from M&T’s discriminatory acts and omissions. 56. M&T’s conduct has caused, and continues to cause, Ms. Kodra and Class members substantial losses in earnings and other work benefits. 9. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) provides Form I-9 to employers within the United States to allow employers to verify the identity and employment authorization of individuals they wish to hire. Background

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10. Defendant told Plaintiff that she still owed the debt. 11. Defendant had no legal basis to demand payment from payment, because the account had been fully satisfied as per the March 18, 2014 Satisfaction of Judgment filed in St. Louis County. 12. Upon information and belief, it is Defendant’s routine practice to violate the FDCPA by attempting to debts allegedly owed to St. Anthony’s Medical Center without the legal right to do so. 13. This action is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class consists of the following persons: 3 14. FDCPA class: all residents of the United States who within one year of January 12, 2015 that received a communication wherein Defendant was trying to collect a debt owed to St. Anthony’s Medical Center when it had no legal right to do so. 15. Members of the class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Based on Plaintiff’s and Plaintiff’s counsel’s research regarding consumer complaints, Defendant is a high volume debt collector that attempts to collect many thousands of consumer debts throughout Missouri, Illinois and the United States. 16. Upon information and belief, Defendant has engaged in the improper collection communications described above with hundreds of consumers. 17. Plaintiff is a member of the class she seeks to represent. 18. There are no unique defenses Defendant can assert against Plaintiff individually, as distinguished from the class. 19. Plaintiff will assure the adequate representation of all members of the class and will have no conflict with class members in the maintenance of this action. Plaintiff’s interests in this action are typical of the class and are antagonistic to the interests of the Defendant. Plaintiff has no interest or relationship with the Defendant that would prevent him from litigating this matter fully. Plaintiff is aware that settlement of a class action is subject to court approval and she will vigorously pursue the class claims throughout the course of this action. 20. A class action will provide a fair and efficient method to adjudicate this controversy since the claims of the class members are virtually identical in that they raise the same questions of law and involve the same methods of collection and telephone contact by the Defendant. 21. Most, if not all, the facts needed to determine damages are obtainable from the Defendant’s records. 22. The purposes of the FDCPA will be best effectuated by a class action. 4 23. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 24. Furthermore, as damages suffered by most members of the class are relatively small in relation to the costs, expense, and burden of litigation, it would be difficult for members of the class individually to redress the wrongs done to them. 25. Many, if not all, class members are unaware that claims exist against the Defendant. There will be no unusual difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 26. Four common questions of law and fact predominate over all individual questions in this action. The common questions are whether: (1) Defendant is a “debt collector” pursuant to the FDCPA; (2) the liabilities that Defendant has sought to collect from class members constitute “consumer debt” under the FDCPA; (3) whether Defendant attempting to collect St. Anthony’s Medical Center debt when they have no legal right to do so. 27. Because many class members are unaware of their claims and because their claims are small in relation to the cost of an individual suit, a class action is the only proceeding in which class members can, as a practical matter, recover. 28. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action. Plaintiff’s counsel will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. 29. All Class members have been damaged in precisely the same fashion, by precisely the same conduct. The loss suffered by individual Class members is calculable and ascertainable. 6. On or about January 12, 2015, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by telephone calling from (314) 925-9001 attempting to collect a debt once owed to St. Anthony’s Medical Center in the amount of $731.45. 7. During the call, Defendant told Plaintiff the debt was due and owing. 8. The debt at issue was the basis of a lawsuit filed against Plaintiff in St. Louis County with a case number of 13SL-AC03480. A Satisfaction of Judgment was filed on March 18, 2014. 9. Plaintiff informed Defendant that she had already paid the debt and that she was no longer indebted to St. Anthony’s Medical Center.

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23. Defendant owns, operates and/or controls its restaurants, sells store gift cards to the public, and uses them as a form of communication. One or more of its restaurants is located in New York City. Defendant’s restaurants constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s restaurants provide important goods and services to the public. 25. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s store gift cards, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public at its restaurants. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from purchasing, accessing, and utilizing the store gift cards and, as a result, Defendant’s restaurants. 26. These access barriers on Defendant’s store gift cards have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to purchase a Braille store gift card related to Defendant’s physical restaurant locations, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations. Plaintiff intends to immediately purchase a store gift card issued by the Defendant as soon as they become available in Braille. 27. If the store gift cards were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently purchase the store gift cards and complete a desired transaction utilizing gift cards as sighted individuals do. 28. Through his knowledge about the lack of Braille store gift cards, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 31. Title III of the ADA requires that public accommodations provide “appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 32. Defendant discriminates on the basis of disability because they fail to afford individuals who are visually impaired with the same ability to independently access the goods and services provided to others, thus failing to ensure effective communication with its visually impaired customers during transactions for its goods and services. 33. The regulation sets forth numerous examples of “auxiliary aids and services”, including, without limitation, “Brailled materials and displays..." 28 C.F.R. § 34. In addition to this general nondiscrimination mandate, Title III prohibits public accommodations from engaging in specific types of discrimination, including the failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, services, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a). 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service, (emphasis added) . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) Nothing in this section shall require a person with disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization … does not intend to comply with its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) 37. If the store gift cards were accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently utilize them. 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding its store gift cards, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually- impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in marketing and selling its store gift cards and has generated significant revenue from the store gift cards. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its store gift cards equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the store gift cards, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards are a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards are a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards deny the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards deny the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s restaurants are places of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s restaurants. The store gift cards are a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the store gift cards, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in the State of New York and constitute restaurants and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s store gift cards are a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns, operates and/or controls its physical locations and sells its store gift cards. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Readily available manufacturing and/or printing capabilities exist for making store gift cards accessible to the blind and visually impaired. The addition to store gift cards of Braille on the gift card and packaging thereof and other related marketing materials would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s store gift cards and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 74. Defendant’s locations are restaurants and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its store gift cards are a service that is integrated with its establishments. 75. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns, operates and/or controls its physical locations in the City of New York and its store gift cards, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant is: a. developing, marketing and selling store gift cards that are inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failing to sell store gift cards that are sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its store gift cards and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 81. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 84. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, Defendant’s store gift cards contain access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its store gift cards and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 87. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers On Its Store Gift Cards VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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11. CCI operates and maintains a website which describes its business as “[s]upplying award-winning, mobile field service technicians” that CCI can “immediately deploy.” 12. CCI relies on Technicians, such as Plaintiffs, who install, service and repair Dish Network satellite TV and Internet services throughout the southeastern United States. On its website, CCI refers to these workers as “our service technicians.” 13. CCI Technicians perform core work that is necessary to CCI’s business, namely providing installation and product support for residential and commercial customers. 14. As described above, during the relevant statutory periods, Plaintiffs worked as full- time as Technicians for CCI in North Carolina and South Carolina. 15. CCI treated Plaintiffs and all other Technicians as independent contractors, when the economic reality of the position is that of an employee, and CCI retains the right of control, and, in fact, actually does control their work. 16. For example, the work performed by Plaintiffs and Technicians is an integral part of CCI’s business. CCI is in the business of providing satellite TV and Internet installation and repair services. Plaintiffs and Class Members literally performed these exact services, so that without the Technicians, CCI would have no business at all. 18. Plaintiffs and Class Members do not make any significant investments in their work relative to the substantial investment of CCI. 19. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ work does not require special skills, judgment or initiative because all jobs are scheduled and assigned through CCI, and CCI provides training and guidelines regarding how Plaintiffs and Class Members must perform their work. 20. Plaintiffs and Class Members are not customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business, and their relationships with CCI are indefinite, resembling an employment relationship. 21. In its agreements with Technicians, CCI reserves the right to control the work performed by Plaintiffs and Class Members. This includes CCI determining the pay scale of the work provided by the Plaintiffs and Class Members “at the time the service is performed.” 31. Plaintiffs bring Count I and II of this lawsuit pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of themselves and the following individuals: All Technicians who were classified as independent contractors while performing work for Custom Communications, Inc. (“CCI”) in the United States from three years before the filing of this Complaint to the present (the “FLSA Collective”). 33. The similarly situated employees are known to CCI, are readily identifiable, and can easily be located through CCI’s business and human resources records. 34. CCI employs many FLSA Class Members throughout the United States. These similarly situated employees may be readily notified of this action through U.S. mail and/or other means and allowed to opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for minimum wage and overtime compensation. 35. Plaintiffs bring Counts III and IV of this lawsuit as a class action pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23, on behalf of themselves and the following class: All Technicians who were classified as independent contractors while performing work for Custom Communications, Inc. (“CCI”) in North Carolina from two years before the filing of this Complaint to the present (the “North Carolina Class”). 36. Plaintiffs bring Count V of this lawsuit as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of themselves and the following class: All Technicians who were classified as independent contractors while performing work for Custom Communications, Inc. (“CCI”) in South Carolina from three years before the filing of this Complaint to the present (the “South Carolina Class”). 37. The members of the North Carolina Class and South Carolina Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) members of the North Carolina Class and more than forty (40) members of the South Carolina Class. 39. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed Rule 23 classes, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The common questions include whether CCI has violated and continues to violate the relevant state wage laws by treating class members as “independent contractors,” failing to pay them overtime and statutory minimum wage, and/or deducting substantial amounts from class members’ weekly pay. 40. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The North Carolina Class and South Carolina Class are readily identifiable from CCI’s own records. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the North Carolina Class or South Carolina Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual North Carolina Class or South Carolina Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for CCI. 42. Plaintiffs reserve the right to redefine the Classes prior to filing a motion for notice to similarly situated employees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), prior to filing a motion for class certification pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23, and thereafter, as necessary. 43. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 44. CCI is an “employer” for purposes of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s), because it has annual gross sales or business of at least $500,000 and has employees engaged in interstate commerce. 45. Plaintiffs and FLSA Class were employees of CCI for purposes of the FLSA during all times relevant to this Complaint, despite being misclassified by CCI as independent contractors. CCI failed to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Class members an hourly rate of at least the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour as required by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206 for all hours worked. 46. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class members are also entitled to liquidated damages equal to the amount of unpaid minimum wages due to them under the FLSA, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 48. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 49. The FLSA requires that covered employees be compensated overtime pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours at no less than one and a half (1 ½) times their regular rate of pay. See 29 U.S.C. § 207. 50. The FLSA defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer,” 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1), and “employer” as including “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,” 29 U.S.C. 203(d). The FLSA’s definition of “employ” broadly covers anyone who is “suffer[ed] or permit[ed] to work.” 29 U.S.C. 203(g). 51. CCI is subject to the wage requirements of the FLSA because CCI is an “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 52. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are covered employees entitled to the above-described FLSA’s protections. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 53. At all relevant times, CCI is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 54. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are not exempt from the requirements of the FLSA. 55. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class are entitled to be paid overtime for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207. 57. CCI, pursuant to its policies and practices, knowingly failed to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class overtime compensation for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207. 58. In violating the FLSA, CCI acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions. 59. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 60. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(a)(2), an employer may only withhold or divert any portion of an employee’s wages, “when the amount of the proposed deduction is known and agreed upon in advance,” after meeting several requirements, including, but not limited to: (1) receiving written authorization from each employee “on or before the payday(s) for the pay period(s) from which the deduction is to be made”; (2) providing the reason for each deduction; and (3) providing advance written notice of the actual amount to be deducted. 61. CCI violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8(a)(2) by not receiving sufficient authorization from Plaintiffs and the North Carolina Class, including but not limited to, failing to receive written authorization that “states the actual dollar amount” from each employee “on or before the payday(s) for the pay period(s) from which the deduction is to be made.” 63. CCI does not have written authorization from Plaintiffs or any members of the North Carolina Class to withhold, divert, or deduct any portion of his or her wages that concern this lawsuit. 64. Pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.22, an employer, such as CCI, who fails to pay an employee wages in conformance with the NCWHA shall be liable to the employee for the wages or expenses that were not paid, pre-judgment interest, liquidated damages, court costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in recovering the unpaid wages. 65. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 66. CCI has received and benefited from the uncompensated labors of Plaintiffs and the North Carolina Class, such that to retain said benefit without compensation would be inequitable and rise to the level of unjust enrichment. 67. At all relevant times hereto, CCI devised and implemented a plan to increase its earnings and profits by fostering a scheme of securing work from Plaintiffs and the North Carolina Class without paying wages for all hours worked, by making unauthorized deductions from Plaintiffs’ pay, and by requiring Plaintiffs to pay for CCI’s own business expenses. 69. Accordingly, it would be inequitable for CCI to retain the benefit of Plaintiffs’ and the North Carolina Class’ services without paying them wages for all hours worked as required by law. 70. Plaintiffs and the North Carolina Class are entitled to judgment in an amount equal to the benefits unjustly retained by CCI. 71. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 72. CCI is an “employer” as defined by the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10(1), because it employs individuals within the State of South Carolina. 73. CCI employed James Kobe Jackson and the South Carolina Class members within the State of South Carolina. Although CCI misclassified Jackson and the South Carolina Class members as “independent contractors,” Jackson and the South Carolina Class were truly “employees” of CCI. 74. CCI failed to provide written notice to Jackson and South Carolina Class members of deductions to their pay, as required by Section 41-10-30 of the Act. 75. CCI failed to pay Jackson and the South Carolina Class members all wages due, as required by Sections 41-10-40 and -50 of the Act, because of the unlawful deductions to their pay. 76. CCI’s failure to pay Jackson and the South Carolina Class members all wages due is willful, without justification, and in violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Unjust Enrichment Under North Carolina Law (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the North Carolina Class) Violation of the FLSA—Failure to Pay Minimum Wage (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class) Violation of the North Carolina’s Deduction Statute (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the North Carolina Class) Violation of South Carolina Deduction Statute (On Behalf of Plaintiff James Kobe Jackson and the South Carolina Class) Violation of the FLSA—Failure to Pay Overtime (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class)

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17. This action is properly maintainable as a collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 18. This action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and a putative collective consisting of similarly situated employees who performed work for Defendants. 20. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the putative class. The Plaintiff and putative class members were all subject to Defendants’ policies and willful practices of failing to pay employees all earned overtime wages. The Plaintiff and putative class members thus have sustained similar injuries as a result of Defendants’ actions. 21. Upon information and belief, Defendants uniformly apply the same employment policies, practices, and procedures to all employees who work at the Defendants’ valet. 22. This action is properly maintainable as a collective action pursuant to § 216(b) of the Act. 23. Based upon the information preliminarily available, and subject to discovery in this cause, the Defendants employed the Plaintiff and members of the putative class to perform tasks in furtherance of their valet and transportation business. 24. Based upon the information preliminarily available, and subject to discovery in this cause, the Defendants did not properly compensate Plaintiff Mejias for his overtime hours worked in a work week. 25. Plaintiff Mejias was an hourly employee and his hourly rate of pay was $8.50 per hour. 26. During the months of October, November, December and January, on average, Plaintiff Mejias worked (10) shifts each week. Each shift was approximately (8) hours long 28. During the remaining months of the year, February through September, on average, Plaintiff Mejias worked (6) to (7) shifts per week. Each shift was approximately (8) hours long. 29. Plaintiff Mejias worked (48) or (56) hours per week during these months, depending on the number of shifts in a given week. 30. Plaintiff Mejias was not paid at one-and-one half times his hourly rate of pay for his hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 31. Plaintiff Mejias was only paid his regular rate of pay for all hours worked, including those worked in excess of forty each week. 32. Upon information and belief, employees similarly situated to Plaintiff were also only compensated at their regular rate of pay for all hours worked, regardless of the fact that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 33. Beginning in November, 2018, Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with paid sick or personal time; rather, when Plaintiff took time from work, regardless of whether he was sick, he was not paid. 34. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees were performing their duties for the benefit of and on behalf of Defendants. 35. This cause of action is brought to recover from Defendants overtime compensation, liquidated damages, and the costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees under the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §201,et.seq., as well as applicable provisions of the NJWHL, and to recover unpaid sick time in accordance with the NJWHL, on behalf of Plaintiff during the material time. 37. Plaintiff has retained the law office of Jaffe Glenn Law Group, P.A. to represent him individually and incurred attorneys’ fees and costs in bringing this action. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 38. Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates here by reference, all allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 37 above. 39. Plaintiff is entitled to be paid additional compensation for each of his overtime hours worked per work period. 40. All similarly situated employees of the Defendants are also owed their overtime rate for each and every overtime hour they worked and were not properly paid. 41. Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees at time and one half of their regular rate of pay for their overtime hours worked in a work period. 42. By reason of the said intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees have suffered damages plus incurring costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 43. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the Act, Plaintiff and those similarly situated employees are entitled to liquidated damages. 44. Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates here by reference, all allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 43 above. 45. Defendants’ afore mentioned conduct is in violation of the NJWHL. In violation of New Jersey Statutes §§ 34:11-56a4 et seq., the Defendants willfully failed to pay the Plaintiff and other members of the putative class their statutorily required overtime compensation for the time they worked in excess of forty (40) hours a week for the Defendants. 46. Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees are entitled to one-and-one half times their regular hourly wage for each hour of working time in excess of 40 hours in any week. 47. Defendants’ afore mentioned conduct is in violation of the NJWHL. 48. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff and all similarly situated employees suffered damages, including but not limited to lost wages and liquidated damages. 49. Plaintiff re-alleges, and incorporates here by reference, all allegations contained in the paragraphs above. 50. Plaintiff was not provided sick leave. 51. Defendants did not have a policy by which Plaintiff earned sick leave. 52. As a result of not earning sick leave, Plaintiff suffered damages. Plaintiff seeks actual damages, as well as additional damages as dictated in the statute. RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR DEFENDANTS’ VIOLATION OF NEW JERSEY’S PAID SICK LEAVE STATUTE SICK LEAVE RECOVERY OF OVERTIME COMPENSATION PURSUANT TO THE FLSA

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21. Defendant is a children’s products and accessories company that owns and operates the website, www.munchkin.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 24. Plaintiff most recently visited Defendant’s website in February of 2020 to potentially make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a user experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to enjoy the privileges and benefits of Defendant’s public accommodation. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contains a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances, an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by disabled individuals. 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 72. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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12. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and subscriber of the cellular telephone number ending in 7679. 13. At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 7679 was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 14. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was financially responsible for his cellular telephone equipment and services. 15. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide his cellular phone number to Defendant or otherwise consent to receive phone calls from Defendant. 16. In May 2020, Plaintiff started to receive solicitation calls from Defendant to schedule a health assessment. 18. Upon answering Defendant’s calls, Plaintiff was required to say “hello” numerous times before being connected to a live representative. 19. On multiple occasions, including June 8, 2020 and September 1, 2020, Plaintiff answered Defendant’s calls and requested that Defendant cease its solicitation calls. 20. Despite Plaintiff’s multiple requests that the calls cease, Defendant continued its barrage of solicitation calls, including, but not limited to, calls from the phone numbers (855) 746- 8709 and (855) 215-1831. 21. In total, Defendant placed dozens of solicitation calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone after Plaintiff initially requested that the solicitation calls cease in June 2020. 22. Defendant’s invasive solicitation calls have severely disrupted Plaintiff’s daily life and general well-being. 23. Defendant’s phone harassment campaign and illegal telemarketing activities have caused Plaintiff actual harm, including but not limited to, invasion of privacy, nuisance, wasting Plaintiff’s time, the increased risk of personal injury resulting from the distraction caused by the phone calls, decreased daily productivity, aggravation that accompanies unwanted telephone calls, emotional distress, mental anguish, anxiety, loss of concentration, diminished value and functionality of his cellular phone, the loss of battery charge, and the per-kilowatt electricity costs required to recharge his cellular telephone as a result of increased usage of his cellular phone. 24. Moreover, each time Defendant placed a telephone call to Plaintiff, Defendant occupied Plaintiff’s cellular phone such that Plaintiff was unable to receive other phone calls or otherwise utilize his cellular phone while his phone was ringing. 26. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 27. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Putative Class”) defined as follows: All persons in the United States (1) to whom Defendant placed a phone call relating to the scheduling of a health assessment; (2) to a phone number assigned to a cellular phone; (3) without the call recipient’s express consent; (4) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (4) within four years preceding the date of this compliant through the date of class certification. 28. The following individuals are excluded from the Putative Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate Judge presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Putative Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. A. Numerosity 29. Upon information and belief, the members of the Putative Class are so numerous that joinder of them is impracticable. 30. The exact number of the members of the Putative Class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and will be determined through targeted discovery. 32. The members of the Putative Class are identifiable in that their names, addresses, and telephone numbers can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. B. Commonality and Predominance 33. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class. 34. Those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Putative Class. C. Typicality 35. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of members of the Putative Class because Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class were harmed by Defendant’s conduct and thus are entitled to damages as result of Defendant’s conduct. D. Superiority and Manageability 36. This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. 37. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution. 38. By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 39. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. E. Adequate Representation 41. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Class and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 42. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer class action litigation. 43. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 44. As pled above, Defendant placed or caused to be placed dozens of non-emergency calls, including but not limited to the aforementioned calls, to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) without his prior consent in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). 45. The TCPA defines ATDS as “equipment which has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 46. Upon information and belief, based on the lack of prompt human response during the phone calls in which Plaintiff answered, Defendant used an ATDS to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number. 48. As pled above, Plaintiff never provided Defendant with consent to place calls to his cellular phone. 49. Moreover, Plaintiff requested that Defendant’s phone calls cease to no avail. 50. As pled above, Plaintiff was harmed by Defendant’s solicitation calls to his cellular phone. 51. Upon information and belief, Defendant knew its solicitation practices were in violation of the TCPA, yet continued to employ them to maximize efficiency and profits. 52. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Class are entitled to receive $500.00 in damages for each such violation. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq.) (On behalf of Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class)

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10. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the Debt”). 11. The Debt was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 12. Sometime after the incurrence of the Debt, Plaintiff fell behind on payments owed. 13. Thereafter, at an exact time known only to Defendant, the Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 14. In its efforts to collect the debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter (“the Letter”) dated August 11, 2017. (“Exhibit 1.”) 15. The Letter was the initial communication Plaintiff received from Defendant. 16. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 17. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 18. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the account, Plaintiff was charged fees on any payments due but not timely made by Plaintiff. 26. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) requires the written notice provide “the amount of the debt.” 29. The written notice, to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), must convey the amount of the debt clearly from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer. 30. The written notice, to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), must convey the amount of the debt accurately from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer. 31. The written notice, to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), must convey the amount of the debt without ambiguity from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer. 57. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 58. As previously set forth, Plaintiff was always charged fees on any payments due but not timely made by Plaintiff. 59. As previously set forth, Plaintiff was never informed by anyone that the terms and conditions of the account were changed. 60. The Letter fails to disclose whether the amount stated may increase due to additional fees. 70. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of Florida from whom Defendant attempted to collect a consumer debt using a collection letter with the same deficiencies as the Letter herein, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. 71. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 72. Defendant regularly engages in debt collection. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g

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1. Goins currently resides in Bloomington, Monroe County, Indiana. 10. Restaurant Employer has intentionally, knowingly, and with reckless disregard violated Goins and all server employees’ rights to tips paid by customers with credit cards and debit cards. Goins is expressly alleging that Restaurant Employer has acted in bad faith in violating its server employees’ rights under the FLSA and the Indiana Crime Victims Relief Act. 11. By way of this Complaint, Goins seeks for herself and for all other similarly situated server employees all illegally misappropriated credit card and debit card paid tips, plus any and all liquidated damages owed to each. Additionally, Goins seeks payment of her reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses. 12. Goins incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 - 11 above. 13. This Complaint is brought as a collective action on behalf of other current and former server employees of Restaurant Employer who were similarly denied payment of credit card and debit card paid tips under Restaurant Employer’s scheme. This collective action protects all such server employees who work or have worked for Restaurant Employer at one or more of its Bloomington, Indiana restaurants at any time from three years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the present. 14. This action is filed as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USC § 216(b), on behalf of Goins and all of Restaurant Employer’s 4 current and former server employees who were damaged by Restaurant Employer’s tip confiscating scheme. By virtue of the “collective action,” Goins represents the identical and/or similar interests of former and current hourly-paid server employees who were deprived and not paid credit card and debit card paid tips under the same circumstance. Goins anticipates that other Restaurant Employer server employees will opt in to the action. 15. Particularly with the types of wage claims and practices at issue in this case, there are questions of law and fact that are common to the entire collective group. 16. Goins’ claims are typical of the claims of the whole collective group of current and former hourly-paid server employees harmed by Restaurant Employer’s unlawful taking and retention of credit card and debit card paid tips. Goins’ claims are typical of the claims of the whole class of current and former servers harmed by Restaurant Employer’s unlawful taking and retention of server employees’ credit card and debit card paid tips. 17. Goins will act to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the entire collective group of current and former server employees of Restaurant Employer. 18. A determination regarding the “similarness” of those able to participate in the collective action would also allow litigation of claims that may not otherwise be cost effective, depending upon the amount of each individual group member’s damages. Particularly with the type of FLSA violations at issue in this litigation, some, if not most, of the individual group members may not be aware of their rights to their wages under the FLSA, or may not, because of financial means or experience, be in a position to seek the assistance of counsel to commence individual litigation. 19. A collective action will result in an orderly and expeditious administration of the group members’ claims, and economies of time, court resources, effort and expense, and uniformity of decisions will be assured. 2. Based upon information and belief, the “Restaurant Employer” is comprised of individual Defendant Hong Huang (who is the primary member of each limited liability company and owner/operator of the restaurants) and three separate limited liability company Defendants called Bapu Teafresh LLC, Thrivingteehee, LLC and A&A Food LLC. Restaurant Employer operates three restaurants in Bloomington, Indiana called Bapu Teahouse, Bapu Fresh and Zero Degrees. The restaurants serve drinks (tea, bubble tea, smoothies) and food. 20. Goins incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 - 19 above. 5 21. This Complaint is brought as a class action on behalf of other current and former server employees of Restaurant Employer who were similarly denied payment of credit card and debit card paid tips under Restaurant Employer’s scheme. 22. With respect to Rule 23(b)(3) class action claims, Goins will serve as class representative over the following class: Goins will serve as class representative for the class-wide claims brought under the Indiana Crime Victims Relief Act based upon conversion and/or theft. This action is filed as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure on behalf of Goins and on behalf of all eligible current and former server employees of the Restaurant Employer who were damaged by Restaurant Employer’s credit card and debit card paid tip confiscation scheme. By virtue of the class action, Goins represents the identical and/or similar interests of former and current server employees of Restaurant Employer were denied credit card and debit card paid tips under the same circumstance. 23. The number of Restaurant Employer’s current and former server employees who will be members of this class action is so great (numerosity) that joinder of all members is impractical. Instead, Goins will pursue discovery to obtain the names of the other current and former server employees, to provide notice of the class action and to offer the opt out opportunity. 24. Particularly with the type of conversion/theft claim and practice at issue in this case, there are questions of law and fact that are common to the entire class. 25. Goins’ claims are typical of the claims of the whole group of current and former server employees harmed by Restaurant Employer’s illegal conversion/theft of credit card and debit card paid tips entrusted to it by customers for payment to server employees. 26. Goins will act to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the entire class of current and former server employees of Restaurant Employer. 27. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient prosecution of these conversion/theft claims against Restaurant Employer. For example, to prove Restaurant Employer’s illegal practices, Goins and other members of this class would seek in discovery records about all similarly situated current and former server employees who were subjected to the same or similar tip confiscation scheme. Individual lawsuits by the members of 6 the class could lead to 1) inconsistent or varying outcomes in the cases, 2) duplicitous discovery, or 3) competition for limited funds. Further, as a practical matter, the first litigant to trial may achieve a result which would have bearing on all of the other individuals in the group. 28. A determination regarding the “similarness” of those able to participate in the class action would also allow litigation of claims that may not otherwise be cost effective, depending upon the amount of each individual group member’s damages. Particularly with the type of Indiana statutory violations at issue in this litigation, some, if not most, of the individual group members may not be aware of their rights to their tips under Indiana law, or may not, because of financial means or experience, be in a position to seek the assistance of counsel to commence individual litigation. 29. A class action will result in an orderly and expeditious administration of the class members’ claims, and economies of time, court resources, effort and expense, and uniformity of decisions will be assured. 3. Goins is a former employee of Restaurant Employer. She was hired in early May 2019 and continued to work until she voluntarily resigned her employment on June 5, 2020. Goins worked for Restaurant Employer as a part-time, hourly paid employee at both Bapu restaurants and Zero Degrees. As part of her wages, Goins was paid tips by the customers to whom she served drinks and food. 4. At all times during her employment as a server with Restaurant Employer, Goins was paid wages on an hourly basis and she was treated as a non-exempt employee. In the same way, Restaurant Employer paid all of its server employees wages on an hourly basis and treated all servers as non-exempt employees. During her employment, Goins was paid at an hourly rate of at least $8.50 and, by the end of her employment, was paid $9.50 per hour. Based upon information and belief, all of Restaurant Employer’s servers are paid at hourly rates that are greater than the FLSA minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. 5. Goins and all of Restaurant Employer’s server employees were promised payment of tips by customers as part of their wages. The tips were to be in addition to the hourly wages Restaurant Employer paid its servers. 6. Restaurant Employer, acting by and through Defendant Hong Huang, is and has been systematically taking and keeping all of its server employees’ tips paid by customers with credit cards and debit cards. Generally, Restaurant Employer has allowed Goins and all server 2 employees to periodically divide among all server employees the cash tips paid by customers (and, generally, collected in tips jars). Specifically, Restaurant Employer has been illegally taking and keeping all credit card and debit card paid tips and has never paid over the credit card and debit card paid tips to Goins and all other server employees. This is particularly harmful as more customers pay for purchases with credit cards and debit cards than pay with cash and more tips are paid by customers to Goins and all server employees with credit and debit cards than are paid in cash. 7. For her claim under the FLSA, Goins is specifically raising claims against Restaurant Employer for its violations of 29 USC § 203(m)(2)(B), as employers and managers are keeping portions of employees’ tips. The tips credit and debit card paid tips that Restaurant Employer illegally took and kept must be paid back to Goins and all other participating server employees.1 8. Restaurant Employer, acting by and through Defendant Hong Huang, knowingly and intentionally exerted unauthorized control over Goins and all server employees’ credit card and debit card paid tips, which were specific dollar amounts entrusted by customers to Restaurant Employer and special chattel intended for the dedicated purposes of paying server employees tips for their services. Stated differently, the credit card and debit card paid tips were entrusted by customers to Restaurant Employer to apply to a special purpose, payment of tips to server employees for their service. Rather than pay all of those credit card and debit card paid tips to its server employees, Restaurant Employer wrongfully took possession and kept the credit and debit card paid tips for itself and for Restaurant Employer’s own unauthorized and wrongful purposes. Moreover, Restaurant Employer wrongfully and illegally enriched itself, for its benefit and to its server employees’ harm, by retaining credit and debit card paid tips that were specifically 1To clarify, Goins is not bringing additional FLSA minimum wage claims based upon the tip credit, see 29 USC § 203(m)(2)(A), because Restaurant Employer was not using tips to pay a portion of its employees’ wages. Restaurant Employer was paying hourly wages which were in excess of $7.25 per hour. 3 collected for the intended purpose of paying tips to server employees. 9. Restaurant Employer is wrongfully misappropriating credit card and debit card paid tips intended for its server employees in each and every work week. Based upon information and belief, at the three restaurants, Restaurant Employer is misappropriating and keeping hundreds of dollars or more in credit card and debit card paid tips every week. Goins is specifically asserting and alleging that she was paid tips by customers with credit cards and/or debit cards in each and every week she worked for Restaurant Employer and Restaurant Employer took and kept Goins’ credit card and debit card paid tips for itself and to her detriment.

win

(Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 21. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Rosewoodhotel.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in The Carlyle Hotel, during the relevant statutory period.” 23. There are hundreds of thousands of visually impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 24. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Rosewoodhotel.com and The Carlyle Hotel. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Rosewoodhotel.com and by extension the goods and services offered through Defendant’s website to The Carlyle Hotel. 26. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Rosewood Hotel has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Rosewoodhotel.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 27. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 28. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 30. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 31. Rosewood Hotel operates The Carlyle Hotel, a luxury hotel in New York City. 32. Rosewoodhotel.com is a service and benefit offered by Rosewood Hotel and The Carlyle Hotel throughout the United States, including New York state. Rosewoodhotel.com is owned, controlled and/or operated by Rosewood Hotel. 33. Rosewoodhotel.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale that are available in The Carlyle Hotel. The online store allows the user to browse, select and book reservations; learn about the Rosewood Hotel’s history and founders, find the hotel location; and perform a variety of other functions. 34. Among the features offered by Rosewoodhotel.com are the following: (a) hotel information, allowing persons who wish to visit The Carlyle Hotel to learn its location, hours and phone numbers; (b) an online store, allowing customers to book a reservation; (c) information about Rosewood Hotel’s gift cards, history and job opportunities; and (d) sale of many of the products and services available at The Carlyle Hotel. 36. Rosewood Hotel denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Rosewoodhotel.com by preventing them from freely navigating Rosewoodhotel.com. 37. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as shopping, banking, etc., for sighted and blind persons. 38. The blind access websites by using keyboards in conjunction with screen-reading software which vocalizes visual information on a computer screen. Except for a blind person whose residual vision is still sufficient to use magnification, screen access software provides the only method by which a blind person can independently access the Internet. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, blind persons are unable to fully access Internet websites and the information, products and services contained therein. 40. Rosewoodhotel.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop down menus; the lack of navigation links and the lack of adequate prompting and labeling; the denial of keyboard access; and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 41. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen reader can speak the alternative text while a sighted user sees the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Rosewoodhotel.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. (Screen readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user.) As a result, Plaintiff and blind Rosewood Hotel customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the site, look for Rosewood Hotel’s location, investigate Rosewood Hotel’s accommodations, amenities and promotions and/or make reservations online. 43. Rosewoodhotel.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On an online booking site such as Rosewoodhotel.com, these forms include search fields to locate menu items, fields that specify the room desired, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to the lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers are unable to complete a reservation. 44. More specifically, Plaintiff and blind customers are prevented from making a reservation on The Carlyle Hotel’s initial page. The “make a reservation” button is not accessible with keyboard. Thus, Plaintiff and blind customers are left without online alternatives to make reservations. 45. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Rosewood Hotel’s website makes attempting to navigate through Rosewoodhotel.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 46. Rosewoodhotel.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Rosewoodhotel.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make reservations on Rosewoodhotel.com. 48. Rosewoodhotel.com thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Rosewoodhotel.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of The Carlyle Hotel in New York State. 49. Plaintiff LUCIA MARETT has made numerous attempts to complete a reservation on Rosewoodhotel.com, most recently in October 2016, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website, causing Rosewoodhotel.com to be inaccessible and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 50. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Rosewoodhotel.com contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 51. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Rosewoodhotel.com and The Carlyle Hotel. 53. Rosewood Hotel utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 55. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 56. The Carlyle Hotel located in New York State is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). Rosewoodhotel.com is a service, privilege or advantage of The Carlyle Hotel. Rosewoodhotel.com is a service that is by and integrated with this hotel. 57. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because they own and operate The Carlyle Hotel. 59. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 60. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 61. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of The Carlyle Hotel who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Rosewoodhotel.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Rosewoodhotel.com and The Carlyle Hotel in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 66. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 71. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 72. The Carlyle Hotel located in New York State is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Rosewoodhotel.com is a service, privilege or advantage of The Carlyle Hotel. Rosewoodhotel.com is a service that is by and integrated with this hotel. 73. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because they own and operate the The Carlyle Hotel and Rosewoodhotel.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 75. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 76. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 77. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Rosewoodhotel.com and The Carlyle Hotel under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 81. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 82. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 85. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 86. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 87. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof …” 88. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision” 90. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because they own and operate The Carlyle Hotel and Rosewoodhotel.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Rosewoodhotel.com, causing Rosewoodhotel.com and the services integrated with The Carlyle Hotel to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 92. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 93. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby…” 95. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 97. Plaintiff and class members are entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 98. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein.

lose

15. Defendants made many of the calls using the outbound phone number (732) 362- 0402, among others. 16. The call recipients, like Plaintiffs, include, but may not be limited to, former subscribers of one or more Gannett newspapers; however, their subscriptions were cancelled or expired, and they have chosen to not re-subscribe and no longer do business with Gannett. 17. To regain these lost customers, Defendant Gannett hired Defendant Marketing Plus to repeatedly call Class members’ telephones in an attempt to convince them to renew their subscriptions. 18. These calls are placed on a near daily basis, and often multiple times per day. Even worse, when a consumer answers one of the calls and expressly requests to not receive any further calls, Defendants persist—even after multiple cancellation requests. 19. Defendants made these calls, or directed them to be made, using an automatic telephone dialing system, often known as a “predicative dialer,” to calls numerous telephone numbers simultaneously and without the calls being manually dialed. 20. All the more problematic, many of the call recipients, like Plaintiffs, were registered on the National Do Not Call Registry at the time the calls were made. That is, those consumers had taken the affirmative step to be listed in a national database for the express purpose of not receiving telemarketing calls. 22. Neither Plaintiffs nor the other members of the putative Classes ever consented to have Defendants make telemarketing calls to them, and certainly not after their business relationship had ended. 23. Plaintiff subscribed to The Asbury Park Press, a Gannett newspaper, in or around early 2012. Plaintiff did not consent to receive telemarketing calls of any kind from Defendants (or Asbury Park Press) as part of his subscription. 24. In or around March 2013, after Plaintiff’s subscription had already ended, he started to receive telephone calls on his personal landline from the phone number (732) 362- 0402. 25. Plaintiff Casagrand’s landline telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry since at least 2010. Plaintiff re-registers his number on a regular basis in an attempt to stop unwanted telemarketing calls like those at issue in this case. 26. When Plaintiff Casagrand answered one of these calls, the live operator identified himself as calling regarding Asbury Park Press. However, the call was actually placed by Defendant Marketing Plus at the direction of Defendant Gannett. 28. On several occasions, the caller acknowledged Plaintiff’s request that the calls stop and informed him that he would be removed from the call list. 29. Yet, after each request to stop, Defendants continued to call. 30. For example, in the face of two requests to stop calling in the forty-five days prior to filing this Complaint, Plaintiff has continued to receive calls as often as three times per day, everyday (around 8:30 a.m., 10:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m.). 31. Plaintiff Casagrand’s experience is corroborated by numerous consumer complaints appearing online, which indicate that Defendants placed calls to consumers without permission and on a repeat basis, even in the face of repeated requests to stop. 32. Defendants were and are aware that the above-described telephone calls were being made, and that the telephone calls were being made to consumers who had not consented to receive them, or revoked any purported consent. 33. Plaintiff subscribed to The Journal News, a Gannett newspaper, in or around early 2009. Plaintiff did not consent to receive telemarketing calls of any kind from Defendants (or The Journal News) as part of his subscription. 34. In or around 2011, Plaintiff Schlossberg’s subscription to The Journal News ended and Plaintiff Schlossberg chose to not renew it. 36. Defendants have called Plaintiff Schlossberg on a regular basis for over a year, often multiple times per week. 37. Plaintiff Schlossberg has repeatedly, at least ten times, made express request to the telemarketers that he was not interested in renewing his subscription and that the calls cease. 38. After receiving numerous unwanted calls from Defendants, and after numerous requests to the telemarketers that the calls stop, Plaintiff Schlossberg placed a telephone call to Defendant Gannett, via The Journal News, to request that the calls stop. 39. The live operator stated that she could not stop the calls and gave him the telephone number for Defendant Marketing Plus and told him to leave a message requesting that the calls cease. Plaintiff Schlossberg called Defendant Marketing Plus and left a message expressly requesting that Defendants stop calling. 40. However, despite Plaintiff Schlossberg’s best efforts, the calls continued unabated. 41. To make matters worse, Plaintiff’s cellular telephone has been registered with the National Do Not Call Registry since June 15, 2007. 42. Overall, Defendants placed several dozen calls to Plaintiff Schlossberg that he neither wanted nor consented to. At the time of filing this complaint, the calls continue. 44. Numerosity: The exact size of the Classes is unknown and not available to Plaintiffs at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants have made telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definitions of the Classes. Members of the Classes can be identified through Defendants’ records. 45. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Classes in that Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. 46. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiffs have no interest antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiffs. 49. Plaintiff Schlossberg incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendants made, or directed to be made, unsolicited telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff Schlossberg and other members of the Cell Phone (No Consent) Class without their prior express consent to receive such calls. 51. Defendants also made unsolicited telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff Schlossberg and other members of the Cell Phone (Revocation) Class more than seven days after they expressly requested to no longer receive telephone calls from Defendants. As such, the calls made to Cell Phone (Revocation) Class members after they revoked any purported consent were made without Plaintiff Schlossberg and the Cell Phone (Revocation) Class members’ prior express consent to receive such calls. 52. Defendants made the telephone calls, or directed them to be made, using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce lists of telephone numbers, equipment that has the capacity to generate and store numbers randomly or sequentially, and the capacity to dial such numbers. 54. By making, or having made on its behalf, the unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff Schlossberg and the Cell Phone (No Consent) Class members’ cellular telephones without their prior express consent, and by utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system to make those calls, Defendants have violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 55. By making, or directing to be made, the unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff Schlossberg and the Cell Phone (Revocation) Class members’ cellular telephones more than seven days after the requests were made to stop such calls (thereby revoking any type of purported consent), and by utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system to make those calls, Defendants have violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 56. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff Schlossberg and the members of the Cell Phone (No Consent) Class and the Cell Phone (Revocation) Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones and under section 227(b)(3)(B) are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 57. Should the Court determine that Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff Schlossberg and the other members of the Cell Phone (No Consent) Class and the Cell Phone (Revocation) Class. 58. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 60. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “No person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation [to]…[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 61. 47 C.F.R. §64.1200 (e) provides that §64.1200 (c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers to the extent described in the Commission's Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153, ‘Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,’” which Report and Order, in turn, provides as follows: The Commission’s rules provide that companies making telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers must comply with time of day restrictions and must institute procedures for maintaining do-not-call lists. For the reasons described above, we conclude that these rules apply to calls made to wireless telephone numbers. We believe that wireless subscribers should be afforded the same protections as wireline subscribers. 64. Defendants made, or directed to be made, more than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiffs and the members of the Do Not Call (No Consent) Class within a 12-month period, without their prior express consent to receive such calls. Plaintiffs and members of the Do Not Call (No Consent) Class never provided any form of express consent, at any time, to receive telemarketing calls from Defendants. 65. Plaintiffs and members of the Do Not Call (Revocation) Class expressly requested that Defendants no longer place calls to them, after which Defendants failed to place Plaintiffs and members of the Do Not Call (Revocation) Class on Defendants’ internal do-not-call list (or failed to do so within a reasonable time period). 66. More than seven days following Plaintiffs’ and the members of the Do Not Call (Revocation) Class’s express requests to not receive calls from Defendants, Defendants placed additional calls to them without their consent and in contradiction of their requests not to be called. 67. Defendants violated § 64.1200 (d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to residential and wireless telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiffs, the Do Not Call (No Consent) Class, and the Do Not Call (Revocation) Class, without instituting procedures that comply with the regulatory minimum standards for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls from them. 68. Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiffs, the Do Not Call (No Consent) Class, and the Do Not Call (Revocation) Class received more than one telephone call within a 12-month period made by or on behalf of the Defendants in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 69. To the extent Defendants’ misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call (No Consent) Class and the Do Not Call (Revocation) Class. Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (On behalf of Plaintiffs, the Do Not Call (No Consent) Class, and the Do Not Call (Revocation) Class) Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (On behalf of Plaintiff Schlossberg, the Cell Phone (No Consent) Class, and the Cell Phone (Revocation) Class)

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(for the California and Nationwide Classes) 135. Representative Plaintiff incorporates in this cause of action every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 136. Representative Plaintiff and members of each of the classes hereby demand an accounting of all transactions between them, on the one hand, and Southern, on the other hand, within the limitations period and payment of the amount found due. 137. Representative Plaintiff and members of each of the classes also hereby demand an accounting of all transactions between Southern, on the one hand, and unlicensed third-parties to whom Southern has (a) sold and/or distributed alcohol and/or (b) provided alcohol free of charge on the other hand, within the limitations period, and payment of the amount found due. 138. To date, Southern has failed to render such an accounting and to pay such sum. 139. Such an accounting is necessary to determine, inter alia, the degree of unjust enrichment to Southern, lost profits to class members, class members’ proper tax liabilities, and the degree to which class members may now be compelled to re-calculate and re-state prior tax liabilities. 29. Representative Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the provisions of Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and the following class and subclass(es) (collectively, the “classes”): California Class: “All persons/entities, within the State of California, who had an account with Southern Glazer’s Wine & Spirits, LLC and/or Southern Wine & Spirits of America, Inc. within the applicable time period.” National Class: “All persons/entities, within the United States of America, who had an account with Southern Glazer’s Wine & Spirits, LLC and/or Southern Wine & Spirits of America, Inc. within the applicable time period.” 30. Defendants, and their officers, directors and employees are excluded from each of the Plaintiff classes. 59. Representative Plaintiff incorporates in this cause of action every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 60. Southern willfully, falsely, and knowingly misrepresented material facts relating to the manner in which it would use class members’ license/account numbers, failing to provide adequate protection and confidentiality regarding this and/or other identifying information, and disclosing/supplying confidential information to third-parties to facilitate transactions to the detriment and without the knowledge or consent of class members, as well as engaging in transactions using said accounts for Southern’s own benefits. The prohibition against such conduct is expressed and/or implied in the common contract between the parties. 61. Southern intended that Representative Plaintiff and members of both classes rely on said misrepresentations, in order to induce them to do business with Southern. 62. The conduct of Southern constitutes fraud against Representative Plaintiff and members of both classes. Southern, directly and/or through its agents and employees, made false representations to Representative Plaintiff and members of both classes that were likely to deceive Representative Plaintiff and class members. Representative Plaintiff and the members of both classes were misled by these false representations in purchasing goods and/or services from Southern and/or entering into and/or maintaining agreements therewith. 67. Representative Plaintiff incorporates in this cause of action every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 68. Southern was Representative Plaintiff’s (and members of both classes’) business partner and was, therefore, in a fiduciary relationship with Representative Plaintiff and members of both classes, pursuant to which Southern was obligated to keep certain confidential information (such as class members’ license/account numbers) private. 69. Southern had information relating to Representative Plaintiff and members of both classes that it knew or should have known was confidential (such as class members’ license/account numbers). BREACH OF CONTRACT (for the California and Nationwide Classes) BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY (for the California and Nationwide Classes) COMMON LAW FRAUD (for the California and Nationwide Classes) Post-Prohibition History of the Nation’s Liquor Industry

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65. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through one sixty-four (64) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 66. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 68. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, though the precise number of class members may be known only to the Defendant. Plaintiff estimates that each class has thousands of members. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who observed such language in their credit reports, furnished by the Defendant to the credit bureaus (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 70. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 71. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 72. The Defendant’s actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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19. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, the subscriber of the cellular telephone number ending 9701 (the “9701 Number”). The 9701 Number is, and at all times mentioned herein was, assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 20. At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a business relationship with Defendant, nor did Plaintiff ever provide that cellular telephone number to Defendant through any medium. 21. On or about September 25, 2020, at approximately 7:58 a.m., Defendant placed an automated call to Plaintiff on his cellular phone ending in “9701” from the number (520) 353-3072. 22. Upon information and belief, Defendant used a pre-recorded voice to leave a voicemail on Plaintiff’s cell phone. The voicemail was from Scott Herkert of J.D. Mellberg, and advertised Defendant’s services of providing leads to financial advisors using Defendant’s mobile sales technology platform. 23. Plaintiff was confused as to why he had received a solicitation call and voicemail from Defendant because Plaintiff had no prior business relationship or contact with Defendant. Further, Plaintiff never provided Defendant with his cellular telephone number. Frustrated and confused by this unwanted automated call and voicemail, Plaintiff did not return Defendant’s call. 24. On or about October 5, 2020, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Defendant placed a second automated call to Plaintiff on his cellular phone ending in “9701,” but this time that call was from a blocked number. Plaintiff did not answer the call, but received a voicemail identical to the September 25, 2020 voicemail, which used 41. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of Plaintiff and all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 42. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and/or (b)(2), which is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received an automated call to their cellular telephone from Defendant, its employees or its agents, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 43. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Sub-Class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) and/or (b)(2), which is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received an automated call to their cellular telephone from Defendant, its employees or its agents, with an artificial or prerecorded voice message, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 44. The Class and Sub-Class are together referred to as the “Classes.” 45. Excluded from the Classes are: (1) Defendant, any entity or division in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and their legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and the Judge’s staff; and (3) those persons who have suffered personal injuries as a result of the facts alleged herein. 46. Plaintiff reserves the right to redefine the Classes, and to add and redefine any additional subclass as appropriate based on discovery and specific theories of liability. 47. The Classes that Plaintiff seeks to represent contains numerous 62. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth above as though fully stated herein. 63. The forgoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Defendant’s repeated automated calls and prerecorded voice messages to Plaintiff’s cellular phone, without any prior express written consent. 64. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and all members of the Classes are entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA in the future. 65. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and all members of the Classes are also entitled to, and do seek, an award of $500.00 statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 66. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth above as though fully stated herein. 67. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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16. Defendant has alleged that, sometime prior to August 21, 2012, ALCANTARA incurred a financial obligation (“ALCANTARA DEBT”) to Citibank South Dakota, N.A./Home Depot. 17. Defendant has alleged that Jackson Capital, Inc. (“JACKSON”), a New Jersey for-profit corporation, purchased the ALCANTARA DEBT. 18. Defendant has alleged that the ALCANTARA DEBT is in default. 19. ALCANTARA never incurred any debts in connection with a business or commercial activities and, therefore, the ALCANTRA DEBT, if truly an obligation owed by him, could have only arisen from a financial obligation for primarily personal, family, or household purposes. 20. The ALCANTARA DEBT is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 21. ALCANTARA is, at all relevant times to this complaint, a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 22. JACKSON purchased defaulted debt and collects, and attempts to collect, debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using U.S. Mail, telephone, and/or internet. 23. In connection with its debt servicing operations, JACKSON outsources collection activities to other collection agencies such, such as SMITH. 24. JACKSON retained the services of SMITH to attempt to collect the 37. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of themselves and all consumers and their successors in interest (hereinafter the “Class”), who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from SMITH which are in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 40. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-39. 41. Defendant violated Sections 1692e(3), e(10) and 1692j of the FDCPA by using its title and status as a lawyer and law firm to make false, deceptive or confusing statements or forms to consumers. 42. Defendant violated Sections 1692d, 1692e(3), e(5), e(10), and 1692f, of the FDCPA by using the authority and credibility created by its letterhead to collect debts and/or convey the threat of litigation, without any meaningful attorney review of the consumer’s account. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et. seq.

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11. On February 6, 2015, Plaintiff JEREMY MEYERS received from Defendant at one of its retail establishments located at 501 Packerland Drive, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54303, a computer-generated cash register receipt which displayed more than the last five digits of the Plaintiff’s credit card number as well as the card’s expiration date. 12. On February 10, 2015, Plaintiff JEREMY MEYERS received from Defendant at one of its retail establishments located at 3120 South Packerland Drive, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54313, a computer-generated cash register receipt which displayed more than the last five digits of the Plaintiff’s credit card number as well as the card’s expiration date. 13. On February 17, 2015, Plaintiff JEREMY MEYERS received from Defendant at one of its retail establishments located at 5939 Old Highway 29, Pulaski, Wisconsin 54162, a computer-generated cash register receipt which displayed more than the last five digits of the Plaintiff’s credit card number as well as the card’s expiration date. 14. On information and belief, it is possible to replicate a card number using more than the last five digits of the card number and the expiration date. 15. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(a) and (b)(3). 17. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. Since its first store opened in 1985, the Oneida Tribe has opened stores in fifteen locations in northern Wisconsin.1 Many of the Oneida stores also contain casinos and slot machines for visitors to use.2 The popularity of Oneida stores has helped them to become a “profitable growing enterprise for more than twenty-five years.”3 Therefore, upon information and belief, there are over 50 alleged FACTA violations at issue. 18. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful, negligent, reckless and/or willful conduct. 20. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained experienced counsel. 21. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Class members. Individual actions are not economically feasible. 28. 29. On information and belief, Defendant knew of the requirement concerning the truncation of credit and debit card numbers and prohibition on printing of expiration dates, but continued to print more than the last five digits of the card number and expiration dates anyway. 30. On information and belief, VISA, MasterCard, American Express, the PCI Security Standards Council—a consortium founded by VISA, MasterCard, Discover, American Express and JCB—companies that sell cash registers and other devices for the processing of credit or debit card payments, and other entities informed Defendant about FACTA, including its specific requirements concerning the truncation of credit card and debit card numbers and prohibition on the printing of expiration dates, and Defendant’s need to comply with the same. 31. The truncation requirement was widely publicized among retailers. 32. In May 2007, the Federal Trade Commission issued a business alert informing businesses that they, “must delete the [credit and debit] card’s expiration date” and for example, a receipt that truncates the credit card number and deletes the expiration date could look like this: FACTA is a statute of general applicability, the statute does not interfere with tribal governance or the rights granted to the tribe in other treaties, and Indian tribes are not specifically exempt from the statute. debit cards up to three years to comply with its requirements, requiring compliance for all machines no later than December 4, 2006.

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1. BreaCh of Contract 1. For waiting time penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 203; m. For statutory penalties according to proof; -17- 16. Plaintiffs, Bernadette Pauley and Thomas Clark are actors and comedians who were hired to work on the television show Comedy.TV in approximately May and August of 2009. The show was produced by Comics Unleashed Productions, Inc. the a1ter-ego, -5- 2. Failure to Indemnify Employees for Necessary Expenditures 3. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Statements to Employees 33. This action is appropriately suited for a Class Action because: a. The potential class is a significant number. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the class includes at least 112 actors and comedians which perfonned on the show Comedy.TV. Joinder of all putative class members individually would be impractical. b. This action involves common questions of law and fact to the potential class because the action centers on contracts using a standardized language entitling Plaintiffs and putative class members to residual payments. -8- 34. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fully set forth the 17 allegations in paragraphs I through 33. 18 35. Plaintiffs and class members entered into standardized union engagement contracts 19 with Defendants where Plaintiffs would work on the show Comedy.TV and in exchange 20 Defendants would, in addition to other things, pay Plaintiffs an upfront monetary cost and 21 22 provide each Plaintiff with a residual payment for each episode that subsequently aired. 36. Plaintiffs and putative class members did all or substantially all of the things that were required of them under their contracts. 23 37. All conditions required by the contract for Defendants' performance had either 24 occurred or been excused. 2S 38. Despite repeated attempts on the part of Plaintiffs to inquire as to the status of 26 residual payments, Defendants have failed to properly pay Plaintiffs and putative class 27 members residual payments for subsequent airings as required under the contract. Moreover, 28 Defendants have acted in bad faith either misrepresenting to Plaintiffs the status of their ·9· 4. FaDure to Pay All Wages Due S. Unfair Business Practices 41. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fully set forth the 16 allegations in paragraphs 1 through 40. 17 42. Labor Code § 2802(8) requires an employer to indemnify an employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the 18 discharge of his or her duties. or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer. 19 43. During the class period. Defendants have knowingly and willfully failed to 20 indemnify Plaintiffs and class members for all business expenses andlor losses incurred in 21 direct consequence of the discharge of their duties while working under the direction of 22 Defendants. 44. As a proximate result of Defendants' unlawful actions and omissions. Plaintiffs and 23 class members have been damaged in an amount according to proof at trial. and seek 24 reimbursement of all necessary expenditures. plus interest thereon pursuant to Labor Code § 2S 2802(b). Additionally. class members are entitled to all available statutory penalties and an 26 award of costs. expenses. and reasonable attorneys' fees, including those provided in Labor 27 Code § 2802(c). as well as all other available remedies. 45. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fulJy set forth the 7 alJegations in paragraphs I through 44. 8 46. During the class period. as part of their illegal payroll policies and practices to , deprive their non-exempt employees all wages earned and due. Defendants knowingly and 10 intentionally failed to provide their non-exempt employees with accurate wage statements as required by Labor Code § 226. 11 47. As a proximate result of Defendants unlawful actions and omissions. Plaintiffs and 12 putative class members have been damaged in an amount according to proof at trial. and seek 13 all wages earned and due. plus interest thereon. Additionally. Plaintiffs and putative class 14 members are entitled to all available statutory penalties, including but not limited to civil 15 penalties pursuant to Labor Code §§ 226.3, and an award of costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys' fees, including those provided in Labor Code § 226(e}. as well as all other 16 17 18 l' 20 21 22 23 24 2S available remedies. 48. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fully set forth the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 47. 49. Pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 201. 202, and 203. upon former employee Plaintiffs' respective dates of discharge or quitting. Defendants were required to pay 26 Plaintiffs all earned wages. Pursuant to California § 202. Defendants were required to pay all 27 wages due to a quitting employee who did not provide 72-hour notice no later than 72 hours 28 -11- 53. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fully set forth the 22 allegations in paragraphs 1 through S2. 23 54. By violating the foregoing statutes and regulations, breaching Plaintiffs' and 24 putative class members' contracts, and engaging in the aforementioned conduct, Defendants' 25 acts constitute unfair and unlawful business practices under California Business and 26 Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. 27 28 -12- 57. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fully set forth the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 56. 58. Plaintiffs are informed an believe that Defendants CF Entertainment, Comics 12 Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, and Byron Allen Folks have engaged in 13 pervasive, deceptive, and fraudulent practices of affirmatively misrepresenting including but 14 not limited to the number of episodes in existence for Comedy.TV and the number of times 15 each episode has aired, downloaded, played, re-played, andlor been distributed, in addition to 16 other facts, in an effort to reduce the amount of payments, including but not limited to residual payments, owed to Plaintiffs and putative class members. 17 59. These misrepresentations were made by officers and/or directors or they were 18 authorized andlor ratified by officers andlor directors of Defendants. 19 6. Fraud aDd Intentional Deceit 60. Such misrepresentations were false and of a material nature. 20 61. Defendants made these misrepresentations with knowledge of their falsity or 21 recklessly and without regard for their truth, with the intent that Plaintiffs and putative class 22 members would rely on these misrepresentation. 62. Plaintiffs and putative class members reasonably relied on these misrepresentations 23 and their reliance was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff and putative class members 24 harm. 2S 63. As a proximate cause of Defendants misrepresentations, Plaintiffs and putative 26 class members have suffered monetary damage, consequential damage, past lost profits, 27 future damage, lost wages, unreimbursed expenses, unpaid residual payments, and hann -13- 64. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fully set forth the 7 allegations in paragraphs 1 through 63. 8 65. Plaintiffs are informed an believe that Defendants CF Entertainment, Comics 9 Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, and Byron Allen Folks intentionally failed to 10 disclose including but not limited to the number of episodes in existence for Comedy.TV and the number of times each episode has aired, downloaded, played, replayed, andlor been 11 distributed, in addition to other facts which were concealed in an effort to reduce the amount 12 of payments, including but not limited to residual payments, owed to Plaintiffs and putative 13 class members. 14 15 16 66. These facts were known only to Defendants, and Plaintiffs and putative class members could not have discovered them. 67. Plaintiffs and putative class members did not know of these concealed facts. 68. Defendants intended to deceive Plaintiffs and putative class members by 17 concealing these facts. 18 19 20 21 69. Such fraudulent concealments were made by officers andlor directors or they were authorized andlor ratified by officers andlor directors of Defendants. 7. Fraud by Concealment 70. Plaintiffs and putative class members reasonably relied on Defendants' deception and concealment and their reliance was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff and putative 22 class members harm. 23 71. As a proximate cause of Defendants misrepresentations, Plaintiffs and putative class members have suffered monetary damage, consequential damage, past lost profits, 24 future damage, lost wages, unreimbursed expenses. unpaid residual payments, and harm 25 subject to proof at trial. Plaintiffs and putative class members seek prejudgment interest, 26 punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 27 II/ 28 II/ -14- 72. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fully set forth the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 71. 6 73. Plaintiffs are informed an believe that Defendants CF Entertainment, Comics 7 Unleashed Productions. Entertainment Studios. and Byron Allen Folks have engaged in 8 9 pervasive. deceptive, and fraudulent practices of affinnatively misrepresenting including but not limited to the number of episodes in existence for Comedy.TV and the number of times each episode has aired. downloaded, played, re-played. anellor been distributed, in addition to 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 other facts, in an effort to reduce the amount of payments, including but not limited to residual payments. owed to Plaintiffs and putative class members. 74. These misrepresentations were made by officers and/or directors or they were authorized anellor ratified by officers and/or directors of Defendants. 75. Such misrepresentations were false and of a material nature. 76. Although Defendants may have known or honestly believed that such representations were true. Defendants had no reasonable grounds for believing such representations were true when they were made. 77 • Defendants made these misrepresentations with the intent that Plaintiffs and 18 putative class members would rely on these misrepresentations. 19 20 21 22 23 78. Plaintiffs and putative class members reasonably relied on these misrepresentations and their reliance was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs and putative class members hann. 79. As a proximate cause of Defendants misrepresentations, Plaintiffs and putative class members have suffered monetary damage. consequential damage. past lost profits, future damage, lost wages, unreimbursed expenses, unpaid residual payments, and bann 24 subject to proof at trial. Plaintiffs and putative class members seek prejudgment interest, 2S punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 26 III 27 III 28 III -15- 8. Negligent Misrepresentation 80. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fully set forth the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 79. 81. AFTRA owed Plaintiff's and putative class members a duty offair representation. 82. AFI'RA breached its duty to fairly represent Plaintiffs and putative class members 7 by arbitrarily andlor in bad faith ignoring a meritorious grievance or processing it in a 8 perfunctory fashion. Plaintiffs and putative class members informed AFTRA of their 9 meritorious grievance. Acting arbitrarily andlor in bad faith AFTRA failed to process the grievance in a timely manner, thereby allowing portions of the time limit mandated by the 10 applicable collective bargaining agreement to expire and ultimately prejudicing Plaintiffs and 11 putative class members. 83. As a result of AFTRA's breach, Plaintiffs and putative class members have 13 suffered harm in the form of monetary damages, compensatory damages, past lost profits, 14 future damages, unpaid wages, unreimbursed expenses, unpaid residual payments, and harm 15 subject to proof at trial. Plaintiffs and putative class members seek prejudgment interest, 16 punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 17 18 19 20 11 11 REPRESENTATrvEACTlON 84. Plaintiffs incorporate herein by specific reference as though fully set forth the allegations in paragrapbs 1 through 84 with exception to the allegations concerning class 23 action designation, paragraph 33 (A-D). 85. Pursuant to California Labor Code sections 2698-2699.5, Plaintiffs are entitled to 15 collect civil penalties from Defendants in a representative action for the California Labor 16 Code violations set forth above. Plaintiffs are aggrieved employees and seek to collect civil 27 penalties on behalf of the State of California for Defendants violations of California Labor 28 Code including, but not limited to, sections 201, 202, 203, 221,226.226.7,227.3,512,558, -16- 86. Plaintiffs have given written notice by certified mail to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency of the specific Labor Code provisions alleged to have been violated. 4 including the facts and theories to support the alleged violations. 5 87. Plaintiffs have complied with the requirements set forth in California Labor Code 6 section 2699.3. 7 8 WHEREFORE. Plaintiffs. on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. 9 respectfully pray for relief against Defendants as follows: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 a. For certification of the action as a class action on behalf of the proposed class and subclasses; b. For an order appointing Plaintiffs as class and subclass representatives. and Plaintiffs' counsel as counsel for the class and subclasses; c. For compensatory damages; d. For consequential damages, past lost profits, and future lost profits; e. For punitive damages; f. For preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendant AFrRA from failing to process grievances in a timely manner and to release all sums due to class members held by AFI'RA; g. For unpaid wages. residuals payments. and damages stemming from AFI'RA's failure to process Plaintiffs and putative class members' grievances in a timely manner. h. For back wages. reimbursement, andlor restitution of all monies due to Plaintiffs and disgorged profits from the unlawful business practices of Defendants; i. For actual and statutory damages andlor penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 226(e); j. For all penalties authorized under Labor Code § 2699; k. For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from violating the relevant provisions of the Labor Code and common law causes of action. and requiring Defendants to cease and desist from engaging in the unlawful acts and unlawful business practices complained of herein; 9. Breach of Duty of Fair Representation BERNADE1TE PAULEY, an individual, 12 THOMAS CLARK, an individual, on behalf of themselves and all others 13 similarly situated, 14 15 16 Plaintiffs, vs. 17 CF ENTERTAINMENT. a California corporation; COMICS UNLEASHED 18 PRODUCTIONS. INC .• a California 19 corporation; ENTERTAINMENT STUDIOS, INC., a California 20 corporation; BYRON ALLEN FOLKS. an individual; SCREEN ACTORS 21 GUn..D - AMERICAN FEDERATION 22 Breach of Contract (Plaintiffs and Oass Members against CF Entertainment, Comics Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, IDe., Byron Allen Folks, and Does 2 through 100) Breach of Duty of Fair Representation/FaDure to Adequately Represent (Plaintiffs and Class Members against AFI'RA, and Does 2 througb 100) By electronic service (via electronic filing service provider) - electronically transmitting 7 the documents listed above to Case Anywhere, an electronic filing service provider, at 8 www.caseanywhere.com pursuant to the Court's Order Authorizing Electronic in the matter of Bernadette Pauley v. CF Entertainment, et al., LASC Case No. BC498061 mandating electronic 9 service. The transmission(s) was reported as complete and without error to the addresses as 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 stated on the attached service list . Ivy Kagan Biennan, Esq. Email: ibiennan@Joeb.com Ramon Ramirez, Esq. Email: rramirez@loeb.com DATE: 09/24/13 DEFf. 310 FaDure to Indemnify Employees for Necessary Expenditures [Cal. Labor Code § 2802] (plaintiffs and Class Members against CF Entertainment, Comics Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, InC., Byron AUen Folks, and Does 2 througb 100) 15 FaHure to Provide Accurate Itemized Statements to Employees [Cal. Labor Code §§ 226; and 226.3) (plaintiffs and Class Members against CF Entertainment, Comics Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, Inc., Byron Allen Folks, and Does 2 through 100) 6 Fallure to Pay AU Wages Due [Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203] (plaintiffs and Class Members against CF Entertainment, Comics Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, InC., Byron AUen Folks, and Does 2 through 100) Fraud by Concealment (plaintiffs and Class Members against CF Entertainment, Comics Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, Inc., Byron Allen Folks, and Does 2 through 100) 6 Fraud and Intendonal Deceit (plaintiffs and Oass Members against CF Entertainment, Comics Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, Inc., Byron Allen Folks, and Does 2 through 100) Negligent Misrepresentation (plaintiffs and Class Members against CF Entertainment, Comics Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, Inc., Byron Allen Folks, and Does 2 through 100) Representative Action for Civil Penalties (California Labor Code §§ 2698·2699.5) (plaintiffs and Aggrieved Employees against CF Entertainment, Comics Unleashed Productions, Entertainment Studios, Inc., Byron Allen Folks, and Does 1 through 100) Unfair Business Practices [California Business and Professions Code §t 17200·17208) (plaintitTs and Class Members against all Defendants, and Does 2 through 100) 18 19 20 21

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ACTION Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) Brief description of cause: Violation of Minn. Stat. § 325E.64, Negligence

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22. Defendant NRA is a membership organization focused on firearms education, training, and advocacy. 23. The NRA has a sister organization, The NRA Foundation, which is a 501(c)(3) charitable organization, organized and existing under the laws of the District of Columbia.2 24. This is an important distinction, as the unsolicited telemarketing calls complained of herein were made on behalf of the NRA, not The NRA Foundation. 51. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (“Class Members”). 59. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 65. Defendants placed the telephone calls described in this complaint, which were telephone solicitations made for the purpose of encouraging Plaintiff and the other members of the Washington State Do Not Call Class to purchase Defendants goods and services, namely memberships in Defendant NRA, to Washington State. 66. Defendants placed unsolicited and unwanted calls to telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff Kalmbach and other members of the Washington State Do Not Call Class within 12 months after the person had indicated to Defendants that s/he no longer wished to receive calls from Defendants. 67. Defendants and/or their agents have thus continually and repeatedly violated RCW 69. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 70. Pursuant to RCW 80.36.400(3), which provides that a violation of RCW 80.36.400 constitutes a violation of the Washington State Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86, et seq., Defendants and/or their agents have continually and repeatedly violated the WCPA by using ADADs to leave recorded messages for the purpose of encouraging Plaintiff Kalmbach and the Washington State Pre-recorded Call Class to purchase memberships in Defendant NRA. 71. The unsolicited telemarketing calls were made to Washington State. 72. As a direct result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff Kalmbach and the other Washington State Pre-recorded Call Class members suffered damages, including $500 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the WADAD. The full amount of damages will be proven at trial. Plaintiff Kalmbach and the other members of the Washington State Pre-recorded Call Class are additionally entitled to treble damages, civil penalties, and costs and attorneys’ fees as provided by RCW 19.86.090. A. General Factual Allegations KATHARYN KALMBACH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff v. Washington Automatic Dialing and Announcing Device Statute (Violations of RCW 80.36.400 et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Washington State Pre-Recorded Call Class) Washington Do Not Call Statute (Violations of RCW 80.36.390 et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Washington State Do Not Call Class) Washington Consumer Protection Act (Violation of RCW 19.86 et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Washington State Pre-recorded Call Class)

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(Declaratory Relief) 112. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 111 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 113. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Venusetfleur.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Venusetfleur.com, which Venus et Fleur owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 114. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) 24 (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 100. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 99 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 101. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 102. Venusetfleur.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 103. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates Venusetfleur.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 104. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Venusetfleur.com, causing Venusetfleur.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 25 105. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 106. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 107. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Venusetfleur.com under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 108. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 109. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 110. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 26 111. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 25. Defendant, Venus et Fleur LLC, controls and operates Venusetfleur.com. in New York State and throughout the United States. 26. Venusetfleur.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse the different types of flowers, bouquets, and related products, select products for specific occasions, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Venusetfleur.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Venus et Fleur on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase the various types of bouquets, flowers, and related products for delivery; and (c) learning about shipping policies, promotions, answers to frequently asked questions, and about the company. 28. This case arises out of Venus et Fleur’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Venusetfleur.com. Due to Venus et Fleur’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Venusetfleur.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Venus et Fleur, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Venusetfleur.com. 29. Venus et Fleur denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Venusetfleur.com by preventing them from freely navigating Venusetfleur.com. 30. Venusetfleur.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of 9 keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Venusetfleur.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Venusetfleur.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Venusetfleur.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Venusetfleur.com, these forms include search fields to select box size, color of flowers, and style, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 33. On Venusetfleur.com, Plaintiff and the class of blind customers are not aware if the desired products, such as bouquets, have been added to the shopping cart because the Add to Cart button does not have an accessible name and is only announced as “blank.” When Plaintiff attempted to add a bouquet to cart, he was unable to locate the Add to Cart button and 10 could not proceed to checkout. Specifically, the Plaintiff experienced the following problems when attempting to make a purchase on the Website: Summary The website developers have added some accessibility features but, in many cases, the slapshot add-ons are creating more problems. For example, the developers put the menu items into two lists. The result is that a user will first hear that a list is present, then the number of items in the list, and then the menu item that they are currently on. A user will expect to just hear Shop All, Collections, etc. but they hear the list announcements, then the first three menu items, followed by another list and then the final three menu items. Overall, the homepage and product page issues will slow users down, but the cart process will absolutely prevent a checkout. Homepage  Free shipping pop-up is not announced. Therefore, Plaintiff was unable to take advantage of this feature.  Skip navigation is not available  Header information, such as the menu items, were announced but the cart icon was not. The cart is announced as “zero link”  A major navigation issue is that all menu items are announced twice. Product Page  Product images are announced as “blank” and this is the first thing a user hears when they arrive on a product  For product colors, Plaintiff did not hear the section label and instead heard up to 18 color buttons with no indications that he had to select one  Add to Cart button is not present and instructions are not given so a user must know to click on the “blank” product image or product name to add it to the cart. Plaintiff was not able to locate the Add to Cart button. Cart  Once an item is added to the cart (although Plaintiff was unable to do so) then there are actionable elements which are not in the normal navigation. For example, the first three product options are arrangement, box, and style but these are all announced as “edit” and no label is mentioned so you don’t know what you’re editing  The label to choose a color is not announced so users just hear a list of color buttons but no instructions  If a user does make a selection, then the selection is not announced as required so there is no feedback mechanism to inform a user that the value was successfully selected. 11  Clicking the Next button does not result in an announcement that the button was pressed or that a new page is shown. Instead users just begin to hear buttons with messages but no indication that they are now supposed to pick a message for the lid. This is clearly shown on screen but very confusing when using JAWS because of the lack of labeling. Consequently, Plaintiff was essentially prevented from completing a transaction on the Website. 34. Furthermore, Venusetfleur.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Venusetfleur.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, he was unable to access it completely. 35. Venusetfleur.com also lacks accessible forms. Quantity boxes allow customers to specify the quantity of certain items. On Venusetfleur.com, blind customers are unable to select specific quantity because the screen-reader does not indicate the function of the box. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the quantity box. Furthermore, Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping cart because the shopping cart form does not specify the purpose of the shopping cart. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping cart. Consequently, Plaintiff was unsuccessful in adding products into his shopping cart and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Venusetfleur.com. 36. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Venusetfleur.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 12 37. Venusetfleur.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Venusetfleur.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Venusetfleur.com. 38. Due to Venusetfleur.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Venusetfleur.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Venusetfleur.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Venusetfleur.com. 39. Venusetfleur.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Venusetfleur.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Venusetfleur.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 13 40. Plaintiff, Angel Rodriguez, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Venusetfleur.com, most recently on February 10, 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Venusetfleur.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase a bouquet of roses for Valentines’ Day for his wife. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Venusetfleur.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 42. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Venusetfleur.com. 43. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 45. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Venusetfleur.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an 14 injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Venusetfleur.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Venusetfleur.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 47. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Venusetfleur.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Venusetfleur.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 49. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Venusetfleur.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Venusetfleur.com. 15 50. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Venusetfleur.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Venusetfleur.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Venusetfleur.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Venusetfleur.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 51. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Venus et Fleur has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Venusetfleur.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 16 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 55. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 56. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 57. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 58. Venusetfleur.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 17 59. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Venusetfleur.com. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 62. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 63. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 18 64. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Venus et Fleur who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Venusetfleur.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Venusetfleur.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 68. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 19 71. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 71 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 73. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 74. Venusetfleur.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 75. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Venusetfleur.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Venusetfleur.com, causing Venusetfleur.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that 20 making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 78. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 79. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 8 80. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 21 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Venusetfleur.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 83. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 86. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 87. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 86 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 88. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 22 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or his civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 91. Venusetfleur.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 92. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Venusetfleur.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40- c(2). 93. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Venusetfleur.com, causing Venusetfleur.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 94. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited 23 to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 95. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 96. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 99. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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23. Williams claims that “For more than a century, [Williams] has provided valuable energy infrastructure that Americans count on every day. [Williams] has a long successful history of doing things right—[Williams] doesn’t take shortcuts and [Williams] treats people, the environment, and communities with respect.”1 To complete their business objectives, Williams hires inspector personnel (like Fairchild) to perform work. 24. Many of these individuals worked for Williams on a day-rate basis and make up the proposed Putative Class. While exact job titles and job duties may differ, these employees are subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work. 25. Williams paid the Putative Class Members a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) and failed to provide them with overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 26. For example, Fairchild worked for Williams throughout 2019. During his employment with Williams, he was paid on a day-rate basis. 27. Fairchild normally worked 10 to 12 hours a day for six days a week. 28. Fairchild was never guaranteed a salary when he worked for Williams. 30. The work Fairchild performed was an essential and integral part of Williams’ core business. 31. During Fairchild’s employment with Williams, it and/or the company Williams contracted with exercised control over all aspects of his job. 32. Williams and/or the company it contracted with controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Fairchild. 33. Even though Fairchild often worked away from Williams’ offices, Williams still controlled all aspects of Fairchild’s job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance with Williams’ and/or its client’s policies and procedures. 34. Williams directly determined Fairchild’s rates of pay, his work schedule, and prohibited him from working other jobs for other companies while he was working on jobs for Williams. 35. Very little skill, training, or initiative was required of Fairchild to perform his job duties. 36. Indeed, the daily and weekly activities of the Putative Class Members were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by Williams and/or its clients. Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Williams and/or its clients, including the tools to use at a job site, the data to compile, the schedule of work, and related work duties. The Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the pre-determined parameters. 37. Moreover, the job functions of the Putative Class Members were primarily manual labor/technical in nature, requiring no college education or other advanced degree. 39. All of the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities performed by each person. 40. The Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. 41. Williams’ policy of failing to pay its inspectors, including Fairchild, overtime violates the FLSA and PMWA because these workers are performing non-exempt job duties. 42. It is undisputed that Fairchild and the Putative Class Members are performing manual labor and working long hours out in the field. 43. Williams’ day-rate system violates the FLSA and PMWA because Fairchild and those similarly situated did not receive any overtime pay for hours worked over 40 hours each week. VI. 55. Fairchild incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Williams imposed on Fairchild were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 57. Numerous other individuals who worked with Fairchild indicated they were paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. 58. Based on his experiences and tenure with Williams, Fairchild is aware that Williams’ illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 59. The Putative Class Members were all not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 60. Williams’ failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 61. Fairchild’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 62. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not prevent class or collective treatment. 63. Fairchild has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. Like each Putative Class Member, Fairchild has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to him under state and/or federal law. 64. A collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 65. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Williams will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA, PMWA, and any other applicable state labor laws. 67. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 68. The questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class Members predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and fact are: a. Whether Williams employed the Putative Class Members within the meaning of the applicable state and federal statutes, including the FLSA and PMWA; b. Whether Williams’ day rate pay practice meets the salary-basis test; c. Whether Williams’ decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the Putative Class Members was made in good faith; d. Whether Williams’ violation of the FLSA was willful; and e. Whether Williams’ illegal pay practices were applied uniformly across the nation to all Putative Class Members. 69. Fairchild’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Fairchild and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Williams’ illegal and uniform employment policy. 70. Fairchild knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a class or collective action. 71. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective action treatment.

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39. Valley Forge’s common stock was publicly traded on the OTCBB market at all relevant times. Defendants’ material misrepresentations, omissions and manipulative contrivances had the effect of artificially inflating the price of Valley Forge’s common stock and warrants. 43. Defendants made each misrepresentation and/or omission of material fact alleged herein with reckless disregard for, or knowledge of its false and misleading nature. 49. At all relevant times, the market for Valley Forge’s common stock was an efficient market for the following reasons, among others: a. During the Class Period, Valley Forge’s common stock was actively traded on the over-the-counter market, a highly efficient national securities market. During the Class Period, Valley Forge had tens of millions of shares outstanding. In or about March 30, 2012, it had roughly 62.4 million shares outstanding. b. As a registered and regulated issuer of securities, Valley Forge filed periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission described in this complaint; 50. As a result of the above, the market for Valley Forge securities promptly digested current information with respect to Valley Forge from all publicly available sources and reflected such information in Valley Forge’s stock prices. Under these circumstances, all purchasers of Valley Forge stock during the Class Period suffered similar injury through their purchase of securities at prices, which were artificially inflated by Defendants’ manipulative activities. Thus, a presumption of reliance applies. VI. 56. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference each of the preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 57. Defendants Brothers and Wilhide are jointly and severally liable for Valley Forge’s material misrepresentations and omissions complained of herein under §20(a) of the Exchange Act in that they each functioned as a control person of Valley Forge by virtue of their respective executive and directorial positions with the company, as well as their knowledge of and involvement in the business of Valley Forge, their daily access to confidential information regarding the operations and finances of Valley Forge, and their power and ability to make public statements on behalf of Valley Forge to shareholders, potential shareholders and the SEC during the Class Period. As such, they had the power and ability to control Valley Forge’s actions. Violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated thereunder (Against All Defendants and DOES 1-100) Violations of § 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Against Defendants Brothers, Wilhide and DOES 1-100)

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29. Defendant offers the commercial website, https://www.sterling.edu/, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all prospective students to access the services offered by the Defendant. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to, the following: which allow students the ability to take courses online, to pay tuition and other costs online, apply for payment plans, and apply for admissions online, as well as information relating to course offerings, financial aid, cost of tuition, majors, and other services available online and other general information about attending the College. 31. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 32. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March, 2021, in an attempt to access the Website for the purpose of possibly taking online courses offered by the Defendant, she was denied access to the Website due to various barriers. The Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff an experience similar to that of a sighted person and full and equal access to the services offered and made available to the public and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the services of the Website by being unable to utilize the Defendant’s website and learn more information about: taking courses online, the ability to pay tuition and other costs online, apply for payment plans and admissions online, as well as information relating to course offerings, financial aid, cost of tuition, majors, online classes, and other services available online and other general information about attending the College. 34. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 36. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired prospective students such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 37. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s Website, and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to use and enjoy the Website in the same manner as sighted individuals do, preventing Plaintiff from using the Website to take courses online, apply for admissions and pay tuition and costs online. 38. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 39. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 41. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 42. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 44. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by visually-impaired persons. 46. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired prospective students. 47. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired prospective students. 48. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired prospective students will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class and Sub-Classes, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL and RA; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL, NYCHRL and RA. 54. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation as well as ADA litigation and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 55. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 56. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Defendant’s online college is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online college. 60. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 61. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 63. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 65. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 66. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 68. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 69. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 72. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 73. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 74. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 76. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 77. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 78. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 79. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 80. Plaintiff, on behalf of himrself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 81. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 82. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 83. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 85. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the RA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and the Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under the RA and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 87. Defendant’s violations of Sec. 504 of the RA were intentional or with deliberate indifference. 88. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff is entitled to damages from the Defendant. 89. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 90. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 91. Defendant’s website is an online college and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online college. 92. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 93. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind prospective students full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 95. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 96. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 97. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and Sub-Class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Sub-Class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 99. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 100. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 101. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. DECLARATORY RELIEF 102. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 103. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods and services of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 104. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504

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13. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer class (the “Class”) consisting of: a) All consumers who have an address in the state of Alabama b) who were sent a collection letter from the Defendant c) attempting to collect a consumer debt, d) that states “Unless you notify this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid.” (e) which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date 21 days after the filing of this action. 14. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 16. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §1692e and 1692g. 17. The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 18. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 21. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. Some time prior to August 15, 2016, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Radiology Consultants of N. 24. The alleged Radiology Consultants of N obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for medical purposes. 25. The alleged Radiology Consultants of N obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 26. Radiology Consultants of N is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 27. Defendant contends that the “Radiology Consultants of N” debt is past due. 28. Defendant RS Clark and Associates, Inc. is a company that uses mail, telephone or facsimile in a business the principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, or that regularly collects or attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors. 30. On or about August 15, 2016, the Defendant caused to be delivered to the Plaintiff a collection letter in an attempt to collect the alleged debt. See Exhibit A. 31. Upon information and belief, the August 15, 2016 letter was the first communication between the Defendant and Plaintiff regarding the Radiology Consultants of N debt. 32. The August 15, 2016 letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 33. The August 15, 2016 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 34. The Plaintiff received and read the Letter sometime after August 15, 2016. 35. The Letter stated in part: “Unless you notify this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid.” 36. Upon reading the notice, the Plaintiff, as would any least sophisticated consumer, believed that the only legally effective way to notify the Defendant that she is disputing the debt was to do so in writing. 37. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3) a debt collector must within five days after the initial communication, send the consumer a written notice containing a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector within 30 days after receiving the notice that the consumer disputes the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, the debt collector will assume the debt is valid. 38. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3), a consumer may dispute the debt, or any portion thereof, over the phone. 40. Congress further desired to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid.” S.Rep. No. 95–382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699. 41. By providing an inaccurate validation notice, the Defendant caused the Plaintiff real harm by depriving her of information to which she was statutorily entitled to receive, by making it more difficult for the Plaintiff to exercise her dispute rights, by making it less likely that Plaintiff would dispute her debt, and by subjecting the Plaintiff to deceptive collection practices which she had a substantive right to be free from. 42. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 43. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 44. The Defendant violated said provision by failing to accurately convey the validation notice in violation of 1692g(a)(3). 46. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 47. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 48. Pursuant to 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive or misleading representation in connection with the collection of a debt. 49. The Defendant violated said section by falsely stating that the Plaintiff could only legally dispute said debt was in writing in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 50. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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10. In 1991, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (TCPA), in response to a growing number of consumer complaints regarding certain telemarketing practices. 11. The TCPA regulates, among other things, the use of automated telephone dialing systems, or “autodialers.” The plain language of sections 227(a)(1) defines an autodialer as equipment which has the capacity - (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. Further, the plain language of section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) prohibits the use of autodialers to make any call to a wireless phone number in the absence of an emergency or the prior express consent of the called party. 12. According to findings by the Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”), the agency Congress vested with authority to issue regulations implementing the TCPA, such calls are prohibited because, as Congress found, these calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used. 34. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 35. Defendants placed, or caused to be placed, calls to Plaintiff and the Class with an automatic telephone dialing system, within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 227(a). The equipment used by Defendants had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. By using such equipment, Defendants, or their agent, were capable of making thousands of calls to the subscribers of cellular phone numbers automatically without human intervention. 36. These calls were made en masse without the prior express consent of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 49. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 50. By sending Plaintiff and the class members unsolicited phone calls, Defendants deprived Plaintiffs and Class members of the use of, and converted to their own use, the cellular telephones belonging to Plaintiff and the Class members. 51. Immediately prior to the placing of the unsolicited calls, Plaintiff and the Class members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the cellular telephone. 52. By sending the unsolicited calls, Defendants appropriated to their own use, and deprived Plaintiff and the Class members of the use of, the cellular telephones used to receive the calls, such that they could not be used for the receipt of any other data or calls. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 56. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 57. Among other duties, Defendants owed a duty not to damage Plaintiff and members of the Class. However, Defendants and/or their agents, by error and neglect, permitted, suffered, required, ratified, directed, and/or otherwise proximately caused the acts and omissions that have damaged Plaintiff and members of the Class as referenced herein. 58. If any of the Defendants and/or their agents had not been negligent in their acts or omissions, or their supervision, management, direction, instruction, training, guidance, assistance, and/or control of each other, their agents, or themselves, then the marketing practices and/or phone calls referenced herein would have comported with all applicable laws, and none of the inherently injurious calls referenced herein would have been transmitted to the telephonic devices of Plaintiff and members of the Class. 59. In this regard, by transmitting the unsolicited calls to Plaintiff and members of the Class, the Defendants violated their duty or duties to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 60. For such reasons and/or otherwise as a consequence of Defendants’ negligence proximately causing injuries to Plaintiff and members of the Class and/or their property, Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to recover from Defendants the actual or compensatory damages referenced herein and in accord with proof. 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 63. Defendants, by their acts and omissions described herein, have invaded Plaintiff and the Class members’ privacy and/or committed an unauthorized intrusion or prying into plaintiff and the Class members’ seclusion. 64. The invasions of privacy and/or intrusion committed by the Defendants have been highly offensive and/or objectionable to Plaintiff and the Class members. 65. The invasion of privacy and/or intrusion committed by the Defendants would be highly offensive and/or objectionable to any reasonable person. 66. Defendants invaded and/or intruded on the privacy and/or private matters of Plaintiff and the Class members. 67. The invasions of privacy and/or intrusion committed by Defendants have caused Plaintiff and the Class members anguish and suffering, as well as additional damages as described herein. 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 69. Defendants, by their acts and omissions described herein, have invaded the Plaintiff and the Class members’ interest in the use and enjoyment of their property. 73. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 74. Plaintiff, the class members, and the rest of the public, have a right to be free from the inconvenience and annoyance of unsolicited calls placed to their cellular telephones. 75. Defendants, by their acts and omissions as described herein, have substantially and unreasonably interfered with these rights. 76. Defendants, by their acts and omissions as described herein, have proximately caused Plaintiff and the Class members, in particular, actual damages as described herein. 77. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 78. Plaintiff and each member of the Class is a person entitled to the protection of the consumer protection and/or unfair trade laws of the state in which they reside and received an unsolicited phone call from Defendants. COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, STATUTORY PENALTIES, AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Telephone Consumer Protection Act CONVERSION General Overview of the TCPA INVASION OF PRIVACY LIABILITY PURSUANT TO THE TCPA NEGLIGENCE PRIVATE NUISANCE PUBLIC NUISANCE VIOLATION OF VARIOUS STATES UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES LAWS

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(Declaratory Relief) 115. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 114 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 116. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Helenficalora.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Helenficalora.com and by extension Helen Ficalora Stores, which Jewelry Boutique owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 117. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. 27 (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 103. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 102 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 104. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 105. Helen Ficalora Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). Helenficalora.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Helen Ficalora Stores. Helenficalora.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 106. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates Helen Ficalora Stores and Helenficalora.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 107. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Helenficalora.com, causing Helenficalora.com and the services integrated with Helen Ficalora Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This 25 inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 108. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 109. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 110. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Helenficalora.com and Helen Ficalora Stores under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the 26 Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 111. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 112. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 113. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 114. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) 27. Defendant, Jewelry Boutique, LLC., operates Helen Ficalora Stores in New York State and sells signature jewelry designs including charms, earrings, chains, rings, and bracelets, amongst other jewelry and related products. 28. Helenficalora.com is a service and benefit offered by Jewelry Boutique, LLC in New York State and throughout the United States. Helenficalora.com is owned, controlled and/or operated by Jewelry Boutique, LLC. 29. Helenficalora.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for Online sale that are available in Helen Ficalora Stores. The online Store allows the user to browse signature jewelry designs including charms, earrings, chains, rings, and bracelets, amongst other jewelry and related products, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 30. Among the features offered by Helenficalora.com are the following: (a) learning about Store information including, allowing persons who wish to visit Helen Ficalora Stores to learn their location, hours of operation, and phone numbers; (b) an online Store, allowing customers to view and purchase the various lines of signature jewelry designs including charms, earrings, chains, rings, and bracelets, amongst other jewelry and related products; and (c) learning about the company’s history, promotions, and return and exchange policies, read reviews, and read answers to frequently asked questions, amongst other matters. 31. This case arises out of Jewelry Boutique’ policy and practice of denying the blind access to Helenficalora.com, including the goods and services offered by Helen Ficalora Stores through Helenficalora.com. Due to Jewelry Boutique’ failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Helenficalora.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Helen Ficalora Stores, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Helenficalora.com. 9 32. Jewelry Boutique denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Helenficalora.com by preventing them from freely navigating Helenficalora.com. 33. Helenficalora.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 34. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Helenficalora.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Helenficalora.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate Jewelry Boutique’s web pages and/or make purchases. 35. Helenficalora.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Helenficalora.com, these forms include search fields to locate products, select color and quantity, and fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot 10 make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 36. Specifically, Plaintiff and the class of visually-impaired who use screen-readers encountered the following specific problems when visiting Helenficalora.com: Summary The Store locations page is not accessible. There is no way for Plaintiff or other a screen reader users to hear the locations. Plaintiff could not change the color of any product. The Add to Cart button does work but screen readers are unaware that it is working because the confirmation pop-up message is not announced. Sighted users can see that the item was added but screen reader users don’t hear the confirmation, instead, they hear other elements on the page so it appears that the button is not working. Specific Inaccessibility Issues  The Store menu is announced but users cannot hear or access the submenu items which are the individual store locations  The locations page is completely inaccessible. All locations are shown in a single, unlabeled image so there’s no way for screen reader users to hear the locations. Plaintiff could not find store location in New York.  The Shop menu is announced but the submenu items are not  The Color section, located directly above the quantity field on the Double Ring Stud Earring page is not announced. It’s not in the Tab order so it is skipped  Plaintiff was able to add the stud earrings to the cart without selecting a color (a default color was assigned), however, the confirmation pop-up box is not announced. This pop- up informs users that the purchase was successful and it provides links for users to checkout. None of this is announced. Instead, Plaintiff heard and other screen reader users hear other elements on the page after they press the Add to Cart button. Consequently, Plaintiff and blind visitors to the website are not able to complete a transaction or make any purchases or find the store location on the website. 37. Furthermore, Helenficalora.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must 11 contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Helenficalora.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 38. Furthermore, Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping cart because the shopping cart does not specify the purpose of the shopping cart. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping cart. Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping cart and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Helenficalora.com. 39. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Helenficalora.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 40. Helenficalora.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Helenficalora.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Helenficalora.com. 41. Due to Helenficalora.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at a Helen Ficalora Stores. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the Stores or require assistance in navigating the Stores. By contrast, if Helenficalora.com was accessible, a blind person could independently 12 investigate products and programs and make purchases and/or reservations via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Helenficalora.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Helenficalora.com. 42. Helenficalora.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Helenficalora.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Helen Ficalora Stores in New York State and throughout the United States. 43. Plaintiff, Mary Conner, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Helenficalora.com, most recently on August 2, 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Helenficalora.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually- impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to find the location of the New York store and to make an online purchase of the “Double Ring Stud Earrings with Diamond.” 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Helenficalora.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 45. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Helenficalora.com and Helen Ficalora Stores. 13 46. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Helenficalora.com and Helen Ficalora Stores, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Helenficalora.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in Helen Ficalora Stores, during the relevant statutory period.” 50. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Helenficalora.com and as a result have been denied 14 access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in Helen Ficalora Stores, during the relevant statutory period.” 51. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 52. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Helenficalora.com and Helen Ficalora Stores. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Helenficalora.com and by extension the goods and services offered through Defendant’s website to Helen Ficalora Stores. 53. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Helenficalora.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Helenficalora.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Helenficalora.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Helenficalora.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 15 54. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Jewelry Boutique has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Helenficalora.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 55. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 56. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 58. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 16 59. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 60. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 61. Helen Ficalora Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(E). Helenficalora.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Helen Ficalora Stores. Helenficalora.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 62. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Helen Ficalora Stores. 63. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 64. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful 17 discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 65. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 66. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 18 68. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Helen Ficalora Stores who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Helenficalora.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Helenficalora.com and Helen Ficalora Stores in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 71. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 72. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 19 75. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 74 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 76. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 77. The Helen Ficalora Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Helenficalora.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Helen Ficalora Stores. Helenficalora.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 78. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Helen Ficalora Stores and Helenficalora.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 79. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Helenficalora.com, causing Helenficalora.com and the services integrated with Helen Ficalora Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 8 80. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages 20 or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 81. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 82. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 83. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or 21 (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Helenficalora.com and Helen Ficalora Stores under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 86. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 87. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 89. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 90. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 89 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 22 91. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 92. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 93. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 94. Helen Ficalora Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Helenficalora.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Helen Ficalora Stores. Helenficalora.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 95. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Helen Ficalora Stores and Helenficalora.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 96. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Helenficalora.com, causing Helenficalora.com and the services integrated with the Helen Ficalora Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This 23 inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 97. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 98. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 99. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 100. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 101. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are 24 being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 102. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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25. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the above paragraphs as though fully set forth therein. 26. Defendant RCA is an “employer” and Plaintiffs and “employees” under the FLSA. 27. Defendant Lahasky is the Chief Executive Officer of RCA. He is involved in the day-to-day operation of RCA and has the authority to hire and fire employees, the authority to direct and supervise the work of employees, the authority to sign on corporate checking accounts, including payroll accounts, and the authority to make decisions regarding wage and hour classifications, employee compensation and capital expenditures. At all relevant times, Lahasky acted and had responsibility to act on behalf of and in the interests of RCA in devising, directing, implementing and supervising the wage and hour practices and policies relating to employees. As such, at all time herein mentioned, Defendant Lahasky has been and continues to be an “employer” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §203(d) of the FLSA. 28. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) states that an employee must be paid overtime, equal to one and one-half (1.5) times the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week. The FLSA provides that employers who violate the provisions of the FLSA are liable to affected employees for unpaid wages, liquidated damages, costs and attorney’s fees and other appropriate relief. 29. Defendants violated the FLSA by regularly and repeatedly failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs for the actual time they worked each week. 30. Defendants also willfully failed to pay overtime wages and other benefits to Plaintiffs. 31. In particular, Plaintiffs are either Emergency Medical Technicians or Ambulance Drivers for RCA. 32 Plaintiffs maintain regular time records for their work with RCA through a program known as “ProSchduler Plus – Richmond County Ambulance at a website known as www.net-scheduler.com. 33. As an example, Plaintiff Matos worked for a total of 71 hours and 25 minutes as evidenced by ProScheduler Plus during the period between January 19, 2014 and January 24, 2014. 34. Moreover, Plaintiff Matos commented that on January 24. 2014, she actually worked 13 hours and 22 minutes whereas she was “punched out by mistake by dispatch” showing only having worked 11 hour and one minute. 35. Regardless, even though Plaintiff Matos worked well in excess of 40 hours during this time period, she did not receive overtime compensation. 36. RCA’s failure to pay overtime was persistent. For example, for the period between February 23, 2015 and February 26, 2015, Plaintiff Matos worked for a period of 49 hours and 40 minutes (49.67) hours but was not paid overtime. For this period, RCA’s payroll records reflect that “items in red are unpaid or belong to salaried employees.” However, Plaintiff Matos is not an exempt employee and never has been a salaried exempt employee. 37. Defendants know that Plaintiff Matos is not an exempt employee and never has been a salaried exempt employee. 38. Plaintiff Matos has maintained records for at least 50 weeks and perhaps more. 39. Plaintiff Acevedo worked 45 hours and 38 minutes (45.53 hours) during the period starting December 15, 2014 and through December 18, 2014. Plaintiff Acevedo was not paid overtime. For this period, RCA’s payroll records reflect that “items in red are unpaid or belong to salaried employees.” However, Plaintiff Acevedo is not an exempt employee and never has been a salaried exempt employee. 40. Plaintiff Acevedo has maintained records for as many as 50 weeks reflecting non-payment of overtime. 41. These time records are merely illustrative of the persistent and pervasive pattern of RCA’s failure to pay its ambulance drivers and EMTs overtime wages as required by the FLSA and the New York Labor Law. 42. The time records of Plaintiffs Matos and Acevedo are not isolated instances but merely illustrative of the persistent and pervasive willful conduct of Defendants in failing to pay Plaintiffs overtime wages to which they are entitled under both federal and New York State law. 43. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer lost wages and other damages. UNPAID WAGES AND OVERTIME UNDER THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW, ARTICLE 19 AND THE NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF LABOR UNPAID WAGES AND OVERTIME UNDER THE FLSA

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(On behalf of Plaintiff individually) (On behalf of Plaintiff and Class) 1. Many employers require job applicants to complete a background check successfully prior to extending an offer of employment. 11. In August 2020, Stuffed Puffs refused to hire Mr. Minielly based solely on criminal history record information in a Sentry Link background check that showed five (5) pending criminal charges under the “National Criminal and Offense” section of the report. 12. Defendant systematically violates the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (the “FCRA”), by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of Mr. Minielly’s Criminal Conviction Report. 13. As a result, Ms. Minielly brings the instant claims, seeking injunctive relief, actual damages, exemplary and punitive damages, and costs and fees. II. 19. Mr. Minielly had been charged in 2018 with six (6) misdemeanor criminal offenses on one occasion related to a dispute with his ex-partner, his only lifetime contact with the criminal justice system. 2. Companies that provide background check services collect information concerning members of the public, such as criminal histories, into reports and offer the reports for sale. Including for sale to employers when the employers are conducting background checks on prospective and current employees. 20. On April 26, 2019, Mr. Minielly pled guilty to one (1) of these misdemeanor charges while the other five charges were dismissed in April 2019 in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas. Mr. Minielly’s Application for Employment with Stuffed Puffs 21. In or around June 26, 2020, Mr. Minielly applied for an open position with Stuffed Puffs as a Controller. Mr. Minielly applied for the position by completing a Stuffed Puffs employment application online. 22. Mr. Minielly was qualified for the position. 23. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Minielly interviewed, telephonically and through video conferencing, and visited Stuffed Puffs’ offices to meet with the company founder regarding employment. 24. After the aforesaid series of interviews, Stuffed Puffs made an offer of employment to Mr. Minielly contingent upon drug screen and background check results. 26. On or about August 7, 2020, using its usual practices and procedures, Defendant compiled and furnished criminal records data to Sentry Link for use in a consumer background report to Stuffed Puffs regarding Mr. Minielly. 27. On or about August 14, 2020, Mr. Minielly received a letter stating that the background check report received from Defendant may affect his application for employment with Stuffed Puffs. Attached to the letter was from Stuffed Puffs was a National Criminal and Offense Report from Sentry Link which was compiled for Sentry Link by Defendant. 28. Mr. Minielly was also told verbally by the Talent Acquisition department at Stuffed Puffs that it could not hire him given the pending status of the aforesaid five (5) criminal charges. 29. Thereafter, Plaintiff informed Stuffed Puffs of the inaccuracy of the report’s criminal information showing five (5) pending open and/or pending criminal charges rather than those charges being accurately reported as dismissed. 3. Defendant provides such services. Defendant offers background reports for sale to employers including background reports containing criminal histories. 30. Plaintiff disputed the report’s accuracy with Sentry Link accordingly. 31. Thereafter, Stuffed Puffs informed Mr. Minielly that it was denying his application for employment through a “Notice of Adverse Action” letter. 32. In September 2020, Sentry Link informed Mr. Minielly that his dispute with Sentry Link resulted in the latter removing of the aforesaid five (5) criminal charges altogether thereby finally correcting the pending/open status of those charges. 34. The Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (“AOPC”) provides electronic information about Pennsylvania criminal cases to the public. 35. Information about an individual’s criminal cases in Pennsylvania can be obtained by any member of the public by searching the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania’s web portal. See https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/docketsheets.aspx. 36. Information can also be obtained through bulk distribution of electronic case records. 37. AOPC sells this information on a recurring basis. 38. Upon information and belief, Defendant obtains electronic case record data generated by AOPC through a reseller. 39. One of the data elements that is provided by AOPC for each electronic case record, where available, is the status of the offense charged. 40. Upon information and belief, Defendant obtained plaintiff’s criminal database record data from a reseller company called Backgroundchecks.com which records it included in the report used by Stuffed Puffs as described herein. 42. Had Defendant followed reasonable procedures and adhered to the foregoing settlement agreement, it would have never falsely reported the five dismissed charges as pending and/or open charges on Plaintiff’s consumer background report. 43. Defendant has deliberately, willfully, recklessly and negligently adopted a policy and practice that disregards its duty to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information about the individuals to whom the reports relate, in violation of the 5. Unfortunately, for prospective employees whose prospective employers engage background reporting services based on data compiled by resellers like Defendant, the reports (a “Criminal Conviction Report”) are often misleading and inaccurate. 51. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following §1681e(b) Outdated Records Class: All natural persons residing within the United States and its Territories who, beginning five (5) years prior to the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the conclusion of this action, were the subject of a consumer report prepared by Defendant which included any criminal record reported as pending for which the status or disposition of the public record had changed to “dismissed”, or otherwise was not updated, more than 30 days prior to the date of the report, and for which Defendant did not include the most recent status or disposition. 52. All natural persons residing within the United States and its Territories who, beginning five (5) years prior to the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the conclusion of this action, were the subject of a consumer report prepared by Defendant which included one or more items of criminal record information which had been expunged, sealed, or otherwise removed from the public record prior to the creation of the report. 53. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Classes based on discovery or legal developments. 55. Common Questions of Law and Fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Classes and predominate over the questions affecting only individual members. The common legal and factual questions include, among others: Whether Defendant violated § 1681e(b) of the FCRA by failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the consumer reports it sold. See Soutter v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 307 F.R.D. 183, 201-06 (E.D. Va. 2015) (§ 1681e(b) class claim involving objective comparison of consumer reports to available public records presented common questions with respect to accuracy and reasonable procedures) 56. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of each Class member, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. 57. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Classes because his interests are aligned with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Classes he seeks to represent, he has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and he intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of members of the Classes. 59. Plaintiff reiterates each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth at herein. 6. Defendant’s misleading and inaccurate Criminal Conviction Reports result in adverse employment decisions against qualified employees. 60. In the “Congressional findings and statement of purpose” of the FCRA, Congress stated that “[c]onsumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers” and “[t]here is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3), (4). 62. The FCRA applies to Defendant because it is a “person” and a “consumer reporting agency” under the statute and its National Criminal and Offense Reports are “consumer reports” under the statute. Id. § 1681a(b), (d)(1), (f). 63. Indeed, Defendant has admitted the FCRA applies to the National Criminal and Offense Reports it issues as it did for Plaintiff’s prospective employer herein because it accompanies each such report with, inter alia, a copy of Plaintiff’s rights under the FCRA. 64. Under the FCRA, a “consumer reporting agency” is a “person which, for monetary fees . . . regularly engages . . . in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating . . . information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 65. Defendant is a “consumer reporting agency” under the FCRA because, for monetary fees, it assembles or evaluates information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing National Criminal and Offense Reports to third parties (i.e., the consumers’ current or prospective employers), and because Defendant uses means or facilities of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing the National Criminal and Offense Reports. Id. 67. Mr. Minielly’s National Criminal and Offense Report was not procured using these special procedures. 68. Mr. Minielly’s report was not procured in connection with any investigation of suspected misconduct relating to employment or to compliance with federal, State, or local laws and regulations, the rules of a self-regulatory organization, or any preexisting written policies of the employer. § 1681e(b) of the FCRA provides: Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 69. Under FCRA § 1681e(b), Defendant has a duty to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information” in the National Criminal and Offense Reports. Id. § 1681e(b). 7. Defendant provided a misleading and inaccurate Criminal Conviction Report to Plaintiff’s prospective employer, Stuffed Puffs, LLC in that it produced information used in a Sentry Link background check report which reported five (5) pending criminal charges under the “National Criminal and Offense” section of the report. Those charges, were in fact, dropped and dismissed. 70. Consumer reports are inaccurate for purposes of § 1681e(b) not only when they are facially false, but also when they are technically accurate yet nonetheless misleading. 71. As set forth above, when preparing the National Criminal and Offense Report, which are consumer reports, Defendant has lacked, and continues to lack, reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the information about whom the reports relate. Defendant fails to follow such reasonable procedures because it knowingly, recklessly, or negligently reports summary convictions under the “Felony and Misdemeanor” § of the National Criminal and Offense Report. 73. Defendant’s violations of § 1681e(b) were willful in that (i) it knew, or reasonably should have known, that it was failing to comply with the FCRA and/or (ii) it was acting in reckless disregard of its responsibilities under the FCRA. 74. In the alternative, Defendant’s violations of § 1681e(b) were negligent in that it had an affirmative statutory duty to employ reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy of the information in the consumer reports in question, but failed to comply with that statutory duty. 75. If Defendant willfully violated § 1681e(b), Plaintiff is entitled to any actual damages he sustained or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000; such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow; and the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court, as specified in § 1681n(a)(1)(A), (2), and (3). 76. In the alternative, if Defendant negligently violated § 1681e(b), Plaintiff is entitled to any actual damages he sustained, along with the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court, as specified in § 1681o(a)(1), (2). 77. Plaintiff reiterates each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth at herein. 78. Pursuant to § 1681n and § 1681o of the FCRA, Defendant is liable for violating FCRA § 1681k(a) by engaging in the following conduct by failing to maintain strict procedures to insure that the public record information it sells to employers is complete and up to date. 8. Thus, the Defendant presented Mr. Minielly’s criminal history information in its National Criminal and Offense Report to Sentry Link in a manner that misleads and is inaccurate, which consequently injured Mr. Minielly. 9. As described in detail below, Defendant has injured Mr. Minielly by providing his prospective employer through Sentry Link with misleading and inaccurate Criminal Conviction Report. The inaccurate Criminal Conviction Report resulted in, among other things, Mr. Minielly’s offer of employment being rescinded by prospective employer, Stuffed Puffs, LLC.

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2.1 Longshore workers include workers who are classified for II. A. Longshore Seniority, Work, and Work Assignments MARLENA ROSS, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers (559) 291-8452 and (947) 756-3421 confirmed to be Defendant’s number. 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 8. Beginning on or about May 18, 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -5154 and -7210, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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6.12 Plaintiff and the Class Members were at all times “non-exempt” employees and eligible to receive overtime pay pursuant to Section 207 of the FLSA. 6.14 Plaintiff and the Class Members worked/work over forty hours per work week and Defendant fails/failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members any overtime compensation. 6.13 Defendant improperly classified Plaintiff and the Class Members as exempt from receiving overtime compensation. 6.1 Defendant JSE is an engineering company that offers a range of engineering services. 6.10 As plumbing, HVAC, and electrical designers, Plaintiff and Class Members regularly work/worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek. Neither he nor any of the other Class Members had authority to (nor did they): manage an enterprise, hire or fire other employees, set the pay rates of other employees, create policies or procedures to govern Defendant’s employees, handle employee grievances, determine the type of equipment or materials that Defendant could use in its operations, enter into contracts on behalf of Defendant or otherwise have operational control over Defendant’s business operations and practices. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Class Members did not perform office or non- manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of Defendant or its customers, nor did they exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance in the conduct of Defendant’s business. 6.15 During his employment, there were approximately eight (8) plumbing designers, twelve (12) electrical designers and five (5) HVAC designers at any given time who were/are subject to the same pay policy/plan described herein, work/worked overtime hours, and were/are not compensated in accordance with the FLSA by Defendant. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff was aware of multiple other individuals who worked as plumbing, HVAC and/or electrical designers and were not compensated in accordance with the FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty-hours per work week. 6.2 Plaintiff worked as a plumbing designer for Defendant JSE. Plaintiff was told by Defendant that his position as a plumbing designer is exempt from overtime compensation however he is expected to work over forty (40) hours per week if Defendant’s business demands require a quick turn-around or short deadline. The electrical and HVAC designers that Plaintiff worked with also worked over forty (40) hours per week and did not receive overtime compensation in accordance with the FLSA. 6.4 Defendant dictated what hours Plaintiff works, provided the tools for him to do his job, told him what work he is required to complete and the specifications on how the work was to be completed. On multiple weeks during his employment over the last three (3) years Plaintiff worked from 20-35 hours over 40 hours per work week. 6.5 Defendant controlled all the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. Defendant determined Plaintiff’s pay rate, the schedule he worked, and the policies and procedures Plaintiff and the other Class Members are/were required to follow. 6.6 Defendant also required Plaintiff and the Class Members to fill out a timesheet recording the hours they work on a daily basis. Defendant required that timesheets be submitted to the team leader, division leader, and/or office manager on scheduled due dates and if Plaintiff and the Class Members were going to be absent on a timesheet due date, they were required to submit their timesheet early. 6.7 As a plumbing designer, Plaintiff’s primary duties included, performing calculations and sizing pipe. Electrical designers’ primary duties included sizing wires and circuits. HVAC designers’ primary duties included sizing duct work and equipment. Plaintiff and the Class Members worked in Defendant’s office as well as occasionally performed site visits for projects he was assigned by Defendant. 6.9 Plaintiff and Class Members do/did not have authority to hire or fire any of Defendant’s employees and do not have authority to set pay. 7. 7.2 Defendant classified/classifies and paid/pays all of its plumbing, HVAC and/or electrical designers in the manner described above. Defendant maintained a common pay practice or policy and the Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiff. 7.3 Defendant’s plumbing, HVAC and/or electrical designers all performed the same/similar essential job functions and duties of performing calculations and/or sizing pipe (plumbing), duct work and equipment (HVAC) or wires and circuits (electrical), notwithstanding the fact that one employee might have more tenure or experience than another employee in the same or similar position. Therefore, the Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiff. 7.4 The damages for each individual can easily be calculated using the same methodology and formula although the exact amount of the damages may vary. 7.5 Defendant possesses the names and addresses of Class Members in its records. The Class Members should be allowed to receive notice about this lawsuit and given an opportunity to join. Like Plaintiff, these similarly situated workers are entitled to recover their unpaid wages, overtime wages, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and other damages. Therefore, notice is appropriately sent to the following class: All plumbing, HVAC or electrical designers that worked for Defendant at any time from [three years before date of mailing of Notice and Consent] up to [the date of mailing of Notice and Consent]. 8.

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