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25. Plaintiff, Monica Aniszewski, is a resident of the State of Illinois. MAWKS CORPORATE FACTS 26. Defendant MAWKS EDEWEISS, LTD., d/b/a Edeweiss Restaurant (Hereinafter referred to as “Mawks”), is a corporation or business which does business in Illinois. 27. Mawks operates a large restaurant in Norridge Illinois. 28. Defendant employs a staff of some full-time employees and a larger number of part time employees. 29. Matthew Kosch and Walter Kosch are owners and/or operators of Mawks. 30. Plaintiff brings state wage law claims, pursuant to the Illinois Minimum Wage Law 820 ILCS 105/1 and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq., as individual and class action. The Class is defined as all current, former and future employees of Mawks paid an hourly wage less than minimum wage and/or not paid overtime or not paid the proper rate of overtime pay for all hours over forty per week via off-the-clock work time or had improper deductions/reductions taken from their wages and/or members of the tip pool, for which Defendants did not follow the tip pool regulations. 31. Plaintiff’s IMWL Class includes claims for all owed wages due for three (3) years prior to the filling of this complaint and until an judgment is entered in this case (the “Class” and “Class Period,” respectively) (hereinafter, “Plaintiff” or “Plaintiffs” refers to both Named Plaintiffs and the Class). 32. Plaintiff’s IWPCA Class includes claims for all owed wages due for five (5) years and/or ten (10) years prior to the filling of this complaint and until an judgment is entered in this case (the “Class” and “Class Period,” respectively) (hereinafter, “Plaintiff” or “Plaintiffs” refers to both Named Plaintiffs and the Class). 33. Excluded from the Class are Mawks legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has, or who at any time during the Class period has had, a controlling interest in Mawks; the Judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s immediate family; and all persons who will submit timely and otherwise proper request for exclusion from the Class. 7 34. Numerosity: The persons in the Class identified above are geographically diverse and so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are hundreds of members of the Class based upon the fact that during the Class Period. The numerosity is also demonstrated by the MAWKS having a work force of 7-12 waitstaff employees at any one time and due to the high “turnover” of these positions the number of potential class members is increased substantially. It is estimated that there are at least 100 persons in the IMWL Class and 300 for the IWPCA Class. 35. Commonality: There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The questions of law and fact common to this Class that predominate over any question solely affecting individual members of the Class, including but are not limited to: a. whether the Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class within the meaning of the IMWL and IWPCA. b. what proof of hours worked is sufficient where employers fail in their duty to maintain time records c. whether the Plaintiff and the Class were paid overtime wages pursuant to the overtime provisions of the IMWL and IWPCA d. whether Defendant’s engaged in a continuing policy, pattern or practice of failing to pay all overtime wages at the proper rate of pay which includes all compensation; 8 e. whether Defendant took unconsented deductions from the wages/hours/tips of the Class. 36. Typicality: The claims of Representative Plaintiff are typical of the Class. 37. Adequacy: Representative Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. 38. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for their fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation, where individual Plaintiff lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute separate lawsuits in Court against a corporate Defendant like Mawks. 39. The Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 40. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of this litigation where no individual employee can justify the commitment of the large financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in Federal Court against the corporate Defendant. 41. The Defendant has acted or has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 9 42. IMWL and IWPCA violation claims are brought and maintained as a class for all IMWL/ IWPCA claims asserted by the Plaintiff. 43. The Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 44. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of this litigation where no individual employee can justify the commitment of the large financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in against the corporate Defendant. 45. The Defendant has acted or has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 46. IWPCA violation claims are brought and maintained as a class action pursuant to Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 735 ILCS 5/2-801-806, for all IWPCA and other Illinois wage laws asserted by the Plaintiff. B. The FLSA Collective Action 47. Plaintiff brings claims for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 216(b)), on behalf of all employees of MAWKS who were, are, or will be employed by MAWKS during the period of three (3) years prior to the date of commencement of this action through the date of judgment in this action, who were: a. Had deductions taken from overtime wages. 10 b. Worked off the clock via the punch-out and keep working policy and procedure which reduced or failed to pay for all overtime wages. c. Who were not compensated at one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay for all work performed in excess of forty (40) hours per work week and/or who were not compensated at the federal minimum wage rate of $7.25 per hour, via the above named policy and procedures. 48. FLSA violation claims are brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to § 16(b) of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for all FLSA claims asserted by the Plaintiff, since the FLSA claims of the Plaintiff are similar to the FLSA claims of all server employees employed by Mawks. 49. Defendant is liable for improperly compensating Plaintiff and FLSA Collective under the FLSA, and as such notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of MAWKS who have been denied proper payment of the overtime wages. These current, former and future employees would benefit from the issuance of a court supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. The similarly situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s records. 50. Plaintiff was employed by MAWKS as an employee of the Defendant and Plaintiff who work beyond forty hours, but for which Defendants failed to pay overtime at the proper and correct rate of pay. A. MAWKS policies and procedures and Compensation Practices fail to pay proper overtime rate of pay and/or Minimum Wage and/or take tips which are wages of Plaintiff and Class/Collective 11 A. Class Allegations under IMWL and IWPCA 6 Defendants. ) CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPLAINT NOW COMES the Plaintiff, Monica Aniszewski, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as class representatives, by and through her undersigned counsel of record, upon personal knowledge as to those allegations in which she so possesses and upon information and belief as to all other matters, pursuant to §216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter “FLSA”), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq (hereinafter “IMWL” ) Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2002)) (hereinafter “IWPCA” ) and brings this cause of action against Defendant MAWKS EDEWEISS, LTD., d/b/a Edeweiss Restaurant (Hereinafter referred to as “Mawks”), and against 2 Defendant Matthew Kosch and Walter Kosch as individuals under FLSA and Illinois Wage Laws and in so doing states the following: Individual and Class Action Against Defendant Under Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act “IWPCA” 115. Plaintiff realleges and incorporate by reference all the preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 116. Plaintiff was employed by Mawks. 117. It is and was at all relevant times, a policy of MAWKS to take, without Agreement wages, tips and/or work time. 118. The Defendants unlawful conduct was and is not inadvertent, de minimis, isolated or sporadic, but widespread, repeated and part of a pattern and practice of conduct affecting all Defendants’ employees. 119. Further that Defendant’s forced Plaintiff and Class to work “off-the-clock”. 120. Plaintiff brings her claims for relief pursuant to the IWPCA as a class action for all employees who were, are, or will be employed by Defendants during the period of date five years (for oral contracts) and/or ten years (for written contracts) prior to the filing of this complaint of this action through the date of 20 judgment in this action, failed to pay all Agreed Wages via a policy of MAWKS to take, without Agreement wages, tips and work time from the class. 121. IWPCA violation claims are brought and maintained as a class action pursuant to Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 735 ILCS 5/2-801-806, for all IWPCA claims asserted by the Plaintiff. 122. This cause of action arises out of employment contracts or agreements; written and/or oral. 123. The named Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant. 124. The Defendants unlawful conduct was and is not inadvertent, de minimis, isolated or sporadic, but widespread, repeated and part of a pattern and practice of conduct affecting all Defendants’ employees. 125. Upon information and belief, all class employees of the Defendant had the same policies imposed upon its employees. 126. Plaintiffs are or were under the control and direction of the owner of the Defendant and/or his agents during the period of the Plaintiff employment under their contracts of service and in fact. 127. Plaintiffs were not an independent contractors, rather were employees of the Defendant by oral agreement and/or written contract. 128. Plaintiffs employment were in the usual course of business for which such service is performed. 129. Plaintiffs do not possess a proprietary interest in the Defendant. 130. The Defendant is an “employer” under the terms of the IWPCA section 2. 21 131. In accordance with IWPCA, an employer is also defined as: “any officer of a corporation or agents of an employer who knowingly permit such employer to violate the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation”. 132. Individual Defendant Matthew Kosch and Walter Kosch are named as an employers, as they knowingly permitted violations of the IWPCA. Individual and Class Action Against Defendant Under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law “IMWL” 107. Plaintiff realleges and incorporate by reference all the preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 108. Plaintiffs are or were employee of the Defendant pursuant to the IMWL. 109. Plaintiffs are or were employed by MAWKS as an employee. 110. It is and was at all relevant times, a policy of MAWKS to pay its employees at an overtime rate of pay and/or minimum wage pursuit to the Defendants’ improper deduction policy and procedures and/or off-the-clock work, and/or Tip rate violations. 111. It is a policy, procedure and job requirement of Defendant MAWKS its employees to pay its employees at an overtime rate of pay which does not include the added compensation earned as commissions or earned bonuses 19 112. The Defendants unlawful conduct was and is not inadvertent, de minimis, isolated or sporadic, but widespread, repeated and part of a pattern and practice of conduct affecting most if not all of the Defendant’s employees. 113. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 114. Illinois law contains a three-year statute of limitations regardless of whether the violation was willful. 820 ILCS 105/12(a). On Behalf of Plaintiff and All Opt-In Employees Against Defendant Mawks As a Collective Action (FLSA Claims, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.) 133. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all the preceding paragraphs, as if fully set forth herein. 134. The Collective claims include all plead claims found in this complaint which fall within the coverage of FLSA. 135. The Collective claims include all employees which Defendant has failed to pay at an overtime rate of pay which does not include the off the clock time and/or reduces the rate of pay by deductions. 136. At all relevant times, Defendant MAWKS has been, and continues to be, an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. At all relevant times, Defendants has employed, and continues to employ, “employee[s],” including the Plaintiffs, and each of the members of the FLSA Opt-Ins, that have been, and continue to be, engaged in interstate “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. At all relevant times, Defendants has had gross 22 operating revenues in excess of Five Hundred Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($500,000.00). 137. At all relevant times, Defendants has engaged, and continue to engage, in a willful policy, pattern, or practice of requiring their employees, including the Plaintiffs and members of the prospective FLSA Class, to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week without compensating such employees to pay its employees at an overtime rate of pay which does not include the added compensation earned as commissions or earned bonuses. 138. At all relevant times, the work performed by retail employees including the Plaintiffs and prospective FLSA Opt-Ins, employed at Defendant were, and continue to be, required or permitted by Defendants, for the benefit of Defendants, directly related to such employees’ principal employment with Defendants, and as an integral and indispensable part of such employees’ employment of Defendants. 139. As a result of the Defendant willful failure to record or compensate its employees – including Plaintiff and members of the prospective FLSA Class – employed by Defendant for all hours worked, Defendant has violated, and continues to violate, the maximum hours provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), and § 215(a). 140. As a result of the Defendant’s willful failure to record, report, credit, and/or compensate its employees employed by Defendant, including the Plaintiffs and members of the prospective FLSA Class, Defendant has failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of their employees sufficient to determine 23 the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, including 29 U.S.C. §§211(c) and §§ 215(a). 141. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 142. Plaintiffs, on behalf of herself and all FLSA Opt-Ins, seek damages in the amount of their respective unpaid compensation, plus liquidated damages, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 143. Plaintiffs, on behalf of herself and all FLSA Opt-Ins, seek recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs of action to be paid by Defendant, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 144. Plaintiff has consented to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 145. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all FLSA Opt-Ins were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the FLSA. 146. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiffs and all FLSA Opt-Ins were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce and/or Defendant were an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 147. Due to Defendant’s FLSA violations, Plaintiff and all FLSA Opt-Ins are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid compensation, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, additional liquidated damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs of the action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)§ 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206, 9 FCA title 29, § 206, provides that every employer shall pay to each of his employees 24 who is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce or in the production of goods for such commerce, wages at specified hourly rates. 148. Individual Defendant Matthew Kosch and Walter Kosch are named as an employers, as they knowingly permitted violations of the FLSA

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number (510) 573-7243, confirmed to be Defendant’s number. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 13. During all relevant times, Defendant did not possess Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on its telephones pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 15. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the proposed class (“The Class”). The class is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 16. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any solicitation telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 17. Defendant, their employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the members of The Class number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 18. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of The Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that The Class includes thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that The Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 8. Beginning in or around November of 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s telephone number ending in -7210 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and The Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and The Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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14. Defendant Safelife sells medical alert devices. 15. Defendant Safelife hired Defendant John Doe to make robocalls promoting Safelife’s products. 16. To increase their sales and avoid paying for legitimate forms of advertising, John Doe called and sent artificial and prerecorded voice messages to thousands of residential and cellular telephones at a time. 17. When the Class members answered their cell phones expecting to hear from a real person, Defendants pulled a bait and switch by playing an artificial or prerecorded voice message. 18. Unfortunately, Defendants failed to obtain consent from Plaintiff and the Class before bombarding their cell phones with these illegal voice recordings. 28. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) on behalf of Plaintiff and a class defined as follows: TCPA Class. All persons in the United States who: (1) from the last 4 years to present (2) received at least one telephone call; (3) on his or her cellular or residential telephone; (4) that was played an artificial or prerecorded voice message; (5) for the purpose of promoting Defendants’ products 36. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 37. Defendants and/or their agent placed telephone calls to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written consent to do so. 38. Defendants’ calls were made for a commercial purpose. 39. Defendants played artificial or prerecorded voice message to the cellular and residential phones of Plaintiff and the Class members as proscribed by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B). 40. As a result of its unlawful conduct, Defendants repeatedly invaded Plaintiff’s and the Class’s personal privacy, causing them to suffer damages and, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), entitling them to recover $500 in civil fines for each violation and an injunction requiring Defendants to stop their illegal calling campaign. 41. Defendants and/or its agent made the violating calls “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 42. If the court finds that Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated this subsection, the court may increase the civil fine from $500 to $1500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 11. On information and belief, on or about August 19, 2015, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 12. On information and belief, Defendant receives some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendant profits and benefits from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 14. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt-out language to Plaintiff and more than 25 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission. 15. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 16. Defendants’ facsimiles attached as Exhibit A did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 17. In accordance with F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) from whom Defendants did not have prior express invitation or permission, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which include but are not limited to the fax advertisements sent to Plaintiff. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 2. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 20. Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar faxes or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 21. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 22. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 25. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 26. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 29. The Fax. Defendants sent the on or about August 19, 2015, advertisement via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendants had an established business relationship with Plaintiff and other members of the class, because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class which includes this fax and all others sent during the four years prior to the filing of this case through the present. 3. a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; 31. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 32. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 33. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ products, goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice or were sent without prior express invitation or permission was unlawful.

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11. Part 2.5 of the purchase agreement, termed “Assumed Liabilities,” stated that Defendant assumed “all Suzuki Product Liability[.]” Part 16 of the purchase agreement defined “Product Liability” to include “any Liability of Seller [American Suzuki Motor Corporation], regardless of whether arising before or after the Petition Date, (i) under the Express Warranty Claims on any Suzuki products; (ii) for recalls and other obligations under the NTMVSA with respect to Suzuki Products; or (iii) under any Lemon Laws with respect to Suzuki Products.” 12. From at least 2004-2008, the American Suzuki Motor Corporation manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or sold the Suzuki Forenza and Suzuki Reno motor vehicle throughout the United States, including in Oklahoma. 13. Upon information and belief, all Suzuki Forenzas for the years 2004-2008 and all Suzuki Renos for the years 2005-2008 contained a three-year / 36,000 mile express warranty covering all parts and workmanship except for normal wear and tear. 14. “Unfair trade practice” means any practice which offends established public policy or if the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers[.] 16. The dates outlined in paragraphs 14-15 above make clear that the American Suzuki Motor Corporation was aware of electrical defects related to lighting causing fires in 2004-2008 model Suzuki Forenzas as early as April 5, 2007 or shortly thereafter and was aware of similar defects in 2005-2008 model Suzuki Forenzas as early as December 1, 2009 or shortly thereafter. 17. At the very least, the dates outlined in paragraphs 14-15 above also make clear that the American Suzuki Motor Corporation deliberately continued to distribute, market, and sell affected vehicles with a known defect after April 5, 2007 or possibly earlier. 18. In spite of knowledge of the electrical lighting defect causing fires, which knowledge Defendant Suzuki Motor of America, Inc., had or should have had no later than the first half of 2007, Defendant did not issue a vehicle recall notice to correct the defect until many years later on July 22, 2014. 20. The Recall Notice further stated: “Affected vehicles may generate heat in the Headlamp Switch or DRL Module, located on or near the left side of the steering column, which could melt the switch or module. If the heat generated within the Headlamp Switch or DRL Module melts the component, there is an increased risk of fire. You do not need to stop driving your vehicle, however if local driving rules or driving conditions require the use of your headlamps or DRL lighting, Suzuki can not recommend you operate the vehicle if the lighting is not operating as designed. If you smell unusual odors associated with possible overheated plastic or wire insulation while driving, please safely drive the vehicle off the roadway and exit the vehicle immediately. In addition, avoid parking the vehicle near permanent structures or in a garage until repairs can be performed.” (Emphasis added.) 21. The Recall Notice further stated that Defendant would repair the defect but added that “Recall service parts are not yet available to correct this condition. Providing repair parts is a top priority, however, their availability is not known at this time. Vehicle owners will be notified by mail when repair parts are available and scheduling appointments can then begin.” (Emphasis in original.) 23. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered an ascertainable loss of money, property, and/or value of their vehicles subject to the Recall Notice, including diminution of value to such vehicles, 24. Plaintiff is the owner of a 2007 Suzuki Forenza, VIN KL5JD56Z77K552255 (“Plaintiff’s Forenza”) which was purchased new by Plaintiff in 2007 from Richardson Suzuki in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. 25. Plaintiff received a copy of the vehicle Recall Notice referenced in Paragraph 17 above in late July 2014. 26. Around the same time, the headlamps in the Plaintiff’s Forenza began not turning off intermittently when Plaintiff would attempt to switch them off. On these occasions, the lights would take approximately 20 - 40 minutes to turn off. 27. On or about the morning of August 18, 2014, Plaintiff left for work driving his Forenza. 28. Approximately five minutes later, gray smoke started to billow out from behind the dashboard and instrument panel and down by the pedals, primarily on the driver’s side of Plainitff’s Forenza. 30. The fire department arrived and put out the fire in Plaintiff’s Forenza. The fire department confirmed that the fire was an electrical fire. 31. Plaintiff’s Forenza was towed to Big Red Sports and Imports in Norman, Oklahoma. Plaintiff was repeatedly advised by Big Red Sports and Imports as well as by representatives of Defendant that Plaintiff would have to submit an insurance claim to pay for repair of Plaintiff’s Forenza. Defendant did not repair Plaintiff’s Forenza or offer to cover the costs of the repair. 32. In an effort to repair Plaintiff’s Forenza, Plaintiff has dealt with his insurance company, Liberty Mutual Insurance. An October 7, 2014 e-mail from Liberty Mutual Insurance to Plaintiff stated: “Our appraiser indicated the fire under the instrument panel caused damage to the main harness, fuse box, carpet, trim items. . . . There are about 4 electrical modules that are burnt and Bruce advised that one of them is the one that was recalled for possible fire damage. We believe the probable cause of the fire to be in the area of the recalled item.” 33. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the following proposed class: All individuals in the United States who purchased or leased any of the motor vehicles (2004-2008 Suzuki Forenzas and 2005-2008 Suzuki Renos) which are the subject of the July 22, 2014 Recall Notice. 35. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(A)(1), Plaintiff states that the proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable as a matter of law because the proposed class consists of the owners or lessees of the 184,244 vehicles that were recalled. Thus the class consists, at least, of tens of thousands of potential members which is easily ascertainable whose identities can be readily determined from the Recall Notice records themselves and/or other records maintained by Defendant. 37. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(A)(3), Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are typical of the claims of the proposed class because the conduct of Defendant with respect to the defect and recall was identical with respect to Plaintiff as it was with respect to all other proposed class members. So far as is known at this point, the defect is common to all affected vehicles owned or leased by Class Members and Defendant has sent all proposed Class Members, including Plaintiff, identical copies of a form letter advising recipients of the recall. 39. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(B)(3), the issues of law and fact common to members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Therefore, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The legal grievances of proposed class members are common to all class members, including Plaintiff. If Defendant is liable to any class member on any of the questions of law outlined in Paragraph 36 above, it will automatically be liable to all class members. Defendant undertook a single course of conduct that resulted in the same liability with respect to all class members. A class action is clearly superior to the many hundreds or thousands of lawsuits which might be brought, raising the same legal claims against Defendant, burdening the courts, and potentially resulting in unjustly disparate outcomes. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 40. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 42. Pursuant to the statutory definitions, Plaintiff and all other proposed class members were “buyers” as defined by 12A Okla. Stat. § 2-103(1)(a); Defendant [for purposes of this claim and all further claims below, “Defendant” shall include both Defendant Suzuki Motor of America, Inc., and its predecessor in interest the American Suzuki Motor Corporation and Plaintiff specifically incorporates all acts and omissions by either entity in Plaintiff’s use of the term “Defendant” herein] was a “seller” as defined by 12A Okla. Stat. § 2-103(1)(c) and was a “merchant” as defined by 12A Okla. Stat. § 2-104; and the vehicles purchased by Plaintiff and all other proposed class members were transactions in “goods” as defined by 12A Okla. Stat. § 2-105(1). 43. Pursuant to 12A Okla. Stat. § 2-313, Defendant’s warranty mentioned in paragraph 13 above was an “express warranty” governed by the provisions of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code. 45. Defendant breached its express warranty to Plaintiff and all other proposed class members by not furnishing (according to Defendant’s own admission in the Recall Notice) a vehicle with working parts and quality workmanship. Rather, Plaintiff and all other proposed class members were furnished vehicles with a defective component that can cause a serious and dangerous risk of overheating and fire in vehicles distributed, marketed, and sold by Defendant. Defendant further breached its warranty by not taking affirmative steps to correct the defect as soon as it was discovered by Defendant. Rather, Defendant waited approximately seven years before bringing the defect to the attention of consumers and still has not, to this day, made any remedy, repair, and/or reimbursement available to said consumers. 46. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability by furnishing vehicles that did not “pass without objection” (if the vehicles were unobjectionable, then a recall would be unnecessary); were not of “fair average quality”; were not “fit for the ordinary purpose” for which vehicles are used, namely, as a safe and reliable means of transportation; and generally are unsatisfactory, dangerous, and of questionable value to consumers absent a remedy, repair, and/or reimbursement by Defendant. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 49. Plaintiff and all other proposed class members are “consumers” as defined at 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3); Defendant is both a “supplier” as defined at 15 U.S.C. §2301(4) an a “warrantor” as defined at 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5); and the vehicles that are the subject of this lawsuit are “consumer goods” as defined at 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 50. Therefore, pursuant to the foregoing paragraph, the warranty claims in this lawsuit are covered by the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“the Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq., as well as by Oklahoma warranty laws. Specifically, Defendant’s express warranty, as described more fully above, is governed by the provisions of the Act and is a “full warranty” as defined at 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(1) and Defendant’s implied warranty of merchantability is also governed by the provisions of the Act pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2308. Such implied warranty is of infinite duration for purposes of the Act pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2). 52. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d), the amounts in controversy of Plaintiff’s individual claim and all other proposed class members’ individual claims in this matter are each in excess of $25.00; the amount in controversy of all claims to be determined in this suit is in excess of $50,000.00; and the number of named Plaintiffs in this lawsuit will easily exceed one hundred. 53. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e), Defendant has had an ample opportunity already to cure its failure to comply with its warranties. Defendant has admitted that a dangerous defect exists and has, to date, offered no further solution to Plaintiff or to any other proposed class member. Therefore, any preliminary demand under § 2310(e) would be utterly futile given that, by Defendant’s own admission to Plaintiff and to all other proposed class members, there is no “cure” available at this time. Indeed, Defendant’s failure to make such a “cure” available forms part of the basis of this lawsuit. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 56. The elements of a claim for manufacturer’s product liability in Oklahoma are: (1) that the Defendant manufactured, sold, or leased the product in question; (2) that the Defendant was in the business of manufacturing, selling, or leasing such products; (3) that the product was defective and was therefore unreasonably dangerous to the user, consumer, and/or to one who might reasonably be expected to be affected by the product; (4) that the product was defective at the time it was manufactured, sold, or leased by the Defendant or when the product left the Defendant’s control; (5) that Plaintiff was a person who used, consumed, or could have reasonably been affected by the product; and (6) Plaintiff sustained personal injuries and/or damage to property directly caused by the defect in the product. 57. With respect to element (1), it is undisputed that Defendant was the distributor, marketer, and seller of the vehicles that are the subject of this lawsuit. 58. With respect to element (2), it is undisputed that Defendant was in the business of distributing, marketing, and selling such vehicles. 59. With respect to element (3), Defendant has admitted that the vehicles are defective and dangerous to consumers. 61. With respect to element (5), Plaintiff and all other proposed class members were users and consumers of the vehicles that are the subject of this lawsuit. 62. With respect to element (6), Plaintiff and all other proposed class members have incurred damages that go beyond mere damage to the vehicles themselves. Rather, Plaintiff and all other proposed class members have been exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm; have been forced to forego driving the vehicles for safety reasons; have suffered a diminution in the value of the vehicles; property damage to their vehicles; and have been placed in an untenable situation in which they are unable to obtain a prompt repair, leading to the stress and mental/emotional distress of being stuck with unsafe vehicles. The facts specific to Plaintiff in this lawsuit starkly demonstrate the extreme risk of danger and loss to which Plaintiff and all other proposed class members have been exposed by Defendant. 63. Therefore, Defendant should be held strictly liable for the defects in the vehicles that are the subject of this lawsuit and Plaintiff and all other proposed class members should be compensated for their damages accordingly. 65. Oklahoma common law, like the law of most states, recognizes four elements of negligence: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. See, e.g., Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Benham-Blair & Affiliates, Inc., 1989 OK 48. 66. Defendant has a duty, pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., and related federal regulations, as well as other statutory and common law duties, to conduct vehicle recalls in a manner that is safe for consumers of Defendant’s vehicles. 67. Defendant breached said duty to its consumers by: (1) failing to issue a vehicle recall notice regarding the risk of electrical fire due to vehicle lights until July 22, 2014 in spite of knowledge of such defect as early as April 5, 2007; (2) failing to issue a vehicle recall notice that warned consumers not to drive the vehicles (indeed, the Recall Notice specifically stated “You do not need to stop driving your vehicle” except in certain circumstances); (3) failing to offer immediate repair given the risk of danger to consumers; and (4) failing to perform repairs of such vehicles. 68. The facts specific to Plaintiff illustrate the consequences of the risk to which Defendant unnecessarily and unreasonably exposed Plaintiff and all other proposed class members: Plaintiff’s Forenza in fact did catch on fire, at great personal risk to Plaintiff, damaging Plaintiff’s Forenza and resulting in a costly repair to Plaintiff’s Forenza which Defendant refused to pay for. 70. Therefore, Defendant should be held liable for its negligent handling of the recall that is the subject of this lawsuit and Plaintiff and all other proposed class members should be compensated for their damages accordingly. 71. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 72. The Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, first enacted in 1972, provides that it is unlawful, when dealing with a consumer, for a person to “Commit[] an unfair or deceptive trade practice as defined in Section 752 of this title[.] 15 Okla. Stat. § 753. The definitions in § 752 are: 73. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that “[b]ecause the OCPA is remedial in nature it is to be liberally construed to effectuate its underlying purpose.” Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92, ¶ 28 (emphasis added). Patterson also lists the “four elements” of an OCPA cause of action: (1) that the defendant engaged in an unlawful practice as defined at 15 O.S. (1991) § 753; (2) that the challenged practice occurred in the course of defendant’s business; (3) that the plaintiff, as a consumer, suffered an injury in fact; and (4) that the challenged practice caused the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at ¶ 30. The Paterson court concluded that the protection against an “unfair trade practice” is a “broad protection” and is left “to the courts to determine whether specific conduct qualifies.” Id. at ¶ 34. 74. Plaintiff and prospective class members were all harmed by Defendant’s mishandling of its vehicle recall. Such conduct was in violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act’s prohibitions, including, but not limited to, prohibitions against deceptive practices, practices that are contrary to public policy, and practices that are substantially injurious to consumers. 76. Defendant engaged in practices that are contrary to public policy by botching its recall and failing to repair vehicles in a prompt and safe manner that would have eliminated unnecessary risk to consumers. For example, vehicle recalls are intended to promote motor vehicle safety as defined in 49 U.S.C. § 301 and as overseen by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Therefore, a vehicle recall that does not result in promoting the interests of safety is contrary to public policy. 77. Defendant engaged in practices that are substantially injurious to consumers by failing to timely recall their defective vehicles and then by botching the recall in a manner that exposed consumers to dangerous risks. The facts of Plaintiff’s vehicle fire speak for themselves with respect to the unnecessary and injurious risks imposed on consumers by Defendant. 78. Therefore, Defendant should be held liable for its violations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and Plaintiff and all other proposed class members should be compensated for their damages accordingly. 79. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 81. This case presents a classic instance of unjust enrichment whereby Defendant accepted payment in full for vehicles which were warranted to be safe, without defect to any components, and merchantable. Yet the vehicles measured up to none of these promises by Defendant. Further, Defendant concealed a dangerous defect for seven years and still has not provided a solution to its consumers. In short, Defendant obtained the benefit of the bargain, but Plaintiff and all other proposed class members did not. Therefore, Defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff and all other proposed class members. 82. Therefore, this Court should grant Plaintiff and all other proposed class members the remedy of imposing a constructive trust on the monetary benefits unjustly received and retained by Defendant, both in the past and to the present day. Plaintiff specifically requests that this Court provide whatever legal and/or equitable relief it deems proper, given Defendant’s conduct and unlawful retention of funds rightfully belonging to Plaintiff and all other proposed class members. 83. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations pled in the foregoing paragraphs and brings this claim both individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 9. American Suzuki Motor Corporation was a California corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling new motor vehicles in the United States, including in the State of Oklahoma. BREACH OF EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE RECALL MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT

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14. Defendant employs personnel who work in Afghanistan providing non- combat support services to deployed United States forces and other government agencies. 15. In 2008, Fluor was awarded the LOGCAP IV contract by the United States Army to provide logistics support to troops stationed in Afghanistan. Because this is the fourth in a series of LOGCAP contracts, it is commonly referred to as LOGCAP IV. The nature of LOGCAP IV is such that the contractors are to serve in non-combat support roles of the U.S. Army. 16. Each Class Member is, or at all times relevant herein was, an employee working for Defendant in Afghanistan with the job title of “Tier II FGG Contractor.” Tier II employees are non-managerial employees responsible for providing base- camp construction, housing, transportation, fuel, meals, and laundry to U.S. troops. 17. Each Tier II employee has been classified by Fluor as “exempt” with an annual “salary” of $45,000 per year. Despite each Class Member’s classification as “exempt,” their weekly compensation is paid at an hourly rate and they perform duties typically performed by “hourly” non-exempt employees. 18. Plaintiffs work, and at all times relevant herein worked, in excess of 40 hours per week throughout the entirety of their employment with Fluor in Afghanistan. In fact, Fluor has mandated that all Tier II employees work a total of 84 hours per week, and a review of pay stubs reveals that these employees were consistently working over 300 hours in a four week period. Plaintiffs are required to report the number of hours worked each day, and their pay is subject to a reduction if they work less than the required 84 hours per week. Violations of Afghanistan Labor Code Article 67 (Against All Defendants)

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Intrusion Upon Seclusion / Invasion of Privacy (On behalf of Plaintiff and All Class Members against Defendant PaperlessPay and on behalf of Plaintiff and all PHM Subclass Members against Defendant PHM) Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in all Paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states: One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or her private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of her privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977) Plaintiff and Class Members had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the PII Defendants mishandled. In failing to protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII, and in intentionally misusing and/or disclosing their PII, Defendants acted with intentional malice and oppression and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ rights to have such information kept confidential and private. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks an award of damages on behalf of herself and the Class. Negligence (On behalf of Plaintiff and all Class Members against Defendant PaperlessPay) Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all Paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. Plaintiff and Class Members were required to submit PII in order to obtain employment or as a condition of their employment. By collecting and storing this data in PaperlessPay’s computer property, PaperlessPay had a duty of care to use reasonable means to secure and safeguard its computer property—and Class Members’ PII held within it—to prevent disclosure of the information, and to safeguard the information from theft. Defendant PaperlessPay’s duty included a responsibility to implement processes by which it could detect a breach of their security systems in a reasonably expeditious period of time and to give prompt notice to those affected in the case of a data breach. Defendant PaperlessPay owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class Members to provide data security consistent with industry standards and other requirements discussed herein, and to ensure that their systems and networks, and the personnel responsible for them, adequately protected the PII. Defendant PaperlessPay’s had duty of care to use reasonable security measures because it was in a position to ensure that its systems were sufficient to protect against the foreseeable risk of harm to Class Members from a data breach. Defendant PaperlessPay’s duty to use reasonable care in protecting confidential data also arose also because it is bound by industry standards to protect confidential

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12. On information and belief, on or about September 5, 2017, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 13. On information and belief, Defendants receive some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendants profit and benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 14. Plaintiff did not give prior express invitation or permission to Defendants to send the faxes. 15. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles with opt-out language identical or substantially similar to the opt-out language of the fax advertisement attached hereto as Exhibit A to Plaintiff and at least 40 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission or without having an established business relationship as defined by the TCPA and its regulations. 16. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 17. Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A does not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 19. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Classes is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 22. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class members. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 23. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 24. Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 26. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 27. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 31. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmissions from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendants had an established business relationship because of the failure to comply with the Opt- Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmissions in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 32. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 34. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given prior express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ products, goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice or were sent without prior express invitation or permission was unlawful.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a software company, and owns and operates the website, www.opensea.io (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.opensea.io, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse digital assets for purchase, view a blog, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in May 2021, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various digital assets for purchase, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 58. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 92. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. 11. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number (602) 483-1403, which Plaintiff alleges on information and belief was a spoofed telephone number, indicating Defendant’s attempts to mask its identity to avoid accountability from placing illegal robocalls, as well as having used an ATDS to place the calls. 21. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 9. Beginning in or around October 2019, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -6678, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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16. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §207, Plaintiffs seek to prosecute their FLSA claims as a collective action on behalf of all persons who are or were formerly employed by Defendants at any time since December 4, 2009 to the entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) (statute of limitations tolled by failure to post statutory notice), who were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the FLSA and who were not paid minimum wages and/or were not paid overtime compensation at rates not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek (the “Collective Action Members”). 18. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members and have retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the fields of employment law and class action litigation. 19. Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 20. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a collective action. 22. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 23. Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 25. The persons in the Class identified above are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there at least 40 members of the Class during the Class Period. 26. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy—particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate defendants. 27. The Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 28. Plaintiffs are committed to pursuing this action and have retained competent counsel experienced in employment law and class action litigation. 29. Plaintiffs have the same interests in this matter as all other members of the class and Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the Class. 31. At all relevant times, Defendants maintained and operated a water meter installation business, with over 40 water meter installation employees. 32. Plaintiffs were water meter installers employed by Defendants during the last two years and during the Class Period. 34. Plaintiff Soto worked as a water meter installer for Defendants during the period from about September 1, 2013 to about May 15, 2015 under government prevailing wage contracts in New York State at West Nyack, Greenberg and Westchester, in the State of New Jersey at Allamuchy, and in the State of Delaware at Wilmington and Newark. 35. Plaintiffs are not members of any union and are not licensed plumbers. 36. Plaintiffs worked for Defendants with at least 40 other similar meter installer employees who had the same duties as themselves. 37. Plaintiffs’ duties did not include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent business judgment. 38. Plaintiffs were not permitted to enter a sign out time after 5:00 p.m., even when they worked later than 5:00 p.m. Plaintiffs worked hours later than their sign out times and were not paid for this time working. 39. Plaintiffs were required to enter on the sign out sheet that they had taken a one hour lunch even though they were on call during their alleged lunch break and often were so busy that the were not able to take a break. 40. Plaintiffs were not paid for the time working that was not listed on their time sheets but was performed at the direct request and knowledge of Defendants (“off the clock time”). 41. Plaintiffs and the other meter installer employees did not sign in to their job, but did sign out of their job at the end of the day. 43. Plaintiffs’ paystubs do not reflect the full amount of hours that they worked because, among other reasons, (a) they were not paid for the time worked prior to 8:00 a.m. (except on two occasions when Plaintiffs started at 6:00 a.m.), (b) they were not paid for the time working after the time they were required to enter on the sign out sheet which was 5:00 p.m. (Plaintiffs generally worked until 6:00 p.m. or later), (c) they were not paid for working or being on call during the one hour alleged meal break, and (d) they were not reimbursed for the cost of using their personal tools, automobile expenses, cameras and phone for their work. 44. Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs for all hours at their prevailing wage. 45. For the pay period from March 8, 2015 to March 14, 2015, Plaintiff James worked in Pennsylvania and his pay was calculated using a rate of $59.95 per hour and not calculated on the proper prevailing wage rate, which was $79.83 per hour. This rate was also not applied to the correct amount of hours worked. 46. For the pay period from March 30, 2015 to April 20, 2015, Plaintiff Soto worked in Allamuchy/Hackettstown, New Jersey and his pay was calculated using a rate of $45.40 per hour and not calculated on the proper prevailing wage rate, which was $82.30 per hour. This rate was also not applied to the correct amount of hours worked. 47. The prevailing wage rate that applied to Plaintiffs was generally about $80 per hour. 48. Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs for all their hours worked and did not pay them their full time and one half for all their hours worked over 40 in a week (“overtime”). 50. They were not paid for, inter alia, gasoline expense, insurance, depreciation, wear and tear, parking expenses and maintenance associated with the business use of their vehicles. 51. Plaintiffs and the other similar water meter installer employees were required to use their own tools to perform their work for Defendants, but were never paid for the cost of using their personal tools. Plaintiffs were supplied a list of tools which they were required to possess and use for their work. 52. Plaintiffs were required to use the following tools, among others, to perform their jobs: a Sawzall, a screw gun, a snake light, a miner’s light, a T-25 staple gun, a four foot drill bit and hammer drill. 53. Plaintiffs were required to buy a camera with a date and time stamp capability to take photos on a SIM card, which they were required to submit to Defendants at the end of each day. 54. Plaintiffs were not paid for the cost of their cameras. 55. Plaintiffs were required to use their personal phones to check in throughout the day with the office and the customers and were not reimbursed for expenses related to using their phones for Defendants’ work. 56. The cost of the tools required to perform the meter installations was at least $1,800. 57. The Plaintiffs and other similar meter installers were not paid for the cost of their tools. 59. Upon information and belief, Defendants hired at least 40 of such similar meter installer workers. 60. Plaintiffs and the other similar water meter installer employees regularly worked more than 40 hours per week for Defendants. 61. On certain jobs, Plaintiffs were paid a piece rate and not paid time and one half for their hours worked over 40 in a week, but were only paid their straight piece rate. 62. Plaintiffs and these other similar meter installer employees worked more than 40 hours per week and (a) were not paid for all their hours worked (b) were not paid time and one half for their overtime hours worked, (c) were not paid prevailing wage rates for their hours worked, and (d) were required to use their personal tools, cameras and/or vehicles for their work and were not paid for such use. 63. Throughout the Class period, Defendants have employed other individuals, like Plaintiffs, in positions as water meter installer workers. 64. Such individuals have worked in excess of 40 hours a week, yet the Defendants has likewise willfully failed to pay them for all their hours worked, failed to pay them at prevailing wage rates, failed to pay them overtime compensation of one and one-half times their regular hourly wage rate, and failed to pay them for their required use of their personal vehicles, cameras and/or tools. 65. Upon information and belief, no notice or poster was posted indicating that employees of Defendants had any rights, including the right to minimum wage and time and one half for their overtime. 67. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 68. At all relevant times, Defendants have been and continue to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 69. At all relevant times, Defendants employed, and/or continue to employ, Plaintiffs and each of the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 70. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 71. Plaintiffs consent in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). The named Plaintiffs’ written consents are attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 72. At all relevant times, the Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation to its employees for their hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 74. As a result of the Defendants’ failure to record, report, credit and/or compensate its employees, including Plaintiffs and the Collective Action members, the Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a). 75. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 76. Due to the Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Class are entitled to recover from the Defendants, their unpaid overtime compensation, an additional amount equal as liquidated damages, additional liquidated damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 77. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 78. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class were employed by the Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law, including §§ 2 and 651, and the laws of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and/or Delaware. 81. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ rights and the rights of the members of the Class, by failing to provide them proper notices and wage statements in violation of the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act. 82. As a result of Defendants’ violation of the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, Plaintiffs and the member of the Class are entitled to damages of $150 per week during which the violations occurred and/or continue to occur. 83. Due to the Defendants’ violations of the laws of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and/or Delaware, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid wages, their unpaid prevailing wages, their unpaid overtime compensation, their unreimbursed expenses, their reasonable attorneys’ fees, and their costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to New York Labor Law § 663(1) and/or the laws of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and/or Delaware. 84. Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class are also owed monies for their unreimbursed work expenses including expenses related to their use of personal tools and/or automobiles for their work. 85. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 87. Plaintiffs and the Class of other similar employees who performed work as water meter installers are third party beneficiaries of each Prevailing Wage Contract. 88. The parties to each Prevailing Wage Contract intended Plaintiffs to be third party beneficiaries. 89. Defendants breached the Prevailing Wage Contract by failing to pay Plaintiffs and the Class the regular and overtime hourly rates required by the Prevailing Wage Contract. 90. Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf and on behalf of the Class of similarly situated employees of Defendants who were also third party beneficiaries of the Prevailing Wage Contract and who were also not paid the hourly and overtime rates required by the Prevailing Wage Contracts during the Class Period under Rules 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 91. Due to Defendants’ breach of the Prevailing Wage Contract, Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid wages, interest, and the costs and disbursements of this action. 92. Defendants’ breaches of the Prevailing Wage Contract have caused Plaintiffs material damages and irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. BREACH OF CONTRACT -- PREVAILING WAGE CLAIM FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT STATE LAW

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22. On or about December 22, 2020 and December 28, 2020, Defendant caused the following automated marketing text messages to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 7451 (the “7451 Number”): 23. At the time Plaintiff received these messages she was the subscriber and/or sole user of the 7451 Number. 24. The 7451 Number is Plaintiff’s personal cell phone number and not a business phone number. 25. The 7451 Number has been registered with the National Do Not Call Registry since January of 2006. 27. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS. 28. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. The messages include no personal identifiers and are formatted in a generic manner. 29. The number used by Defendant (586-210-9192) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 30. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 32. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 33. Upon information and belief, the Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers. 34. Upon information and belief, the Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers. 35. Upon information and belief, the Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order. 37. Upon information and belief, the Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention. 38. Upon information and belief, the Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages. 39. Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff additional harm, including invasion of privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s call also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 40. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 41. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Class defined as follows: NO CONSENT CLASS: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message using the same type of equipment used to text message Plaintiff, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number for the purpose of promoting and/or advertising Defendant’s goods and/or services. DO NOT CALL CLASS: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action: (1) were sent a text message or phone call by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of advertising and/or promoting Defendant’s products and services. 42. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 46. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to members of the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class are: a) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; b) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; c) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; d) Whether Defendant initiated telemarketing calls to telephone numbers listed on the National Do Not Call Registry; e) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and f) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 52. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 54. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. at § 227(a)(1). 55. Defendant used an ATDS to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 56. Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 57. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an ATDS to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 58. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 59. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the members of the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 60. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1-51 as if fully set forth herein. 62. Additionally, it is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “[i]nitiate, or cause to be initiated, any telephone call that includes or introduces an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing, using an automatic telephone dialing system…other than a call made with the prior express written consent of the called party or the prior express consent of the called party when the call is made …” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). 63. Defendant transmitted calls using an automatic telephone dialing system to the telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class without their prior express written consent. 64.1200(a)(1)(iii). 64. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 64.1200(a) by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. 65. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express written consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 66. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1-51 as if fully set forth herein. 69. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 70. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.” 71. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 72. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12- month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 73. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 75. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and No Consent Class) Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

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20. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. -4- 21. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of American Coradius International LLC and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 22. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of American Coradius International LLC, and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 23. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 24. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 25. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 26. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: -5- (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment -6- will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. 27. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 28. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 29. Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. -7- 30. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 31. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through thirty (30) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 32. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 33. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about May 6, 2014; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), and 1692g(1) for false and deceptive threats and for failing to accurately state the balance of the debt by stating that the outstanding balance may increase. Therefore, leaving the least sophisticated consumer to reasonably conclude that she must pay the balance stated in the letter immediately or possibly owe a larger amount, causing the consumer to be uncertain of her rights. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 34. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. -8- Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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28. Plaintiff still has and had, at all relevant times to this action, telephone facsimile service at (714) 333-1840 at its place of business at 2240 N. Harbor Blvd., Suite 110, Fullerton, CA 92835. Plaintiff receives facsimile transmissions (“faxes”) at this number, using a telephone facsimile machine (“fax machine”). 29. Upon information and belief, on or about May 19, 2014, Defendant, without Plaintiff’s express invitation or permission, arranged for and/or caused a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited fax advertisement, advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, to Plaintiff’s fax machine located at its principal place of business. A copy of the fax advertisement is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is incorporated herein by reference. 30. Exhibit A was wholly unsolicited in that Defendant sent it to Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s express invitation or permission. In addition, as stated above, Exhibit A does not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. 32. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against Defendant pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further investigation reveal that any Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 34. Upon information and belief, a more precise Class size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to Defendant’s fax and marketing records. 35. Members of the Class may additionally or alternatively be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court. 37. One or more questions or issues of law and/or fact regarding Defendant’s liability are common to all Class Members and predominate over any individual issues that may exist and may serve as a basis for class certification under Rule 23(c)(4). 38. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same course of conduct that violates the TCPA. 39. Plaintiff and members of the Class each received at least one fax advertisement, advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, which contained no purported opt-out notice, which Defendant sent or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 40. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel, who are competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, TCPA litigation, and class-action litigation. 42. Class-Wide Injunctive Relief and Rule 23(b)(2): Moreover, as an alternative to or in addition to certification of the Class under Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members as a whole. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of Class Members on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class in order to enjoin and prevent Defendant’s’ ongoing violations of the TCPA, and to order Defendant to provide notice to them of their rights under the TCPA to statutory damages and to be free from unwanted faxes. 44. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of the Class defined above against Defendant for its violation of the TCPA and the rules prescribed under it by the FCC. 45. At all times material to this action, Defendant was a person that used or caused to be used a “telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device” to send, to a “telephone facsimile machine” an “unsolicited advertisement” or an “advertisement” within the meaning of the TCPA and its regulations. 46. Defendant sent or caused to be sent hundreds or thousands of these advertisements exemplified by Exhibit A. Plaintiff and each Class Members received at least one of them. 47. Each of the foregoing advertisements violated the TCPA because they failed to contain the opt-out notice required by 47 U.S.C § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv); and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii). 48. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). 49. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly sent and/or caused to be sent fax advertisements to Plaintiff and the members of Class in violation of the TCPA, Plaintiff requests an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227)

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22. On or around August of 2020, Plaintiff visited the Website, using a popular screen reading software called NonVisual Desktop Access, with the intent of browsing and potentially making a purchase. 24. As a result of visiting the Website, Plaintiff is aware that the Website includes multiple barriers making it impossible for himself, and any other visually impaired or blind person, from enjoying access to the Website’s content equally to that of a sighted user. 25. For example, many features on the Website fail to accurately describe the contents of graphical images, fail to properly label title, fails to distinguish one page from another, contain multiple broken links, contain headings that do not describe the topic or purpose, and the keyboard user interfaces lack a mode of operation where the keyboard focus indicator is visible. 26. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 27. Upon information and belief, Defendant has not, and have never, had adequate policies and procedures in place to ensure the Website is and will remain accessible to the blind and/or visually impaired. 28. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons, who need screen-readers to access websites, have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 30. If the Website were equally accessible to all, and if simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 guidelines were met, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Because of this, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including maintaining a website that is inaccessible to members of a protected class. 32. Due to Defendant’s violations of the ADA, and the harm it has caused, Plaintiff seeks damages, fees, costs, and injunctive relief. 33. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 34. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 35. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 37. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 38. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 40. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 42. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 43. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 44. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 46. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 47. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 48. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 50. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 51. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 52. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 53. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 55. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 56. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 58. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 60. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 61. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 62. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 63. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 64. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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22. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff, Cynthia Fuerte, was paid at a rate of $8.75 per hour, plus commission and bonus. 23. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff, Terry Dimery, was paid at a rate of $9.00 per hour. 24. Defendants mission statement states that they are “a people-focused business of 130,000 dedicated professionals, speaking 58 languages and working from more than 150 locations in 33 countries.” See http://www.convergys.com/about/mission-values (last visited 3/7/17). 25. Defendants’ website solicits business from clients and states “[l]et Convergys help you deliver a personalized, multichannel customer experience that meets your customer care and business goals while lowering your service costs.” “We combine decades of experience with our integrated, end-to-end solution of advanced analytics, omnichannel technology, and global outsourcing to design, unify, and optimize the customer care expereinece.” See http://www.convergys.com/client-solutions/capabilities/customer-care (last visited on 3/7/17). 27. The “Convergys Anywhere program hires sales & service agents who work from home.” “For example, when you call the customer service department for your cell phone or cable provider, you just might be talking to a Convergys home based customer service & sales agent – answer that call on behalf of one of our clients. These calls might involve billing questions, changes or cancellations of services, inquiries on the status of an order, troubleshooting services etc.” See http://www.convergys.com/career-details.php?id=R1028342 (last visited on 3/7/17). 28. Regardless of the geographic location in which the CSR works, all of Defendants’ CSRs use multiple computer networks software applications in the course of performing their job responsibilities. These programs and applications are integral and an important part of the CSR’s work and they cannot perform their jobs without them. 29. Some of the equipment that all CSRs are required to have includes: a router that supplies two or more IP addresses and is connected to a PC; a USB or Analog Headset; a minimum of a 17” monitor with minimum resolution of 1280 x1024 (Televisions used as monitors, touch screen monitors and dual monitors are not acceptable); and a Convergys Approved Flashdrive. 30. In order to perform their job, Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, were required to boot up and log in to various computer networks, software programs and applications, including those referenced above, in order to access information necessary to perform their job functions. The pre-shift boot-up/log-in process took substantial time on a daily basis ranging from twelve (12) and eighteen (18) minutes per day, and even longer on days where Defendants’ computer networks and programs were not working properly. 32. The Daily Start of Day Checklist laid out thirteen-steps in chronological order: 1) Make sure your computer is completely off; 2) Reboot your Modem and Router; 3) With your PC still in OFF mode, insert your USB drive into an available USB port; 4) Turn on your PC and begin tapping the required function key to access the Boot Menu for your PC; 5) Once you have access to the boot menu, select the designated USB option; 6) Start the Linux Desktop (Convergys Home Agent Desktop Environment), then you should see Connection Established in the bottom right; 7) Log into Lady with Lamp page, up to 5 minutes early, with your LAN ID and LAN Passowrd; 8) Next a new tab will populate for the Citrix XenApp login … login using your LAN ID and LAN Password; 9) At this point your e-start punch time will take place automatically; 10) Click Agent at Home folder displayed on your Citrix applications screen; 11) Click XA65 – eBay Training; 12) At this point you will see “connecting …”, once that is complete, click OK; 13) At the start of your scheduled shift, you will need to change your activity code in e-start to 37-002. (Do not be late). Exhibit C, Daily Start of Day Checklist. 33. The process as described in the Daily Start of Day Checklist, requires CSRs to complete at least eight (8) of the thirteen (13) start-up steps before they are clocked in. 34. The pre-shift off-the-clock time Plaintiffs and all other CSRs spend booting- up/logging-in to their computers directly benefited Defendants. 35. The pre-shift boot-up/log-in process was an integral and indispensable part of Plaintiffs’ job responsibilities as CSRs. 37. The post-shift work performed after disconnecting from Defendants’ network and logging out of the timekeeping system took between three (3) and four (5) minutes at the end of each shift. 38. The post-shift off-the clock time Plaintiffs and all other CSRs spend logging- out/shutting-down directly benefited Defendants. 39. The post-shift log-out/shut-down process was an integral and indispensable part of Plaintiffs’ job responsibilities as CSRs. 40. At all relevant times, Defendants controlled Plaintiffs’ and all other CSRs’ work schedule, duties, protocols, applications, assignments and employment conditions. 41. Defendants maintained and enforced a common attendance policy for all CSRs that was based on a point system, whereby, the CSR was assessed points for each absence, tardy, and early departure. In the event that a CSR accumulated 12 points, the consequence was “probable termination of employment.” Conversely, if the CSR worked 60 calendar days without an occurrence, they were credited with one (1) full attendance point. 42. Despite knowing Plaintiffs and other CSRs performed work before and after their scheduled shifts, Defendants and their managers failed to make any effort to stop or disallow this pre-, mid-, and post-shift work and instead suffered and permitted it to happen. 43. Defendants possess, control, and/or have access to information and electronic data indicating the times Plaintiffs and other CSRs booted up and logged into their computers and logged-out and shut-down each day and the time they logged into their telephone systems. 45. Despite their ability to track the amount of time Plaintiffs and other CSRs spent in connection with the pre-shift boot-up/log-in process and post-shift shut-down/log-out, and technical downtime, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and other CSRs for the off-the-clock work they performed each shift. A. Pre-Shift Off-the-Clock Work 47. Defendants’ CSRs completed the pre-shift process outlined above each shift; however, they were not actually “clocked in” for their shifts until after they started-up their computers, connected to the virtual private network, and opened several essential software applications (many of which required usernames and passwords). 48. As a result, Plaintiffs and other CSRs spent between twelve (12) and eighteen (18) minutes at the beginning of each shift performing off-the-clock work for Defendants. 49. The unpaid off-the-clock work performed prior to each shift by Plaintiffs and other CSRs directly benefitted Defendants, and the tasks undertaken in connection with the off-the-clock work were integral and indispensable to their job duties and responsibilities as CSRs. B. Post-Shift Off-the-Clock Work 51. At the end of the day, after the CSRs removed themselves from the Avaya “available” status, closed multiple software applications, disconnected from Citrix, and performed a complete shut-down. After clocking out of Defendants’ timekeeping system (Citrix), the Plaintiffs and other CSRs must complete the following essential work activities off-the-clock in chronological order:  First, CSRs were required to log-out and close down Citrix. In order to log-out/close Citrix, after clicking through multiple windows, the CSR was required to wait for the application to disconnect. This step generally took about one (1) minute.  Next, the CSR was required to close windows that remained open, such as Mozilla Fire Fox.  After the CSR had fully logged-out/closed Citrix and any other windows that remained open, they were required to disconnect and log-off of the Convergys Home Desktop. This process took between one (1) to two (2) minutes, or even longer if there were connection issues.  The CSR was then required to do a complete shut-down of their computer. This took approximately one (1) additional minute. 52. Pursuant to the above process, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and other CSRs for three (3) to four (4) minutes of off-the-clock work performed each shift. 53. The unpaid post-shift off-the-clock work performed by Plaintiffs and other CSRs at the end of each shift directly benefits Defendants and the tasks undertaken in connection with the post-shift off-the-clock work are integral and indispensable to their job duties and responsibilities as CSRs. C. Technical Malfunction (Down-Time) Spent Off-the-Clock 55. Before contacting the technical support team with a technical problem, Defendants trained and instructed Plaintiffs and other CSRs to perform a “Power Down” to correct the problem. A “Power Down” required the CSR to push and hold the power button on their computer for three seconds. This completely powered down the computer, removed the CSR from the timekeeping system, and required them to perform the entire log in process set forth in paragraph 45 of this Complaint. Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs and other CSRs for this time. 56. When Plaintiffs and other CSRs encountered technical difficulties with their networks, programs, phones, applications, and other programs that they could not resolve with a “Power Down,” they were required to change their status from “Available,” clock-out of Defendants’ timekeeping system, contact the technical support team, and wait/assist the technical support team while they attempted to resolve the problem. This often required them to wait on hold for appreciable amounts of time. 57. Although Plaintiffs and other CSRs were compensated for some tech down time, they were not paid for all time spent working with Defendants’ technical team. 58. Additionally, Plaintiffs and other CSRs often lost their connection to Defendant’s VPN or to other applications when they went on break and their systems became idle. As a result, Plaintiffs and other CSRs were required to undertake the log in process laid out in paragraph 45 of this Complaint. 59. The mid-shift time spent off the clock directly benefitted Defendants’, and was compensable time, and is an element of damages in this lawsuit. 61. An example of a specific workweek where Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff Terry Dimery all overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours (as mandated by the FLSA) includes the following: Pay Period of 12/06/2015 to 12/19/2015  Plaintiff’s paystub states that he worked 86.51 hours and was paid at a regular hourly rate of $9.00 per hour for each hour of each workweek.  Plaintiff’s overtime rate was $13.50 per hour. Plaintiff received 6.46 hours of overtime, but no overtime pay for the time spent undertaking the pre-, mid-, and post-shift activities described herein.  With pre-shift time of 12-18 minutes per shift and post-shift time of 3-4 minutes per shift, Plaintiff should have been paid for an additional 75 to 110 minutes for each workweek at his overtime rate of $13.50 per hour (assuming that he worked five shifts in a week) and an additional amount for tech time if he experienced connectivity issues during this pay period. Exhibit D, Dimery Paystubs. Pay Period of 10/23/206 to 11/05/2016  Plaintiff worked 93.55 hours and was paid at a regular hourly rate of $9.00 per hour for each hour of each workweek.  Plaintiff’s overtime rate was $13.50 per hour. Plaintiff received 5.04 hours of overtime, but no overtime pay for the time spent undertaking the pre-, mid-, and post-shift activities described herein.  With pre-shift time of 12-18 minutes per shift and post-shift time of 3-4 minutes per shift, Plaintiff should have been paid for an additional 75 to 110 minutes for each workweek at his overtime rate of $13.50 per hour (assuming that he worked five shifts in a week) and an additional amount for tech time if he experienced connectivity issues during this pay period. Exhibit D, Dimery Paystubs. 63. At all relevant times, Defendants directed and directly benefited from the work performed by Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees in connection with the above described pre-, mid- and post-shift activities performed by Plaintiffs and other CSRs. 64. At all relevant times, Defendants controlled the work schedules, duties, protocols, applications, assignments and employment conditions of Plaintiffs and other CSRs. 65. At all relevant times, Defendants were able to track the amount of time Plaintiffs and the other CSRs spent in connection with the pre-, mid- and post-shift activities however, Defendants failed to do so and failed to compensate Plaintiffs and other CSRs for the off-the-clock work they performed. 66. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the CSRs were non-exempt hourly employees, subject to the requirements of the FLSA. 67. At all relevant times, Defendants used its attendance and adherence policies against Plaintiffs and the CSRs in order to pressure them into performing the pre-, mid- and post-shift off- the-clock work. 68. Defendants expressly trained and instructed Plaintiffs and its other CSRs to perform the above-described pre-shift activities before clocking into Defendants’ timekeeping system and their shift’s scheduled start time to ensure they were prepared to take calls at the moment their shift began. 70. Defendants knew or should have known that the time spent by Plaintiffs and its other CSRs in connection with the pre-, mid- and post-shift activities is compensable under the law. Indeed, in light of the explicit DOL guidance cited above, there is no conceivable way for Defendants to establish that they acted in good faith. 71. Unpaid wages related to the off-the-clock work described herein is owed to Plaintiffs at the FLSA mandated overtime premium of one-and-one-half the Plaintiffs’ regular hourly rate because Plaintiffs regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 72. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on behalf of themselves and on behalf of: All current and former hourly at-home customer service representatives who worked for Convergys at any time from March ___, 2014 through the date of judgment (hereinafter referred to as the “Class” or “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this definition if necessary. 73. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, their failure to properly compensate Plaintiffs and other similarly situated CSRs. 74. Excluded from the proposed FLSA Collective are Defendants’ executives, administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside sales persons. 76. All of the work that Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective have performed has been assigned by Defendants, and/or Defendants have been aware of all of the work that the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed. 77. As part of its regular business practice, Defendants intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to: a. Willful failure to pay its employees, including Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective, for all premium overtime wages for hours that they worked off- the-clock in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek; b. Willful failure to pay its employees, including Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective, for hours worked off-the-clock; c. Willful failure to record all of the time that its employees, including Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective, have worked for the benefit of Defendants. 78. Defendants are aware or should have been aware that federal law required them to pay Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 79. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 81. The employment relationships between Defendants and every proposed FLSA Collective member are the same and differ only by name, location, and rate of pay. The key issues – the amount of uncompensated pre-shift start-up/log-in time, time spent in connection with mid- shift connectivity issues, and the amount of post-shift log-out/shut-down time owed to each employee – does not vary substantially among the proposed FLSA Collective members. 82. There are many similarly situated current and former CSRs who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. 83. This notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 84. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendants’ records. 85. Plaintiffs estimate the putative Class, including both current and former employees over the relevant period, includes hundreds, if not thousands of members. The precise number of Class members should be readily available from a review of Defendants’ personnel and payroll records. 87. The members of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class are so numerous that joinder of all Rule 23 Nationwide Class members in this case would be impractical. Plaintiffs reasonably estimate there are thousands of Rule 23 Nationwide Class members. Rule 23 Nationwide Class members should be easy to identify from Defendants’ computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records. 88. There is a well-defined community of interests among Rule 23 Nationwide Class members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class. These common legal and factual questions, include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the pre-shift time Rule 23 Nationwide Class members spend on start-up and log-in activities each session is compensable time; b. Whether the post-shift time Rule 23 Nationwide Class members spend on shutdown and log-out activities is compensable time; c. Whether mid-shift time spent by the Rule 23 Nationwide Class members in connection with logging back into their computers after breaks, out of their computers to go on breaks, and for technical connectivity issues is compensable time; and d. Whether Defendants’ non-payment of wages to the Rule 23 Nationwide Class members for all compensable time amounted to a breach of contract. 90. Plaintiffs will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class and they retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of nationwide wage and hour class actions. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have interests that are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class. 91. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Rule 23 Nationwide Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer. 92. This case will be manageable as a Rule 23 Class action. Plaintiffs and their counsel know of no unusual difficulties in this case and Defendants and its corporate clients all have advanced, networked computer and payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages issues in this case to be resolved with relative ease. 93. Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied in this case, class certification is appropriate. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action”). 94. Because Defendants acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Rule 23 Nationwide Class and declaratory relief is appropriate in this case with respect to the Rule 23 Nationwide Class as a whole, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is also appropriate. 95. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all previous paragraphs herein and further allege as follows. 96. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were joint employers under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) of the FLSA and subject to the mandates of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. See also 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b). 97. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants engaged in interstate commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA. 98. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiffs were “employees” of Defendants within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) of the FLSA.

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12. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “11” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 13. Upon information and belief, Defendant, on behalf of a third-party, began efforts to collect an alleged consumer debt from Plaintiff. 14. Defendant was attempting to collect on Plaintiff’s purportedly overdue account with TD Bank N.A. alleged to be in the amount of $3,234.88 (the “Debt”). 15. In an effort to begin collecting on the Debt, Defendant sent Plaintiff a debt collection letter, dated March 23, 2018. 16. On or about May 21, 2018, Plaintiff called Defendant to inquire about and dispute the alleged Debt. 17. A representative of Defendant answered the phone and identified herself as Kristen Walker. 18. Plaintiff explained that he disagreed with the balance. 19. Plaintiff thereafter stated that he wanted to dispute the Debt over the phone. 20. However, instead of simply accepting the dispute, Defendant’s representative stated that Plaintiff could not dispute the debt over the phone because “disputing with me doesn’t mean anything” and that Plaintiff has to send a formal letter of why he wants to dispute this bill. 21. Defendant’s representative stated that Plaintiff could not dispute the Debt because Plaintiff’s reason for disputing the debt “is not a dispute.” 22. Defendant failed/refused to accept and investigate Plaintiff’s oral dispute. 24. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “27” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 25. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards Plaintiff violated § 1692e of the FDCPA by using false, deceptive, and misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt. 26. The FDCPA allows the consumer to orally dispute a debt. See, Brady v. The Credit Recovery Company, Inc., 160 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 1998)(The FDCPA does not limit the time period for disputing a debt. A consumer can always dispute a debt with a debt collector, regardless of the passage of time); Register v. Reiner, Reiner & Bendett, P.C., 488 F.Supp.2d 143 (D.Conn. 2007); Vega v. Credit Bureau Enters., No. CIVA02CV1550, 2005 WL 711657 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005); Nasca v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, No 01CIV10127, 2002 WL 31040647 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002); In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Litig., 208 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2002); Castro v. ARS Nat'l Servs., Inc., No. 99 CIV. 4596, 2000 WL 264310 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000); Ong v. Am. Collections Enter., No. 98-CV-5117, 1999 WL 51816 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1999). 27. Defendant is required to accept Plaintiff’s oral dispute over the telephone. Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2013); Abramov v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 28. The FDCPA does not require the consumer to provide any reason at all in order to dispute a debt. See, Castro v. ARS National Servs., Inc., 2000 WL 264310 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000); DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 f.3d 159 (2nd Cir. 2001). 30. After Plaintiff disputed the Debt, Defendant continued to assume that Plaintiff’s Debt was still valid. 31. Defendant unilaterally denied Plaintiff’s oral dispute. 32. Defendant violated § 1692e by not accepting Plaintiff’s dispute over the telephone. 33. Defendant further violated § 1692e by requiring a reason for the dispute. 34. Defendant and its employees, intentionally denied Plaintiff her dispute rights afforded to her under the FDCPA. 35. Defendant and its employees wrongfully failed to accept Plaintiff’s oral dispute. 36. Defendant and its employees, wrongfully implied to Plaintiff that a dispute needs to be deemed valid in order for it to be considered a dispute. 37. Upon information and belief, Defendant and its employee, by intentionally denying Plaintiff and any other debtor to dispute the debt orally and without a valid reason unfairly intimidate and force debtors in to paying disputed debts. 38. As an actual and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant and its employees, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages and injury, including but not limited to, fear, stress, mental anguish, emotional stress, acute embarrassment and suffering for which she should be compensated in an amount to be established by a jury at trial.

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16. On or about February 27, 2010, Plaintiff successfully registered his residential cellular telephone number ending in -2220 with the National Do Not Call Registry. 17. During or about January of 2017, Defendant began placing unsolicited telemarketing calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 18. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number 800- 838-7132, confirmed to belong to Defendant. 19. Defendant’s unsolicited telemarketing calls to Plaintiff constitute solicitation calls pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), as they were made in attempts to promote or sell Defendant’s products or services. 20. Plaintiff received at least five such unsolicited telemarketing calls from Defendant between January and February of 2017. 21. Plaintiff did not provide his prior express invitation or permission to Defendant to place these solicitation telemarketing calls to his telephone. 23. In multiple instances, Defendant placed unsolicited telemarketing calls to Plaintiff after Plaintiff registered his telephone number ending in -2220 with the federal government’s Do Not Call List, in violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c). 24. Defendant’s unsolicited telemarketing calls to Plaintiff after Plaintiff registered his telephone number ending in -2220 with the federal government’s Do Not Call List violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 25. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as members of the proposed class defined as follows (the “Class”): All residential telephone subscribers within the United States whose telephone numbers were registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days, who had not granted Defendant prior express invitation or permission, nor had a prior established business relationship with Defendant, or who had revoked such invitation or permission or prior business relationship, who received more than one solicitation call made by or on behalf of Defendant within any 12-month period, within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 27. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Class include hundreds, if not thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that the Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 28. This suit is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) because the Class is so numerous that joinder of its members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class Action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. 30. As a residential telephone subscriber who received multiple telephone calls in a 12- month period, made by or on behalf of Defendant, without his prior express invitation or permission and without a prior established business relationship with Defendant, after his telephone number was registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days, within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. 31. Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the Class. 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class actions. 33. A class action is superior to other available methods of fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since individual litigation of the claims of all Class members is impracticable. Even if every Class member could afford individual litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which individual litigation of numerous issues would proceed. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties, and to the court system, resulting from multiple trials of the same complex factual issues. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system, and protects the rights of each Class member. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 35. Defendant has acted or refused to act in respect generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with regard to the members of the Class as a whole. 36. Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the TCPA, including but not limited to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), as to the Class members with respect to the above-alleged transactions. 37. The TCPA regulations, specifically 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), provide that: [n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to…[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government. 38. In multiple instances, Defendant placed solicitation telephone calls to the Class members after the members had registered their telephone numbers with the federal government’s Do-Not-Call Registry, and without the prior express invitation or permission of, or without a prior established business relationship with, the recipients, in violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. and 47 C.F.R. 64.1200. 39. The size and definition of the Class can be identified through Defendant’s records and/or Defendant’s agents’ records. 41. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including, but not limited to, each and every one of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., including the implementing regulations of 47 C.F.R. 42. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every such violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 43. Plaintiff is also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 44. Plaintiff incorporates all of the allegations and statements made in paragraphs 1 through 39 above as if reiterated herein. 45. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including, but not limited to, each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., including the implementing regulations of 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(c). 46. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff is entitled to an award of up to $1,500.00 in statutory damages for each and every such violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 64.1200(c). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

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23. On or about June 12, 2020, Defendant sent an automated unsolicited marketing text message to Plaintiff Brooks’ cellular telephone number from the telephone number (206) 775- 7325. 24. Then, on June 14, 2020, Defendant sent a second automated unsolicited marketing text message to Plaintiff Brooks’ cellular telephone number from the telephone number (206) 775- 7325. 26. Defendant sells and promotes its products at this website. 27. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant’s initial text messages. 28. Nonetheless, Defendant sent two additional text messages to Plaintiff Brooks’ cellular telephone number on July 18, 2020 and July 19, 2020 from a different telephone number: (213) 414-7549. 30. The links embedded in these text messages are https://curaleaf.com/locations/#new-york; https://hqui.us/gG02oEgM2vX3; and https://ccop.us/gG02a892Z9z4. 31. Each of these links redirect to Defendant’s website (https://website.curaleaftest.com/locations/#new-york) 32. Defendant sells and promotes its products at this website. 33. Plaintiff did not give Defendant prior express written consent to send text messages to her cellular telephone numbers by using an automatic telephone dialing system. 34. The text messages Defendant sent to Plaintiff consisted of pre-written templates of impersonal text and were identical to text messages Defendant sent to other consumers. 35. Upon information and good faith belief, the language in the messages was automatically generated and inputted into pre-written text templates without individualized human intervention in the drafting or sending of the messages. 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant sent identical text messages to thousands of other consumers. 37. The telephone system Defendant used to send the message constitutes an ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 38. The text messages at issue are standardized, impersonal, and consistent in structure and format. 40. Upon information and belief, no human directed any single text message to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number. 41. Upon information and belief the hardware and software combination utilized by Defendant has the capacity to store and dial sequentially generated numbers, randomly generated numbers, or numbers from a database of numbers. 42. Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express consent to place automated text messages to Plaintiff on her cellular telephones. 43. Receipt of Defendant’s unauthorized messages drained Plaintiff’s phone batteries and caused Plaintiff additional electricity expenses and wear and tear on her phone and battery. 44. Defendant did not place the text message for an emergency purpose. 45. Through the aforementioned conduct, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 56. Plaintiff brings this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and as representatives of the following class: All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendant delivered, or caused to be delivered, a text message, (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, (3) by using an automatic telephone dialing system, (4) within four years preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification. 57. Excluded from the class are Defendant, its officers and directors, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendant have or had a controlling interest. 59. The exact number of the members of the class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can (and will) be determined through appropriate discovery. 60. On information and belief, Defendant texted thousands of class members nationwide during the class period. 61. Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 62. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. Ascertainability 63. The members of the class are ascertainable because the class is defined by reference to objective criteria. 64. In addition, the members of the class are identifiable in that, upon information and belief, their cellular telephone numbers, names and addresses can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant and by third parties. Typicality 65. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. 66. Plaintiff has had to suffer the burden of receiving text messages to her cellular telephone from an ATDS. 67. Thus, her injuries are typical to class members. 68. Defendant used an ATDS to deliver text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number in a similar manner as it did to all members of the class. 70. Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same theories, as are the claims of the members of the class. 71. Defendant harmed Plaintiff and class members by illegally texting their cellular phones using an ATDS. 72. Plaintiff and the class were damaged thereby. Adequacy 73. Plaintiff is qualified to and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class with whom she is similarly situated. 74. Plaintiff acknowledges that she has an obligation to make known to the Court any relationships, conflicts, or differences with any class member. 75. Plaintiff’s interests in this matter are not directly or irrevocably antagonistic to the interests of the members of the class. 76. Plaintiff will vigorously pursue the claims of the members of the class. 77. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced and competent in class action litigation. 78. Plaintiff’s attorneys, the proposed class counsel, are versed in the rules governing class action discovery, certification, and settlement. 79. In addition, the proposed class counsel is experienced in handling clams involving consumer actions and violations of the TCPA. 80. Plaintiff’s counsel will vigorously pursue this matter. 81. Plaintiff’s counsel will assert, protect and otherwise represent the members of the class. 83. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over questions that may affect individual members of the class. 84. The elements of the legal claims brought by Plaintiff and class members are capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class rather than individual to its members. Commonality 85. There are common questions of law and fact as to all members of the class, including but not limited to: a. Defendant’s conduct, pattern, and practice as it pertains to delivering advertisement and telemarketing text messages; b. Whether, within the statutory period, Defendant used an ATDS as defined by the TCPA to send text messages to class members; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the TCPA; d. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future; and e. The availability of statutory penalties. Superiority: 86. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter. 88. The pursuit of separate actions by individual members of the class would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the class, and could substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 89. The pursuit of separate actions by individual members of the class could create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, which might establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. 90. These varying adjudications and incompatible standards of conduct, in connection with presentation of the same essential facts, proof, and legal theories, could also create and allow the existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the class. 91. The damages suffered by each individual member of the class may be relatively modest, thus, the expense and burden to litigate each of their claims individually make it difficult for the members of the class to redress the wrongs done to them. 92. Absent a class action, most class members would likely find the cost of litigating their claims prohibitively high and would therefore have no effective remedy at law. 93. The pursuit of Plaintiff’s claims, and the claims of the members of the class, in one forum will achieve efficiency and promote judicial economy. 94. There will be little difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 95. Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the members of the class, making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate. 96. Plaintiff and the class members have all suffered and will continue to suffer harm and damages as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 98. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding factual allegations as if fully restated herein. Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the TCPA Class)

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11. On information and belief, on or about September 12, 2016, Defendants used a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 13. Plaintiff did not give prior express invitation or permission to Defendants to send the fax. 14. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles with opt-out language identical or substantially similar to the opt-out language of the fax advertisements attached hereto as Exhibit A to Plaintiff and at least 40 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission and without having an established business relationship as defined by the TCPA and its regulations. 15. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 16. Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A does not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 18. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 20. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for himself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar faxes or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 21. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 23. Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 25. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 30. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission or that Defendants had an established business relationship because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 31. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 32. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.

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10. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 11. Enterprise Medical Services is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the fax. 13. Enterprise Medical Services either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and other recipients in sending the fax. 14. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with Defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisement to Plaintiff. 15. The fax does not contain an “opt out” notice that complies with 47 U.S.C. §227. 16. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 17. On information and belief, Defendant has transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Michigan. 18. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff or other recipients of Defendant’s unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 19. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-18. 20. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 22. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 23. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 24. Defendant violated the TCPA even if its actions were only negligent. 25. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 26. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons (b) who, on or after a date four years prior to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. §1658), (c) and were sent faxes by or on behalf of Defendant Enterprise Medical Services promoting its goods or services for sale, (d) and which did not contain an opt out notice as described in 47 U.S.C. §227. 27. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 29. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 30. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 31. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 9. On August 4, 2015, Western Wayne received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine.

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14. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Florida. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). 15. AIA is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and “persons,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). 16. At all times relevant AIA conducted business in the State of Florida and in Broward County, within this judicial district. 17. AIA utilizes bulk SPAM text messaging, or SMS marketing, to send unsolicited text messages, marketing and advertising AIA’s insurance services, including at least 1 unsolicited text message to Plaintiff. 18. For example, on or about February 12, 2018, at approximately 11:18 a.m. (EST), AIA sent an unsolicited text message to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone ending in “6258”. 19. On or about March 5, 2018, at approximately 12:37 P.m. (EST), AIA sent another unsolicited text message to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone ending in “6258”. 21. Plaintiff was at no time given an option to “opt-out” of receiving future unsolicited text messages from AIA. 22. At no time did Plaintiff provide Plaintiff’s cellular phone number to AIA through any medium, nor did Plaintiff consent to receive such unsolicited text messages. 23. Plaintiff has never signed-up for, and has never used, AIA’s services, and has never had any form of business relationship with AIA. 25. Upon information and belief, this ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 26. Upon information and belief, this ATDS has the capacity to store numbers on a list and to dial numbers from a list without human intervention. 27. This text message constituted a call that was not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 28. Plaintiff did not provide AIA or its agents prior express consent to receive text messages, including unsolicited text messages, to her cellular telephone, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 29. The unsolicited text message by AIA, or their agents, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 30. AIA is and was aware that it is placing unsolicited text messages to Plaintiff and other consumers without their prior express consent. 31. Plaintiff was damaged by AIA’s text message. In addition to using Plaintiff’s cellular data, her privacy was wrongfully invaded, and Plaintiff has become understandably aggravated with having to deal with the frustration of repeated, unwanted robo-text messages forcing her to divert attention away from her work and other activities. 33. Excluded from the Class are: any Defendant, and any subsidiary or affiliate of that Defendant, and the directors, officers and employees of that Defendant or its subsidiaries or affiliates, and members of the federal judiciary. 34. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against AIA pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well- defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further investigation reveal that any Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 35. Numerosity: At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of Class Members, but among other things, given the nature of the claims and that AIA’s conduct consisted of a standardized SPAM text messaging campaign electronically sent to particular telephone numbers, Plaintiff believes, at a minimum, there are greater than forty (40) Class Members. Plaintiff believes that the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action rather than incremental individual actions will benefit the Parties and the Court by eliminating the possibility of inconsistent or varying adjudications of individual actions. 36. Upon information and belief, a more precise Class size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through AIA’s records, including, but not limited to AIA’s text and marketing records. 39. One or more questions or issues of law and/or fact regarding AIA’s liability are common to all Class Members and predominate over any individual issues that may exist and may serve as a basis for class certification under Rule 23(c)(4). 40. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same course of conduct that violates the TCPA. 41. Plaintiff and members of the Class each received at least one SPAM text advertisement, promoting insurance products, which contained no purported opt-out notice, which AIA sent or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 42. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel, who are competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, TCPA litigation and class action litigation. 44. Class-Wide Injunctive Relief and Rule 23(b)(2): Moreover, as an alternative to or in addition to certification of the Class under Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2) because AIA has acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members as a whole. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of Class Members on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class in order to enjoin and prevent Defendant AIA’s ongoing violations of the TCPA, and to order AIA to provide notice to them of their rights under the TCPA to statutory damages and to be free from unwanted text messages. 46. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system. . .to any telephone number assigned to a . . .cellular telephone service . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 47. The text message sent to Plaintiff was made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to send text messages to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class. 48. Defendant has, therefore, violated Sec. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to send non-emergency text messages to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 49. The foregoing acts and omissions of AIA constitutes numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 50. As a result of AIA’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 42 and 46 – 48 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 53. At all relevant times, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 54. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to send these texts, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 55. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members did not give prior express consent to receive autodialed texts, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 56. As a result of AIA’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 57. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant Plaintiff and the Class members relief against AIA, as set forth in the Prayer for Relief below.  KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)

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27. Plaintiff’s claims are brought on its own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all owners of Lionbridge common stock and their successors in interest, except defendants and their affiliates (the “Class”). 28. Plaintiff’s claims are properly maintainable as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 29. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to the Proxy Statement, there were more than 61 million outstanding shares of common stock entitled to vote at the Special Meeting on the Merger. 30. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. The common questions include, but are not limited to, whether: (a) defendants violated §§14(a) and 20(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 by preparing, reviewing and disseminating a false and misleading Proxy Statement; and (b) plaintiff and the other members of the Class have been damaged as a result of the conduct detailed herein. 31. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and plaintiff does not have any interests adverse to the Class. 32. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class, has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature, and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 33. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of - 9 - the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class. 34. Plaintiff anticipates that there will be no difficulty in the management of this litigation. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 35. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect to the matters complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with respect to the Class as a whole. 66. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained above in ¶¶1-65, as if fully set forth herein. - 22 - 67. SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-9, promulgated pursuant to §14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides: No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading. 68. Defendants prepared, reviewed and/or disseminated the false and misleading Proxy Statement which failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 69. As stated herein, the Proxy Statement contained untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements that were made not misleading in violation of §14(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder, which the Proxy Statement was an essential link in the consummation of the Merger. The defendants have also failed to correct the Proxy Statement and the failure to update and correct false statements is also a violation of §14(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. 70. The written communications made by the defendants described herein constitute violations of Rule 14a-9 and §14(a) because such communications are materially false and/or misleading and were provided in at least a negligent manner. 71. As a direct result of the defendants’ negligent preparation, review and dissemination of the false and/or misleading Proxy Statement, plaintiff and the class were precluded both from exercising their right to seek appraisal and were induced to vote their shares and accept inadequate consideration of $5.75 per share in connection with the Merger. - 23 - The false and/or misleading Proxy Statement used to obtain stockholder approval of the Merger deprived plaintiff and the class of their right to a fully informed stockholder vote in connection therewith and the full and fair value for their Lionbridge shares. At all times relevant to the dissemination of the materially false and/or misleading Proxy Statement, defendants were aware of and/or had access to the true facts concerning Lionbridge’s acquisition-based growth strategy, which was not reflected in the management projections that were disclosed in the Proxy Statement, and as a result were aware that Lionbridge’s true value was materially higher than indicated in Union Square’s financial analyses based on those projections and materially higher than the $5.75 per share that Lionbridge’s stockholders received in the Merger. Thus, as a direct and proximate result of the dissemination of the false and/or misleading Proxy Statement defendants used to obtain stockholder approval of and thereby consummate the Merger, Plaintiff and the class have suffered damage and actual economic losses (i.e., the difference between the price Lionbridge stockholders received and Lionbridge’s true value at the time of the Merger) in an amount to be determined at trial. 72. The omissions and false and misleading statements in the Proxy Statement are material in that a reasonable stockholder would have considered them important in deciding how to vote on the Merger. In addition, a reasonable investor would view a full and accurate disclosure as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made available in the Proxy Statement and in other information reasonably available to shareholders. 73. By reason of the misconduct detailed herein, the defendants are liable pursuant to §14(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. - 24 - 74. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained above in ¶¶1-65, as if fully set forth herein. 75. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Lionbridge within the meaning of §20(a) of the 1934 Act. (a) By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors and/or controlling stockholders of Lionbridge, and/or their participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the Proxy Statement filed with the SEC, the Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements which Plaintiff contends are false and misleading. (b) Each of the Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Proxy Statement and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading before and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. (c) The Proxy Statement details the Individual Defendants’ involvement in negotiating, reviewing and approving the Merger and preparation of the Proxy Statement. (d) The Proxy Statement contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Merger. They were thus directly involved in the making of this document. (e) By reason of such conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the 1934 Act. - 25 - 76. The Buyer Defendants are a controlling person of Lionbridge and the Individual Defendants within the meaning of §20(a) of the 1934 Act. By reason of its contractual obligations with Lionbridge, the Individual Defendants, and defendant Cowan in particular, the Buyer Defendants possessed control over Lionbridge and the Individual Defendants. (a) Lionbridge and the Individual Defendants were required by §6.01 of the Merger Agreement to refrain from changing the operation of the Company’s business or engaging in a variety of activities without the express written consent of the Buyer Defendants. (b) Pursuant to §6.04(a) of the Merger Agreement, Lionbridge was not permitted to change the record date for the stockholder meeting on the Merger without the Buyer Defendants’ prior written consent. (c) Pursuant to §6.04(b) of the Merger Agreement, the Buyer Defendants were required to, and did, “cooperate with the Company in connection with the preparation and filing of the Proxy Statement, including as promptly as practicable furnishing to the Company in writing upon request any and all information relating to it as may be required to be set forth in the Proxy Statement under Applicable Law.” HIG also promised to ensure that such information supplied by it in writing for inclusion in the Proxy Statement will not, on the date it is first mailed to stockholders of the Company and at the time of the Stockholder Meeting or filed with the SEC (as applicable), contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary in order to make the statements therein, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not false or misleading. HIG also explicitly required that, “prior to filing or mailing the Proxy Statement or any other required filings (any amendment or supplement thereto), or responding to any comments of the SEC with respect thereto, the Company shall provide Parent and its counsel with a - 26 - reasonable opportunity to review and comment on such document or response and shall consider Parent’s comments in good faith.” 77. By reason of such conduct, the Buyer Defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the 1934 Act. Against the Individual Defendants and the Buyer Defendants for Violation of §20(a) of the 1934 Act Against All Defendants for Violations of §14(a) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder

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11. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 12. Some time prior to August 20, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to T-Mobile 40. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following classes, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 41. Class A consists of (a) all individuals in the State of New Jersey (b) whose information was shared by Defendant to its mail house (c) in connection with a debt purportedly whose original creditor was T-Mobile USA, (d) during the one-year period preceding the filing of the Complaint in this action. 43. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect debts. 44. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 45. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s practice, of sharing debtor’s personal and protected information with its mail house, violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c and 1692f. 46. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 47. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 49. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 50. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 51. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 52. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. 53. Pursuant to Section 15 U.S.C. §1692c of the FDCPA: “Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.” (emphasis added). 55. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692c et seq. of the FDCPA, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 56. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 57. Pursuant to Section 15 U.S.C. §1692e of the FDCPA, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 58. The Defendant violated said provision by: • falsely representing the amount of the debt in violation of §1692e(2); • using false, deceptive and misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). 59. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 60. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 62. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f by using unfair means in connection with the collection a debt, to wit, knowingly disclosing sensitive information about Plaintiff’s debt to third parties not expressly authorized under the FDCPA. 63. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692c et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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18. In or around December of 2007, a third party, CSGA, LLC obtained a default judgment against Plaintiff. 19. Between December of 2009 and July of 2013, Plaintiff received multiple collection letters from four different creditors, each claiming at they owned the judgment. 20. In or around May 30, 2016 Plaintiff received a collection letter from Defendant claiming that assignment of judgment has been transferred from CSGA, LLC to Defendant. 21. On or around June 28, 2016, Plaintiff sent a Cease & Desist Letter to Defendant to stop contacting Plaintiff and to verify the alleged debt. 22. On or around August 12, 2016 Defendant sent Plaintiff a Bill of Sale and Assignment indicating that Defendant purchased the judgment and became the assignee of the judgment on August 24, 2015 from third party DRS Acquisitions, LLC. However, the Bill of Sale did not even identify Plaintiff’s specific judgment. 23. Instead, the Bill of Sale tracked the ownership of judgments from December of 2007 to August of 2015. The Bill of Sale stated that the judgment was originally recorded by CSGA, LLC in December of 2007 and then changed ownership to these companies on the listed dates: 1) DRS Acquisitions, LLC on December 21, 2009; 2) LPI on January 10, 2010; 3) DRS, LLC on November 10, 2011; 4) DRS Acquisitions, LLC on July 11, 2013; 5) LVNV Funding, LLC on April 29, 2016; and, 6) Caddis Funding, LLC 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth above. 58. Actions for relief under the unfair competition law may be based on any business act or practice that is within the broad definition of the UCL. Such violations of the UCL occur as a result of unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts and practices. A plaintiff is required to provide evidence of a causal connection between a defendants' business practices and the alleged harm--that is, evidence that the defendants' conduct caused or was likely to cause substantial injury. It is insufficient for a plaintiff to show merely that the Defendant’s conduct created a risk of harm. Furthermore, the "act or practice" aspect of the statutory definition of unfair competition covers any single act of misconduct, as well as ongoing misconduct. 75. Plaintiff incorporates by reference, the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 76. Defendant’s conduct violated the FDCPA in multiple ways, including but not limited to: (a) Falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of Plaintiff’s debt (§ 1692e(2)(A)); (b) Using false representations and deceptive practices in connection with collection of an alleged debt from Plaintiff (§ 1692e(10); (c) Using unfair or unconscionable means against Plaintiff in connection with an attempt to collect a debt (§ 1692f)); (d) Collecting an amount from Plaintiff that is not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt (§ 1692f(1)); and, (e) Collecting an amount from Plaintiff that is not permitted by law (§ 1692f(1)). 78. Plaintiff incorporates by reference, the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 79. Pursuant to §1788.17 of the RFDCPA: “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this title, every debt collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt shall comply with the provisions of Sections 1692b to 1692j, inclusive, of, and shall be subject to the remedies in Section 1692k of, Title 15 of the United States Code. However, subsection (11) of Section 1692e and Section 1692g shall not apply to any person specified in paragraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (6) of Section 1692a of Title 15 of the United States Code or that person's principal. The references to federal codes in this section refer to those codes as they read January 1, 2001.” Cal. Civ. Code §1788.17 80. Thus by engaging in conduct prohibited by Sections e(2)(A), e(10), f, and f(1) of the FDCPA, Defendant violated the RFDCPA. 81. As a direct proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered actual damages and other harm, thereby entitling them to seek statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.00 each, actual damages and reasonably incurred attorney’s fees and costs. Cal. Civ. Code §1788.30. Violation of Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act [On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Sub-Class] Violation of Unfair Business Practices Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.) [On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class] Violation of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act [On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class]

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17. Microsoft maintains uniform employment, compensation, performance review, and promotion policies throughout the United States. Microsoft also cultivates and promotes a common corporate culture. 18. Microsoft’s offices throughout the U.S. use a common organizational structure, organizing technical employees by levels. 19. Microsoft discriminates against female technical employees in (1) performance evaluations; (2) compensation; and (3) promotions. Performance Evaluations 20. Microsoft uses uniform, unvalidated, and unreliable procedures for evaluating employee performance that systematically undervalue female technical employees relative to their similarly situated male peers. 30. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (c)(4) seeking liability-phase injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of a Class of all female technical employees employed by Microsoft in the United States at any time from September 16, 2009 through the resolution of this action for claims under Title VII. Plaintiff also brings this class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) seeking backpay, monetary damages and other make-whole relief on behalf of a Class of all female technical employees employed by Microsoft in the United States at any time from September 16, 2009 through the resolution of this action for claims under Title VII. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Class based on discovery or legal developments. 31. Plaintiff also brings this class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (c)(4) seeking liability-phase injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of a Class of all female technical employees employed by Microsoft in the United States at any time from September 16, 2012 through the resolution of this action for claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination. Plaintiff also brings this class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) seeking backpay, monetary damages and other make-whole relief on behalf of a Class of all female technical employees employed by Microsoft in the United States at any time from September 16, 2012 through the resolution of this action for claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Class based on discovery or legal developments. 32. Plaintiff is a member of the Class she seeks to represent. 51. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 52. This claim is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the Class she seeks to represent. Plaintiff has filed a timely charge with the EEOC and has thus exhausted her administrative remedies. 53. Microsoft has engaged in an intentional, company-wide, and systematic policy, pattern, and/or practice of discrimination against its female technical employees. Microsoft has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff and the Class in violation of Title VII by, among other things: a. Utilizing a biased performance rating system; b. Utilizing a biased compensation system; c. Utilizing a biased promotion system; and d. Failing to take reasonable and adequate steps to prevent and correct the use of standardless, unvalidated, and/or illegitimate criteria to determine the terms and conditions of employment. 59. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 60. This claim is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the Class she seeks to represent. Plaintiff has timely filed a charge with the EEOC and has thus exhausted her administrative remedies. 61. Microsoft’s reliance on illegitimate and unvalidated systems and criteria to evaluate employee performance, set compensation, and select individuals for promotion, and determine other terms and conditions of employment, have an adverse impact on female technical employees in violation of Title VII and are not, and cannot be, justified by business necessity. Even if such system and/or policies could be justified by business necessity, less discriminatory alternatives exist and would equally serve any alleged necessity. 66. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 67. This claim is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the Class she seeks to represent. 68. Microsoft has engaged in an intentional, company-wide, and systematic policy, pattern, and/or practice of discrimination against its female technical employees. Microsoft has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff and the Class in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination by, among other things: a. Utilizing a biased performance rating system; b. Utilizing a biased compensation system; c. Utilizing a biased promotion system; and d. Failing to take reasonable and adequate steps to prevent and correct the use of standardless, unvalidated, and/or illegitimate criteria to determine the terms and conditions of employment. Disparate Impact Discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Intentional Discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Intentional Discrimination (Washington Law Against Discrimination, Rev. Code Wash. 49.60.010. et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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17. Amicus Therapeutics, Inc. is a biotechnology company that developed therapies for rare and orphan diseases. 18. The Company has developed a therapy, an oral small molecule pharmacological chaperone called migalastat, for the treatment of Fabry disease. Amicus’ treatment purports to be a new option for patients afflicted by Fabry disease who have amenable mutations. 20. Prior to submitting an NDA, pharmaceutical companies can engage in a process with the FDA, which can include a “Pre-NDA” meeting to discuss the development of the drugs at issue. 21. Executives from Amicus attended such a meeting with the FDA on September 15, 2015, where it discussed its development of migalastat. 23. Those that follow Amicus reacted positively to the press release. One Twitter user, @bradloncar, stated on September 15 “$FOLD – 4Q15 AA NDA still on track after pre-NDA meeting. With reduction in disease substrate as primary endpoint,” while linking to the press release. Another Twitter user, @XsleepftLearner, tweeted “[positive] NDA news,” along with a link to the press release. 25. While Crowley stated that “[t]he guidance provided by the FDA during the [September 15, 2015] Pre-NDA meeting further reinforces our confidence in the NDA package and post-marketing confirmatory study we are preparing for submission by the end of this year,” the FDA apparently provided no such guidance to Crowley or others at Amicus during the September 15, 2015 meeting. 27. After this so-called “Regulatory Update” revealed to the market that Amicus had misstated the nature and outcome of the September 15, 2015 Pre-NDA meeting, Amicus stock plummeted. 28. Amicus’ stock price, which closed at $13.75 per share on October 1, 2015, and traded as high as $18.23 during the period between September 15, 2015 and October 1, 2015, opened on October 2, 2015 at $5.98 per share and traded as low as $5.69 per share, before closing at $6.39 per share. 30. Joseph P. Schwartz, an analyst for investment bank Lerink Partners, LLC, who covers Amicus, is reported to have stated that the company’s October 2, 2015 press release came as a “huge surprise” to investors and noted that “[a]dditional clinical data will be required to bolster the case for approval in the 46. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a Class of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Amicus common stock between September 15, 2015 and October 1, 2015, inclusive. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, directors, and officers of Amicus, as well as their families and affiliates. 47. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. 49. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct alleged herein. 50. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel who are experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with those of the Class. 51. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 57. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as it fully set forth herein. 58. During the Class Period, Defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 59. Defendants violated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they (i) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (ii) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading; and (iii) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon those who purchased or otherwise acquired Amicus securities during the Class Period. 61. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 62. Crowley acted as a controlling person of Amicus within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of his high-level position at the Company, Crowley had the power and authority to cause or prevent Amicus from engaging in the wrongful conduct complained of herein. Crowley was provided with or had unlimited access to the September 15, 2015 press release and other statements alleged by Plaintiffs to be misleading both prior to and immediately after their publication, and had the ability to prevent the issuance of these materials or to cause them to be corrected so as not to be misleading. Violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder (Against All Defendants) Violation of § 20(a) of the Exchange Act (Against John F. Crowley)

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13. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “12” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 14. Some time prior to August 16, 2014, an obligation was allegedly incurred to First Premier Bank. (“FPB”) 15. The FPB obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 16. The alleged FPB obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 17. FPB is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 18. Defendant contends that the FPB debt is past due. 19. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 20. FPB directly or through an intermediary contracted the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. 21. On or about August 16, 2014, the Defendant caused to be delivered to the Plaintiff a letter in an attempt to collect the alleged FPB debt. See Exhibit A. 23. The August 16, 2014 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 24. The August 16, 2014 letter was sent in an envelope that contained a glassine window. 25. Visible through the glassine window above the Plaintiff’s address was the Plaintiff’s account number with the Defendant. 26. The account number constitutes personal identifying information. 27. The account number is not meaningless – it is a piece of information capable of identifying [the consumer] as a debtor, and its disclosure has the potential to cause harm to a consumer that the FDCPA was enacted to address. Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F. 3d 299 (Third Cir. 2014). 28. Defendant’s actions as described herein are part of a pattern and practice used to collect consumer debts. 29. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 30. On information and belief, Defendant sent a written communication, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the State of New Jersey within one year of the date of this Complaint. 32. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 33. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f(8), a debt collector is prohibited from using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with the consumer by use of mails. 34. The Defendant violated said section by putting the Plaintiff’s account number visible on theAugust 16, 2014 letter. 35. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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16. Progrexion employs more than 1,500 employees at its call centers in Utah, Idaho, Arizona, and Oklahoma. Progrexion’s hourly call-center employees receive calls from Progrexion’s clients and assist those clients with repairing their credit reports.2 17. Upon information and belief, Progrexion is a privately-held company with call centers located in Salt Lake City, Utah; North Salt Lake, Utah; West Valley, Utah; Provo, Utah; Rexburg, Idaho; Idaho Falls, Idaho; Phoenix, Arizona; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 18. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of answering phone calls made by Progrexion’s clients, answering customer inquiries, troubleshooting on behalf of customers, and generally assisting customers with matters related to their credit reports. 19. Plaintiff Winter was employed by Progrexion in customer service at its call center located in Phoenix, Arizona from approximately February 2017 until May 2017. 20. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt call-center employees who were (and are) paid by the hour. 22. In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members often work up to two and a half hours “off-the-clock” per week and are not compensated for that time. 23. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours they worked for Progrexion as a result of Progrexion’s corporate policy and practice of requiring all hourly call-center employees to be ready to take their first phone call the moment their official shift starts. 24. Specifically, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are required to start and log-in to their computer, open multiple different Progrexion computer programs, log in to each Progrexion program, and ensure that each Progrexion program is running correctly—all of which can take up to thirty minutes—before they are able to take their first phone call, which comes in as soon as their official shift starts. 25. During this start up time, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not compensated although they were expected to have completed this process in advance of their official start time. 27. As a result, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA. 28. Progrexion has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiff. 29. Progrexion is aware of its obligation to pay for all hours worked and overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week to Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members but has failed to do so. 30. Because Progrexion did not pay Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members time and a half for all hours worked and overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week, Progrexion’s pay policies and practices violated (and continue to violate) the FLSA. 31. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 32. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 48. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 49. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of Progrexion’s employees who have been similarly situated to Plaintiff with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they were paid. 50. Other similarly situated employees of Progrexion have been victimized by Progrexion’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 51. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 32. 53. Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 54. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members do not prevent collective treatment. 55. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked over forty (40) hours each week. 56. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 57. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Progrexion will retain the proceeds of its violations. 58. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. A. FLSA COVERAGE

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22. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of all holders of the common stock of the Company (except the Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any of the Defendants) and their successors in interest, who are or will be threatened with injury arising from Defendants’ actions, as more fully described herein (the “Class”). 23. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 24. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of October 31, 2018, there were reportedly approximately 148,901,892 shares of Pacific Biosciences common stock outstanding owned by thousands of shareholders spread across the United States. 57. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 58. Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act provides that it is “unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1). 59. Rule 14a-9, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, provides that Proxy communications with shareholders shall not contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. 60. As set forth above, Pacific Biosciences filed and delivered the Proxy to its stockholders, which Defendants knew, or recklessly disregarded that they, contained material omissions and misstatements described herein. 67. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 68. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Pacific Biosciences within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Pacific Biosciences, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 69. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Proxy and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 70. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the Exchange Act violations alleged herein, and exercised the same. The Proxy at issue contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to vote their shares in support of the Proposed Transaction. They were thus directly involved in preparing the Proxy. 71. In addition, as the Proxy sets forth at length, and as described herein, the Individual Defendants were involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger Agreement. The Proxy purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants reviewed and considered. The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their input on the content of those descriptions. Background of the Merger On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder

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22. The crux of the FLSA and South Carolina state law is, inter alia: (i) that all employees are entitled to be paid mandated minimum wages for all hours worked; (ii) that all employees are entitled to premium overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours a week; (iii) that all gratuities earned by an employee are the property of the employee; and (iv) that wages cannot be diverted from employees to offset the business expenses of the employer, particularly without the express, freely-given consent of the employees. 24. Plaintiff and the members of the Nationwide Collective Class are, or were, Dancers who worked at any of Defendant’s business locations. 25. Plaintiff and the members of the SC Class are, or were, Dancers who worked at Defendant’s business locations in South Carolina. 26. Thee New DollHouse is operated by Defendant under uniform policies applicable to all members of the Classes. Through these policies and procedures, Defendant maintains significant supervision and control over Plaintiff and members of both Classes. 27. Notwithstanding Defendant’s classification of Dancers as independent contractors, as set forth below, due to the amount of control Defendant has over its Dancers, Dancers are legally Defendant’s employees. 28. Defendant has the power to hire and fire Dancers and has specific rules governing the conditions under which Dancers work. 29. Further, a Dancer is required to check in with the podium host and “House Mom” as soon as they arrive for their shift. Indeed, there is a sign-in book that the House Mom keeps. 31. Further, Defendant required its Dancers, including Plaintiff and members of the Classes, to pay “House Fees” for each shift that Dancers worked. 32. Typically, the House Fees range from $25 per shift to $100 per shift and are changed by Defendant without any advance notice to the Dancers. 33. It is black letter law that tips received by an employee are the employee’s tips and an employer has no ownership interest in said tips. Indeed, according to the DOL’s Regulations, “[t]ips are the property of the employee whether or not the employer has taken a tip credit under section 3(m) of the FLSA.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.52. Despite this plain fact, Defendant unlawfully retained a portion of tips Dancers received from Defendant’s customers. 34. Defendant mandates the fees a Dancer may charge customers for her services. By way of example, Defendant maintains a policy establishing the amount a Dancer is required to charge for private performances. 35. For example, Defendant mandates that the price of a private “lap dance” for one song is $30, of which a Dancer must pay Defendant $10, and that the price for a private dance for 30 minutes is $300, of which a Dancer must pay Defendant $50. 36. As a result, customers who believe that they are tipping Dancers a certain amount are actually tipping them less, due to the aforementioned deductions taken by Defendant. 37. As set forth below, these deductions are in contravention of applicable law. 39. Upon information and belief, Defendant uses these tips paid by Dancers to offset its ordinary business expenses. Stated another way, Defendant requires Dancers to pay cash to these individuals so that Thee New DollHouse can then reduce its labor costs by having the Dancers supplement the compensation Defendant pays its other employees. 40. The number of individuals Dancers are required to pay is numerous and the tip amount is significant. Defendant has a mandatory tip out policy whereby Dancers must each pay a minimum of (i) $10 to the House Mom, (ii) $5 to the club’s DJ, (iii) $5 to the valet attendant, and (iv) $5 to the Floor Host. The aforementioned amounts are the required minimum “tip.” 41. As a result of the mandatory house fees and required tip-outs, Dancers sometimes receive little to no actual compensation despite hours of work. 42. Thee New DollHouse requires Dancers to wear certain types of clothes, including a “dancer’s G-string.” If a Dancer does not have such apparel, they are required to purchase their uniforms from the House Mom, and Defendant does not reimburse them for the cost of their uniforms. In addition, Defendant does not pay for the cost of laundering or maintaining these unique uniforms. 43. Exemplifying the degree of control Defendant has over Plaintiff and members of the Classes, Dancers are not permitted to select their own music. 44. In short, Defendant maintains significant supervision and control over Plaintiff and members of the Classes and sets the rules governing the conditions under which Dancers work. 46. The extent of Defendant’s control over its Dancers is demonstrated by the fact that Dancers were prohibited from performing at any competing clubs during the same period they worked at Thee New DollHouse. 47. Defendant has been unjustly enriched to the detriment of the Classes by: (i) requiring Dancers to pay money out of their tips to pay for the ordinary business expenses of Defendant; (ii) requiring Dancers to forfeit a portion of their tips to Defendant; (iii) paying Dancers less than the mandated minimum wage while failing to comply with the requirements for doing so; and (v) failing to pay Dancers premium overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty in a work week. 48. Further evidencing Defendant’s unjust enrichment, when Plaintiff and members of the Classes appear outside the club on Defendant’s behalf, they receive no remuneration for their time. 49. In addition, Defendant does not compensate Plaintiff or other members of the Classes for Defendant’s use of the Dancers’ image on Defendant’s website and/or Facebook page. 50. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiff believed she was an employee of Defendant. Indeed, Plaintiff made appearances at public events representing herself as a Dancer of Defendant and advertising Defendant’s business. 52. While Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact amount owed to the Classes, Plaintiff believes that such information will become available during the course of discovery. Irrespective of the foregoing, when an employer fails to keep complete and accurate time records, employees may establish the hours worked solely by their testimony and the burden of overcoming such testimony shifts to the employer. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946). 53. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the Nationwide Collective Class as a collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b). Plaintiff also brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and the SC Class for claims under the South Carolina state laws. 54. The claims under the FLSA may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The claims brought pursuant to the South Carolina state laws may be pursued by all similarly-situated persons who do not opt out of the SC Class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 55. Upon information and belief, the members of each of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of the members of these Classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes there are over one hundred individuals in each of the Classes. 56. Defendant has acted or has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole appropriate. 58. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the Classes that predominate over any questions only affecting them individually and include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) whether Plaintiff and Dancers were improperly classified as independent contractors by Defendant; (b) whether Defendant has failed to pay minimum wages for each hour worked; (c) whether Plaintiff and Dancers were required to pay Defendant, in cash, fees for each shift worked; (d) whether Defendant improperly retained and/or diverted any portion of Plaintiff’s and Dancers’ tips; (e) whether Defendant has failed to pay overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek; (f) whether Defendant provided proper notice to Dancers before setting or changing their compensation; (g) whether Plaintiff and members of the Classes are entitled to compensatory damages, and if so, the means of measuring such damages; (h) whether Plaintiff and members of the Classes are entitled to restitution; and (i) whether Defendant is liable for attorney’s fees and costs. 59. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes as her interests are in alignment with those of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has no interests adverse to the Classes she seeks to represent, and she has retained competent and experienced counsel. 61. Plaintiff and the Classes she seeks to represent have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable damage from Defendant’s illegal pay practices. 62. Defendant has acted willfully and has engaged in a continuing violation of the FLSA and South Carolina state laws. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Nationwide Collective Class, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. 64. At all relevant times, Defendant has had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 65. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 66. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and/or continues to employ, Plaintiff and each of the Nationwide Collective Class Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 67. Pursuant to Defendant’s compensation policies, rather than pay Dancers the federally-mandated minimum wage, Defendant improperly classified Plaintiff and other Dancers as independent contractors. 68. As a result of the Defendant’s willful practices, Defendant was not entitled to pay Plaintiff and the members of the Nationwide Collective Class less than the mandated minimum wage for all hours worked. 70. Due to Defendant’s FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the members of the Nationwide Collective Class, is entitled to recover from the Defendant compensation for unpaid wages; an additional equal amount as liquidated damages; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Nationwide Collective Class, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. 72. At all relevant times, Defendant has had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 73. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 74. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and/or continues to employ, Plaintiff and each of the Nationwide Collective Class Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 75. At relevant times in the period encompassed by this Complaint, Defendant had, and maintains, a willful policy and practice of refusing to pay premium overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek due to Defendant’s improper classification of Plaintiff and Dancers as independent contractors. 76. Defendant has violated, and continues to violate, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 78. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the members of the SC Class, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. 79. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and/or continues to employ, Plaintiff and each of the SC Class Members within the meaning of the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-10-10 to 110 (“PWA”). Plaintiff and the SC Class Members are “employees” and are not free from the control and direction of Defendant. 80. Plaintiff and the SC Class Members worked for Defendant with the clear understanding and agreement by Defendant that their compensation would be consistent with all applicable laws, including federal and state wage and hour laws. 81. Pursuant to the PWA, “[a]n employer shall not withhold or divert any portion of an employee’s wages unless the employer is required or permitted to do so by state or federal law . . . .” Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the SC Class were entitled to receive all compensation due and owing to them. 83. Due to Defendant’s policy of deducting amounts from the tips of Plaintiff and the SC Class to offset business expenses, Plaintiff and the SC Class were subject to improper deductions from their compensation. Specifically, Defendant unlawfully withheld and diverted monies from the compensation earned by Plaintiff and the SC Class for business expenses of Defendant, including, but not limited to, the cost of employing other workers, in direct violation of the PWA. Plaintiff and the SC Class Members have not expressly and freely given written consent to such deductions, and these deductions were not made in response to a valid wage assignment or deduction order. Such deductions were not for the Plaintiff’s and SC Class Members’ benefit. 84. Defendant has set, reduced, withheld and/or diverted the wages of Plaintiff and the SC Class Members without providing advance notice of such amounts, and absent any lawfully sufficient reason for such conduct. 85. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the SC Class have suffered substantial losses and have been deprived of compensation to which they are entitled, including monetary damages in the amount of three times the unpaid wages, as well as costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of the Nationwide Collective Class) FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OVERTIME WAGE VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of the Nationwide Collective Class) SOUTH CAROLINA PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT (On Behalf of the SC Class)

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32. Cynthia L. Czuhaj brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 33. The classes which Consumer Representative seeks to represent are defined as follows: 34. A class consisting of all "consumers" as defined by Cal. Civ. Code §1761(d) residing in the United States who purchased, not for resale, a Conair Infiniti Pro 1875 watt Salon Performance hair dryer ("Hair Dryer") at any time in the four years preceding the filing of this action (the "Nationwide Class"). The Nationwide Class seeks certification of claims based on Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, et seq. ("UCL"), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17500 et seq. ("FAL"), Cal. Civ. Code §1750 et seq. ("CLRA"), Strict Products Liability – Product, and/or Strict Products Liability – Failure to Warn. 43. The Plaintiff/Consumer Representative repeats and re-alleges all prior paragraphs and incorporate them as if fully set forth herein. 44. Defendant has engaged in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices or acts as set forth above. 45. The Consumer Representative brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and the Nationwide Class, or in the alternative, the California Class pursuant to California Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. 46. Defendant's conduct constitutes unfair business acts and/or practices because Defendant's practices have caused and are likely to cause substantial injury to Plaintiff and consumers which injury is not reasonably avoidable by Plaintiff and consumers in light of Defendant's exclusive knowledge of the defects in the Hair Dryers, and is not outweighed by the acts' or practices' benefits, if any, to Plaintiffs and consumers. Such conduct is ongoing and continues to this date. 73. The Plaintiff/Consumer Representative repeats and re-alleges all prior paragraphs and incorporate them as if fully set forth herein. 74. Plaintiff, and others similarly situated, purchased Hair Dryers which were manufactured, distributed or sold by Defendant. 75. The potential for the Hair Dryers to catch fire while drying hair or even while off but still plugged in presents a substantial danger to consumers. 76. Plaintiff and other ordinary consumers would not have recognized the potential risk of the Hair Dryer to spark and/or catch fire. 79. The Plaintiff/Consumer Representative repeats and re-alleges all prior paragraphs and incorporate them as if fully set forth herein. 8. Conair is one of the world's largest privately held health and beauty companies and has been around for more than 50 years. It develops, designs, manufactures and sells health and beauty products nationwide through direct website sales and through nationwide retailers such as Sam's Club, Wal-Mart, Target and CVS Pharmacies. Conair holds the number one position in the industry with hair dryers.1 80. Plaintiff purchased the Hair Dryer from Conair's authorized retailer, Sam's Club. 81. Pursuant to an agreements for resale of the Hair Dryers between Conair and nationwide retailers including, but not limited to, Sam's Club, Target, CVS Pharmacies, Amazon and Wal-Mart Stores, Plaintiff and California Class Members are third-party beneficiaries of such contracts. 82. At the time of sale, and currently, Defendant is in the business of manufacturing, distributing and selling hair dryers. 83. Defendant knowingly and/or recklessly sold a defective product without conspicuously informing consumers about the defect. Defendant possessed actual superior knowledge of the Hair Dryer's propensity to spark and/or catch fire based on consumer complaints filed through the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Conair's customer service representatives and internal investigations. 88. The Plaintiff/Consumer Representative repeats and re-alleges all prior paragraphs and incorporate them as if fully set forth herein. Asserted on Behalf of the Nationwide Class, and Alternatively on Behalf of the California Class (Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq.) Asserted on Behalf of the California Class (Breach of Implied Warranty) Asserted on Behalf of the Nationwide Class, and Alternatively on Behalf of the California Class Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§1750, et seq. Asserted on Behalf of the Nationwide Class, and Alternatively on Behalf of the California Class (Strict Products Liability-Defective Design or Manufacture) Asserted on Behalf of the Nationwide Class, and Alternatively on Behalf of the California Class (Strict Products Liability-Failure to Warn) Asserted on Behalf of the Nationwide Class, and Alternatively on Behalf of the California Class (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§2301, et seq.)

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46. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 47. Plaintiff and Defendant are parties to a contract regarding the use of the Uber platform, including terms regarding eligible vehicles stating that Acura MDX, Audi Q7, Chevrolet LTZ, Chevrolet Tahoe, Ford Expedition (non-Platinum series), Infinity QX60, Mercedes GL Class, Nissan Armada, Toyota Sequoia and/or other vehicles of an appropriate model year could be used be in connection with the Uber BlackSUV service level. 49. The conduct of Defendant was a direct and proximate cause, as well as a substantial factor, in bringing about the serious injuries, actual damages and harm to the Plaintiff and the Class that are outlined more fully above and, as a result, Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and the Class for the full amount of actual damages, as well as such further relief, as may be permitted by law. 50. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 51. In its business dealings with Plaintiff and other drivers in the State of New Jersey, Uber repeatedly made binding representations or promises stating that Acura MDX, Audi Q7, Chevrolet LTZ, Chevrolet Tahoe, Ford Expedition (non-Platinum series), Infinity QX60, Mercedes GL Class, Nissan Armada, Toyota Sequoia and/or other vehicles of an appropriate model year were eligible to be used in connection with Uber’s Uber BlackSUV service level. 52. Uber made these representations or promises with the intent that Plaintiff and other New Jersey-based drivers would rely on them in selecting vehicles to use on the Uber platform. 53. Plaintiff and other New Jersey-based drivers reasonably relied upon Uber’s representations and promises regarding vehicle eligibility in selecting vehicles. 55. The conduct of Defendant was a direct and proximate cause, as well as a substantial factor, in bringing about the serious injuries, actual damages and harm to the Plaintiff and the Class that are outlined more fully above and, as a result, Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff and the Class for the full amount of actual damages, as well as such further relief, as may be permitted by law. 56. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 57. The agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding access to the Uber platform contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 58. By, contrary to its prior representations, terminating the ability of Plaintiff and other drivers of otherwise eligible Acura MDX, Audi Q7, Chevrolet LTZ, Chevrolet Tahoe, Ford Expedition (non-Platinum series), Infinity QX60, Mercedes GL Class, Nissan Armada, Toyota Sequoia and/or vehicles from accessing the Uber BlackSUV service level, Defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 59. Defendant acted in bad faith and/or with a malicious motive to deny Plaintiff and other drivers of some of the benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties, thereby causing Plaintiff and other drivers damages as outlined above. Breach of Contract Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Promissory Estoppel

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21. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs by reference as if set forth fully in this section. 23. On information and belief, Encinal, Texas is/was the single site of employment, as defined by the WARN Act, for employees of Defendant, such as Martinez and the Class Members. On information and belief, management of Defendant’s South Texas oilfield operations in addition to management and administrative support of Martinez and the Class members, is/was conducted at/from/through the Encinal, Texas single site of employment. 24. Martinez worked with numerous other employees of Defendant. Those employees performed oilfield operations/support of oilfield operations for Defendant. Like Martinez, those workers are/were subject to Defendant’s Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing made the subject matter of this lawsuit. 25. Martinez was verbally notified by Defendant on or about January 14, 2015 that his employment with Defendant was terminated or that he otherwise was subject to an employment loss. Martinez was not discharged for cause, did not voluntarily resign, and did not retire. 26. On information and belief, the employment losses at the Encinal, Texas site of employment made the subject matter of this lawsuit occurred within a 30 day period of Martinez’s Employment Loss. Alternatively, and on information and belief, those employment losses occurred within a 90 day period of Martinez’s Employment Loss, such employment losses not being the result of separate and distinct actions and causes. 28. The exact number of employees who experienced an employment loss at the Encinal, Texas site of employment made the basis of this lawsuit within a 30 day and 90 day period of Martinez’s Employment Loss is information that is only known to Defendant. Similarly, the exact number of employees employed at/from/through that site of employment is information that is currently known only to Defendant. 29. Martinez and the Class Members were not provided with 60 days’ advance written notice by Defendant of their employment loss, Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing. 30. Martinez and the Class Members were not provided with any written notice by Defendant prior to their employment loss, Mass Layoff and/or Plant Closing. 31. Martinez and the Class Members were not provided with written notice, at any time prior to their termination, of each and every of the following items in connection with their employment loss: (a) A statement as to whether the planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is to be closed, a statement to that effect; (b) The expected date when the plant closing or mass layoff will commence and the expected date when the individual employee will be separated; (c) An indication whether or not bumping rights exist; (d) The name and telephone number of a company official to contact for further information. IV. 51. Martinez incorporates the preceding paragraphs by reference as if set forth fully in this section. 52. Martinez brings this action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(1) and (3) and the WARN Act 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5). 53. Martinez brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees. Martinez seeks to represent a Class initially defined as: “All of Defendant’s employees working at/from/through Defendant’s Encinal, Texas site of employment for its drilling services operations who experienced an employment loss during the 30 or 90 day period from January 14, 2015 without 60 days’ advance written notice required by the WARN Act.” Martinez requests the opportunity to expand, narrow or modify the class definition pursuant to a motion for class certification and/or amended pleading to the extent discovery reveals that there is more than one single site of employment for Defendant’s oilfield operations. 54. Martinez and the Class Members are “affected employee(s)” subject to an “employment loss,” as those terms are defined in the WARN Act at 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(5) and (6). 56. On information and belief, the Class Members is so numerous that joinder is therefore impracticable. The precise number of Class Members and their addresses are readily determinable from Defendant’s records. 57. There are common questions of fact and law as to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The questions of law and fact common to the class arising from Defendant’s actions/omissions include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the provisions of the WARN Act apply; b. Whether Defendant’s employees at the Encinal, Texas site of employment for Defendant’s oilfield operations experienced an employment loss in connection with a “Mass Layoff” and/or “Plant Closing” under the WARN Act; c. Whether Defendant failed to provide the notices required by the WARN Act; d. Whether Defendant can avail itself of any provisions of the WARN Act permitting lesser periods of written notice; and e. The appropriate method to calculate damages under the WARN Act. 58. The questions above predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons, and a class action is superior with respect to considerations of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness and equity, to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the WARN Act claims. 60. Martinez is an affected former employee of Defendant who experienced an employment loss during the relevant 30 day and 90 day “look ahead” and “look behind” periods of the WARN Act, 20 C.F.R. § 639.5, without the required written notice. Martinez is, therefore, a member of the class. Martinez is committed to pursuing this action and has retained counsel with extensive experience in prosecuting complex wage, employment, and class action litigation. Accordingly, Martinez is an adequate representative of the class and has the same interests as all of its members. Further, Martinez’s claims are typical of the claims of all members of the Class, and Martinez will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the absent members of the class. Martinez and his counsel do not have claims or interests that are adverse to the Class Members. 61. Furthermore, class action treatment of this lawsuit is authorized and appropriate under the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(5), which provides that a plaintiff seeking to enforce liabilities under the Act may sue either on his or her behalf, for other persons similarly situated, or both.

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5.1 Defendant Capital Alliance Group provides short term business loans and equipment financing and leasing to small to middle-sized companies. On information and belief, part of Defendant’s strategy for increasing the volume of its customers involves sending unsolicited facsimile advertisements to solicit business, many of which are made to recipients who have not consented to receive these facsimiles. 5.2 On or about August 14, 2013, Plaintiff received a fax offering “SHORT TERM BUSINESS LOAN – FAST AND SIMPLE”. The fax advertised that it provided capital for small businesses as an alternative to traditional bank financing. 5.3 The fax encouraged the reader to go to www.communitybf.com or call 1-800-950-4042. Upon information and belief, the website, phone number and contact email are all owned maintained and operated by Defendant. Upon information and belief, Defendant is responsible for initiating the sending of the above-described fax. 5.5 Defendant’s faxes to Plaintiff’s fax line were advertisements, soliciting Plaintiff to obtain a credit line or other services through Defendant. 5.6 Plaintiff did not provide prior consent to the receipt of faxes from Defendant, did not voluntarily agree to make its facsimile number available for public distribution, did not invite or give permission to Defendant to use its fax number, and had no established business relationship with Defendant. 5.7 Upon information and belief, Defendant initiated a large number of substantially similar unsolicited fax advertisements to persons in California and throughout the United States. 5.8 Upon information and belief, Defendant intends to continue to send similar unsolicited fax advertisements to persons in California and throughout the United States. 6.1 Class Definition. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of itself and a class (the “Class”) defined as follows: All persons or entities in the United States who, on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, received one or more unsolicited facsimile messages containing an advertisement that was initiated by or on behalf of Defendant, or its agents or affiliates with whom Defendant did not have an established business relationship or with whom Defendant did not obtain prior express permission to send a fax. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, any entity in which a Defendant has a controlling interest or that has a controlling interest in a Defendant, and Defendant’s employees or agents, legal representatives, assignees, and successors. Also excluded are the judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the judge’s immediate family. 6.3 Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff and its counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff, nor his counsel, has any interest adverse to those of the other members of the Class or each other. 6.4 Superiority. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive, and will have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 6.6 Commonality. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to the following: a. Whether the initiation of the unsolicited facsimile advertisement by Defendant and/or its agents, affiliates and/or others acting on Defendant’s behalf violate 47 U.S.C. § 227 and 46 CFR § 64.1200; b. Whether Defendant and/or its agents, affiliates and/or others acting on Defendant’s behalf should be enjoined from violations 47 U.S.C. § 227 and 46 CFR § 64.1200 in the future; and c. Whether Class members are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct. 6.7 Predominance. Defendant engaged in a common course of conduct toward Plaintiff and the Class. The common issues arising from the conduct that affect Plaintiff and the Class predominate over any individual issues. 7.1 Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 7.2 The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant and/or its affiliates, agents and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendant’s behalf constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 7.4 Plaintiff is also entitled to and does seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant and/or its agents, affiliates, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendant’s behalf from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), in the future. VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) �������������������������������������������������������(Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity)� � ���������������������������

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10. The debt arose from services which were primarily for family, personal, or household purposes, specifically, repairs relating to a personal vehicle for Ms. Heistand, and meets the definition of “debt” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 11. Around October 2015, United began attempts to collect the debt from the Heistands. 13. In or around November 2015, UTA called Mr. Heistand on his cell phone and attempted to collect the debt from him. 14. UTA’s representative initially stated that Mr. Heistand had written the check. 15. Mr. Heistand stated that he had not written any check to Stingray, and rather, his wife had. 16. Thus, Mr. Heistand disputed the debt was his personal liability. 17. UTA’s representative stated that unless Mr. Heistand paid the debt immediately, UTA would have an arrest-warrant issued for Ms. Heistand, and the police would take Ms. Heistand into custody later that day. 18. UTA’s representative stated the call was regarding a “case number” and then listed a number. 19. At no point did UTA’s representative state the call was from a debt collector or that the communication was from a debt collector. 20. UTA’s representative implied he was associated with, or UTA was associated with, a district attorney. 21. Upon information and belief, these tactics are consistent with UTA’s normal collection practices, in which consumers are routinely threatened with fraud charges, arrest, imprisonment, and more. 23. On or about August 13, 2015, UTA requested a consumer credit bureau report on both Mr. and Ms. Heistand from Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”), a consumer credit reporting agency (“CRA”). 24. To lawfully request a credit report from a CRA, the person making the request must have a “permissible purpose” to do so. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 25. Experian requires any person requesting a credit report on a consumer to first certify that they have a permissible purpose to obtain the report pursuant to the FCRA. 26. Upon information and belief, UTA certified to Experian its permissible purpose for requesting the credit reports on Mr. and Ms. Heistand was that UTA needed the information for “collection” purposes. 27. However, to have permissible purpose under the FCRA to request a report for “collection” purposes, the debt collector must be collecting on a debt which is considered to be a “credit transaction involving the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A). 28. Tendering a check is not a credit transaction involving a consumer, i.e., one in which the consumer voluntarily participated and requested an extension of credit. 29. Thus, while UTA may have believed it was collecting on a lawful debt, it had no reason to believe the debt related to a credit transaction involving the consumer. 30. Further, the paper check which created the debt was signed by only one individual. 31. As such, there was no way UTA reasonably could have believed it had the right to request credit reports on two different people. 33. UTA reported that Mr. Heistand was the debtor and that $465 was delinquent to 46. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 48. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Classes based on discovery or legal developments. 49. Numerosity. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). The Class members are so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. Although the precise number of Class members is known only to Experian and UTA, the names and addresses of the Class members are identifiable through documents maintained by Experian and UTA. 51. Typicality. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of each Class member, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. Experian disclosed consumer reports without a permissible purpose. UTA obtained consumer reports without a permissible purpose. Plaintiffs have the same claims for statutory, actual and punitive damages that they seek for absent class members. 52. Adequacy. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class. Their interests are aligned with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Class they seek to represent. They have retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and they intend to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiffs and their counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of members of the Class. 54. This action should be maintained as a class action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Classes would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Classes, as well as a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members, which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 55. The Heistands adopt and incorporate paragraphs 1 - 45 as if fully stated herein. 56. Because UTA lacked a permissible purpose to obtain Mr. Heistand’s credit report, UTA willfully and intentionally violated the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), when it requested a credit report on Mr. Heistand from Experian in August 2015. 57. Because UTA lacked a permissible purpose to obtain Ms. Heistand’s credit report, UTA willfully and intentionally violated the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f), when it requested a credit report on Ms. Heistand from Experian in August 2015. 58. UTA was fully aware that the debt it sought to collect was not a credit transaction and that the credit reports it requested had no connection to any credit transaction. 60. UTA is liable to Plaintiffs and all Class members for the above-stated violation of the FCRA in the amount of actual damages or statutory damages not to exceed $1,000 per incident, plus their reasonable attorney fees and costs. 61. The Heistands adopt and incorporate paragraphs 1 - 45 as if fully stated herein. 62. At all times relevant, Experian was aware of the nature of UTA’s business, i.e., that it collected on non-credit-based debts. 63. Because Experian knew or should have known that UTA lacked a permissible purpose to obtain Plaintiffs’ credit reports, Experian willfully and intentionally violated the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a), when it provided credit report(s) on the Heistands to UTA in August 2015, and Experian knew, or should have known, that no permissible purpose existed because Experian knew, or should have known, that UTA was not requesting the credit report in connection with the collection of a credit transaction involving the Heistands, since UTA collects only non-credit-based debts. 64. Experian was aware that it was providing credit reports to UTA on an on-going basis despite there being no permissible purpose to do so under the FCRA. 7. During the month of July 2015, Ms. Heistand incurred a debt for automobile repairs and parts on her personal vehicle. Ms. Heistand allegedly wrote a check to Stingray Chevrolet, LLC (“Stingray”) to pay the debt in the amount of $425, rounded to the nearest whole dollar. UTA guaranteed payment of the check to Stingray. 8. The check was supposedly returned unpaid to Stingray. 9. On information and belief, UTA paid Stingray the value of the check. Having paid Stingray, UTA was then entitled, under its contract with Stingray, to collect that sum from the issuer of the check and keep whatever it obtained. EXPERIAN’S VIOLATION OF THE FCRA – 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et. seq UTA’S VIOLATION OF THE FCRA – 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et. seq

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12. At all times relevant to the complaint herein, Defendant engaged in telecommunications by means of telephone facsimile machines as defined by the TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3). 13. Upon information and belief, Defendant regularly advertises its goods and services to recipients by transmitting fax advertisements. 14. Upon information and belief, the faxes were sent by means of a telephone facsimile machine that has the capacity to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line, or onto paper, and send thousands of faxes per day to facsimile numbers that were preselected by Defendant. 15. Upon information and belief, Defendant has no procedure or means for recipients who do not consent to receiving the faxes to stop receiving them. 16. In this instant case, Defendant had no prior established business relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff had never in the past used Defendant’s services, nor given Defendant consent to receive unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendant. 17. Within four (4) years prior to the commencement of this action, Defendant, or a third party agent acting on behalf of Defendant, willfully and knowingly transmitted facsimiles to Plaintiff that advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services. 18. Specifically, on or about October 2015, the Defendant caused to be delivered, which Plaintiff received at Plaintiff’s facsimile number ending in 4993, facsimile advertisements which solicited Plaintiff’s business by advising Plaintiff that Defendant offers a seminar on tips for helping Plaintiff’s practice achieve new levels of productivity. See Exhibit A. 20. Plaintiff did not give Defendant, or any third party acting on behalf of Defendant, prior express invitation or permission to transmit the aforementioned facsimiles, thereby rendering them unsolicited. 21. Plaintiff did not agree to make available its facsimile number for advertisement in a directory. 22. Defendant transmitted at least one (1) unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiff. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes. 24. Defendant failed to provide the proper notice to Plaintiff and the putative class members of the method and/or process of how to opt-out of receiving such future facsimile advertisements with the all of the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). 25. Specifically, Defendant failed to comply with the statute, which requires: a notice contained in an unsolicited advertisement complies with the requirements under this subparagraph only if— (i) the notice is clear and conspicuous and on the first page of the unsolicited advertisement; (ii) the notice states that the recipient may make a request to the sender of the unsolicited advertisement not to send any future unsolicited advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or machines and that failure to comply, within the shortest reasonable time, as determined by the Commission, with such a request meeting the requirements under subparagraph (E) is unlawful; (iii) the notice sets forth the requirements for a request under subparagraph (E); (iv) the notice includes— (I) a domestic contact telephone and facsimile machine number for the recipient to transmit such a request to the sender; and (II) a cost-free mechanism for a recipient to transmit a request pursuant to such notice to the sender of the unsolicited advertisement; the Commission shall by rule require the sender to provide such a mechanism and may, in the discretion of the Commission and subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe, exempt certain classes of small business senders, but only if the Commission determines that the costs to such class are unduly burdensome given the revenues generated by such small businesses. 27. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 28. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Classes, consisting of: a. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agents(s) and/or employee(s) within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. b. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agent(s) and/or employee(s) where said advertisements failed to properly notify the recipient of their ability to opt-out of receiving such fax advertisements from Defendant in the future. 29. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believe the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 30. Plaintiff and members of the Classes were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their telephone facsimile machines by either: 1) sending unsolicited fax advertisements; or 2) sending fax advertisements which failed to properly inform Plaintiff and the class members of their ability to opt-out of receiving such fax advertisements from Defendant in the future. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 32. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 33. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Classes predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: a. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents sent any unsolicited fax advertisements to a Class member; b. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents sent any fax advertisement to a Class member which failed to properly advise the recipient of an ability to opt-out of receiving such future fax advertisements from Defendant; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and d. Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 35. Plaintiff and the members of the Classes have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Classes will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 36. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 37. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and state laws. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 38. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 40. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 42. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). 43. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to an Order, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), enjoining Defendant from transmitting any advertisements in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 45. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 46. The transmission of facsimiles to Plaintiff as set forth above, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). 47. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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10.  Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant herein Defendant conducted business within this judicial district. 11.  At no time did Plaintiff ever enter into a business relationship with Defendant. 12.  Beginning in 2017, Plaintiff began receiving telephonic communications from Defendant in order to solicit Plaintiff’s business. 13.  As part of these solicitation efforts, Defendant’s automated voice asked Plaintiff three questions. 14.  Only after answering these questions was Plaintiff transferred to a live agent. 15.  Thereafter, Defendant’s agent inquired as to whether Plaintiff was interested in taking a cruise. 16.  Plaintiff answered in the negative which prompted Defendant’s agent to end the call. 17.  On information and belief, Plaintiff has not utilized Defendant’s services nor requested said services at any time. 18.  Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to send the artificial or prerecorded message to Plaintiff as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 27.  Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 39.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 40.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 41.  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 43.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 44.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 45.  As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 46.  Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. •   As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). •   Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. •   Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 110. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 111. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Brookstone.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Brookstone.com and by extension Brookstone Stores, which Brookstone owns, 26 operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 112. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 21. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Brookstone.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in Brookstone Stores, during the relevant statutory period.” 22. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Brookstone.com and as a result have been denied 7 access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in Brookstone Stores, during the relevant statutory period.” 23. There are hundreds of thousands of visually impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually impaired. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 24. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Brookstone.com and Brookstone Stores. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Brookstone.com and by extension the goods and services offered through Defendant’s website to Brookstone Stores. 25. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether Brookstone.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Brookstone.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through its website Brookstone.com denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through its website Brookstone.com denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 8 accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 26. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Brookstone has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the website, Brookstone.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 27. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 28. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 29. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 30. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 9 31. Brookstone operates Brookstone Stores, which provide fitness accessories, games, toys and gifts. The company currently operates currently twelve Brookstone Stores in New York state. 32. Brookstone.com is a service and benefit offered by Brookstone and Brookstone Stores throughout the United States, including New York State. Brookstone.com is owned, controlled and/or operated by Brookstone. 33. Brookstone.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale and home delivery that are available in Brookstone Stores. The online store allows the user to browse items; find store locations; and perform a variety of other functions. 34. Among the features offered by Brookstone.com are the following: (a) a store locator, allowing persons who wish to shop at Brookstone to learn its location, hours of operation, and phone numbers; (b) an online store, allowing customers to make a purchase and select for delivery or pickup at a Brookstone Stores; (c) information about Brookstone’ company privacy policy; (d) information about Brookstone’ return policy; (e) sale of many of the products and services available at Brookstone Stores in New York State. 35. This case arises out of Brookstone’ policy and practice of denying the blind access to Brookstone.com, including the goods and services offered by Brookstone Stores through Brookstone.com. Due to Brookstone’ failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Brookstone.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Brookstone 10 Stores, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Brookstone.com. 36. Brookstone denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Brookstone.com by preventing them from freely navigating Brookstone.com. 37. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as shopping, banking, etc., for sighted and blind persons. 38. The blind access websites by using keyboards in conjunction with screen-reading software which vocalizes visual information on a computer screen. Except for a blind person whose residual vision is still sufficient to use magnification, screen access software provides the only method by which a blind person can independently access the Internet. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, blind persons are unable to fully access Internet websites and the information, products and services contained therein. 39. There are well-established guidelines for making websites accessible to blind people. These guidelines have been in place for at least several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility. The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including, but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard and not just a mouse; ensuring that image maps are 11 accessible, and adding headings so that blind people can easily navigate the site. Without these very basic components a website will be inaccessible to a blind person using a screen reader. 40. Brookstone.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible forms, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling; lack of navigation links; the denial of keyboard access; and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 41. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen reader can speak the alternative text while a sighted user sees the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Brookstone.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. (Screen readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user.) As a result, Plaintiff and blind Brookstone customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the site, investigate Brookstone’ menu and/or make any purchases. 42. Similarly, Brookstone.com lacks accessible forms including forms that allow customers to locate and choose products as well as specify the size, fit and color of certain items. Due to the complete lack of accessibility of these forms, blind customers cannot choose and purchase the products they want since they are stopped from doing so. In particular, blind customers are unable to specify the color and/or size of the product desired because the forms on Brookstone.com do not indicate its purpose. As blind customers are prevented from adding items 12 to their carts, they are essentially prevented from purchasing any item on Brookstone.com which requires this information. 43. Brookstone.com also lacks accessible forms. Quantity boxes allow customers to specify the quantity of certain items. On Brookstone.com, blind customers are unable to select specific quantity because the screen reader doesn’t indicate the function of the box. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the quantity box. Therefore, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping carts and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Brookstone.com. 44. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Brookstone website makes attempting to navigate through Brookstone.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 45. Brookstone.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Plaintiff was unable to move forward in his transaction because he did not specify collar type. However, without the use of a mouse Plaintiff was unable to specify this option. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Brookstone.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate Brookstone.com. 46. Due to Brookstone.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at a Brookstone stores. Some blind 13 customers may require a driver to get to the store or require assistance in navigating the store. By contrast, if Brookstone.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and programs and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every menu option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Brookstone.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Brookstone.com. 47. Brookstone.com thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Brookstone.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Brookstone Stores in New York State. 48. Plaintiff VICTOR ANDREWS has made numerous attempts to complete a transaction on Brookstone.com, most recently in June 2017, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. Additionally, Plaintiff was unable to find the location on Defendant’s website, preventing him from going into the physical location to complete a reservation. These access barriers have caused Brookstone.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 49. Plaintiff VICTOR ANDREWS experienced many barriers in his attempt to access Brookstone.com. For instance, the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) are part of a series of web accessibility guidelines published by Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI) of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which are the main international standards organization for 14 the Internet. Plaintiff VICTOR ANDREWS was completely blocked from online ordering since Brookstone.com is barely accessible. Brookstone has failed to adhere to the recommendations of many of these guidelines such as, a. WCAG 2.1 recommending businesses to make all functionality available from a keyboard since Brookstone.com requires the visual activity of mouse manipulation to complete a purchase. b. WCAG 2.4 recommending businesses to provide help for users to navigate, find content and determine where they are on the website due to Brookstone.com’s lack of links and headings. c. WCAG 4.1 recommending businesses to maximize compatibility with current and future user agents, including assistive technologies, for the reasons stated above. 50. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Brookstone.com contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually impaired individuals. 51. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Brookstone.com and Brookstone Stores. 52. Brookstone engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of 15 substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 53. Brookstone utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 55. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 56. Brookstone Stores located in New York State are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). Brookstone.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Brookstone Stores. Brookstone is a service that is by and integrated with these stores. 57. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because they own and operate Brookstone Stores. 58. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I) it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 16 or accommodations of an entity. 59. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 60. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 61. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of 17 Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 63. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Brookstone Stores who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Brookstone.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. As such, Defendant discriminate, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Brookstone.com and Brookstone Stores in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 66. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 18 70. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 71. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 72. Brookstone Stores located in New York State are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Brookstone.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Brookstone Stores. Brookstone.com is a service that is by and integrated with these stores. 73. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because they own and operate the Brookstone Stores and Brookstone.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 74. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Brookstone.com, causing Brookstone.com and the services integrated with Brookstone Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 19 75. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 76. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 77. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 78. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or 20 (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Brookstone.com and Brookstone Stores under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 81. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 82. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 84. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 21 85. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 86. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 87. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof …” 88. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision” 89. Brookstone Stores located in New York State are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Brookstone.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Brookstone Stores. Brookstone.com is a service that is by and integrated with these stores. 22 90. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because they own and operate Brookstone Stores and Brookstone.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Brookstone.com, causing Brookstone.com and the services integrated with Brookstone Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 92. There are readily available, well established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 93. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby…” 94. Specifically, under NY Civ Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of 23 competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside …” 95. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 97. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 98. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 99. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of … disability … directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 100. Brookstone Stores located in New York State are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). Brookstone.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Brookstone Stores. Brookstone.com is a service that is by and integrated with these stores. 101. Defendant is subject to City Law because they own and operate Brookstone Stores 24 and Brookstone.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 102. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Brookstone.com, causing Brookstone.com and the services integrated with Brookstone Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities … any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to … enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 103. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8- 107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (d) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (e) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (f) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 104. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 25 105. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Brookstone.com and Brookstone Stores under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 106. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 107. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 108. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 109. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

win

15. At all relevant times, Defendant has marketed its Products in a consistent and uniform manner. Defendant sells the Products in all 50 states on its website and through various distributors. 31. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as representatives of all those similarly situated, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of the below-defined Class: National Class: All persons in the United States who purchased the Products. 32. In the alternative, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of the following State Class: California State Subclass: All persons in the State of California who purchased the Products. 43. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 42, as though set forth fully herein. 44. The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 57. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 42 as if fully set forth herein. 58. The FAL provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or to perform services” to disseminate any statement “which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. 66. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 42 as if fully set forth herein. 67. The CLRA prohibits deceptive practices in connection with the conduct of a business that provides goods, property, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 73. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 42 as if fully set forth herein. 74. Through the Products’ labels and advertising, Defendant made affirmations of fact or promises, or description of goods, described above, which were “part of the basis of the bargain,” in that Plaintiff and the Class purchased the Products in reasonable reliance on those statements. Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1). 75. Defendant breached the express warranties by selling Products that do not and cannot provide the promised benefits and moreover by selling Products that are illegally labeled as dietary supplements. 76. Plaintiff and the Class Members would not have purchased the Products had they known the true nature of the Products’ ingredients and what the Products contained and that the Products are illegally labeled as dietary supplements. 77. That breach actually and proximately caused injury in the form of the lost purchase price that Plaintiff and Class members paid for the Products. 80. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-42 as if fully set forth herein. 81. Defendant, through its acts and omissions set forth herein, in the sale, marketing, and promotion of the Products, made representations to Plaintiff and the Class that, among other things, the Products were labeled as legal dietary supplements. 87. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-42 as if fully set forth herein. 88. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of the Nationwide Class and/or the California State Subclass. 89. Declaratory relief is intended to minimize “the danger of avoidable loss and unnecessary accrual of damages.” 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2751 (3d ed. 1998). 90. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., there is an actual controversy between Defendant and Plaintiff concerning whether: a. Defendant has misrepresented the nature, ingredients and effectiveness of the Products; and b. Defendant knew or should have known of the misrepresentations regarding the efficacy of the Products. 91. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the Court may “declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” Breach of Express Warranties Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1) (On Behalf of the California State Subclass) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Cal. Com. Code § 2314 (On Behalf of the California State Subclass) California’s False Advertising Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 (“FAL”) (On Behalf of the California State Subclass) California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (“UCL”) (On Behalf of the California State Subclass) California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”) (On Behalf of the California State Subclass) Declaratory Relief Under the Declaratory Judgment Act (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the California State Subclass)

lose

(FLSA – COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) (O.R.C. § 4111.03 – RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME) 30. In or around September, 2014, Named Plaintiff Parton began working for Defendants as a service technician and/or general laborer until his employment ended on or about May 1, 2017. 31. Service technicians and general laborers primarily perform the same or similar job duties in the form of general labor. 32. Plaintiff Parton was compensated a weekly wage in the amount of approximately $600 per week. 33. As a service technician, Plaintiff Parton’s primary job duties consisted of general labor in the form of commercial and residential home and building repairs and maintenance services, including but not limited to remodeling, electrical, plumbing, and other miscellaneous services for Defendants. 34. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff Perez was jointly employed by Defendant AMBH and Defendant Carpenter from approximately April, 2014 through January, 2015 as a general laborer. He subsequently returned to work for Defendants as a service technician from approximately July, 2015 through July, 2016. 35. As both a general laborer and a service technician, Plaintiff Perez primarily performed general labor in the form of commercial and residential home and building repairs and maintenance services, including but not limited to remodeling, electrical, plumbing, and other miscellaneous services for Defendants. 36. Plaintiff Perez was compensated a weekly wage in the amount of approximately $550 per week. 38. Upon information and belief, Defendants have a companywide pay policy and/or practice of misclassifying all of its employees, including Named Plaintiffs, in the position of service technician, general laborer, or equivalent position, because they are paid a weekly wage even though Defendants knew or should have known that its employees, including Named Plaintiffs, primarily performed non-exempt job duties in the form of general labor as described herein. 39. Named Plaintiffs regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week during all relevant times herein, but were not paid time-and-a-half (“overtime rate”) due to them for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in any workweek as a result of Defendants’ unlawful pay policy and/or practice. 40. For example, Named Plaintiffs were required to work from approximately 8:00 am until 5:00 pm, Monday through Friday, which amounts to a minimum of approximately forty-five (45) hours per week. 41. Upon information and belief, the mandatory forty-five-hour (45) workweek is a company policy in Defendants’ employee handbook. 42. Named Plaintiffs also often performed substantial duties on behalf of Defendants beyond 5:00 pm during the workweek. 43. Despite working more than 40 hours in a workweek during the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Named Plaintiffs were only paid the weekly wage, resulting in unpaid overtime wages due to them by Defendants. 45. Furthermore, Named Plaintiffs’ weekly wages were reduced depending on the number of hours worked in a workweek, including when they worked below forty (40) hours per week. 46. As such, Defendants misclassified the Named Plaintiffs and Putative Class Members because they primarily performed non-exempt job duties in the form of general labor and Defendants reduced the weekly wages when Named Plaintiffs worked below forty (40) hours per week. 47. Despite the misclassification of Named Plaintiffs and Putative Class members employed in the positions of service technician, general laborer, or equivalent position, Defendants willfully continued to compensate them on a weekly basis regardless of whether they worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 48. Accordingly, Named Plaintiffs were misclassified at all times relevant during the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint because they were each, as a service technician, general laborer or equivalent position, an hourly non-exempt employee of Defendants. 49. Named Plaintiffs neither primarily performed managerial duties nor supervised two or more employees. 50. Named Plaintiffs could not hire, fire, or discipline employees. 51. Named Plaintiffs’ primary job duties did not consist of the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 53. During the three years preceding the filing of Named Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendants did not pay them one-and-a-half times her regular hourly rate for all compensable hours they worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 54. Defendants knew or should have been aware that Named Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, but willfully elected not to compensate them for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) during the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint. 55. Defendants’ failure to pay Named Plaintiffs has caused damages, including unpaid wages, including overtime wages, liquidated damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees. 56. In the alternative, Named Plaintiffs have been misclassified by Defendants as exempt employees when Defendants knew or should have known through reasonable diligence that Named Plaintiffs either were actually not compensated on a salaried basis or that, if they were compensated on a salaried basis, that Named Plaintiffs primarily performed non-exempt job duties and should have been paid them overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 in any workweek. 57. Upon information and belief, during the relevant time period, Defendants applied the same pay practices and policies to all of its employees, including Named Plaintiffs. IV. 59. Examples of employees that may be members of the §216(b) Class include, but may not be limited to, service technicians, general laborers, or equivalent positions performing similar general labor in the form of commercial and residential home and building repairs and maintenance services, including but not limited to remodeling, electrical, plumbing, yard maintenance, and other miscellaneous services for Defendants. 60. This FLSA claim is brought as an "opt-in" collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) as to claims for overtime compensation, compensation withheld in violation of the FLSA, liquidated damages and attorneys' fees under the FLSA. In addition to Named Plaintiffs, numerous putative §216(b) Class Members have been denied proper overtime wages due to Defendants’ company-wide payroll policies and practices. Named Plaintiffs are representatives of those other similarly situated employees and are acting on behalf of their interests as well as their own in bringing this action. 61. The identity of the putative §216(b) Class Members are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants’ payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime and minimum wages, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs under the FLSA. 63. Named Plaintiffs bring their Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (“Ohio Wage Act”) claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 as a class action on behalf of themselves and all other members of the following class: All current and former misclassified service technicians, general laborers, or other employees of Defendants who performed general labor and worked over 40 hours in any workweek beginning three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint through the date of final disposition of this case (the “Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class,” or the “Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class Members”). 64. Examples of employees that may be members of the Rule 23 Class include, but may not be limited to, service technicians, general laborers, or equivalent positions performing similar general labor in the form of commercial and residential home and building repairs and maintenance services, including but not limited to remodeling, electrical, plumbing, yard maintenance, and other miscellaneous services for Defendants. 65. The Rule 23 Class, as defined above, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 66. Named Plaintiffs are members of the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class and their claims for unpaid overtime wages are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class. 67. Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class and the interests of all members of the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class. 68. Named Plaintiffs have no interest that is antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests of the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class that she undertaken to represent. 69. Named Plaintiffs have retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can ably represent the interests of the entire Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class. 71. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because individual actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants with respect to their non-exempt employees. 72. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class as a whole. 73. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) as the questions of law and facts common to the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class predominate over questions affecting individual members of the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 75. A class action is superior to individual actions for the fair and efficient adjudication of Named Plaintiffs’ and the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class’ claims and will prevent undue financial, administrative and procedural burdens on the parties and the Court. Named Plaintiffs and counsel are not aware of any pending Ohio litigation on behalf of the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class, as defined herein, or on behalf of any individual alleging a similar claim. Because the damages sustained by individual members are modest compared to the costs of individual litigation, it would be impractical for class members to pursue individual litigation against the Defendant to vindicate their rights. Certification of this case as a class action will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. V. 76. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 77. This claim is brought as part of a collective action by the Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the §216(b) Class. 78. During the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendants employed Named Plaintiffs and/or the §216(b) Class Members. 79. The FLSA requires that employees receive overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 80. Defendants employed individuals, including Named Plaintiffs, in the positions of service technician, general laborer, or equivalent position to be determined through discovery. 82. Service technicians primarily perform non-exempt job duties. 83. General laborers or equivalent positions primarily perform non-exempt job duties. 84. Named Plaintiffs and the §216(b) Class Members were paid a weekly wage rather than on an hourly basis when working in non-exempt positions. 85. Alternatively, the weekly wages of Named Plaintiffs and the §216(b) Class Members were reduced depending on the number of hours worked in a workweek, including when they worked below forty (40) hours per week. 86. Named Plaintiffs and the §216(b) Class Members worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 87. Defendants violated the FLSA with respect to Named Plaintiffs and the §216(b) Class by, inter alia, failing to compensate them at time-and-one-half times their regular rates for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek due to the fact that, by way of demonstration and not limitation, Named Plaintiffs were paid a weekly wage rather than on an hourly basis even though they primarily performed non-exempt job duties; and Defendants failed to keep accurate timekeeping records for the hours working over forty (40). 88. Named Plaintiffs and the §216(b) Class Members were not exempt from receiving FLSA overtime benefits. 90. Despite such knowledge, Defendants willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which Named Plaintiffs and the §216(b) Class Members are entitled. 91. Defendants knowingly and willfully jointly failed to pay Named Plaintiffs and the §216(b) Class Members the overtime wages they were due. 92. The exact total amount of compensation, including overtime compensation, that Defendants have failed to pay Named Plaintiffs and the §216(b) Class Members is unknown at this time, as many of the records necessary to make such precise calculations are in the possession of Defendants or were simply not kept by Defendants due to the misclassification of Named Plaintiffs. 93. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ joint conduct, Named Plaintiffs and the §216(b) Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages. Named Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of themselves and the §216(b) Class Members. 94. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 95. This claim is brought under Ohio law. 96. The Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendant, and Defendant is an employer covered by the overtime requirements under Ohio law. 98. While employed by Defendants, the Named Plaintiffs and the Ohio Overtime Rule 23 Class Members worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but were not paid overtime wages for all such hours. A. 216(b) Collective Action for Unpaid Overtime and Other Wages.

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10. Defendants specialize in providing a variety of landscape and grounds keeping services, including some landscaping related construction services, for business and residential clients. 12. Defendant Gregory Hamann has operational control over the Defendant Prime Lawn Care Inc. business by exercising control over the terms and conditions of the business’s employees, maintaining business records, and possessing the power to hire and fire Prime Lawn Care Inc.’s employees. 13. Upon information and belief, Defendant Gregory Hamann developed the scheme to underpay Prime Lawn Care Inc. employees. He established the employees’ wage rates and Prime Lawn Care Inc.’s pay practices. 14. Defendants employed named Plaintiff as a landscape laborer under the H-2B temporary visa program in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Defendants employed approximately 58 H-2B workers in 2011, 61 in 2012, 61 in 2013, 65 in 2014. 15. Upon information and belief, Defendants employed approximately 80 hourly employees engaged in landscaping during each of the relevant years. 16. Plaintiff was, and Class Members are or were, assigned to work crews of 3-5 workers per crew and are or were responsible for providing a variety of landscaping and grounds keeping-related services. 18. Plaintiff was and Class Members are or were paid hourly, at a rate based on their level of expertise and the type of work performed. For example, employees that worked on the Defendants’ landscaping related construction crews were paid at a higher hourly rate than maintenance crews. 19. Plaintiff was and Class Members are or were required to arrive at Defendants shop by 7am to do work prior to beginning their paid shift. Similarly, Plaintiff was and Class Members are or were required to do work after their paid shift. 20. Plaintiff were and Class Members are or were regularly not paid at all for their work performed prior to leaving the shop in the morning or after arriving to the shop in the afternoon. 21. Plaintiff worked and Class Members worked or work routinely more than forty hours per week and often were or are not paid for all of their overtime hours worked. 22. When Plaintiff and Class Members were paid for their hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek, they were often compensated in cash and at their regular hourly rate. 23. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard, carried out the illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay overtime wages due to the Plaintiff and Class Members. 24. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendants failed to maintain complete and accurate records of the Plaintiff and Class Members’ hours of work and compensation as required by the FLSA. 26. The Plaintiff have fulfilled all prerequisites and/or requirements to bring this suit and obtain the relief sought herein. 27. Defendants employed other individuals (Class Members) to perform the same or similar job duties as Plaintiff in that they worked performing landscaping or landscaping related construction duties for the Defendants. 28. Plaintiff was aware that the Defendants engaged in the same pattern and practice of failing to properly compensate Class Members for all hours worked and failing to pay the overtime compensation as required by the FLSA. 29. Plaintiff and Class Members were and are subjected to the same pay provisions in that they were not and are not paid for all the hours they worked or work, and were and are regularly not paid the overtime rate (time-and-one-half regular hourly rate) for the hours they worked or work in excess of forty hours per week. 30. Defendants knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out their illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay overtime wages with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to pay each employee for his/her total hours worked and/or by failing to pay each employee at the proper overtime rate for work hours performed over forty hours in a workweek. 32. The Defendants’ failure to pay the overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Plaintiff or those joining this lawsuit. Rather, the same policy or practice which resulted in the non-payment of overtime wages to Plaintiff applied to all Class Members. Accordingly, the “Class Members” are properly defined as: All workers who were subject to the work hours and payment practices detailed above and who were consequently not paid properly in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §207. 33. All Class Members, regardless of their precise job requirements or rates of pay, are entitled to overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 35. Under 29 U.S.C. § 216, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to recover unpaid overtime compensation, as well as an equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as attorney fees and costs. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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- FDCPA 23. On information and belief, Rushmore acquired servicing of plaintiff s loan in June 2013, after it was in default. 24. The loan was accelerated substantially prior to June 2013. 25. GMAT 2013 claims to have acquired ownership of the loan on or about February 15, 2014, after the loan was in default. 26. On July 21, 2016, Rushmore caused a foreclosure lawsuit to be filed against plaintiff Matthew D. Williams. The lawsuit was filed in the name of GMAT 2013, as alleged owner of the loan. Hunt Leibert Jacobson, P.C., now McCalla, was counsel for GMAT 2013. A copy of the complaint and accompanying documents is attached as Appendix D. 27. On August 2, 2016, Rushmore sent the letter attached as Appendix E, seeking payment of late charges. 28. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-27. 30. It is the policy and practice of defendants to seek late fees for periods after the loan had been accelerated. 31. A mortgagee or servicer is not entitled to late fees after acceleration. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota N.A. v. Guarnieri, 308 B.R. 122, 127 (D.Conn. 2004); FDICv. M.F.P. Realty Associates, 870 F.Supp. 451, 455 (D.Conn. 1994); SKWReal Estate LP v. Gallicchio, 49 Conn. App. 563, 580, 716 A.2d 903, 918 (1998); Berkeley Federal v. Ogalin, 48 Conn.App. 305, 213, 708 A.2d 620, 625 (1998); FDIC v. Napert-Boyer P'ship, 40 Conn. App. 434, 443, 671 A.2d 1303, 1308-09(1996). 32. Defendants thereby violated 15 U.S.C. §§1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(10), 1692f and 1692f(l). 33. Section 1692e provides: § 1692e. False or misleading representations A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:... (2) The false representation of-- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt;... (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer 44. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 -27. 45. The seventh page of Appendix D consisted of a purported 15 U.S.C. §1692g notice. 46. The inclusion of such a notice with a complaint is not required. 47. The inclusion of such a notice with a complaint is confusing to the least sophisticated consumer, in that it suggests a means of responding to the complaint other than as specified in the summons. Marquez v. Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S., 836 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2016). 48. Defendants' notice did not warn that the consumer should comply with the instructions in the summons notwithstanding the notice. 50. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of three classes, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 51. Class A consists of (a) all individuals (b) against whom Rushmore caused to be filed a foreclosure complaint (c) which included a page describing validation or dispute rights similar to those in § 1692g (d) at any time during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 21 days after the filing of this action.' 52. Class B consists of (a) all individuals (b) against whom McCalla filed a foreclosure complaint (c) which included a page describing validation or dispute rights similar to those in §1692g (d) at any time during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 21 days after the filing of this action. 53. Class C consists of (a) all individuals (b) against whom GMAT 2013 filed a foreclosure complaint (c) which included a page describing validation or dispute rights similar to those in §1692g (d) at any time during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 21 days after the filing of this action. 54. On information and belief, each class is so numerous that joinder of all members is not practicable. 55. There are questions of law and fact common to the class members, which common questions predominate over any questions relating to individual class members. The predominant common questions are (a) whether each defendant included a page describing validation or dispute rights similar to those in §1692g with a foreclosure complaint and (b) whether such practice violates the FDCPA. 56. Plaintiffs claim is typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 58. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that: a. Individual actions are not economically feasible. . b. Members of the class are likely to be unaware of their rights; c. Congress intended class actions to be the principal enforcement mechanism under the FDCPA. WHEREFORE, the Court should enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendants for: i. Statutory damages; ii. Attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; iii. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

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11. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an individual residing in the State of Florida. He is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39), and the “called party.” See Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 755 F. 3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014) and Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2014). 12. Plaintiff is the owner and customary user of cellular telephone number (xxx) xxx- 5808 (redacted for privacy). Plaintiff was the called party and recipient of Defendant’s calls, as described herein. 13. Plaintiff registered his cellular phone with the National Do Not Call Registry on January 23, 2007. 14. Between approximately October of 2018 to the present, Defendant placed, or caused to be placed, approximately 100 automated calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) or pre-recorded or artificial voice. 15. When receiving many of these calls, Plaintiff was in his home, attempting to enjoy the seclusion of his private domain, uninterrupted by unwanted calls and annoyances of the outside world. The calls intruded upon Plaintiff’s seclusion within his home and interrupted his peaceful enjoyment thereof. 17. When Plaintiff spoke with a representative, she identified herself as calling from National Debt Relief and was soliciting for the company’s services. Plaintiff asked for the calls to stop but the calls continued. 18. These unwanted and illegal robocalls were very upsetting and frustrating to the Plaintiff and left him with a feeling of helplessness to stop these calls. 19. Plaintiff is not now, nor has he ever been, a National Debt Relief customer. He does not have an account or business relationship with National Debt Relief. 20. Plaintiff did not provide his cellular telephone number to Defendant, nor did he ever provide express consent to Defendant to place calls to his cellular telephone for any reason. 21. Plaintiff requested to opt out of, or for cessation of, Defendant’s calls however, he continued to receive calls. 22. All of the calls that Defendant placed and sent, or caused to be placed and sent, to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number were placed and sent using an ATDS or pre-recorded or artificial voice, which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator (including but not limited to a predictive dialer) or an artificial or pre-recorded voice and to dial such numbers, as specified by 47 U.S.C § 227(a)(1). 23. The telephone number Defendant used to contact Plaintiff via an ATDS or pre- recorded or artificial voice was assigned to a cellular telephone service, as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 25. Defendant’s placement of calls using an ATDS or pre-recorded or artificial voice for non-emergency purposes and without Plaintiff’s prior express consent violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 26. Consumers who do not want to receive telemarketing calls may indicate their preference by registering their telephone numbers on the national Do Not Call Registry. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). According to the Federal Trade Commission, the Registry, which was established in 2003, currently has over 239,000,000 active registrations. 27. These registrations must be honored indefinitely, or until the registration is cancelled by the consumer or the telephone number is removed by the database administrator. Id. 28. Because a telephone subscriber listed on the Registry must take an affirmative step to register his or her number, a telemarketer who wishes to call a person listed on the Registry must take a similarly affirmative step, and must obtain the registrant’s signed, written agreement to be contacted by the telemarketer. Id. § 64.1200(c)(2)(ii). The written agreement must also include the telephone number to which the calls may be placed. Id. 29. A person whose number is on the Registry and has received more than one telephone solicitation within any twelve-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the TCPA, can sue the violator and seek the greater of actual damages or $500, a figure that may be trebled for willful or knowing violations. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 31. To avoid violating the TCPA by calling registered numbers, telemarketers must scrub their call lists against the Registry at least once every thirty-one days. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(3)(iv). 32. It has long been the law that a seller of goods or services can be liable for TCPA violations even if the seller does not directly place or initiate the calls. 33. The provision that establishes a private right of action against an entity that violates the DNC Registry restrictions provides that “[a] person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection” may bring an action for damages and injunctive relief. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (emphasis added). 34. Defendant has a corporate policy to use an ATDS or a pre-recorded or artificial voice to place calls to individuals, just as it did to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone here. 35. Defendant has a corporate policy to use an ATDS or a pre-recorded or artificial voice, just as it did to the Plaintiff’s cellular telephone in this case, with no way for the consumer to cease the placement of calls. 36. Defendant’s corporate policy is structured so as to continue to place calls to individuals like Plaintiff, despite the fact these consumers request that Defendant cease the placement of calls. 38. Defendant has a corporate policy to harass and abuse individuals despite actual knowledge that the called parties do not wish to be called. 39. As a result of each of the calls described above, Plaintiff and putative Class Members suffered an invasion of privacy, as well as particularized and concrete injuries, including the inducement of stress, anxiety, nervousness, embarrassment, distress, and/or aggravation. Plaintiff and putative Class Members also suffered out-of-pocket losses, including the monies paid to their wireless carriers for the receipt of such calls. Additionally, due to both the answered and unanswered calls placed by Defendant, Plaintiff and putative Class Members suffered the expenditure of their time, exhaustion of their cellular telephone batteries, unavailability of their cellular telephones while Defendant’s calls were incoming, and trespass upon their respective chattels. All of the above-mentioned injuries were caused by, and/or directly related to, Defendant’s placement of calls to Plaintiff and putative Class Members by using an ATDS to call their cellular telephone numbers. 40. In response to Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit and seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to cease all unsolicited cellular telephone calls and an award of statutory damages and actual damages to putative Class Members under the TCPA, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 42. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its employees, agents and assigns, and any members of the judiciary to whom this case is assigned, their Court staff, and Plaintiff’s counsel. Members of the above-defined Class can be easily identified through Defendant’s records or those of its vendors who placed the calls and/or sent the text messages at issue on behalf of Defendant. Numerosity 44. The alleged size and geographic disbursement of the putative Class, and relatively modest value of each individual claim, makes joinder of all Class Members impracticable or impossible. Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the putative Class Members, as Plaintiff and Class Members have been injured by Defendant’s uniform misconduct – the placement of calls to cellular telephones using an ATDS or artificial or pre-recorded voice for non- emergency purposes and without prior express consent. 47. Plaintiff shares the aforementioned facts and legal claims and/or questions with all putative Class Members. Further, a sufficient relationship exists between Defendant’s conduct and the damages sustained by Plaintiff and putative Class Members. Adequacy 51. Without prior express consent, Defendant placed calls for non-emergency purposes to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members using an ATDS or artificial or pre- recorded voice with the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called. 52. The foregoing acts constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including, but not limited to, each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. 53. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), and as a result of the alleged negligent violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every non-emergency call placed and text message sent in violation of the 56. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 49, as though fully set forth herein. 58. The foregoing acts constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including, but not limited to, each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. 59. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), and as a result of the alleged knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages for each and every non-emergency call placed in violation of the statute. 60. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting future violations of the TCPA. 61. Plaintiff and Class Members are also entitled to an award of costs and expenses. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. Negligent Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq.

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6.12 Plaintiff and the Class Members were at all times “non-exempt” employees and eligible to receive overtime pay pursuant to Section 207 of the FLSA. 6.15 During his employment, there were other internet installers/technicians in Texas working for Defendants who were/are subject to the same pay policy/plan described herein, misclassified as independent contractors, work/worked overtime hours, and were/are not compensated in accordance with the FLSA by Defendant. Plaintiff is also aware that Defendants operate in other states outside of Texas where internet installers/technicians perform the same work, are misclassified as independent contractors, and are subject to the same policies that have been described herein. 6.13 Defendants improperly classified Plaintiff and the Class Members as independent contractors. Defendants still fail to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime wages and all wages earned in accordance with the FLSA. 6.14 Defendants also made improper deductions from Plaintiff’s wages for purported quality control inspections where Plaintiff and the Class Members are penalized wrongfully, at time for jobs they were/are not responsible for, and thus amount are deducted from their wages earned. Plaintiff is aware of other internet installers/technicians who are/were also subject to deductions in which significant amounts are/were wrongfully deducted from their wages in violation of the FLSA. 6.10 Plaintiff and Class Members do/did not have authority to hire or fire any of Defendants employees and do not have authority to set pay. 6.12 As internet installers/technicians, Plaintiff and Class Members regularly work/worked more than forty (40) hours per workweek. Neither he nor any of the other Class Members had authority to (nor did they): manage an enterprise, hire or fire other employees, set the pay rates of other employees, create policies or procedures to govern Defendants’ employees, handle employee grievances, determine the type of equipment or materials that Defendants could use in its operations, enter into contracts on behalf of Defendants or otherwise have operational control over Defendants’ business operations and practices. Moreover, Plaintiff and the Class Members did not perform office or non- manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of Defendants or its customers, nor did they exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance in the conduct of Defendants’ business. 6.1 Defendant Millcom is an internet installation company. Defendant Perfect 10 is a privately owned telecommunications company. 6.2 Plaintiff worked as an internet technician/installer for Defendants. He worked for Defendants from February 2017 to July 24, 2019. 6.2 Defendant Anthony Miller owns Defendant Millcom and supervised Plaintiff and the Class Members, determined their classification as independent contractors, determined their rate of pay, made decisions as to hiring and firing, and day to day operations. 6.3. Plaintiff was classified as an independent contractor by Defendants. He did not receive overtime compensation however he was expected to work over forty (40) hours per week (and did in fact work over forty (40) hours per week) during that time period. 6.4 The other internet installers/technicians that Plaintiff worked with also work/worked over forty (40) hours per week and did not receive overtime compensation in accordance with the FLSA. 6.5 Due to the high volume of work, Plaintiff was often required to work long hours (over 40 hours per work week). Defendants were aware that Plaintiff and the Class Members work/worked over forty hours per work week to meet Defendants’ business needs. 6.5 Defendants controlled all the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. Defendants determined Plaintiff’s pay rate, the schedule he worked, the tools he was required to purchase and the policies and procedures Plaintiff and the other Class Members are/were required to follow. 6.6 Defendants also required Plaintiff and the Class Members log in to a mobile app called FSM Mobile. All internet installers/technicians who worked for Defendants were required to log in to the FSM Mobile app and Defendants used this to track their work, locations and jobs throughout the day. 6.7 As an internet installer/technician, Plaintiff’s primary duties included, installing internet service in customers’ homes. Plaintiff and the Class Members were required to install the internet antenna and modem, run cables to the modem and activate the internet service including assisting customers with setting up their logins and passwords. Plaintiff and the Class Members were also required to video call a Perfect 10 representative and/or upload pictures of their work into an app for approval. Plaintiff and the Class Members were also required to attend meetings approximately once a month. These meetings were mandatory and could last up to three (3) hours. Plaintiff and the Class Members were not compensated for these meetings and if they did not attend, they could face termination or not receive any more work from Defendants. 6.9 Plaintiff and the Class Members do/did not have the authority to make unilateral decisions regarding the work assigned by Defendants. Plaintiff and the Class Members could/cannot arbitrarily make changes to anything without Defendants’ approval. 7. 7.2 Defendants classified/classifies as independent contractors and paid/pays all of its internet installers/technicians in the manner described above. Defendants maintain a common pay practice or policy and the Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiff. 7.3 Defendants’ internet installers/technicians all performed the same/similar essential job functions and duties, notwithstanding the fact that one employee might have more tenure or experience than another employee in the same or similar position. Therefore, the Class Members are similarly situated to Plaintiff. 7.4 The damages for each individual can easily be calculated using the same methodology and formula although the exact amount of the damages may vary. 8. INC. d/b/a PERFECT 10 and

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113. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 114. Count II is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Maloney. 115. Exhibit A falsely threatens to send Maloney’s account to an attorney and/or threaten a lawsuit against Plaintiff if Plaintiff does not pay or call Midland by a specified date. 116. At the time Exhibit A and Exhibit B were sent, Midland did not intend to file a lawsuit against Maloney even if Maloney did not pay or call by such date. 117. Defendants’ conduct violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692f. 118. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 119. Count III is brought on behalf of Plaintiff Maloney. 120. Exhibit A threatens and implies legal action notwithstanding the fact that Midland did not intend to forward the letter to an attorney network even if Maloney did not pay or call by the date specified in the letters. 121. Such conduct violates Wis. Stat. §§ 427.104(1)(L) and 427.104(1)(h). 45. Plaintiff Debbie Maloney entered into a consumer transaction with Comenity Capital. ("Comenity") for a personal credit card. 47. Prior to October 7, 2016, and after Plaintiff Maloney’s account with Comenity was in default, Comenity sold or otherwise assigned the ownership rights to Plaintiff’s account to Midland Funding. 48. On or about October 7, 2016, MCM mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff Maloney regarding an alleged debt, allegedly owed to Midland Funding and originally owed to Comenity. A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A and a copy of the envelope in which it was received is attached as Exhibit B. 49. The alleged debt identified in Exhibit A was for a personal credit card account used only for personal, family or household purposes. 50. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 51. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form debt collection letter used by Midland to attempt to collect alleged debts. 52. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is a form debt collection envelope used by Midland to attempt to collect alleged debts. 53. Exhibit A contains bold, all-capitalized text at the top of the letter: 55. Exhibit A also contains the following: 56. Exhibit A also contains the following: 57. The above language is false, misleading and confusing to the unsophisticated consumer. 58. At the time Exhibit A was sent to Plaintiff Maloney, Midland did not intend to sue Plaintiff Maloney, even if no payments were made on the account by 11-21-2016. 59. Despite the clear language threatening to send the account to “an attorney in your state . . . if we don't hear from you or receive payment by 11-21-2016,” Midland did not file a lawsuit against Plaintiff Maloney. 60. A search of CCAP on September 29, 2017 shows no civil actions filed by Midland against Plaintiff Maloney in Wisconsin. 61. An unsophisticated consumer would understand that Exhibit A threatens a lawsuit, and/or implies that legal action will be taken unless payment or a phone call is made by 11-21-2016. 63. Even indirect or oblique threats give rise to liability, provided they indicate that “legal action is underway or contemplated in the near future.” Jenkins, 999 F. Supp. At 1136. 64. The unsophisticated consumer would interpret the “pre-legal status” and the statement that “if we don't hear from you or receive payment by 11-21-2016, we may proceed with forwarding this account to an attorney” as a threat that the account is on a litigation track. 65. The threat of litigation in Midland’s letter is false and misleading and exists only to unfairly scare consumers. 66. In fact, Plaintiff’s account was not forwarded to an attorney network. 67. Additionally, Exhibit B included extraneous text. 68. The exterior face of Exhibit B, containing Plaintiff's mailing address, also states in the upper right hand corner, "U.S.POSTAGE PAID MCM." Vega Letter 69. Plaintiff Amy Vega entered into a consumer transaction with Synchrony Bank. ("Synchrony") for a personal credit card. 70. Prior to October 12, 2016, Plaintiff Vega’s account with Synchrony went into default. 72. On or about October 12, 2016, MCM mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff Vega regarding an alleged debt, allegedly owed to Midland Funding and originally owed to Synchrony. A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit C and a copy of the envelope in which it was received is attached as Exhibit D. 73. The alleged debt identified in Exhibit C was for a personal credit card account used only for personal, family or household purposes. 74. Upon information and belief, Exhibit C is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiffs inserted by computer. 75. Upon information and belief, Exhibit C is a form debt collection letter used by Midland to attempt to collect alleged debts. 76. Upon information and belief, Exhibit D is a form debt collection envelope used by Midland to attempt to collect alleged debts. 77. Exhibit D included extraneous text. 78. The exterior face of Exhibit D containing Plaintiffs’ mailing address also states “Time Sensitive Document” and, in the upper right hand corner, “U.S. POSTAGE PAID MCM.” Plaintiff Czarnecki entered into a consumer transaction with Comenity Bank (“Comenity”) for a personal credit card. Czarnecki Letter 79. Prior to January 20, 2017, Plaintiff Czarnecki’s account with Comenity went into default. 81. On or about January 20, 2017, MCM mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff Czarnecki regarding an alleged debt, allegedly owed to Midland Funding and originally owed to Comenity. A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit E and a copy of the envelope in which it was received is attached as Exhibit F. 82. The alleged debt identified in Exhibit E was for a personal credit card account used only for personal, family or household purposes. 83. Upon information and belief, Exhibit E is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiffs inserted by computer. 84. Upon information and belief, Exhibit E is a form debt collection letter used by Midland to attempt to collect alleged debts. 85. Upon information and belief, Exhibit F is a form debt collection envelope used by Midland to attempt to collect alleged debts. 86. Exhibit F included extraneous text. 87. The exterior face of Exhibit F containing Plaintiffs’ mailing address also states “Time Sensitive Document” and, in the upper right hand corner, “U.S. POSTAGE PAID MCM.” 88. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits unfair debt collection practices. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 90. The language on Exhibit B, Exhibit D, and Exhibit F violates the plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). The statute contains no exceptions – any extraneous text on the envelope or on the outside of a self-mailer violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8). 91. Moreover, the extraneous text in Exhibit D and Exhibit F indicates that the letters are, in fact, debt collection letters. See Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303- 04 (3d Cir. 2014) (disclosure through window envelope “implicates a core concern animating the FDCPA—the invasion of privacy.”); Peter v. GC Services L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 2002). 92. In Peter, for example, the Fifth Circuit held that text on the envelope impersonating the U.S. Department of Education1 “implicates this core concern of the FDCPA [impersonating public officials].” Peter, 310 F.3d at 351-52. 93. Likewise, in Douglass, the Third Circuit held that a collection letter displaying the consumer’s account number and a QR code2 that linked to the consumer’s alleged debt, through a “glassine” window envelope, violated § 1692f(8). Douglass, 765 F.3d at 303 (“Convergent's disclosure implicates a core concern animating the FDCPA—the invasion of privacy.”) 94. As in Douglass and Peter, the language on Exhibit B, Exhibit D, and Exhibit F implicates a core concern animating the FDCPA – privacy. 96. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(7) prohibits: “Communicating with a consumer regarding a debt by post card.” The content of a post card is visible to anyone who views it. 97. Likewise, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) prohibits most communications with third parties: (b) Communication with third parties Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector. 98. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b allows but strictly regulates communications with third parties for the purpose of obtaining the consumer’s location information, including explicit prohibitions against stating “that such consumer owes any debt,” and using “any language or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any communication effected by the mails or telegram that indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(2), 1692b(5). Maloney Letter

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(FLSA Collective Action) (NYLL Class Action) 15. Defendants own and operate two restaurants in the New York City area under the trade name Libertador. 16. From on or around September 2, 2019 until her termination on or around October 2, 2019, Plaintiff worked for Defendants as a food server at the Libertador restaurant located at 1725 Second Avenue in Manhattan (“Restaurant”). Throughout her employment Plaintiff was paid at the rate of $10 per hour, the tip-credit minimum wage under the NYLL. 18. However, not all of Plaintiff’s worked time was recorded by Defendants. At the beginning of their shifts, Plaintiff and others similarly situated would be “clocked in” by one of the Individual Defendants. When they finished their server duties, Plaintiff and others similarly situated would be “clocked out” by one of the Individual Defendants. At no point were Plaintiff or others similarly situated allowed to clock in or clock out for themselves. 19. After clocking out, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were required to do additional (non-tipped) work, such as cleaning the Restaurant and preparing service reports. Plaintiff routinely performed approximately 1.5 to 2 hours of such work per shift. However, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were still paid at the tip-credit minimum wage no matter how much time they spent performing non-tipped work. 20. Moreover, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated for any work performed after they had been clocked out, either at the regular NYLL-mandated minimum wage of $15 or at the tip-credit minimum wage of $10. 21. Thus for the first three weeks of her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff regularly worked 7.5 to 10 hours per week for which she was not paid, including hours in excess of 40 for the week. 22. The unpaid hours Plaintiff and others similarly situated regularly worked for Defendants additionally served to reduce their average hourly wage below the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. 24. The Individual Defendants also improperly took a portion of the tips that rightfully should have gone to Plaintiff and others similarly situated. Pursuant to Defendants’ policy, all of the tips collected throughout the shift were pooled and divided among employees. However, once or twice a week, Xiomara worked a shift as a bartender and server, and the tips she collected from the bar area were never included in the tip pool. 25. Defendants also took improper deductions from the wages of Plaintiff and others similarly situated. Specifically, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were made to pay for any items returned by customers or for tables that walk out. Per the Restaurant’s online menu1, individual entrees are priced in the range of $30-40, with the “Mixed Grill for 2 Person” going for $72.95. During her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff was made to pay for returned dishes or even entire tables an average of twice per week. 26. As a result of Defendants’ policies, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were not paid for all of the time they worked (including overtime hours), and are not paid all of the wages and compensation they were due, including federal- and state-mandated minimum wages. 27. Defendants also failed to properly record the unpaid time Plaintiff and others similarly situated worked, and thereby failed to make and keep accurate payroll records and provided Plaintiff and others similarly situated with fraudulent and inaccurate wage statements and wage notices in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. 29. Defendants were or should have been aware of their statutory requirements as employers, including specifically but without limitation the requirements under the FLSA and NYLL to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated for all of the time they worked (including overtime hours), to pay them at a rate equal to or above the applicable federal and state minimum wage, to not withhold gratuities or otherwise make improper deductions from employees’ pay, and to make and preserve proper payroll records. 30. However, Defendants knowingly failed to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated all of the regular and overtime wages to which they were entitled, and to make and preserve proper payroll records. 31. As such, the various violations of the FLSA and NYLL alleged herein were committed knowingly, willfully, and intentionally by Defendants. 32. Furthermore, these violations are ongoing, as Defendants continue to engage in the wrongful conduct described herein. FLSA Collective Action Allegations 33. Plaintiff brings this action as a collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA on behalf of herself and all other waitstaff, bussers, bartenders, food runners, and other non-exempt laborers employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the initial Complaint in this case (“FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”). 35. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA. The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. Class Action Allegations 36. Plaintiff brings claims for relief under the NYLL pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and all other waitstaff, bussers, bartenders, food runners, and other non-exempt laborers employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the initial Complaint in this case (“Class Period”). 37. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The members of the Class are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the members of the Class are determinable from Defendants’ records. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and rates of pay for each Class member are also determinable from Defendants’ records. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under Rule 23. 39. Plaintiff’s NYLL claims are typical of those claims, which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief, which would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants (i) failing to pay proper regulary, minimum, and overtime wages for off-the-clock work; (ii) improperly retaining gratuities; (iii) improperly deducting returned and unpaid items from employees’ wages; (iv) improperly taking a tip credit against employees’ wages; and (iv) failing to provide proper wage notices and wage statements that were in compliance with the requirements under the NYLL. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff sustained similar losses, injuries, and damages as other Class members, wth such injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices, and procedures. 40. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented plaintiffs in wage and hour cases. 42. When wage and hour violations arise, current and former employees are often afraid to assert their rights. Current employees fear direct or indirect retaliation by their employers, while former employees are fearful of damage to their current or future employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity, which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 44. Plaintiff repeats each and every previous allegation as if fully set forth herein. 45. At all relevant times Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs were employees of DPI within the meaning of the FLSA, and were persons covered by and intended to benefit from the provisions of the FLSA. 46. At all relevant times DPI was an employer within the meaning of the FLSA. 47. At all relevant times DPI and the Individual Defendants were joint employers of Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 49. As a result of these unpaid hours, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs regularly worked at an average rate of pay below $7.25 per hour, in violation of the 52. Plaintiff repeats each and every previous allegation as if fully set forth herein. 53. At all relevant times Plaintiff and the other Class members were employees of DPI within the meaning of the NYLL, and were persons covered by and intended to benefit from the provisions of the NYLL. 54. At all relevant times DPI was an employer within the meaning of the NYLL. 55. At all relevant times DPI and the Individual Defendants were joint employers of Plaintiff and the other Class members. 57. Section 193 of the NYLL prohibits employers from making any deduction from the wages of an employee, except deductions “expressly authorized in writing by the employee and are for the benefit of the employee.” 58. 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 146-2.9 (promulgated under the NYLL) provides that a food service worker who works at a non-tipped occupation for the lesser of (1) two hours or (2) 20 percent of her shift must be paid at the regular minimum wage without a tip-credit deduction. 59. 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 195-4.5(d) (promulgated under the NYLL) prohibits employers from deducting from employee’s wages “repayment of employer losses, including for spoilage and breakage, cash shortages, and fines or penalties incurred by the employer through the conduct of the employee.” 60. As alleged herein, Plaintiff and the other Class members regularly worked hours for Defendants for which they were not paid, in violation of the NYLL. 61. Plaintiff and the other Class members also regularly spent more than 2 hours or 20 percent of their work days performing non-tipped work, but were still paid at the tip-credit minimum wage in violation of the NYLL. 62. Defendants also unlawfully withheld gratuities from Plaintiff and other Class members, in violation of the NYLL. 63. Defendants also regularly took improper deductions from the wages of Plaintiff and the other Class members, including deductions for returned or unpaid food, in violation of the NYLL. 65. Defendants knew of and/or showed a willful disregard for the provisions of the NYLL as evidenced by their failure to pay Plaintiff and the other Class members all of their tips and wages for all of the hours they worked when Defendants knew or should have known such was due, and their failure to provide Plaintiff and the other Class members with accurate wage notices and statements. Wage And Hour Allegations

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20. Defendant is a global online marketplace for print-on-demand products based on user-submitted artwork and operates www.redbubble.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services, including the ability to browse products for delivery, including the ability to upload your own design for product purchase, find information on promotions, as well as related goods and services available online. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in December 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to upload your own design for product purchase and delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those the ability to upload your own design for product purchase available for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 35. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 86. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 97. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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(Declaratory Relief) (On behalf of Plaintiffs, the Nationwide Class, and all Subclasses) 171. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding allegations pled in paragraphs 1- 170 of this Complaint. 172. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiffs contend, and are informed and believe that Defendant denies that its stores fail to comply with applicable laws including but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, §§ 92A and 98, Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93, § 103, California Civil Code § 13082, California Civil Code §§ 51, et seq. – the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54-54.3 – the Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. – the Unfair Competition Law, New York State Human Rights Law §§ 290 et seq., New York Civil Rights Law §§ 40 et seq., New York City Human Rights Law - NYC Admin. Code§ 8-107, and Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.001, et seq. 173. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. – the Unfair Competition Law) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Lisa Irving, NFB, and the California Subclasses) 128. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding allegations pled in paragraphs 1- 127 of this Complaint. 129. The Unfair Competition Law of the California Business & Practices Code (UCL) provides, in pertinent part that “unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” CA Bus. & Prof. § 17200. 130. The unlawful prong of the UCL borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that are independently actionable under the UCL. 131. Virtually any law or regulation – federal or state, statutory or common law – can serve as a predicate for an UCL “unlawful” violation. If a business practice violates any law, it also violates Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. and may be redressed. 132. Defendant has violated the unlawful prong of the UCL by violating each of the following: 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act; the California Civil Code §§ 51, et seq. – the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54- (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (On Behalf of All Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class) 27. Defendant currently operates approximately seventy (70) stores in the United States, including the District of Columbia, with at least seven (7) more stores scheduled to open within the next eight months. Defendant’s stores include three (3) in Massachusetts, eleven (11) in California, four (4) in New York, and twelve (12) in Texas. 28. The Container Store promotes itself as the original and leading specialty retailer of storage and organization products in the United States and the only national retailer solely devoted to the category. Defendant promises creative, multifunctional, customizable storage and organization solutions that help its customers save time, save space and improve the quality of their lives. 30. On information and belief, on an annual basis, Defendant processes hundreds of millions of dollars in sales transactions annually, including millions of dollars in sales to its blind or visually impaired customers. 31. It is estimated that there are 10 million Americans who are visually impaired, including approximately 1.3 million that are legally blind. Although precise numbers are not available at this time, it is safe to estimate that blind customers make tens of thousands of sales transactions on an annual basis at Defendant’s many locations. 32. This case arises out of Defendant’s failure to comply with the legal regulations requiring it to provide equal access to its products and services to blind or visually impaired customers. 34. The Container Store has long known this style of POS Device cannot be independently used by its blind or visually impaired customers. 35. On information and belief, The Container Store has only recently taken steps to replace its POS Devices in California– a state with friendly disability laws and severe compensatory damages for noncompliance – and a state that has for many years explicitly required all merchants to provide tactually discernible keypads to enable blind customers to independently make purchases on their debit cards. § 13082. See California Financial Code § 13082. 37. The device fails to provide the accessibility it purports to provide – an outcome that could have been avoided had The Container Store simply included the NFB and its members in the development or procurement process. 38. A photo of a POS Device utilizing the Accessibility Overlay is provided below. 40. A customer’s use of a debit card instead of a credit card affords the added protection of requiring a PIN to complete the transaction. This extra layer of protection is important in the event a card is lost or stolen. For a blind or visually impaired customer who is required to disclose that PIN in order to proceed with a transaction, that security is compromised. 42. In addition to being unable to independently utilize the POS Device – whether with the Accessibility Overlay, or without – blind or visually impaired customers also cannot independently use the kiosks provided at the register or at various store locations, for participation in The Container Store’s Loyalty Program. 43. Many of the NFB’s members, including Plaintiffs, have patronized Defendant’s retail stores, intend to continue to do so in the future, and would like to continue to patronize Defendant’s retail stores when the discriminatory barriers are removed or cured. 44. Defendant’s touchscreen POS Devices and kiosks have the capacity to provide more information than that which is necessary for completing a transaction. Due to the fact that the information being presented through these touchscreens is entirely inaccessible in a nonvisual manner, blind customers stand the significant risk of not having full and equal access to goods and services being offered by Defendant. 46. Multiple states, including Massachusetts and California, have recognized the obvious privacy issues that arise when a customer’s personal identifying information is provided, and have limited a customer’s need to produce such information during a credit card transaction. Due to the absence of any otherwise capable and accessible alternative while shopping at The Container Store, blind or visually impaired customers must provide their email or other personally identifying information orally, without the same privacy protections afforded sighted customers. 47. Should a blind or visually impaired customer decide to partake in the additional goods and services being offered by the POP! Program, they must forego their right to privacy and disclose personal identifying information in a public manner that is not required of sighted customers. 48. The individual plaintiffs in this case are legally blind. As do sighted customers, they also turn to The Container Store for specialty storage and organization products. 49. The elimination of discrimination such as that of The Container Store is at the core of the NFB’s organizational purpose. To the extent this lawsuit seeks injunctive and/or declaratory relief, the individual participation of each injured NFB member is not indispensable to the proper resolution of this case. 63. The NFB is a membership organization. Its members include many people like Mark Cadigan, Mika Pyyhkala, Lisa Irving, Arthur Jacobs, Jeanine Kay Lineback, and Heather Albright, who are blind or visually impaired. Many of these people are regular patrons of retail establishments such as The Container Store. a. Mark Cadigan 65. Mark Cadigan was unable to make a debit card purchase independently because, at the time of the visit, The Container Store’s POS Devices had only touchscreen devices that could not be read or viewed by Mr. Cadigan. He was therefore unable to independently enter his PIN to complete a transaction. Mr. Cadigan has been denied the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of The Container Store, as a result of accessibility barriers at Defendant’s stores. b. Mika Pyyhkala 66. In or about May of 2015, Mika Pyyhkala visited one of Defendant’s stores located in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. 67. Mika Pyyhkala was unable to make a debit card purchase independently because, at the time of the visit, The Container Store’s POS Devices had only touchscreen devices that could not be read or viewed by Mr. Pyyhkala. He was therefore unable to independently enter his PIN to complete a transaction. Mr. Pyykhala registered for The Container Store’s Loyalty Program in or about the winter of 2014. Because the devices that The Container Store employs to enable customers to privately enter their personal identifying information could not be used by Mr. Pyykhala, he was forced to verbally disclose his personal information to the store clerk in order to participate in and benefit from the Loyalty Program during his May 2015 visit. Mr. Pyyhkala has been denied the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of The Container Store, as a result of accessibility barriers at Defendant’s stores. c. Lisa Irving 69. Lisa Irving was unable to independently participate in the POP! Program offered by The Container Store because the devices that The Container Store employs to enable customers to privately enter their personal identifying information could not be used by Ms. Irving. Ms. Irving was forced to verbally disclose her personal information to the store clerk in order to enroll in the program. Ms. Irving has been denied the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of The Container Store, as a result of accessibility barriers at Defendant’s stores. d. Arthur Jacobs 70. In or about May of 2015, Arthur Jacobs visited one of Defendant’s stores located in New York, New York. 72. In or about February of 2015, Jeanine Kay Lineback visited one of Defendant’s stores located in Austin, Texas. 73. Jeanine Kay Lineback was unable to make a debit card purchase independently. At the time of her visit, The Container Store’s POS Devices utilized the Accessibility Overlay which contained tactile portions that could not be independently discerned by Ms. Lineback. She required verbal instruction and guidance to complete her transaction. There was no privacy shield to prevent the store clerk or other customers from viewing her PIN as it was entered. On a separate occasion in or about May of 2015, Ms. Lineback was also unable to independently register at the store for the POP program because the device that The Container Store employs to enable customers to privately enter their personal identifying information could not be used by Ms. Lineback. Ms. Lineback has been denied the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of The Container Store, as a result of accessibility barriers at Defendant’s stores. f. Heather Albright 74. In or about February of 2015, Heather Albright visited one of Defendant’s stores located in Austin, Texas. 76. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiffs, and other individuals similarly situated, will continue to be unable to independently use Defendant’s POS Devices and/or equally participate in The Container Store’s POP! Program in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the ADA and state law. 77. Whether on the original POS Device, or The Container Store’s attempted retrofitted solution (“Accessibility Overlay”), in order to purchase merchandise with a debit card or participate in a promotional program, a blind or visually impaired customer is required to disclose his/her private PIN or other personal identifying information directly to the cashier or another person, or under their guidance and watch. This is an unnecessary and intrusive violation of privacy that could easily be remedied. To the extent that Defendant offers other goods and services through its inaccessible touch screens, it further discriminates against its blind or visually impaired customers. 79. Plaintiffs also seek certification of the following two Massachusetts subclasses (referred to herein as the “Massachusetts Subclass” or “Massachusetts Subclasses”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all individuals who were unable to independently register for and participate in the POP! Program at any The Container Store location in Massachusetts because of a visual disability, at any time during the applicable limitation period through the duration of any injunctive relief ordered by the Court,” and “all individuals who were unable to independently complete a debit or credit card transaction requiring entry of a PIN independently in a nonvisual manner using a touchscreen POS Device at any The Container Store location in Massachusetts because of a visual disability, at any time during the applicable limitation period through the duration of any injunctive relief ordered by the Court.” 80. Plaintiffs also seek certification of the following two California subclasses (referred to herein as the “California Subclass” or “California Subclasses”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all individuals who were unable to independently register for and participate in the POP! Program at any The Container Store location in California because of a visual disability, at any time during the applicable limitation period through the duration of any injunctive relief ordered by the Court,” and “all individuals who were unable to independently complete a debit or credit card transaction requiring entry of a PIN independently in a nonvisual manner using a touchscreen POS Device at any The Container Store location in California because of a visual disability, at any time during the applicable limitation period through the duration of any injunctive relief ordered by the Court.” 82. Plaintiffs also seek certification of the following two Texas subclasses (referred to herein as the “Texas Subclass” or “Texas Subclasses”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all individuals who were unable to independently register for and participate in the POP! Program at any The Container Store location in Texas because of a visual disability, at any time during the applicable limitation period through the duration of any injunctive relief ordered by the Court,” and “all individuals who were unable to independently complete a debit or credit card transaction requiring entry of a PIN independently in a nonvisual manner using a touchscreen POS Device at any Texas The Container Store location because of a visual disability, at any time during the applicable limitation period through the duration of any injunctive relief ordered by the Court.” 84. There are common questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s goods, facilities and/or services due to the lack of equal access to Defendant’s goods and services as required by law for persons with disabilities. Common questions of law and fact include: (1) Whether The Container Store’s retail establishments deny the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to the blind in violation of the ADA and California, Massachusetts, New York and Texas laws; (2) If so, what measures are legally required to bring The Container Store into compliance with the ADA and state law; and (3) Whether Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class and each Subclass sustained damages and, if so, the proper measure of damages or other relief. 85. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of those of the Nationwide Class and respective Subclasses. 86. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Nationwide Class and each Subclass. Plaintiffs have retained and are represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation. 87. Class certification of the claims of the Nationwide Class and each Subclass is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because The Container Store has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Nationwide Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class and each Subclass as a whole. 89. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden which would otherwise be placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous individual lawsuits and there are no obstacles to effective and efficient management of this lawsuit as a class action. 90. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding allegations pled in paragraphs 1- 89 of this Complaint. 91. Section 302(a) of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 92. Title III of the ADA applies to “any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Defendant owns, leases (or leases to) and/or operates places of public accommodation. 94. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation. 95. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 96. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class in that it has failed to make its POS Devices and Loyalty Program fully accessible to individuals who are blind or visually impaired in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12102(2) and 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101 et seq. Providing the auxiliary aids and services mandated by the ADA would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s businesses nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 97. Defendant is financially capable of the costs required to provide auxiliary aids for its POS Devices. Notwithstanding this fact, The Container Store has failed to develop and provide appropriate auxiliary aids for its blind customers. 99. Without the requested injunctive relief, specifically including the request that the Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for a period to be determined after Defendant certifies it is fully compliant with the mandatory requirements of the ADA that are discussed above, The Container Store’s non-compliance with the ADA’s requirements is likely to recur. Violation of the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (On Behalf of Plaintiffs Mika Pyyhkala, Mark Cadigan, NFB, and the Massachusetts Subclass) 106. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding allegations pled in paragraphs 1- 105 of this Complaint. 107. Plaintiffs Mika Pyyhkala and Mark Cadigan are legally blind and recognized as a protected class under Mass. Const. amend. CXIV and under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93, § 103(a). 108. The retail stores offered by Defendant in Massachusetts constitute a program or activity under Mass. Const. amend. CXIV. 109. Defendant has excluded blind or visually impaired people from the participation in and benefits of the services offered at Defendant’s stores in Massachusetts and has subjected Plaintiffs to discrimination under Mass. Const. amend. CXIV and the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93, § 103.

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VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S FALSE ADVERTISING LAW CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500, ET SEQ. • Restitution and injunctive relief pursuant to Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203; and • recovery of reasonably attorney’s fees pursuant to, inter alia, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S CONSUMER LEGAL REMEDIES ACT CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 1750, ET SEQ. • injunctive relief pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a); and • an award of costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(d). 30. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 31. On or about June 14, 2019, Plaintiff purchased a bottle of Defendant’s “Premium Vitamin B12” for $14.99 (before tax) from Amazon.com. 50. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION • A judgment against Defendant for general and compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial; • prejudgment interest in an amount to be determined at trial, pursuant to California Code § 3287(a); • punitive damages pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 3294; and • that Plaintiff and the members of the Class be granted any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION • A judgment against Defendant for general and compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial; and • prejudgment interest in an amount to be determined at trial, pursuant to California Code § 3287(a). VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, ET SEQ. • Restitution and injunctive relief pursuant to Bus. & Prof. Code § 17535; and • recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to, inter alia, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (“UCL”) BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, ET SEQ.

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22. Plaintiff has never been on a cruise nor has Plaintiff provided Defendant with her email address. 23. Notwithstanding, on or about September 24, 2019, Defendant sent an e-mail to Plaintiff with the following subject line: “1-Day Exclusive Royal Sale! Up to $1,100 to Spend on Board + Hundreds in Discounts.” 25. Thus, Defendant’s claim of a Up to $1,100 to Spend on Board is false or misleading. 26. Defendant’s e-mail constitutes an unsolicited commercial electronic mail message under FEMCA because (1) it was sent to promote the sale or lease of, or investment in, property, goods, or services related to any trade or commerce; and (2) it was sent without Plaintiff’s affirmative or implied consent. 27. Plaintiff is the sole user of the e-mail address to which Defendant transmitted the violative e-mail. 28. Defendant’s unsolicited e-mail caused Plaintiff actual harm including lost productivity and resources, annoyance, and consumption of valuable digital storage space. 29. Plaintiff was induced by the misleading subject line in Defendant’s e-mail to click on and view Defendant’s e-mail. 30. Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted approximately 30 seconds reviewing Defendant’s misleading e-mail. 32. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 33. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of following Class: All persons within Florida who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent the same unsolicited commercial electronic mail message sent to Plaintiff, as alleged herein, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf. 34. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. 35. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 39. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits unsolicited commercial electronic mail messages containing misleading subject lines is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 44. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 45. Defendant initiated the transmission of an unsolicited commercial electronic mail message to electronic mail addresses held by residents of this state that contained false or misleading information in the subject line. 46. Defendant failed to secure affirmative or implied consent to transmit the subject e-mails to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 47. Defendant caused harm to Plaintiff and members of the Class, including lost productivity and resources, annoyance, consumption of valuable digital storage space and/or financial costs. 48. Defendant’s conduct undermined the integrity of electronic commerce in this state. PROPOSED CLASS Violation of Florida’s Electronic Mail Communications Act (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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5.1. In January 2018, Plaintiff was treated for a serious medical condition at MultiCare Deaconess Hospital in Spokane, WA. 5.2. MultiCare billed Plaintiff Born for the services it claimed to have performed for her. 5.3. Plaintiff could not afford to pay the balance in full at the time that she was billed. 5.4. Plaintiff made periodic payments to MultiCare for the billed charges. 5.5. MultiCare assigned collection of the billed charges to Defendant State. 5.6. In October 2018, when Plaintiff contacted MultiCare to pay off her remaining balance, she was told by the MultiCare billing department that her account had been assigned to “state collections”. 5.7. Plaintiff understood that “state collections” meant that the debt was being collected by the state of Washington. 8.1. This action is brought on behalf of a class consisting of: 8.1.1. All persons residing in Washington State who received a communication from Defendant State Collection; 8.1.2. For purposes of the WCPA, all persons and businesses who, within (4) four years preceding the filing of this Complaint, received any communication from Defendant State that was an attempt to collect a claim;

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10. In addition, the written agreement must include a clear and conspicuous disclosure informing the signer that: By executing the agreement, such person authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the signatory telemarketing calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; § 64.1200(f)(8)(i)(A) and The person is not required to sign the agreement (directly or indirectly), or agree to enter into such an agreement as a condition of purchasing any property, goods, or services. § 64.1200(f)(8)(i)(B) 11. The 2015 TCPA Order notes that the text and legislative history of the TCPA revealed “Congress’s intent to give the Commission broad authority to enforce the protections from unwanted robocalls as new technologies emerge.” ¶ 113 Defendant Violated the TCPA 14. At no time did Plaintiff NGUYEN consent to receiving any kind of marketing calls from Defendant. 15. This unsolicited robocall was sent to Plaintiff NGUYEN’s cellular phone through an automated telephone dialing system for the sole purpose of promoting Defendant’s hotels. 17. Even if the calls to Plaintiff NGUYEN were not made with automated telephone dialing system, she knows from direct experience that that Defendant was making the calls with an artificial or prerecord voice, thus satisfying the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 18. Defendant placed similar unsolicited marketing calls (and/or text messages) using an automated telephone dialing system to many other similarly situated persons, who likewise never consented to receiving them. 19. Plaintiff NGUYEN seeks to represent a class consisting of: All persons in the United States who, beginning four years prior to the filing of this action, received unsolicited robocalls and/or text messages to their cellular phones from Defendant through an automated telephone dialing system or with an artificial or prerecorded voice, without providing Defendant with their prior express consent. (the “Class”) 20. The proposed Class excludes current and former officers and directors of Defendant, members of the immediate families of the officers and directors of Defendant, Defendant’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, assigns, and any entity in which it has or has had a controlling interest, and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. 21. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the Class definition based on facts learned in the course of litigating this matter. 23. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendant’s wrongful conduct. 24. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained experienced and competent counsel. 25. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages sustained by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for the members of the Class to individually seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. If Class treatment of these claims were not available, Defendant would likely be able to persist in its unlawful conduct with impunity. 27. The membership of the Class is readily ascertainable from electronic records. 28. The prosecution of this action as a Class action will reduce the possibility of repetitious litigation. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty which will be encountered in the management of this litigation which would preclude its maintenance as a Class action. 29. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by any individual class member are too small to make it economically feasible for an individual class member to prosecute a separate action, and it is desirable for judicial efficiency to concentrate the litigation of the claims in this forum. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will avoid the potentially inconsistent and conflicting adjudications of the claims asserted herein. 30. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) are met, as Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 31. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive relief or equitable relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) are met, as questions of law or fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 33. Defendant’s conduct is generally applicable to the Class as a whole and Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, equitable remedies with respect to the Class as a whole. As such, Defendant’s systematic policies and practices make declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 34. Plaintiff NGUYEN realleges and incorporates herein by references the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs and further alleges as follows: 35. Plaintiff NGUYEN brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class for Defendant’s violations of the TCPA. 36. Defendant directly or vicariously violated the TCPA when it used an automated telephone dialing system or a prerecorded voice to place unsolicited and unauthorized marketing calls and/or texts to the cellular phones of Plaintiff and the Class. 37. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), provides: (1) Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State-- (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $ 500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. 39. Defendant’s violations of the TCPA were willful and knowing. But it is liable to Plaintiff and the Class even if they were only negligent. 40. Defendant should also be enjoined from engaging in similar unlawful conduct in the future. 41. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to all damages referenced herein, attorney’s fees, costs, treble damages, injunctive relief, and any other remedies allowed by the 7. The 2015 TCPA Order also explained the continuing relevance of the TCPA, especially in connection with wireless consumers: Month after month, unwanted robocalls and texts, both telemarketing and informational, top the list of consumer complaints received by the Commission. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and our rules empower consumers to decide which robocalls and text messages they receive, with heightened protection to wireless consumers, for whom robocalls can be costly and particularly intrusive… With this Declaratory Ruling and Order, we act to preserve consumers’ rights to stop unwanted robocalls, including both voice calls and texts, and thus respond to the many who have let us, other federal agencies, and states know about their frustration with robocalls. 2015 TCPA Order ¶ 1 8. The TCPA makes it “unlawful for any person… to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice… to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service… or any service for which the called party is charged for the call…” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The Telephone Consumer Protection Act VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.)

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24. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 25. Beginning in or around March of 2019, Plaintiff began receiving numerous autodialed calls on her cellular telephone ((XXX) XXX-7223) from Defendant. 26. When Plaintiff did not pick up the phone, Defendant left a message on her cellular telephone voicemail informing Plaintiff that Defendant was calling in regard to an overdue medical account owed by someone other than, and unknown to, Plaintiff. 27. There was at least one number that appeared in Plaintiff’s caller ID for these calls: 800-275-4524. 28. Telephone number 800-275-4524 is associated with Defendant. 30. Plaintiff believes Defendant called her cellular telephone number on at least seven (7) separate occasions between March 2019 and June 2019. 31. KCI’s calls were not intended for Plaintiff. Rather, KCI placed its calls in an effort to reach someone other than, and unknown to, Plaintiff named “Brenda Stearns”. 32. Moreover, Plaintiff recalls that some of the calls contained prerecorded messages in which a generic message played stating that KCI was calling in regard to a delinquent medical account purportedly owned by Ms. Stearns. 33. On more than one occasion, Plaintiff contacted Defendant via email and by telephone to explain to Defendant that it was calling the wrong person. Defendant, however, failed to rectify the problem and continued placing calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 34. In receiving unwanted and unsolicited calls on her cellular telephone, Plaintiff suffered concrete harm in the form of lost time spent fielding the unwanted calls and attempting to get Defendant to stop the calls, loss of use of her cellular telephone as the calls came in, and the invasion of privacy and intrusion upon her seclusion. 35. Upon information and good faith belief, and in light of the frequency, number, nature, and character of the calls at issue, including KCI’s use of artificial or prerecorded voice messages, telephone contact made by KCI to Plaintiff on her cellular telephone occurred via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 37. KCI called Plaintiff on her cellular telephone by utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). To be sure, when Defendant left a message on Plaintiff’s voicemail, it was a prerecorded message informing Plaintiff the call was in regard to an account belonging to someone other than, and unknown to, Plaintiff. 38. The telephone number on which KCI contacted Plaintiff was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 39. Plaintiff did not provide her “prior express consent” allowing KCI to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone utilizing an “automatic telephone dialing system” and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 41. In fact, KCI asked for someone other than Plaintiff—a person whom Plaintiff did not know and with whom Plaintiff had no connection whatsoever. 42. Plaintiff is not, nor was at the time of the calls in question, one of Defendant’s customers. 43. Plaintiff does not have, nor did have at the time of the calls in question, a business relationship with Defendant. 44. The telephone calls made to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone by Defendant were not “for emergency purposes” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 45. The telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone made by Defendant, which utilized an “automatic telephone dialing system” and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice for non-emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiff’s prior express consent, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 46. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (“the Class”). 48. Upon information and belief, the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all of them is impracticable. 49. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members of the Class, but on information and belief, the number of Class members is in the thousands. 50. The members of the Class are ascertainable because the Class is defined by reference to objective criteria. 51. In addition, the members of the Class are identifiable in that, upon information and belief, their cellular telephone numbers, names and addresses can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant and by third parties. 52. Plaintiff’s claims, and the claims of the members of the Class, originate from the same conduct, practice and procedure on the part of Defendant. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same theories as are the claims of the members of the Class. 54. Plaintiff suffered the same injuries as the members of the Class. 55. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of Defendant, including, but not limited to, the invasion of their privacy, annoyance, waste of time, depletion of their cellular phone battery, and the intrusion on their cellular telephone that occupied it from receiving legitimate communications. 56. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 58. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all Class members. The questions of law and fact involving the Class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether non-emergency calls made to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones used an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether such calls were made by Defendant; c. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent (i.e., consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated) to make such calls to wrong or reassigned telephone numbers; d. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; e. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and f. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 59. As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without her prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member. 60. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 62. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 63. Class wide relief is essential to compel Defendant to comply with the TCPA. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for the violation of the TCPA are relatively small. 64. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class actions because the calls at issue are all automated and the Class members did not provide prior express consent, as required under the statute, to authorize such calls to their cellular telephones. 65. Defendant has acted on grounds applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 66. Moreover, on information and belief, the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 67. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in paragraphs 1-66. 69. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. Specifically, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, without her consent. 70. Defendant separately violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice in connection with calls it placed to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, without her consent. 71. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 72. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. FIRST COUNT STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

win

(Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) (On Behalf of the Class) (Restitution / Unjust Enrichment) (On Behalf of the Class) (In the Alternative) (Violation of New York General Business Law § 349) (On Behalf of the New York Sub-Class) (Violation of Various Consumer Protection Acts) (On Behalf of the Class) 19. On September 25, 2012, Plaintiff purchased in-flight Internet service from Gogo for $34.95 in reliance on the representations on Gogo’s registration website that he would be charged $34.95 for one month of service. 20. The service could be used for up to 30 days on any airline. After the 30 days ended on October 25, 2012, Gogo continued to bill Plaintiff’s credit card $34.95 every month until at least December 25, 2012, even though Plaintiff did not use the service. Gogo obtained no signature or affirmative authorization to charge for recurring fees. Nor did Gogo send any form of communication to Plaintiff on a monthly basis, as is customary with monthly bills, to notify him of the pending charges that he would incur if he did not cancel his service. 21. Similarly, every other Class member purchased in-flight Internet service from Gogo prior to December 31, 2012, using a registration website that had representations about the monthly cost of the service but had no representations about the recurring nature of charges for the service. 22. Defendants’ website currently indicates that the charge for “monthly” service will be recurring, but it did not do so in 2011 or 2012. Rather, when potential customers registered for the service, the only representation regarding the price indicated the price per month—e.g., “$34.95 per month.” 23. In contrast to the prominent representations on Gogo’s registration website regarding the price for the service, Defendants’ representations omitted reference to the recurring nature of the charges. 7 Berkson et al. v. Gogo LLC 30. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and a proposed class (the “Class”) consisting of all others similarly situated, defined as follows: All persons residing in the United States who, at any time between February 25, 2008, and December 31, 2012 (the “Class Period”), incurred monthly fees for Gogo in-flight Internet service for months that the customers did not use the service. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest, any officers or directors of Defendants, and the legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns of Defendants. 31. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of a proposed subclass (the “New York Sub-Class”) consisting of all other similarly situated New York residents, defined as follows: All New York residents who, at any time between January 30, 2008, and December 31, 2012, incurred monthly fees for Gogo in- flight Internet service for months that the customers did not use the service. Excluded from the New York Sub-Class are Defendants, any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest, any officers or directors of Defendants, and the legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns of Defendants. 32. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 33. Numerosity of the Class; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1): The size of the Class is so large that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Class members number in the thousands. The precise number of Class members and their addresses are unknown to Plaintiff but can be obtained from Defendants’ records. Class members can be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, supplemented by published notice if necessary. 9 Berkson et al. v. Gogo LLC 39. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 40. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of himself and the New York Sub- Class, pursuant to New York General Business Law section 349. 41. As detailed more fully herein, Defendants engaged in deceptive acts and practices by falsely and misleadingly making representations to consumers, and by engaging in omissions, that were material to all reasonable consumers who accessed, or contemplated accessing, Gogo’s in-flight Internet service. These and similar misrepresentations were broadly disseminated to all members of the New York Sub-Class in substantially the same form via Gogo’s website and other advertising and marketing materials. 42. As fully alleged above, by advertising, marketing, distributing, and/or selling the Products to Plaintiff and the other members of the New York Sub-Class, Defendants engaged in and continues to engage in deceptive acts, practices, and omissions. 43. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants’ conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes deceptive acts and practices in violation of New York General Business Law section 349, and Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other members of the New York Sub-Class for the actual damages that they have suffered as a result of Defendants’ actions. The amount of such damages is to be determined at trial, but will not be less than $50.00. 44. Therefore, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 12 Berkson et al. v. Gogo LLC 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges all paragraphs previously alleged herein. 46. Implicit within any agreement that Plaintiff and the other Class members may have entered into with respect to the service described herein is a covenant by Defendants to act in good faith and deal fairly with Plaintiff and the other Class members. 47. Defendants breached this implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by intentionally, knowingly, willfully, unreasonably, recklessly, arbitrarily, frivolously, and/or maliciously: a. promoting Gogo’s in-flight Internet service but omitting the payment scheme from the materials available to customers at the time of initial purchase; b. refusing to offer full refunds to customers who were charged on a recurring basis without their authorization; and c. for such other conduct to be disclosed in discovery. 48. As a result of Defendants’ conduct as described herein, Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered loss and damage. 49. Therefore, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 13 Berkson et al. v. Gogo LLC 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges all paragraphs previously alleged. 51. Plaintiff brings his statutory fraud claims pursuant to the substantially similar Consumer Fraud Acts3 of all United States, all of which were enacted and designed to protect consumers against unlawful, fraudulent, and/or unfair business acts and practices. See, e.g., Illinois’ Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1 et seq. (the “Illinois Consumer Fraud Act”). 3 The following consumer protection acts are modeled after the Federal Trade Commission’s consumer protection provisions and are collectively referred to herein, along with Illinois’ and New York’s consumer protection statutes, as the “Consumer Fraud Acts”: Ala. Code § 8-19-1 et seq. (Alabama); Alaska Stat. § 45.50.471 et seq. (Alaska); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1521 et seq. (Arizona); Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101 et seq. (Arkansas); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105 et seq. (Colorado); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a (Connecticut); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, § 2511 et seq. (Delaware); D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3901 et seq. (District of Columbia); Fla. Stat. Ann, § 501.201 et seq. (Florida); Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-390 et seq. (Georgia); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 481A-1 et seq. and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-1 et seq. (Hawaii); Idaho Code § 48-601 et seq. (Idaho); Kan. Stat. Ann § 50.623 et seq. (Kansas); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.11.0 et seq. (Kentucky); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1401 et seq. (Louisiana); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 5, § 205-A et seq. (Maine); Md. Com. Law Code Ann. § 13-101 et seq., Md. Corn. Law Code Ann. § 13-301 et seq., Md. Corn Law Code Ann, § 13-408 et seq. (Maryland); Mass Gen. L. ch. 93A (Massachusetts); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 445.901 et seq., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 19.418(1) et seq. (Michigan); Minn. Stat. § 325F.68 et seq., Minn. Stat. § 8.31 (Minnesota); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-3 et seq. (Mississippi); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010 et seq. (Missouri); Mont. Code Ann. § 30- 14-101 et seq. (Montana); Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 59-1601 et seq. (Nebraska); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.600 and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0903 et seq. (Nevada); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358:1 et seq. (New Hampshire); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:8-1 et seq., N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:12-1 et seq. (New Jersey); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1.2-1 et seq. (New Mexico); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. § 349 et seq. (New York); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1 et seq. (North Carolina); N. D. Cent. Code § 51-15-01 et seq. (North Dakota); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01 et seq. (Ohio); Okla. Stat. Tit. 15, § 751 et seq. (Oklahoma); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 646.605 et seq. (Oregon); Penn. Stat. § 201-1 et seq. (Pennsylvania); Laws of P. R. Ann. Tit. 10, § 259 et seq. (Puerto Rico); R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1:1 et seq. (Rhode Island); S.C. Code Ann. 39-5-10 et seq. (South Carolina); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 37-24.1 et seq. (South Dakota); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq. (Tennessee); Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 17.41 et seq. (Texas); Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 9, § 2451 et seq. (Vermont); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-196 et seq. (Virginia); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.010 et seq. (Washington); W.Va. Code § 46A-6-101 et seq. (West Virginia); and Wyo. Stat. § 40;12-101 et seq. (Wyoming). 14 Berkson et al. v. Gogo LLC 60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges all paragraphs previously alleged herein. 61. Plaintiff brings this cause of action in the alternative to his First, Second, and Third Causes of Action, on behalf of himself and the Class members. 62. By selling its in-flight Internet service through unfair and deceptive practices, Defendants have engaged in inequitable conduct and has received a benefit at the expense of consumers, including Plaintiff and the other Class members. 16 Berkson et al. v. Gogo LLC

win

(NOTICE AND ABATEMENT CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDED) 12. At all relevant times herein, Steven and Joanna Cone were the owners of the residence located at 12237 Bethel Drive, Frisco, Collin County, Texas 75033 (the “Property”). Plaintiffs home contained multiple toilet tanks marked with the Vortens, Inc. logo believed to be distributed or otherwise manufactured by Vortens and/or Sanitarios Lamosa S.A. DE C.V. 13. There are four model no. 3464 Vortens toilet tanks installed at the Property. 5 14. The relevant Toilet Tanks installed at the Property were designed, manufactured, distributed, sold, and/or otherwise placed into the stream of commerce by the Named Defendants. In the alternative, the Toilet Tanks were designed, manufactured, distributed, sold, and/or otherwise placed into the stream of commerce by Defendant Vortens, and contemporaneous with and/or subsequent thereto, Defendant Sanitarios, by way of merger, consolidation, acquisition, and/or an asset purchase agreement expressly, impliedly, and/or by operation of law acquired and assumed any and all of Vortens’ liabilities arising out of the design, manufacture, distribution, and sale of all or a portion of Vortens’ toilet tanks, including any and all liabilities arising from any defective condition and/or failure of the Toilet Tanks. 15. Under any of these alternatives, both Defendants are legally liable for the claims, causes of action, and damages asserted in this Complaint. Vague Admissions of “Technical Issues.” 16. Plaintiffs discovered that a manufacturing defect affecting multiple models of toilet tanks designed, manufactured, marketed and distributed by the Named Defendants caused such tanks to spontaneously crack, causing extensive damage both to real and personal property. 17. Indeed, through the release of a recent public announcement, Vortens conceded in relevant part: • “Tank models #3464 and #3412 may have been affected by certain technical issues that allegedly caused fractures.” • “Vortens has adjusted that manufacturing process to further minimize the probability of technical issues that might affect them.” 6 See EXHIBIT A. 18. Vortens’ representative Carlos Andrés Ríos Pinto further publically confirmed: “Vortens has ceased production of tank reference #3464 and has improved the manufacturing process of tank reference #3412 to correct and eliminate the possible technical issues that might affect them.” See EXHIBIT B. 19. Upon information, investigation, and belief, the spontaneous cracking caused by a defect in the manufacturing process is not limited to a single admitted production year or to only two models. To the contrary, such manufacturing defect has manifested the same failure mode fracturing in toilet tanks under the manufacturing, distribution, and marketing control of the Named Defendants in production batches dating at least as far back as 2004. 20. The four Vortens toilet tanks installed in the Plaintiffs’ home are all reference #3464 models. In light of the acknowledgement that “technical issues” in the manufacturing of these models can cause spontaneous fractures, Plaintiffs realized their property was in ongoing and imminent danger of extensive damage and that the continued possession and use of such toilet tanks held a substantial risk or credible threat of impending harm. Defective and Unreasonably Dangerous Condition 21. Expert investigation reveals that multiple toilet tank models manufactured, marketed, and distributed by the Named Defendants over the course of several years are prone to spontaneous and catastrophic failure and cracking. The problem appears to begin 7 with a crack in the porcelain tank that holds the water, which ultimately causes more extensive cracking and breakage due to the water pressure inside the tank. 22. Examination and testing of the affected tanks establishes that the tanks were either fired too rapidly or allowed to cool down too quickly or in an uneven fashion. This flaw in manufacturing caused residual stresses to be formed in the ceramic materials. 23. 23. These stresses are concentrated around inclusions in the ceramic material with large stress concentration factors. This in turn causes minute cracks that propagate due to normal and anticipated use. During the continued emptying and fill cycles of the water in the tank, the cyclic stress on the toilet tank continues to slowly propagate these cracks until fracture and failure. 24. This defective, unfit, and unreasonably dangerous condition exists in the affected toilet tanks at the time same leave the possession or control of the manufacturer. Knowledge of the Defective Condition 25. Upon information and belief, prior to (and ongoing since) marketing and selling the Toilet Tanks installed in the Plaintiffs’ Home, both Defendants possessed actual or constructive knowledge, or otherwise knew or should have known, that the toilet tanks in the production lines of certain models manufactured as early as 2004 and up through 2012, which included the Toilet Tanks at issue in this lawsuit, were manufactured in a defective or faulty manner and/or were defective, unreasonably dangerous, and were catastrophically failing and cracking, causing damages to the consumers and end users of these products. 8 26. Defendants had specific prior knowledge of such a defect in the manufacturing process of these toilet tanks and the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in these toilet tanks based on their own test results and reports of the exact same type of catastrophic failures and cracking in numerous other toilet tank models manufactured during this time period. 27. Despite such prior knowledge, both defendants made a conscious decision not to issue or supply any warnings to the public or anyone else adequately alerting or notifying installers or end users of these defects, or that same were manufactured in a defective manner, prone to failure, or had a high risk of catastrophically failing and cracking under normal, expected, and foreseeable uses prior to 2016. Furthermore, these Defendants made a conscious decision against openness as to the extent of the consumer complaints as to all of the affected models and for the full scope of the affected years of production. 28. Despite such prior knowledge, both Defendants decided not to take any feasible measures to promptly and timely correct the defective or faulty manner in which the Toilet Tanks were manufactured, and they also made a conscious decision not to take any feasible measures to promptly and timely correct the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in these toilet tanks or any feasible measures to promptly and timely prevent catastrophic failures and cracking in these toilet tanks, including those installed in and sold with the Plaintiffs’ Home. 29. Instead of issuing any such warnings or taking any such feasible measures, the defendants continued to market, distribute, and sell these defective toilet tanks for a 9 number of years without warning about the danger or timely making feasible modifications to eliminate the danger. 30. The defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in the production line of toilet tanks manufactured 2004-2012, including those installed in the Plaintiffs’ Home, was not obvious, open, visible, or discoverable by a reasonable inspection by any persons or entities, including building contractors, plumbing contractors, installers, building inspectors, or ordinary consumers, such as the Plaintiffs. 31. Both Defendants knew or had reason to know that the Toilet Tanks installed in and sold with the Plaintiffs’ Home were defective and likely dangerous for the use for which they were supplied, and they had no reason to believe that those for whose use the toilet tanks were supplied would realize their dangerous condition. 32. Plaintiffs, and the anticipated Class Members, are faced with the unfair and untenable choice of simply waiting for the failure to occur and risk extensive damage to real and personal property or otherwise incur personal expenses to repair or remediate the impending danger. 37. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action individually and on behalf all other similarly situated individuals and/or persons, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38. Plaintiffs anticipate defining this Class as: Any and all consumers of toilet tank models #3464, #3412, #3404, #3425, #3408 and #3571 manufactured, produced, designed, marketed, or distributed by the named Defendants between 2004-2012. It is further anticipated that additional sub-class definitions and classifications may ultimately be necessary upon class certification based upon the whether the toilet tanks have already been replaced or remain in need of replacement. 11 39. The following persons and/or entities are excluded from the Class: a) Persons and/or entities who timely opt-out of this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting-out that will be formally established by this Court; b) Persons and/or entities who have settled or otherwise resolved claims against the Defendants arising out of or in connection with individual water or flooding damages alleged to be caused by a fractured tank of one of the relevant models, to the extent of the resolution of those claims; c) Any and all federal, state, and/or local governments, including, but not limited to, their departments, agencies, divisions, bureaus, boards, sections, groups, counsels and/or subdivisions; and d) Any currently sitting Texas state court judge and/or justice in the current style and/or any persons within the third degree of consanguinity to such judge and/or justice. 40. In the unlikely event that the Court should determine not to certify a nationwide Class, then in the alternative, Plaintiffs seek certification of a Texas-only class. 41. Numerosity – Rule 23(a)(1). Plaintiffs do not know the exact size or identities of the members of the proposed Class, since such information is in the exclusive control of the Defendants. 42. Upon information and belief regarding the manufacture, distribution, marketing, and installation of affected Toilet Tanks by these Defendants, the class likely encompasses thousands of consumers. It I believed that the improper temperature and lack of appropriate quality control in the manufacturing process extends at least as far back as production references in 2004 with ongoing and continuing production using the same defective processes up through 2012. Plaintiffs believe that the Class can be readily 12 ascertained from Defendants’ books and records reflecting model manufacturing, sales, and distribution accounts. Additionally, based on information and belief, the Class is comprised of persons disbursed across the United States, as well as in the State of Texas. As a result, joinder of persons is impracticable. 43. The disposition of Plaintiffs’ claim will provide a substantial benefit to the persons and the court system by using Rule 23 as the vehicle to adjudicate the rights of thousands of individuals and/or entities in one cause of action. Joining and naming each Class Member as a co-plaintiff is unreasonable and impracticable. Such a requirement would only result in Defendants’ retention of money which is necessary to compensate this Class. 44. Predominance and Commonality – Rule 23(a)(2); (b)(3). As to the Class, there are common questions of law and fact which predominate over any questions affecting individual Class Members which include, but are not limited to: (a) Appropriate corporate liability structures in light of mergers, acquisitions, sales, and manufacturing control; (b) Identification of the manufacturing process and quality control processes for firing the ceramic toilet tanks by the Named Defendants; (c) Whether the manufacturing process and quality control processes for firing the ceramic toilet tanks by the Named Defendants was improper or otherwise defective; (d) Identification of all toilet tank models and years of production subjected to the improper manufacturing process; 13 (e) Whether the designated Toilet Tanks are defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous; (f) Whether the designated Toilet Tanks are defectively manufactured and unreasonably dangerous; (g) Whether the designated Toilet Tanks are prone to failure; (h) Whether Defendants adequately warned, or continue to adequately warn, distributors, installers, and consumers regarding the defective nature of the designated Toilet Tanks; (i) Whether Defendants’ manufacture, sales, and distribution of the designated Toilet Tanks occurred despite actual or constructive knowledge of the defects; (j) Whether the Plaintiffs’ use of the designated Toilet Tanks was foreseeable; (k) Whether Defendants will be in a better position than the consumer to prevent circulation of defective products; (l) Whether Defendants can distribute the cost of compensating for repair or replacement resulting from defects by charging for it in the marketplace; (m) Whether the designated Toilet Tanks were inspected and reached the user and/or consumer without substantial alteration in the condition that the product was designed, manufactured, marketed, sold, and/or distributed; (n) Whether Defendants failed to adequately warn consumers that the designated Toilet Tanks were defective and/or reasonably dangerous at the time it left Defendants’ control; (o) Whether the imposition of strict liability upon Defendants serves as an incentive to properly design, manufacture, market, and/or distribute safe products; (p) Whether restitution is an appropriate remedy for the Plaintiffs and Class Members; 14 (q) Whether remediation and removal of the designated Toilet Tanks is an appropriate remedy to Plaintiffs and Class Members; (r) Whether Class Members are entitled to monetary damages for Defendants’ wrongful conduct; (s) Whether Class Members are entitled to an injunction requiring Defendants to cease and desist from selling, marketing, distributing, and/or placing into the stream of commerce any remaining inventory of the designated Toilet Tanks; (t) Whether Defendants are required to pay reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs associated with prosecuting this lawsuit. 45. Furthermore, there are common questions of law and fact that are based in the same core evidence for all members of the Class such as: (1) the timeline of available knowledge to the Defendants regarding the defective designated Toilet Tanks; (2) the scope of the sale and installation of designated Toilet Tanks; (3) the defect in designated Toilet Tanks; and (4) the causal link between the deceptive, intentional and/or reckless acts of the Defendants and the damages. 46. Typicality – Rule 23(a)(3). The claims asserted by Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class. The Plaintiffs and the proposed Class Members are persons or legal entities who have one or more of the designated Toilet Tanks installed in their home or building. To the extent necessary, sub-classes can be defined within the proposed class definition. 47. Adequacy of Representation – Rule 23(a)(4). Named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the claims of the Class members because Named Plaintiffs have an interest in seeing their claims through to resolution which will at the same time resolve 15 the claims of the class-members. The Named Plaintiffs are comprised of consumers of the designated Toilet Tanks, and have suffered the categories of injury alleged in this cause. 48. Plaintiffs are represented by competent counsel who have extensive experience in class action and consumer advocacy generally, and further who have extensive and specific experience with claims regarding products liability generally and the defective toilet tanks manufactured, distributed, sold, and installed by these Defendants specifically. Such counsel can bear the cost of prosecuting the class action to conclusion. None of the Plaintiffs is antagonistic with the Class or has an interest in conflict with the Class. 49. Superiority – Rule 23(b)(3). This Class Action is not only the appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, but is, in fact, the superior method to all other available causes of action for the following reasons: a) The joinder of thousands of geographically diverse individual Class Members is impracticable, cumbersome, unduly burdensome, and a waste of judicial and/or litigation resources; b) There is no special interest by Class Members and individually controlling prosecution of separate causes of action; c) Class Members’ individual claims now may be relatively modest compared with the expense of litigating the claim, thereby making it impracticable, unduly burdensome, expensive, if not totally impossible, to justify individual Class Members addressing their loss; d) When Defendants’ liability has been adjudicated, claims of all Class Members can be determined by the court and administered efficiently in a manner which is far less erroneous, burdensome, and expensive than if it were attempted through filing, discovery, and trial of all individual cases; 16 e) This Class Action will promote orderly, efficient, expeditious, and appropriate adjudication and administration of class claims to promote economies of time, resources, and limited pool of recovery; f) This Class Action will assure uniformity of decisions in litigation; g) Without the Class Action, Class Members will go without restitution, remediation or money damages; h) Without this Class Action, the restitution and/or remediation damages will be borne by the Class members and Defendants will reap the benefits of profits from defectively designed, manufactured, marketed, and/or distributed products; i) The resolution of this controversy through this Class Action presents fewer management difficulties than individual claims filed in which the parties may be subject to varying adjudications of their rights; j) Injunctive relief will be available to protect all future consumers from the sale, marketing, and/or distribution defective or unreasonably dangerous products. 50. A class action is a superior mechanism in this case to individual actions because Defendants have acted in a way that is consistent as to all Plaintiffs and Class Members as to the designated Toilet Tanks, and thus relief would apply to the Class as a whole. Furthermore, a class action is a superior mechanism to individualized adjudications because prosecuting separate actions by individual class members risk creating inconsistent rulings and standards of conduct. 51. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 34 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at length herein. 52. Defendant Vortens and Defendant Sanitarios, are in the business of designing, manufacturing, distributing, and selling, among other things, “ceramic” toilet 17 tanks for consumer use in residential homes, including toilet tanks of the same make and model as the Toilet Tanks installed in and sold with the Plaintiffs’ Home. 53. The Toilet Tanks installed in and sold with the Plaintiffs’ Home were designed, manufactured, distributed, and/or sold by Defendant Vortens, and/or Defendant Sanitarios. 54. In the alternative, the Toilet Tanks were designed, manufactured, distributed, and/or sold by Defendant Vortens, and contemporaneous with and/or subsequent thereto, Defendant Sanitarios, by way of merger, consolidation, acquisition, and/or an asset purchase agreement expressly, impliedly, and/or by operation of law acquired and assumed any and all of Vortens’ liabilities arising out of the design, manufacture, distribution, and sale of these two Vortens toilet tanks, including any and all liabilities arising from any defective condition and/or failure in these toilet tanks. 55. The Toilet Tanks installed in the Plaintiffs’ Home were unreasonably dangerous, not reasonably safe for use, and were defective at the time they left the possession or control of the manufacturer because they contained a manufacturing defect and a marketing defect. 56. The Toilet Tanks contained a manufacturing defect and were unreasonably dangerous or otherwise unfit for the intended purpose because these products deviated in their construction or quality from the specifications or planned output in a manner that rendered them unreasonably dangerous or unfit. More specifically, tank references #3464, #3412, #3404, #3425, #3408 and #3571 manufactured, produced, designed, marketed, or distributed by the named Defendants between 2004-2012 were 18 subjected to improper temperature controls and further not properly tested under appropriate quality control checks. Such improper manufacturing resulted in defects in the designated reference models unknown to the consumer, such as the Plaintiffs, but which was known or should have been known by the Named Defendants. 57. The Toilet Tanks also contained a marketing defect and were unreasonably dangerous because the risk of harm was inherent in these products or could arise from the intended or reasonably anticipated use of these products, and Defendants actually knew or reasonably foresaw this risk of harm at the time the products were marketed, or the Defendants, by the application of reasonably developed skill and foresight, should have known about the inherent risk and danger in these products, but marketed and sold same without any adequate warnings that would alert any party or end user that they were manufactured in a defective manner, prone to failure, or had a high risk of catastrophically failing and cracking, which rendered the toilet tanks unreasonably dangerous or unfit for intended use to the ultimate user or consumer of the toilet tanks, such as the Plaintiffs. 58. These Toilet Tanks were expected to and did reach the consumers, the Plaintiffs and Class Members, without substantial change in the condition in which they were sold. 59. The manufacturing defect and the marketing defect in the Toilet Tanks installed in and sold cause catastrophic failure and cracking, and were producing causes and/or proximate causes of the damages of repair and remediation suffered by the Plaintiffs’ as described herein. Such damages include, but are not necessarily limited to, 19 additional costs for the repair and/or replacement of designated Toilet Tanks. Additional costs are further pending for final repair or removal of remaining designated Toilet Tanks. 60. The cost of removing or remediating the designated Toilet Tanks is prohibitive to many homeowners, and the act of shifting the costs such measures is the very type of market failure and economic harm consumer protection laws was designed to prevent. Plaintiffs and the class members are left with few options – accept the risk to real and personal property and any associated diminution in value of their structures, or undertake personal costly measures to mitigate the damages caused by the Defendants’ conduct. 61. As a direct, producing, and proximate result of the defective condition of the designated Toilet Tanks, the Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered damages in amounts equal to inspection, replacement, and remedial installation plumbing services, and further to any increase in risk insurability or alternative diminution in value, and neither the defendants nor any other third party, person, or entity has compensated the Plaintiffs or Class Members for such damages. 62. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 34 and of paragraphs 51 through 61 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at length herein. 63. Defendants are merchants with respect to goods of the kind as the designated Toilet Tanks installed in and sold with the Plaintiffs’ Home. 20 64. By selling these designated Toilet Tanks, Defendants impliedly warranted that these tanks were fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. 65. Defendants breached this implied warranty of merchantability. 66. Pleading in the alternative, Defendant Vortens sold the designated Toilet Tanks and breached the implied warranty of merchantability arising out of the sale of same, the liability for which was expressly, impliedly, and/or by operation of law acquired and assumed by Defendant Sanitarios. 67. As a direct, producing, and proximate result of the defective condition of the designated Toilet Tanks, the Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered damages in amounts equal to inspection, replacement, and remedial installation plumbing services, and further to any increase in risk insurability or alternative diminution in value, and neither the Defendants nor any other third party, person, or entity has compensated the Plaintiffs or Class Members for such damages. 68. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 34 and of paragraphs 51 through 61 of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at length herein. 69. Defendants owed the Plaintiffs and Class Members a duty of care to manufacture, market, distribute, and sell the designated Toilet Tanks in a safe and non- defective manner so as to avoid injury or damage to the Plaintiffs, Class Members, and their property. 21 70. Defendants breached this duty of care and were negligent because these designated Toilet Tanks were manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition that cause the toilet tanks to catastrophically fail and crack. 71. Specifically, Defendants were negligent by committing, among others, the following negligent acts of commission and omission: a. Negligently using a faulty manufacturing process to manufacture the designated Toilet Tanks, which causes these toilet tanks to catastrophically fail and crack because they underwent uneven heating/curing and were not properly fired or cured during the manufacturing process; b. Negligently failing to properly and timely inspect and test any of the toilet tanks that were part of the production line of toilet tanks manufactured 2004- 2012 to ensure that these toilet tanks were manufactured in a safe and non- defective manner, and that the toilet tanks did not deviate in their construction or quality from the specifications or planned output in a manner that rendered them unreasonably dangerous or unfit for the intended purpose. c. Negligently failing to warn or adequately warn any party, consumer, or end user that the ceramic toilet tanks manufactured 2004-2014 were manufactured in a defective manner, prone to failure, or had a high risk of catastrophically failing and cracking, which render the designated Toilet Tanks unreasonably dangerous to the Plaintiffs or are other unfit for the intended purpose. d. Committing other negligent acts of commission and omission that may be revealed through further investigation, including discovery. 72. Pleading in the alternative, Defendant Vortens breached the aforesaid duty of care and was negligent for the reasons stated above, the liability for which was expressly, impliedly, and/or by operation of law acquired and assumed by Defendant Sanitarios. 73. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duty and negligent acts of commission and omission, the Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered damages in 22 amounts equal to inspection, replacement, and remedial installation plumbing services, and further to any increase in risk insurability or alternative diminution in value, and neither the Defendants nor any other third party, person, or entity has compensated the Plaintiffs or Class Members for such damages. 74. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in all prior paragraphs of this Complaint, as if fully set forth at length herein. 75. As a direct and proximate result of the catastrophic failures and cracking in the designated Toilet Tanks installed in and sold with the Plaintiffs’ Home and real property owned by Class Members, the Plaintiffs and Class Members suffered damages as described herein. 76. Prior to marketing and selling the designated Toilet Tanks at issue in this case, and/or prior to the catastrophic failures and cracking of same, both Defendants, upon information and belief, knew for an extended period of time that the toilet tanks in the production line manufactured between 2004 and 2012 were manufactured in a defective or faulty manner and/or were defective, unreasonably dangerous, and were catastrophically failing and cracking under normal, expected, and foreseeable uses, causing water and property damages to the consumers and end users of these products. 77. Defendants had specific prior knowledge of such a defect in the manufacturing process of these toilet tanks and the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in these toilet tanks based on their own test results and reports of the exact same 23 type of catastrophic failures and cracking in numerous other toilet tanks manufactured, distributed, and/or sold by them between 2004 and 2012. 78. Upon information and belief, both Defendants had prior knowledge that there was a high probability that the designated Toilet Tanks manufactured between 2004 and 2012 would catastrophically fail and crack under normal, expected, and foreseeable uses, and cause damages to the ultimate user or consumer, including the Plaintiffs and Class Members. 79. Despite such prior knowledge, both Defendants knowingly and/or intentionally made a conscious decision not to issue or supply any warnings adequately alerting or notifying the public or any persons or entities, including building contractors, plumbing contractors, installers, building inspectors, or ordinary consumers and end users of these designated Toilet Tanks, such as the Plaintiffs, that these toilet tanks were manufactured in a defective manner, prone to failure, or had a high risk of catastrophically failing and cracking under normal, expected, and foreseeable uses. Indeed, to the contrary, the Named Defendants are providing limited information as to the scope of the defect, the affected references, and the production span. 80. Despite such prior knowledge, both Defendants also knowingly and/or intentionally made a conscious decision not to take any feasible measures to promptly and timely correct the defective or faulty manner in which the designated Toilet Tanks were manufactured, and they also knowingly and/or intentionally made a conscious decision not to take any feasible measures to promptly and timely correct the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in these designated Toilet Tanks or any feasible 24 measures to promptly and timely prevent catastrophic failures and cracking in these toilet tanks 81. Each of the Defendants also engaged in willful and wanton conduct and/or were grossly negligent, in that the conduct of each Defendant in marketing and selling the products at issue was so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a conscious disregard or indifference to the welfare, safety, and/or rights of persons exposed to such conduct, including the Plaintiffs and Class Members. 82. Pleading in the alternative, Defendant Vortens committed the willful, wanton, and wrongful conduct and/or gross negligence described above, the liability for which was expressly, impliedly, and/or by operation of law acquired and assumed by Defendant Sanitarios. 83. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid willful, wanton, and wrongful conduct and/or gross negligence described above, the Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to recover punitive damages from Defendant Vortens, and/or Defendant Sanitarios. 84. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1- 34 and 51-83 of this Complaint as if fully set forth at length herein. 85. The Plaintiffs and proposed Class Members are “consumers” within the meaning of § 17.45(4) of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), in that they are individuals who acquired by purchase the goods or products that form the basis of this 25 lawsuit, and suffered damages for which they did not receive compensation from any third party, person, or entity. 86. The Plaintiffs seek to recover damages against both Defendant Vortens and Defendant Sanitarios under the Texas DTPA, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.41 et. seq., because the Defendants knowingly and/or intentionally breached their implied warranties with respect to the designated Toilet Tanks at issue in this lawsuit, and also engaged in the following false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of their trade or business: a. Representing that the designated Toilet Tanks at issue had characteristics, ingredients, uses, or benefits which they do not; b. Representing that the designated Toilet Tanks at issue were of a particular standard, quality, or grade, when they were in fact of another. 87. The Defendants engaged in the foregoing false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices because (a) they knew for an extended period of time that the designated Toilet Tanks at issue were part of an entire production line of products that were manufactured in a defective manner, prone to failure, and had a high risk of catastrophically failing and cracking, which rendered the toilet tanks unreasonably dangerous to the Plaintiffs; and (b) despite this knowledge, the Defendants (i) knowingly and/or intentionally did not warn the public or any other person or entity about this unreasonably dangerous condition; (ii) knowingly and/or intentionally used and promptly or timely failed to correct the defective the faulty manner in which the designated Toilet Tanks were manufactured; (iii) knowingly and/or intentionally failed to take any feasible measures to promptly and timely correct the 26 defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in these toilet tanks; and (iv) knowingly and/or intentionally failed to take any feasible measures to promptly and timely prevent catastrophic failures and cracking in these toilet tanks. 88. The Defendants’ conduct in engaging in such false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices constituted a producing cause of the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs such that the Plaintiffs have the right and standing to maintain an action against Defendants under the Texas DTPA pursuant to § 17.50 89. The Plaintiffs also have the right and standing to maintain an action against Defendants under the Texas DTPA pursuant to § 17.50(a) (2) of the Act, because they breached their implied warranties as stated in Count II of this complaint, and such a breach constituted a producing cause of the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs at issue in this lawsuit. 90. With respect to the foregoing described warranties, the Defendants knowingly breached their implied warranties because they had actual awareness of the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in the designated Toilet Tanks at issue and the faulty manufacturing process that created this defective and unreasonably dangerous condition, and Defendants also had actual awareness of their failure to warn about and take feasible measures to timely correct or prevent this defective and unreasonably dangerous condition and/or the aforesaid faulty manufacturing process. 91. The Defendants also intentionally breached their implied warranties because they had actual awareness of the conditions, defects, and failures in the toilet tanks as described above, coupled with the specific intent that the consumer, such as the Plaintiffs, 27 act in detrimental ignorance of the unfairness of the Defendants’ conduct in manufacturing, marketing, and selling the designated Toilet Tanks at issue, as evidenced by Defendants’ knowing and/or intentional failure to warn about the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition in the toilet tanks at issue and the faulty manufacturing process that created this defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. 92. The Defendants’ violations of the Texas DTPA proximately caused the Plaintiffs and Class Members damages in the form of inspection, replacement, and remedial installation plumbing services and products, and further to any increase in risk insurability or alternative diminution in value, and neither the defendants nor any other third party, person, or entity has compensated the Plaintiffs or Class Members for such damages. 93. Pursuant to § 17.50(d) of the Texas DTPA, the Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to be awarded court costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees. 94. Because the Defendants' conduct as described above in this Count VI was committed knowingly and/or intentionally, the Plaintiffs and Class Members are also entitled to be awarded treble damages. 95. Pleading in the alternative, Defendant Vortens violated the Texas DTPA as described above, the liability for which was expressly, impliedly, and/or by operation of law acquired and assumed by Defendant Sanitarios. 96. Plaintiffs aver that notice under Section 17.505 prior to filing suit was both impractical and unnecessary considering the public admissions of a defect in the affected toilet tanks. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have committed to resolution of the litigated issues not 28 only in their individual capacity but also as Class Representatives. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not in a position to individually resolve their claims to the detriment of the putative class. 97. In addition to the formal service required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding process, Plaintiffs are providing a courtesy copy of this Complaint along with an explanatory letter in compliance with the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 98. Plaintiffs will further comply with the requirements of § 17.501 regarding notice of this Complaint to the Consumer Protection Division within the deadlines articulated therein.

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10. FFIF also attempted to collect debts against numerous Arkansas residents through dunning letters and phone calls, while it was not licensed as a debt collector with theASBCA. 11. Additionally, FFIF was also not a licensed debt collector with the ASBCA at the time it filed its Complaint against Lucas. 12. FFIF also filed debt-collection complaints against hundreds of Arkansas residents when it was not licensed with the ASBCA. The filing of these collection lawsuits is a collection activity under the AFDCP A. 13. The complaints filed and served on Lucas and the Class Members in connection and collection of a debt and in an attempt to collect a debt were all a "communication" under Ark. Code Ann.§ 17-24-502(1). 15. Lucas re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs, as if set forth, word for word. 16. The Class is defined as: All Arkansas residents who were subject to collection actions (including both non-judicial and judicial methods of collection) by FFIF for collection of a purported debt at a time FFIF was not licensed by the ASBCA. Excluded from the Class are the judge presiding over this civil action and his/her immediate family members, and FFIF, its members, parent, any subsidiaries, officers, directors, agents, and employees. 17. Lucas's claims are typical of debt collection efforts between FFIF and all Class Members whom FFIF attempted to collect a debt from during times it was not properly licensed to do so. 19. These issues are common among all Class Members and predominate over any issues affecting individual members of the Class. 20. FFIF filed numerous of debt-collection complaints in Arkansas when it was not licensed by the ASBCA. 21. FFIF has made numerous non-judicial collection efforts against Arkansas residents when it was not licensed by the ASBCA. 22. The Class Members are so numerous and scattered throughout Arkansas that joinder of all members is impracticable. 23. A class action is superior to other available methods of relief for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims raised. 24. Absent class action relief, the Class Members would be forced to prosecute hundreds of similar claims in courts throughout Arkansas, which would waste the judicial resources and risks inconsistent outcomes. 25. The prosecution of these claims as a class action will promote judicial economy. 26. The claims raised are well suited for class action relief. 28. Lucas is interested in the outcome and understands the importance of adequately representing the Class. 29. Lucas will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class sought to be certified. 30. Class counsel are experienced in class action and complex consumer litigation and are required to adequately represent the Class. 31. This case fully satisfies Ark. R. Civ. P. 23's requirements and should be certified as a class action. 9. Prior to filing its Complaint against Lucas in Pulaski County District Court on October 9, 2012, FFIF made several attempts to collect the alleged debt at issue. At such times, FFIF was not a licensed debt collector with the ASBCA during these collection efforts. A copy of the Complaint is attached as Exhibit A.

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20. Prior to the year 2020, Plaintiff successfully registered his cellular telephone number ending in -7262 with the National Do-Not-Call Registry 21. On or about December 11, 2020, Defendants began placing unsolicited, automated telemarketing telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -7262 and -1977. 22. When Plaintiff answered Defendants’ calls, he heard a significant pause before he was connected to a live representative, which is indicative of the use of an automatic telephone dialing system, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) and as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 5 23. When Plaintiff answered one of Defendants’ calls, the representative with whom Plaintiff spoke stated that he was calling from the medical compensation department. 24. Plaintiff received multiple unsolicited, automated telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of Defendants, on or about December 11, 2020. 25. The telephone numbers that Defendants, or their agent, called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 26. Defendants’ calls were not made for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 27. Prior to receiving Defendants’ calls, Plaintiff had not previously sought out Defendants’ services, nor had Plaintiff attempted to retrieve information from Defendants about their services. 28. During all relevant times, Defendants did not possess Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 29. Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief, including without limitation his experiences as recounted herein, especially his experience of receiving Defendants’ calls despite Defendants’ lack of express consent to call him, that Defendants lack reasonable policies and procedures to avoid the violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection act herein described. 30. As a result of Defendants’ acts and omissions outlined above, Plaintiff and the putative Class members have suffered concrete and particularized injuries and harm, which include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) invasion of privacy; (b) intrusion upon and occupation of the capacity of Plaintiff’s cellular telephone; (c) wasting Plaintiff’s time; and (d) 6 risk of injury due to interruption and distraction when receiving unwanted telephone calls from Defendants. 31. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (the “ATDS Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing calls from Defendants to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls, or who had revoked such consent, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of class certification. 32. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the second proposed class (the “Do-Not-Call Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States whose telephone numbers were registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days, who had not granted Defendants prior express consent nor had a prior established business relationship with Defendants, or who had revoked such consent or prior established business relationship, who received more than one call made by or on behalf of Defendants that promoted Defendants’ products or services, within any 12-month period, within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of class certification. 33. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the third proposed class (the “Misrepresentation Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who had not granted Defendants prior express consent nor had a prior established business relationship with Defendants, or who had revoked such consent or prior established business relationship, who received a call made by or on behalf of Defendants that promoted Defendants’ products or services, during which Defendants misrepresented the person or entity on whose behalf the call was being made, within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of class certification. 7 34. Defendants, their employees and agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believes the Classes’ members number in the hundreds, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 35. The Classes are so numerous that the individual joinder of all of their members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of the Classes’ members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Classes include hundreds, if not thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that the Classes’ members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendants. 36. This suit is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) because the Classes are so numerous that joinder of the Classes’ members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class Action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and the Court. 37. There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact common to the Classes predominate over questions which may affect individual members of the Classes and include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: a. Whether the ATDS Class members’ cellular telephone numbers were called by Defendants using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice without Defendants having obtained prior express consent to place such calls; 8 b. Whether the Do-Not-Call Class members’ telephone numbers were called by Defendants for the promotion of Defendants’ products or services without Defendants having obtained prior express consent or having a prior established business relationship to place such calls; c. Whether the Misrepresentation Class members’ telephone numbers were called by Defendants for the promotion of Defendants’ products or services with the use of a name other than the actual person or entity on whose behalf the calls were being made; d. Whether members of the Classes granted Defendants prior express consent to place such calls to them and/or whether they revoked any such consent; e. Whether Plaintiff and the Classes’ members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violations; and f. Whether Defendants should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 38. As a resident of the United States whose cellular telephone number was called by Defendants using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on multiple occasions without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the ATDS Class. 39. As a resident of the United States whose telephone number was registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days, who had not granted Defendants prior express consent nor had a prior established business relationship with Defendants, who received more than one call made by or on behalf of Defendants within a 12-month period that promoted Defendants’ products or services, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Do-Not-Call Class. 9 40. As a resident of the United States who had not granted Defendants prior express consent nor had a prior established business relationship with Defendants, who received a call that promoted Defendants’ products or services, during which the person or entity on whose behalf the call was being made was misrepresented, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Misrepresentation Class. 41. Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the Classes. 42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class actions. 43. A class action is superior to other available methods of fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since individual litigation of the claims of all of the Classes’ members is impracticable. Even if every Class member could afford individual litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which individual litigation of numerous issues would proceed. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties, and to the court system, resulting from multiple trials of the same complex factual issues. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system and protects the rights of each Class member. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 44. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the 10 interests of the other Class members not parties to such adjudications or that would substantially impair or impede the ability of such non-party Class members to protect their interests. 45. Defendants have acted or refused to act in respect generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with regard to the members of the Classes as a whole. 46. Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the TCPA, including but not limited to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and (c), and/or 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) and (d), as to all Class members with respect to the above-alleged transactions. 47. The TCPA, specifically 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), provides that: It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice…to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States… 48. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) provides that: [n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to…[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government. 49. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(4) provides that: A person or entity making a call for telemarketing purposes must provide the called party with the name of the individual caller, the name of the person or entity on whose behalf the call is being made, and a telephone number or address at which the person or entity may be contacted. 11 50. In multiple instances, Defendants placed calls to the Classes’ members in violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 51. The size and definition of the Classes can be identified through Defendants’ records and/or Defendants’ agents’ records. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)

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10. The Admiral has misclassified its exotic dancers as independent contractors, when in reality they are employees. 11. The Admiral has exercised extensive control over the manner in which its exotic dancers perform their jobs and conduct themselves while on the club’s premises, including where to be on the premises and when, what they are allowed to wear, requiring certain outfits to coordinate with nightly themes the club chooses, how much they can receive for private dances and sessions, and how they can interact with customers. For example, dancers must dance on stage for at least two songs at a time; they must remove their top during the first ten to fifteen seconds of the first song and remove their bottom during the first ten to fifteen seconds of the second song; they are not allowed to carry a phone with them on the floor; and they must receive permission from management to leave the premises before the end of the night. The dancers have no control over the customer volume, advertising, or atmosphere at the club, which is controlled entirely by Defendants. Defendants require dancers to report to the stage and offer a floor dance and promotional branded T-shirts at least once during the night. On 4 certain nights, Defendants also require dancers to perform “mystery dances” and “two- for-one specials” for customers. 12. Defendants retain the power to hire and fire the exotic dancers and have disciplined or threatened to discipline dancers who do not comply with Defendants’ requirements regarding the manner and means of their work. Specifically, Defendants charge a fine to dancers or send them home if they are caught chewing gum on the premises, and Defendants also charge a fine if dancers are late getting on stage at the required time. 13. At all relevant times, Admiral dancers have not held themselves out to be in business for themselves. Instead, the dancers are economically dependent on their relationship with Defendants for a substantial portion of their earnings. 14. In addition, the Admiral is in the business of providing adult entertainment to its patrons. Its website advertises “the Best All-Nude Gentlemen’s Club in Chicagoland” and offers patrons “over 100 beautiful showgirl entertainers.” Thus, the dancers clearly perform services in the usual course of Defendants’ business, and without the dancers, the Admiral would have no business, such that the dancers’ work is integral to Defendants’ business. 15. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants have treated Plaintiff and their other dancers in a substantially similar manner with respect to their policies and practices. 16. At all relevant times the federal minimum wage has been $7.25 per hour. 17. At all relevant times the minimum wage in Illinois has been $8.25 per hour. 5 18. On July 1, 2015, pursuant to the City of Chicago’ Minimum Wage Ordinance, the minimum wage in Chicago increased to $10.00 per hour. 19. Defendants did not pay the exotic dancers who have worked at the Admiral the prevailing minimum wage. 20. The exotic dancers who have worked at the Admiral receive compensation only in the form of gratuities from patrons. 21. In order to perform their job, the dancers have been required to pay “house fees” to the Admiral in an amount between $40 and $180 for every shift. 22. The dancers have also been required to share their tips with managers and with non-service employees or agents of the Admiral, such as “house moms,” disc jockeys, security, and makeup artists. V. 23. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of a class of all individuals who worked as an exotic dancer at the Admiral at any time between three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit and the entry of judgment in this case, who may choose to “opt-in” to join this lawsuit. 24. Plaintiff attaches as Exhibit A her Notice of Consent to Become a Party Plaintiff in a Collective Action under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 25. Plaintiff also brings this action individually and as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all individuals who worked as exotic dancers at the Admiral at any time between ten years prior to the filing of this lawsuit and the entry of judgment in this case (with respect to the claims brought under the IWPCA) and between three years prior to filing this lawsuit and the entry of 6 judgment in this case (with respect to the claims brought under the IMWL). 26. This action on behalf of the Rule 23 class satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), as alleged in the following particulars: a. The proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in this action is impracticable; b. There are questions of law and/or fact common to the members of the proposed class regarding; (1) the Admiral’s conduct in classifying exotic dancers as independent contractors; (2) failing to ensure they are paid at least minimum wage for their work, and (3) effectively making illegal deductions from their wages by uniformly requiring dancers to pay a portion of their tips to the Defendant and to managers and other non-service employees. c. The claims of Plaintiff Wisniewska are typical of the claims of the proposed class and she has the same interests as the other members of the class; and d. Plaintiff Wisniewska will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class as she has retained able counsel experienced in class action litigation, and her interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, the interests of the other class members. 27. In addition, this action satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b), because the questions of law and/or fact common to the members of the proposed class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because joinder of all class members is impractical. The class is readily 7 definable and prosecution of this action as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitive litigation. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 28. Defendant Admiral Theatre, Inc. d/b/a The Admiral Theatre is an “employer” for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §203(s), because it has annual gross sales or business of at least $500,000 and has employees engaged in interstate commerce as it is an enterprise whose employees engage in commerce, including entertainment as well as the sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages. 29. The individual Defendant Sam Cecola is also an “employer” under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) because he has acted directly or indirectly in the interests of Defendant Admiral in relation to its employees, including Plaintiff and other exotic dancers who have worked at the Admiral in Chicago, Illinois. 30. Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class are employees of Defendants for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act during all times relevant to this Complaint. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class an hourly rate of at least the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour as required by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C). 31. Further, Defendants are not permitted to take the tip credit against the minimum wage (and thus pay the reduced hourly rate for tipped employees of $2.13 per hour) because it did not provide the required notice to the dancers in order to take the tip credit and because the dancers have not been allowed to retain all tips they have 8 received, but instead have been required to share their tips with management and with other employees or agents of Defendants who are not among employees who customarily and regularly receive tips, and not pursuant to a valid tip pooling or sharing arrangement under applicable law. 32. Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class are entitled to back wages at the minimum wage rate of $7.25 per hour for every hour worked, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The failure of Defendants to compensate Plaintiff and the members of the class at least minimum wage was knowing, willful, intentional, and done in bad faith. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other dancers, performing the same job functions, were being improperly misclassified as independent contractors given the wealth of case law that has concluded similarly-situated exotic dancers are employees of the clubs for which they work. 33. Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class are also entitled to liquidated damages equal to the amount of unpaid minimum wages due to them under the FLSA, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 34. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class were employed by Defendants as “employees” within the meaning of the IMWL, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/3(d). 35. At all relevant times, Defendants were “employers” as defined in the IMWL, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/3(c). 9 36. Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class were not paid proper minimum wages under the IMWL, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1, et seq., during their employment with Defendants. 37. Pursuant to 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/4, Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed class were entitled to be compensated at the applicable State minimum wage rate of $8.25 per hour for all hours worked. 38. Defendants’ willful conduct in failing to ensure that its exotic dancers receive the Illinois state minimum wage constitutes a violation of 820 ILCS § 105/1, et seq. This claim is brought on behalf of all dancers who have worked at the Admiral in the last three years prior to the date of filing of this Complaint until the date of judgment in this action. See 820 §ILCS 105/12. 39. Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class were not paid proper minimum wages under the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance, during their employment with Defendants. 40. Pursuant to the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance, Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed class were entitled to be compensated at the minimum wage rate of $10.00 per hour for all hours worked. 41. Defendants’ willful conduct in failing to ensure that its exotic dancers receive the Chicago minimum wage constitutes a violation of the Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance. This claim is brought on behalf of all dancers who have worked at the Admiral at any time since July 1, 2015. 10 42. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class were “employees” of Defendants as defined by the IWPCA. 43. At all relevant times, Defendants were employers of Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class as defined by the IWPCA. Failure to Pay Minimum Wage, 820 ILCS § 105/1, et seq. Failure to Pay Minimum Wage, Chicago Minimum Wage Ordinance Failure to Pay Minimum Wage in Violation of the FLSA Failure to Pay Wages and Illegal Deductions 820 ILCS § 115, et seq.

lose

1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 12. On information and belief, on or about June 6, 2011, June 7, 2011, and June 10, 2011, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine four (4) facsimiles to Plaintiff. Copies of the facsimiles are attached hereto as Exhibit A. 13. Defendants created or made Exhibit A, which Defendants knew or should have known is a good or product which Defendants intended to and did in fact distribute to Plaintiff and the other members of the class. 14. Exhibit A is part of Defendants’ work or operations to market Defendants’ goods or services which were performed by Defendants and on behalf of Defendants. Therefore, Exhibit A constitutes material furnished in connection with Defendants’ work or operations. 15. Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the faxes. 16. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles without the required opt out language to Plaintiff and more than 40 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 17. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 18. Defendants’ facsimile did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47 2. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 20. Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 22. Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same faxes. 23. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 25. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 27. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 28. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 31. The Faxes. Defendants sent the on or about June 6, 2011, June 7, 2011, and June10, 2011, advertisements via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Faxes constitute advertisements under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Faxes. The Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 33. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 34. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 35. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice was unlawful.

win

(Claim for Failure to Establish the Plans Pursuant to a Written Instrument Meeting the Requirements of ERISA Section 402 Against Defendant Trinity) 165. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 166. ERISA section 402, 29 U.S.C. § 1102, provides that every plan will be established pursuant to a written instrument which will provide among other things “for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan” and will “provide a procedure for establishing and carrying out a funding policy and method constituent with the objectives of the plan and the requirements of [Title I of ERISA].” 167. Although the benefits provided by the Trinity Plans were described to the employees and retirees of Trinity (and/or its affiliates and subsidiaries) in various written communications, the Trinity Plans have never been established pursuant to a written instrument meeting the requirements of ERISA section 402, (Claim for Failure to Establish a Trust Meeting the Requirements of ERISA Section 403 Against Defendant Trinity) 169. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 170. ERISA section 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103, provides, subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, that all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees, that the trustees shall be either named in the trust instrument or in the plan instrument described in section 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a), or appointed by a person who is a named fiduciary. 171. Although the Trinity Plans’ assets have been held in trust, the trust does not meet the requirements of ERISA section 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103. 172. Defendant Trinity violated section 403 by failing to put the Trinity Plans’ assets in trust in compliance with ERISA section 403. 29 U.S.C. § 1103. (Claim for Equitable Relief Pursuant to ERISA Sections 502(a)(2) and 502(a)(3) Against Defendant Trinity) .................................................................................... 46 (Claim for Violation of Reporting and Disclosure Provisions Against Defendant Trinity) ................................... 48 Summary Plan Descriptions .................................................... 48 (Claim for Clarification of Future Benefits Under ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) Against Defendant Trinity) .................................................................................... 54 (Claim for Violation of Reporting and Disclosure Provisions Against Defendant Trinity) 145. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. Summary Plan Descriptions (Claim for Failure to Establish a Trust Meeting the Requirements of ERISA Section 403 Against Defendant Trinity)................................................................... 54 (Claim for Declaratory Relief That the Church Plan Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution, and Is Therefore Void and Ineffective) ............................................. 63 (Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against All Defendants) 184. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege by reference the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 185. Plaintiffs bring this Count VII for breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Breach of the Duty of Prudence and Loyalty (Claim for Failure to Provide Minimum Funding Against Defendant Trinity)................................................................... 52 COUNT IV .................................................................................................. 53 (Claim for Failure to Establish the Plans Pursuant to a Written Instrument Meeting the Requirements of ERISA Section 402 Against Defendant Trinity) .................... 53 (Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against All Defendants) ............................................................................. 57 Breach of the Duty of Prudence and Loyalty ......................... 57 1. Prohibited Transactions .......................................................... 59 1. 146. At no time has Trinity provided Plaintiffs or any member of the Class with a Summary Plan Description with respect to the Trinity Plans that meets the requirements of ERISA section 102, 29 U.S.C. § 1022, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. 147. Because Trinity has been the Plan Administrator of the Plans at all relevant times, it violated ERISA section 104, 29 U.S.C. § 1024, by failing to provide Plaintiffs and members of the Class with adequate Summary Plan Descriptions. Annual Reports 2. Failure to Monitor Fiduciaries ................................................ 60 3. A. Numerosity ........................................................................................ 41 B. Commonality ..................................................................................... 42 C. Typicality ........................................................................................... 42 D. Adequacy ........................................................................................... 43 E. Rule 23(b)(1) Requirements .............................................................. 44 F. Rule 23(b)(2) Requirements .............................................................. 44 G. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements .............................................................. 44 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-3052 T E L E P H O N E : ( 2 0 6 ) 6 2 3 - 1 9 0 0 F A C S I M I L E : ( 2 0 6 ) 6 2 3 - 3 3 8 4

win

1. Whether Defendant’s employees and agents such as managers, bell staff, doormen, concierges, transportation providers, security personnel, front desk and other staff are trained to assist blind and vision-impaired guests with basic needs such as: completing the hotel registration; learning about and completing service requests like laundry, dry cleaning, valet, shipping, room service, etc.; reviewing the hotel bill and charges; counting and identifying currency; using a signature guide or template in conjunction with their credit card; using a passcard-type of key; luggage rooms, business center, gym or health club, lounge facilities, rest rooms; orienting guests to hotel and guest room layouts; location of fire alarms, emergency exits and equipment; heating and air conditioning controls; TV remote controls; message retrieval system; automated wake- up systems; and safe deposit box. 2. Whether Defendant accepts guide dogs and, if so, if there are any charges associated with the guide dogs, their policies with respect to guide dogs and if there are any rest areas for guide dogs. 25. Defendant owns and operates a hotel in the City of New York. This location offers dining and entertainment options, including on-site restaurants, room service and lobby lounges. 26. Defendant’s Website offers features to the public that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that it offers at their hotel. The Website is heavily integrated with their hotel, serving as their gateway. 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Defendant’s Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, last occurring in March, 2019, Plaintiff was not able to determine from the reservation system on the Website what ADA compliant features, if any, the hotel offers and whether the guest rooms have handicap accessible facilities or communications equipment in the guest rooms suitable to blind or visually-impaired persons. As a result, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York City by being unable to learn any information about the accessibility features of the hotel or its guest rooms. Defendant Must Include Information Relating to ADA Compliant Rooms and Handicap Accessibility Features Through Its Website Reservation System 31. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website reservation system have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical location, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information on the Website reservation system relating to the accessibility of the hotel and guest rooms for blind and visually-impaired people and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from reserving a room at the hotel, staying at the hotel and using the facilities of the hotel including restaurants and attending events. 32. If the hotel and the Website reservation system were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through visiting the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the lack of information on accessibility features available on the reservation system on the Website that result in making the services and facilities of the hotel inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. If the ADA-required information is included on the Website reservation system, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently determine through use of the Website if Defendant’s hotel and guest rooms are ADA compliant and if the facilities described relating the facilities and communications equipment in guest rooms are acceptable to the Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website and the inclusion of information on the Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system to make such information fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 4. Whether or not emergency exit signs are compliant with ADAAG1 requirements and emergency evacuation plans and information are provided in braille and large print. 40. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining the Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of including the information required under the ADA regulations on the Website reservation system in order to make its facilities and guest rooms equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website reservation system to obtain information relating to ADA accessibility of the hotel and their guest rooms, violating their rights. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant have violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system so individuals with disabilities can independently assess if Defendant’s hotel or guest rooms meet the accessibility needs of the Plaintiff and the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 5. Whether or not all accessible signage complies with the requirements of the ADAAG. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s hotel. The Website is a service that is integrated with the Defendant’s hotel and is a gateway thereto. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, and, as a result, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 6. Whether or not the stairs, escalators and elevators comply with ADAAG standards, such as braille for floor numbers in the elevator and a verbal annunciator for each floor. 60. Defendant’s physical hotel is located in the State of New York and constitute a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with this physical location and is a gateway thereto. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. The Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, causing the Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden." 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for including the ADA-required information on websites making such websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website reservation system include the ADA-required information would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that does not contain the ADA- required information on its reservation system making their hotel inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failed to take actions to correct the lack of the ADA-required information in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 7. Whether or not the hotel has removed or protected protruding objects which protrude more than 4” into walkways and hallways such as drinking fountains, fire extinguishers, and planters and if they provide cane detectable warnings for the underside of stairways. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 75. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and the Website is a service that is integrated with their establishments. 77. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update the Website and remove access barriers to its hotel by failing to include the ADA- required information on its reservation system, causing the services integrated with their physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non- disabled public. 78. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 79. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that does not contain the ADA- required information on its reservation system making their hotel inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failed to take actions to correct the lack of the ADA-required information in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 8. Whether or not the guest rooms contain tactile and large print thermostat controls and talking/large print clocks. 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 85. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Website and Compliance with Requirement to Describe Accessibility Features VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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19. MENN regularly engages in the collection of defaulted consumer debts. 2. Unless Attorney William P. McKinley of Menn Law Firm, Ltd. is notified of a dispute of the indebtedness within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid. 20. According to its website, MENN has wide-ranging experience in business litigation, including “Collection/creditors’ rights”. http://www.mennlaw.com/business-litigation/ 21. MENN regularly engages in the collection of defaulted consumer debts owed to others. 22. In attempting to collect debts, MENN uses the mail, telephone, internet, and other instruments of interstate commerce. 23. MENN mailed or caused to be mailed a two-page letter dated May 1, 2018 (the “Letter”) to COLE. 24. A true and correct copy of the Letter is attached as Exhibit A, except that the undersigned has partially redacted it. 26. The alleged Debt arose out of one or more transactions in which the money, property, insurance, or services that were the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 27. The Letter was MENN’s first written communication to COLE attempting to collect the Debt. 28. On information and belief, sometime prior to May 1, 2018, the creditor of the Debt either directly or through intermediate transactions assigned, placed, or transferred the debt to MENN for collection. 29. On the second page of the Letter, MENN stated in relevant part: 3. If Attorney William P. McKinley of Menn law Firm, Ltd. is notified in writing within thirty (30) days that there is some dispute concerning the indebtedness, written verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment will be provided to you. 30. This statement did not accurately state COLE’s rights under the FDCPA, and was misleading and deceptive, because COLE was entitled to dispute the debt “within thirty days after receipt” of the Letter, not within 30 days of the date of the Letter. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). 31. The statement also did not accurately state COLE’s rights under the FDCPA, and was misleading and deceptive, because it failed to make clear that COLE was entitled to lodge a dispute even if she did not dispute the entire debt but rather “any portion thereof”. 15 U.S.C § 1692g(a)(3). 32. The statement further did not accurately state COLE’s rights under the FDCPA, and was misleading and deceptive, because it failed to clarify that, if COLE did not dispute the Debt, MENN, and only MENN, was entitled to assume it to be valid. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). 34. This statement did not accurately state COLE’s rights under the FDCPA, and was misleading and deceptive, because it failed to make clear that COLE had thirty days after receipt of the Letter, not thirty days from the date of the Letter, to dispute the debt in writing. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). 35. The statement also did not accurately state COLE’s rights under the FDCPA, and was misleading and deceptive, because it failed to make clear that COLE could send a written dispute even if she did not dispute the entire debt but rather “any portion thereof”. 15 U.S.C § 1692g(a)(4). 36. On the second page of the Letter, MENN stated in relevant part: 4. Attorney William P. McKinley of Menn Law Firm, Ltd. will provide the name and the address of the original creditor if different from the creditor named herein if such is requested by the Debtor within thirty (30) days of the date hereof. However, to the best of the undersigned’s knowledge, the original creditor and Creditor are one and the same. i.e. Exterior Homes 49. MENN’s conduct is consistent with its policies and practices when attempting to collect debts from consumers. Consequently, this action is brought by COLE, both individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 50. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 51. Class Definition. The Class consists of: All natural persons to whom Defendant mailed a written communication in the form of Exhibit A to an address in the State of Wisconsin during the Class Period which begins on April 12, 2018 and ends on May 3, 2019. 52. The identities of the Class members are readily ascertainable from MENN’s business records or those entities on whose behalf MENN attempted to collect debts. 53. Class Claims. The Class claims include all claims each Class member may have for a violation of the FDCPA arising from Defendant having mailed a written communication in the form of Exhibit A to such Class member. 54. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: 56. Common Questions Predominate. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members because such questions and issues concern the same conduct by MENN with respect to each Class member. 57. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because those claims arise from a common course of conduct engaged in by MENN. 58. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interest adverse to the Class members. Moreover, Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter and has retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. 59. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to the Class members predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 60. Based on discovery and further investigation (including, but not limited to, disclosure by MENN of class size and net worth), Plaintiff may, in addition to moving for class certification using modified Class definitions, Class claims, or Class periods, seek class certification only as to particular issues as permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). VI. 61. The factual allegations in the preceding paragraphs are realleged and incorporated by reference. 63. The Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 64. COLE is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 65. The use and mailing of Exhibit A by MENN in an attempt to collect the Debt violated the FDCPA in one or more following ways: (a) Using a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; (b) Making the false representation or creating the false implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3); (c) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10); and (d) Failing to provide a written notice containing accurate information required under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(2)-(5). PRACTICES ACT

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10. Defendant is a business entity engaged in the business of collecting consumer debts. 11. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 26. This action is brought on behalf of the following “FDCPA Class.” 27. The “FDCPA Class” consists of: (1) all persons with Florida addresses (2) who were mailed a letter (3) from Defendant (4) that attempt to collect a time-barred consumer debt (5) during the twelve [12] months preceding the filing of this Complaint. 28. Plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, each class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because Defendant has dispatched thousands of identical letters to addresses in Florida which unlawfully and/or otherwise deceptively attempt to collect time-barred consumer debts from Florida consumers. 29. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the proposed class and otherwise predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. 39. On behalf of the FDCPA Class, Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-38 as though fully set forth herein. 40. Defendant violated § 1692e, § 1692e(2)(A), § 1692e(5), § 1692e(10), and § 1692f of the FDCPA because the Collection Letter Defendant dispatched to Plaintiff, in light of the least sophisticated consumer standard, was a deceptive, misleading, unfair, and unconscionable attempt to collect the time-barred debt from the least sophisticated consumer. 5.1 8. The debt at issue (the “Consumer Debt”) is a financial obligation Plaintiff incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 9. Defendant is a business entity engaged in the business of soliciting consumer debts for collection. VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, e(2)(A), e(5), e(10), & § 1692f

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Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 11. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 12. In or about 2014, Plaintiff purchased the “DualTools PS7000” (the “polisher/sander” or “PS7000”), which is the subject of this litigation, from the Lowe’s Home Center located in Shelby Township, Michigan. 13. The polisher/sander is unique in that it has 2 individual and separate pads; which rotate in opposite directions, designed to eliminate kickback, scars, and swirl marks. 14. Because of the unique nature of the polisher/sander, it requires a one-of-a-kind polishing/sanding pad designed to accommodate the dual counter-rotating pads. 15. Said pads are only manufactured by Infusion Brands, Inc., and made specifically for use with the polisher/sander. Consequently, when the polishing/sanding pad wears down and is no longer usable, a consumer’s only option is to purchase the one-of-a-kind polishing/sanding pads made specifically for said product. Without these very unique and specific pads, the polisher/sander cannot be used. 16. In the instant case, Plaintiff purchased his polisher/sander in 2014, very close in time to with the date the polisher/sander was first offered for sale to the public. At this time, Plaintiff also purchased 3 polishing pads, made specifically to be used with the polisher/sander. 18. To date, and based upon information and belief, Infusion still has not manufactured any replacement pads to be made available for consumer’s to purchase. 19. The polisher/sander cannot be used as advertised without these very unique and specific pads. Consequently, and because Infusion failed to produce the necessary replacement pads, the polisher/sander is utterly useless. 20. Based upon information and belief, the PS7000 was manufactured by Infusion and sold to consumers at Menards, Lowe’s, Amazon.com, and dualtools.com. 21. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 22. Plaintiff brings all claims herein as class claims pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). Plaintiff hereby reserves the right to amend the class action allegations after further discovery on the matter has occurred. The requirements of FRCP 23 are met with respect to the class defined below. A. Class Definition(s) 24. Plaintiff proposes that the Class be defined as: All persons or entities throughout the United States and its territories that, during the class period, purchased a “DualTools PS7000” polisher/sander. 25. Plaintiff proposes that the “class period” be defined as ending on March 11, 2016 and beginning on the first allowable date after accounting for any applicable state statute of limitations. 27. Based upon Defendants’ publicly available sales data, it is estimated that the Class numbers are potentially in the millions and that joinder of all members is impracticable. The number and identities of proposed class members are administratively feasible and can be determined through appropriate discovery and identification from Defendants’ records. Moreover, joinder of all members is further impracticable because the proposed class members reside throughout the United States. C. Commonality – FRCP 23(a)(2) 28. This action involves questions of law or fact common to the class. These common questions predominate over questions that affect only individual proposed class members. 30. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the proposed class. 31. Plaintiff’s claim is typical because it arises from the same unlawful, unfair and deceptive business conduct that gave rise to the claims of the other proposed class members and because all such claims are based on the same legal theory. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the proposed class because, during the class period, Plaintiff and each proposed member bought the exact same product, specifically the “DualTools PS7000.” Defendants’ unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent actions concern the same business practices described herein, irrespective of where they occurred or were experienced. The injuries of each member of the proposed class were caused directly by Defendants’ wrongful conduct. In addition, the factual basis for the alleged misconduct is common to all proposed class members and represents a common thread of misconduct resulting in injury to all proposed members. E. Adequacy – FRCP 23(a)(4) 33. The representative parties in this case will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 35. The questions of law or fact common to the proposed class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 36. Common issues predominate because any individual factual determinations that will need to be made can be accomplished using Defendants’ computer records. Moreover, common issues predominate because adding more plaintiffs to the class will not increase the amount of evidence that will be required to be introduced. 37. In addition, the fact that each individual class member may be entitled to a specific, and different, amount of damages does not cause individual questions to predominate over common questions. “Courts in every circuit have uniformly held that the 23(b)(3) predominance requirement is satisfied despite the need to make individualized damage determinations and a recent dissenting decision of four Supreme Court Justices characterized the point as ‘well nigh universal.’ Indeed, a class may also be certified solely on the basis of common liability, with individualized damages determinations left to subsequent proceedings.” (William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions, § 4:54 (5th ed.)(Updated June 2015) (citations omitted)). 39. A class action in this case is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 40. When considered on an individual basis, the damages resulting from Defendants’ unfair and deceptive business practices are extremely low. Consequently, it is highly unlikely any individual claimant (and even less likely that an attorney) would spend the time, money and effort necessary to challenge the alleged conduct. Therefore, there is no question that a class action is the superior method of adjudication. 41. Class Action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would create. Class treatment of common questions of law and fact would also be superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that class treatment will conserve the resources of the Court and the litigants, and will promote consistency and efficiency of adjudication. F. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) are Satisfied 43. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 44. Defendants’ tender of the performance did not conform as a result of the vehicle’s mechanical defects, lack of merchantability, or fitness for intended purpose which existed at the time of delivery, and which is a material breach of contract. 45. Whether by law or statute, all contracts impose upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 46. Plaintiff and the proposed class members entered into a contract with Defendants in which they agreed to pay Defendants money in consideration for the PS7000 polisher/sander. 47. Each Defendant breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to determine whether the product it sold could be used by consumers as advertised. 48. Defendants violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to determine if there was a large enough supply of PS7000 replacement pads to meet the reasonably expectable public demand. 50. Plaintiff and the proposed class members have performed all, or substantially all, of the obligations imposed on them under their agreement with the respective Defendant. 51. Plaintiff and the proposed class have sustained damages as an actual and legal result of Defendants’ breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Consequently, they are entitled to damages in an amount to be later determined. 52. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 53. Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class conferred a benefit on each Defendant by tendering money to them in consideration for purchasing the PS7000 polisher/sander. 54. Plaintiff and the proposed class did not receive the benefit of the barging because they no longer can use the polisher/sander due to the fact that it is impossible to obtain replacement pads. Despite this fact, Defendants’ knowingly and willfully retained the benefits and funds from Plaintiff and the proposed class, in conscious disregard for their rights. 55. As a direct and legal result, Defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense and detriment of Plaintiff and the proposed class. 56. Defendants must pay restitution to Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class for its unjust enrichment, in an amount to be later determined. 58. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive or fraudulent business practices. These state statues are often referred to as “Little FTC” consumer protection acts due to the obvious similarities they share with Section 5(a) of Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 60. Defendants’ policies and practices as described herein are misleading, deceptive, unfair, false and fraudulent and are in violation of the above-cited statutes. Including, but not limited to, the following practices, which have been intentionally, knowingly and unlawfully perpetrated upon Plaintiff and the proposed class members: a. Advertising products for sale from companies without determining whether there is a large enough supply of the replacement pads necessary to meet the reasonably expectable public demand; b. Defendants’ business practices, as described herein, which are otherwise unlawful, unfair or deceptive and in violation of the state statutes described in the above sub-classes. 61. Defendants’ actions as described herein occurred during the course of trade and commerce. 62. Defendants have injured the public interest, and Defendants’ actions pose a continued threat to the public. 63. Defendants’ acted knowingly, with intent to defraud, deceive and with intent that Plaintiff and the proposed class members rely on Defendants’ deceptive concealments and misrepresentations, which they reasonably did. 65. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 66. Defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that they knew, or should have known, that there was not a large enough supply of the replacement pads necessary to meet the reasonably expectable public demand. 67. Defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that the PS7000 could only be used with the specially manufactured and unique replacement pads. 68. Defendants engaged in this conduct with the intent to deceive Plaintiff and/or the proposed class and to induce them to enter into the contract. 69. Plaintiff and/or the proposed class members reasonably relied on Defendants’ conduct and were actually deceived by Defendants’ fraudulent actions. 70. Defendants made a promise that they had no intention of performing, and this false misrepresentation pertained to a material fact of the contract. 71. As a direct and legal result of Defendants’ misleading, deceptive, unfair, false and fraudulent practices, Plaintiff and/or the proposed class members have sustained damages in an amount to be determined later. Fraudulent Inducement (As Applied to Plaintiff Individually or Alternatively to the Proposed Class) Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (Violation of State “Little FTC” Consumer Protections Acts) Unjust Enrichment

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43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and the Class solely for breach of federal law. This cause of action is not based on any violation of state law. 44. The MMWA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq., creates a private federal cause of action for breach of “written warranty” as defined by the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) and § 2310(d)(1). 45. The AirFloss is a “consumer products” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1), as they constitute tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family or household purposes. 46. Plaintiff and members of the Class are “consumers” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3), since they are buyers of the AirFloss product for purposes other than resale. 47. Defendants are entities engaged in the business of making the AirFloss available, either directly or indirectly, to consumers such as Plaintiff and the Class. As such, Defendants are “suppliers” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4). 48. Through their labeling, Defendants gave and offered a written warranty to consumers relating to the nature and quality of the AirFloss. As a result, Defendants are “warrantors” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5). 5. Since at least 2011, Defendants have packaged, marketed, distributed and sold AirFloss as either being “Floss”, a replacement for Floss to or better than Floss. In addition, Defendants have failed to warn consumers that their product does not replace flossing, which is a recognized requirement for proper oral hygiene. The following representations appear on the packaging of the product (Exhibit 1) as well as on the internet, including Defendants’ website, and in print advertisements A. “An Easier Way to Floss”; B. “It’s probably the easiest way to floss in just 60 seconds”; C. “Airfloss takes the hassle out of flossing so you can get a deep clean every day”; and D. “AirFloss” (Presented on the package in a way that Air is bolder than the Floss) 6. The following representations were also made on the internet and in print media: A. “Sonicare Airfloss Replaces Traditional Flossing With Micro Bursts of Water and Air”; (See Exhibit 2). B. Sonicare AirFloss is designed to make flossing easier, maximize plaque removal..." C. “With Sonicare Airfloss, interdental cleaning has just been reinvented”; D. “They’re calling it a game changer that will benefit virtually all their patients”; E. “Sonicare AirFloss has been through meticulous clinical validation…”.; and F. "The reputation of the Sonicare brand is built on its research-based approach to dental and oral care and AirFloss underwent the same rigorous clinical validation as all Sonicare products". 71. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and the Class. This claim is brought in the alternative to the First Cause of Action under state law. 72. Defendants made express warranties to Plaintiff and members of the Class that the products they were purchasing was: 1) “An Easier Way to Floss”; 2) “It’s probably the easiest way to floss in just 60 seconds”; 3) “Airfloss takes the hassle out of flossing so you can get a deep clean every day”. 73. These express warranties made to Plaintiff and Class appears on every package of the AirFloss products and was also reinforced by appearing in numerous other forms of advertising commissioned by Defendants. These promises regarding the nature of the products marketed by Defendants, specifically relate to the goods being purchased and became the basis of the bargain. 74. Plaintiff and the Class purchased the AirFloss in the belief that they conformed to the express warranties that were made on the AirFloss’ packaging. 75. Defendants breached the express warranties made to Plaintiff and members of the Class by failing to supply goods that conformed to the warranties they made. As a result, Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered injury and deserve to be compensated for the damages they suffered. 78. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 79. Plaintiff asserts this cause of action on behalf of herself individually, and on behalf of the Class. 80. Plaintiff is a person as defined by California’s Unfair Competition Act. 81. Defendants designed, marketed and/or sell, and continue to market and sell the AirFloss in California, including through the internet and through a distribution network that includes major retail outlets such as, Costco and Walmart. Each of the defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the California market with respect to AirFloss by putting the AirFloss into the stream of national commerce. 82. Plaintiff became aware of the AirFloss though defendants’ label claims and promotional activities undertaken and directed to California consumers. On the basis of these factors, plaintiff purchased the AirFloss for money at a San Diego Costco store. 92. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 93. Plaintiff asserts this cause of action on behalf of herself individually, and on behalf of the Class. 94. California Business & Professions Code § 17500 prohibits various deceptive practices in connection with the dissemination in any manner of representations for the purpose of inducing, or which are likely to induce, directly or indirectly, customers to purchase products, including the product at issue. 95. Defendants knew that their representations were false when they put these misrepresentations on the AirFloss packaging, on the internet, including defendants’ website and in print media, but did it any way. Their knowledge of the falsity of their statements is evidenced in a buried section of their Frequently Asked Questions on their website. See Exhibit 3. Further, Defendant failed to inform Plaintiff and the Class that their product was not a substitute for flossing. Such a disclaimer was required to properly inform the consumers of the true efficacy of their product for proper oral hygiene. However, including such a disclaimer would have undermined Defendants’ AirFloss, which was intentionally marketed as a replacement for traditional dental floss. In order to increase sales, defendants have fraudulently induced customers to by their product. 96. The defendants’ acts, practices, misrepresentations and omissions alleged herein were intended to, and did, induce the consuming public, including plaintiff, to purchase the products in California, and violated and continue to violate Business & Professions Code § 17500. 98. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. Breach of Express Warranty Cal. Com. Code § 2313 (Against all Defendants) Unlawful, unfair and Fraudulent Business Acts and Practices in Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Bus. & Prof. Code §17500, et. seq. (Against all Defendants) Unlawful, unfair and Fraudulent Business Acts and Practices in Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, et. seq. (Against all Defendants) Violation Of The Consumers Legal Remedies Act Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et Seq. (Against All Defendants) Violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq. (Violation of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Under California Law) (Against all Defendants) Violation of the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq. (Violation of Written Warranty Under Federal Law) (Against all Defendants)

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1.”) 21. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 22. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 23. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 24. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 25. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 4 26. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 27. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter (“the Letter”) dated August 5, 2019. (A true and accurate copy is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 28. The Letter conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 29. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 30. The Letter was received and read by Plaintiff. 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendant. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 32. The deprivation of Plaintiff's rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 33. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 36. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318. 37. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319. 38. A collection letter also violates 15 64. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 65. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 66. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 67. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318. 68. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319. 69. A collection letter also violates 15 80. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York. 81. Plaintiff seeks to certify two classes of: i. All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter failing to explicitly state the owner of the alleged Debt, substantially and materially similar to the Letter sent to Plaintiff, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. ii. All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter failing to 8 state whether the settlement payment must be sent by the consumer, or received by the Defendant, by the stated deadline in order to accept the settlement offer, substantially and materially similar to the Letter sent to Plaintiff, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 82. This action seeks a finding that Defendant's conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 83. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 84. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 85. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 86. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant's conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10) Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10)

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27. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs of this complaint as if fully alleged herein. Plaintiff brings his first cause of action as a nationwide "opt-in" collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of himself and on behalf of the following class of persons ("FLSA Class"): All persons who were employed as non-exempt hourly examiner-technicians and/or inspectors in the United States, or anywhere else the FLSA governs, by any of the Defendants during any part of the time period beginning three years prior to the filing of the initial complaint and who elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b) ("FLSA Class"). 28. The FLSA claim may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case, pursuant to 29 I U.S.C. §216(b). 29. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, seeks I relief on a collective basis challenging, among other FLSA violations, Defendants' practice of I failing to accurately record all hours worked, and failing to pay employees for all hours worked, including overtime compensation. The number and identity of other plaintiffs yet to opt-in and consent to be party plaintiffs may be determined from Defendants' records, and potential class members may easily and quickly be notified of the pendency of this action. California Classes 31. � The terms "Class Members", "Employees" and "other employees" refer to the � 14 � members of these classes and subclasses, including Plaintiff. � 15 � 32. � The California state law claims, if certified for class-wide treatment, may be 16 pursued by all similarly situated persons who do not opt-out of the California Classes. The 17 California Labor Code, Wage Order provisions, and FLSA, upon which Plaintiff bases his 18 claims, are broadly remedial in nature. These laws and labor standards serve an important 19 public interest in establishing minimum working conditions and standards. These laws and � 20 � labor standards protect the average working employee from exploitation by employers who may � 21 � seek to take advantage of superior economic and bargaining power in setting onerous terms and � 22 � conditions on employment. � 23 � 42. � Typicali : The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of all members 10 I of the Class. Mr. Viceral is a member of the proposed Classes and proposed Subclass. � 11 � Plaintiff, himself, has suffered and been damaged by the alleged violations of the Labor Code, 12 I Wage Order, and Bus. & Prof. Code herein alleged. � 13 � 43. � Adeauacy of Representation: � Plaintiff is fully prepared to take all 14 necessary steps to represent, fairly and adequately, the interests of the above-defined Class. � 15 � Plaintiff s attorneys are ready, willing, and able to fully and adequately represent the Class and 16 individual Plaintiff. Plaintiffls attorneys have prosecuted and settled numerous wage-and-hour � 17 � class actions in the past and currently have a number of wage-and-hour class actions pending in � 18 � the California state and federal courts, as well as elsewhere in the United States. � 19 � 45. � Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding 5 paragraphs. � 6 � 46. � Defendants engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and practice of violating the 7 FLSA, as detailed in this Complaint. � 8 � 47. � At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the members of the Class were engaged in 9 commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 10 206(a) and 207(a). � 11 � 48. � The overtime wage provisions set forth in the FLSA apply to Defendants and 121 protect Plaintiff and the Class. 13 1 � 49. � Defendants are employers engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods 14 I for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). � 15 � 50. � At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the members of the Class were or have been � 16 � employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 58. � Labor Code section 510 and the applicable Wage Order provide that eight hours � 11 � of labor constitutes a days work and that any work in excess of eight hours in one workday or ' � 12 � 40 hours in any one workweek and the first eight hours worked on the seventh day of work any � 13 � one workweek shall be compensated at the rate of no less than 1'/z times the regular rate of pay � 14 � for an employee. � 15 � 59. � Labor Code section 510(a) and the applicable Wage Order provide that any work 16 in excess of 12 hours in one day shall be compensated at the rate of no less than twice the � 17 � regular rate of pay for an employee, as must any work in excess of eight hours on any seventh � 18 � day of a workweek. iti � 60. � Plaintiff and the California Class members were regularly required to work in � 20 � excess of eight hours in a day and/or 40 hours in a workweek (including days that exceeded 12 21 hours in a work day and workweeks that included a seventh day of work) during the Class 22 Period by being required to participate in mandatory online training courses and/or programs. � 23 � Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff or the California Class members at the statutory rates � 24 � for their time spent in mandatory online training courses and/or programs. � 25 � 61. � Defendants' failure to compensate Plaintiff and the California Class members for 1►~i their overtime work violated Labor Code section 510 and the applicable Wage Order, � 27 � 63. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this I I complaint as though set forth in full at this point. 64. The applicable Wage Order provides, in pertinent part: "No employer shall employ any person for a work period of more than five (5) hours without a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that when a work period of not more than six (6) hours will complete the day's work the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee." Labor Code § 512 contains parallel language.' 65. Plaintiff alleges that he and members of the California Class were routinely not I I relieved of all duty for an entire 30 minutes, and further, that such relief which did occur took , place long-after the beginning of the sixth hour of work. 66. Labor Code § 226.7 requires that Defendants provide Plaintiff and each California l Class member all meal periods specified in the applicable Wage Order and that Plaintiff and each California Class member was to be paid one additional hour of pay per day at his/her regular rate of compensation as additional wages for meal periods that were not properly provided. 67. Plaintiff and each California Class member have suffered a loss equal to his/her applicable hourly wage rate times the total number of times he/she was not authorized and permitted to take the legally-required meal periods and have therefore not been paid all of the wages due. Accordingly, Plaintiff and each California Class member are entitled to recover the I unpaid wages in an amount to be proven at trial. 68. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this complaint as though set forth in full at this point. 69. The applicable Wage Order provides that every employer must authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods, which insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of ' each work period. The authorized rest period time is based on the total hours worked each day, at the rate of ten minutes net rest time per four hours worked or major fraction thereof. The Wage Order declares that such 4uthorized rest period time shall be counted as hours worked for which there shall be no deduction from wages. 70. Labor Code section 226.7 and the Wage Order direct that if the employer fails to provide a rest break in accordance with the Wage Order, the employer shall credit the employee with and pay one additional hour of work at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each workday that a rest period was not provided. 71. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not authorize and permit the rest breaks required by the Wage Order. Plaintiff further alleges that, notwithstanding any formal written policy to the contrary, Defendants' actual custom and business practice was to undermine any formal policy of providing rest breaks by pressuring employees to perform their duties in ways that omitted breaks, including, but not limited to, scheduling a heavy workload that made taking breaks extremely difficult, maintaining an informal anti-rest-break policy enforced through ridicule or reprimand, and exerting coercion against the taking of, creating incentives to forego, or otherwise encouraging the skipping of legally protected breaks. 73. � Plaintiff and the California Class members are entitled to be compensated for an 2 I hour of time, at their regular rate, for each occasion when Defendants failed to provide a 3 I required rest break. � 4 � 74. � Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this � 9 � complaint as though set forth in full at this point. � 10 � 75. � Pursuant to the Labor Code and the Wage Order, every employer must provide 11 I accurate itemized wage statements at the time employees are paid, showing accurate figures for, 12 inter alia, gross wages earned, total hours worked, net wages earned, and all applicable hourly 13 rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each � 14 � hourly rate by the employee. � 15 � 76. � Plaintiff alleges that he and the class members did not receive accurate itemized 16 wage statements, as required by law, in that the wage statements provided to them did not 17 accurately reflect correct figures for gross wages earned, total hours worked, net wages earned, � 18 � and/or all applicable hourly rates in effect with the corresponding number of hours worked at � 19 � each hourly rate. � 20 � 78. � As a result of Defendants' failure to provide the accurate itemized wage 2 I I statements required by law, Plaintiff and the class members have been injured in the manner set 3 I I forth in the Labor Code in that they could not readily determine if they had been paid all earned � 4 � wages at each pay period. � 5 � 79. � Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to the penalty set forth in Labor Code 6 I I section 226(e), to the civil penalty set forth in Labor Code section 226.3, to the penalty set forth � 7 � in the applicable Wage Order, to costs of suit, and reasonable attorney's fees. � 8 � SIXTIi CAUSE OF ACTION � 9 � 84. � Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this � 9 � complaint as though set forth in full at this point. � 10 � 85. � Section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code prohibits any 11 I unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice. � 12 � 86. � Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and loss of wages and monies as a result of I 13 I I Defendants' actions. 141 � 87. � The actions of Defendants, as herein alleged, amount to conduct which is 15 I unlawful and a violation of law. As such, said conduct constitutes unfair business practices, in 16 I violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et. seq. � 17 � 88. � Defendants' conduct as herein alleged has damaged Plaintiff and the members of 18 I the California Class by denying them wages due and payable. As a result of such conduct, 19 I Defendants have unlawfully and unfairly obtained monies owed to Plaintiff and the members of I the California Class. � 21 � 89. � All members of the California Class can be identified by reference to payroll and � 22 � related records in the possession of the Defendants. The amount of wages due to Plaintiff and 23 members of the California Class can be readily determined from Defendants' records. The 24 I members of the proposed class are entitled to restitution of monies due and obtained by 25 ( Defendants during the Class Period as a result of Defendants' unlawful and unfair conduct. � 26 � 91. � Defendants' course of conduct, acts, and practices in violation of the California 2 laws and regulations, as mentioned in each paragraph above, constitute distinct, separate and � 3 � independent violations of Sections 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code. � 4 � 92. � The harm to Plaintiff and the members of the California Class of being I 5 wrongfully denied lawfully earned but unpaid wages outweighs the utility, if any, of 6 Defendants' policies and practices and, therefore, Defendants' actions described herein � 7 � constitute unfair business practices or acts within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 8 et seq. � 9 � 93. � Defendants' conduct described herein threatens an incipient violation of I 10 I California's wage and hour laws, and/or violates the policy or spirit of such laws, or otherwise � 11 � significantly threatens or harms competition. 121 � 94. � Defendants' course of conduct described herein further violates Bus. & Prof. � 13 � Code §§ 17200, et seq., in that it is fraudulent, improper, and/or unfair. � I � 14 � 95. � The unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices and acts of Defendants as � 15 � described hereinabove have injured Plaintiff and members of the California Class in that they � 16 � were wrongfully denied the timely and full payment of wages owed to them. � 17 � 96. � Defendants have been unjustly enriched as a direct result of their unlawful � 18 � business practices alleged in this complaint and will continue to benefit from those practices and 19 I have an unfair competitive advantage if allowed to retain the unpaid wages. � 20 � Civic Center Courthouee 400 McAllister St., San Francisco, CA 94102 The name, address, and telephone number of plafntHPs attomey, or plalnUff whhout an attomey, Is: (Ei nombre, la direccidn y el rtetimero de fel8fono del abopedo del demandante, o del demandentee que no tiene abogado, ea): Louis M. Marlin, Esq .(SBN 54053) FAILURE TO AUTHORIZE AND PERMIT COMPLIANT MEAL BREAKS (Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512, 558, & 1198, and Wage Order) (By Plaintiff and the California Class Against All Defendants) FLSA Nationwide Collective Action � 21 � CIVIL PENALTIES UNDER THE � 22 � � 2 � FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT — OVERTIME WAGES � 3 � (By Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Against All Defendants) � 4 � � 5 � FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCURATE WAGE STATEMENTS � 6 � (Labor Code §§ 226, 226.3; Wage Order) � 7 � (By Plaintiff and the California Class Against All Defendants) � 8 � � 5 � UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES � 6 � (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.) � 7 � (By Plaintiff and the California Class Against All Defendants) � 8 � � 5 � FOR FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES � 6 � (Labor Code §§ 510,1194; Wage Order) � 7 � (By Plaintiff and the California Class Against All Defendants) � 8 �57. � Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs of this � 9 � complaint as though set forth in full at this point. � 10 �

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20. Prior to November of 2018, Kathleen visited Menorah Medical Center in Overland Park, Kansas. 22. In or around November of 2018, Menorah Medical Center referred the Debt to Defendant for collection from Plaintiffs and Defendant then contacted Plaintiffs regarding the Debt. 23. Plaintiffs and Defendant agreed to settle the entire balance of the Debt for a one- time payment by Plaintiffs of $318.79. 24. On or about November 25, 2018, as agreed, Plaintiffs drafted, signed, and mailed Defendant a check for $318.79. The check was numbered 3039 and referenced account number ending 2997 in the memo line. 25. On or about November 29, 2018, Defendant received Plaintiffs’ check number 3039 for $318.79. 26. Also, on or about November 29, 2018, Defendant used the information contained on Plaintiffs’ check to prepare a second, electronic check from Plaintiffs’ CapFed Account. This electronic check contained the same account number, routing number, and check number as the check that Plaintiffs mailed to Defendant, but the payment amount was listed as $832.80. The electronic check contained an electronic signature that reads “Menorah Medical Center.” Under the signature line stated “by MENORAH MEDICAL CENTER as authorized signature for JOHN 36. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of multiple classes of individuals pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 37. The aforementioned classes of individuals (collectively referred to as the “Classes”) are defined as: a. all persons from whom Defendant collected funds in excess of the amount such persons authorized Defendant to collect during the applicable statute of limitations. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “FDCPA Class”). b. All persons from whom Defendant collected funds via an electronic fund transfer from an “account” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§1693a(2) without first obtaining authorization from the person to perform said transfer and without notifying such person that such transfer would or may be processed as an electronic fund transfer. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “EFTA Class”). 38. The Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Upon information and belief, Defendant has collected funds in excess of amounts authorized by consumers and has performed electronic funds transfers from myriad consumer “accounts” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C.§1693a(2) without first obtaining authorization from the person to perform said transfer and without notifying such person that such transfer would or may be processed as an electronic fund transfer. Given the aforementioned conduct across the potential class, there exists a presumption of numerosity. 40. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims for the Classes, which arise from the same operative facts and are predicated on the same legal theories. 41. There are no individual questions of fact, other than whether a Class member did not authorize Defendant to perform an electronic funds transfer in the amount actually taken by Defendant and whether a Class member was provided with notice that a transfer would or may be treated as an electronic fund transfer, which can be determined by a ministerial inspection of Defendant’s records. 42. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiffs are committed to vigorously prosecuting this matter and have retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiffs nor counsel for Plaintiffs have any interests that might cause them to not vigorously pursue this claim. 44. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small as the maximum statutory damages in an individual action under both the FDCPA and EFTA are $1,000. Management of the Class claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. The identities of individual Class members may be easily obtained from Defendant’s records. 45. As a result of the above violations of the FDCPA and EFTA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and Class members for statutory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs. 46. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each of the preceding paragraphs in this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 47. By creating an electronic check using the information from Plaintiffs’ actual check without Plaintiff’s knowledge, consent, or permission, and then withdrawing both amounts from Plaintiffs’ CapFed Account, Defendant collected funds from Plaintiffs without having any lawful authority to do so. 48. In its attempts to collect the debt allegedly owed by Plaintiffs to Menorah Medical Center, Defendant violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §1692, in one or more of the following ways: a. Used unfair and/or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692f; b. Collected funds from Plaintiffs despite having no lawful authority to do so in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692f(1); c. Was otherwise deceptive and failed to comply with the provisions of the 51. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each of the preceding paragraphs in this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 52. The EFTA, and Regulation E promulgated thereunder, prohibit the initiation of electronic funds transfers without first obtaining the account holder’s authorization. 15 U.S.C. §1693b(a)(; 12 C.F.R. §205.3. 53. Defendant violated the EFTA and Regulation E by initiating or causing to be initiated an electronic funds transfer in the amount of $832.80 without first obtaining either Plaintiff’s authorization. 54. Section 1693b(a) of the EFTA authorizes the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (the “Board”) to prescribe regulations to carry out the purpose and provisions of the statute, which the board has done by promulgating Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. §205. 56. Defendant’s initiation of an electronic transfer in the amount of $832.80 was neither authorized nor permitted by 12 C.F.R. §205.3 or 15 U.S.C. §1693b(a). 57. Defendant violated the EFTA and Regulation E because it initiated or caused to be initiated an electronic funds transfer in the amount of $832.80 from Plaintiffs’ CapFed Account without first obtaining Plaintiffs’ authorization to do so. 58. Neither Jonathan nor Kathleen never received any notice that he would be charged $832.80, or that such payment would or may be processed as an electronic fund transfer. 59. Neither Jonathan nor Kathleen have provided Defendant with any authorization, orally or in writing, to transfer $832.80 from Plaintiffs’ CapFed Account to Defendant. 60. Defendant has not obtained any authorization, either orally or in writing, from either Jonathan or Kathleen to transfer $832.80 from Plaintiff’s CapFed Account to Defendant. 61. Defendant has not provided either Jonathan or Kathleen with any form of notice that a payment of $832.80 will or may be processed as an electronic fund transfer. 62. Neither Jonathan nor Kathleen have informed Defendant that he or she waived his or her right to provide Defendant with written authorization to execute the transfer of funds from Plaintiff’s CapFed Account to Defendant. 63. Defendant’s conduct in violating the EFTA and Regulation E directly and proximately caused Plaintiffs to suffer damages as set forth in the paragraphs above.

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1. Kroger Does Not Disclose That Its Products Are Artificially Flavored. 1. Kroger Does Not Disclose That Its Products Are Artificially Flavored. ......................... 4 2. Federal and State Laws Require Kroger to Disclose the Artificial Flavor in Its Products. ..................................................................................................................... 8 27. The Product front labels display the name of each Product’s namesake fruits or berries or both. 28. At least some of the Products during the proposed Class period also displayed pictures of those ripe, fresh fruits or berries on the front labels. 29. These label representations convey to the consumer by operation of federal and state law that the Product is made exclusively from and is flavored only with natural fruits and fruit flavors. 3. Kroger Competitors Label Their Products Lawfully. .................................................... 11 30. None of the Products include on either the front- or back-label any indication that the Product contains artificial flavoring chemicals. 31. All of the Products included herein omit the legally-required disclosures. 32. All the Products, however, are made with a synthetic chemical flavoring ingredient identified in the product ingredient list as “malic acid”. 33. The “malic acid” that Kroger puts in its Products is not a natural flavoring material as defined by federal and state law; it is a synthetic chemical manufactured in a petrochemical factory from petroleum feedstocks. 34. The Product labels therefore violate California and other states’ statutory and common-law consumer protection laws in a minimum of three different ways. 4. Plaintiff and the Class Pay a Price Premium for the Misbranded Products................... 12 V. VII. CAUSES OF ACTION ............................................................................................ 17 First Cause of Action: .............................................................................................. 17 Violation of Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, ORC 1345.01 et seq ................ 17 (All Ohio- and Similar-States’ Plaintiffs v. Kroger) ............................................... 17 Second Cause of Action: Violation of the CLRA (California Sub-Class) ............. 19 Third Cause of Action: Violation of the UCL, Unlawful and Unfair Prongs (California Sub-Class) ................................................................................... 20 Fourth Cause of Action: Violation of California False Advertising Law (California Sub-Class) ................................................................................... 23 Fifth Cause of Action: Breach of Express Warranty ............................................... 24 Sixth Cause of Action: Breach of Implied Warranty ............................................. 25 Seventh Cause of Action: Common Law Fraud by Omission ............................... 27 Eighth Cause of Action: Negligent Misrepresentation ........................................... 28 Ninth Cause of Action: Money Had and Received ................................................. 28

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16. Defendants have regularly denied plaintiffs freedom of religion and the right to marry. 17. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference as though fully set forth at length herein paragraphs 1 - 16 of this Complaint. 18. Plaintiffs assert that defendants have regularly denied them freedom of religion and the right to marry. 20. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference as though fully set forth at length herein all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 21. As hereinabove alleged, defendants are enterprises within the meaning of § 76-10- 24. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference as though fully set forth at length herein all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 26. Plaintiffs have in fact been subjected to severe emotional distress as a result of such conduct by defendants, and continue to be subjected to such distress, in amounts to be shown at trial. 27. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that, unless restrained, defendants will continue to violate the rights of the plaintiffs to their irreparable injury. Plaintiffs therefore request injunctive relief stopping further such conduct, together with appropriate damages. 28. Plaintiff class has been damaged in an amount not less than Twenty Five Thousand Dollars for each member of the class. Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray for judgment and a decree as hereinafter set forth. 7. This action is brought under Rule 23, FRCP, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711 et seq, 1331 and 1332 on behalf of Plaintiffs and others similarly situated who are described as follows: a. all persons denied freedom of religion and the right to marry. 8. Plaintiffs are unable to state the exact number of the plaintiff class members without discovery of defendants’ records. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that the plaintiff class exceeds 500 members. The members of each class are so numerous as to make joinder impracticable. FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION ACT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS OF UTAH PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY ACT Summary

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1. Whether Defendant’s employees and agents such as managers, security personnel and other staff are trained to assist blind and vision-impaired guests with basic needs such as: completing the hotel registration; learning about and completing service requests like reviewing the hotel bill and charges; counting and identifying currency; using a signature guide or template in conjunction with their credit card; using lounge facilities, rest rooms; orienting guests to hotel and guest room layouts; location of fire alarms, emergency exits and equipment; heating and air conditioning controls; and TV remote controls 2. Whether Defendant accepts guide dogs and, if so, if there are any charges associated with the guide dogs, their policies with respect to guide dogs and if there are any rest areas for guide dogs. 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website https://freehandhotels.com/ to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to: find information about hotel location and hours of operation and other goods and services offered at the Defendant’s hotel. 29. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s hotel. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s hotel and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 33. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 34. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical hotel location, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical hotel on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations, and access to various other goods and services such as finding information about dining and entertainment options, and other goods and services offered at the Defendant’s hotel. 35. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 37. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 38. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . their title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 4. Whether or not emergency exit signs are compliant with ADAAG1 requirements and emergency evacuation plans and information are provided in braille and large print. 41. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently access goods and services, locate Defendant’s hotel locations and hours of operation, and shop for and otherwise research related information available via the Website. 42. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 44. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. Defendant’s Website and Compliance with Requirement to Describe Accessibility Features 45. Defendant owns and operates a hotel in New York. This hotel offers dining and other goods and services offered at the Defendant’s hotel. 46. Defendant’s Website offers features to the public that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that it offers about their hotel. The Website is heavily integrated with their hotel, serving as their gateway. 47. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, using Defendant’s Website access to information through their reservation system relating to the availability of ADA compliant rooms and handicap accessible features of the hotel, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s hotel. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to add information through their reservation system relating to its accessibility for visually-impaired persons on their Website, Plaintiff and visually- impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s hotel and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public at Defendant’s hotel. 49. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, Plaintiff was not able to determine from the reservation system on the Website what ADA compliant features, if any, the hotel offers and whether the guest rooms have handicap accessible facilities or communications equipment in the guest rooms suitable to blind or visually-impaired persons. As a result, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York State by being unable to learn any information about the accessibility features of the hotel or its guest rooms. Defendant Must Include Information Relating to ADA Compliant Rooms and Handicap Accessibility Features Through Its Website Reservation System 5. Whether or not all accessible signage complies with the requirements of the 51. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website reservation system have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information on the Website reservation system relating to the accessibility of the hotel guest rooms for blind and visually-impaired people and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from reserving a room at the hotel, staying at the hotel and using the facilities of the hotel including its dining and entertainment options and other goods and services offered at the Defendant’s hotel. 52. If the hotel and the Website reservation system were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 53. Through visiting the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the lack of information on accessibility features available on the reservation system on the Website that result in making the services and facilities of the hotel inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 55. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 56. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 61. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required accessibility information and/or have been denied access to the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 62. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required information and/or have been denied access to the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required information and/or have been denied access to the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 65. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website and/or by failing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system so individuals with disabilities can independently assess if Defendant’s hotel or guest rooms meet the accessibility needs of the Plaintiff and the Class. 67. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 68. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 71. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s hotel. The Website is a service that is integrated with the Defendant’s hotel and is a gateway thereto. 73. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 74. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 76. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 77. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 78. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 79. Defendant’s physical hotel is located in the State of New York and constitute a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. The Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 82. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden." 83. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 85. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is not accessible and does not contain the ADA-required information on its reservation system making their hotel inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or; b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct the lack of the ADA-required information in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members and/or; d. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination. 86. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 88. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 90. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 91. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 92. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 93. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 95. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates a physical location in New York and the Website, making the Defendant a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 96. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update the Website and remove access barriers to its hotel and by failing to include the ADA-required information on its reservation system, causing the services integrated with their physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 97. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). DECLARATORY RELIEF 105. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 106. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location and that the Website also does not contain the ADA-required information on its reservation system denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension their physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 107. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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45. The Plaintiffs bring this action individually and as a class and collective action on behalf of all persons similarly situated and proximately damaged by the Defendants’ unlawful conduct as follows: (a) failure to pay wages for all hours worked and overtime compensation at rates not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work in excess of forty hours per workweek, as required by the FLSA; (b) failure pay for all hours worked and overtime compensation in breach of Article 19 of the NYLL, and failure to comply with related wage and hour provisions of the NYLL, including but not limited to wage statement and wage notice requirements; (c) engaging in a pattern and practice whereby defendants deprived Plaintiffs and Class Members of prevailing wages that Defendants were obligated to pay under NYLL § 220(3)(a) and/or pursuant to their contracts with public agencies that incorporated prevailing wage obligations, by, inter alia: (a) creating, certifying and/or submitting false time and payroll records relating to the Projects, which, upon information and belief, Defendants and/or their agents submitted to the New York City Comptroller’s office and/or other public agencies; (b) orchestrating unlawful kickbacks by paying workers in cash at rates that were lower than prevailing wage schedules, while demanding that workers sign “payroll” checks, which Defendants kept; and (c) demanding that workers at the Projects conceal facts from and/or misrepresent Defendants’ practices to public investigators as a precondition for their continued employment. FLSA Collective 47. This action claims that Defendants violated the wage and hour provisions of FLSA by depriving Named Plaintiffs and others similarly situated to Named Plaintiffs, of their lawful wages. Upon information and belief, there are many similarly situated current and former workers of Defendants who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join this lawsuit. 48. Consistent with the Defendants’ policies and patterns or practices, the Named Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective were not paid proper overtime compensation of 1.5 times their regular rates of pay for all hours worked beyond forty per workweek. 49. All of the work that the Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed was assigned by the Defendants, and/or the Defendants have been aware of all of the work that the Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed. 50. The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. Their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. 51. As part of their regular business practice, the Defendants have intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to the Named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to, willfully failing to pay proper premium overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 52. Consent to sue forms for the Named Plaintiffs are being filed with this Court contemporaneously with the filing of this complaint. NYLL/Prevailing Wage Class 54. The Named Plaintiffs bring their claims on behalf of themselves and the NYLL/Prevailing Wage Class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to remedy: (a) Defendants’ violations of the minimum wage, overtime and related wage and hour provisions of the NYLL; (b) Defendants’ breach of their contractual obligations to pay prevailing wages under contracts of which Plaintiffs and Class Members are third party beneficiaries; and (c) Defendants’ willful breach of their prevailing wage obligations at the Projects through (i) their pattern and practice of demanding kick-backs from workers in exchange for employment at the Projects and (ii) willful deception of government agencies by knowingly creating, certifying and submitting materially false business records relating to the personnel and wages at the Projects, all in an effort to violate and/or conceal violations of prevailing wage rules. 55. Members of the NYLL/Prevailing Wage Class are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class Members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The positions held, and nature and extent of certain unlawful deductions from wages are also determinable from Defendants’ records. 56. The Defendants, their officers, and directors are excluded from the Classes. 58. Defendants’ unlawful and corrupt wage practices at the Projects were extensive, willful, and involved their collusion to falsify business records and mislead government compliance officers. Defendants’ Willful Failure to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages Required by the FLSA and NYLL: 59. As described herein, Defendants have knowingly failed to adequately compensate those employees within the class definitions identified above for wages, including minimum wage and premium (overtime) wages due, under the FLSA (29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207) and the NYLL, as well as legally-mandated prevailing wages. 60. At all relevant times, Defendants employed, and/or continue to employ Class Members within the meaning of the NYLL and FLSA. 61. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiffs and Class Members at 1.5 times their regular rate for their overtime and/or required workers to perform overtime work with no compensation at all for these work hours. 63. Defendants required workers to supply and pay for “tools of the trade,” including but not limited to paint sprayers and protective facemasks. 64. The Defendants applied the same policies, practices, and procedures to finish workers (i.e., tapers, painters, plasterers, and drywall framers) at 280-282 East Burnside Avenue, 2247 Walton Avenue and 2848 Bainbridge Avenue in Bronx County, New York. Facts Relating to Plaintiffs’ Status as Third Party Beneficiaries of Prevailing Wage Construction Agreements and Defendants’ Scheme to Deprive Plaintiffs of Prevailing Wages: 65. The Projects constituted public works projects as defined by Article 9 of the New York Labor Law and/or pursuant to other applicable law. 66. New York Labor Law § 220 provides that the wages to be paid to works upon public work shall not be less than “prevailing rate of wages.” 67. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and similarly situated persons supplied labor in connection with, and in further of, the work required by Defendants at the Projects; and in doing so, complied with the terms of their employment agreements with Defendants. 68. Defendants breached their contractual obligations, which, upon information and belief, incorporated NYLL § 220, by shortchanging Named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. Defendants effectuated this scheme through a pervasive pattern of illegal kickbacks, whereby Defendants would issue paychecks to certain Named Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees at or near the required “prevailing wage,” amount(s), and require workers to endorse the checks back to Defendants. Defendants would give significantly lower cash wages to Plaintiffs, in the amounts set forth herein below, and all others similarly situated. 70. Upon information and belief, the Serviam Heights Development (at 2848 Bainbridge Avenue) was financed with “$47 million in fixed-rate, tax-exempt bonds from HDC and $11.9 million from the HDC Corporate Reserves.” (See https://www.novoco.com/periodicals/news/low-income-housing-tax-credits-news-briefs-august- 2016 (accessed on February 16, 2018)). 71. Upon information and belief, Graves operated in the shadows of the New York construction industry, with a track record of willfully and systematically underpaying (and/or failing to pay) laborers in violation of the FLSA, NYLL and/or prevailing wage requirements. 72. Upon information and belief, Graves’ willingness to flout wage laws and other legal obligations enabled Cheever, Graves and their agents and managers at the Projects to extract unlawful profits by usurping public funds that were earmarked for Plaintiffs and Class Members. 73. Upon information and belief, Graves’ agents at the Projects collaborated with Cheever’s management team, including Ashton Besse (“Besse”), Cheever’s General Super, to conceal unlawful wage practices, including “kick-backs.” 74. Besse’s job responsibilities for Cheever included, inter alia, overseeing superintendents, foremen and craftsmen on all construction sites on a daily basis, managing subcontractors, and “ensuring adherence to contract instruments.” See http://www.cheeverdevelopment.com/managementteam.htm (accessed on February 6, 2018) 76. Upon information and belief, on or about January 9, 2018, in an effort to cover up their scheme of depriving Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees of prevailing wages, Defendants abruptly terminated the employment of Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees who were designated as employees of Sheer Taping, and ordered them, without notice, to cease reporting to work at the Serviam Heights Project. 77. Through their foregoing collusion, Defendants unlawfully retained, for their own financial gain, portions of funds paid by government agencies that were earmarked for the benefit of Plaintiffs and similarly situated workers at the Projects. 79. All of the Plaintiffs were required to provide and pay for their own tools of the trade, without reimbursement from Defendants. 80. Defendants paid certain Plaintiffs every fifteen days, in violation of NYLL § 190(1)(a)(i), which provides that employers must pay manual workers “weekly and not later than seven calendar days after the end of the week in which the wages are earned.” Jimenez 81. Jimenez worked at the Serviam Heights Development as a painter and drywall finisher beginning in or about May 2017 until in or about January 2018. Jimenez worked five and six day workweeks. On weekdays, he began at 7:00 a.m. until as late as 9:00 p.m. On Saturdays, Jimenez worked eight hours. 82. Despite workweeks of 68 or more hours, Jimenez was not paid one and one half times his regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. Instead, Jimenez was paid at his regular hourly rate of $18.75 per hour, with no premium overtime compensation. Lopez 83. Lopez worked as a painter and drywall finisher at the Serviam Heights Development beginning from approximately April through December 2016. 85. Despite working as much as 58 hours per week, Lopez was never paid premium overtime compensation. Instead, Defendants paid Lopez the same regular daily rate ($100.00) regardless of the number of hours or days per week that he worked. Vega 86. Vega worked as a painter and drywall finisher at the Serviam Heights Development beginning in the summer of 2016 until on or about December 10, 2017. 87. Vega was paid $130.00 per day, regardless of the number of overtime hours that he worked. 88. Vega alternately worked five and six days per week. On weekdays, he worked from 7:00 a.m. until approximately 5:00 p.m. On Saturdays, he typically worked an eight-hour shift. 89. Despite working as much as 58 hours per week, Vega was never paid premium overtime compensation. Instead, Defendants paid Vega the same regular daily rate ($130.00) regardless of the number of hours or days per week that he worked. Calvo 90. Calvo worked as a painter, sander and drywall finisher at the Serviam Heights Development beginning in or about May 2017 until on or about December 16, 2017. Calvo’s work involved interior finishing work, including painting moldings in interior areas of the Serviam Heights Development and sanding surfaces, including walls. 92. Calvo worked particularly long hours during the last four months of his employment with defendants (i.e., from September 2017 through December 16, 2017). During this period, Calvo worked until as late as 9:00 p.m. 93. Despite Calvo’s workweeks that encompassed more than 40 hours, Calvo was not paid one and one half time his regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. Calvo was paid a fixed daily rate of $140.00 that only compensated him for the first forty hours that he worked per week. Villanueva 94. Villanueva worked as a painter and drywall finisher at the Serviam Heights Development beginning on or about May 7, 2017 until on or about January 1, 2018. 95. During his employment, Villanueva regularly worked six days per week. On weekdays, Villanueva worked twelve hours per day. On Saturdays, Villanueva worked eight hours. Despite these 60-hour-plus workweeks, Villanueva was not paid one and one half time his regular rate for overtime hours. Instead, he was paid at his regular pay rate, with no premium overtime compensation. Correa 96. Correa worked as a painter and drywall finisher at the Serviam Heights Development during the spring of 2017. 97. Correa was paid $100.00 per day, which did not vary even when Correa was required to stay later or work a longer schedule than usual. Illegal Deductions, New York Labor Law, Article 19 § 193 and 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 2.10(a). (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the NYLL/Prevailing Wage Class – Rule 23) 149. Plaintiffs incorporate each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 150. In violation of the New York Labor Law, Article 19, § 193, Defendants unlawfully deducted wages from Plaintiffs and members of the New York Class, including, inter alia, requiring Plaintiffs and similarly situated workers to provide and pay for their own “tools of the trade,” which further reduced their effective, hourly rates of compensation below the required minimum and overtime rates of pay. 151. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiffs seek judgment against Defendants on their own behalf, and on behalf of putative New York Class Members similarly situated for reimbursement of unlawful deductions, as well as liquidated damages, pre-judgment and post- judgment interest, and such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. New York Labor Law – Overtime Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the NYLL/Prevailing Wage Class – Rule 23) 137. Named Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 138. Defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern, policy and practice of violating the NYLL, as detailed in this Complaint. 139. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been employees of Defendants, and Defendants have been employers of Plaintiffs and Class Members within the meaning of the NYLL §§ 650 et seq. and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 140. At all times relevant, Named Plaintiffs and Class Members have been covered by the

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20. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through nineteen (19) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 21. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 22. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about August 18, 2014; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt purportedly owed to Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f and 1692f(8) for using unfair and unconscionable means to collect on an alleged debt, and for sending collection letters to consumers, which reveal information, other than the Defendant’s name and/or address. 23. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that a form collection letter is at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. -5- C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such collection letters (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 24. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 25. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” -6- Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 27. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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1. To enter an Order certifying the proposed Class under Rule 23 and appointing Plaintiffs and the undersigned counsel of record to represent the Class; 12. Law enforcement agencies in North Carolina are obligated to investigate crashes which are reported to them, such as those described below. 13. In conducting crash investigations, law enforcement officers in North Carolina must use a DMV-349 to record their investigations of reportable crashes, as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(33b). 14. When law enforcement officers complete the DMV-349 in connection with a crash investigation, they are obligated to comply with the then-current edition of the Instruction Manual for the DMV-349 (“the Manual”). 16. At the time of the collisions described below, the Manual instructed officers to review the registration information for each vehicle involved in the wreck and to record the name and address of the registered owner of each involved vehicle on the 2. To permanently enjoin each Defendant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2724(b)(4), from: a. Obtaining names and addresses sourced from DMV-349s for purposes of marketing legal services; b. Sending letters marketing legal services to drivers whose names and/or addresses are obtained by Defendants by means of DMV- 349s; and c. Sending letters containing a copy of a completed DMV-349 for the purpose of marketing legal services. 3. To award liquidated damages, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2724(b)(1), to each Plaintiff in the amount of $2,500.00 for instance in which a Defendant knowingly obtained or used that Plaintiff’s protected personal information; 4. To award reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2724(b)(3); 5. To award pre- and post-judgment interest as allowed by law; 53. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of a class defined as follows: a. All natural persons b. residing in North Carolina c. identified on a DMV-349 as either i. a driver whose address is designated on the DMV-349 as matching the address on that person’s driver’s license or ii. a registered owner of a vehicle registered with the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles d. to whom a Defendant named in this action sent a mailing with the words “This is an advertisement for legal services” printed on the outside of the envelope e. within the 4 years preceding the filing of this action through conclusion of this action. 55. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)): Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over the questions affecting only individual members. The common legal and factual questions include: a. Whether Defendants knowingly obtained protected personal information from a motor vehicle record; b. Whether Defendants’ primary purpose in obtaining protected personal information was the marketing of legal services; and c. Whether Defendants violated section 2722(a) of the DPPA by obtaining or disclosing personal information from a motor vehicle record without a permissible purpose under section 2721(b) of the 6. For a trial by jury on all issues so triable; and 60. Defendants knowingly obtained and used one or more Plaintiff’s protected personal information from a motor vehicle record as described above. 61. Each Defendant knowingly obtained and used one or more Plaintiff’s protected personal information from a motor vehicle record for the purpose of marketing that Defendant’s legal services. 62. When each Defendant knowingly obtained and used one or more Plaintiff’s protected personal information, said Defendant lacked Plaintiffs’ express consent as required by the DPPA. 63. When each Defendant sent its above-described mailing containing the words “This is an advertisement for legal services” to one or more Plaintiffs, Defendants knowingly used said Plaintiff’s personal information from a motor vehicle record. 64. Defendants knowingly both obtained and used Plaintiffs’ personal information from a motor vehicle record for the purpose of marketing legal services. 65. Advertising for legal services for the solicitations of new potential clients is not a permissible purpose for obtaining motor vehicle records under the DPPA. Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013). 66. Defendants knowingly both obtained and used Plaintiffs’ personal information from a motor vehicle record in violation of the DPPA. 68. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(4), the Court should enter a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from obtaining or using personal information from motor vehicle records for marketing purposes. Specifically, the Court should enjoin Defendants from: a. Obtaining names and addresses sourced from DMV-349s for purposes of marketing legal services; b. Sending mailings marketing legal services to drivers whose names and/or addresses are obtained by Defendants by means of DMV- 349s; and c. Sending letters containing a copy of a completed DMV-349 for the purpose of marketing legal services. 7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. The DMV-349 Accident Report VIOLATION OF THE DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT (18 U.S.C. § 2721 ET SEQ.)

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(BOAC Aided and Abetted the Bank’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty) (Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Prudent Investing) (Self-Dealing in Violation of the Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and to Avoid Conflicts of Interest) (Unjust Enrichment) (Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 et seq.) 40. Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of Nationwide Class: All persons (and their successors) who are or were beneficiaries of personal trusts whose principal and/or income is or was managed by the Bank as a corporate trustee, and assets of which the Bank invested in Columbia Funds mutual funds at any time from 1998 to the present. 41. Plaintiff also brings this action on her own behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all members of the California Sub-class: All persons (and their successors) who are or were beneficiaries of personal trusts whose principal and/or income is or was managed by the Bank as a corporate trustee in California, and assets of which the Bank invested in Columbia Funds mutual funds at any time from 1998 to the present. This class includes all beneficiaries of personal trusts, like Plaintiff, to whom the Bank disseminated its “California Disclosures to Beneficiaries.” 42. Excluded from each class are Defendants and their subsidiaries, directors, employees, agents, attorneys, accountants, and consultants. 52. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges each of the foregoing paragraphs, as though fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows: 57. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges each of the foregoing paragraphs, as though fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows: 58. At all relevant times the Bank, as the corporate trustee of the affected trust, was in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the class. The Bank’s duties to the beneficiaries of the trusts it administers include all duties imposed by the universally recognized common law of trusts, which are codified and incorporated into California’s Probate Code. These include the highest duty of loyalty known to the law, specifically encompassing, though not limited to, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest with the trust beneficiaries; such conflicts of interest including self-dealing through the trustee’s management of trust assets. 59. By the policies, acts, practices, and omissions alleged above, the Bank breached said fiduciary duties. 60. Defendant’s policy to invest trust account assets in shares of their own proprietary Columbia Funds without regard for the interests of trust account beneficiaries was a breach of the Bank’s fiduciary duties to the Stoody Trust and the Class. 63. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges each of the foregoing paragraphs, as though fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows: 64. BOAC knowingly participated in the development of the Bank’s policy and practice of investing trust accounts in shares of proprietary Columbia Funds; BOAC was aware that this was not in the best interests of the trust account beneficiaries, and BOAC conspired with the Bank to act in a manner intended to benefit the Defendants instead of the beneficiaries. Additionally, BOAC participated in the development of the Bank’s policy and practice of keeping such trust accounts invested in shares of the proprietary Columbia Funds even though BOAC knew that a prudent investor should have instead divested those funds due to poor performance or excessive expense ratios. Further, BOAC intentionally supported these policies and practices in order to grow its proprietary mutual funds complex, the Columbia Funds, by forced selling the funds to the Bank’s trust accounts and employing the accounts as a primary distribution channel for the Columbia Funds. Thus, BOAC actively aided and abetted the Bank’s breach of its fiduciary duties to the Stoody Trust and other members of the Class. 65. As a proximate result of said aiding and abetting of the Bank’s breaches of fiduciary duty, Plaintiff and every class member have sustained damages in an amount to be proven at trial. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff incorporates and realleges each of the foregoing paragraphs, as though fully set forth herein and further alleges on behalf of the California Sub-class as follows: 70. Defendants are subject to section 17200 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code (“section 17200"), which provides that “unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful…business act. . . .” 71. By their policies, practices and other alleged abuse, Defendants have violated the common law, including the common law of trusts, and numerous statutes as well as federal banking regulations commonly known as Regulation 9. Said acts and practices of Defendants constitute unlawful business practices in violation of section 17200. 72. Pursuant to sections 17203 and 17204 of the Business and Professions Code, Defendants should be enjoined from continuing their violations of section 17200, and should be ordered to provide complete restitution of all overcharges and disgorgement of all profits and benefits derived there from. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.

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21. Tidal was originally launched in 2014 as a high fidelity music-streaming platform by a company named Aspiro. 22. Soon thereafter, Project Panther BidCo Ltd., a holding company created by Defendant SCE (which is controlled by Jay Z) acquired Aspiro.6 50. Plaintiff Baker-Rhett is a fan of Defendant Kanye West’s music. 64. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 65. Defendants engaged in advertising and marketing to consumers throughout the United States, including in California, that encouraged them to subscribe to Tidal by promising them that The Life of Pablo album would be exclusive to its music-streaming service. 66. Specifically, Mr. West—via his Twitter account—represented to his fans and the public at large that the album would only be available through the Tidal platform. Mr. West made this representation knowing that various media outlets would ensure it was broadcast to consumers the world over—in particular, consumers of his music. Moreover, SCE and Mr. West also represented to consumers that Tidal would be the exclusive method of listening to the album via Tidal’s Twitter feed and other representations made by Tidal. SCE then failed to correct any statements made by Mr. West, or otherwise indicate that the album would not be a permanent exclusive on Tidal. 67. Defendants did so with the intent to induce Plaintiff and the California Subclass members to subscribe to Tidal’s streaming platform. 68. Despite their public advertising and marketing statements that The Life of Pablo would only be available via the Tidal music-streaming platform, The Life of Pablo was not a Tidal only exclusive (nor did Defendants intend it to be). 75. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 76. California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., protects both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services. 77. The UCL prohibits any unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business acts or practices. A business practice need only meet one of these three criteria to be considered unfair competition. 87. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 88. To induce Plaintiff and the Class into subscribing to Tidal’s music streaming service, Mr. West and SCE affirmatively and intentionally misrepresented, made false statements about, and/or omitted facts about the different mediums through which The Life of Pablo would be available. 96. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein, excluding paragraphs 60-91. 97. Defendants have knowingly received and retained benefits from Plaintiff Baker- Rhett and the Class through a fraudulent scheme that would render it unjust to allow them to retain such benefits. Specifically, Defendants have received and retained Plaintiff Baker-Rhett and the Class members’ money, personal information, credit card information, and social media account details, which Plaintiff Baker-Rhett and the Class members submitted under false pretenses because of the misrepresentation that The Life of Pablo would be available exclusively through Tidal. Fraudulent Inducement (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) The Tidal Music Service Unjust Enrichment In the Alternative to Counts 1-3 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of California’s False Advertising Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Subclass) Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Subclass)

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13. Slice markets to consumers using the names of the pizzerias in its network, and encourages consumers to place orders to these local pizzeria through the Slice app or website. 15. The pizzerias that join Slice’s network do not maintain control or ownership over the VOIP phone number that Slice assigns to them, and do not initiate the pre-recorded calls to consumers. 16. The pre-recorded solicitation calls from Slice advertise the benefits of Slice, encouraging the recipient of the prerecorded phone call to download and place an order using the Slice app. 17. If a consumer places an order using the Slice app, Slice earns $1.95 for that, and each subsequent order. 18. When a consumer calls back a Slice VOIP phone number that they were called on, such as 708-572-3368, they hear a prerecorded message that offers an incentive to place an order using the Slice app, and that offers to send a text message to consumers’ cellular phones with a link to the Slice app. The message states: “…to save $3 by ordering on the Slice app, press ‘1’ and we’ll send you a text message with your code. To continue to order by phone, please press ‘2.’” 19. If a consumer presses “1,” they receive the following text message: 20. The URL in the text message from Slice leads to https://slicelife.com/?shortlink=IVR&pid=Twilio&c=IVR_app_upsell. From this URL, a consumer can download the Slice app, or order pizza from Slice’s website. 22. On March 4, 2019 at 11:24 AM, Plaintiff Nikrothanond received a prerecorded call from Defendant using phone number 708-572-3368. 23. The prerecorded message that Plaintiff heard solicited Plaintiff to order food through Slice. 24. Prior to receiving the message, Plaintiff had not heard of Slice and had never downloaded the Slice app. 25. Phone number 708-572-3368 is the number Slice assigned to Al’s Pizzeria.5 26. Plaintiff has never ordered pizza from Al’s Pizzeria or any other pizzeria through Slice, and has never provided his prior written express to Al Pizzeria or to Slice to receive pre- recorded calls. 27. Seeking redress for these injuries, Nikrothanond, on behalf of himself and a Class of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits prerecorded telephone calls to consumer telephones. 29. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 30. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Class such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 31. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant placed calls using a prerecorded message to Plaintiff and the members of the Class; (b) whether Defendant placed calls using a prerecorded message to Plaintiff and members of the Class without first obtaining prior express written consent to make the calls; (c) whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; and (d) whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct. 33. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant’s business practices apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 34. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 33 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 35. Defendant and/or its agents made unwanted telephone calls to telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using a prerecorded message. 36. These telephone calls were made en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class to receive such telephone calls. 38. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class are each entitled to between $500 and $1,500 for each and every call. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claim Slice Places Pre-recorded Solicitation Calls to Consumers Without Proper Consent Slice Called Plaintiff Using a Prerecorded Message Without Plaintiff’s Consent Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Prerecorded No Consent Class)

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a clothing company that owns and operates www.lurkingclass.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in January of 2021, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.lurkingclass.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to -8- differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. -9- 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to -10- visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website -11- on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website -12- and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. -13- 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). -14- 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class -15- of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). -16- 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. -17- 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the -18- products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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19. INCR provides Phase I to Phase IV clinical development services to pharmaceutical, biotechnology and medical device companies. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period 30. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class, consisting of all persons and entities that acquired INCR securities between May 10, 2017, and November 9, 2017, inclusive, and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 31. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, INCR’s common stock actively traded on the NASDAQ. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are at least hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Millions of INCR shares were traded publicly during the Class Period on the NASDAQ. As of November 2, 2017, INCR had 104,344,972 shares of common stock outstanding. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by INCR or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. 36. The market for INCR’s securities was open, well-developed and efficient at all relevant times. As a result of these materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failures to disclose, INCR’s securities traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired INCR’s securities relying upon the integrity of the market price of the Company’s securities and market information relating to INCR, and have been damaged thereby. 48. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 49. During the Class Period, Defendants carried out a plan, scheme and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (ii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase INCR’s securities at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, Defendants, and each defendant, took the actions set forth herein. 59. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 60. Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of INCR within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their high-level positions and their ownership and contractual rights, participation in, and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and intimate knowledge of the false financial statements filed by the Company with the SEC and disseminated to the investing public, Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements which Plaintiff contends are false and misleading. Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Company’s reports, press releases, public filings, and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 61. In particular, Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. Background Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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12. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer class (the “Class”):  All New York consumers who received a collection letter from the Defendant attempting to collect an obligation owed to or allegedly owed to Santander Bank, N.A. (“Santander”), that contain the alleged violation arising from Defendant's violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692g and 1692e, et seq.  The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 13. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action:  Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from Defendant that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that is sent to hundreds of persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy);  There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; 4 c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories.  Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class.  A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action.  A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as 5 monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed to proceed without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains.  Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 14. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “13” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 15. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 16. Upon information and belief, within the last year Defendant commenced efforts to collect an alleged consumer “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5), when it mailed a Collection Letter to Plaintiff seeking to collect an unpaid balance allegedly owed to Santander. 17. On or around July 11, 2016, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter. See Exhibit A. 18. The letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 19. The letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 20. The letter concerns a debt that was incurred on a credit card. 21. The credit card accrued interest. 22. The credit card accrued late fees. 23. Defendant failed to advise Plaintiff whether or not such fees were continuing to accrue. 6 24. As a result, Plaintiff and the least sophisticated consumer were left in the dark as to the amount due and owing in violation of §1692g. 25. Congress adopted the debt validation provisions of section 1692g to guarantee that consumers would receive adequate notice of their rights under the FDCPA. Wilson, 225 F.3d at 354, citing Miller v. Payco–General Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir.1991). 26. The rights afforded to consumers under Section 1692g(a) are amongst the most powerful protections provided by the FDCPA. 27. Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA created the risk of real harm that Plaintiff would make payment only to be contacted again later due to other charges that may have accrued between the date of the letter and the date payment was made. 28. Defendant’s actions as described herein are part of a pattern and practice used to collect consumer debts. 29. Defendants could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 30. On information and belief, Defendants sent a written communication, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the State of New York within one year of the date of this Complaint. First Count Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g Failure to Adequately Convey the Amount of the Debt 31. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “30” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 7 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 33. One such requirement is that the debt collector provide “the amount of the debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 34. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the amount of the debt, but also to convey such clearly. 35. Defendant’s letters to Plaintiff sets forth a “Balance” of $856.64. 36. Defendant’s letters fail to disclose whether the balance may increase due to interest and fees. 37. The least sophisticated consumer would be confused as to how she could satisfy the debt. 38. The least sophisticated consumer might believe she could pay the debt in full by remitting the sum stated in the letter at any time after he received the letter. 39. Such a belief may or may not be correct, as Defendant has failed to disclose whether the balance may increase due to interest and fees. 40. If interest continues to accrue after the date of the letter, the least sophisticated consumer would not know how to satisfy the debt because the Defendant has failed to indicate the applicable interest rate. 41. Conversely, the least sophisticated consumer might believe she may pay the debt in full by remitting the sum stated in the letter at any time after the date of the letter. 42. Defendant failed to clearly state the amount of the debt. 43. Because of this failure, the least sophisticated consumer would likely be confused as to the amount of the debt. 8 44. Because of this failure, the least sophisticated consumer would likely be uncertain as to the amount of the debt. 45. Defendant has violated the FDCPA because the letter fails to disclose whether the balance may increase due to interest and fees. 46. Defendant has violated § 1692g as it failed to clearly, explicitly and unambiguously convey the amount of the debt. 47. Nor has Defendant provided the safe harbor language adopted by the Second Circuit.1 48. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Second Count 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. False or Misleading Representations as to Status of Debt 49. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “48” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 50. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector is prohibited from using false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the collection of a debt. 51. The said letter stated in pertinent part as follows: “Interest “$0.00” 52. The said letter also stated in pertinent part: “Costs $0.00.” 53. Defendant did not have any legal basis for adding “Costs $0.00” onto Plaintiff's alleged debt. 1 Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, Nos. 15-1584(L), 15- 1597(Con), 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5327, at *8 (2d Cir. Mar. 22, 2016) ("The district court also expressed a concern that requiring debt collectors to disclose this information might lead to more abusive practices, as debt collectors could use the threat of interest and fees to coerce consumers into paying their debts. This is a legitimate concern. To alleviate it, we adopt the "safe harbor" approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000)...The court[in Miller] held that a debt collector who used this form would not violate the [FDCPA], "provided, of course, that the information [the debt collector] furnishes is accurate.") (emphasis added). 9 54. The least sophisticated consumer could be led to believe that although there is no collection fee at the time he received the said letter, he may be liable to such a fee in the future. 55. The said letter language implies a threat, and is confusing to the least sophisticated consumer so as to falsely imply that the creditor is entitled to receive a collection fee. 56. Defendant was not entitled to impose a collection fee as a permissible fee that a creditor may charge in connection with a consumer credit transaction. Tylke v. Diversified Adjustment Service, Inc., No. 14-CV-748 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2014). ([I]t is possible that, as the defendant suggests, an "unsophisticated consumer" might understand the statement to be explaining that no part of the debt is a "collection fee" even though the (creditor’s) agreement allows for one. On the other hand, it is also possible that an "unsophisticated consumer" would interpret the statement to mean that there is no "collection fee" now but that one could be assessed later on. In other words, the inclusion of a collection fee, even one showing a balance of zero, could imply the future possibility of one. Such a reading is neither bizarre nor idiosyncratic.) 57. Said language can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is false. Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1989). (Because the collection notice was reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading, it was deceptive within the meaning of the Act.), Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993). (Collection notices are deceptive if they are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.), Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1996). (A collection notice is deceptive when it can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. The fact that the notice's terminology was vague or uncertain will not prevent it from being held deceptive under § 1692e(10) of the Act.) 10 58. Defendant, as a matter of pattern and practice, mails letters, or causes the mailing of letters, to debtors using language substantially similar or materially identical to that utilized by Defendant in mailing the above-cited letter to Plaintiff. 59. The letters Defendant mails, or causes to be mailed, are produced by Defendant's concerted efforts and integrated or shared technologies including computer programs, mailing houses, and electronic databases. 60. The said letter is a standardized form letter. 61. Defendant's July 11, 2016 letter is in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5) 1692e(10), 1692f and 1692f(1) for the use of false and deceptive means; for falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of a debt; for the false representation of compensation which may be lawfully received by a debt collector for the collection of a debt; for threatening to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken; for the use of unfair and unconscionable means to collect on a debt; and for attempting to collect an amount unless such an amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 62. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Third Count 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. Validation of Debts 63. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “62” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 11 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 65. One such request is that the debt collector provide “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 66. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, but also to convey such clearly. 67. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, but also to state such explicitly. 68. Merely naming the creditor without specifically identifying the entity as the current creditor to whom the debt is owed is not sufficient to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 69. Even if a debt collector conveys the required information, the debt collector nonetheless violates the FDCPA if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty. 70. When determining whether the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed has been conveyed clearly, an objective standard, measured by how the “least sophisticated consumer” would interpret the notice, is applied. 71. Defendant's letter fails to explicitly identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 72. Defendant’s July 11, 2016 letter to Plaintiff fails to identify any creditor to whom the debt is owed. 73. Indeed, Defendant’s letter fails to identify any entity or individual as a “creditor.” 74. Defendant’s letter merely states, “Re: Santander Bank, N.A., formerly Sovereign Bank, N.A.” 12 75. The letter fails to indicate whether the “Re:” refers to Plaintiff’s creditor. 76. The letter fails to indicate whether the “Re:” refers to the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 77. The letter fails to indicate whether the “Re:” refers to the original creditor or the current creditor to whom the debt is owed. 78. Defendant’s letter states, “The above referenced account has been referred to our offices for collection.” 79. The letter fails to indicate who referred the account to Defendant. 80. Defendant failed to clearly state the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 81. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be confused as to the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 82. Defendant has violated § 1692g as it failed to clearly and explicitly convey the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 83. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law.

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. 23. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the four proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 8. Beginning in or around June of 2015, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -6147, -7887, -7470, -3803, and -1080 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers belonging to Defendant, including but not limited to (954) 522-4835; (305) 974-1399; (954) 510-7735. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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39. Representative Plaintiffs Brazile, Mote, and Motes bring this action against Defendant PRCA under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all members of the following Class (collectively, the “Class”): “All present and future professional rodeo athletes who are or will be an officer, board member, employee of ERA or have or will have an ownership or financial interest of any form in ERA.” 42. By engaging in this unlawful conduct, PRCA has acted and/or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to representative Plaintiffs Brazile, Mote, Motes, and all members of the Class. Temporary and final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief, therefore, is appropriate respecting the Class as a whole 43. The claims of representative Plaintiffs Brazile, Mote, and Motes are typical of the claims of all members of the Class and these representative Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Representative Plaintiffs Brazile, Mote, and Motes as well as other members of the Class have been injured by the same unlawful and anticompetitive conduct engaged in by the PRCA. Representative Plaintiffs Brazile, Mote, and Motes’ interests are consistent with, and not antagonistic to, those of the other members of the Class. 44. Representative Plaintiffs are represented by counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action and antitrust litigation against sports organizations. 45. Representative Plaintiffs Brazile, Mote, and Motes will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 46. The Class is readily definable.

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11. TracFone is a provider of cellular telephones and cellular telephone services. 12. According to TracFone’s User Agreement, through its SafeLink brand, Defendant purports to offer those who meet certain income-based eligibility requirements a cellular telephone provided by TracFone together with a certain allotment of airtime minutes each month, 4 for up to one year. However, units are deducted from a customer’s account for incoming and outgoing calls. Once a customer reaches the free monthly allotment of airtime, he must purchase additional airtime in order for the phone to remain functioning.1 13. Unfortunately for consumers, Defendant utilized, and continues to utilize, a sophisticated telephone dialing system to call telephone users, en masse, to promote its services and products, often times placing calls to consumers on their cellular telephones. 14. Worse yet, Defendant calls these consumers using a pre-recorded message known as a “robo-call” to initiate such solicitations. Though inexpensive for Defendant to conduct, these calls violate the privacy of Defendant’s costumers. 15. In Defendant’s overzealous marketing attempts, it placed, and continues to place, phone calls to consumers that never provided prior express written consent to be called, and to consumers with whom Defendant had no prior dealings or relationship. 16. Defendant seeks to generate leads for its cellular telephone service, but fails to appropriately segment its call list between landline and cell phone numbers, causing Defendant to call cell phone numbers with its auto-dialer and using a pre-recorded message, which is expressly prohibited by the TCPA. 17. Defendant further violates the TCPA by making robo-calls to residential landline telephones without first securing prior express consent. 18. Defendant, and/or agents acting on its behalf, use a variety of phone numbers to make these unlawful sales calls to consumers, including (845) 207-3692. 19. Not surprisingly, Defendant’s practices have led to numerous complaints from consumers, including complaints from people who, like Plaintiff, received pre-recorded calls 1 https://www.safelinkwireless.com/Enrollment/Safelink/en/NewPublic/terms_conditions.htm 5 from (845) 207-3692: “Call today from a number I didn’t recognize. Didn’t answer and there was no message.” (Ken, Jan. 13, 2016)2 “Call from this number, dead air on message.” (Guy, Jan. 26, 2016)3 “Call from this number answered & it was dead air.” (Gail, Jan. 29, 2016)4 “Called today. Did not answer and they left no message. Now on my block list.” (Buddy Lats, Feb. 3, 2016)5 “Scam to get ur info to send a fake phone” (Tina, Feb. 24, 2016)6 20. Defendant knowingly made, and continues to make, telemarketing calls without the prior express consent of the call recipients and knowingly continues to call them after requests to for the calls to stop. As such, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Classes, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the 21. On February 15, 2016, Plaintiff Bloch received a telephone call from Defendant or its agent on his cellular telephone from (845) 207-3692. When Plaintiff answered, he heard a pre-recorded robo-call message that stated that he could receive a cell phone at little to no cost. 22. Plaintiff estimates that he has received at least two calls per week from Defendant, all with the same pre-recorded robo-call message, in the past several months. 23. On March 10, 2016, Plaintiff received the same pre-recorded call from Defendant on his residential landline from 718-332-6421. 24. Bloch did not provide his cellular or landline telephone number to Defendant or any of its agents, so therefore did not and could not provide any form of consent to be called by 2 http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-845-207-3692 3 http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-845-207-3692 4 http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-845-207-3692 5 http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-845-207-3692 6 http://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-845-207-3692 6 Defendant or its agents. 25. As a result of Defendant’s intrusive calls, which adversely affected Bloch’s right to privacy and interfered with his use of his phones, Bloch has suffered cognizable harm in the form of monies paid to his wireless carrier and landline carrier. 26. Defendant was, and is, aware that the above-described telephone calls were being made either by Defendant directly, or made on its behalf, and that the telephone calls were being made to non-consenting consumers. 27. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and the Classes of similarly situated individuals defined as follows: Robo-call Cell Class: All persons in the United States who (1) from the last four years through the present, (2) received one or more telephone calls from Defendant (or a third-party acting on Defendant’s behalf) on their cellular telephones, (3) that featured an artificial or pre-recorded voice, and (4) for whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to call Plaintiff. Autodialed Cell Class: All persons in the United States who (1) from the last four years through the present, (2) Defendant (or a third-party acting on Defendant’s behalf) called on the person’s cellular telephone number using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to call Plaintiff. Robo-call Landline Class: All persons in the United States who (1) from the last four years through the present, (2) received one or more telephone calls from Defendant (or a third-party acting on Defendant’s behalf) on their residential landline telephone, (3) that featured an artificial or pre-recorded voice, and (4) for whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to call Plaintiff. The following people are excluded from the Classes: 1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; 2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, 7 parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; 3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; 4) the legal representatives, successors, or assigns of any such excluded persons; and 5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 28. Numerosity: The exact number of the Classes is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant has made telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Classes. Members of the Classes can be identified and class membership can be ascertained objectively through Defendant’s records. 29. Commonality: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Classes, and those questions go to the heart of the case and predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. Common questions for the Classes include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant’s conduct violated the TCPA; (b) whether Defendant and/or its agents made calls featuring an artificial or pre-recorded voice to residential landline and wireless telephone numbers; (c) whether Defendant and/or its agents systematically made phone calls to persons who did not previously provide Defendant and/or its agents with their prior express written consent to receive such phone calls; (d) whether Defendant used an ATDS to call cellphone numbers; and 8 (e) whether Class members are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct. 30. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Classes, in that Plaintiff and the members of the Classes sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. 31. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 32. Conduct Applicable to the Classes as Wholes: TracFone’s conduct as described herein was generally the same as applied to the Classes as respective wholes. TracFone called everyone using an artificial or pre-recorded voice, and called wireless telephone numbers using and ATDS. Final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief is necessary and appropriate to ensure consistent adjudications. 33. Common Issues Predominate: The common issues of fact and law in this case are go to the heart of and drive the litigation and predominate over any supposed individualized issues affecting any each class member. The claims in this case may be adjudicated using common evidence. 34. Superiority & Manageability: This case is also appropriate for class certification because a class proceeding is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy due to the impracticality of joinder of all parties. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by 9 Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Classes to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members of the Classes could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action proceeding because individual litigation of the complex legal and factual controversies in this Complaint would increase the delay and expense to all parties. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be also fostered, and uniformity of decisions rendered will be ensured. 35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 36. Defendant and/or its agents made unsolicited and unwanted telephone calls to the cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Robo-call Cell Class without their prior express consent for the purpose of soliciting its cellular telephone service. 37. Defendant and/or its agents made unsolicited telemarketing calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Robo-call Cell Class using a prerecorded or artificial voice, more commonly referred to as a “robo-call.” 38. The Defendant’s calls promoted Defendant’s good or services. 39. By making, or having made on its behalf, unsolicited robo-calls utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice to Plaintiff’s and the Robo-call Cell Class’s telephones without prior express written consent, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of 10 Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Robo-call Cell Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive unsolicited calls and, under section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each violation of the TCPA. 40. In the event that the Court determine that Defendant’s misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Robo-call Cell Class. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 42. Defendant made unsolicited telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed Cell Class without their prior express written consent to receive such calls. 43. Defendant made, or had made on its behalf, such telephone calls using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. 44. Defendant, and/or its agents, utilized equipment that made such telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Autodialed Cell Class simultaneously and without human intervention. The telephone dialing equipment utilized by Defendant, also known as a “predictive dialer,” dialed numbers from a list, or dialed numbers from a database of telephone numbers, in an automatic and systematic manner. 45. By making, or having made on its behalf, the unsolicited telephone calls to 11 Plaintiff’s and the Autodialed Cell Class’s cellular telephones without prior written express consent, and by utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system, Defendant has violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 46. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Autodialed Cell Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones, and under section 227(b)(3)(B) are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 47. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the autodialed Class. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 49. Defendant and/or its agents made unsolicited and unwanted telephone calls to the residential landline telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Robo- call Landline Class without their prior written express consent for the commercial purpose of soliciting its cellular telephone service. 50. Defendant and/or its agents made unsolicited telephone calls to residential telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Robo-call Landline Class using a prerecorded or artificial voice, more commonly referred to as a “robo-call.” 51. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) makes it unlawful “to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the 12 prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes or is exempted by rule or order by the Commission under paragraph (2)(B)”. 52. By making, or having made on its behalf, unsolicited robo-calls to Plaintiff’s and the Robo-call Landline Class’s residential telephone lines without prior express written consent, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). 53. Moreover, Defendant’s calls are not made for emergency purposes and are not exempted by rule or order under paragraph (2)(B) of the Act. 54. As a result of Defendant’s illegal conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Robo-call Landline Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive unsolicited calls and, under section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each violation of the TCPA. 55. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Robo-call Landline Class) Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed Cell Class) Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Robo-call Cell Class)

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1. Certify the proposed Classes under Federal Rule of Procedure 23 and appoint Ms. Munroe and her counsel to represent the Classes; 10. Award the FCRA Class costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3); and 11. Grant such other further relief as is necessary and proper. Jury Demand Plaintiff demands a trial by jury, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for all issues triable of right by a jury. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Charles M. Delbaum Charles M. Delbaum (BBO #543225) Persis Yu (BBO #685951) National Consumer Law Center 7 Winthrop Square, 4th Floor Boston, MA 02110 (617) 542-8010 tel. (617) 542-8028 fax cdelbaum@nclc.org pyu@nclc.org Elizabeth Ryan (BBO # 549632) John Roddy (BBO # 424240) Bailey & Glasser LLP 176 Federal Street, 5th Floor Boston, MA 02110 (617) 439-6730 tel. (617) 951-3954 fax eryan@baileyglasser.com jroddy@baileyglasser.com Michael Murphy* Bailey & Glasser LLP 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW Suite 540 Washington, DC 20007 (202) 463-2101 tel. (202) 463-2103 fax mmurphy@baileyglasser.com 2. Find that Radius violated Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A, § 2; 3. Enter judgment in favor of Ms. Munroe and the Chapter 93A Class and against Radius for the (i) greater of twenty-five dollars per class member or actual damages equal to all amounts improperly collected by Radius within the applicable statutory period that have not yet been reimbursed; and (ii) up to three but not less than two times the amount specified in (i) if the Court finds that Radius’s conduct was willful or knowing; 33. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A, § 2(a) prohibits any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” 34. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93, § 49 further provides that it is a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A to attempt to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes “in an unfair, deceptive or unreasonable manner.” 35. 940 Mass. Code Regs. 7.07(2) further provides that it is a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A to attempt to collect any debt by engaging in “[a]ny knowingly false or misleading representation in any communication as to the character, extent or amount of the debt.” 36. 940 Mass. Code Regs. 7.07(2) further provides that it is a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A to attempt to collect any debt by engaging in “[a]ny false, deceptive, or misleading representation, communication, or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 37. 940 Mass. Code Regs. 3.16(4) further provides that a violation of the FDCPA constitutes a violation of c. 93A. 38. Radius pursued collection activities against Chapter 93A Class members despite the fact that they had previously settled and paid their debts in full and did not owe anything on the accounts on which Radius attempted to collect. 39. To initiate said collection against class members, Radius falsely represented the amount of the Chapter 93A Class members’ debt. 4. Award the Chapter 93A Class costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A §9; 40. Therefore, Radius violated Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A, § 2(a) by falsely representing the amount of the Chapter 93A Class members’ debt in connection with the collection of those alleged debts and by violating the FDCPA, as alleged below in Count II. 41. In addition, the above described actions violate Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A, § 2(a) because they constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce. 42. Because Radius does not maintain a place of business or keep assets within Massachusetts, a 30-day demand letter is not required as a prerequisite for asserting a violation of c. 93A. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A, § 9(3). 43. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides that a debt collector may not use “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 44. Section 1692e(2)(A) further provides that it is a violation to make a “false representation of . . . the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” 45. Section 1692e(10) further provides that it is a violation to “use any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 46. Ms. Munroe is a “consumer” as that term is defined in section 1692a(3) because she is a natural person allegedly obligated to pay the student loan debt Radius sought to collect. 47. Private student loans are “debts” as that term is defined in section 1692a(5) because they are obligations by a consumer, in this case Ms. Munroe and class members, to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money is used for a personal, family, or household purpose, in this case higher education intended for personal growth. 48. Radius pursued collection activities against the FDCPA Class members despite the fact that they had previously settled and paid their debts in full and owed nothing on the accounts on which Radius attempted to collect. 49. Therefore, Radius violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10)(A) by falsely representing the amount of the FDCPA Class members’ debt to them in connection with the collection of their alleged debts. 5. Find that Radius violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f; 50. In addition, the above described actions violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e because they constitute false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means to collect alleged debt. 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 52. Section 1692f(1) further provides that it is a violation to collect any amount “unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 53. Radius was not permitted to collect any amount on the FDCPA Class members’ loan agreements because the debt balances that allegedly remained in the accounts were settled and paid according to the terms of the settlement agreements and payments made pursuant thereto. 54. Radius delivered collection notices to the FDCPA Class members in an attempt to collect alleged debts on accounts that had already been settled and paid. 55. Therefore, Radius violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by attempting to collect on debts where it was not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 56. In addition, the above described actions violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692f because they are unfair and unconscionable means to collect allegedly defaulted student loan debt. 57. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f) prohibits a “person” from using or obtaining a consumer report without a permissible purpose. 58. Radius is a “person” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b) because Radius is a “partnership, corporation, . . . or other entity.” 59. Ms. Munroe and the FCRA Class members are “consumers” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c) because they are individuals. 6. Enter judgment in favor of Ms. Munroe and the FDCPA Class and against Radius for the (i) actual damages equal to all amounts improperly collected by Radius within the applicable statutory period that have not yet been reimbursed; and (ii) maximum amount of statutory damages provided under 15 U.S.C § 1692k; 60. The report on Ms. Munroe obtained by Radius on January 5, 2020 is a consumer report as that term is defined by FCRA section 1681a(d)(1) because it included “information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness.” 61. Section 1681b(a)(3)(A) does not permit debt collectors like Radius to obtain an individual’s consumer report in the furtherance of collection activity when the individual does not owe the alleged debt that the collector seeks to collect. 62. Radius was in possession of records from which it knew or could readily have determined that Ms. Munroe and the other individuals whose consumer reports it obtained had paid off the debt by settlement. 63. Radius obtained a consumer report on Ms. Munroe and other FCRA Class members in reckless disregard of the fact that the FCRA Class members did not owe a debt to Radius or a creditor with whom Radius contracts for collection services. 64. None of the permissible purposes to use or obtain a consumer report described in section 1681b(a) permitted Radius to obtain Ms. Munroe’s or the consumer report of the other FCRA Class members. 65. Obtaining a consumer report without a permissible purpose constitutes an invasion of a legally protected interest in the confidentiality of the consumer’s sensitive personal information. 66. Therefore, Radius willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f) by obtaining Ms. Munroe’s and other FCRA Class members’ consumer reports without a permissible purpose. Prayer for Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court: 7. Award the FDCPA Class costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 8. Find that Radius willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f); 9. Enter judgment in favor of Ms. Munroe and the FCRA Class and against Radius for (i) the maximum amount of statutory damages provided under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A); and (ii) maximum amount of punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2); THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b IMPERMISSIBLY OBTAINING CONSUMER REPORTS THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e FALSE OR MISLEADING REPRESENTATIONS THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f UNFAIR PRACTICES THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A, § 2(a) UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES

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36. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following class: All persons or entities in the United States who made retail purchases of Products during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate (“the Nationwide Class”). 37. In the alternative, Plaintiff JOSLIN seeks to represent a class consisting of: All persons or entities who made retail purchases of the Products in California during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate (“the California Class”). 38. Also in the alternative, Plaintiff DAVIS seeks to represent a class consisting of: All persons or entities who made retail purchases of the Products in New York during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate (“the New York Class”). 50. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further allege as follows: 51. Plaintiffs brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Nationwide Class for Defendant’s violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq., including § 1761(d). 52. Alternatively, should the Court not certify Plaintiffs’ proposed Nationwide Class, Plaintiff JOSLIN brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the California Class for Defendant’s violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq., including § 1761(d). 53. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class and California Class are consumers who purchased the Products for personal, family or household purposes. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class and California Class are “consumers” as that term is defined by the CLRA in Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d). Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Class and California Class are not sophisticated experts with independent knowledge of corporate branding, labeling and marketing practices. 62. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further allege as follows: 63. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Nationwide Class for Defendant’s violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. 72. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further allege as follows: 73. Plaintiffs brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Nationwide Class for Defendant’s violations of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq. 74. Alternatively, should the Court not certify Plaintiffs’ proposed Nationwide Class, Plaintiff JOSLIN brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the California Class for Defendant’s violations of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq. 75. Under the FAL, the State of California makes it “unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public in this state, … in any advertising device … or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement, concerning … personal property or services, professional or otherwise, or performance or disposition thereof, which is untrue or misleading and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” 81. Plaintiff DAVIS realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 82. Plaintiff DAVIS brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the New York Class for an injunction for violations of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices Law, General Business Law (“NY GBL”) § 349. 83. NY GBL § 349 provides that “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state are . . . unlawful.” 84. Under the New York Gen. Bus. Code § 349, it is not necessary to prove justifiable reliance. (“To the extent that the Appellate Division order imposed a reliance requirement on General Business Law [§] 349 . . . claims, it was error. Justifiable reliance by the plaintiff is not an element of the statutory claim.” Koch v. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co., 18 N.Y.3d 940, 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (internal citations omitted)). 91. Plaintiff DAVIS realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 98. This claim is brought on behalf of Plaintiff DAVIS and members of the New York Class against Defendant. DAMAGES AND INJUCTIVE RELIEF FOR VIOLATIONS OF NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §§ 350 AND 350-a(1) (FALSE ADVERTISING) (brought individually and on behalf of the New York Class) DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW YORK DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (New York General Business Law § 349) (Brought Individually and on Behalf of the New York Class) Defendant’s Products Do Not Contain Real White Chocolate INJUNCTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW YORK DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (New York General Business Law § 349) (Brought Individually and on Behalf of the New York Class) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, (California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq.) (brought individually and on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws of the other states and the District of Columbia to the extent California law is inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the California Class). VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S CONSUMER LEGAL REMEDIES ACT, (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.) (brought individually and on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws of the other states and the District of Columbia to the extent California law is inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the California Class) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S FALSE ADVERTISING LAW, (California Business & Professions Code § 17500, et seq.) (Brought Individually and on behalf of the Nationwide Class, in conjunction with the substantively similar consumer protection laws of the other states and the District of Columbia to the extent California law is inapplicable to out-of-state Class members, or, in the alternative, on behalf of the California Class).

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16. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference. paragraphs one (I) through fifteen ( 15) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 17. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 18. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about May 23, 2013: and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt purportedly owed to PayPal. Inc.: and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered: (c} and the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(5) and 1692e( I 0) for false threats of deceptive actions. 19. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. a class action 1s appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that a form collection letter is at the heart of this litigation. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. -3- ; B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defondant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such collection letters, (i.e. the class members). a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members· interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiffs interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. :rn. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members· claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U .S.C. § l 692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals. whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 21. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Ruic 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. -4- 22. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer ... Violations of the Fair Debt Collectio11 Practices Act 23. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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ALLEGATIONS 13. On a date or dates unknown to Plaintiff, Plaintiff incurred a financial obligation, namely a consumer credit account issued by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (hereinafter “the debt”). The debt was incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes (e.g. purchase of clothing, groceries, gasoline, etc.) and is therefore a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 14. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that sometime after she defaulted on her consumer credit account with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the defaulted debt was sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., to PORTFOLIO, either directly or through a series of intermediate assignees. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., retained no interest in Plaintiff’s defaulted account after the sale, assignment, and transfer of the debt to PORTFOLIO. 15. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that sometime thereafter on a date unknown to her, the debt was consigned, placed, or otherwise assigned to H&H by PORTFOLIO for the purposes of collection from Plaintiff. 16. On or about November 22, 2010, Defendants filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff in the Superior Court of California, San Mateo County captioned Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Julia Meza, Case No. CLJ500834 (hereinafter the “state court action”) which sought to collect the defaulted consumer debt from Plaintiff. 17. Thereafter, on or about April 11, 2014, Defendants sent a document titled Declaration of Plaintiff in Lieu of Personal Testimony at Trial (CCP § 98) directly to Plaintiff. A true and accurate copy of the Declaration of Plaintiff in Lieu of Personal Testimony at Trial (CCP § 98) is attached hereto, marked Exhibit “1,” and by this reference is incorporated herein. - 6 - 31. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32. Plaintiff tentatively defines the class as (i) all persons residing in California (ii) who were served by Defendants with a Declaration in Lieu of Personal Testimony at Trial, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 98 (iii) where the declarant was located more than 150 miles from the courthouse where the collection lawsuit was pending (iv) in an attempt to collect a past due account alleged to be due PORTFOLIO (v) regarding a debt incurred for personal, family, or household - 9 -

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88.Title XIX of the Social Security Act establishes the federal-state Medicaid program. See 42 U.S.C. §§1396–1396w-5. The purpose of Medicaid is to furnish, as far as practicable, “medical assistance on behalf of . . . aged, blind or disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services” and “to help such families and individuals to attain or retain​ ​capability​ ​for​ ​independence​ ​or​ ​self-care.”​ ​42​ ​U.S.C.​ ​§1396-1. 89.Participation in the Medicaid program by states is voluntary. If a state elects to participate in the Medicaid program, it must “comply with detailed federally mandated standards.” ​Antrican v. Odom​, 290 F.3d 178, 183 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002). Participating states are reimbursed by the federal government for a majority of the costs​ ​of​ ​Medicaid​ ​benefits.​ ​See​ ​42​ ​U.S.C.​ ​§​ ​1396b. 90.Participating states must designate a “single state agency” to administer the Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5). Oklahoma has elected to participate in Medicaid, and the state has designated the Oklahoma Health Care Authority I: VIOLATION OF

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19. The Class Period begins on May 12, 2014. On that day, Kandi filed with the SEC its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2014, providing the Company’s consolidated financial results for that period. 20. The Company’s May 12, 2014 10-Q also summarized the Company’s investment in the JV Company: 50. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class of all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Kandi securities between May 12, 2014 through March 13, 2017, inclusive. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, directors and officers of the Company, as well as their families and affiliates. 52. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in this case. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class which predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members include: a. Whether the Exchange Act was violated by Defendants; b. Whether Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts; c. Whether Defendants’ statements omitted material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; d. Whether Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements were false and misleading; e. Whether the price of the Company’s stock was artificially inflated; and f. The extent of damage sustained by Class members and the appropriate measure of damages. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct alleged herein. 55. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 60. As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter in that Defendants knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and/or misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding Kandi, his/her control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of Kandi’s allegedly materially misleading misstatements and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Kandi, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 65. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 67. Defendants violated § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they (i) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (ii) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading; and (iii) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon those who purchased or otherwise acquired the Company’s securities during the Class Period. 68. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially inflated prices for the Company’s common stock. Plaintiff and the Class would not have purchased the Company’s common stock at the price paid, or at all, if they had been aware that the market prices had been artificially and falsely inflated by Defendants’ misleading statements. 69. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 71. In particular, each of these Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. 72. As set forth above, Kandi and the Individual Defendants each violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by their acts and/or omissions as alleged in this Complaint. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their purchases of the Company’s securities during the Class Period. A. Materially False And Misleading Statements Made During the Class Period Violation of § 20(a) of the Exchange Act (Against The Individual Defendants) Violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder (Against All Defendants)

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(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.) 20. The spread of COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (“WHO”) on March 11, 2020. 21. On March 13, 2020, President Donald Trump issued the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Emergency Declaration, which declared that the pandemic was of “sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant an emergency declaration for all states, territories and the District of Columbia.” 22. The Federal Government expressly recognized that with the COVID-19 emergency, “many small businesses nationwide are experiencing economic hardship as a direct result of the Federal, State and local public health measures that are being taken to minimize the public’s exposure to the virus.” 2 23. The economic fallout from COVID-19, and the national response to it, was immediate and enormous. As “stay at home” issues were ordered by states across the nation, countless businesses were forced by law to overhaul their business models, scale back their business dramatically, or shutter–either temporarily or permanently. Business were further harmed as the public began to avoid all public spaces. Furloughs and layoffs were rampant in the private sector. 24. On March 25, 2020, in response to the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 crisis and to overwhelming public pressure, the U.S. Senate passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, or the CARES Act. The CARES Act was passed by the House of Representatives the following day and signed into law by President Trump on March 27, 2020. Amounting to approximately $2 trillion, the CARES Act was the single-largest economic stimulus bill in American history. 50. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated as a nationwide Class, defined as follows: All persons and businesses who served as an agent in relation to, and provided assistance to a client in relation to, the preparation and/or submission of a client’s PPP loan application to Zions which resulted in a loan being funded under the PPP. Plaintiff further brings this action on behalf of a subclass of individuals defined as follows: California Subclass. All persons and businesses in California who served as an agent in relation to, and provided assistance to a client in relation to, the preparation and/or submission of a client’s PPP loan application to Zions which resulted in a loan being funded under the PPP. 60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 61. Plaintiff and the Class represent individuals who are “agents” as defined by the SBA regulations for the PPP. 62. Plaintiff and the putative Class have assisted clients with the process of preparing applications, and applying for, PPP loan funds. Defendants, despite the clear command of the SBA’s PPP regulations, have refused to make these payments. An actual controversy has arisen between Plaintiff and the Class, on one hand, and Defendants on the other, wherein Defendants deny by their refusal to pay that they are obligated to pay Plaintiff’s and the Class’s “agent” fees pursuant to PPP regulations. 63. Plaintiff and the Class seek a declaration, in accordance with SBA regulations and pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that Defendants are obligated to set aside money to pay, and pay third-party agents –within the SBA-approved limits—for the work performed on behalf of a client in relation to the preparation and/or submission of a PPP loan application that resulted in a funded PPP loan. 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 65. Based on information and belief, Defendants entered into an agreement with the SBA in connection with the loans funded in the PPP. 70. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 71. Pursuant to California Business & Professions Code § 17200, “any unlawful, unfair…business act or practice” is prohibited in the State of California. This statute creates a private right of action based on any unlawful or unfair act committed in the course of business, particularly where it provides the unlawful actor with an unfair business advantage. Local, state and/or federal law can serve as the basis for an “unlawful…business act or practice[.]” 72. The SBA’s PPP regulations specifically provide that “lenders” who provide loans under the program will be responsible for paying “agent” fees, within prescribed limits. 73. Defendants have uniformly refused to pay these fees to Plaintiff and the Class. As a result, Defendants have engaged in unlawful conduct that has cost Plaintiff and the Class millions of dollars in fees, collectively. 77. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 78. Unjust enrichment, or restitution, may be alleged where a Defendant unjustly obtains and retains a benefit to the Plaintiff’s detriment, where such retention violates fundamental principles of equity, justice, and good conscience. 79. Here, Defendants have obtained millions of dollars in benefits in the form of PPP loan origination fees. A portion of those fees were to be paid to agents, like and including Plaintiff, who assisted in their clients’ PPP loan applications. But Defendants are refusing to pay those fees, in contravention of PPP regulations. 80. Principles of justice, equity, and good conscience demand that Defendants not be allowed to retain these agent fees. Defendants have fallen short in their duties as lenders, and during a crisis no less. As a result, Plaintiff and the putative Class have been unable to obtain the agent fees due to them. 81. Accordingly, Defendants must disgorge the portion of any and all PPP origination fees that they have retained to the extent they are due to Plaintiff and the putative Class in their capacities as agents.

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10. naviHealth, Inc. manages post-acute care and care transitions on behalf of health plans, hospitals, health systems, and post-acute providers in the United States. It offers clinical service support, proprietary technology, and advisory solutions for payers and providers. The company provides clinical support services, such as coordinating care in the acute and post-acute setting. naviHealth has in its possession, custody, and control all the employment records of Plaintiffs and those similarly situated. 11. Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, while working as an LPN on behalf of Defendant, Barbee worked from home. Her primary job duty was to review patient appeals regarding the decision to discharge a patient from a Skilled Nursing Facility (“SNF”). In carrying out her assignments, Barbee compared the patient’s case files against well-established industry guidelines for discharge. If the reasons for discharge aligned with the established guidelines, Barbee prepared a form letter of explanation to the patient explaining the rationale for the discharge from the SNF. If the justifications for discharge did not align with the well- established industry guidelines, Barbee notified the naviHealth medical director who would then review the case and decide whether discharge was appropriate. Barbee had neither discretion to discharge a patient nor discretion to grant or deny a patient’s appeal of a discharge decision. 12. Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, Barbee, and all others similarly situated, worked approximately 44 to 56 hours per week. Each day, Monday through Friday, she started her workday at 8:00 a.m. and stopped working between approximately 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. and, at times, worked up until 10:00 p.m. Additionally, Barbee was unable to take a duty-free meal period on any day due to the volume of work Defendant required. 13. For example, in the workweek beginning August 15, 2016, Barbee began her workday at 8:00 a.m. and ended her workday at approximately 7:00 p.m. each day. She was 4 unable to take a duty-free meal period on any of these days. Barbee thus worked 55 hours this week, and Defendant failed to compensate her for 15 of those hours. 14. For example, in the workweek beginning June 4, 2018, Barbee began her workday at 8:00 a.m. each day. She ended her workday at 7:00 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday, and Friday and at 8:30 p.m. on Wednesday and Thursday. She was unable to take a duty-free meal period on any of these days. Barbee thus worked 58 hours this week, and Defendant failed to compensate her for 18 of those hours. 15. Time-stamped emails from Barbee to naviHealth management show that Barbee worked hours in excess of 40 hours a week for which she was not paid. naviHealth management knew or should have known that Barbee, and all those similarly situated to her, worked in excess of 40 hours a week without pay. 16. Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, while working as an LPN on behalf of defendant, Trone worked from home. Her primary job duty was to review provider requests to transfer patients from hospitals to facilities providing post-acute care. Trone compared the patient’s clinical chart against the applicable well-established criteria to determine whether the criteria were met for the request for post-acute care. The applicable criteria used in the review depended on whether the request for post-acute care was for an SNF, an in-patient rehabilitation facility (“IRF”), or long term acute care admission (“LTAC”). No matter which type of post-acute care was requested, Trone was required to adhere to strict guidelines in determining whether criteria were or were not satisfied for the requested transfer. For example, for an IRF/LTAC request, Trone compared the patient’s clinical file against InterQual and LiveSafe criteria and then submitted the request for the transfer to the medical director to review and to make the final determination of whether to approve or deny the request. 5 17. Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, Trone, and all others similarly situated, worked approximately 44 to 56 hours per week. From August 2018 until September 28, 2018, plaintiff started her workday at 11:00 a.m. on two days per week, 7:30 a.m. on two days per week, and 8:00 a.m. on one day per week. Each day, she stopped working at approximately 6:30 p.m. and, at times, worked up until 9:00 p.m. Additionally, Trone was unable to take a duty-free meal period on most days due to the volume of work Defendant required. During this period, Trone worked approximately 47 hours per week, sometimes more, but Defendant failed to compensate her for any hours worked over 40. 18. From November 2017 until August 2018, Trone started her workday at 7:30 a.m. on two days per week and at 8:00 a.m. on three days per week. Each day, she stopped working at approximately 7:00 p.m. and, at times, worked up until 9:00 p.m. Trone was unable to take a duty-free meal period on most days due to the volume of work Defendant required. During this period, Trone worked approximately 55 hours per week, sometimes more, but Defendant failed to compensate her for any hours worked over 40. 19. From 2016 until November 2017, Trone started her workday at 9:00 a.m. on five days per week and stopped working at approximately 7:00 p.m. and, at times, worked until 9:00 p.m. Trone was unable to take a duty-free meal period on most days due to the volume of work Defendant required. During this period, Trone worked approximately 50 hours per week, sometimes more, but Defendant failed to compensate her for any hours worked over 40. 20. From 2014 until 2016, Trone worked four days per week. She started her workday at 7:00 a.m. and stopped working at approximately 6:00 p.m. and, at times, worked up until 9:00 p.m. Trone was unable to take a duty-free meal period on most days due to the volume of 6 work Defendant required. During this period, Trone worked approximately 44 hours per week, sometimes more, but Defendant failed to compensate her for any hours worked over 40. 21. When Trone, and all those similarly situated to her, began work each morning, she turned on her phone and activated Skype. Trone’s Skype remained on and activated until she finished working each shift. naviHealth management knew or should have known when she was on-line and working. 22. During the weeks that Barbee and Trone, and all others similarly situated, have worked in excess of 40 hours, Defendant naviHealth has failed to pay Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, overtime compensation at the rate of one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 during the workweek. 23. Within the last three years until September 28, 2018, Plaintiffs routinely performed the tasks referenced in paragraphs 11 and 15 throughout their workweeks, without a duty-free meal period, normally more than 8 hours per day (and up to 11 hours a day), causing them to work in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, for which Defendant denied Plaintiffs proper compensation. The precise amount of uncompensated work time Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, performed can be identified through Defendant’s records. 24. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 in their entirety and restate them. 7 25. During the times that Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, have worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant has not compensated such work at the rate of one- and-one-half times their regular rate of pay. 26. Section 7(a) of the FLSA provides that employees shall be paid overtime compensation at a rate of not less than one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 27. Defendant has violated the FLSA by failing and refusing to compensate Plaintiffs, and all other similarly situated employees, at a rate of not less than one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay in workweeks in which Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated worked 40 or more hours per week. Id. 28. Defendant’s violations of the FLSA have been done in a willful and bad-faith manner. 29. As a result of the Defendant’s willful and purposeful violations of the FLSA, there has become due and owing to Plaintiffs, and all those similarly situated, an amount that has not yet been precisely determined. Defendant maintains exclusive possession, custody, and control of the employment and work records for Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs are unable to state at this time the exact amount owing to them. The FLSA, as well as various other statutory and regulatory provisions, imposes a duty on Defendant to maintain and preserve payroll and other employment records with respect to Plaintiffs and all other employees similarly situated from which the factfinder can ascertain the amount of Defendant’s liability. Id. § 211(c). 30. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover liquidated damages in an amount equal to their backpay damages for Defendant’s failure to pay overtime compensation. Id. § 216(b). 31. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. 8 5. Plaintiff Mae Barbee (“Barbee”) has been, at all material times herein until September 28, 2018, employed by naviHealth as a Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) in the positions of “Utilization Review Coordinator” and “Quality Improvement Organizational Appeals Coordinator.” 6. Plaintiff Donna Trone (“Trone”) has been, at all material times herein until September 28, 2018, employed by naviHealth as an LPN in the positions of “Pre-service Care Coordinator” and “Flex Team Pre-service Care Coordinator.” 7. Plaintiffs bring this action for a declaratory judgment, back pay, and other relief under the FLSA to remedy Defendant’s willful and unlawful violations of federal law. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 216(b). 8. At all times material herein, Plaintiffs, while employed by Defendant, were “employees” within the meaning of the FLSA, id. § 203(e)(1). 9. Defendant naviHealth, Inc. is an employer within the meaning of the FLSA, id. § 203(d). naviHealth’s principal office and place of business is located at 210 Westwood Place, Suite 400, Brentwood, Tennessee 37027-7554. Its registered agent for service of process is Corporation Service Company, 2908 Poston Avenue, Nashville, Tennessee 37203-1312. 3 FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME FOR ALL HOURS PLAINTIFFS WERE SUFFERED OR PERMITTED TO WORK IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207

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12. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff asserts the following Factual Allegations, which in addition to other facts, support Plaintiff’s causes of action set out herein. 14. Beginning in or around April 2016, Defendant called Plaintiff on her cellular telephone number ending in “1651” using an automatic dialing and/or predictive dialer system (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), and prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 15. Defendant called Plaintiff from telephone number: “(800) 650-2951.” 16. At no time did Plaintiff have a business relationship with Defendant. 17. In addition, at no time did Plaintiff consent for Defendant to place telephone calls on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 18. Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff never entered into a business relationship with Defendant nor consented to receive calls from Defendant, Plaintiff received the following non-exclusive list of calls from Defendant: • On or about April 4, 2016, Plaintiff received a call from Defendant at or around 4:19 p.m. • On or about April 15, 2016, Plaintiff received a call from Defendant at or around 9:40 p.m. • On or about May 12, 2016 Plaintiff received a call from Defendant at or around 4:15 p.m. • On or about May 20, 2016, Plaintiff received a call from Defendant at or around 2:51 p.m. 19. Tired of the persistent and unsolicited calls, in or around late 2016, Plaintiff asked Defendant to “stop calling,” thereby revoking any type of prior express consent, if any prior express consent ever existed to call her cellular telephone number. 20. The calls by Defendant to Plaintiff’s cellular phone continued, despite Plaintiff’s oral revocation at said time. 21. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant called Plaintiff two times per day – every other day after Plaintiff revoked consent to receive calls from Defendant. 22. Upon information and belief, the ATDS used by Defendant has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 23. The ATDS used by Defendant also has the capacity to, and does, call telephone numbers from a list of databases of telephone numbers automatically and without human intervention. 25. As already mentioned, Plaintiff at no time provided “prior express consent,” written or otherwise, for Defendant to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone with an ATDS as proscribed under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 26. Plaintiff had not provided her cellular telephone number to Defendant. Plaintiff was not a customer of Defendant. Plaintiff had no “established business relationship” with Defendant, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(2). 27. These telephone calls made by Defendant were in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 40. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: “All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one telephone call using an ATDS from Defendant, or their agents calling on behalf of Defendant, between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for the purpose of marketing, to non-customers of Defendant, at the time of the calls.” 41. Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 42. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant or its agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 43. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 44. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records and/or Defendant’s agent’s records. 46. As a person who received calls from Defendant in which Defendant used an ATDS, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 47. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 48. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 50. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 52. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 53. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 54. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 56. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 58. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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23. GPB Capital was formed in March 2013 by David Gentile. 25. GPB Capital claims to have invested, through its funds, in automotive dealerships and waste management companies, among other businesses. 26. GPB Capital investments, including in GPB Holdings II and GPB Automotive, are illiquid, high-commission and high-fee products. B. The Controlling Limited Partnership Agreements 27. Plaintiff Wade’s investment in GPB Holdings II is subject to an Amended Confidential Private Placement Memorandum for Class A Limited Partnership Units, dated March 7, 2016 (“Holdings II PPM”). The Holdings II PPM incorporates an Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of GPB Holdings II, LP (“Holdings II LPA”). 28. The Holdings II LPA defines the General Partner as GPB Capital. 29. The Holdings II LPA defines the Fiscal Year as the calendar year. 30. Section 6.5 of the Holdings II LPA provides, in relevant part, that “[w]ithin 120 days after the end of each Fiscal Year, the General Partner will cause to be furnished to the Limited Partners a financial report for such Fiscal Year that includes the audited Financial Statements for such Fiscal year . . . .” 31. Plaintiff Loch’s investment in GPB Automotive is also subject to a private placement memorandum (“Automotive PPM”) which incorporates a limited partnership agreement (“Automotive LPA”). 32. The Automotive LPA defines the General Partner as GPB Capital. 33. The Automotive LPA defines the Fiscal Year as the calendar year. 35. Under the Holdings II LPA, Defendants were obligated to furnish Wade an audited 2017 financial statement regarding GPB Holdings II by April 30, 2018. Defendants have not at any time furnished Wade an audited 2017 financial statement regarding GPB Holdings II. 36. Under the Holdings II LPA, Defendants were obligated to furnish Wade an audited 2018 financial statement regarding GPB Holdings II by April 30, 2019. Defendants have not at any time furnished Wade an audited 2018 financial statement regarding GPB Holdings II. 37. Under the Automotive LPA, Defendants were obligated to furnish Loch an audited 2017 financial statement regarding GPB Automotive by April 30, 2018. Defendants have not at any time furnished Loch an audited 2017 financial statement regarding GPB Automotive. 38. Under the Automotive LPA, Defendants were obligated to furnish Loch an audited 2018 financial statement regarding GPB Automotive by April 30, 2019. Defendants have not at any time furnished Loch an audited 2018 financial statement regarding GPB Automotive. D. Defendants’ Improper Conduct and Responses by Governmental and Other Entities 39. Defendants’ failure to fully and timely disclose the Funds’ financial condition has to date impaired Plaintiffs’ ability to know the true facts required to assess the status of and take actions required to protect their investments. 41. Defendants have not registered their GPB investment offerings with the SEC. Through April 2017, Defendants marketed and sold GPB private placement securities without the need to register these offerings, as permitted under Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 et seq. 42. As of May 2017, each of the two Funds had more than 2,000 limited partners and assets in excess of $10 million. As a result, Regulation 12g-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required each Fund to register its securities with the SEC and to file an audited financial statement by April 30, 2018. 43. GPB Capital acknowledged these obligations but, as to both Funds, missed its deadline to file the registration statements and audited financial statements required under the Act. GPB Capital still has not filed any registration or financial statement with the SEC. 44. Plaintiffs are investigating reports that GPB Capital has been unable to provide audited financial statements to the SEC and investors because its auditors refused to provide a clean audit opinion in view of undisclosed related-party transactions and other irregularities reflected in GPB Capital’s books and records. 45. In November 2018, GPB Capital’s accountant, Crowe LLP, resigned purportedly based on its determination that its internal risk-tolerance parameters were exceeded by the activity reflected in GPB Capital’s books and records. 47. On March 4, 2019, GPB Capital confirmed in a letter to investors that it was raided by law enforcement and has been under regulatory scrutiny since the summer of 2018. Similarly, a GPB Capital spokesman wrote in an email that “we have been cooperating with inquiries from various authorities and the visit on February 28, 2019 from the FBI and the New York City Business Integrity Commission, while unscheduled, was a part of that process.” 48. In June 2019 Fidelity Investments gave its broker-dealer clients a 90-day deadline to remove GPB Capital-issued private placements from the Fidelity platform. 49. Additionally, reports have surfaced that the SEC and FINRA are investigating Defendants’ conduct and operations. 50. Through their counsel, Plaintiffs are investigating the allegations against Defendants, as they call into question the accuracy and completeness of the disclosures made by Defendants and their selling agents relating to investments in the Funds. Plaintiffs intend to amend this complaint or bring independent legal action against Defendants and their agents if Defendants do not provide full, complete and satisfactory financial reports. VI. 51. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 52. The class is initially defined as investors who purchased equity shares in GPB Holdings II, LP or GPB Automotive Portfolio, LP, and who did not (i) sell all of their shares before May 1, 2018 without repurchasing shares thereafter, or (ii) purchase and sell all of their shares between May 1, 2018 and May 1, 2019 without repurchasing shares thereafter. 54. The Class members are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Members of the Class are widely dispersed throughout the country. The Class includes many hundreds of investors. 55. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of all Class members. Plaintiffs, like all Class members, purchased equity shares in GPB Holdings II, LP or GPB Automotive Portfolio, LP. Plaintiffs and all Class member held the same contractual rights and were subject to the same material breaches. 56. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs’ interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the Class. 57. Plaintiffs are represented by counsel who are experienced and competent in the prosecution of investor fraud litigation, and who will adequately represent the Class. 58. Questions of law and fact common to the Class members predominate over any questions that may affect only individual Class members, because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class. 60. Class treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, because, among other things, class treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. The benefits of proceeding through the class mechanism, including providing injured persons and entities with a means of obtaining redress on claims that might not be practicable to pursue individually, substantially outweigh any difficulties that may arise in the management of this class action. 62. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. A. Defendants’ Investment Business

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2. Whether Defendant accepts guide dogs and, if so, if there are any charges associated with the guide dogs, their policies with respect to guide dogs and if there are any rest areas for guide dogs. 26. Defendant’s Website offers features to the public that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that it offers about their hotels. The Website is heavily integrated with their hotels, serving as their gateway. 27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, using Defendant’s Website access to information through their reservation system relating to the availability of ADA compliant rooms and handicap accessible features of the hotel, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s hotels. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to add information through their reservation system relating to its accessibility for visually-impaired persons on their Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s hotels and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public at Defendant’s hotels. 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Defendant’s Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 3. Whether the hotels provide a braille and/or large print menu for restaurants and/or room service and, in the alternative, if they have trained staff to read the menu to blind or vision- impaired guests. 30. Due to the lack of information relating to the accessibility features of Defendant’s hotels through the reservation system on the Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public in their hotels. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis using the services that the hotels offer to the public because of the lack of information on accessibility through the reservation system on the Website. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant’s hotels or book rooms in Defendant’s hotels in the future if the Plaintiff was able to learn about the accessibility of Defendant’s hotels and guest rooms for blind and vision-impaired persons through the reservation system on their website and those accessibility features meet the needs of the Plaintiff. 32. If the hotels and the Website reservation system were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through visiting the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the lack of information on accessibility features available on the reservation system on the Website that result in making the services and facilities of the hotel inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Because simple compliance with the provisions of the ADA relating to providing information about accessibility features of the hotels and the guest rooms on its Website reservation system would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the services and facilities at Defendant’s hotels, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the failure to provide information on its Website reservation system sufficient to advise that the hotels are fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guest room, to specify the room type, the type of accessible facility in the room, and the communications features in the room. 35. Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 37. Because Defendant’s Website reservation system has never included the required information, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause the Website reservation system to include the required information relating to accessibility, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with the ADA regulations requiring certain accessibility information to be included on Defendant’s Website reservation system. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website for accessibility and compliance to identify and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms on the Website reservation system and a statement that the hotels are fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guest room, to specify the room type, the type of accessible facility in the room including a detailed description of the features of such facility so that a blind or visually-impaired person can determine if the features meet such person’s needs, and the communications features in the room including a detailed description of the communications features so that a blind or visually-impaired person can independently determine if the features meet such person’s needs, including, but not limited to: 38. If the ADA-required information is included on the Website reservation system, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently determine through use of the Website if Defendant’s hotels and guest rooms are ADA compliant and if the facilities described relating the facilities and communications equipment in guest rooms are acceptable to the Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people 4. Whether or not emergency exit signs are complaint with ADAAG3 requirements and emergency evacuation plans and information are provided in braille and large print. 40. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining the Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of including the information required under the ADA regulations on the Website reservation system in order to make its facilities and guest rooms equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website reservation system to obtain information relating to ADA accessibility of the hotels and their guest rooms, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required accessibility information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website reservation system contains the information on accessibility required under the ADA regulations; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant have violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system so individuals with disabilities can independently assess if Defendant’s hotels or guest rooms meet the accessibility needs of the Plaintiff and the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 5. Whether or not all accessible signage complies with the requirements of the ADAAG. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 6. Whether or not the stairs, escalators and elevators comply with ADAAG standards, such as braille for floor numbers in the elevator and a verbal annunciator for each floor. 60. Defendant’s physical hotels are located in the State of New York and constitute places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. The Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden." 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for including the ADA-required information on websites making such websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website reservation system include the ADA-required information would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and their physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 7. Whether or not the hotels have removed or protected protruding objects which protrude more than 4” into walkways and hallways such as drinking fountains, fire extinguishers, and planters and if they provide cane detectable warnings for the underside of stairways. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 75. Defendant’s hotels are places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and the Website is a service that is integrated with their establishments. 76. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates physical locations in the City of New York and the Website, making the Defendant a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update the Website and remove access barriers to its hotels by failing to include the ADA- required information on its reservation system, causing the services integrated with their physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non- disabled public. 79. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that does not contain the ADA- required information on its reservation system making their hotels inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failed to take actions to correct the lack of the ADA-required information in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and their establishments under § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 85. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website does not contain the ADA-required information on its reservation system denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension their physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 9. Whether or not signage in the hotel can be easily located by blind and vision-impaired persons with 2” minimum height raised letters and braille characters centered at 60” above the finished floor to indicate floor numbers, rest rooms, lobby, vending and ice machines and all other hotel facilities and amenities. b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website and its reservation system under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website and the reservation system complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and d. Regularly check the hotels and the guest rooms to ensure that the accessibility features that they describe on its website reservation system are in fact available and properly maintained. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Website and Compliance with Requirement to Describe Accessibility Features VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from a telephone number confirmed to be Defendant’s number. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 20. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 8. Beginning in or around October of 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -9695, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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19. Sundance operates as a travel company. On its website, Sundance claims to have encouraged tens of thousands of clients to explore, dream and discover. 20. Unfortunately for consumers, Sundance utilizes a sophisticated telephone dialing system to call consumers with pre-recorded messages en masse promoting its services. However, Sundance fails to get the requisite prior consent prior to sending these text messages. 21. In Sundance overzealous attempt to market its services, Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) telemarketing phone calls with pre-recorded messages without the prior express written consent of the call recipients, and continued to send messages after requests that the text messages stop. As such, Sundance not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiffs and members of the Classes, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 22. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was assigned, and was the owner of a cellular telephone number of 732-453-4197. 23. During and around March 2021, Defendant began calling Plaintiff on her cellular telephone number via an ATDS and with a pre-recorded message, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 25. On information and belief, and based on the circumstances as described above, Defendant called Plaintiff using an ATDS and with pre-recorded messages. 26. When Plaintiff listened to the message, Plaintiff was able to determine that it was a prerecorded message. See, Rahn v. Bank of Am., No. 1:15-CV-4485-ODE-JSA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186171, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016) (“When one receives a call, it is a clear-cut fact, easily discernible to any lay person, whether or not the recipient is speaking to a live human being, or is instead being subjected to a prerecorded message.”). 27. That these voice messages were pre-recorded were evident from inter alia (a) the fact that each of the pre-recorded voice messages received by the Plaintiff were exactly identical in content, tone and inflection, without even the most minute variation between these messages, (b) the generic content of the voice message, and (3) the tone, cadence and inflection of the voice message, which sounded to the Plaintiff’s ears like a pre-recorded message, rather than a personal voice message that was placed personally for the Plaintiff by an individual. 28. Plaintiff has previously received both pre-recorded voice messages and regular non-prerecorded voice messages, and has experienced the different characteristics and sounds of a pre-recorded voice message as contrasted to an ordinary voice message. 29. Based on the Plaintiff’s own personal experience, the voice messages received from Defendant clearly sounded as if they were pre-recorded voice messages. 37. Plaintiff reserve the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 38. Plaintiff and the Class members were harmed by Defendant’s acts in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiffs and the Class via their cellular telephones by using an ATDS, thereby causing Plaintiffs and the Class to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiffs and the Class members previously paid; and Plaintiffs and Class members' privacy was invaded. 39. The exact size of the Class is presently unknown but can be ascertained through a review of Defendant’s records, and it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. Defendant made telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Classes. 40. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiffs and the Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Classes. 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct during transactions with Plaintiff and the Class. 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. 44. Plaintiff have no interest antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 45. This class action is appropriate for class certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. 46. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiffs’ challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Classes as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiffs. 47. This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. 48. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Classes will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. 49. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Classes to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. 51. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions ensured. 52. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 53. Defendant made unsolicited and unauthorized phone calls using an ATDS to Plaintiff’s and the Class members cellular telephones for the purpose of marketing products and/or services to Plaintiff and the Class. 54. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 55. Defendant made unsolicited and unauthorized calls to Plaintiff for the purpose of marketing products and/or services to those Plaintiffs and the Class. 56. Defendant’s conduct invaded Plaintiff’s privacy. 58. Because Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiff never gave her prior express consent, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiffs and the Classes. 59. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227

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Defendant. § § § § § § § § § CASE NO.: 5:17-cv-00081-DAE 10. Defendant lacks information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief about the truth of Paragraph 10. Therefore, Defendant denies Paragraph 10. 11. Defendant lacks information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief about the truth of Paragraph 11. Therefore, Defendant denies Paragraph 11. 12. Defendant denies Paragraph 12. 13. Defendant denies that Paragraph 13 is a complete and accurate statement of law. 15. Defendant admits Plaintiff seeks class certification, but denies that Plaintiff is entitled to class certification. 16. Defendant admits Plaintiff seeks class certification. Defendant denies the remainder of Paragraph 16. 17. Defendant admits Paragraph 17. A. 21. Defendant denies Paragraph 21. C. 34. Defendant re-alleges the previous paragraphs as though stated herein. 35. Defendant denies Paragraph 35. 36. Defendant admits that Paragraph 36 is a partial quotation of the FDCPA. Defendant denies that Paragraph 36 is a complete and accurate statement of law. Defendant denies Plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested in Paragraph 36. 6. Defendant lacks information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief about the truth of Paragraph 6. Therefore, Defendant denies Paragraph 6. 7. Defendant denies that Paragraph 7 is a complete and accurate statement of law. 8. Defendant lacks information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief about the truth of Paragraph 8. Therefore, Defendant denies Paragraph 8. 9. Defendant admits to attempting to collect a debt and lacks information or knowledge sufficient to form a belief about the truth of Paragraph 9. Therefore, Defendant denies Paragraph 9. ANSWER TO CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, Dekalb County Solutions, Inc. (“Defendant” herein), by and through counsel files its Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint and to respectfully show unto the Court as follows: I.

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10. The 2015 FCC Order also clarified that telephone calls and text messages have the same protections under FCC rules, and that text messages are “calls” for purposes of the 38. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) & (b)(3) on behalf of herself, on behalf of all others similarly situated, and as a member of the “Class,” defined as follows: All persons in the United States of America to whom Defendant has placed any automated phone calls or sent any automated commercial text message for whom Defendant has no record of prior express consent and/or for whom Defendant has no record of providing the required disclosures between October 16, 2013 and the date of class certification of this action. 39. Excluded from the Class are: (i) Defendant, its assigns, successors, and legal representatives; (ii) any entities in which Defendant has controlling interests; (iii) federal, state, and/or local governments, including, but not limited to, their departments, agencies, divisions, bureaus, boards, sections, groups, counsels, and/or subdivisions; (iv) all persons presently in bankruptcy proceedings or who obtained a bankruptcy discharge in the last three years; and (v) any judicial officer presiding over this matter and person within the third degree of consanguinity to such judicial officer. 40. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend or otherwise alter the class definition presented to the Court at the appropriate time, or to propose or eliminate sub-classes, in response to facts learned through discovery, legal arguments advanced by Defendant, or otherwise. 41. Numerosity: Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is presently unknown, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that Class members number in the thousands of persons, if not more. 43. This action is properly maintainable as a class action for the reasons set forth herein. 45. Adequacy: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class she seeks to represent because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class Members Plaintiff seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained highly competent counsel experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and the interests of members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. 46. Superiority and Substantial Benefit: The class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ claims. The damages suffered by each individual Class are limited and prescribed by law. Damages of such magnitude are small given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Defendant’s conduct. Further, it would be virtually impossible for the Class members to redress the wrongs done to them on an individual basis. Even if members of the Class themselves could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system, due to the complex legal and factual issues of the case. By contrast, the class- action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefit of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 48. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is also appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 49. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are unaware of any difficulties that are likely to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 50. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant sent commercial text messages (“calls” in FCC parlance) to the mobile cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the Class. 52. On information and belief, Defendant used an ATDS to place commercial phone calls and send commercial text messages to the mobile cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the Class. 53. Defendant did not obtain express written consent prior to placing commercial phone calls or sending commercial text messages to Plaintiff or the Class. 55. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to, and seek, awards of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 56. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to, and seek, awards of $1,500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation because Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s conduct was and is willful, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 57. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to, and seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 8. The purpose of the TCPA is to protect consumers from unwanted calls and text messages, such as those received Defendant sent to Plaintiff. 9. Under the FCC’s July 10, 2015 Order (the “2015 FCC Order”), Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; American Association of Healthcare Administrative Management, Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling and Exemption; et al, Federal Communications Commission, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961 (July 10, 2015), companies wishing to place certain call or text messages must obtain prior express written consent. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. On behalf of Plaintiff and the Putative Class The TCPA

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22. A prospective student or graduate who is interested in initiating or consolidating his or her student loans has hundreds of lenders in the nation to choose from. Although the original interest rates on federal consolidation loans are set by statute, lenders are free to, and often do, compete for graduates’ business by offering them the opportunity to reduce the interest rates on such loans if certain conditions are met. Once a graduate consolidates his/her federal loans with a single lender, they are ineligible to reconsolidate that loan with another lender. 23. To give itself a competitive advantage in the marketplace of student loan lenders, beginning in 2001, Northstar’s loan agreements contained a provision that a credit would be given to borrowers who paid timely. Northstar called that credit the “T.H.E. Repayment Bonus” (the “T.H.E. Program”). 24. Under the T.H.E. Program, Northstar uniformly promised to each of its borrowers that this bonus would be paid as a monthly interest rebate credit to all borrowers who were no more than 59 days behind on their loan repayments. Northstar represented that its T.H.E. Program would effectively reduce the interest rate on borrowers’ student loans by a set amount. 26. Northstar provided Plaintiff and the other Class members with quarterly form summaries of their federal and private loan accounts before the loans went into repayment. Each of these summaries touted Northstar’s T.H.E. Program, and represented that The T.H.E. Repayment Bonus is currently being paid out as a monthly credit equal to an annualized interest rate reduction. It is paid to all T.H.E. borrowers in repayment and less than 60 days delinquent. B. Northstar’s First Suspension of the T.H.E. Program 27. On or about February 18, 2008, Northstar announced that the T.H.E. Program was “suspended” and that it would no longer pay the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus. In a form letter sent to Plaintiff and the other Class members, Northstar attempted to explain away this breach of its contracts with Plaintiff and the other members of the Class by citing “ongoing disruption in the global markets.” Northstar claimed that the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus “is based on current financial market conditions and portfolio performance and is therefore subject to change. See Exhibit A. 28. Northstar’s justification of its suspension of the T.H.E. Program was legally invalid. Nowhere in any of the loan documents that Northstar provided to Plaintiff and the other Class members did Northstar reserve a right to change, amend, revoke, withdraw, terminate, discontinue, suspend, cease, modify, and/or alter the T.H.E. Repayment Program in any way. C. The Class Settlement 30. This litigation resolved with entry of a settlement agreement, pursuant to which Northstar agreed to reinstitute the T.H.E. Repayment Program. (See Exhibit B (the “Settlement”).) Specifically, the Settlement “mandates that the Bonus be paid over the life of Settlement Class Members’ loans, except for in certain circumstances set forth below.” (Id. at 16.) 31. The “certain circumstances” described in the Settlement have not been triggered such that Northstar may legally suspend the T.H.E. Repayment Program. 32. The Settlement also provides: Given the ongoing nature of the relationship between Northstar and the Settlement Class, Class Counsel shall have the right to audit Northstar's compliance with the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement if they become aware of credible evidence of Northstar’s noncompliance. In the event that Class Counsel establishes Northstar has not complied with the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement, Class Counsel shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs – to be paid by Northstar – for their work conducted in connection with requiring Northstar's compliance. (Id. at 32-33.) Two of the three court-appointed Class Counsel invested with this responsibility, Adam J. Levitt and Robert K. Shelquist, are also counsel for Plaintiff and the proposed Class here. (The third, Charles S. Zimmerman, has passed away.) D. Northstar’s Latest Suspension of the T.H.E. Program 34. Northstar did not send any notice of this suspension to counsel for the Settlement class to allow for their ongoing oversight over the T.H.E. Program that the Settlement requires. 35. Northstar’s latest failure to honor its contractual obligation to maintain the T.H.E. Program and to pay the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus is a breach of both its underlying loan contracts and its Settlement with Plaintiff and each of the other Class members and is an unfair and/or deceptive trade practice. Northstar’s conduct has caused, and continues to cause, Plaintiff and the other Class members to suffer economic harm. V. 36. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 37. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class (the “Nationwide Class”) defined as: All persons and entities in the United States who obtained or co-signed a student loan held by Northstar or a wholly-owned subsidiary of Northstar at the time of the Re-Suspension of the T.H.E. Program in or about February to March, 2020. 39. Excluded from all Classes are Defendant and any of its members, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees, successors, or assigns; and the Court staff assigned to this case and their immediate family members. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend these Nationwide and California Class definitions, as appropriate, during the course of this litigation. 40. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained on behalf of the Nationwide and Statewide Classes proposed herein under the criteria of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 41. Numerosity—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). The members of the Nationwide and California Classes are so numerous and geographically dispersed that individual joinder of all class members is impracticable. While Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are thousands of members of the Nationwide and California Classes, the precise number of Nationwide and California Class members is unknown to Plaintiff but may be ascertained from Northstar’s books and records. Nationwide and California Class Members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. Mail, electronic mail, Internet postings, and/or published notice. 43. Typicality—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the other Nationwide and California Class members’ claims because they each arise from the same course of conduct by Northstar and are based on the same legal theories. Plaintiff and the other Nationwide and California Class members suffered damages as a direct proximate result of the same wrongful practices in which Northstar engaged. Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies Rule 23(a)(3)’s “typicality” requirements with respect to the Classes he seeks to represent. 45. Risk of Inconsistent Adjudications—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1). Absent a representative class action, Class members would continue to suffer the harm described herein, for which they would have no remedy. Even if separate actions could be brought by individual borrowers, the resulting multiplicity of lawsuits would cause undue hardship and expense for both the Court and the litigants, as well as create a risk of inconsistent rulings and adjudications that might be dispositive of the interests of similarly situated borrowers, substantially impeding their ability to protect their interests, while establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Northstar. The proposed Class thus satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l). 46. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). Northstar has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other Nationwide and California Class members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as described below, with respect to the Nationwide and California Class members as a whole. 48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1-47, as if fully set forth herein. 49. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the Nationwide Class (the “Class,” for purposes of this Count). 50. Plaintiff and the other Class members entered into and executed student loan agreements with Northstar. 52. Plaintiff and the other Class members have fully performed all of their obligations under their Northstar loan contracts. 53. In or about February or March, 2020, NorthStar breached its contractual obligations to Plaintiff and the other Class members by suspending the T.H.E. Program and has continued to breach its loan agreement by not honoring the credit to which Plaintiff and the other Class members are contractually entitled. 54. Northstar’s conduct breaching its contractual obligations, and its failure to continue to provide the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus to Plaintiff and the other Class members, is unjustified and unexcused under the terms of its form contract(s) with Plaintiff and each of the other Class members. 55. Plaintiff and each of the other Class members have been damaged by Northstar’s suspension of the T.H.E. Program for each of their loans with Northstar, in an amount to be determined at trial. 56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1-47, as if fully set forth herein. 57. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the Prior Settlement Class (the “Class,” for purposes of this Count). 59. The relevant material terms of Northstar’s Settlement with Plaintiff and the other Class members included NorthStar's obligation to honor the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus on all student loans for which repayments are no more than 59 days late. 60. Plaintiff and the other Class members have fully performed all of their obligations to maintain the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus under the Settlement. 61. In or about February or March, 2020, Northstar breached its contractual obligations to Plaintiff and the other Class members by suspending the T.H.E. Program and has continued to breach the Settlement by not honoring the credits to which Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled. 62. Northstar's conduct breaching its contractual obligations, and its failure to continue to provide the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus, is unjustified and unexcused under the terms of its Settlement with Plaintiff and each of the other Class members. 63. Plaintiff and each of the other Class members have been damaged by Northstar’s suspension of the T.H.E. Program for each of their loans with Northstar, in an amount to be determined at trial. 64. Plaintiff repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1-47, as if fully set forth herein. 66. The Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Chapter 325D of the Minnesota Statutes, prohibits the use of deceptive trade practices in the course of business. 67. In the course of its business, by its above-described conduct, Northstar engaged in one or more acts characterized as “deceptive trade practices” pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 325D.43-.48, as set forth herein, including: a. Minn. Stat. § 325D.44(5): “represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have, or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that the person does not have;” b. Minn. Stat. § 325D.44(7): “represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another;” and c. Minn. Stat. § 325D.44(13): “engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.” 68. By representing that the interest rates on the student loans of Plaintiff and each of the other Class members would be reduced by the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus, and then unilaterally revoking its T.H.E. Repayment Bonus program, Northstar violated the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 70. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the Nationwide Class (the “Class,” for purposes of this Count). 71. The Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act prohibits “[t]he act, use, or employment by any person of any fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice, with the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise….” Minn. Stat.§ 325F.69. 72. By representing that the interest rates on the student loans of Plaintiff and the other Class members would be reduced by the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus, and then unilaterally revoking the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus, NorthStar violated the Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act. B. Claims Brought on Behalf of the California Class 73. Plaintiff repeats and realleges Paragraphs 1-47, as if fully set forth herein. 74. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the California Class (the “Class,” for purposes of this Count). 76. Northstar is a “person” as defined by California Civil Code section 1761(c) (“‘Person’ means an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or other group, however organized.”). 77. Plaintiff and the members of the California Class are “consumers” within the meaning of California Civil Code section 1761(d) (“‘Consumer’ means an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.”). 78. Northstar provided Plaintiff and the Class “services” within the definition of California Civil Code section 1761(b) (“‘Services’ means work, labor, and services for other than a commercial or business use….”). Specifically, in addition to the credit itself, the loan packages at issue and sold to Plaintiff and the Class included the following services: management of the T.H.E. Program, application of the bonuses earned under the program, customer service and counseling regarding the terms of the T.H.E. Program and loan servicing. 79. Plaintiff and the other Class members’ purchases of the loans are “transaction[s]” as defined by California Civil Code section 1761(e) (“‘Transaction’ means an agreement between a consumer and any other person, whether or not the agreement is a contract enforceable by action, and includes the making of, and the performance pursuant to, that agreement.”). 81. By misrepresenting the benefits and terms of the loans and application of the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus Program, failing to apply the bonuses as promised, and/or by failing to disclose that Northstar may unilaterally discontinue applying bonuses, Northstar violated, inter alia, California Civil Code sections 1770(a)(2), (5), (7), (9), (13), (14), (16) and (19). 82. At all relevant times, Northstar misrepresented that Plaintiff and Class Members would be entitled to the promised bonus as long as they made their payments ontime and in full. At all times relevant, Northstar failed to disclose and entered into the loan agreements knowing that it intended to reserve its ability to unilaterally breach the terms of the bonus program. At all times relevant, Northstar actively concealed the true nature of its bonus program. 83. The omissions and misrepresentations set forth herein are material facts that any reasonable person would have considered important in deciding whether or not to select Northstar for his or her student loan financing. Indeed, Plaintiff and the other Class members justifiably acted or relied upon these misrepresentations and omissions when deciding to purchase the loans and bonus programs. 85. Northstar engaged in the deceptive practices alleged herein, in violation of the CLRA, to induce Plaintiff and the other Class members to select their loans over competitors’ loan products and services. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, demands judgment against Defendant under the CLRA for injunctive relief as may be appropriate and an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 87. Pursuant to California Civil Code section 1782(a), Plaintiff served Northstar with notice of the alleged violations of the CLRA on behalf of himself and all other Class members by certified mail, return receipt requested, on March 26, 2020. A copy of this notice is attached hereto as Exhibit E. If after 30 days Northstar fails to adequately address and correct the violations alleged herein for Plaintiff and the Class, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to seek actual and punitive damages as permitted under the statute on behalf of himself and the Class.  88. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1-47, as if fully set forth herein. 89. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the California Class (the “Class,” for purposes of this Count). 91. Such acts are inherently unfair because they breach public policy governing student loans and basic terms of decency. Northstar’s acts are also unlawful because they violate, among other things, California Civil Code sections 1668, 1709, 1750, et seq. and the common law. 92. Plaintiff would not have entered into the loan agreement but for the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus promise or would have demanded better terms. As a result, Plaintiff lost money and suffered an injury in fact because of Northstar’s violations. 93. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks an injunction against Northstar preliminarily, and permanently enjoining it: (a) from continuing to engage in unlawful and unfair conduct and ordering it to reinstate the promised T.H.E. Repayment Bonus benefits secured under the terms of the loan and the Settlement Agreement; (b) reimbursing all unlawful retained profits and unlawfully collected fees retained as a result of these practices; and (c) ordering that the T.H.E. Repayment Bonus be reinstated consistent with both the student loan agreement and Settlement Agreement. A. General Background BREACH OF CONTRACT (STUDENT LOAN AGREEMENT) BREACH OF CONTRACT (SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT) VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER LEGAL REMEDIES ACT Cal. Civ. Code. §§ 1750, et seq. VIOLATION OF MINNESOTA PREVENTION OF CONSUMER FRAUD ACT Minn. Stat. § 325F.68-.70 VIOLATION OF MINNESOTA UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT Minn. Stat. § 325D.43-.48 VIOLATIONS OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code. §§ 17200, et seq.

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