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(Declaratory Relief) (Disability Discrimination in Violations of NYC Human Rights Law § 8-107(4)) (Injunctive Relief and Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) (Failure to Reasonably Accommodate in violation of NYC Human Rights Law § 8-107(15)) (Injunctive Relief and Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) (Violations of New York State Civil Rights Law) (Statutory Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) (Violations of New York State Human Rights Law) (Injunctive Relief and Damages on Behalf of Plaintiffs) (Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Injunctive Relief) 25. Plaintiff is paralyzed and cannot walk. As a result, he uses a wheelchair for mobility. 27. Defendant DLP GROUP, LLC owns or operates a public accommodation named Stone Street Coffee Company located 132 Ninth Avenue, New York, NY. 28. Throughout 2015 and 2016, Plaintiff entered-attempted to use Defendants' public accommodation, however was unable to enter because of an unlawful architectural barrier. 29. Plaintiff resides less than 600 feet from Defendant's public accommodation and is frequently near Defendant's facility. 30. Plaintiff is deterred from visiting Defendants’ public accommodation because of the existing accessibility barriers. 31. Plaintiff has the intention to return to Defendants’ public accommodation once it becomes readily accessible to and usable. 32. The removal of existing architectural barriers is readily achievable. 33. To date, Defendants have failed to remove the architectural barriers. 34. Defendants’ facility named Stone Street Coffee Company located 132 Ninth Avenue, New York, NY is a public accommodation within the meaning of Title III of the ADA, 42 58. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 59. Defendants’ facility named Stone Street Coffee Company located 132 Ninth Avenue, New York, NY is a public accommodation within the meaning of New York State Human Rights Law § 292(9). 60. Defendants have not provided Plaintiff and others similarly situated with evenhanded treatment in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 61. Defendants’ direct or indirect unevenhanded treatment of Plaintiff and others similarly situated is demonstrated when he was segregated from all other customers. 62. Defendants have, because of Plaintiff’s disability, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from or denied Plaintiff any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of their public accommodation. 63. Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage or custom thereat of Plaintiff and others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited. 64. Defendants and its agents discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 65. Defendants discriminated in against Plaintiff by creating, fostering, and otherwise failing to prevent or remedy the discrimination against Plaintiff, in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 68. On the basis of Plaintiff’s disability, Defendants have violated his Civil Rights. 69. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the penalty prescribed by Civil Rights Law § 40-c and 40-d, in the amount of $500 for each and every violation. 70. Pursuant to NY Civil Rights law, Defendants are guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 71. Notice of the action has been served upon the Attorney-General as required by Civil Rights Law § 40-d. 72. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 73. Defendants’ facility named Stone Street Coffee Company located 132 Ninth Avenue, New York, NY is a place or provider of public accommodation within the meaning of New York City Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 74. In violation of New York City Admin. Code § 8-107(4), Defendants have not reasonably accommodated Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 76. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent and employee of defendants' public accommodation, have, because of the actual or perceived disability of the Plaintiff, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from and denied Plaintiff the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 77. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, on the basis of Plaintiff’s disability, Defendants have demonstrated that the patronage or custom of Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable, and not acceptable. 78. Pursuant to New York City Human Rights Law § 8-502, notice of this action has been served upon New York City's Commission on Human Rights. 79. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants disability discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish and emotional distress, including but not limited to depression, humiliation, stress, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, and emotional pain and suffering. 80. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all of the allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 81. Reasonable accommodations and modifications are necessary to enable Plaintiff and all others similarly situated the ability to enjoy the non-restricted access and use of the public accommodation in question. 83. In violation of New York City Admin. Code 8-102(4) and (18), and 8-107(4) and 8- 107(15), Defendants have not reasonably accommodated Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 84. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, Defendants have unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 85. Reasonable accommodations and modifications are necessary to enable Plaintiff and all others similarly situated the ability to enjoy the non-restricted access and use of the public accommodation in question. 86. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent and employee of defendants' public accommodation, have, because of the actual or perceived disability of the Plaintiff, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from and denied Plaintiff the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 87. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, Defendants have demonstrated that, because of Plaintiff's disability, the patronage or custom of Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable, and not acceptable. 88. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants disability discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish and emotional distress, including but not limited to depression, humiliation, stress, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self-confidence, and emotional pain and suffering. 90. Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment concerning the violations committed by Defendant specifying the rights of Plaintiff and other persons similarly situated as to the policies, practices, procedures, facilities, goods and services provided by Defendant.

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90. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (“the Class”). 92. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all of them is impracticable. While the exact number of Class Members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time, based on information and belief, the Class consists of thousands of patients of Defendant TH whose data was compromised in the Ransomware attack. 94. Typicality. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of other Class Members because Plaintiffs’ information, like that of every other Class member, was compromised in the Ransomware Attack. 95. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs’ Counsel are competent and experienced in litigating class actions. 97. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Class treatment of common questions of law and fact is superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation. Absent a class action, most Class Members would likely find that the cost of litigating their individual claim is prohibitively high and would therefore have no effective remedy. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class Members, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. In contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves judicial resources and the parties’ resources, and protects the rights of each class member. 98. Defendant has acted on grounds that apply generally to the Class as a whole, so that class certification, injunctive relief, and corresponding declaratory relief are appropriate on a class-wide basis. NEGLIGENCE (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and All Class Members)

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11. On August 30, 2017, Keyes sent an unsolicited text to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number without Plaintiff’s consent: 12. Keyes’ unsolicited text was a nuisance that aggravated Plaintiff, wasted his time, invaded his privacy, diminished the value of the cellular services he paid for, caused him to temporarily lose the use and enjoyment of his phone, and caused wear and tear to his phone’s data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components. 13. On information and belief, Keyes, or a third-party acting on its behalf, sent substantively identical unsolicited text messages en masse to the cellular telephone numbers of thousands of consumers. To the extent the text messages were sent on Keyes’ behalf to consumers, Keyes provided the third-party access to its records, authorized use of its trade name, otherwise controlled the content of the messages, and knew of, but failed to stop, the sending of the text messages in violation of the TCPA. 15. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons who, on or after four years prior to the filing of the complaint, (1) were sent a text message to their cellular telephone number by or on behalf of Keyes, (2) in the same manner that Keyes sent a text message to Plaintiff, and for whom (3) Keyes claims to have obtained consent in the same manner it claims to have obtained consent from Plaintiff, or Keyes does not claim to have obtained consent. 16. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the class definitions following appropriate discovery. 17. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant sent unsolicited text messages to thousands of individuals who fall into the Class definition. Class membership can be easily determined from Defendant’s records. 19. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) How Defendant gathered, compiled, or obtained the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class; b) Whether the text messages were sent using an automatic telephone dialing system; c) Whether Defendant sent some or all of the text messages without the consent of Plaintiff and the Class; and d) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing such that Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages. 20. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 21. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 23. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of this complaint and incorporates them by reference. 24. Defendant and/or its agents agent transmitted text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using an automatic telephone dialing system. 26. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), entitling Plaintiff and the Class to a minimum of $500 in damages, and a maximum of $1,500 in damages, for each violation. 8. Keyes is a realty brokerage “with a breadth of product and service offerings usually reserved for national, corporate firms, to provide a better experience for … its Realtors.”1 9. This case arises from Keyes’ use of unsolicited autodialed text messages to market itself to prospective agents and to obtain a split of those prospective agents’ commissions. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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21. Defendant is a clothing and boots manufacturing company that owns and operates the website, www.tecovas.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Upon information and belief, because TECOVAS, INC.’s Website has never been accessible and because TECOVAS, INC. does not have, and has never had, an adequate corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that TECOVAS, INC. retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that TECOVAS, INC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that TECOVAS, INC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that TECOVAS, INC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that TECOVAS, INC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility-related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 103. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 104. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals the full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and hard of hearing. 105. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 19. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 21. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 23. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 27. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 29. Defendant operates the Website, which provides videos, information, and articles on a variety of topics related to science, technology, innovation, health, and culture. It delivers information to tens of millions of people and businesses across the United States. 30. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 32. Defendant’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the Internet on computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. 33. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 34. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 35. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 36. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard-of-hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the videos on the Website. 38. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 39. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to apprehend the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends or family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard-of-hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the services provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 41. Plaintiff attempted to watch the video “Did Climate Change Cause ISIS?” on the Website in March 2018 but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 42. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 43. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 44. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 45. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, and methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 47. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 48. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 49. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 50. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 51. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 52. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 66. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 67. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 68. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 69. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 71. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 72. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 73. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 75. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 77. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 78. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 79. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 80. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 83. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 84. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 85. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 87. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .” 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 90. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 91. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 93. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 94. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 95. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 22. Defendant is a Movie Theatre that operates REGAL CINEMAS as well as the REGAL CINEMAS website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. 23. Defendant operates REGAL CINEMAS (its “Theatre”) across the United States, with a location in New York City, at 102 North End Avenue, New York, NY 10281. 24. Its Theatres constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Theatres provide to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including Theatre locations and hours, access to information on movies and showtimes, including the ability to purchase movie tickets online, and related goods and services. 26. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Theatres. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Theatres and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 27. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 30. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 31. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Theatres on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 32. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s physical locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 40. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s Theatres are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Theatres. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 78. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 79. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 80. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 83. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 84. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 89. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 90. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 93. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 94. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 96. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 97. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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12. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Arizona. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 13. CMRE is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 14. At all times relevant, CMRE conducted business in the State of Arizona and in the County of Maricopa, within this judicial district. 15. On or about August 23, 2012 at approximately 12:55 p.m., Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number via an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”), as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), using an “artificial or prerecorded voice” as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) 29. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 30. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who received any telephone call from Defendant or its agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or with an artificial or prerecorded voice, which call was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient’s prior express consent, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 31. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 32. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using artificial or prerecorded voice messages, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 46. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 47. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 48. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. 227 NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. 227 THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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14. Founded in 1997 and launched in 1998, AutoTrader operates a digital automotive marketplace and is a leading provider of marketing and software solutions to automotive dealers in the United States. 15. AutoTrader has over 20,000 automobile dealer clients and boasts of having 18.5 million unique visitors monthly with average daily vehicle listings of 16. “Autotrader has the most unique visitors monthly and drives more buyers to dealerships than any other third-party automotive website. Our comprehensive view of the marketplace provides proprietary market insights to help dealers improve their operational efficiency and inform their decisions,” according to AutoTrader’s website. 4.4 million, according to its company website. 96. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), and 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated as members of the following nationwide class ("Nationwide Class”), on their claims as purchasers of subscription advertisement listings from AutoTrader. 97. The proposed Nationwide Class is defined as follows: Nationwide Class: All dealer customers located in the United States who purchased subscription advertisement listings from AutoTrader between June 1, 2010 and June 30, 2015 inclusive. AutoTrader Touts Itself As Being The Most Visited Car Shopping Website

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(Fair Labor Standards Act: 29 V.S.C.A. §§ 201, et seq.) 27. The Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1-26 herein. 28. By its actions alleged herein, Defendants willfully, knowingly and/or recklessly violated the FLSA provisions and corresponding federal regulations. 29. Defendants have willfully and intentionally engaged in a widespread pattern and practice ofviolating the provisions ofthe FLSA, as detailed herein, by failing to pay overtime compensation to current and former employees, including Christine Hoffner, Kendra Hammond, Jonathon Garner, Kyle Walters, and other similarly situated employees in accordance with § 207 ofthe FLSA. 30. As a result of Defendant's violations of the FLSA, named Plaintiffs Christine Hoffner, Kendra Hammond, Jonathon Garner, Kyle Walters, and other similarly situated employees, have suffered damages by failing to receive overtime wages in accordance with § 207 of the FLSA. 32. As a result ofthe violations ofthe FLSA by the Defendant, named Plaintiffs Christine Hoffner, Kendra Hammond, Jonathon Gamer, Kyle Walters, and all current and former employees similarly situated have been deprived of overtime compensation in an amount to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, costs and other compensation.

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10. During the course of the aforesaid time period, and on multiple occasions therein, Defendant initiated telephone calls to Plaintiff in an attempt to offer certain legal services to Plaintiff. 11. During each of the aforesaid telephone calls, Defendant played an artificial or prerecorded voice message. 12. Plaintiff does not currently have any accounts with Defendant. 14. Plaintiff ascertained the multiple telephone calls were from Defendant by viewing the telephone number on the caller identification on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 15. The caller identification on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone identified that the multiple telephone calls had originated from Defendant. 16. The caller identification for the aforesaid telephone calls was 971-256-5661. 17. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known Plaintiff would find Defendant’s conduct, in initiating multiple telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, to be harassing. 18. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known Plaintiff would find Defendant’s conduct, in initiating multiple telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, to be abusive. 19. Plaintiff was upset, frustrated and inconvenienced at Defendant’s conduct, as delineated above, by it initiating multiple telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number. 20. Plaintiff has been substantially damaged by Defendant’s telephone calls; her privacy was improperly invaded, she was charged for the telephone calls, and she was annoyed and frustrated by said calls. 21. Defendant willfully and knowingly utilized an automatic telephone dialing system to make and/or place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number in an attempt to offer Plaintiff certain legal services. 23. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs in this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 24. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of: All persons who, on or after June 2009, Defendant called to a cellular phone number using predictive dialing equipment and/or a prerecorded or artificial voice where Defendant did not obtain the phone number called from the called party, with respect to the services offered by Defendant (for example, where the number was obtained through skip tracing or captured by the Defendant’s equipment from an inbound call, or Defendant was calling a wrong number). 25. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Upon information and belief Plaintiff alleges that there are more than forty (40) members of the class. 25. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 26. A class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 27. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. 28. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. 30. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the class have been substantially damaged by Defendant’s telephone calls; their privacy was improperly invaded, they were charged for the telephone calls, and they were annoyed and frustrated by said telephone calls. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, DEBRA VEHLEWALD, On behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, by and through her attorneys, respectfully prays for Judgment to be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant as follows: a. Awarding Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated, all actual compensatory damages suffered; b. Awarding Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated, statutory damages of $500.00 per violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B); c. Awarding Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated, statutory damages of $1500.00 per violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); d. Awarding Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated, Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs; and, e. Awarding Plaintiff, and all those similarly situated, any other relief deemed appropriate by this Honorable Court. VI. 7. In or around June 2013, and July 2013, and on multiple occasions therein, Defendant initiated multiple telephone calls to Plaintiff. 8. During the course of the aforesaid time period, the telephone calls initiated by Defendant were placed to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number. 9. At the time Defendant initiated the aforesaid telephone calls to Plaintiff, Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the telephone number to which it was calling was Plaintiff’s telephone number. COUNT I: DEBRA VEHLEWALD, INDIVIDUALLY V. CLAIM ASSISTANCE GROUP, LLC. COUNT II: DEBRA VEHLEWALD, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, V. CLAIM ASSISTANCE GROUP, LLC.

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36. Avista is primarily, an electric and natural gas utility. Avista provides utility operations in the Pacific Northwest and Juneau, Alaska. Avista’s utility division in the Pacific Northwest provides electric service to 379,000 customers and natural gas to 342,000 customers. In addition to its utility services, Avista has other businesses, including venture fund investments, sheet metal fabrication, and real estate investments. 37. On July 19, 2017, Avista and Hydro One executed the Merger Agreement and issued a joint press releasing announcing the parties’ entry into the transaction, which in relevant part stated: TORONTO, ONTARIO and SPOKANE, WASHINGTON – (Marketwired) -- 07/19/17 -- Hydro One Limited ("Hydro One") (TSX:H) and Avista Corporation ("Avista") 59. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 67. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 68. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Avista within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Avista and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the Proxy, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are false and misleading. 69. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Proxy alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause them to be corrected. 70. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control and influence the particular transactions giving rise to the violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. The Proxy contains the unanimous recommendation of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Transaction. They were thus directly involved in the making of the Proxy. 71. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Claim for Violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, and SEC Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder, Against the Individual Defendants and Avista Claim for Violation of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act Against the Individual Defendants Company Background and the Proposed Transaction

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1.”) 21. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 22. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 23. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 25. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 26. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 27. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter (“the Letter”) dated October 8, 2018. (A true and accurate copy is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 28. The Letter conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 29. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 30. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 31. The Letter was received and read by Plaintiff. 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to receive a clear, accurate and unambiguous validation notice, which allows a consumer to confirm that he or she owes the debt sought to be collected by the debt collector. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendant. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 34. The deprivation of Plaintiff's rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) provides that the written notice must contain a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector. 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) provides that the written notice must contain a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. 39. In order to be entitled to obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer, the consumer must dispute the debt in writing. 40. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) provides that the written notice must contain a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 41. In order to be entitled to obtain the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor, the consumer must request such in writing. 42. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the 15 U.S.C. § 1692g required disclosures, but also to convey such clearly. 43. Even if a debt collector conveys the required information accurately, the debt collector nonetheless violates the FDCPA if that information is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in the communication. 44. Even if a debt collector conveys the required information accurately, the debt collector nonetheless violates the FDCPA if that information is overshadowed by other collection activities during the 30-day validation period following the communication. 45. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) provides that collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor. 46. A collection activity or communication overshadows or contradicts the validation notice if it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain or confused as to her rights. 48. The first address, located in the coupon, is: Dept. 96307 PO Box 1259 Oaks, PA 19456. 49. The second address, located in the coupon, is: 4839 N Elston Ave Chicago IL 60630. 50. The third address, located in the coupon, is: PO Box 301122 Chicago IL 60630. 51. In order to be entitled to obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4), the consumer must dispute the debt in writing. 52. The Letter fails to instruct the consumer to which of the multiple addresses provided written disputes must be sent. 53. As a result of the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer would likely be confused as to which of the multiple addresses she should send her written dispute. 54. As a result of the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer would likely be uncertain as to which of the multiple addresses she should send her written dispute. 55. Without clear direction as to where to mail her written dispute, the least sophisticated consumer would likely not dispute the debt at all. 56. Without clear direction as to where to mail her written dispute, the least sophisticated consumer would likely not dispute the debt at all because she would be frightened of calling the collection agency where highly trained and aggressive debt collectors answer calls. 57. As a result of the foregoing, the Letter would likely discourage the least sophisticated consumer from exercising her right to dispute the debt. 58. In order to be entitled to obtain the name and address of the original creditor pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5), the consumer must request such in writing. 59. The Letter fails to instruct the consumer to which of the multiple addresses provided requests for the name of the original creditor must be sent. 60. As a result of the foregoing, the least sophisticated consumer would likely be confused as to which of the multiple addresses she should send her request for the name of the original creditor. 62. Without clear direction as to where to mail her request for the name of the original creditor, the least sophisticated consumer would likely not request this information at all. 63. Without clear direction as to where to mail her request for the name of the original creditor, the least sophisticated consumer would likely not request this information at all because she would be frightened of calling the collection agency where highly trained and aggressive debt collectors answer calls. 64. As a result of the foregoing, the Letter would likely discourage the least sophisticated consumer from exercising her right to request for the name of the original creditor. 65. As a result of the foregoing, the multiple addresses would likely make the least sophisticated consumer confused as to her rights. 66. As a result of the foregoing, the multiple addresses would likely make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights. 67. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the multiple addresses overshadow the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). 68. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the multiple addresses overshadow the disclosure of the consumer's right to receive verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). 69. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the multiple addresses overshadow the disclosure of the consumer's right to request the name and address of the original creditor provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5). 70. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the multiple addresses are inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the alleged Debt provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). 71. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the multiple addresses are inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to receive verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). 72. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the multiple addresses are inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to request the name and address of the original creditor provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5). 74. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 75. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318. 76. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319. 77. A collection letter also violates 15 91. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 92. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 93. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 94. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318. 95. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319. 96. A collection letter also violates 15 Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(b), 1692e and 1692e(10) Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10)

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16. Williams worked for True North from June of 2015 until June 18, 2017. 17. True North hired Williams as a Customer Service Representative for True North Store 345, located at 21920 Miles Road, Cleveland, Ohio 44128 in or around June 2015. 18. In or around April 2016, True North promoted Williams to an Assistant Store Manager for True North Store 345, located at 21920 Miles Road, Cleveland, Ohio 44128. 19. Throughout her employment with True North, Williams was an paid an hourly wage. 20. At all times material to the Complaint, Williams worked between 40 and 65 hours per week on average. 21. True North, however, did not pay Williams for the total hours she worked each week. .5 22. For each week that Williams worked, True North marked a portion of Williams’ hours as “unpaid.” 23. Williams was not paid for hours marked “unpaid” even though she performed work for True North during those hours at the direction of True North. 24. Williams was often told to not clock-in when she was performing work for True North at the direction of True North prior to her scheduled shift beginning. 25. Williams was often instructed to clock-out at the end of her shift although she was required to continue performing work for True North at the direction of True North after her scheduled shift ended and she had clocked-out. 26. Often, the hours marked “unpaid” on Williams’s time card were hours that Williams had worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 27. True North adjusted Williams’ clock-in and clock-out times in order to avoid paying Williams for all hours worked. 28. On May 20, 2016, former Assistant Manager John Hamrick filed a lawsuit against Defendants in the Northern District of Ohio asserting claims for violations of the FLSA (“Hamrick Litigation”).2 29. The Hamrick Litigation specifically sought unpaid wages springing from Defendants’ practice of having Assistant Managers perform “fuel price surveys” of competitor gas stations before and after they clocked in each day. 30. The Hamrick Litigation was certified as a collective action on July 20, 2016. 31. The class at issue in the Hamrick Litigation was limited to Assistant Managers, and did not include other hourly employees. 2 See Hamrick v. True North Management, LLC, No. 1:16cv01216. .6 32. The court-approved “Notice Of Pending Fair Labor Standards Act Lawsuit” narrowly defined the scope of the FLSA claims at issue in the Hamrick Litigation as follows: This lawsuit alleges that the Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by failing to pay their Assistant Managers for all time worked, including overtime. Specifically, the lawsuit alleges Plaintiff and other Assistant Managers are full-time employees at True North gas stations who are typically scheduled at or near 40 hours per week, paid by the hour, and classified as non-exempt employees under the FLSA. Defendants require their Assistant Managers to, among other things, perform fuel price surveys of competitor gas stations off-the clock before and after work. These fuel price surveys require Assistant Managers to drive past competitor gas stations, make note of the prices being charged for fuel by these competitors, and report these prices once they get to work and again after they leave work. However, Defendants require that employees’ (including Assistant Managers) clock-in and clock-out times for pay purposes adhere closely to their scheduled hours, and expressly prohibit clocking in earlier than (5) five minutes prior to their shift starting and clocking out more than (5) five minutes after their shift ends. Plaintiff therefore alleges that Defendants require Assistant Managers to perform these fuel price surveys off-the-clock before arriving at work for their scheduled shift and after clocking out and leaving work at the end of their scheduled shift. As a result, Plaintiff alleges he and other similarly situated Assistant Managers have been denied pay for all hours worked and overtime pay at one and one half times their regular rate in violation of the FLSA. 33. A true and accurate copy of the “Notice Of Pending Fair Labor Standards Act Lawsuit” that was issued in the Hamrick Litigation is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 34. The Hamrick complaint did not allege that Defendants were shaving time from Assistant Manager’s time cards, or simply refusing to pay Assistant Managers for all hours worked. 35. The Hamrick complaint did not allege that Assistant Managers were not paid for “unpaid time” on their time cards. 36. The claims at issue in the Hamrick Litigation differ materially from the claims raised in this action. 37. Williams did not opt-in to the Hamrick Litigation. 38. In or around October or November of 2016, the parties to the Hamrick Litigation entered into a settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”). 39. A true and accurate copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. .7 40. As it related to the class claims that had been asserted in Hamrick, the Settlement Agreement specifically stated that the class members released and forever discharged Defendants for all claims, damages, or liability arising under state and federal wage and hour laws as asserted in the Hamrick Litigation. 41. By its own express terms, the Settlement Agreement did not contemplate and does not cover the claims asserted in this action. 42. The Hamrick litigation put Defendants on notice that their pay practices violated the FLSA. 43. Despite being aware that True North’s pay practices violated the FLSA, Defendants continued to engage in conduct that blatantly violated the FLSA. 44. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful and reckless. 45. Defendants lacked good faith and acted unreasonably in violating the FLSA. 46. Plaintiff brings this as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals who are part of the following class: All individuals employed by True North who are or were hourly-paid, FLSA non- exempt employees who were not paid for all hours worked, and/or overtime compensation at a rate of one-and-one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek at any time during three (3) years preceding the filing of this action. These individuals are referred to as the “FLSA Class” or “FLSA Class Members”. 47. Collective Action treatment of Plaintiff’s and the FLSA Class Members’ FLSA claims is appropriate because Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members have been subjected to the common business practices referenced herein, and the success of their claims depends on the resolution of common issues of law and fact, including, inter alia, whether True North’s .8 companywide practices fail to properly compensation the FLSA Class Members for all hours worked. 48. Plaintiff seeks to recover all wages owed to herself and the FLSA Class Members for unpaid regular and overtime hours worked, liquidated damages to the fullest extent allowable under the FLSA and Ohio Wage Law, all available equitable relief, including attorneys’ fees and associated litigation costs. 49. Plaintiff restates each and every prior paragraph of this Complaint, as if it were fully stated herein. 50. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendants were employers covered by the FLSA. 51. During all times material to this Complaint, Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members were employees who were not exempt from overtime compensation under the FLSA because, inter alia, they were not “executive,” “administrative,” or “professional” employees as defined under the FLSA, and were entitled to one-and-one-half times their respective regular rates for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 52. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendants violated the FLSA with respect to the Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members by, inter alia, failing to compensate them for every hour worked in a workweek, where each hour worked includes all time spent by an employee that was primarily for the benefit of the employer or the employer’s business and where the employer knew or should have known that the employee was spending the time at issue primarily for the employer’s benefit. 53. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendants violated the FLSA with respect to the Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members by, inter alia, failing to compensate them at one-and- .9 one-half their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 54. During all times material to this complaint, Defendants knew that Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members were not exempt from the overtime obligations imposed by the FLSA. Defendants also knew that they were required to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members overtime compensation at a rate of one-and-one-half their respective regular rates for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. Despite such knowledge, Defendants willfully withheld and failed to pay the FLSA Class Members for all time worked, including overtime compensation, to which Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members are entitled. 55. In violating the FLSA, Defendants acted willfully, without a good faith basis, and in reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions. 56. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ conduct, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and those similarly situated for the full amount of the required overtime obligations, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 57. Plaintiff restates each and every prior paragraph of this Complaint, as if it were fully restated herein. 58. The Ohio Wage Act requires that covered employees be compensated for every hour worked in a workweek. 59. The Ohio Wage Act requires that employees receive overtime compensation at a rate of one- and-one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. .10 60. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendants were employers required to comply with the Ohio Wage Act’s mandates. 61. During all times material to this Complaint, Plaintiff was an employee entitled to individual protection of the Ohio Wage Act. 62. Defendants violated the Ohio Wage Act with respect to Plaintiff by, inter alia, failing to compensate Plaintiff for all hours worked, failing to pay Plaintiff the minimum wage for all hours worked, and failing to pay Plaintiff overtime for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 63. In violating the Ohio Wage Act, Defendants acted willfully, without a good faith basis, and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio Wage Act provisions. PAY OVERTIME COMPENSATION

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22. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 of the Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 23. Plaintiff, Angelia Ruffin has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since on or about March 11, 2002. 24. Plaintiff, Constance Hudson has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since December 2002. 25. Plaintiff, Pamela Girton-Hart has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 26. Plaintiff, Sean Baldwin has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 27. Plaintiff, Philip Tibbs has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 28. Plaintiff, Alan Oden has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since 1999. 29. Plaintiff, Gregory Mosley has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since December 1999. 30. Plaintiff, Charles Moses has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 31. Plaintiff, Michaele Jackson has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM Doc # 1 Filed 04/16/12 Pg 3 of 8 Pg ID 3 4 32. Plaintiff, Raphael Cosby has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 33. Plaintiff, Eugene Hickman has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino since on or about March 11, 2002. 34. Plaintiff, Cary Bryan has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 35. Plaintiff, Robin White has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 36. Plaintiff, Falikau Fofana has been employed as security guard with Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years. 37. Since 1999 Defendant, required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards to arrive at Defendant’s premises fifteen (15) minutes prior to their shift for roll call. 38. Since 1999 Defendant routinely disciplined security guards for failure to appear at roll call, being late for roll call and/or any other alleged misconduct during roll call. 39. Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards similarly situated in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and of the Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act MCLA 408.471, et seq. 40. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 39 of the Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 41. Since 1999 Defendant, required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards to arrive at Defendant’s premises fifteen (15) minutes prior to their shift for roll call. 2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM Doc # 1 Filed 04/16/12 Pg 4 of 8 Pg ID 4 5 42. Since 1999 Defendant routinely disciplined security guards for failure to appear at roll call, being late for roll call and/or any other alleged misconduct during roll call. 43. The Fair Labor Standard Act 29 U.S.C. § 206 requires that Defendant pay to each of its employees in an amount at least at the current minimum wage, 44. Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards similarly situated in violation of Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and specifically U.S.C. § 206. 45. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s repeated and willful refusal to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards, Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards have sustained damages and are entitled to the following relief: a. unpaid compensation; b. liquidated damages; c. civil penalties in the amount of $1,100 per violation; and d. costs and attorney fees. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment in their favor and against Defendant in an amount in excess of $100,000.00, plus exemplary damages, together with costs, interest, attorney fees and punitive damages as allowed by statute and any other relief this Honorable Court deems appropriate. 46. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 45 of the Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 47. Since 1999 Defendant, required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards to arrive at Defendant’s premises fifteen (15) minutes prior to their shift for roll call. 2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM Doc # 1 Filed 04/16/12 Pg 5 of 8 Pg ID 5 6 48. Since 1999 Defendant routinely disciplined security guards for failure to appear at roll call, being late for roll call and/or any other alleged misconduct during roll call. 49. The Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act MCLA 408.471, et seq. requires that Defendant pay to each of its employees in an amount at least at the current minimum wage, 50. Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards similarly situated in violation of Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act MCLA 408.471, et seq. 51. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s repeated and willful refusal to compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards, Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards have sustained economic and non- economic damages. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment in their favor and against Defendant in an amount in excess of $100,000.00, plus exemplary damages, together with costs, interest, attorney fees and punitive damages as allowed by statute and any other relief this Honorable Court deems appropriate. 52. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 51 above as though more fully set forth herein. 53. Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs, Angelia Ruffin, Philip Tibbs, Constance Hudson, Pamela Girton-Hart, Cary Bryan, Alan Oden, Charles Moses, Michaele Jackson, Sean Baldwin, Raphael Cosby, Eugene Hickman, Gregory Mosley, Robin White and Falikau Fofana and all similarly situated current and former security guards in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act which creates a class so numerous that joinder of all numbers is impractical. (FRCP 23A1). 2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM Doc # 1 Filed 04/16/12 Pg 6 of 8 Pg ID 6 7 54. The question of whether the Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs, Angelia Ruffin, Philip Tibbs, Constance Hudson, Pamela Girton-Hart, Cary Bryan, Alan Oden, Charles Moses, Michaele Jackson, Sean Baldwin, Raphael Cosby, Eugene Hickman, Gregory Mosley, Robin White and Falikau Fofana and all similarly situated current and former security guards involves questions of law or fact which are common to the entire class. 55. The claims or defenses of the representative class parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the entire class. 56. The prospective Plaintiffs class representatives, Angelia Ruffin, Philip Tibbs, Constance Hudson, Pamela Girton-Hart, Cary Bryan, Alan Oden, Charles Moses, Michaele Jackson, Sean Baldwin, Raphael Cosby, Eugene Hickman, Gregory Mosley, Robin White and Falikau Fofana, will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the entire class. 57. Prosecuting the multitude of separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or variant adjudications with respect to individual class members and would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class. 58. The questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions effecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS VIOLATIONS OF THE MICHIGAN WAGES AND FRINGE BENEFITS ACT, MCLA 408.471, et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.

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10. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of all members of the class, because all members of the class were subject to the same unlawful practices and suffered similar harms. 11. Plaintiff Walsh will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class because she does not have any conflict of interest with the class members, she understands her duty as a class representative, and the undersigned counsel will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests because, between them, they have substantial experience in this field. 12. In addition to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this lawsuit should be maintained as a class action for the reasons enumerated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). 13. Defendants employ exotic dancers who provide erotic entertainment to the Defendants’ customers at Club Fantasies. 14. Defendants classify their exotic dancers as independent contractors, but they do not meet the definition of independent contractors under state and federal law. Specifically: a) the Defendants require their exotic dancers to work exclusively for Club Fantasies, and prohibit the exotic dancers from working at any other club; b) the Defendants establish set hours for each shift, and require their exotic dancers to work a minimum number of shifts per week; c) the Defendants require their exotic dancers to report their availability to management at least a week in advance for scheduling purposes, and whenever an exotic dancer fails to report for a scheduled shift, they were subject to being fined, suspended, or terminated; d) the Defendants also have the right, in their sole discretion, to turn any of their exotic dancers away at the start of shift, even if the dancer is scheduled to work on that shift; e) the Defendants have the right to terminate their exotic dancers at will, for any reason and without any warning, as well as to discipline, fine, or suspend their exotic dancers for any reason; f) the Defendants employ a management staff, including “house moms,” that supervise the exotic dancers; g) the management staff takes attendance, controls how often and at what time the exotic dancers are required to perform stage dances during their shifts, and enforces the club’s rules for the exotic dancers; h) for each stage dance performance, the Defendants require their exotic dancers to perform on stage for a specific number of songs that the Defendants unilaterally determine, and the Defendants prohibit their exotic dancers from leaving the stage until another exotic dancer is available to replace them; i) the exotic dancers perform a service that is an integral part of the Defendants’ regular course of business, namely, the operation of an adult entertainment club (i.e. a strip club) that provides live entertainment in the form of live nude and semi-nude exotic dancing. 15. Defendants do not pay their exotic dancers a base wage. 16. The only compensation that the exotic dancers receive while working at Club Fantasies are tips paid by customers. 17. In order to work at Club Fantasies, the Defendants require their exotic dancers to pay the Defendants a shift fee of approximately $30 (the fee depends on whether it was a day shift or a night shift), plus a $10 fine if the dancer reports to the shift late. If an exotic dancer works double shifts in one day, she must pay two shift fees. If an exotic dancer does not earn enough in tips to pay a shift fee, the dancer cannot work again until she pays the full amount of the fee. If an exotic dancer does not report to a scheduled shift, the Defendants still require the exotic dancer to pay the fee for that shift before being allowed to work again. 18. In addition to shift fees, the Defendants collect a mandatory $5 fee from their exotic dancers for every lap dance that the dancers perform, and a $30 fee for every private “champagne room” dance the dancers perform, from the tips that the exotic dancers receive from customers for those dances. 19. The Defendants also require their exotic dancers to “tip-out” employees who are not eligible to receive tips, including the club’s bouncers, house moms, bartenders, and disc jockeys. The Defendants require their exotic dancers to pay a $5 tip-out to the bouncer after every private champagne room dance, and between $5 and $10 to each bartender, house mom, and disc jockey each shift. 20. As set forth above, the Defendants’ failure to pay their exotic dancers the federal minimum wage violates the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 21. As set forth above, the Defendants’ failure to allow their exotic dancers to retain all of their tips by requiring them to “tip-out” employees who do not customarily and regularly receive tips, as well as to pay a portion of their tips to the Defendants in the form of shift fees and other unlawful payments, violates the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 22. As set forth above, the Defendants’ misclassification of their exotic dancers as independent contractors, rather than as employees, violates R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-19.1. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-19.2. 23. As set forth above, the Defendants’ failure to pay their exotic dancers the state minimum wage rate, including by requiring the dancers to pay shift fees and fines, violates R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-12-3. The Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-19.2. 24. As set forth above, the Defendants’ requirement that their exotic dancers pay shift fees and fines to the Defendants in order to work at Club Fantasies violates R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-14-2 and 28-14-2.2. The Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-14-19.2. 25. As set forth above, an actual controversy has arisen among the parties. 26. A declaratory judgment entered by this Court will terminate the uncertainty and controversy among the parties. 27. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 6. Plaintiff Walsh brings this lawsuit on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3), and section 28-14-19.2 of the Rhode Island Payment of Wages Law, to recover classwide damages arising from Defendants’ misclassification of their exotic dancers, their failure to pay wages, and their practice of requiring dancers to pay unlawful fees, fines, and tip-outs to ineligible employees. In addition, the Plaintiff seeks to recover liquidated damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs as provided by law. 7. Plaintiff Walsh seeks to represent the following class under Rhode Island law and the FLSA: all individuals who have worked for Defendants as exotic dancers at Club Fantasies at 28 Sims Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island, at any time during the three-year period prior to the filing of this action. 8. Joinder is impracticable due to the size and composition of the class, the nature of the claims and relief sought, the remedial purpose of the underlying claims, and because individual joinder would be inefficient, uneconomical, and could result in the deprivation of wage rights to aggrieved employees. The class is expected to be comprised of well-over one- hundred class members. 9. There are issues of law and fact common to all class members, because Defendants’ employment and wage practices similarly applied to and affected all class members. The issues of law and fact are: a) whether Defendants misclassified their exotic dancers, b) whether Defendants failed to pay wages, c) whether Defendants unlawfully required dancers to pay fees, fines, and tip-outs to ineligible employees. Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 (Declaratory Relief) Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (Unlawful Tip Sharing) Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (Failure to Pay the Federal Minimum Wage) Rhode Island General Laws § 28-14-2 and § 28-14-2.2 Rhode Island General Laws § 28-14-19.1 (Independent Contractor Misclassification) Rhode Island General Laws § 28-12-3 (Failure to Pay the State Minimum Wage)

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97. The experiences of Plaintiff Torres at NCU were similar to those experienced by numerous other students attempting to navigate NCU’s doctoral programs across all NCU’s doctoral disciplines. 98. NCU’s marketing materials (e.g., webpages) available to all prospective students uniformly promised shorter timeframes to program completion than was supported. 99. Further, when NCU recruiters made personal representations to students about shorter timeframes to graduate, upon information and belief, they did so from recruitment materials/scripts which contained false timelines to completion within them. Such recruitment materials/scripts would provide the basis for such uniform misrepresentations. 100. Plaintiff requests that the Court certify this lawsuit as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 101. In the first instance, Plaintiff seeks certification of a nationwide Class under Arizona law, including certification of claims for fraud in the inducement under Arizona law (First Cause of Action), unjust enrichment under Arizona law (Second Cause of Action), breach of contract under Arizona law (Third Cause of Action), violations of the Arizona Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Fourth Cause of Action) and Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under Arizona Law (Fifth Cause of Action). Thus, Plaintiff seeks to certify the following nationwide Class pursuant to Rule 23: All current or former students of NCU who enrolled in and paid for a doctoral degree program from NCU from 2006 until 2017 (“Arizona Nationwide Class”). 19 Breach of Contract Against NCU (Under New Jersey Law on Behalf of Alternative New Jersey Sub-Class) 260. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 261. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action in the alternative on behalf of a New Jersey Subclass under New Jersey common law. NCU has systematically violated its contracts with Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass. 262. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass contracted with NCU to receive doctoral educational services. Implied in each contract was a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 263. As part of the contract, NCU promised, inter alia, that, in connection with providing doctoral educational services (1) dissertation/doctoral study committee members would work as a team, directly guiding students through the various stages of the dissertation process including the proposal; and (2) their respective programs could be completed in the promised time. 264. Rather than provide doctoral educational services as per its contractual agreement, NCU knowingly and intentionally created and implemented a process fraught with inefficiencies, meant to ensure that students receive neither adequate resources, nor the timely responses and attention that they were promised. All of this was done without honesty or transparency by NCU regarding the actual length of time the doctoral programs would take and the expense that would be incurred by its doctoral 45 Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Against NCU (Under New Jersey Law on Behalf of Alternative New Jersey Subclass) 271. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 272. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action in the alternative on behalf of a New Jersey Subclass under California common law. NCU has systematically violated its contracts with Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass. 273. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass contracted with NCU to obtain doctoral education services. 274. Implied in each contract was a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 275. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass provided value to NCU in the form of tuition payments and other costs for their doctoral programs as contracted. 276. By the scheme and conduct detailed herein, NCU has breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in its contracts. 47 Breach of Contract Against NCU (Under Arizona Law on Behalf of the Arizona Nationwide Class) 142. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 143. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action on behalf of a Nationwide Class under Arizona common law. NCU has systematically violated its contracts with Plaintiff Torres and each member of the Arizona Nationwide Class. 144. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the Arizona Nationwide Class contracted with NCU to receive doctoral educational services. Implied in each contract was a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 27 Breach of Contract Against NCU (Under New York Law on Behalf of Alternative New York Sub-Class) 321. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 322. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action in the alternative on behalf of a New York Subclass under New York common law. NCU has systematically violated its contracts with Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New York Subclass. 323. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New York Subclass contracted with NCU to receive doctoral educational services. Implied in each contract was a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 53 Breach of Contract Against NCU (Under California Law on Behalf of the California Nationwide Class) 196. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 197. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action, on behalf of a Nationwide Class under California common law. NCU has systematically violated its contracts with Plaintiff Torres and each member of the California Nationwide Class. 198. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the California Nationwide Class contracted with NCU to receive doctoral educational services. Implied in each contract was a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 35 Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Against NCU (Under Arizona Law on Behalf of the Arizona Nationwide Class) 31 Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Against NCU (Under California Law on Behalf of California Nationwide Class) 227. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 228. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action on behalf of a California Nationwide Class under California common law. NCU has systematically violated its contracts with Plaintiff Torres and each member of the California Nationwide Class. 229. Plaintiff and each member of the California Nationwide Class contracted with NCU to receive doctoral education services. 230. Implied in each contract was a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 231. Plaintiff and each member of the California Nationwide Class provided value to NCU in the form of tuition and fee payments for their respective doctoral programs as contracted. 232. By the scheme and conduct detailed herein, NCU has breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in its contracts. 233. This breach on the part of NCU has resulted in NCU doctoral students being damaged because they were required to enroll in courses that would not have otherwise been necessary, thereby 41 Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Against NCU (Under New York Law on Behalf of Alternative New York Sub-Class) 332. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 55 Fraud in the Inducement Against NCU (Under Arizona Law on Behalf of the Arizona Nationwide Class) 24 Fraud in the Inducement Against NCU (Under New York Law on Behalf of Alternative New York Sub-Class) 295. Plaintiff brings this cause of action in the alternative on behalf of a state-wide Subclass under New York common law. 296. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 297. NCU made actual or implied false representations concerning the cost and length of time to get a doctoral degree, while concealing the truth from prospective and actual students. 298. NCU had a duty to disclose that NCU’s doctoral programs were designed to take much longer than was represented to prospective students. 299. Instead, NCU concealed how long NCU’s doctoral programs take to complete. 300. For example, NCU intentionally misled Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New York Subclass with statements that the program would take a shorter timeframe, and that Plaintiff 50 Fraud in the Inducement Against NCU (Under New Jersey Law on behalf of alternative New Jersey Sub-Class) 234. Plaintiff brings this cause of action in the alternative on behalf of a state-wide Subclass under New Jersey common law. 235. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 236. NCU made actual or implied false representations concerning the cost and length of time to get a doctoral degree, while concealing the truth from prospective and actual students. 237. NCU had a duty to disclose that NCU’s doctoral programs were designed to take much longer than was represented to prospective students. 238. Instead, NCU concealed how long NCU’s doctoral programs take to complete. 239. For example, NCU intentionally misled Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass with statements that the program would take a shorter timeframe, and that Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass would have control over how quickly they could complete the program. 240. Instead, at the time Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass were recruited and enrolled in their respective doctoral degrees, NCU concealed that the programs in which they enrolled were designed to take longer than disclosed. 241. Similar, if not identical, false representations and omissions were also made to other members of the Subclass about their degree programs via recruiters, in NCU marketing materials, and on NCU webpages. 42 Fraud in the Inducement Against NCU (Under California Law on Behalf of the California Nationwide Class) 172. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of a nationwide Class under California common law. 173. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 32 Unjust Enrichment Against NCU (Under California Law on Behalf of the California Nationwide Class) 187. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 188. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action on behalf of a Nationwide Class under California common law. 189. NCU has engaged in unjust conduct, to the detriment of Plaintiff Torres and each member of the California Nationwide Class. 190. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the California Nationwide Class provided significant value to NCU in the form of tuition payments for doctoral program courses. 191. NCU appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit received by retaining the money paid by Plaintiff Torres and each member of the California Nationwide Class. 192. Although NCU accepted the tuition payments and retained and received benefit therefrom, it did not provide students with the doctoral programs that were promised and expected in connection with the payment of the tuition. On the contrary, NCU intentionally and deliberately 34 Unjust Enrichment Against NCU (Under Arizona Law on Behalf of the Arizona Nationwide Class) 133. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 134. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action on behalf of a Nationwide Class under Arizona common law. 135. NCU has engaged in unjust conduct to the detriment of Plaintiff Torres and each member of the Arizona Nationwide Class. 136. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the Arizona Nationwide Class provided significant value to NCU in the form of tuition and costs payments for doctoral program courses. 137. NCU appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit received by retaining the money paid by Plaintiff Torres and each member of the Arizona Nationwide Class. 138. Although NCU accepted the tuition payments and retained and received benefit therefrom, it did not provide students with the doctoral programs that were promised and expected in connection with the payment of tuition and costs. On the contrary, NCU intentionally and deliberately 26 Unjust Enrichment Against NCU (Under New Jersey Law on Behalf of Alternative New Jersey Sub-Class) 252. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 253. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action in the alternative on behalf of a New Jersey Subclass under New Jersey common law. NCU has engaged in unjust conduct, to the detriment of Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass. 254. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass provided significant value to NCU in the form of tuition and fee payments. 255. NCU appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit received by retaining the money paid by Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New Jersey Subclass. 256. Although NCU accepted the tuition and fee payments and retained and received benefit therefrom, it did not provide students with the doctoral process that was promised and contemplated in connection with the payment of tuition. To the contrary, NCU intentionally and deliberately used its doctoral programs as a means of improperly extracting tuition and fees and generating revenue. NCU has intentionally and knowingly created and implemented doctoral programs fraught with inefficiencies, meant to ensure that students do not receive the timely responses and attention that they were promised. All of this was done without any honesty or transparency by NCU regarding the actual time and expense that NCU’s doctoral students would incur to complete their degrees. 257. This unjust conduct on the part of NCU has resulted in its doctoral students enrolling in more courses than would be necessary had NCU not acted unjustly and incurring significant additional tuition and costs. It has also caused certain New Jersey Subclass members to stop pursuing their doctoral degrees. 44 Unjust Enrichment Against NCU (Under New York Law on Behalf of Alternative New York Sub-Class) 313. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 314. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action in the alternative on behalf of a New York Subclass under New York common law. NCU has engaged in unjust conduct, to the detriment of Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New York Subclass. 315. Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New York Subclass provided significant value to NCU in the form of tuition and fee payments. 316. NCU appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit received by retaining the money paid by Plaintiff Torres and each member of the New York Subclass. 317. Although NCU accepted the tuition and fee payments and retained and received benefit therefrom, it did not provide students with a doctoral process that was promised and contemplated in connection with the payment of the tuition. To the contrary, NCU intentionally and deliberately used its doctoral programs as a means of improperly extracting tuition and generating revenue. NCU has 52 Untrue and Misleading Advertising in Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17500 et seq. (On behalf of California Nationwide Class) 222. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 223. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action, on behalf of a Nationwide Class under California Business & Professions Code §17500. 224. California Business & Professions Code §17500 prohibits various deceptive practices in connection with the dissemination in any manner of representations which are likely to deceive members of the public to purchase products and services such as enrollment and re-enrollment in NCU’s doctoral programs. 225. NCU disseminated, through common advertising, untrue statements about NCU and its doctoral programs as described within this Complaint. NCU knew or should have known that its 40 Violation of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act 56:8 (Unconscionable Commercial Practices) (On Behalf of Alternative New Jersey Sub-Class) 278. Plaintiffs repeat and allege each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs above and incorporate said allegations as if fully set forth herein. 279. Plaintiff brings this cause of action in the alternative on behalf of an New Jersey Sub- Class. 280. New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA"), N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 prohibits: The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing [] concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merch subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby... 281. The CFA defines "merchandise" as including "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale." N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c). 282. As described in this Complaint, NCU has engaged in the advertisement and sale of services within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c), including through its website, recruiters, and other materials. 283. NCU has engaged in unconscionable commercial practices including, but not limited to, misrepresenting the length of time and cost it would take to complete a doctoral degree. 48 Violation of NY CLS Gen Bus § 349 (New York Consumer Protection Act) Against NCU (On Behalf of Alternative New York Sub-Class) 339. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 340. Plaintiff brings this cause of action in the alternative on behalf of an New York Sub- Class. NCU has engaged in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices, as set forth above. 341. NY CLS Gen Bus § 349 specifically prohibits the use of unfair or deceptive trade practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in New York. 56 Violations of California Business and Professions Code §17200 on behalf of California Nationwide Class (On Behalf of the California Nationwide Class) 207. Plaintiff Torres brings this cause of action, on behalf of a Nationwide Class under California Business & Professions Code §17200. 37 Violation of Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, A.R.S. § 44-1521 et seq. Against NCU (Arizona Nationwide Class) 153. Plaintiff Torres realleges and incorporates the preceding allegations by reference as if set forth fully herein. 29 Violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §1750 et seq. (On behalf of California Nationwide Class) 38

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17. Ring offers a variety of Wi-Fi enabled security and safety devices, most notably video doorbells and cameras. The Ring video doorbell is the company’s flagship product. It is a smart doorbell that contains a high-definition camera, a motion sensor, a microphone and speaker for two-way audio communication. It integrates with an associated mobile app, which allows users to view real-time video from the camera, receive notifications when the doorbell is rung, and communicate with visitors at the door via the integrated speaker. 18. In 2015, Ring released the first of its internal wireless IP cameras. Like the video doorbell, the cameras provide high definition video and microphone-speaker functionality for two-way communication. Since 2015, Ring has expanded its selection to include a range of indoor and outdoor cameras, each with video and two- way audio communication. 1 58. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 59. Defendants had full knowledge of the purpose for which its security cameras were being used and the sensitivity of the people and things the cameras were designed to secure and protect. Defendants also knew the types of harm that Plaintiff and Class Members could and would suffer if the integrity of the cameras were compromised. 60. Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in ensuring their cameras were secure, safe to use and inviolable by unauthorized parties. This duty includes, among other things, ensuring that reasonable and proper protocols and safeguards are in place, so that the Wi-Fi enabled cameras are not easily compromised by unauthorized users. 61. Plaintiff and Class Members were the foreseeable and probable victims of any inadequate security practices and procedures. Defendants knew of or should have known of the inherent risks of allowing Ring cameras to be set up and used without adequate security protocols and safeguards. 68. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 79. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 80. Defendants are in the business of manufacturing, designing, supplying, marketing, advertising, warranting, and selling security cameras. Defendants impliedly warranted to Plaintiff and Class Members that the Product was of a certain quality, free from defects, fit for the ordinary purpose of observing and recording events for the purpose of securing property and maintaining safety of its residents. 81. The Ring cameras were and are unfit for ordinary use and not of merchantable quality as warranted by Defendants because the Products are defective in that they are not secure and can easily be hacked by unauthorized third parties. Before purchase, Plaintiff and Class Members could not have readily discovered that the cameras were not merchantable for use to protect their homes and occupants. 82. Defendants have failed to provide adequate remedies under their limited warranty, which have caused that warranty to fail of its essential purpose, thereby permitting remedies under these implied warranties. 83. Defendants had unequal bargaining power and misrepresented the Products’ reliability and performance properties, and the limited remedies unreasonably favor Defendants and fail Plaintiff’s reasonable expectations for product performance. 85. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 86. Defendants sold Ring cameras to Plaintiff and Members of the Class for which they received a benefit in the form of monetary payment. 87. Defendants have acknowledged the benefit and accepted or retained the benefit conferred. 88. Implicit in the agreement between the Defendants and Plaintiff and Class Members was to provide cameras that were suitable for their purpose and not designed with flaws that render them vulnerable to hacking resulting in the compromise of user safety and security. 89. Without such implied contracts, Plaintiff and Class Members would not have paid for and conferred a benefit upon Defendants, but rather chosen one of the numerous alternative cameras that were available to them and which did not present a hidden safety risk. 90. Plaintiff and Class Members fully performed their obligations under the implied contracts with Defendants, however, Defendants did not. 91. Defendants breached the implied contracts with Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to acknowledge the inherent vulnerability in their cameras. These circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefit received. 93. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 94. As the intended and expected result of their conscious wrongdoing, Defendants have profited and benefited from the purchase of the Product by Plaintiff and the Class. 95. Defendants have voluntarily accepted and retained these profits and benefits, with full knowledge and awareness that, as a result of Defendants’ misconduct, Plaintiff and the Class did not receive Product of the quality, nature, fitness, or value that had been represented by Defendants, and that reasonable consumers expected. 96. Defendants have been unjustly enriched by their fraudulent and deceptive withholding of benefits to Plaintiff and the Class at the expense of these parties. 97. Equity and good conscience militate against permitting Defendants to retain these profits and benefits. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unjust enrichment, Plaintiff and Class Members suffered injury and seek an order directing Defendants’ disgorgement and the return to Plaintiffs and the classes of the amount each improperly paid to Defendants. A. Ring Products and Wi-Fi Connectivity BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT INVASION OF PRIVACY NEGLIGENCE UNJUST ENRICHMENT

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14. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)-23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for Defendant’s violations of the TCPA. 16. Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the Class members through this the class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 17. Upon information and belief the Class contains at a minimum thousands of members. 18. Upon information and belief, the Class’ size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to Defendant’s call records. 19. Members of the Class may be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in the class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to the Class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court. 20. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 21. Defendant, using an automatic telephone dialing system within the meaning of the TCPA, made, initiated and/or caused to be initiated at least one telephone call to Plaintiff and each member of the Class, without obtaining the called parties’ prior express consent, that delivered a text message identical or substantially similar to the text messages described above that were left for Plaintiff. 23. The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual members and include the following: (a) Whether Defendant’s conduct of using an automatic telephone dialing system within the meaning of the TCPA, to make, initiate or cause to be initiated at least one telephone call to Plaintiff and each member of the Class, without obtaining the called parties’ prior express consent, that delivered a text message identical or substantially similar to the messages described above that was left for Plaintiff, violated the 27. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 28. By Defendant’s above-described conduct, Defendant committed thousands of violations of the TCPA against Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 30. If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly violated the TCPA, Plaintiff and the members of the Class request an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations, which amounts to greater than $15,000,000.

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12. Each of the specific acts alleged in this Complaint are alleged to be consistent with Defendants’ abusive, unfair, unconscionable, and unlawful practices, which were designed to or had the natural consequence of attempting to improperly obtain money from consumers for the Defendants’ economic benefit and to the detriment of both consumers and law abiding debt collectors. 53. DIEUVEILLE repeats the foregoing factual allegations by reference. 54. The alleged Obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 55. DIEUVEILLE is a “consumer” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 56. C-SPV is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 57. CPS is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 58. ASPC is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 59. SCIAN is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 60. The Defendants violated the FDCPA. 63. Based on any one of those violations, Defendants are liable to DIEUVEILLE for statutory damages, attorney’s fees and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k 64. As a direct, proximate, and legal cause of the Defendants’ violations of the FDCPA, DIEUVEILLE has suffered actual damages. PRACTICES ACT AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW2.NAZ.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 31. Plaintiff, Jason Camacho, attended the NACAC college fair at Javits on Nov. 5, 2018 in order to obtain information from the college exhibitors presenting and marketing at the fair including the Defendant’s school. 32. Soon after attending the Javits fair, Mr. Camacho attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s school but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 35. The stated principles of NACAC members include “They strive to eliminate bias within the educational system based on …disability.”1 36. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant, that is a member of NACAC, intentionally violated NACAC’s basic principles to eliminate bias toward the disabled as well as federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. 37. NACAC maintains a business relationship with the New York Daily News newspaper which publishes full page advertisements for the NACAC college fairs at Javits and an onsite guide to the exhibitors which is distributed free of charge to attendees at the college fairs. Exhibitors, such as the Defendant, may participate in the New York Daily News advertisements and/or advertise in the onsite guide. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 40. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 41. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 42. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 44. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 48. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 56. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 58. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Defendant’s school and it’s exhibits at Javits are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s school. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 63. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 64. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 66. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant’s physical exhibit locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 87. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 90. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 92. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 97. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 98. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. DECLARATORY RELIEF 116. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 117. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 118. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504 VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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(Unjust Enrichment) 155. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations of all other paragraphs of this Complaint as though set forth herein. 156. TGPNA has been unjustly enriched as a result of the conduct complained of herein. 157. It would be inequitable for TGPNA to retain the benefit of illicitly obtained monies that were obtained at the expense of the Plaintiff Class members as alleged herein. 158. Plaintiff and the members of the Class seek restitution with respect to, and/or disgorgement of, all illicitly obtained monies and profits obtained by TGPNA through its willful acts either as damages or restitution. 24. The FERC Report can be accessed in full at https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20160428164930-IN12-17-000.pdf (attached to Order to Show Cause), and includes a detailed description of the manipulative and anticompetitive scheme engaged in by TGPNA to control Monthly Index Prices for natural gas at the four western United States trading hubs which are the subject of this action -- i.e., at SoCal; Permian; Waha; and San Juan -- between July 1, 2009 and July 31 2012. 26. A more detailed description of TGPNA’s manipulations of Monthly Index Prices is set forth below. (i) The Four Natural Gas Trading Hubs Where the Manipulation Occurred: SoCal, Permian, Waha and San Juan 27. In the western U.S. during the relevant time, natural gas was “traded” with reference to specific recognized geographical trading locations. Four of the most significant trading locations in the western U.S., and the ones where the manipulation described herein occurred, were known as SoCal; Permian; Waha; and San Juan. 28. SoCal is a trading hub near the border of California and Arizona. Permian is a trading hub near the southeast border of New Mexico. San Juan is a trading hub in the northwest part of New Mexico. Waha is a trading hub in western Texas. (ii) Physical vs. Financial Natural Gas Contracts 29. Natural gas contract transactions are characterized as either physical or financial transactions. A physical transaction involved the contractual obligation to actually deliver or receive physical natural gas at a particular location during a particular time. Physical natural gas is typically measured in units of One Million British Thermal Units (or “Mmbtu’s”), also known as a dekatherm (“Dth”) (i.e., 1 Mmbtu = 1 Dth). For example, a person with a “long” physical position (i.e., a net buyer) of 1,000 Mmbtu of natural gas at SoCal for each day in August 2011 had purchased a net volume of 1,000 Mmbtu of natural gas to be delivered at SoCal during each day during August 2011, and thus had an obligation to actually take delivery of (i.e., receive) 1,000 Mmbtu of natural gas to be delivered at SoCal during each day during August 2011. 31. Physical transactions could be priced at either a fixed price agreed to by the counterparties (e.g., $4.10 per Mmbtu) or at a published index that typically reflected the volume- weighted average price (“VWAP”) of certain transactions made by natural gas market participants during a bidweek (as determined by the compiler and publisher of the index), such as the Monthly Index Prices. 33. According to the FERC Report, FERC Office of Enforcement undertook a non- public investigation of TGPNA’s bidweek trading activities in natural gas markets in the southwestern U.S. to determine whether TGPNA was trading natural gas-related products uneconomically during bidweek in certain markets to affect the Monthly Index Prices to benefit its related financial positions, the profitability of which were determined by the Monthly Index Prices. During the investigation, FERC obtained and reviewed productions of data and documents submitted by TGPNA in response to subpoenas issued by Enforcement as well as the Commodity Trading Futures Commission (“CFTC”), which conducted its own independent investigation of TGPNA’s trading in coordination with Enforcement. Enforcement also took sworn testimony from a number of witnesses, including current and former TGPNA employees and executives and senior executives at Total and TGPL. Enforcement also conducted interviews with former TGPNA employees and several TGPNA counterparties. 35. Specifically FERC’s Office of Enforcement determined that TGPNA and its traders manipulated natural gas market prices during 38 of what FERC calls “point months” (i.e., buying or selling natural gas relating to a specific location (e.g., SoCal, Permian, Waha or San Juan) for a specific calendar month). FERC’s Office of Enforcement determined TGPNA traders engaged in a coordinated scheme during those months to take the physical next-month contractual positions they had built and offset them with fixed price next-month physical contracts -- generally at a loss -- to impact the Monthly Index Price settlements to benefit TGPNA’s related financial positions that settled against those indices. A list of the 38 manipulated point months, and the direction of the manipulation, is set forth in Exhibit A hereto. 36. FERC’s Office of Enforcement also determined that TGPNA traders executed their manipulative scheme for contracts for natural gas at primary natural gas trading points in the western U.S. at the time: SoCal, Permian, Waha and San Juan. 37. FERC Office of Enforcement determined that TGPNA made illegal profits of in excess of $9 million and caused pecuniary losses to other market participants of at least $89 million by its manipulative scheme in artificially moving the Monthly Index Prices. 38. On April 28, 2016, FERC issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Proposed Penalty to TGPNA, Total, TGPL, Hall and Tran premised on the Office of Enforcement’s report. C. Background of TGPNA’s West Desk and Trading 39. The foregoing manipulative and anticompetitive scheme was perpetrated on behalf of TGPNA by its West Desk which focused on trading contracts for physical and financial natural gas-related products in western U.S markets. 41. Tran, who had worked for Hall at her prior energy trading employer, was recruited by and directly worked for Hall at the West Desk. 42. TGPNA’s western U.S. natural gas trading during the alleged manipulation months focused on four of the most significant western U.S. trading locations, discussed above: SoCal, Permian, Waha and San Juan. D. The Details of the Manipulative and Anticompetitive Scheme 43. TGPNA’s West Desk traders’ manipulative and anticompetitive scheme involved, for each month of manipulation in which they artificially manipulated a hub’s Monthly Index Prices identified in Appendix A to the FERC Report, the following: (1) setting up a financial index position (principally contractual swap agreements), (2) purchasing physical next-month futures contracts that established a position that was in the opposite direction of the financial position (i.e., in the opposite direction of the financial index position) and (3) then “flattening” (i.e., “liquidating”) the physical next-month futures contracts position through purchasing or selling next-month fixed price contracts during bidweek, at artificially high or low prices, resulting in a loss in combination with the physical next-month futures contracts, but which caused the Monthly Index Prices to increase or decrease as the traders desired and thereby benefitted the financial index positions (e.g., the swaps). Because of the larger position TGPNA held in the financial index swaps (or other financial contractual position) in step 1, which benefitted by the manipulated movement in the Monthly Index Prices, TGPNA made an overall significant profit on the scheme. 45. TGPA’s holdings of contracts for physical positions going into a bidweek (that were in the opposite direction of TGPA’s financial index position) (step 2) thus enabled TGPNA to trade large volumes of next-month fixed price gas in the opposite direction during the bidweek (step 3) as a means of flattening the contracts for the physical positions but also had the effect of moving the relevant Monthly Index in the direction that would benefit its financial index holdings. For example, a short physical next-month contract position of 10,000 Mmbtu of natural gas going into bidweek allowed TGPNA to enter into next-month fixed price contracts to buy 10,000 Mmbtu during bidweek to flatten the physical contract position it had built. Those purchases, if intentionally made at inflated prices, would inflate the Monthly Index Price that was calculated based on such prices and thereby enhance TGPA’s return on its financial index contracts. 46. In other words, because the VWAP of the reported next-month fixed price contracts entered into during bidweek set the Monthly Index Price, TGPNA’s flattening of its physical next- month contractual positions in the market allowed TGPNA to impact Monthly Index Prices and benefit its related financial positions, which either paid or received the Monthly Index Prices at settlement. 48. The relevant markets which TGPNA unreasonably restrained and monopolized, or attempted to monopolize, are the markets for determining the Monthly Index Prices for the natural gas hubs and periods set forth in Exhibit A (“Relevant Markets”), which index dictated the prices for the sale of natural gas under pre-existing contracts that settled against such Monthly Index Prices and for making payments due under pre-existing financial contracts that settled against such Monthly Index Prices. F. TGPNA’s Conduct Had Anticompetitive Effects 49. The manipulative scheme described herein had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the Relevant Markets, as evidenced by, inter alia, the FERC Report which found that TGPNA’s scheme distorted the normal forces of supply and demand which should have driven the Monthly Index Prices: [T]he West Desk’s fixed price trading during the Relevant Period did not reflect supply and demand fundamentals, and its traders were generally indifferent to price. Rather than trade fixed price gas during bidweek based on market fundamentals trying to buy low and sell high—West Desk traders bought and sold gas for the purpose of influencing published index prices. The West Desk traders were generally indifferent to price fundamentals. As Wilson testified, after observing a 12-cent swing in NYMEX prices during the May 2012 bidweek period at Permian, Tran directed Wilson to “just start trading it, and . . . not worry about the volume.” Wilson also admitted, “I wasn’t concerned whether I made or lost money on the fixed price trades. I was concerned with having an impact on the first-of-the-month index.” FERC Report at 68-69 (footnotes omitted). 51. TGPNA’s scheme of acquiring substantial Monthly Index Price swap contracts, and thereafter engaging in artificial, uneconomic and money-losing purchases or sales of next- month fixed price natural gas contracts at intentionally inflated or deflated prices in the bidweek markets to benefit such swap contracts interfered with the normal forces of supply and demand in those markets and injected false and non-competitive prices into the markets for determining Monthly Index Prices which were intended to be based exclusively on freely-competitive market transactions entered into pursuant to the normal competitive forces of supply and demand in the Relevant Markets. By reason of such interference with and destruction of competitive market forces in the Relevant Markets, Plaintiff and the members of the Plaintiff Class have been injured. There were no procompetitive benefits of TGPNA’s scheme. G. TGPNA Willfully Acquired and Maintained Monopoly Power and Engaged in Anticompetitive Conduct with a Specific Intent to Monopolize 52. TGPNA’s traders intentionally engaged, on behalf of TGPNA, in their unlawful course of conduct from June 2009 through July 2012 to acquire and maintain monopoly power over, or to attempt to monopolize, the Monthly Index Prices which dictated the prices payable under pre-existing contracts that settled against the Monthly Index Prices during the 38 point months for the four trading locations listed in Exhibit A hereto. 54. TGPNA’s traders knew their next-month fixed price natural gas trading during bidweek was losing money and that it would prevent free market forces from operating in the Relevant Markets, but they were willing to accept such losses because the uneconomic next- month fixed price trading was part of their manipulative scheme to acquire and maintain monopoly power over Monthly Index Prices to benefit their related financial positions. 55. This willfulness and intent of TGPNA is demonstrated through direct evidence, such as TGPNA’s execution of transactions benefiting its Monthly Index swap positions, and trading which would be economically irrational but for the manipulative scheme. TGPNA traders coordinated their individual and collective actions in furtherance of the manipulative scheme. 57. Direct evidence of TGPNA’s manipulative intent includes, among other things, (1) testimony from two former TGPNA employees (Wilson and Stephen Callender (“Callender”)) who separately and independently “blew the whistle” on TGPNA’s manipulative conduct to FERC and to the CFTC, respectively; (2) TGPNA trade data corroborating Wilson’s and Callender’s account of the West Desk’s manipulative conduct; (3) contemporaneous documents showing that, during the Class Period, TGPNA’s internal offices and senior management raised specific compliance concerns with the West Desk’s bidweek trading, especially with regard to (i) its very high market share of next-month fixed price volumes during bidweek, (ii) the price difference between the West Desk’s next-month fixed price trades and the rest of the market, and (iii) large Monthly Index Price financial positions that profited from its manipulative next-month fixed price trading during bidweek; and (4) documents showing that the West Desk employed sophisticated bidweek spreadsheets that facilitated and monitored the success of the manipulation scheme in real time. (i) Wilson and Callender Provided Detailed Accounts of TGPNA’s Bidweek Trading Scheme 59. Wilson’s three-year tenure at TGPNA is divided into two phases: an initial phase between 2009 and January 2012 during which Wilson was not involved in the West Desk’s bidweek trading, and a second phase during the first half of 2012 when Wilson directly observed and knowingly participated in the desk’s scheme under Tran’s supervision. (1) Phase 1 of Wilson’s Tenure at TGPNA: Hall Attempts Unsuccessfully to Teach Wilson the Bidweek Scheme 61. Within a few months after joining TGPNA, Hall, the initial head of the West Desk, gave Wilson a tutorial explaining the West Desk’s bidweek trading strategy. During this 2009 meeting, Hall drew a table on a white board to try to teach Wilson the West Desk’s bidweek strategy, but this was an entirely different way to approach the market to Wilson, who later admitted that he did not understand it, or “the broader strategy” at that time. After just “one bid week, maybe two bid weeks at the most” Hall stopped asking Wilson to participate. 62. Wilson only came to fully understand Hall’s description of the bidweek strategy and the table Hall drew on the whiteboard almost two-and-a-half years after their 2009 meeting when, in January 2012, Tran, Hall’s successor as head of the West Desk, directed him to help her in the West Desk’s bidweek trading, and Wilson thereafter observed and participated in the scheme. The table (reproduced and explained in the FERC Report at 23) highlights two critical components of the scheme. First, the table illustrates the purpose for the initial positions: as Wilson explained, “the whole reason you’ve established a large short index position is so that you can trade a bunch of fixed price and have an impact on the index.” Second, it illustrates the impact and overall purpose of the fixed price trades: As Wilson emphasized, by the end of day 4, “I have traded a ton of fixed price to support my financial position.” (2) Phase 2 of Wilson’s Tenure at TGPNA: Wilson Learned, Observed, and Participated in the Bidweek Scheme Under Tran’s Supervision 64. Wilson traded bidweek under Tran’s direction from the end of January 2012 (for the February Market Index Price) through the end of May 2012 (for the June Market Index Price). Based on his experience during these five bidweek periods, Wilson identified two principal factors that led him to realize that the West Desk was designing its trades to influence Market Index Prices. 65. First, Wilson found that during these bidweek periods that the West Desk consistently established an initial position leading up to bidweek or in bidweek that included a large financial position and a physical index position that pointed in opposite directions. For example, Wilson noted that heading into the April 2012 bidweek period at San Juan, the West Desk had a short basis position of approximately 128,000 MMBtu/day and a long index position of approximately 140,000 MMBtu/day. Wilson then described the significance of these initial positions, explaining that TGPNA would trade fixed price gas during bidweek for the dual purpose of flattening the index position and supporting the basis position. 66. The large physical index position going into bidweek, which included large volumes of physical index gas, especially stood out to Wilson. He explained that it did not make sense for a trading operation like TGPNA, solely interested in speculation, to stockpile such a large physical index position going into bidweek. 68. In his testimony, Wilson detailed his involvement trading bidweek during the five- month period in 2012 and how he came to understand the nature of the West Desk’s scheme. During the month of February heading into the March 2012 bidweek, Wilson familiarized himself with the West Desk’s bidweek spreadsheet: [it] would allow me to track all of the basis risk, the index risk, the NYMEX risk. It would all be loaded into the sheet on the last day of the month prior to the start of bid week so I could see what the initial front month position was. FERC Report at 27-28. 69. Continuing to study the spreadsheets during subsequent bidweeks, Wilson developed an understanding of the West Desk’s bidweek trading strategy. He testified that by studying the bidweek spreadsheets and seeing how they worked during bidweek, “I was seeing how various fixed price trades were aligned with financial positions and how those fixed price trades would change certain values that we were keeping track of.” 71. As Wilson recalled in his testimony, the “watershed” moment occurred at the end of March 2012 (during the April 2012 bidweek period) when he realized that he was being directed to trade a lot of fixed price gas at San Juan after the NYMEX dropped, with the specific intent to lower the index price at San Juan. 72. After the April 2012 bidweek period, Wilson traded two more bidweeks—May and June 2012. In each of those, he was fully aware of the scheme and, in fact, he intentionally traded fixed price gas to affect the index price in an effort to benefit the desk’s related positions. During these bidweeks, Wilson admitted that he knew at that time that he was “having an impact on the index” and that he was “knowingly trading to try to affect the index price.” For the May 2012 bidweek, as an example, Wilson made fixed price trades at Permian in order to strengthen the index because the desk had a long Print Risk position. As he described it, “I wasn’t concerned whether I made or lost money on the fixed price trades. I was concerned with having an impact on the first-of- the-month index.” 74. Like Wilson, Callender also explained the West Desk’s bidweek trading scheme in detail. Callender testified that he believed Hall and Tran engaged in a scheme to trade physical products during bidweek to try to influence index prices, that this strategy “was employed continually month after month after month,” and that it occurred at SoCal and Waha. 75. There were two principal bases for Callender’s allegation: his review of TGPNA position reports and discussions with other traders at the company that were seated in close proximity to him. Callender testified that he frequently looked at TGPNA’s position reports and, like Wilson, he discovered that the West Desk had sizeable financial and physical index positions leading up to bidweek. For example, referring to a position report TGPNA created just prior to the February 2010 bidweek, Callender testified that TGPNA had a short basis position (a position that would benefit from a decline in the Monthly Index Price) of approximately 142,000 MMBtu/day and a long index position of approximately 247,000 MMBtu/day at Permian. Callender then explained how these positions created a prime posture for the West Desk traders to influence the published Monthly Index Price. Specifically, Callender testified that he believed, “[b]ased on history, what normally went on,” the traders would take advantage of their large long physical index position to “be a big seller of physical gas throughout bid week “ (i.e., sell a lot of next- month fixed price gas during bidweek). He believed the traders did this “to influence the paper” (i.e., drive the published Monthly Index Price in its favor). 77. In addition to his review of position reports showing a consistent pattern of initial positions, Callender also believed the West Desk engaged in its bidweek trading scheme based on discussions he had with other traders at TGPNA. For example, one of Callender’s friends at TGPNA explained to him how TGPNA made a lot of money during bidweek by trading physical gas as a way of influencing related financial basis swap positions. (ii) The Trade Data Corroborates the Existence of the Scheme 78. Wilson’s and Callender’s accounts of the West Desk’s bidweek trading scheme are corroborated by the relevant trade data, which shows that the desk’s traders frequently used their monthly physical fixed price bidweek trades to influence published Monthly Index Prices for the purpose of benefiting their related positions. The data confirm that this conduct occurred between June 2009 and June 2012 at SoCal, Waha, Permian, and San Juan during the 38 point months identified by FERC. Moreover, the data verify that the scheme operated under the same two phases described by Wilson and Callender. 79. First, going into each bidweek period, the West Desk regularly established large physical and financial positions exposed to published index prices (i.e., a large Print Risk position), which included basis and index positions in opposite directions and a large physical index position. To obtain these large Print Risk positions, the traders actively traded before (and sometimes during) bidweek, and they frequently discussed and coordinated these positions. 81. The West Desk lost money on its monthly physical fixed price bidweek trades in the vast majority of the 38 point-months and made only a small profit in the remaining point- months. Overall, it lost approximately $2.09 million on its fixed price trades across the 38 point- months. 82. The collective and repeated nature of these strategies during the Class Period demonstrates the West Desk’s intent to move index prices to benefit its related Print Risk positions. 83. One of many examples illustrating the essential concepts described by Wilson and Callender—build-up of positions leading into bidweek and fixed price trading during bidweek to influence index prices to benefit those positions — was the bidweek trading in late July 2011 for the month of August 2011 at the SoCal hub, described below. FERC Report at 38-41 85. This is exactly what Tran did during bidweek. Trading during the first and second days of bidweek, Tran entered into 22 fixed price transactions at SoCal, trading more than 5 Bcf of gas (by gross volumes). The following trading behaviors and patterns show Tran’s intent to drive up prices at SoCal: almost all the transactions (20 of 22) were purchases, consistent with a desire to drive up prices; she established sufficient market share to move the index upward by dominating the market for fixed price trades at SoCal during bidweek - and her trades put her on one side of approximately 48 percent of the volumes transacted on ICE underlying the published index price at SoCal; consistent with the intent to move the index upward, Tran transacted at fixed prices above the prices traded by other market participants, and engaged in strategies to pay more, not less, for her purchases, in order to establish a higher index price. 86. FERC Enforcement’s finding that these patterns show Tran’s intent to affect prices is consistent with the findings of TGPNA’s Vice President of Risk Control, Natalie Bondareva, who found the appearance of what she called “suboptimal trading” during the August 2011 “bidweek” period. (iii) Other Contemporaneous Documents Reveal The Existence and Broad Knowledge of the West Desk’s Bidweek Trading Scheme 88. Gary Craven (“Craven”), TGPNA’s Chief Compliance Officer from approximately 2008 through 2011, recognized that physical bidweek trading with the intent to benefit related financial positions could constitute market manipulation, and took steps to alert senior management to the risk of such trading at TGPNA. 89. At the conclusion of each bidweek from February 2009 through February 2011 Craven compiled reports for TGPNA management highlighting, among other things, (1) TGPNA’s bidweek market share for trades at various points reported to index publications; and (2) how its bidweek prices at those points differed from the rest of the market and affected the published index prices. 90. For example, Craven analyzed the effect of TGPNA’s bidweek trading at Waha during the December 2009 bidweek period, which is within the relevant period and one of the 38 point-months specifically identified in the FERC Report. Craven found that the West Desk’s fixed price trades at Waha during this bidweek period made up 46 percent of the reported volumes during this bidweek period; affected the Waha published index in his view by 3 cents; and benefited TGPNA’s long Print Risk position in his view by $7,000. 92. Craven’s reports also raised the specter of illegal conduct for TGPNA management. After reviewing Craven’s February 2009 report, TGPNA’s President, Bruce Henderson, sent a memorandum to and met with executives of Total and TGPL about TGPNA’s very high market share at several trading points and resultant regulatory scrutiny. 93. TGPNA also recognized that the data (and the specific language Craven used to describe the data) might disclose TGPNA’s manipulative conduct. Thus, in his September 2010 report, Craven revised some of the language in his reports at the suggestion of the law firm of Covington & Burling LLP. For example, until this time, Craven labeled his calculation for the effect of TGPNA’s bidweek fixed price trades on the published Monthly Index Prices as “TGPNA Reporting Effect on Price.” Starting in September 2010, after Covington reviewed the documents, Craven still calculated this figure, but, apparently concerned about potentially disclosing TGPNA manipulative conduct, labeled it simply “Dif.” 94. Despite the matters contained in Craven’s reports, there is no evidence that TGPNA management conducted any meaningful inquiries regarding the trading activity that Craven identified. b. Middle Office Reports Raised Concerns With TGPNA’s Market Share of Reported Bidweek Trades Contributing to Index Prices 96. The potential for manipulation by TGPNA’s West Desk was also highlighted by Wilson’s internal whistleblowing activities. Wilson sent an email to TGPNA’s President, Bruce Henderson, on June 10, 2012, stating that “I have learned that some of the west team trading activity may not be entirely above board, and should be closely examined. At best, I think these activities would generate an ethics discussion and, at worst could be a violation of federal regulations.” Shortly after receiving this email, Henderson alerted senior management at Total and TGPL, and asked TGPNA’s Vice President of Risk Control, Natalie Bondareva, to analyze the West Desk’s bidweek trading. 97. Bondareva analyzed the West Desk’s bidweek trading at Permian, San Juan, SoCal, and Waha between July 2011 and July 2012. Her analysis identified numerous months when the desk had a high market share of fixed price trades contributing to the index. A. General Background

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(Failure to Pay Timely Wages Due - Arizona Wage Statute) 20. ComTrans is an Arizona corporation in the business of providing behavioral health and social services transportation to children and adults with special or unique non- emergency circumstances. 21. ComTrans employs more than 400 Drivers whose principal business is to provide transportation services for the company’s clients. Drivers provide transportation services for clients of CPS and other behavioral health care services from their home, health care facilities and various locations. Drivers are responsible for maintaining accurate and complete paperwork. Drivers are also responsible for maintenance of ComTrans’ equipment, including vehicles, radios, map books, and car seats. 22. ComTrans requires its Drivers to remain in dress code at all times during their work day, even when they are at base during non-working hours. The uniform includes an assigned ComTrans shirt. 23. Plaintiff was employed during his tenure for ComTrans as a ComTrans driver from on or around April 7, 2014 until in or around June 2015. Plaintiff was also employed as a case aide from in or around June 2015 until on or around March 10, 2016. Plaintiff’s duties as a case aide included driving. 24. As a non-exempt Driver Plaintiff provided transportation services pursuant to strict ComTrans policies. 25. Plaintiff provided transportation for women in domestic violence crisis, individuals in detoxification facilities, individuals who are seriously mentally ill, and other individuals with sensitive needs. 26. ComTrans provided Plaintiff a company-owned vehicle to perform his transportation duties as a Driver, as well as a two-way radio and company cell phone to communicate with dispatch and track his schedule and daily transports. 28. ComTrans considered Plaintiff’s start time as the time he arrived on scene for his first pick-up and his end time is the last drop-off. 29. ComTrans required Plaintiff to perform duties before the start of his shift and after his shift concluded without recording that time or receiving compensation for it. 30. Throughout the day, there were numerous hours in which Plaintiff was required to be working but was not allowed to record his time and thus was not compensated for the time he worked. 31. According to ComTrans policy, Plaintiff was required to drive his company vehicle to pick up his first passenger while in uniform, but he was not paid for this time. 32. Plaintiff was required to turn in his manifest, which is his daily schedule, to ComTrans’ home base located at 2336 East Magnolia Street in Phoenix, Arizona, but he was not compensated for this time. 33. Plaintiff was required to check with ComTrans Scheduling or Dispatch by radio prior to his first trip and after his last drop off of the last client in many instances, which he was not compensated for. 34. Plaintiff was also required to prepare his schedule in advance of each day he spent working, but he was not compensated for this time. ComTrans acknowledges in its written policies that planning a route takes ample time for a driver. Nevertheless, ComTrans required this work to be completed “prior to [Plaintiff’s] start of shift” and he was not compensated for this time. During this planning time, Plaintiff was required to download his manifest from the transport application, print a hardcopy of the manifest, locate his first stop in the map book and write out the route he was going to use to get there. These tasks were completed for each transport scheduled on a given day. All of these tasks were required to be completed before Plaintiff’s shift started, and he was not able to record or receive compensation for this time. 36. ComTrans also did not compensate Plaintiff for hours he spent working during the day that the company called “downtime.” ComTrans considered downtime to be the time in between scheduled client pickups throughout Plaintiff’s day that is thirty minutes or longer. ComTrans required Plaintiff to wear his work uniform, continue to utilize his work vehicle, and perform work duties by responding to dispatch during this “downtime.” ComTrans prohibited Plaintiff from using the company-owned vehicle for personal use, and ComTrans required Plaintiff to remain within a four-mile radius of his last drop-off during downtime so that he could quickly provide services to new transports. ComTrans policy required Plaintiff to clean his vehicle during unpaid downtime as well. 37. ComTrans also required Plaintiff to work off the clock when a passenger canceled a scheduled transport. If Plaintiff was traveling to pick up a client and the client canceled the transport prior to his arrival, ComTrans would not pay Plaintiff for that travel time. 38. ComTrans required Plaintiff to perform mandatory maintenance and cleaning on his company-owned vehicle as part of his regular job duties. ComTrans required Plaintiff to perform this work without recording the time and compensating him for it. For example, ComTrans’ written policy required Plaintiff to return to the base to charge his radio or phone battery if it was dead, but he was required to do this mandatory task during a “break” and was not compensated for this time. 40. ComTrans required Plaintiff to attend mandatory training during regular hours of employment directly related to his duties as a driver transporting individuals with special health concerns, including training about planning daily routes, filling out transportation logs, customer service, and CPR. According to written ComTrans policy, Plaintiff was not paid for mandatory CPR training or benefits meetings. 41. ComTrans required Plaintiff to attend a four-hour CPR training and additional hours of refresher CPR training as part of his duties as a driver for individuals with serious health conditions. ComTrans’ written policy, however, required Plaintiff to attend the CPR training without receiving compensation for that time. ComTrans also required Plaintiff to attend benefits meetings but he was not compensated for this time either. 42. Plaintiff routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week as part of his regular schedule as a Driver, many hours for which he was required to work off the clock. 43. Plaintiff typically worked approximately sixty (60) hours per week during his employment at ComTrans. 44. During a typical day, Plaintiff would start his work for ComTrans at around five in the morning. He would review his daily manifest and plan his route. He would then travel to his first pickup at six in the morning. None of the work he performed prior to his first pick-up was compensated. He then would conduct transports throughout the day, often with downtime ranging from thirty minutes to several hours that was not compensated for despite being required to perform job duties like answering calls from dispatch or having maintenance performed on ComTrans’ equipment. He would then drop off his last pick-up around six in the evening. 46. ComTrans also failed to timely pay Plaintiff all the wages which he was due in violation of the Arizona Wage Statute. 47. Plaintiff’s duties, hours and compensation are indicative of the similarly situated Drivers. 48. ComTrans improper policies and compensation practices applied to Plaintiff and all similarly situated Drivers he purports to represent. 49. For example, ComTrans provided its employees, including Plaintiff, with numerous written policies uniformly applicable to all Drivers governing their job duties and the compensation practices applicable to them, including a Driver’s Guide and Take Home Policy Contract & Administrative Policy documenting when Drivers’ start and end their shifts, their unpaid breaks that they must work through, unpaid trainings they are required to attend, and the requirements like maintenance and cleaning that must be performed during the Drivers’ breaks and at their own expense. 50. The ComTrans Driver’s Guide indicates that all Drivers are subject to the same duties and job requirements they are required to perform off the clock. 51. The Driver’s Guide states that Drivers must remain in a four-mile radius of their most recent pickup and continue to perform job duties in accordance with the ComTrans Standard Conduct and Work Rules even during “downtime” for which the company does not compensate. The Driver’s Guide also requires all Drivers to download their manifest on the transport application and plan their schedules “prior to the start of [their] shift.” 52. All the Drivers are uniformly subject to the same unlawful compensation practices that Plaintiff was subject to during his employment at ComTrans. 54. ComTrans’s illegal overtime wage practices were widespread with respect to the proposed class. The failure to pay proper overtime was not the result of random or isolated individual management decisions or practices. 55. ComTrans’s overtime wage practices were routine and consistent. Throughout the Liability Period, employees regularly were not paid the proper overtime wage despite working in excess of forty hours per week. 56. Other Drivers performed the same or similar job duties as Plaintiff. Moreover, these Drivers regularly worked more than forty hours in a workweek. Accordingly, the employees victimized by ComTrans’s unlawful pattern and practices are similarly situated to Plaintiff in terms of employment and pay provisions. 57. ComTrans’s failure to pay overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA result from generally applicable policies or practices and do not depend on the personal circumstances of the members of the collective action. Thus, Plaintiff’s experience is typical of the experience of the others employed by ComTrans. 58. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various members of the collective action do not prevent collective treatment. All ComTrans Drivers, including Plaintiff, regardless of their precise job requirements or rates of pay, are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40). Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of facts pertaining to liability. 60. Throughout the Liability Period, ComTrans has employed a large number of Drivers. The class is therefore so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Members of the class can readily be identified from business records maintained by ComTrans. 61. Proof of ComTrans’s liability under the Arizona Wage Statute involves factual and legal questions common to the class. Whether Defendants paid Class members the proper wages due in accordance with A.R.S. §§ 23-351, 23-353, 23-355 is a question common to all Class Members. 62. Like Plaintiff, all Class Members worked without being paid the statutorily required overtime wage. Plaintiff’s claim is therefore typical of the claims of the class. 63. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of other Class Members and has retained attorneys who are knowledgeable in wage and hour and class action litigation. The interests of Class Members are therefore fairly and adequately protected. 64. This action is maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) because questions of law or fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 65. In addition, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The Arizona Wage Statute recognizes that employees who are denied their wages often lack the ability to enforce their rights against employers with far superior resources. Further, because the damages suffered by individual class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it difficult for members of the class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. 66. Plaintiff’s Arizona Wage Statute claim is easily managed as a class action. The issue of liability is common to all Class Members. Although the amount of damages may differ by individual, they are objectively ascertainable and can be easily calculated. 67. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above allegations as though fully set forth herein. 68. Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee entitled to the statutorily mandated overtime pay according to the FLSA. 69. ComTrans was an employer pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 70. ComTrans failed to comply with 29 U.S.C. § 207 because Plaintiff worked for ComTrans in excess of forty hours per week, but ComTrans failed to pay Plaintiff for those excess hours at the statutorily required rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay as required by the FLSA. 71. ComTrans’s failure to pay overtime to Plaintiff was willful. ComTrans knew Plaintiff was working overtime but failed to properly pay overtime wages. ComTrans had no reason to believe its failure to pay overtime was not a violation of the FLSA. 72. Plaintiff is entitled to statutory remedies provided pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), including but not limited to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees. 73. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above allegations as though fully set forth herein. 74. ComTrans was aware of its obligation to pay timely wages pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-351. 75. ComTrans was aware that, under A.R.S. §§ 23-351-353, it was obligated to pay all wages due to Plaintiff. 76. ComTrans failed to timely pay Plaintiff wages he was due without a good faith basis for withholding the wages.

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37. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 38. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendants’ facilities and/or services due to Defendants’ failure to make their Kiosks fully accessible and independently usable as above described. 39. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 40. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of class litigation under the ADA. 41. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole.

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15. Defendant owns and operates a restaurant known as Bluefin Bar & Grill. 16. Defendant employs several servers, bartenders, hosts, bussers, and runners. 18. As a server, Plaintiff was responsible for serving food and beverages, explaining the menu and taking orders from guests, and adhering to company standards for food and beverages. 19. Plaintiff typically worked thirty (30) to forty (40) hours per week. 20. Defendant paid Plaintiff an hourly wage less than federal minimum wage (approximately $5.60). 21. In addition, Plaintiff earned tips as a server. 22. Defendant paid Plaintiff according to what is commonly referred to as the “tip credit.” 23. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment Defendant failed to notify Plaintiff of the provisions of FLSA § 3(m), 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 24. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment Defendant required Plaintiff to share her tips with other workers. 25. Specifically, Defendant required Plaintiff to tip out other “back of house,” non- tipped employees. 26. Servers should not share tips with back of the house employees. 27. As a result, Defendants were not entitled to utilize the FLSA’s tip credit provision to credit Plaintiff’s tips towards a portion of their minimum wage obligations. VI. 28. Defendant employs other servers as part of its business operations. 29. Servers perform similar job duties as Plaintiff in that they explain the menu and take orders from guests, serve beverages and keep their area clean. 31. Servers are paid less than minimum wage, plus tips (“the tip credit”). 32. Servers typically work thirty (30) to forty (40) hours per week. 33. Servers are required to tip out “back of house” employees in a manner similar to Plaintiff. 34. Defendant’s servers are the putative class members for this potential collective action. 35. Plaintiff and the class members performed the same or similar job duties as one another in that they provided services for Defendants. 36. Plaintiff and the class members were required to tip back of house employees each shift in violation of the FLSA’s requirement that minimum wages be paid “free and clear.” 37. Shortly after being hired, Defendant explains it policy that servers are required to tip out dishwashers. 38. The tip out is mandatory and affects all servers. 39. Further, Plaintiff and the class members were subjected to the same pay provisions in that they were subject to working without receiving proper compensation in the form of a free and clear minimum wage. 40. Defendants’ common policy violations have caused Plaintiff and the class members to receive less than minimum wage for all hours worked. 41. Thus, the class members are similar with regard to their wages for the same reasons as Plaintiff. 43. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out its illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members at a rate of at least the statutorily prescribed minimum wage. 44. Defendant did not act in good faith or reliance upon any of the following in formulating its pay practices: (a) case law, (b) the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., (c) Department of Labor Wage & Hour Opinion Letters or (d) the Code of Federal Regulations. 45. During the relevant period, Defendant violated § 7(a)(1), § 15(a)(2) and § 203(m), by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA as aforesaid, for one or more workweeks without compensating such employees for their work at the statutorily prescribed minimum wage within a work week during one or more weeks. 46. Defendant has acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members in accordance with the law. 47. Plaintiff reincorporates and readopts all allegations contained within Paragraphs 1-27 above as though fully stated herein. 48. Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to be paid minimum wage for each hour worked during their employment with Defendant. 50. Because of Defendant’s improper tip out policy in this regard, Plaintiff and the class members have not been paid the minimum wage for each hour worked during one or more weeks of employment with Defendant. 51. Defendant willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and the class members minimum wage for one or more weeks of work contrary to 29 U.S.C. § 206 because it was aware of the minimum wage law requirements but continued its violations. 52. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s deliberate underpayment of wages, Plaintiff and the class members have been damaged in the loss of minimum wages for one or more weeks of work with Defendant. 53. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 22. Defendant is a kitchen appliance company. Defendant is an online retailer of refrigerators, ovens, and dishwashers, among other appliances. Defendant owns, operates, manages and controls the website, www.bigchill.com (its “Website”), which is a kitchen appliance retailer. The Website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace without any physical location. Thus, Defendant’s Website is the main point of sale for its business operation. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 28. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 29. Many features on the Website also fail to add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. This was an issue on Defendant’s Website particularly in the select style section. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 30. Plaintiff has made multiple attempts to complete a purchase on www.bigchill.com, most recently in March of 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused www.bigchill.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 32. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 33. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly, to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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23. Plaintiffs re-state, re-allege, and incorporate herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through twenty two (22) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 24. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the members of a class. 25. The class consists of all persons whom Defendants' records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letters sent to the Plaintiffs on or about September 15, 2014 and March 19, 2015; and (a) the collection letters were sent to consumers seeking payment of a personal debt purportedly owed to Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC and Midland Funding LLC; and (b) the collection letters were not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiffs assert that the letters contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10) for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 26. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that form collection letters are at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The -5- principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendants violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such collection letters (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendants. D. The claims of the Plaintiffs are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiffs’ interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 27. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 28. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiffs will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 29. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendants are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” -6- Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 30. The Defendants' actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the members of a class, as against the Defendants.

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(FLSA Overtime – Individual Plaintiff) (FLSA Minimum Wage – Individual Plaintiff) (FLSA Minimum Wage – Class) 15. Plaintiff worked as a server for Defendant at its IHOP restaurant in Rockwall, Texas from approximately May 2012 until approximately May 7, 2018. 16. Defendant recruited, hired, and employed Plaintiff to work as a server in the restaurant. 17. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant’s gross annual volume of sales has been between $500,000 and $1,500,000. 19. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and Class Members performed substantially similar work for Defendant in Rockwall County, Texas. Responsibilities included taking customers’ orders, serving food and beverages, and cleaning. 20. Throughout the period relevant to this action, Defendant regularly required Plaintiff and Class Members to perform “off the clock” work during most of their shifts by directing them to work while clocked out. In addition, Defendant regularly altered Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ time records in most work weeks, deleting hours that they worked, and paying them on the basis of the altered records reflecting reduced hours. As a result, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and Class Members the required minimum wage for all hours worked. 21. Throughout the period relevant to this action, Defendant further violated the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA by paying Plaintiff and Class Members less than the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, but failing to meet the requirements to avail itself of the tip credit provision, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2). 22. Specifically, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff or Class Members with notice of the requirements of the tip credit provision, as required to take the tip credit under the FLSA. 24. Furthermore, throughout the period relevant to this action, Defendant regularly violated the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of 40 hours each week. Although Plaintiff’s schedule has varied during this period, Plaintiff generally works seven days per week, and generally works nine to ten hours per day. Class Members’ schedules range from part time to full time, but many work or worked between 40 and 60 hours per week. 25. In each workweek in which Plaintiff and Class Members worked in excess of 40 hours, however, they were not paid the required overtime premium of one-and-a-half times their regular hourly rate for hours they worked in excess of 40. Instead, hours in excess of 40 were deleted from Defendant’s time records, and Plaintiff and Class Members were not paid at all by Defendant for these hours. 26. At all times relevant to this action and as a matter of economic reality, Defendant employed Plaintiff and Class Members within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d) and 203(g). For example, at all material times, Defendant possessed the authority to hire and fire Plaintiff and Class Members, trained and supervised them, and set policies including scheduling, timekeeping, payroll, and disciplinary practices. 27. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant failed to maintain complete and accurate records of Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ hours of work and compensation as required by the FLSA. 29. The above-described actions by Defendant violated Plaintiff’s right to the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., for which he is entitled to relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 30. The above-described actions by Defendant violated the Class Members’ right to the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., for which they are entitled to relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 31. The above-described actions by the Defendant violated Plaintiff’s overtime pay rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., for which he is entitled to relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

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30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered thereby. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 34. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 35. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually-impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 36. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 38. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 39. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 40. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 42. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 44. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by visually-impaired persons. 45. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 46. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 47. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 48. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 54. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, including ADA litigation and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 56. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by visually-impaired persons throughout the United States. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 59. Defendant’s online retail store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail store 61. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 62. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 64. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 65. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 66. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 67. Defendant’s Website operates in the State of New York and constitutes an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail establishment. 68. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 72. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 74. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 75. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) ​et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 76. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 77. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) ​et seq​. for each and every offense. 78. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 80. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 82. Defendant’s website is an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online sales establishment. 83. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 84. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind consumers full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 86. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 87. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 90. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 92. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 93. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 94. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods and services of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, ​et seq.​, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, ​et seq.​, and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, ​et seq​. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 95. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 ​et seq.

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23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and as a class action, pursuant to the provisions of Rules 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class defined as: All persons whose ZIP codes were collected and recorded at any J. Crew Massachusetts retail location while making a Credit Card purchase from June 20, 2009 through the present (the “Class”). (Unjust Enrichment) (Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices G. L., c. 93A, §§ 2 and 9) 11. J. Crew has sixteen retail locations in Massachusetts, three of which are factory outlets and the remainder of which are traditional retail stores. 12. J. Crew collects ZIP codes from customers when they make purchases with Credit Cards at its retail store locations. When a customer makes a purchase with a Credit Card, store employees ask the customer for his or her ZIP code at the register, and the employees then record that information on the credit card transaction form located on the register as part of the Credit Card transaction. J. Crew has engaged in this practice throughout the Class Period. 13. The ZIP code information that J. Crew collects from Plaintiff and Class members is neither required by the Credit Card issuers nor necessary in order to complete the credit card transactions at the retail locations. 14. J. Crew does not collect, record, and use the customers’ (including Plaintiff’s and Class members’) ZIP code information in order to verify the customer’s identity or for any other legitimate purpose in connection with the Credit Card transaction. Rather, J. Crew uses this information for its own marketing and promotional purposes. Possession of the consumer’s ZIP code information, together with the customer’s name, enables Defendant to identify the customer’s address and/or telephone number through the use of publicly available databases. 15. J. Crew uses the ZIP code information it collects from customers (including Plaintiff and Class members) and the addresses and other information it then obtains, to send unsolicited marketing and promotional materials, or “junk mail,” to customers, including Plaintiff and Class members. 17. Plaintiff and Class members have suffered an injury as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct by receiving unsolicited marketing and promotional materials, or “junk mail,” from Defendant. Plaintiff and Class members have also suffered an injury as a result of Defendant’s misappropriation of their ZIP codes and other personal identification information for use in its marketing and promotional efforts and other improper and unlawful purposes, from which Defendant earns a profit and obtains other benefits. Plaintiff and Class members’ personal identification information has commercial value, which is demonstrated by, among other things, the profit or other economic benefit Defendant obtains from the use of that information. 18. Plaintiff’s and Class members’ damages as a result of this unlawful conduct include the invasion or breach of their privacy from the collection of their personal identification information and the profit or other economic benefit obtained by Defendant from the use of that information. 19. Plaintiff made at least two Credit Card purchases at J. Crew retail locations during the Class Period, on or about August 18, 2011 and on or about June 27, 2012. These purchases were made at the J. Crew women’s shop at Copley Place in Boston, Massachusetts, and Plaintiff made these purchases using her Sovereign Bank debit card. 21. After Plaintiff provided her ZIP code as discussed above, J. Crew began sending Plaintiff unsolicited marketing and promotional materials, or junk mail. Prior to having provided her ZIP code to J. Crew, Plaintiff had not received any junk mail from J. Crew, nor had she requested or consented to the receipt of any such materials. 22. Plaintiff’s Credit Card issuer does not require a purchaser’s ZIP code in order to complete a credit card transaction. V. 24. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates; all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class; governmental entities; and the judge to whom this case is assigned and any immediate family members thereof. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the Class definition, as appropriate. 25. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for classwide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on a classwide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 27. Commonality and Predominance – Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and 23(b). This action involves common questions of law and fact, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. All Class members were subject to the same business practice complained of, the collection and recording of their ZIP codes in connection with Credit Card purchases. Furthermore, common questions of law and fact, include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein violates Massachusetts law, including the provisions of c. 93, § 105; b. Whether Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or practices in violation of c. 93A, § 2; c. Whether Plaintiff and Class members have been injured by Defendant’s unfair and deceptive acts or practices; d. Whether Defendant’s violation of c. 93A, § 2 was willful and knowing; e. Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to damages and if so, in what amount; f. Whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched as a result of the conduct complained of herein; g. Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to restitution and, if so, in what amount; and h. Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to equitable relief, including but not limited to injunctive or declaratory relief. 29. Adequacy of Representation – Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate Class representative because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the other members of the Class she seeks to represent; she has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation; and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The Class’s interests will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. 30. Superiority – Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). A class action is superior to any other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy, and no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be required to individually litigate their claims against Defendant, so it would be impracticable for Class members to individually seek redress for Defendant’s wrongful conduct. Even if the Class members could afford individual litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation creates a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 32. At all relevant times, Defendant was engaged in commerce for purposes of G. L. c. 93A. 33. G. L. c. 93A, § 2 provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” G. L. c. 93A, § 9 permits any consumer injured by a violation of c. 93A, § 2 to bring a civil action, including a class action, for damages and injunctive relief. 34. By collecting and recording Plaintiff and Class members’ ZIP code information for its own promotional and marketing purposes when Plaintiff and Class members made Credit Card purchases at its Massachusetts retail store locations, in violation of c. 93, § 105(a), J. Crew engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices in violation of c. 93A, § 2. 35. Plaintiff and Class members were injured by Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein by the receipt of unsolicited promotional and marketing material sent by Defendant, using the ZIP code and other personal identification information unlawfully collected from Plaintiff and Class members. 36. Plaintiff and Class members were also injured as a result of Defendant’s misappropriation of their commercially valuable personal identification information (including their ZIP codes and other information obtained by using the ZIP codes) for profit or other economic benefit. 38. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive acts or practices, as alleged herein, were and are willful and knowing violations of c. 93A, § 2, within the meaning of c. 93A, § 9(3). 39. On March 23, 2013, Plaintiff made a demand for relief, in writing, to Defendant, as required by G. L. c. 93A, § 9(3). The demand letter explained in detail the nature of the unfair and deceptive acts or practices and the injuries suffered by Plaintiff and the Class, as well as demanding compensation for those injuries and other relief. Defendant has failed to tender a reasonable offer of relief in response to Plaintiff’s written demand. 40. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to all remedies available pursuant to c. 93A, §9, including, but not limited to actual damages, statutory damages (to the extent that they are greater than actual damages), double or treble damages, disgorgement of Defendant’s profits derived from its unlawful activities, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and other reasonable costs. 41. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth at length here. 42. Plaintiff and the other Class members conferred a benefit upon Defendant, in the form of the ZIP codes and other personal identification information they provided to Defendant when concluding Credit Card transactions at Defendant’s retail locations. 44. Defendant had an appreciation or knowledge of the commercial value of the personal identification information, including ZIP codes, provided to it by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, of the fact that such information was being provided to it without consideration, and of the benefits it could obtain from the use of that information. 45. Defendant’s acceptance or retention of these benefits is inequitable under the circumstances outlined above and entitles Plaintiff and Class members to restitution or such other compensation as is appropriate in the circumstances. 8. G. L. c. 93, § 105(a) forbids the collection and recording of personal identification information in Credit Card transactions: Section 105 (a) No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity that accepts a credit card for a business transaction shall write, cause to be written or require that a credit card holder write personal identification information, not required by the credit card issuer, on the credit card transaction form. Personal identification information shall include, but shall not be limited to, a credit card holder’s address or telephone number. 9. ZIP codes are within Section 105(a)'s definition of personal identification information. Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 464 Mass. 492, 506 (2013) (“[T]his Court holds that ZIP code numbers are ‘personal identification information’ under Section 105(a)”).

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21. During the relevant time period of this action, Defendant has employed Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals as traveling nurses to provide nursing services to various healthcare facilities throughout California and the United States. 22. atient care duties that they must attend to throughout their shifts. They work with patients and physicians. They also must spend time at the start and end of their shifts on the patient handoff process, where the outgoing shift provides information concerning the patients to the incoming shift. In addition, the health and recovery for review by the treating physician and other nurses. 23. The traveling nurses employed by Defendant are not unionized, but the permanent, non-traveling nurses employed by the hosting facilities and the other health care systems served by Defendant typically are unionized. 24. Defendant placed Ms. Clifford to work at the Kaiser Permanente Zion Medical Center in San Diego, California. 25. In California, Defendant is obligated to compensate traveling nurses an overtime premium rate of 1.5 times the regular rate of pay for hours worked between 8 and - he regular rate for hours worked in excess of 12 in a day. In California and nationally, Defendant also is obligated to compensate traveling nurses at a rate of 1.5 times the regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in a week. 36. Plaintiff brings this Complaint as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of the following class of individuals: All individuals who worked as a traveling nurse or like hourly position for Defendant nationwide at any time beginning during the time period three years prior to the filing the filing of the opt- join forms, plus time for equitable tolling, until resolution of this action, and consisting of those who submit a consent to join the action . 36. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 37. Defendant has not compensated these employees for the unpaid meal breaks -the- 38. - ective action for the claims asserted by Plaintiff because her claims are similar to the claims possessed by FLSA Class members. 39. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that FLSA Class members have been denied compensation for time worked, including meal breaks wor -the- also been denied overtime pay for this work and would therefore likely join this collective action if provided a notice of their rights to do so, together with a clear statement that opting to join such an action would not result in termination or other forms of retaliation. 59. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 68. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 69. California Labor Code §226.7 and Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations § 11040, ¶ 12 requires Defendant to authorize and permit off-duty rest periods to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class at the rate of ten minutes net rest time per four hours or major fraction thereof. 70. Defendant does not authorize or permit such off-duty rest periods to the extent required by law. To the contrary, the nurses regularly work long shifts without the opportunity to rest off-duty for even ten minutes during each of their four-hour work periods or major fractions thereof. 71. statutorily-mandated r monitoring, rather than to maintain a system whereby other nurses relieve them at regular intervals throughout the day. The nurses routinely are not authorized and permitted to take rest breaks of at least ten minutes by the end of every fourth hour of work or major fraction thereof. 72. Under both California Labor Code § 226.7 and Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations §11040, ¶ 12, an employer must pay an employee who was denied a requi for each workday that the rest period was not provided. 73. Plaintiff brings Causes of Action Two through Nine as a class action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and/or (b)(3). Plaintiff brings the PAGA Cause of Action as a representative law enforcement action, but not as a class action. 76. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the above paragraphs as though fully set forth below. 77. Califor performed by employees of every description, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained 78. California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 require an employer to pay all wages earned but unpaid immediately upon the involuntary discharge of an employee or within seventy- 79. California Labor Code §204 provides that employers must compensate 80. California Labor Code §§221-223 prohibit employers from withholding and deducting wages, or otherwise artificially lowering the wage scale of an employee. 85. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 86. California Labor Code §1174 requires Defendant to maintain payroll records showing, among other things, the actual hours worked daily by its employees, wages paid to its employees, the number of piece-rate units earned by its employees, and any applicable piece rate paid to its employees. 87. California Labor Code §1174.5 provides that employers who willfully fail to maintain accurate payroll records shall be subject to civil penalties. 91. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation California Labor Code §§ 510, 515.5, 1194, and 1198 et seq., and IWC Wage Order No. 5. Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked in Violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 204, and 221-223 Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements California Labor Code § 226 Failure to Keep Accurate Payroll Records California Labor Code §§ 1174 & 1174.5 Failure to Provide Meal Periods, or Compensation in Lieu Thereof California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512; and Cal. Code Regs., Title 8 §11040 ¶¶ 7 & 11 Failure to Provide Rest Periods, or Compensation in Lieu Thereof California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and Cal. Code Regs., Title 8 § 11040 ¶ 12 VIOLATIONS OF 29 U.S.C. § 207 FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME COMPENSATION (FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION)

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10. Upon information and belief, the ATDS used to send the HomeJab Text Messages has the present capacity to dial and store random and sequential numbers and it can send text messages without human intervention. 11. Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, 47 C.F.R. 12. However, Defendant, or a third party on Defendant’s behalf, sent the HomeJab Text Messages despite not obtaining Plaintiff’s Prior Express Written Consent. 13. Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, 47 C.F.R. 14. Defendant sent the HomeJab Text Messages without obtaining Plaintiff’s or the other recipients’ Prior Express Written Consent to send text messages using an ATDS, and without obtaining the signature of Plaintiff or the other recipients on a written agreement that states: “By executing the agreement, such person authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the signatory telemarketing calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” 15. These actions violate the TCPA and are an invasion of privacy and right to seclusion. 16. By sending the HomeJab Text Messages, Defendant harmed Plaintiff and the members of the putative class by: (1) invading their privacy and right to seclusion; (2) wasting their time; (3) causing the risk of personal injury due to interruption and distraction; (4) forcing them to incur charges; (5) depleting a cell phone's or wireless phone’s battery, resulting in increased electricity costs; (6) intrusion upon and occupation of the capacity of a cell phone or wireless phone; and (7) causing the risk of personal injury due to interruption and distraction. 17. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for statutory damages on behalf of himself and a class of all persons similarly situated. 19. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff avers that the proposed class is in excess of 50 persons. The class size is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 20. Commonality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)): There are questions of law and fact common to all members of the class. Common material questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to, the following: a. whether Defendant (or another on its behalf) used an ATDS to send the HomeJab Text Messages to Plaintiff and other members of the class; b. whether the HomeJab Text Messages constitute Advertisements; c. whether the HomeJab Text Messages constitute Telemarking; d. whether Defendant violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and its implementing regulations by using (or having another on its behalf use) an ATDS to send HomeJab Text Messages to Plaintiff and the class members without obtaining Prior Express Written Consent; e. whether Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to statutory damages; and f. whether Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to treble damages. 22. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class members. Plaintiff is committed to this cause, will litigate it vigorously, and is aware of the fiduciary duties of a class representative. Plaintiff’s interests are consistent with and not antagonistic to the interests of the other class members. Plaintiff has a strong personal interest in the outcome of this action and has retained experienced class counsel to represent his and the other class members. 23. Class Counsel is experienced in class action litigation and has successfully litigated class claims. 25. Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates herein by reference the averments set forth in paragraphs 1 through 24, above. 26. Plaintiff brings this action against the Defendant for sending HomeJab Text Messages to himself and to members of the Plaintiff Class in violation of the TCPA and its implementing regulations. 27. Defendant violated the TCPA and implementing regulations 47 C.F.R. § 29. In the alternative, the named Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class are entitled to $500 for each of the HomeJab Text Messages that violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, text messages that constitute advertising or telemarketing that are sent with the use of an ATDS may not be sent to persons or entities without obtaining Prior Express Written Consent. 64.1200(a) and $500 for each of the HomeJab Text Messages that violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a), by initiating or authorizing the sending of the HomeJab Text Messages to the phone numbers of Plaintiff and the members of the Plaintiff Class without receiving Prior Express Written Consent. 8. Upon information and belief, Defendant or a third party on Defendant’s behalf used an ATDS to send the HomeJab Text Messages to Plaintiff and other persons and entities. 9. Upon information and belief, the ATDS used to send the HomeJab Text Messages has the present capacity to store lists of numbers and send text messages to those numbers automatically.

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27. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, Plaintiff Weathersby seeks to prosecute her FLSA claims as collective actions on behalf of herself and others who worked as Bartenders and other tipped employees of the Bar (the “Collective Action Members”) at any time during the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of the original complaint (the “Statutory Period”). 28. Plaintiff regularly worked for Defendants as a tipped employee, but, between November 2017 and July 2019, did not receive any wages from Defendants. 30. Defendants subjected Plaintiff and Collective Action Members to the same pay provision(s) in that neither Plaintiff nor Collective Action Members received wages representing the tipped minimum wage from Defendants. 31. The Collective Action Members are thus owed unpaid wages under the FLSA for the same reasons as Plaintiff. 33. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 23”), Plaintiff Weathersby seeks to prosecute her NYLL claims as class actions on behalf of herself and others who worked as Bartenders or other tipped employees of the Bar (the “Class Members”) at any time during the six-year period immediately preceding the filing of the original complaint (the “Statutory Period”). 34. While the exact number of Class Members is presently unknown, it is estimated that there are approximately twenty-five to thirty-five Class Members. 35. The group of potential Class Members is so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the Court, for which reason Plaintiff initiates this litigation for all persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23. 36. Despite the numerical size of the Class, the identities of Class Members can be ascertained through Defendants’ payroll records. 37. Plaintiff and her counsel do not anticipate any difficulties in the management of this action as a class action. 38. Plaintiff is committed to vigorous prosecution of this action, will adequately represent the purported Class Members in this action, and has retained competent counsel experienced in class action litigation. 39. Plaintiff is a Class Member and has no interest antagonistic to or in conflict with other Class Members. 41. The claims or defenses of the represented party is typical of the claims or defenses of the Class Members. 42. Plaintiff has the same interests as other Class Members in prosecuting the claims against Defendants. 43. Plaintiff and all Class Members sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 45. Furthermore, due to the expense and burden of individual litigation, it would be extraordinarily difficult for Class Members to redress the wrongs done to them individually. 46. Plaintiff and The Law Offices of Veronica S. Jung, PLLC, will fairly and adequately assert and protect the interests of the Class Members. 47. Plaintiff Vicki Weathersby was employed by Defendants as a Bartender at Manitoba’s from 2011 to 2019. 48. Manitoba’s is a bar located on Manhattan’s Lower East Side. 49. The Bar is owned by Richard Manitoba and Steven Van Zandt; Mr. Manitoba oversees the Bar’s day-to-day operation. 50. The Bar is named after Mr. Manitoba, and trades heavily on Mr. Manitoba’s fame as “Handsome Dick Manitoba,” a punk rock musician. 51. Mr. Manitoba regularly spent time at the Bar entertaining friends and guests. He was typically at the bar multiple times a week. 52. Ms. Weathersby and the other bartenders at the Bar were tipped employees. Accordingly, Ms. Weathersby was entitled to receive the tips she earned during any given shift and the tipped minimum wage. 53. During her employment at Manitoba’s the general minimum wage ranged from $7.25 per hour in 2011 to $15 per hour in 2019. During that period the tipped minimum – the minimum cash wage the bar was allowed to pay its tipped employees – increased from $5.00 per hour in 2011 to $10.00 per hour in 2019. 55. Ms. Weathersby’s earnings varied wildly: on a profitable weekend night shift Ms. Weathersby could earn a few hundred dollars in tips, but on weekday mornings and afternoons she would often earn less than the minimum wage. 56. The Bar, from the beginning of Ms. Weathersby’s employment into late 2017, often delayed paying wages to its staff. 57. Ms. Weathersby and others had no recourse but to wait until Defendants elected to pay them their back wages; this could take anywhere from days to months. 58. Ms. Weathersby is a professional bartender: she has decades of experience working as a bartender and has worked in a wide range of establishments. 59. While bars and restaurants often need to delay payment of wages, Ms. Weathersby had never experienced delays so routine and severe as those at Manitoba’s. 60. While Ms. Weathersby and other went unpaid, Mr. Manitoba treated the Bar as his own purse, taking out hundreds of dollars each week and using money set aside for contractors – such as security and DJs – for himself. 61. When Ms. Weathersby asked Mr. Manitoba for the wages she was owed he claimed the bar was “broke,” a difficult excuse to swallow given his own personal withdrawals from the till. 62. Mr. Manitoba ran the Bar. He hired and fired staff and established policies for paying out employees. 63. Starting in November 2017, Defendants ceased paying its employees the tipped minimum wage altogether. 65. Defendants should have paid Ms. Weathersby $69.20 for each 8-hour shift in 2018; instead, she received nothing. 66. Ms. Weathersby repeatedly pleaded with Mr. Manitoba for her wages. She had no other source of income and – due to the Bar’s withholding of wages – she began falling behind on rent and medical bills. 67. Ultimately, Manitoba’s closed in and around July 2019, leaving its employees empty-handed. 68. Plaintiff, for herself and on behalf of those similarly situated, hereby realleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 67 with the same force as though separately alleged herein. 69. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants within the meaning of the FLSA. 70. The FLSA mandates that employers pay their employees a basic minimum wage. The FLSA provides that employers may pay tipped employees a lower cash wage as long as the difference between the lower wage and the basic minimum wage is made up by the employee in tips received. 71. Where a state minimum wage exceeds the federal minimum wage, the FLSA mandates and enforces payment of the higher wage. 73. Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants her back pay, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest related to the action. 74. Plaintiff, for herself and on behalf of those similarly situated, hereby realleges and incorporates each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 73 with the same force as though separately alleged herein. 75. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants within the meaning of the NYLL. 76. The NYLL mandates that employers pay their employees a basic minimum wage. The NYLL provides that employers may pay tipped employees a lower cash wage as long as the difference between the lower wage and the basic minimum wage is made up by the employee in tips received. 77. Between November 2017 and July 2019, Plaintiff did not receive any basic wage from the bar – she was only paid in tips. 78. As a result, Plaintiff was not paid the tipped minimum wage for hours worked. Unpaid Minimum Wage in Violation of the NYLL Unpaid Minimum Wage in Violation of the FLSA

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44. American consumers increasingly and consciously seek out “natural” ingredients in their packaged foods. Once a small niche market, natural product sales through retail channels reached $65 billion in 2010, and continue to grow today. 45. Consumers value “all natural” ingredients for a myriad of reasons, including perceived benefits of avoiding disease, attaining health and wellness, helping the environment, assisting local farmers, assisting factory workers who would otherwise be exposed to synthetic and hazardous substances, and financially supporting the companies that share these values. 46. Hoping to capture this growing market, Whole Foods labels and advertises its products as “organic” or containing “nothing artificial,” and makes other similar representations detailed fully below. 47. Whole Foods also carefully cultivates its image as a healthy, eco-friendly, worker-friendly brand — the kind of company whose label claims can be trusted. Whole Foods further markets itself as an expert source of information on all things organic and natural. Further, Whole Foods markets itself as an expert in environmental programming and information, offering advice on sustainability and organic farming and broadcasting environmental videos.

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13. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “12” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 14. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 15. Upon information and belief, within the last year the Defendant began a collection campaign against the Plaintiff in an attempt to collect an alleged “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5). 16. On or about January 27, 2015, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter. See Exhibit A. 17. The back of Defendant’s letter to the Plaintiff (See Exhibit B) stated in part: “Note that a $10.00 processing fee may be added to all credit card payments, if allowed by the laws of your state.” 18. Upon information and belief, the Defendant has no legal or contractual right to charge a processing fee. 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “19” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2), 1692e(5), and 1692e(10). 22. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, misleading and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. 23. The Defendants violated said section by falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of the debt and falsely representing that a transaction fee may lawfully be received by the Defendant in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(2)(B). 24. The Defendant further violated said section by threatening to charge a fee that cannot legally be charged in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). 25. The Defendant further violated said section by using false representation or deceptive means in an attempt to collect the alleged debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 27. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “26” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 28. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f)1 of the FDCPA. 29. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692(f), a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (1) The collection of any amount (including interest, fee, charge or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 30. Defendants violated said section by stating in their November 11, 2014 letter that a fee may be charged for payments made by phone. 31. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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16. On information and belief, Defendant is a medical market research company that helps organizations conduct market research surveys with knowledgeable healthcare professionals and patients. (See www.medsurvey.com – last visited 9/14/20) 17. On information and belief, Defendant conducts surveys on behalf of its clients to gather data for their clients’ marketing, sales, and research needs. Defendant receives payment for providing this information to its clients. 18. On or about April 19, 2018, June 29, 2018, July 5, 2018, July 13, 2018, and July 18, 2018, Defendant sent five unsolicited facsimiles survey requests to Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device. See Group Exhibit A. 20. The Faxes are invitations to participate in Defendant’s market research surveys of Ceiling Lifts and/or Medical Equipment in exchange for a specified dollar amount payment. See Group Exhibit A. 21. The Faxes are offers by Defendant to “buy” a service from Plaintiff and the putative Class (survey participation), and Defendant then uses this data for the benefit of its clients. These clients, in turn, pay Defendant for these benefits. On this basis, the Faxes are advertisements under the TCPA and the regulations implementing the TCPA. 22. Defendant created or made the Faxes, or directed a third party to do so, and the Fax was sent by or on behalf of Defendant with Defendant’s knowledge and authorization. 23. Plaintiff did not give Defendant “prior express invitation or permission” to send the Faxes. 24. On information and belief, Defendant faxed to at least forty recipients the same and other unsolicited facsimile advertisements without prior express invitation or permission, and without the required opt-out language, thereby precluding the affirmative defense of established business relationship. 25. There are no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 26. Defendant’s facsimiles attached as Group Exhibit A do not display a compliant opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4). 28. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the proposed Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 30. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiff received the same or other faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of Defendant advertising the commercially availability and/or quality of property, goods or services of Defendant during the Class Period. Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. Defendant has acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or other faxes or faxes which did not contain compliant opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 33. The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 34. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 38. Defendant’s Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendant has sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines faxes other than Group Exhibit A that constitute advertisements under the TCPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission (and/or that Defendant is precluded from sustaining the established business relationship safe harbor due to its failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements). By virtue thereof, Defendant violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendant may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 40. The TCPA is a strict liability statute, so Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if its actions were only negligent. 41. Defendant knew or should have known that (a) Plaintiff and the other class members had not given prior express invitation or permission for Defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the availability or quality of Defendant’s property, goods, or services to be bought or sold; (b) Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendant transmitted advertisements; and (d) the Fax did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice. 64.1200(a)(4). Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its officers, directors, shareholders, employees and agents, and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class that includes but is not limited to the fax advertisements sent to Plaintiff. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery.

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1. the amount of the debt; 11. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of himself and all consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendant which are in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 12. This Action is properly maintained as a statewide class action. The Class consists of:  All New Jersey consumers who were sent initial letters and/or notices from ZUCKER, concerning a debt owed to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which did not contain a validation notice pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.  The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 14. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3). 15. ZUCKER collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 16. ZUCKER is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 17. Sometime prior to March 12, 2013 Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to Wells Fargo, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). 19. Prior to March 12, 2013, Plaintiff became delinquent on the Wells Fargo obligation. 2. the name of the creditor to who the debt is owed; 20. On or before March 12, 2013, Wells Fargo referred Plaintiff past due obligation to ZUCKER to begin foreclosure proceedings. 21. On or about March 12, 2103, Wells Fargo mailed a letter to Plaintiff advising her that, "The above loan file has been referred to our attorneys with instructions to begin foreclosure proceedings... If you have any questions, please contact our attorney list below. Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman...." A copy of said letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit A except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy. 22. On or about April 3, 2013 Defendant ZUCKER, caused to be delivered to Plaintiff a letter concerning the alleged Wells Fargo obligation. A copy of said letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit B except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The April 3, 2013 letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by ZUCKER as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 24. The letter states, "ZUCKER, GOLDBERG & ACKERMAN, LLC - 3. a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector, 35. Section 1692e(10) makes it a violation of the FDCPA to the "...use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt...". 36. ZUCKER used false representations or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect the debt by failing to state the amount of the debt. 37. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 36 as if the same were set forth at length. 38. Section 1692g(a) of the FDCPA requires the debt collector to give what is commonly referred to as a thirty-day (30) notice within five (5) days of its initial communication with the consumer and send the consumer a written notice containing: 39. Defendants violated Section 1692g(a)(1) of the FDCPA as the April 3, 2013 letter fails to state the amount of the debt. 4. a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; 40. Defendants violated Section 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA as the April 3, 2013 letter fails to state "...unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector." 41. Defendants violated Section 1692g(a)(4) of the FDCPA as the April 3, 2013 letter fails to state "...if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector." 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692 VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692 VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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10. The Defendant would further leave automated, prerecorded messages on the Plaintiff’s cell phone. These prerecorded messages would typically state: “This is Allstate, calling with an important message for Margaret Huwigan (phonetic). Par espanol, esprima dos. If this is Margeret Huwigan, press 1 now. Otherwise, press 2. If we have reached this number in error, please press 3. I’m sorry, I did not understand the response. If this is Margeret Huwigan, press 1 now. Otherwise, press 2. If we have reached this number in error, please press 3. I’m sorry, I did not understand the response. If this is Margeret Huwigan, press 1 now. Otherwise, press 2. If we have reached this number in error, please press 3. I’m sorry, I did not understand the response. Allstate appreciates your business. Goodbye.” 11. The Plaintiff never gave the Defendant his prior, express permission to call his cell phone via the use of an automated telephone dialing system. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has never provided his cell phone number to Defendant or had any business, educational or personal relationship with the Defendant. 12. Plaintiff had no wish to be contacted on his cell phone via the use of an autodialer or prerecorded message, and expressly directed Defendants to stop calling his cell phone number on numerous occasions. 13. By placing auto-dialed calls and prerecorded messages to the Plaintiff’s cell phone, the Defendant violated 47 USC §227(b)(A)(iii) which prohibits using any automated telephone dialing system or an artificial prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service when calling to the plaintiff’s cell phone. 15. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded message and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 16. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or via the placement of prerecorded messages and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 17. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. 18. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 20. Plaintiff and members of The Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and Class members to incur certain charges or reduced telephone time for which Plaintiff and Class members had previously paid by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and Class members. 22. As a person that received numerous calls from Defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of The Class. 23. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of The Class. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of claims arising under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and in prosecuting class actions. 24. A class action is superior to other available methods of fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since individual litigation of the claims of all Class members is impracticable. Even if every Class member could afford individual litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which individual litigation of numerous issues would proceed. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent, or contradictory judgments and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same complex factual issues. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system, and protects the rights of each Class member. 26. Defendant has acted or refused to act in respects generally applicable to The Class, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with regard to the members of the California Class as a whole. 27. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference into this cause of action the allegations set forth above at Paragraphs 1-26. 28. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 29. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 30. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 31. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference into this cause of action the allegations set forth above at Paragraphs 1-30. 32. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 34. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 6. On information and belief, on a date better known to Defendants, Defendants began their campaign of communicating with the Plaintiff via the use of an automated telephone dialing system and prerecorded messages throughout the past four years by calling his cell phone number of (732)222-2222 numerous times seeking a third party. 7. The Defendant called from numerous phone numbers, including but not limited to 866- 723-8375 and 866-219-1145, which phone numbers belongs to Defendant. 9. Defendant specifically used an automated telephone dialing system and prerecorded messages to call the Plaintiff on his cell phone on November 29, 2011 and December 20, 2011 amongst numerous other dates, calling the Plaintiff several times per day. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.

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(Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) 26. Defendant, Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., controls and operates Neutrogena.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 27. Neutrogena.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse skin care, hair care, and cosmetic products, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 28. Among the features offered by Neutrogena.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Johnson & Johnson and Neutrogena on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase the various lines of skin care, hair care, cosmetics, and other related products; and (c) learning about the company and its story, about the benefit of the products, about how to use the products, and about shipping and return policies, amongst other features. 30. Johnson & Johnson denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Neutrogena.com by preventing them from freely navigating Neutrogena.com. 31. Neutrogena.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 32. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Neutrogena.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Neutrogena.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 34. Additional accessibility issues with the Neutrogena.com website include: (a) Navigation is very difficult. The product page is read verbatim from the html which is long and cumbersome. In this case, the visitor to the product page hears “haircare/conditioner-and-treatment/triple-moisture-silk-touch-leave-in- cream/6802175.html.” (b) The price and size fields are not labeled and announce immediately after the long statement above, making it difficult to understand what was just read. Most screen-reader users, including the Plaintiff, will completely miss the price. (c) While the “add to bag” button is announced and can be selected, this is where the process completely breaks down. A sighted person will see a confirmation pop- up window. However, blind people using a screen-reader are not aware of this pop- up window and have no idea of knowing if the selected item was added to the shopping cart. Furthermore, the cart icon on top of the page read by screen-readers and there is no way for a blind user to get to the shopping cart. 36. Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping bag because the shopping bag form does not specify the purpose of the shopping bag. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping bag. Consequently, blind customers are unaware if they are adding products into their shopping bags and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Neutrogena.com. 37. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Neutrogena.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 38. Neutrogena.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Neutrogena.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Neutrogena.com. 40. Neutrogena.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Neutrogena.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Neutrogena.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff, Linda Slade, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Neutrogena.com, most recently on August 6, 2019 but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Neutrogena.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually- impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase hair care products including the “Triple Moisture Silk Touch Leave-In Cream.” 42. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Neutrogena.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 43. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Neutrogena.com. 45. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 46. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Neutrogena.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Neutrogena.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Neutrogena.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 48. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Neutrogena.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Neutrogena.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 50. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Neutrogena.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Neutrogena.com. 51. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Neutrogena.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Neutrogena.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Neutrogena.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Neutrogena.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 52. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Johnson & Johnson has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Neutrogena.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 54. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 55. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 56. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 57. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 56 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 59. Neutrogena.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 60. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Neutrogena.com. 61. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 62. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 63. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 65. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Johnson & Johnson who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Neutrogena.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 69. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 70. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 74. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 75. Neutrogena.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 76. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Neutrogena.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 78. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 79. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 80. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 82. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 83. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Neutrogena.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 84. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 85. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 86. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 87. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 88. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 87 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 89. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 90. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 91. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 92. Neutrogena.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 94. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Neutrogena.com, causing Neutrogena.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 95. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 96. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 97. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 99. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 100. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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(29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Collective Action Claims) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES (29 U.S.C. § 216(b) Individual Claims) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES (Individual Claims) Violation of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1, et seq. FAILURE TO PAY STRAIGHT TIME WAGES 112. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 113. Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff for all hours worked as alleged herein. 114. Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff straight time wages for work performed up to 40 hours per week. 115. Defendant’s conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional, unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith. 116. As a result of Defendant’s uniform and common policies and practices described above, Plaintiff was illegally deprived of straight time wages earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, pre and post-judgment interest and other compensation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1, et seq. 27. Defendant has generated over $500,000.00 in revenue per year. 28. Defendant had two (2) or more employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce. 29. Defendant has engaged in ordinary commercial activities within the meaning of the FLSA that result in sales made or business done. 30. Defendant was the “employer” of Plaintiff and similarly situated store managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks (collectively, the “thrift store workers”) within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1(g) and N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1a. 31. Thrift store workers including Plaintiff were “employees” of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1(h) and N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1b. 32. Defendant “suffered or permitted” the thrift store workers including Plaintiff to work and thus “employed” them within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §203(g) and N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1(f). 33. Defendant, directly or indirectly, hired the thrift store workers including Plaintiff and determined the rate and method of the payment of their wages. 34. Defendant controlled the work schedules, duties, protocols, applications, assignments and conditions of employment of the thrift store workers including Plaintiff. 35. The store manager position at Defendant’s thrift stores is classified as non-exempt from overtime. 36. The store manager position at Defendant’s thrift stores is an hourly-paid position. 38. The assistant store manager position at Defendant’s thrift stores is an hourly-paid position. 39. The associate/clerk position at Defendant’s thrift stores is classified as non-exempt. 40. The associate/clerk position at Defendant’s thrift stores is an hourly-paid position. 41. While employed as an associate/clerk, Plaintiff regularly worked approximately three (3) days a week. 42. While employed as a store manager, Plaintiff regularly worked five (5) days a week and on some occasions six (6) days a week. 43. While employed as a store manager, Plaintiff regularly worked over forty (40) hours a week. 44. In multiple weeks, Defendant paid Plaintiff forty (40) hours in a workweek at her regular hourly rate. 45. In some weeks, Defendant additionally paid Plaintiff overtime at a rate of one and one-half (1.5) times her regular hourly rate when she worked six (6) days a week. 46. Defendant failed to pay the thrift store workers for time spent performing pre-shift and/or post-shift work-related activities. 47. Defendant required the thrift store workers to perform pre-shift and/or post-shift off-the-clock work without pay. 49. Plaintiff was required to arrive at approximately 7:30 a.m. – an hour prior to the beginning of the regular shift time and store opening time – to perform off-the-clock work-related activities. 50. The pre-shift off-the-clock work included, but not limited to, pushing the gates up for the truck arrival, pricing the unloaded items and putting them on the shelves. 51. When Plaintiff was an associate/clerk, the then-store manager and assistant store manager were also required to arrive at approximately 7:30 a.m. to perform the same pre-shift off-the-clock work for approximately one (1) hour per workday. 52. When she was a store manager, the then-assistant store manager and associates/clerks with the key were also required to arrive at approximately 7:30 a.m. to perform the same pre-shift off-the-clock work for approximately one (1) hour per workday. 53. During the course of her employment with Defendant including the periods when she was an associate/clerk and when she became a store manager, Plaintiff and other thrift store workers were required to perform post-shift off-the-clock work for approximately thirty (30) minutes to one (1) hour after the end of the regular shift time and store closing time. 54. The post-shift off-the-clock work included, but not limited to, counting out, getting the bank deposit ready, cleaning the store and making deposits at the bank. 55. As a result of Defendant’s common unlawful policies, the thrift store workers were not compensated straight time for work performed up to 40 hours per week and overtime at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for work performed over 40 hours per week. 57. For instance, during the pay period of 2/12/18 to 2/25/18, even though Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a week – and in excess of eighty (80) hours in two (2) weeks – Defendant only paid Plaintiff for eighty (80) hours at her regular hourly rate, resulting in a deprivation of overtime wages. That is, she was not paid for time spent working off the clock. 58. The thrift store workers have been subjected to the common unlawful policies and practices of Defendant as stated herein that violated the FLSA, NJWHLR and NJWPL. 59. Defendant’s wrongful acts and/or omissions/commissions, as alleged herein, were not made in good faith, or in conformity with or in reliance on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or interpretation by the state and/or U.S. Department of Labor and/or any state department of labor, or any administrative practice or enforcement practice or enforcement policy of such departments. 60. Defendant’s violations of the above-described federal and state wage and hour statutes and regulations were willful, arbitrary, unreasonable and in bad faith. 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 63. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on behalf of: All hourly-paid store managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks employed by Defendant at any time from three (3) years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of judgment. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 64. Plaintiff brings this collective action against Defendant to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 65. The collective action further alleges a willful violation of the FLSA and seeks an additional, third year of limitations. 66. Plaintiff seeks to send Notice to all hourly-paid store managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks of Defendant permitting them to assert FLSA claims in this collective action by filing their individual consent forms, as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and supporting case law. 67. Certification of the collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because the employees described herein are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The class of employees on behalf of whom Plaintiff brings this collective action are similarly situated because: (a) they had the same job positions and performed the same or similar job duties as one another on behalf of Defendant; (b) they were subject to the same or similar unlawful practices and policies as stated herein; and (c) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories. 69. Plaintiff anticipates that there will be no difficulty in the management of this litigation. This litigation presents claims under the FLSA, a type that have often been prosecuted on a class wide basis, and the manner of identifying the collective and providing any monetary relief to it can be effectuated from a review of Defendant’s records. 70. Plaintiff and the putative FLSA collective members demand a trial by jury. 71. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 72. Plaintiff also seeks to maintain this action pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 23, as an opt-out class action, for an on behalf all hourly-paid thrift store workers including store managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks who have been affected by Defendant’s common policies and practices which include failure to properly pay for all hours worked resulting in a deprivation of overtime time wages, in violation of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Laws and Regulations (“NJWHLR”), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a et seq. 73. Plaintiff brings this Rule 23 class action as to the NJWHLR claims on behalf of: All hourly-paid store managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks employed by Defendant in the State of New Jersey at any time from two (2) years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of judgment. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 74. Plaintiff brings this Rule 23 class action as to the NJWHLR claims against Defendant to recover unpaid overtime time wages, pre- and post- judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25 and 12:56-1.5. 76. Plaintiff brings this Rule 23 class action as to the NJWPL claims on behalf of: All hourly-paid store managers, assistant store managers and associates/clerks employed by Defendant in the State of New Jersey at any time from six (6) years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of judgment. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 77. The members of the Rule 23 class are so numerous that joinder of all class members in this case would be impractical. The Rule 23 class members should be easy to identify from Defendant’s computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records. 78. There is a well-defined community of interest among the Rule 23 class members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions affecting each individual class member. These common legal and factual questions, include, but are not limited to, the following: whether the Rule 23 class members were properly compensated straight time wages for work performed up to 40 hours per week and overtime wages at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for work performed over 40 hours per week. 80. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant in the same capacity as all of the class members. All class members were treated the same or similarly by management with respect to pay or lack thereof. This treatment included, but was not limited to, failure to pay proper straight time and overtime wages. Thus, there are common questions of law and fact which are applicable to each and every one of the class members. 81. Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the class members and have retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of nationwide wage and hour class actions. Plaintiff and her counsel do not have interests that are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the class members. 82. Defendant’s corporate-wide policies and practices affected all class members similarly, and Defendant benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each class member. Plaintiff’s claim arises from the same legal theories as all other class members. Therefore, this case will be more manageable and efficient as a Rule 23 class action. Plaintiff and her counsel know of no unusual difficulties in this case. 83. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 class members demand a trial by jury. 84. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 86. In multiple weeks, Plaintiff worked more than forty (40) hours per week. 87. Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff for all hours worked as alleged herein. 88. Defendant failed to properly pay Plaintiff overtime wages at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times her regular rate of pay for all hours she worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 89. Defendant’s conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional, unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith. 90. Because Defendant willfully violated the FLSA, a three (3) year statute of limitations shall apply to such violation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 91. As a result of Defendant’s uniform and common policies and practices described above, Plaintiff was illegally deprived of overtime wages earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 92. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 94. In multiple weeks, Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members worked more than forty (40) hours per week. 95. Defendant failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members for all hours worked as alleged herein. 96. Defendant failed to properly pay Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members overtime wages at a rate of not less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for all hours they worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 97. Defendant’s conduct and practices, described herein, were willful, intentional, unreasonably, arbitrary, and in bad faith. 98. Because Defendant willfully violated the FLSA, a three (3) year statute of limitations shall apply to such violation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 99. As a result of Defendant’s uniform and common policies and practices described above, Plaintiff and the FLSA collective members were illegally deprived of overtime wages earned, in such amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such total unpaid amounts, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b).

win

1.  Market Volume Increases ......................................................................... 26  2.  Relationship Between Secondary Market Trading and Primary Market Issuing ....................................................................................................... 28  3.  Regulatory Changes .................................................................................. 29  4.  A Perfect Storm for Collusion .................................................................. 31  5.  Dealers Collude to Increase Spreads ......................................................... 35  C.  News Reports of Regulatory Investigations into the SSA Market ....................... 36  D.  Defendants Terminate or Suspend SSA Traders as the Government Investigations Are Revealed ......................................................................................................... 38  VI.  61. Exclusions from the Class. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their co- conspirators. For the Bank Defendants and their co-conspirators, this includes their subsidiaries and affiliates, as well as the directors, members, partners, managers, officers, employees, and agents of both the Bank Defendants and their subsidiaries and affiliates. For the Trader Defendants, this includes any entity in which they have a controlling interest, their legal representatives, heirs, assigns or any other person acting on their behalf. Also excluded from the Class are any judicial officer presiding over this action and the members of his/her immediate family and judicial staff, and any juror assigned to this action. 62. Ascertainability. Using, among other things, Defendants’ records, the Class members are readily ascertainable. 63. Numerosity. Due to the nature of the trade and commerce involved, Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of geographically dispersed Class members, the exact number and their identities being known to Defendants and their co-conspirators. 64. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of Class members. Defendants’ wrongful common course of conduct in violation of the law directly and proximately caused the damages and injuries of Plaintiff and each member of the Class. 66. Commonality. There are one or more questions of law and/or fact common to the Class, including, but not limited to: a. whether Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in an agreement, combination, or conspiracy to fix, raise, elevate, maintain, or stabilize USD-denominated SSA bond bid/ask spreads in interstate commerce in the United States; b. the identity of the participants of the conspiracy or manipulative scheme; c. the duration of the conspiracy scheme alleged herein and the acts performed by Defendants and their co-conspirators in furtherance thereof; d. whether the alleged conspiracy violated Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 3; e. whether the conduct of Defendants and their co-conspirators, as alleged in this Complaint, caused injury to Plaintiff and Class members; and f. the appropriate measures of damages for the Class. 67. Predominance. Questions of law and fact common to Class members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. 69. The Class is defined herein based on currently available information and Plaintiff hereby reserves the right to amend the definition of members of the Class, including, without limitation, the Class Period. V. 70. The SSA bond market is a large global market. According to Bloomberg estimates, the SSA bond market is valued from $9 trillion to $15 trillion. The SSA bond market experienced significant growth in the past decade, having tripled from 2005 to 2012. In 2015, new issues in SSA bonds reached $843.35 billion.8 71. Governmental or quasi-governmental, supranationals, sub-sovereigns, and agencies issue SSA bonds to raise capital for a variety of public (i.e., social, infrastructure, policy, economic development) purposes worldwide. 72. Supranational issuers are institutions whose mandates extend across national borders and are governed by representatives from a number of countries. Examples of these include the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bank (“EIB”), and the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”). 73. Sub-sovereign issuers include regional entities that sit at the state or province- level. Examples include the German states (such as Berlin or Saxony) or Canadian provinces (Ontario, Alberta, etc.). 74. Agency bonds that are included in the SSA bond market involve a variety of quasi-public entities that meet the social or economic public policy mandates. Examples of these 8 See Abhinav Ramnarayan and Helene Durand., DoJ investigates bond traders over market-rigging, A. The SSA Bond Market V.  SUBSTANTIVE FACT ALLEGATIONS ....................................................................... 22  A.  The SSA Bond Market .......................................................................................... 22  B.  Changes Affecting the SSA Bond Market ............................................................ 26 

win

19. Defendant Empower Energy is a “person” as the term is defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 20. Plaintiff Hopkins’s telephone number, 774-XXX-0365, is registered to a cellular telephone service. 21. The Plaintiff Hopkins received at least five telemarketing calls from the Defendant. 22. The dates of the calls were October 8 (twice), October 22, October 27 and October 29, 2020. 23. The telemarketing calls were generic and computer-generated with the content below: 24. The telemarketing calls were sent using an automated dialing system. 26. As a result, the system that sent automated calls to Plaintiff Hopkins qualifies as an ATDS pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1)(A). 27. After receiving repeated unwanted telemarketing calls, the Plaintiff set an appointment with Empower Energy Solutions. 28. Confirming their involvement, Empower Energy Solutions sent confirmation materials for the call. 29. The telemarketing received by Plaintiff demonstrates that the message was sent for the purpose of encouraging the purchase of Empower’s energy services. 30. This message therefore qualified as telemarketing. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12). 31. Moreover, for more than 31 days prior to the first call, the Plaintiff Hopkins’s telephone number has been listed on the NDNC list. 32. Plaintiff Hopkins did not provide her prior express written consent to receive the telemarketing calls at issue. 33. The calls were not necessitated by an emergency. 35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 36. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and the following classes (the “Classes”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 37. Plaintiff proposes the following Class definitions, subject to amendment as appropriate: Robodialing Class: All persons in the United States who, within four years prior to the commencement of this litigation until the class is certified, received one or more autodialed calls on their cellular telephone from or on behalf of Empower Energy, sent via the same, or substantially similar, system used to contact the Plaintiff. National Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States whose telephone numbers were on the National Do Not Call Registry, but who received more than one telephone solicitation telemarketing call from or on behalf of Empower Energy with a 12-month period, from four years prior the filing of the Complaint. 38. Plaintiff Hopkins is a member of and will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of, these Classes as she has no interests that conflict with any of the class members. 40. Plaintiff and all members of the Classes have been harmed by the acts of the Defendant, including, but not limited to, the invasion of their privacy, annoyance, waste of time, the use of their cell phone battery, and the intrusion on their cellular telephone that occupied it from receiving legitimate communications. 41. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 42. The Classes as defined above are identifiable through the Defendant’s dialer records, other phone records, and phone number databases. 43. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Classes, but Plaintiff reasonably believes Class members number, at minimum, in the hundreds in each class. 44. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. 45. Additionally, the disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. 46. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. The questions of law and fact, referred to above, involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. 48. Further, Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Classes. 49. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions, and especially TCPA class actions. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the other members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. 50. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The only individual question concerns identification of class members, which will be ascertainable from records maintained by Defendant and/or its agents. 51. The likelihood that individual members of the Classes will prosecute separate actions is remote due to the time and expense necessary to prosecute an individual case. 53. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 54. Empower Energy violated the TCPA by sending, or causing to be sent via an agent, automated calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and members of the Robocall Class using an automated dialer without their prior express written consent. 55. As a result of the Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Robocall Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 56. The Plaintiff and Robocall Class Members are entitled to an award of treble damages if their actions are found to have been knowing or willful. 57. Plaintiff and Robocall Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant from advertising their goods or services, except for emergency purposes, using an ATDS or pre-recorded voice in the future. 58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 60. As a result of the Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and National Do Not Call Registry Class members are entitled to an award of up to $500 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 61. Plaintiff and National Do Not Call Registry Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendant from advertising their goods or services, except for emergency purposes, to any number on the National Do Not Call Registry in the future. 62. The Defendant’s violations were knowing or willful. CLASS ACTION JURY TRIAL DEMANDED / Plaintiff Amanda Hopkins (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, alleges on personal knowledge, investigation of her counsel, and on information and belief, as follows: Statutory Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq.) on behalf of the Robocall Class Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq.) on behalf of the National Do Not Call Registry Class

lose

67. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 68. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Zwicker & Associates P.C. and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 69. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of Zwicker & Associates P.C., and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 70. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 71. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 72. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. -14- 73. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. -15- (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. 74. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 75. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 76. Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. -16- 77. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 78. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through seventy-seven (77) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. 79. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 80. The class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about December 20th, 2016; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt and for misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed by the Plaintiff. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 81. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 82. Because the Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. -17- WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows: (a) Statutory damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k); (b) Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and (c) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances. Dated: Brooklyn, New York May 3rd, 2017 /s/ Daniel Cohen_____ Daniel Cohen, Esq. NY Bar No. 5481460 Attorney for the Plaintiff Daniel Cohen, PLLC 300 Cadman Plaza W, 12th floor Brooklyn, New York 11201 E-mail: Dan@dccohen.com Office: (646) 645-8482 Fax: (347) 665-1545 Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable. /s/ Daniel Cohen_____ Daniel Cohen, Esq. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

win

21. Defendant is a tanning products company that owns and operates the website, www.theisleofparadise.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Upon information and belief, because ISLE OF PARADISE LLC’s Website has never been accessible and because ISLE OF PARADISE LLC does not have, and has never had, an adequate corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that ISLE OF PARADISE LLC retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that ISLE OF PARADISE LLC work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that ISLE OF PARADISE LLC work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that ISLE OF PARADISE LLC work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that ISLE OF PARADISE LLC work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility- related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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25. Insight Global is an employment and staffing company operating throughout the United States and internationally, including in Pennsylvania. 26. To provide services to their clients, Insight Global employ recruiting personnel, including Technical Recruiters. 27. Many of the individuals who worked for Insight Global were paid a salary and misclassified as exempt employees, and these make up the proposed Putative Classes. While the exact job titles and job duties may differ, the Putative Class Members are and were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work. These so-called exempt employees were paid a salary for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) without any overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 28. For example, Prather worked for Insight Global as a Technical Recruiter during the relevant time period (in Pennsylvania). Throughout his employment with Insight Global, he was classified as an exempt employee and paid a salary with no overtime compensation. 29. As a Technical Recruiter, Prather regularly worked more than 40 hours each week without receiving overtime compensation. On average, Prather estimates he worked approximately 55 hours each week. 31. The job functions of Prather and the Putative Class Members were primarily technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. 32. Prather and the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities performed by each person. 33. Prather and the Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. 34. The work Prather performed was an essential and integral part of Insight Global’s core business. 35. No advanced degree is required to become a recruiter. In fact, Insight Global regularly hired recruiters who only have a high-school diploma (or less). 36. Being a recruiter does not require specialized academic training as a standard prerequisite. 37. For example, Prather does not have any advanced degree. 38. Prather and the Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management duties. 39. To the extent the recruiters make “decisions,” such decisions do not require the exercise of independent discretion and judgment. 40. Instead, the recruiters apply well-established techniques and procedures and use established standards to evaluate any issues. 41. Recruiters do not set the techniques and procedures utilized to perform their job duties and do not set quality standards. 43. With these job duties, the recruiters are clearly non-exempt employees under the FLSA, and PMWA. 44. Insight Global does not pay their recruiters overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a single workweek. 45. Instead, Insight Global pays these workers a base salary for days worked in the office. 46. Prather and the Recruiters worked for Insight Global in the past three years throughout the United States, including in Pennsylvania. 47. As a result of Insight Global’s pay policies, Prather and the Putative Class Members were denied the overtime pay required by federal and Pennsylvania law, because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non-exempt job duties. 48. Insight Global keeps accurate records of the hours, or at least the days, its recruiters work. 49. Insight Global also keeps accurate records of the amount of pay its recruiters receive. 50. Because Prather (and Insight Global’s other recruiters) were misclassified as exempt employees by Insight Global, they should receive overtime for all hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek. V. 62. Prather incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Insight Global imposed on Prather were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 63. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA and PMWA. 64. Numerous other individuals who worked with Prather indicated they were improperly classified as exempt employees, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. 65. Based on his experiences and tenure with Insight Global, Prather is aware that Insight Global’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 66. The Putative Class Members were all improperly classified as exempt employees and not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 67. Insight Global’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 68. Prather’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 69. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not prevent class or collective treatment. 70. Prather has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. Like each Putative Class Member, Prather has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to them under state and/or federal law. 72. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Insight Global will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor laws. 73. Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual litigation against Insight Global, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 74. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 76. Prather’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Prather and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Insight Global’s illegal and uniform employment policy. 77. Prather knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective or class action. 78. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective and class action treatment.

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22. On or around August of 2020, Plaintiff visited the Website, using a popular screen reading software called NonVisual Desktop Access, with the intent of browsing and potentially making a purchase. 24. As a result of visiting the Website, Plaintiff is aware that the Website includes multiple barriers making it impossible for himself, and any other visually impaired or blind person, from enjoying access to the Website’s content equally to that of a sighted user. 25. For example, many features on the Website fail to accurately describe the contents of graphical images, fail to properly label title, fails to distinguish one page from another, contain multiple broken links, contain headings that do not describe the topic or purpose, and the keyboard user interfaces lack a mode of operation where the keyboard focus indicator is visible. 26. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 27. Upon information and belief, Defendant has not, and have never, had adequate policies and procedures in place to ensure the Website is and will remain accessible to the blind and/or visually impaired. 28. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons, who need screen-readers to access websites, have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 30. If the Website were equally accessible to all, and if simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 guidelines were met, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Because of this, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including maintaining a website that is inaccessible to members of a protected class. 32. Due to Defendant’s violations of the ADA, and the harm it has caused, Plaintiff seeks damages, fees, costs, and injunctive relief. 33. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 34. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 35. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 37. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 38. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 40. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 42. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 43. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 44. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 46. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 47. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 48. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 50. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 51. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 52. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 53. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 55. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 56. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 58. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 60. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 61. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 62. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 63. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 64. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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19. Even if performance was excused or impossible, Defendant would nevertheless be required to return the funds received for services and/or goods that it did not provide. 21. Duke is one of the nation’s most prestigious universities, offering more than 50 major and 50 minor programs of study and 23 certificate programs across its two undergraduate schools, Trinity College of Arts and Sciences and Pratt School of Engineering. Duke touts the opportunity to combine major, minor, and certificate programs into “437,989 unique academic combinations.”7 Duke also offers master’s and doctoral degrees in more than 80 departments and programs of study.8 22. In the 2020 edition of U.S. News & World Report’s Best Colleges, Duke was ranked as the tenth “Best National University.” It also tied for the seventeenth spot in the same rankings for best undergraduate teaching. 23. Duke is also among the nation’s most expensive private secondary educations, and estimates that for the 2020-2021 academic year, the total cost of undergraduate attendance is $81,302, an amount which exceeds the median household income in the United States. 25. In highlighting its undergraduate programs, Duke touts its 8:1 student-to-faculty ratio and “countless opportunities to nurture personal connections.”10 The school notes that “At Duke, you'll be surrounded by some of the world's brightest minds. But you won't just be studying with them-you'll be working with them. After all, the world's toughest problems won't be solved by isolated individuals but rather through interdisciplinary exploration, unconventional thinking, and serious collaboration.”11 Every Duke student is allotted $70 per semester to invite a faculty member to dine with them at various locations around campus to help establish lasting relationships that might not have developed in the classroom.”12 26. Duke also highlights its extensive on-campus facilities, which include “collaborative study spaces, classrooms, and seminar rooms equipped with whiteboards and the latest technology to help promote interdisciplinary, team-based, and data-driven research at Duke,” the 70,000 square-foot Rubenstein Arts Center housing “multipurpose studios, seminar classrooms, a makerspace, lounge, theater, and more,” and lab facilities, such as the Innovation Co-Lab, “which houses cutting-edge tools such as 3-D printing, YR, and biometrical analysis.”13 28. The Graduate School also markets to students by stating: “To come to Duke University for graduate study is to be immersed in the welcoming environment of an educational community dedicated to the pursuit and production of knowledge that will serve the broader society…. [A]t the Duke University Graduate School, among your fellow graduate students, and within the broader community of Durham, you will find the people, commitment, support, and resources to help you succeed and enjoy the journey.”15 29. Because of the high-quality, hands-on, and proven academic opportunities that it advertises, and on-campus experiences and services it guarantees, Defendant has charged substantial tuition and fees for a Duke education. 30. For example, after Plaintiff registered for graduate courses for the Spring 2020 semester and Defendant accepted Plaintiff’s registration, Defendant charged Plaintiff $27,840.00 in tuition, as well as a $10 Grad Student Services Fee, an $18.25 Grad Student Activity Fee, a $158 Recreation Fee, and a $417 Health Fee.16 After receiving a scholarship, Plaintiff had to take out loans of more than $24,500 to pay for his tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 semester. 32. Plaintiff has neither received nor been offered any refund or reimbursement for the in-person tuition or fees that he paid for the Spring 2020 semester at Duke. 33. Defendant, through President Price, has acknowledged that Duke was “engaged in what may be the greatest experiment in our university’s history—indeed, in the history of higher education.” Duke has conceded that “[t]he coming weeks won’t be easy, and there will of course be growing pains” and has asked for students’ “flexibility as we transition to new models of teaching, enabled by technology and accelerated by necessity.”17 Duke further acknowledged that if its experiment was done right, students would have “the tools you need to complete your programs and keep learning…”18 34. It is not at all clear that Duke is getting its experiment right. Duke professors were advised to modify course syllabi and simplify assignments in order to accommodate remote teaching. Professors were provided links to learn on the fly how to use Zoom software for classes.19 Many professors have simply pre-recorded lectures and posted them online. But according to Duke professors, recorded lectures are like “speaking into dead space,” and even “live” Zoom classes are like “talking to a wall of black boxes” because many students have their computers’ camera turned off.20 36. The result of this haphazard approach is that Plaintiff and Class members have been provided with a second-rate online substitute for the hands-on, in-person coursework in which they enrolled—and for which they paid. 37. Yet despite providing students with an admittedly experimental educational experience, to date Duke has refused to provide students with prorated reimbursements of tuition and fees. In fact, Duke’s Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) page on its website does not even mention tuition or fee refunds in any way.22 In effect, Defendant has placed the entire financial burden of its “experiment” onto Plaintiff and the Class. 38. As a result of the closure of Duke, Defendant has not delivered the educational services, facilities, programs, and opportunities for which Plaintiff and the Class contracted and paid. Plaintiff and the proposed Class are therefore entitled to a full refund of the portion of the fees and tuition for the latter half of the Spring 2020 semester that Defendant did not provide, or which it provided in a severely diminished manner. 39. The remote, online learning “classes” offered to Spring 2020 students since March deprive students of in-person learning from their peers and school faculty. The move to these remote classes also deprives students of access to the facilities, materials, and opportunities only offered on Duke’s physical (as opposed to virtual) campus, including laboratory and research experience, use of on campus facilities (e.g., the gym and libraries), and use of on campus services and events (e.g., attending sporting events, end-of-year programs and events, and various student services). 41. The online classes offered to Plaintiff and his peers are also of substantially lower quality and are objectively worth less than the in-person courses for which they enrolled and paid. 42. Duke’s post-COVID-19 online student offerings do not even come close to comparing with Duke’s in-person course experiences. Instead, Plaintiff and Class members have been forced into overpriced bubble-gum and duct-tape substitutes. Yet, despite offering students inferior, poorly planned, and poorly executed online courses, Defendant refuses to issue refunds to Plaintiff and thousands of other students. 43. Moreover, Defendant has refused to issue refunds for mandatory fees as well. Since the campus shut-down Plaintiff and the Class have not received the benefits of these fees, nor been offered a refund for them. 45. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), (b)(3), and/or (c)(4), Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the following Class: All persons who paid tuition, fees, and/or other costs to Duke University for (1) in- person classes for the Spring 2020 semester or a subsequent term and (2) who did not receive the benefits for which they paid. 46. The following persons and entities are excluded from the Class: Defendant and its officers, directors, employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates; all judges assigned to this case and any members of their immediate families; and the parties’ counsel in this litigation. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify, change, or expand the class definition, including by proposing additional subclasses, based upon discovery and further investigation. 47. A class action is a superior means to ensure the fair and efficient adjudication of this case. The damages suffered by individual Class members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense of individual litigation of the claims described herein against the Defendant. Moreover, individualized actions would run the risk of creating inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts and would increase the likely delay and expense to all parties involved and the Court itself. By contrast, by proceeding as a class action, the claims at issue can be adjudicated efficiently through economies of scale. 48. Numerosity. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), the members the proposed Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that individual joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Although the precise number of Class members is unknown presently to Plaintiff, the Class is presumed to number more than 15,000 people and is easily ascertainable through enrollment and financial records maintained by Defendants. 50. Typicality. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3), Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the other Class members’ claims because Plaintiff and the other Class members each paid for certain costs associated with the Spring 2020 semester but were not provided the services that those costs were meant to cover. Each suffered damages in the form of their lost tuition, fees, and other monies paid to Defendant, and the claims all arise from the same Duke practices and course of conduct. There are no defenses available that are unique to the Plaintiff. 52. Plaintiff repeats and alleges the allegations in Paragraphs 1-51, above, as if fully alleged herein. 53. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class. 54. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class entered into binding contracts with Defendant, which provided that Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would pay tuition and fees, to Duke, in exchange for on-campus educational, social, and other experiences and access to facilities. 55. As part of their contracts with Duke, and, in exchange for adequate consideration that Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class provided, Defendant promised to provide educational and campus services and a meal plan during the Spring 2020 semester. 56. Defendant failed to provide the services that it was obligated to perform under its contracts with Plaintiff and the proposed Class. Defendant has retained tuition and fees paid by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for the full 2020 Spring semester without providing them the promised benefits, instead providing those benefits for only a portion of the 2020 Spring semester. 57. By contrast, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class fulfilled their end of the bargain when they paid the monies due and owing for their full tuition and fees for the semester. 59. Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, including being deprived of the education, experience, and services that they were promised and expected to obtain, and for which they have paid. They are entitled to damages including but not limited to prorated reimbursement of the tuition, fees, and other expenses that were collected by Defendant for services that Defendant failed to deliver fully. 60. Defendant’s performance under the contracts is not excused because of COVID- 61. Plaintiff repeats and alleges the allegations in Paragraphs 1-60, above, as if fully alleged herein. 62. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class in the alternative to the breach of contract claim brought in Count I. 63. Plaintiff and other members of the proposed Class conferred a benefit or enrichment on Defendant by paying tuition and mandatory fees to Defendant which were beneficial to Defendant, at the expense of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 65. Defendant has retained the benefit paid by Plaintiff and the Class despite its failure to provide the services for which the benefit was paid. 66. There is no justification or cause for Defendant’s failure to return the portion of the tuition and fees that Defendant has unjustifiably kept for itself even though it failed to complete the services for which Plaintiff provided the funds to Defendant. 67. Accordingly, Defendant has been unjustly enriched and should pay as restitution a prorated portion of the funds for the Spring 2020 semester that Plaintiff and the proposed Class paid for tuition, required fees, and meal plan fees. 68. Plaintiff repeat and re-allege the allegations in Paragraphs 1-67, above, as if fully alleged herein. 69. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Class. 70. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have a right to the in-person educational and extra-curricular services that they were supposed to be provided in exchange for their payments to Defendant. 72. Defendant deprived Plaintiff and the other members of the Class of their fees or of the right to the services for which their fees were intended to be used. 73. Class members demanded the return of the prorated, unused fees for the remainder of the Spring 2020 semester. 74. Defendant’s retention of the fees paid by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without providing the services for which they paid deprived Plaintiff and the other members of the Class of the benefits for which the fees were paid. This interference with the services for which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class paid damaged Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in that they paid fees for services that were not and will not be provided. 75. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to the return of prorated unused portion of the fees paid, through the end of the Spring 2020 semester Breach of Contract Conversion Unjust Enrichment

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1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 9 11. On or about September 30, 2013, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile machine an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff. A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit 19. In accordance with F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation, or (4) which did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery. 2. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 20. Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is 5 numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 21. Commonality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (2)): Common questions of law and fact apply to the claims of all class members. Common material questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to, the following: a) Whether the Defendants sent unsolicited fax advertisements; b) Whether the Defendants’ faxes advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services; c) The manner and method the Defendants used to compile or obtain the list of fax numbers to which they sent Exhibit "A" and other unsolicited faxed advertisements; d) Whether the Defendants faxed advertisements without first obtaining the recipient's prior permission or invitation; e) Whether the Defendants sent the faxed advertisements knowingly; f) Whether the Defendants violated the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 and the regulations promulgated thereunder; g) Whether the faxes contain an “opt-out notice” that complies with the requirements of § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and the effect of the failure to comply with such requirements; h) Whether the Defendants should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the future; i) Whether the Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to statutory damages; and 6 j) Whether the Court should award treble damages. 22. Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the class the same faxes. 23. Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 24. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 25. Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227. 26. Predominance and Superiority (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3)): Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class 7 action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because: a) Proof of the claims of the Plaintiff will also prove the claims of the class without the need for separate or individualized proceedings; b) Evidence regarding defenses or any exceptions to liability that the Defendants may assert and prove will come from the Defendants’ records and will not require individualized or separate inquiries or proceedings; c) The Defendants have acted and are continuing to act pursuant to common policies or practices in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members; d) The amount likely to be recovered by individual class members does not support individual litigation. A class action will permit a large number of relatively small claims involving virtually identical facts and legal issues to be resolved efficiently in one (1) proceeding based upon common proofs; and e) This case is inherently manageable as a class action in that: (i) The Defendants identified persons or entities to receive the fax transmissions and it is believed that the Defendants’ computer and business records will enable the Plaintiff to readily identify class members and establish liability and damages; (ii) Liability and damages can be established for the Plaintiff and the class with the same common proofs; (iii) Statutory damages are provided for in the statute and are the same for all class members and can be calculated in the same or a similar manner; 8 (iv) A class action will result in an orderly and expeditious administration of claims and it will foster economics of time, effort and expense; (v) A class action will contribute to uniformity of decisions concerning the Defendants’ practices; and (vi) As a practical matter, the claims of the class are likely to go unaddressed absent class certification. Claim for Relief for Violation of the JFPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 27. The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 28. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 29. Opt-Out Notice Requirements. The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”): 3. a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act. The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶ 31 of its 2006 Report and Order (In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Junk Prevention Act of 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006). The requirements of (3) above are contained in § (b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice Requirements via § (b)(2)(D)(ii). Compliance with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult nor costly. The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon the owners of the telephone lines and fax machines giving them the right, and means, to stop unwanted faxed advertisements. 30. 2006 FCC Report and Order. The JFPA, in § (b)(2) of the Act, directed the FCC to implement regulations regarding the JFPA, including the JFPA’s Opt-Out Notice Requirements and the FCC did so in its 2006 Report and Order, which in addition provides among other things: 10 A. The definition of, and the requirements for, an established business relationship for purposes of the first of the three prongs of an exemption to liability under § (b)(1)(C)(i) of the Act and provides that the lack of an “established business relationship” precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 8-12 and 17-20); B. The required means by which a recipient’s facsimile telephone number must be obtained for purposes of the second of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(ii) of the Act and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 13-16); C. The things that must be done in order to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements for the purposes of the third of the three prongs of the exemption under § (b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act and provides that the failure to comply with these requirements precludes the ability to invoke the exemption contained in § (b)(1)(C) of the Act (See 2006 Report and Order ¶¶ 24-34); D. The failure of a sender to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements precludes the sender from claiming that a recipient gave “prior express permission or invitation” to receive the sender’s fax (See Report and Order ¶ 48); As a result thereof, a sender of a faxed advertisement who fails to comply with the Opt- Out Notice Requirements has, by definition, transmitted an unsolicited advertisement under the JFPA. This is because such a sender can neither claim that the recipients of the faxed advertisement gave “prior express permission or invitation” to receive the fax nor can the sender claim the exemption from liability contained in § (b)(C)(1) of the Act. 11 31. The Fax. Defendants sent the on or about September 30, 2013, advertisement via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the Act. Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 32. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants are continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 33. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf 12 of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 34. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 35. The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted advertisements; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’ transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required opt-out notice was unlawful. 36. The Defendants’ actions caused damages to the Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving the Defendants’ junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of the Defendants’ faxes. Moreover, the Defendants’ faxes used the Plaintiff's telephone lines and fax machine. The Defendants’ faxes cost the Plaintiff time, as the Plaintiff and its employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing and routing the Defendants’ unauthorized faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on the Plaintiff's business activities. The Defendants’ faxes unlawfully interrupted the Plaintiff's and other class members' privacy interests in being left alone. Finally, the injury and property damage sustained by Plaintiff and the other class members from the sending of Defendants’ advertisements occurred outside of Defendants’ premises. 13 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, SHAUN FAULEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, demands judgment in his favor and against Defendants, DRUG DEPOT, INC. a/k/a APS PHARMACY, INC. and JOHN DOES 1-10, jointly and severally, as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint the Plaintiff as the representative of the class, and appoint the Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court award actual monetary loss from such violations or the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each violation, whichever is greater; C. That Court enjoin the Defendants from additional violations; and D. That the Court award pre-judgment interest, costs, and such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, SHAUN FAULEY, individually and as the representative of a class of similarly-situated persons, By: s/ Brian J. Wanca Brian J. Wanca Ryan M. Kelly

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12. Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and a class of similarly-situated persons. Whether Defendants did so directly or with the assistance of a third party (yet unknown to Plaintiff), Defendants are directly liable for violating the TCPA. 13. Plaintiff has received at least two of Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile. True and correct copies of the faxes received in October 2015 and January 2016 are attached as Exhibit A and Exhibit B. Plaintiff intends to discover the number of other Defendants’ advertisements sent to Plaintiff by fax. 15. Exhibit A and Exhibit B include VM’s name and contact information. 16. Exhibit A and Exhibit B do not include the mandatory opt-out notice required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 17. Plaintiff did not expressly invite or give permission to anyone to send Exhibit A and Exhibit B or any other advertisement from Hygenic or VM to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 18. On information and belief, Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 39 other persons in violation of the TCPA. 19. Plaintiff and the other class members owe no obligation to protect their fax machines from Defendants. Their fax machines are ready to send and receive their urgent communications, or private communications about patients’ medical needs, not to receive Defendants’ unlawful advertisements. 21. Excluded from the class are Defendants, any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest, each of Defendants’ officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns, and any Judge assigned to this action, including his or her immediate family. 22. On information and belief, Defendants’ fax advertising campaigns involved other, substantially-similar advertisements also sent without the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Plaintiff intends to locate those advertisements in discovery. 23. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies Rule 23 (a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. Additionally, prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims separately from the putative class’s claims would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A). Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or fact making class representation the superior method to adjudicate this controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3). 24. Numerosity/impracticality of joinder. On information and belief, the class consists of more than 39 persons and, thus, is so numerous that individual joinder of each member is impracticable. The precise number of class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff, but will be obtained from Defendants’ records or the records of third parties. 26. Typicality of claims. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other class members, because Plaintiff and all class members were injured by the same wrongful practices. Plaintiff and the members of the class received Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile and those advertisements did not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Under the facts of this case, because the focus is upon Defendants’ conduct, if Plaintiff prevails on its claims, then the other putative class members will prevail as well. 27. Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the class it seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and TCPA litigation in particular, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and its counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interest of members of the class. 29. A class action is the superior method of adjudicating the common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual questions. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all class members is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. The likelihood of individual class members prosecuting separate claims is remote, and even if every class member could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Relief concerning Plaintiff’s rights under the laws herein alleged and with respect to the class would be proper. Plaintiff envisions no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 30. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 31. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons against Defendants. 33. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s express invitation or permission.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4). 34. The TCPA provides a private right of action as follows: 35. The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if it determines that a violation was knowing or willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 36. Here, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1) (C) by sending an advertisement by facsimile (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and the other class members without their prior express invitation or permission. 38. Defendants failed to include a clear and conspicuous opt-out notice on Exhibit A and Exhibit B. 39. Exhibit A and Exhibit B do not provide any of the information the TCPA requires for a compliant opt-out notice. For example, Exhibit A fails to state on the advertisement’s first page that the recipient may make a request to the sender not to send any future advertisement by facsimile and that the sender’s failure to comply within 30 days is unlawful. 40. Defendants violated the TCPA by failing to state on the first page of each fax advertisement that their failure to comply with an opt-out request within 30 days would be unlawful. Exhibit A, Exhibit B. 41. Defendants failed to provide a domestic telephone number and a fax number as required by 47 U.S.C. § (b) (2) (D) (iv) and it is not clear from the purported opt-out notice that the mechanism provided is available 24/7 as stipulated by 47 U.S.C § 227 (b) (2) (D) (v). 42. Facsimile advertising imposes burdens on recipients that are distinct from the burdens imposed by other types of advertising. The required opt-out notice provides recipients the necessary information to opt-out of future fax transmissions, including a notice that the sender’s failure to comply with the opt-out request will be unlawful. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 44. The TCPA is a strict liability statute and Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were negligent. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 45. Even if Defendants did not intend to injure Plaintiff and the other class members, did not intend to violate their privacy, and did not intend to waste their valuable time with Defendants’ advertisements, those facts are irrelevant because the TCPA is a strict liability statute. 46. If Defendants’ actions were knowing or purposeful, then the Court has the discretion to increase the statutory damages up to 3 times the amount. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 47. VM is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it sent the faxes, caused the faxes to be sent, participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation, the faxes were sent on its behalf, or under general principles of vicarious liability, including actual authority, apparent authority and ratification. 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 51. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons and against Defendants. 52. By sending advertisements to their fax machines, Defendants improperly and unlawfully converted the class’s fax machines to Defendants’ own use. Where printed (as in Plaintiff’s case), Defendants also improperly and unlawfully converted the class members’ paper and toner to Defendants’ own use. Defendants also converted Plaintiff’s time to Defendants’ own use, as they did with the valuable time of the other class members. 53. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 55. Defendants knew or should have known that their misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. 56. Plaintiff and the other class members were deprived of the use of the fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendants. CONVERSION TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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31. Plaintiff and the Putative FLSA Collective, all of whom regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a workweek, were employed as SMs by Defendants at their For Eyes locations. 32. Defendants maintain control, oversight, and discretion over the operation of their retail stores, including their employment practices with respect to Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective. 34. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Putative FLSA Collective overtime compensation for the hours they worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 35. The number of shifts Plaintiff or each individual member of the Putative FLSA Collective worked per week can be ascertained from Defendants’ records. 36. Defendants have assigned all of the work that Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective performed, and Defendants are aware of the work that they have performed. 37. Throughout the relevant period, it has been Defendants’ policy, pattern, or practice to require, suffer, or permit Plaintiff and the Putative FLSA Collective to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek without paying them overtime wages for all overtime hours worked. 38. This work required little skill and no capital investment. Nor did it include managerial responsibilities, or the exercise of meaningful independent judgment and discretion. 39. Throughout the period relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective performed the same primary job duties, including, but not limited to: a. customer service; b. selling eyeglasses and contact lenses; c. setting up displays and merchandising; d. verifying insurance; and e. cleaning the store. 41. Defendants maintain control, oversight, and discretion over the operation of its retail stores, including its employment practices with respect to Plaintiff and the Putative FLSA Collective. 42. The primary duties of Plaintiff and the Putative FLSA Collective were nonexempt. 43. The primary job duties of Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective did not materially differ from the duties of non-exempt hourly paid employees. Their primary duties were manual in nature. The performance of manual labor and non-exempt duties occupied the majority of the working hours of the Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective. 44. Plaintiff and the other members of the Putative FLSA Collective’s primary duties were customer service related. Customer service occupied the majority of the Plaintiff and the other SMs’ working hours. 45. Pursuant to a centralized, company-wide policy, pattern, and practice, Defendants classified all SMs as exempt from coverage of the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 46. Defendants did not perform a person-by-person analysis of every SMs’ job duties when making the decision to classify all of them as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime protections. 48. Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that underfunding store labor budgets resulted in Plaintiff and members of the Putative FLSA Collective, who were not paid overtime, primarily performing manual and non-exempt duties. 49. By underfunding the store labor budget, Defendants avoided paying any overtime compensation to the SMs for performing non-exempt activities over 40 hours a workweek. The decision to misclassify SMs as exempt was calculated to allow Defendants to avoid paying additional wages (including overtime) to the non-exempt store-level employees. 50. Defendants failed to keep accurate records of all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Members of the Putative FLSA Collective. 51. Defendants assigned the work that Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective have performed or Defendants were aware of the work they performed. 52. The work performed by Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective constitutes compensable work time under the FLSA and was not preliminary, postliminary or de minimus. 53. All members of the Putative FLSA Collective primarily performed the same or substantially similar job duties. 54. Plaintiff and the other SMs' primary duties did not differ substantially from the duties of non-exempt hourly paid employees. 55. Plaintiff and the other SMs did not exercise a meaningful degree of independent discretion with respect to the exercise of their duties. 57. Defendants also knew by virtue of its policies concerning scheduling and labor budgets that Plaintiff and members of the Putative FLSA Collective regularly and customarily did not direct two (2) or more employees, there frequently being only a SM and/or a SM and only one (1) associate scheduled to work most shifts. 58. As an experienced and practical retailer operating numerous stores in multiple states, Defendants were aware of, or recklessly disregarded the fact that by underfunding the labor budgets for store locations, Plaintiff and members of the Putative FLSA Collective (a) did not customarily and regularly direct two (2) or more employees; and (b) were primarily performing non-exempt duties and not performing activities that would suffice to make their actual job duties comply with any exemption under the applicable laws. Inasmuch as Defendants are substantial corporate entities aware of their obligations under the FLSA, they, accordingly, acted willfully or recklessly in failing to classify Plaintiff and members of the Putative FLSA as non-exempt employees. 59. Defendants’ unlawful conduct as described above, was willful and/or in reckless disregard of the applicable wage and hour laws pursuant to Defendants’ centralized, company- wide policy, pattern, and/or practice of attempting to minimize labor costs by violating the FLSA 61. Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA are further demonstrated by the fact that Defendants failed to maintain accurate and sufficient time record for Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective. Defendants acted recklessly or in willful disregard of the FLSA by instituting a policy and/or practice that did not allow the Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective to record all hours worked. 62. Due to the foregoing the Defendants failure to pay overtime wages for work performed by the Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek was willful and has been widespread, repeated and consistent. 63. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207 and § 216(b), Plaintiff seeks to prosecute her FLSA claims as a collective action on behalf of herself and all persons who are or were formerly employed by Defendants as SMs at their For Eyes locations, at any time from three (3) years prior to the filing of this Collective Action Complaint to the entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”). 65. Upon information and belief, there are numerous similarly situated current and former SMs who have not been paid proper overtime wages in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it. Thus, notice should be sent to the Putative FLSA Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 66. Similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, readily identifiable and can be located though Defendants’ records. 67. Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 65 above as if they were set forth again herein. 68. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff, and employed or continue to employ, each of the members of the Putative FLSA Collective within the meaning of the FLSA. 69. Defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as detailed in this Collective Action Complaint. 70. Plaintiff has consented in writing to be parties to this action, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 216(b). 71. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 72. The overtime wage provisions set forth in 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. apply to Defendants. 74. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective were employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 75. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated members of the Putative FLSA Collective the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the FLSA. 76. At all relevant times and continuing to the present time, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation to its SMs for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 77. As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to compensate their employees, including Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendants have violated and, continue to violate, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a). 78. As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to record, report, credit and/or compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the members of the Putative FLSA Collective, Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of their employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a). 79. As a result of Defendants’ policy and practice of minimizing labor costs by underfunding the labor budgets for its stores, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Collective were primarily performing manual labor and non-exempt tasks. 81. As a result of Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the members of the FLSA Collective, are entitled to recover from Defendants (a) their unpaid wages for all of the hours worked by them, as overtime compensation, (b) an additional, equal amount as liquidated damages for Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, and (c) their unreasonably delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), with such amounts to be determined at trial or through undisputed record evidence. 82. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful and as such a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: UNPAID OVERTIME WAGES (On behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective)

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15. Defendant Shady Grove Fertility describes itself in various media as “the largest physician-owned, physician-led partnership of top-tier fertility practices in the U.S.”, with fertility clinics in Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, Georgia and Washington, D.C. 16. As part of its duties, US Fertility was formed by Defendant Shady Grove Fertility and Defendant Amulet for the purpose of, inter alia, providing IT services to Shady Grove Fertility and to manage, store and safeguard PI relating to Shady Grove Fertility patients. 17. As part of its services, Shady Grove Fertility collected and electronically stored confidential PPI relating to patients, including names, social security numbers, patient numbers, dates of birth and information which forms the “Master Patient Index,” or MPI, which is an electronic database that holds demographic information on every patient which allows users to match and link medical records by unique identifying characteristics of patients, including race and ethnicity, current address, contact information, insurance information, and other similar identifying elements. 19. On or about January 8, 2021, Defendants sent out a form notice to current and former patients at Shady Grove Fertility clinics in various states, including Plaintiff, stating that in or around sometime September 14, 2020, Defendants had discovered that US Fertility had been the victim of a data breach and ransomware attack at some point between August 12, 2020 and September 12, 2020 and that electronically stored Patient Personal Information and information from the Master Patient Index, held by US Fertility relating to Shady Grove Fertility patients had been accessed and “acquired” by unauthorized and unidentified users. See Attachment A. 20. That form notice did not provide other information about the breach, including why it took Defendants as long a month – between August 12, 2020 and September 12, 2020 – to even realize that patient PPI and MPI information had been improperly accessed and acquired. Id. 21. Nor did the form notice indicate why Defendants waited from September 14, 2020 until January 2021 to notify Plaintiff and the class of the breach and theft of their data. Id. 22. The packet included with this form notice also offered recipients twelve months of free credit monitoring by Trans Union. Id. 24. Indeed, it is not clear how credit monitoring by Trans Union, a credit reporting agency, will benefit or make whole class members who have had information relating to them previously held in the Master Patient Index stolen. 25. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants were aware of the need to safeguard patient PPI and information contained in the Master Patient Index, a duty which is especially strong given HIPAA mandates. 26. Defendants had obligations created by contract, statute, industry standards, common law, and representations made to Plaintiff and class members to keep their PPI and MPI information confidential and to protect it from unauthorized access and disclosure. 27. The potential for improper disclosure of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PPI and Master Patient Index information was a risk well known to Defendants, and thus Defendants were on notice that the failure to take steps necessary to secure the PPI and MPI information from those risks left that information in a dangerous and vulnerable condition. 28. Despite the fact that the threat of a data breach had been a well-known risk to Defendants, especially due to the valuable and sensitive nature of the data Defendants collect, store and maintain on medical patients, Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to adequately protect the PPI and MPI information of current and former patients of Shady Grove Fertility. 29. The data breach described herein was a direct result of Defendants’ failure to implement adequate and reasonable cyber-security procedures and protocols necessary to protect PPI and MPI information. 31. Defendants had the resources necessary to prevent a data breach of the type which occurred but neglected to adequately invest in security measures, despite its obligation to protect such information. 32. Moreover, Defendants had the resources necessary to immediately detect a data incursion and theft in real time, and to give immediate notice to the class of such a breach, but Defendants neglected to adequately invest in security measures which would have immediately detected the breach and theft, despite their obligation to do so. 33. Accordingly, Defendants breached their common law, statutory, and other duties owed to Plaintiff and class. 34. Defendants’ duty to use reasonable security measures also arose under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting commerce”, including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair practice of failing to use reasonable measures to protect confidential data by entities like Defendants. 35. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has established data security principles and practices for businesses as set forth in its publication, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business. 36. Among other things, the FTC states that companies should encrypt information stored on computer networks and dispose of consumer information that is no longer needed. 37. The FTC also says to implement policies for installing vendor-approved patches to correct problems, and to identify operating systems. 39. Further, the FTC recommends that companies utilize an intrusion detection system to expose a data breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity that might indicate unauthorized access into the system; monitor large amounts of data transmitted from the system; and have a response plan ready in the event of a data breach. 40. In another FTC publication, Start with Security: A Guide for Business, the FTC recommends, among other things, that companies “make sure [third-party] service providers implement reasonable security measures.” 41. The FTC has prosecuted a number of enforcement actions against companies for failing to take measures to protect consumer data adequately and reasonably. The FTC has viewed and treated such security lapses as an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45. 42. The data breach and theft of PPI and Master Patient Index information in this case was a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ failure to: (a) properly safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and class members’ personal patient information from unauthorized access, use, and disclosure, as required by various state and federal regulations, industry practices, and common law; (b) establish and implement reasonable and appropriate safeguards to immediately detect a data incursion and theft of said information; (c) establish and implement reasonable and appropriate safeguards to immediately notify Plaintiff and the class of such an incursion and theft, and (d) protect against reasonably foreseeable threats to the security or integrity of such information. 43. Defendants failed to maintain reasonable data security procedures and practices. 45. Defendants’ failure to maintain and implement reasonable and appropriate measures to detect and protect against unauthorized access to consumer PI constitutes an unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. 46. Accordingly, Defendants did not comply with legal state and federal law requirements, as discussed herein. 47. Moreover, effective and economically practical methods exist for detecting cyber incursions in real time, including computer malware detection software, safety protocols and other cyber security techniques, which make it perfectly feasible to detect such a serious data breach of patient PI/PPI in real time, or at least in far less than 30 days. 48. Indeed, as noted previously, the FTC has specifically advised those who hold customer data to implement software and other measures that detect cyber intrusions in real time. 49. Such adequate malware detection software, safety protocols and techniques which were not employed by Defendants and thus it took as long as 30 days for Defendants to even recognize that a breach had occurred. 50. Further, even after the breach was detected, Defendants failed to take adequate and reasonable steps to notify the class of the breach in a timely fashion. The notice sent by Defendants to the class states expressly that Defendants knew by September 14, 2020 of the cyber breach and the theft of data. Yet Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff and the class that there PPI and Master Patient Index information had been stolen until January 2021; three months after Defendants knew it had been stolen. 52. As a result of all of these failures, the PPI of Plaintiff and class members, including the data relating to them stored in the Master Patient Index, is now in the hands of unknown persons and can be used for unknown purposes for the foreseeable future. 53. Such persons may be cyber thieves, who now hold PPI and information from the Master Patient Index which can now be sold on the Dark Web and used to commit identity theft and fraud for the foreseeable future. 54. Armed with the PPI and Master Patient Index information accessed and acquired, data thieves can commit a variety of crimes including, e.g., opening new financial accounts in class members’ names, taking out loans in class members’ names, using class members’ information to obtain government benefits (such as filing for unemployment benefits), filing fraudulent tax returns using class members’ information, obtaining driver’s licenses in class members’ names but with another person’s photograph, and giving false information to police during an arrest. 55. Defendants’ failure to implement and follow proper security procedures has resulted in ongoing harm to Plaintiff and class members who will continue to experience a lack of data security for the indefinite future and remain at serious risk of identity theft and fraud that would result in significant monetary loss. 56. Plaintiff and class members may also incur out of pocket costs for, e.g., purchasing credit monitoring services, credit freezes, credit reports, or other protective measures to deter and detect identity theft. 58. Yet, Defendants’ offer of 12 months of credit monitoring is an inadequate remedy for the breach and theft. 59. Altering a birthdate is not possible. Altering a social security number is extremely difficult, and even where it is possible, it is very expensive and time-consuming. Changing one’s name and address is also burdensome and expensive. 60. Given these facts, while credit monitoring might be part of a remedy for a data breach, an offer of only 12 months of free credit monitoring is not in any way adequate. 61. The names, addresses, birth dates and social security numbers stolen do not expire in 12 months. 62. There is no guarantee that the stolen PPI and Master Patient Index information will be used by the miscreants in the next 12 months. 63. Unless changed, this stolen PPI will continue to exist forever and allow for identity theft 13 months from now, or 18 months from now, or 24 months from now. 64. Indeed, a GAO Report GAO-07-737 notes with regard to stolen personal data: “once posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years.” 65. Furthermore, Defendants’ offer of 12 months of credit monitoring squarely places the burden on Plaintiff and class members, rather than on the Defendants, to investigate and protect themselves from Defendants’ tortious acts which resulted in the data breach. 66. Rather than automatically and immediately enrolling Plaintiff and class members in identity theft and credit monitoring services upon discovery of the breach in September 2020, Defendants waited until January 2021 to notify Plaintiff and the class, and even then the notice merely sent merely states that Plaintiff and the class can sign up for the services. 68. No one really cares if cyber thieves or hackers find out that a customer bought a sweater at a department store. Many patients, however, care a great deal about the confidentiality of their medical treatment, including the decision to seek fertility treatment in the first place. 69. Defendants themselves recognize this, with the Shady Grove Fertility website being festooned with statements like “privacy is often a primary concern” and “Shady Grove Fertility can ensure there are no leaks in the identity of donor or recipient identifiable information,” and “Shady Grove Fertility has designed our anonymous Egg Donation Program (for donors) and Donor Egg Program (for donor egg recipients) with a multitude of safeguards to protect our patients’ privacy.” 70. These statements show that Defendants were fully aware of the fact that medical patient information, particularly information relating to fertility treatment, were to be treated as especially private and entitled to adequate protections. 71. This complaint aims at making sure that an adequate remedy is provided to Plaintiff and the class by Defendants arising from the data breach and theft of PPI and Medical Patient Index information relating to Shady Grove Fertility patients, one which places the burden on Defendants, who are the parties whose failure to take reasonable safeguards and precautions allowed the breach to happen in the first place, who failed to detect that breach for a month, and then delayed notifying Plaintiff and the class of that breach for another three months. 73. Plaintiff also brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 on behalf of a proposed sub-class (hereafter the “Pennsylvania Sub-Class”) defined as: All persons to whom US Fertility sent a form notice which was identical or substantially similar to Attachment A and who were patients at a Shady Grove Fertility clinic located in Pennsylvania. 74. Plaintiff also brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 on behalf of a proposed sub-class (hereafter the “New Jersey Sub-Class”) defined as: All persons to whom US Fertility sent a form notice which was identical or substantially similar to Attachment A and who were New Jersey residents at the time they were treated at a Shady Grove Fertility clinic. 75. Each class and sub-class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 76. The exact number and identities of the persons who fit within the proposed classes are either contained in Defendants’ records or can be ascertained from those records. It is alleged that each proposed class or sub-class contains several thousand persons. 78. Plaintiff is a member of each class and sub-class he seeks to represent. 79. The claims of Plaintiff are not only typical of all class members, they are identical. 80. All claims of Plaintiff and the class arise from the same common course of conduct and event and all claims are based on the exact same legal theories. 81. Plaintiff seeks the same relief for himself as for every other class member. 82. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to or in conflict with the classes. 84. Defendants have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate injunctive relief for each class as a whole. 85. The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members will create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications, and would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 86. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 87. Common questions will predominate, and there will be no unusual manageability issues. 88. Plaintiff incorporates all prior paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 89. Defendant required Plaintiff and the class to submit PPI and information for the Master Patient Index in order to receive treatment at Shady Grove Fertility clinics located in, inter alia, Maryland. 90. Regardless of whether the Shady Grove Fertility clinic in question was located in Maryland or not, all such PPI and MPI information gathered at all Shady Grove Fertility clinics was stored by Defendants in Rockville, Maryland at a US Fertility facility. 92. Under Maryland law, Defendants had (and continue to have) a duty to Plaintiff and the class to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting their PPI and MPI information. 93. Defendants also had (and continue to have) a duty to use ordinary care in activities from which harm might be reasonably anticipated (such as in the storage and protection of PPI and MPI information within their possession, custody and control). 94. Defendants’ duty to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of the special relationship that existed between Defendant Shady Grove Fertility and its patients, and from the knowledge that the data involved information about highly confidential fertility treatments which patients had been promised strict confidentiality. 95. Only Defendants were in a position to ensure that their systems were sufficient to protect against the harm to Plaintiff and the class members from a data breach. 96. Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45, Defendants had a duty to provide fair and adequate computer systems and data security to safeguard the personal and financial information of Plaintiff and Class Members. 97. The FTCA prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting commerce,” including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice by businesses, such as Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect the personal and financial information of Plaintiff and Class Members. The FTC publications and orders described above also form part of the basis of Defendants’ duty in this regard. NEGLIGENCE UNDER MARYLAND COMMON LAW On Behalf of the Main Class and the Maryland Sub-Class

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82. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 83. Defendants own and/or operate as Cornish Pasty Co., an enterprise located in Maricopa County, Arizona. -17- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 A. FLSA COLLECTIVE MEMBERS: 113. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 114. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on their own behalves and as representatives of individuals similarly situated who are current or former servers and bartenders of Defendants. 115. At all times material, Defendants paid Plaintiffs and the Collective Members at a rate of less than the full, applicable Arizona and federal minimum wage. -23- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 FAILURE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGE 177. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 178. Defendants failed to inform Plaintiffs and the Arizona Class Members of the provisions of the “tip credit” and 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) and its supporting regulations. Therefore, Defendants were precluded from imposing a tip credit upon Plaintiffs’ and the Arizona Class Members’ wages. As such, Defendants could not have paid less than the Arizona minimum wage rate and still complied with federal and state law. 179. Defendants did not provide written notice to Plaintiffs and the Arizona Class Members prior to exercising the tip credit, in violation of Arizona Administrative Code (“A.A.C.”) provision § R20-5-1207 and A.R.S. Title 23. Thereafter, Defendants did not notify Plaintiffs or the Arizona Class Members in writing each pay period of the amount per hour that Defendants took as a tip credit, in violation of A.A.C. § R20-5-1207 and A.R.S. Title 23. Therefore, Defendants were precluded from exercising a tip credit against Plaintiffs’ and the Arizona Class Members’ wages. -39- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 FAILURE TO PROVIDE TIP CREDIT NOTICE 171. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 172. Defendants did not inform Plaintiffs and the Collective Members of the provisions of the “tip credit” and 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) and its supporting regulations. 173. Defendants therefore did not pay Plaintiffs and the Collective Members the applicable minimum wage according to the provisions of the FLSA for each and every workweek that Plaintiffs and the Collective Members worked for Defendants, for the duration of their employment, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 174. As such, full applicable minimum wage for such time Plaintiffs and the Collective Members worked is owed to Plaintiffs and the Collective Members for the entire time they were employed by Defendants. 175. Defendants knew that – or acted with reckless disregard as to whether – their failure to pay to Plaintiffs and the Collective Members the full minimum wage over the course of their employment would violate federal and state law, and Defendants were aware of the FLSA minimum wage requirements during Plaintiffs’ and the Collective Members’ employment. As such, Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. 176. Plaintiffs and the Collective Members are therefore entitled to compensation for the full minimum wage at an hourly rate, to be proven at trial, plus an -37- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ILLEGAL TIP POOL AND TIP RETENTION 163. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 164. Defendants engaged in the regular policy and practice of not allowing Plaintiffs and the Collective Members to retain all tips they received. Specifically, Defendants subjected Plaintiffs and the Collective Members to their policy and practice of requiring participation in a tip pool that included staff who do not customarily and regularly receive tips, such as cooks, dishwashers, and management. 165. Defendants engaged in such conduct in direct violation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 166. Therefore, Defendants were precluded from exercising a tip credit against Plaintiffs’ and Collective Members’ wages, and the manner in which Defendants paid Plaintiffs and the Collective Members violated 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 167. Defendants therefore did not pay Plaintiffs and the Collective Members the applicable minimum wage according to the provisions of the FLSA for each and every workweek that Plaintiffs worked for Defendants, for the duration of their employment, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 168. As such, full applicable minimum wage for such time Plaintiffs and the Collective Members worked is owed to Plaintiffs and the Collective Members for the entire time they were employed by Defendants. -34- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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Brief description of cause This is a claim relating to defective automobiles V I I .

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20. Fred Loya makes promotional phone calls to consumers without having the necessary prior express written consent to do so in violation of the TCPA. 21. Fred Loya makes these unsolicited advertising calls using equipment defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1) that has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, without any need for human intervention. 22. The TCPA was intended to give individuals control over how and where they receive phone calls to their wireless phone. When Fred Loya makes phone calls to consumers without their consent, it fails to address or respect the limitations imposed by the TCPA. In doing so, it takes control away from the consumers and violates both the spirit and the letter of the TCPA. 23. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on Defendant to demonstrate that Plaintiff provided express consent within the meaning of the statute. 24. With the passage of CIPA in 1967, California became a two-party consent state, which means that all parties to a telephone call must consent before their conversation can be recorded. The statute was enacted for the explicit purpose of protecting privacy rights. 25. In or around the Summer of 2020, Plaintiff began receiving unsolicited phone calls to his wireless phone ending in -6277 from Fred Loya attempting to advertise insurance products. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. 53. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the TCPA Class”). Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the TCPA Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited, promotional phone calls from Defendant or its agents on their cellular telephones through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system as set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(3), which phone calls by Defendant or its agents were not made for emergency purposes or with the recipients’ prior express written consent, within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of final approval. 54. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the TCPA Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the TCPA Class, but believes members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 74. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 75. Each such promotional phone call was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. These promotional phone calls were made without the prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and other members of the TCPA Class. 76. Defendant made unauthorized promotional phone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system to the cellular telephone number of Plaintiff and the other members of the TCPA Class without their prior express written consent. 80. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-73 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 81. Each such promotional phone call was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. These promotional phone calls were made without the prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and other members of the TCPA Class to receive such telephone calls. 82. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 et seq. 83. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the TCPA Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 85. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-73 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 86. Californians have a constitutional right to privacy. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has definitively linked the constitutionally protected right to privacy within the purpose, intent and specific protections of the Privacy Act, including specifically, Penal Code § 632. In addition, California’s explicit constitutional privacy provision (Cal. Const., 1 § 1) was enacted in part specifically to protect California from overly intrusive business practices that were seen to pose a significant and increasing threat to personal privacy. Thus, California must be viewed as having a strong and continuing interest in the full and vigorous application of the provisions of section 632 prohibiting the recording of telephone conversations without the knowledge or consent of all parties to the conversation. See Kearney v. Salmon Smith Barney, Inc., (2006) 39 Cal. 4th 95, 125. 87. California Penal Code § 632.7 prohibits one party to a telephone call from intentionally recording the conversation without the knowledge or consent of the other party, where a cellular telephone is involved. Cal. Pen. Code § 632.7 is violated the moment the recording is made without the consent of all parties thereto, regardless of whether it is subsequently disclosed that the telephone call was recorded. The only intent required by Cal. Pen. Code § 632.7 is that the act of recording itself be done intentionally. There is no requisite intent on behalf of the party doing the surreptitious recording to break California law or any other law, or to invade the privacy right of any other person. 96. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and TCPA Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 97. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 98. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each TCPA Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 99. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. UNLAWFUL INVASION OF PRIVACY CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 632.7

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23. Given the demands of the health care industry and staffing shortages, Defendant knows that in order to accomplish the tasks it assigns to Plaintiff and class members, Plaintiff and class members have to work through their unpaid “meal breaks.” 24. Under the “Meal Break Deduction Policy,” Defendant’s computerized time and attendance system automatically deducts a 30 minute meal period per work shift. 25. Upon information and belief, Defendant maintains the “Meal Break Deduction Policy” at all of its facilities. Accordingly, all non-exempt employees of Defendant are subjected to Defendant’s “Meal Break Deduction Policy.” 26. Under Defendant’s “Meal Break Deduction Policy,” Defendant improperly and illegally shifts the burden to Plaintiff and class members to ensure that non-qualifying “meal breaks” are not deducted from their pay. 27. Plaintiff and class members often perform compensable work for Defendant during their uncompensated “meal breaks.” 29. In addition, Plaintiff and class members routinely are required to stay at their duty post during their uncompensated “meal breaks.” 30. Defendant does not prohibit Plaintiff and class members from working during their “meal breaks” and routinely suffers or permits Plaintiff and class members to perform such work. 31. Further, Defendant fails to ensure that unauthorized work is not being performed during employee “meal breaks.” 32. In fact, although Defendant automatically deducts 30 minute meal periods, Defendant expects Plaintiff and class members to be available to work throughout their shifts and consistently require its employees to work during unpaid “meal breaks.” 33. Plaintiff and class members are expected to eat without any change in demands from patients or relief by additional staff. Indeed, Plaintiff and class members are often required to respond to pages, as well as requests by patients, co-workers and management, during unpaid “meal breaks.” 34. Defendant knows and/or has reason to believe that Plaintiff and class members perform work during their unpaid “meal breaks.” Indicative of this, Plaintiff and class members perform work for Defendant, on Defendant’s premises, in plain sight, and often at management’s request (and at times in view of management) during their unpaid “meal breaks.” 35. Even though Defendant knows that Plaintiff and class members are working during “meal breaks,” Defendant fails to compensate Plaintiff and class members for their work, electing instead to accept the benefits of Plaintiff and class members’ uncompensated work. 37. Due to Defendant’s aforementioned employment practices, including specifically wherein it automatically deducts thirty minutes for meal breaks from Plaintiff and class members’ wages, Plaintiff and class members often worked in excess of forty hours per week and were denied statutory overtime wages. 38. Evidence generally reflecting the number of uncompensated hours worked by each class member and the compensation rates for the relevant work periods is in the possession of Defendant. 39. While Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact amount owed to the class, Plaintiff believes that such information will become available during the course of discovery. Irrespective of the foregoing, when an employer fails to keep complete and accurate time records, employees may establish the hours worked solely by their testimony and the burden of overcoming such testimony shifts to the employer. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 40. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully set forth herein. 42. The claims under the FLSA may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). The claims under the IMWL, IWPCA, and Illinois common law may be pursued by all similarly-situated persons who do not opt-out of the IL Class pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. 43. The members of each of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of the members of the Classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes there are thousands of individuals in each defined class. 45. Defendant has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes. 46. The claims of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Classes in that Plaintiff was denied overtime wages as a result of Defendant’s uniform policy of not compensating its non-exempt employees for all hours worked. This is the predominant issue which pertains to the claims of each and every class member. 47. The class action/collective action mechanism is superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The damages suffered by individual members of the Classes may be relatively small when compared to the expense and burden of litigation, making it virtually impossible for members of the Classes to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. 48. Furthermore, even if any member of the Classes could afford individual litigation against Defendant, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. The instant methodology, when compared to voluminous individual actions, has fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of unitary adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Concentrating this litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the Classes and provide for judicial consistency. 50. Counsel for Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Such counsel is experienced with employment/class litigation and has previously served as class counsel in employment litigation. 51. Plaintiff and the Classes she represents have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable damage from the illegal policy, practice and custom regarding Defendant’s pay practices. 52. Defendant has engaged in a continuing violation of the FLSA. 53. Plaintiff, as well as the individuals she represents, was denied overtime wages as a result of Defendant’s pay practices. Defendant’s action in denying overtime wages to Plaintiff was intentional and constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. 54. Defendant has engaged in a continuing violation of the IMWL and the IWPCA. 55. Defendant’s action in denying wages for all hours worked was intentional and constitutes a willful violation of the IWPCA. 56. Defendant’s action in denying overtime wages to Plaintiff was intentional and constitutes a willful violation of the IMWL and the IWPCA. 57. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein. 59. At all relevant times, Defendant has had annual gross revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 60. As a consequence of Defendant’s employment practices whereby it automatically deducts thirty minutes for meal breaks from the pay of hourly, non-exempt employees, Plaintiff and class members were denied statutory overtime wages. 61. Plaintiff and class members were employees of Defendant within the meaning of the FLSA and, as such, were entitled to the benefits of the FLSA’s overtime wage requirements. 62. Defendant’s policy of denying Plaintiff and class members overtime wages represents and results in a violation of the FLSA’s minimum wage requirements. 63. Defendant has failed to pay appropriate overtime wages under the FLSA. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests: A. All applicable statutory damages; B. A Declaration that Defendant has violated the FLSA; C. An Order designating this action as a collective action and directing the issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b); D. An Order appointing Plaintiff and her counsel to represent those individuals opting in to the collective action; E. An Order awarding counsel for Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and F. Any further relief which the Court deems appropriate under the circumstances. 64. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein. 66. As a consequence of Defendant’s employment practices whereby it automatically deducts thirty minutes for meal breaks from the pay of hourly, non-exempt employees, Plaintiff and class members were denied statutory overtime wages. 67. Plaintiff and class members were employees of Defendant within the meaning of the IMWL and, as such, were entitled to the benefits of the IMWL’s overtime wage requirements. 68. Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the IMWL. 69. Defendant’s policy of denying Plaintiff and class members overtime wages represents and results in a violation of the IMWL’s minimum wage requirements. 71. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are fully incorporated herein. 72. The IWPCA provides in relevant part: “Every employer shall be required, at least semi-monthly, to pay every employee all wages earned during the semi-monthly pay period…” 78. The allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs are fully incorporated herein. 79. Plaintiff brings this Count IV in the alternative to her claim under the IWPCA. 80. Plaintiff and class members were not paid wages for every hour that they worked. 81. Defendant retained the benefits of Plaintiff’s and class members’ uncompensated work under circumstances which rendered it inequitable and unjust for Defendants to retain such benefits without paying for their value.

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(Class Action Claim for Violations of the FLSA Overtime Provisions by Plaintiff and All Those Similarly Situated Class Members) (Individual Claim for Violation of the Colorado Minimum Wages of Workers Act) (Individual Claim for Violation of FLSA Overtime Wage Violations) 22. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 23. Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant within the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint. 24. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a personal banker having the title “personal banker,” “teller,” or an equivalent title. 25. Plaintiff’s primary duties as a personal banker was to handle money and accounts for Defendant’s customers. 26. Defendant pays personal bankers an hourly rate. 28. It is Defendant’s policy or practice to require personal bankers, including Plaintiff, to review training materials, take customer calls, and complete transactions with customers after the personal bankers have been “clocked out” of Defendant’s electronic time monitoring system. 29. Plaintiff worked over forty hours in most if not all workweeks. 30. Plaintiff was paid 1.5 times his regular rate of pay for all reported hours he worked in excess of 40 in each workweek, but Plaintiff was not paid for the time he worked for Defendant off-the-clock. 31. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff for his overtime hours worked at the rates required by the FLSA. V. 32. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 33. Plaintiff brings his claim for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons similarly situated as personal bankers who were, are, or will be employed by Defendant and were improperly remunerated during weeks in which they worked more than 40 hours at any time within the applicable statute of limitations period. 35. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact number of the class but believe that the class exceeds 3,000 persons. 36. Defendant can readily identify the members of the class, who are a certain portion of the current and former employees of Defendant. 37. The names and physical and mailing addresses of the probable FLSA collective action plaintiffs are available from Defendant, and notice should be provided to the probable FLSA collective action plaintiffs via, among other methods, first class mail to their last known physical and mailing addresses as soon as possible. 38. The email addresses of many of the probable FLSA collective action plaintiffs are available from Defendant, and notice should be provided to the probable FLSA collective action plaintiffs via email to their last known email address as soon as possible. 39. The proposed FLSA class members are similarly situated in that they have been subject to uniform practices by Defendant which violated the FLSA, including: (a) Defendant’s uniform underpayment to them as personal bankers for Defendant’s business under the FLSA; and (b) Defendant’s failure to pay members of the class overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 41. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of Class members are unknown at this time, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that at least twenty-five (25) and as many as three hundred (300) putative class members have worked for Defendant without appropriate pay, as described herein, during the applicable statutory period. 42. This litigation is properly brought as a class action because of the existence of questions of fact and law common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including: (a) The compensability of Plaintiff and member of the class’s time spent reviewing training materials after the conclusion of the workday; (b) Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class worked off the clock; (c) Whether Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiff and members of the Class regular wages and overtime compensation for all of the hours over forty (40) each week; (d) Whether Defendant properly calculated the overtime pay owed to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 44. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in class litigation. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 45. A class action is an appropriate and superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the present controversy given the following factors: (a) Common questions of law and/or fact predominate over any individual questions which may arise, and, accordingly, there would accrue enormous savings to both the Court and the Class in litigating the common issues on a class-wide instead of on a repetitive individual basis; (b) Despite the relatively small size of individual Class members’ claims, their aggregate volume, coupled with the economies of scale inherent in litigating similar claims on a common basis, will enable this case to be litigated as a Class action on a cost- effective basis, especially when compared with repetitive individual litigation; and (c) No unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action in that all questions of law and/or fact to be litigated at the liability stage of this action are common to the Class. 46. Plaintiff is aware of no members of the proposed class who have an interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions; neither is Plaintiff aware of any other litigation concerning this particular controversy. 48. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 49. As part of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, he was eligible to participate in a licensure program sponsored by Defendant if he met certain fixed goals. 50. In June of 2016, after meeting the goals set by Defendant, Plaintiff submitted his application for the licensure program. 51. As part of his application, Plaintiff was asked to disclose any criminal convictions or acts of distrust. 52. After submitting his application, Plaintiff was informed by a representative of Defendant who was responsible for reviewing Plaintiff’s application that a charge was discovered upon investigating his criminal background, which must be cleared prior to approval. 53. Plaintiff submitted documents showing that the charge had been dismissed and that Plaintiff had never been convicted, as well as a picture of his photo identification. 55. Plaintiff called the same representative to clarify the reasons his application was denied and the representative threatened to report Plaintiff for harassment. 56. On several previous occasions, white applicants for the same licensure program had submitted applications that failed to disclose criminal charges. 57. On these occasions the applicants were asked to re-submit their applications. They were not rejected as being “untruthful.” 58. The real reason Plaintiff’s application was rejected was his race. 59. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant has failed and refused to comply with the FLSA’s wage requirements by failing to pay Plaintiff one and one half times his regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week during Plaintiff’s employment as described in this Complaint. 61. More often than not, each Plaintiff worked more than forty (40) hours per week without premium overtime pay. 62. Defendant deprived Plaintiff of overtime compensation for all of the hours over forty (40) per week in violation of the FLSA. 64. Defendant is and has been subject to the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA because it, as an enterprise, and its employees are engaged in commerce. 65. Defendant’s conduct and practices, as described above, were willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 66. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for monetary damages, liquidated damages and costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees provided by the FLSA for all violations which occurred beginning at least three (3) years preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s initial complaint, plus periods of equitable tolling. 67. Defendant has not acted in good faith nor with reasonable grounds to believe its actions and omissions were not a violation of the FLSA, and, as a result thereof, Plaintiff is entitled to recover an award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime premium pay and unpaid minimum wages described above pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 69. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 70. Defendant has failed and refused to comply with the FLSA’s wage requirements by failing to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated members of the class one and one half times their regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week during their employment as described in this Complaint. 71. Defendant required Plaintiff and similarly situated members of the class to work in excess of forty (40) hours each week but failed to pay Plaintiff and the class members overtime premium compensation for all of the hours in excess of forty (40) in each workweek. 72. Defendant deprived Plaintiff and the class members overtime premium compensation for all of the hours over forty (40) per week, in violation of the FLSA. 73. Defendant’s conduct and practice, as described above, has been and is willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 75. Defendant has not acted in good faith nor with reasonable grounds to believe its actions and omissions were not a violation of the FLSA, and, as a result thereof, Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to recover an award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime premium wages described above pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 76. Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendant acted in good faith in failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members as provided by the FLSA, they are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate. IX. 77. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 78. Defendant violated the Colorado Minimum Wages of Workers Act (“CMWWA”), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 8-6-101 et. seq., by failing to pay Plaintiff the minimum wages required by the CMWWA for all hours worked. 79. Defendant has failed and refused to comply with the CMWWA’s wage requirements by failing to pay Plaintiff one and one half times his regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week during Plaintiff’s employment as described in this Complaint. 81. Defendant is and has been subject to the overtime pay requirements of the CMWWA because it a corporation employing persons in Colorado. 82. Defendant’s conduct and practices, as described above, were willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 83. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for monetary damages, including unpaid wages and reasonable attorney’s fees provided by the CMWWA for all violations which occurred beginning at least three (3) years preceding the filing of Plaintiff’s initial complaint. X.

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VIOLATIONS OF STATE WAGE AND HOUR LAWS CASE NO. 14-CV-05563-EMC Dated: April 3, 2020 Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Jahan C. Sagafi Jahan C. Sagafi Jahan C. Sagafi (Cal. Bar No. 224887)

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(Declaratory Judgment) (Negligence) (Violation of Unfair Competition Law California Business and Professional Code Section 17200, et seq.) 11. Seagate has represented that on or about March 1, 2016, it discovered that it was the victim of a “phishing” scam (the “Data Breach”). According to Seagate, the Data Breach resulted in the release of PII for approximately 10,000 of its and its affiliates’ current and former employees. In the Data Breach, Seagate provided to unknown cybercriminals the 2015 Forms W-2 data for all Employees. The Form W-2 data disclosed the Employees’ names, addresses, compensation and, most importantly, Social Security numbers. 41. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 42. This cause of action is brought on behalf of all of the sub-classes. 51. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 52. This cause of action is brought on behalf of all the classes. 53. Seagate engaged in unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business practices in violation of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (“UCL”). Seagate’s acts, omissions and conduct constitute unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business practices under the UCL. 54. Seagate’s practices were unlawful and in violation of Civil Code section 1798.81.5(b) because Seagate failed to take reasonable measures in protecting Plaintiffs’ and the class members’ PII. 55. Seagate’s practices were also unlawful and in violation of Civil Code section 1798.82 because Seagate unreasonably delayed informing Plaintiffs and the class members about the breach of security after Seagate knew the breach occurred. 63. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference all prior allegations as if fully set forth herein. 64. This cause of action is brought on behalf of all the classes. 65. As set forth above, Plaintiffs and the class members have valid claims against Seagate for negligence and violations of the UCL. An actual controversy has arisen in the wake of Seagate’s Data Breach regarding Seagate’s current obligations to provide reasonable data security measures to protect the PII of Plaintiffs and the class members.

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(Disability Discrimination in Violations of NYC Human Rights Laws § 8-107(4)) 24. Plaintiff is paralyzed and cannot walk. As a result, he uses a wheelchair for mobility. 25. Defendant BEC Foods, LLC owns or operates a food service establishment located at 148 Eighth Avenue, New York, NY (hereinafter ‘facility’). 26. Throughout 2015 and 2016, Plaintiff attempted to enter and use Defendant’s public accommodation. However, was however, was unable because of an unlawful architectural barrier – a step. 27. Plaintiff resides less than 2 blocks away from Defendant's public accommodation and is frequently near Defendant's facility. 29. Plaintiff has the intention to return to Defendant’s public accommodation once it becomes readily accessible to and usable by Mr. Zayas. 30. After being denied service and access, Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter describing his experience and explaining the architectural barriers. 31. The removal of existing architectural barriers is readily achievable. 32. To date, Defendant has failed to remove the architectural barriers. PLAINTIFF’s FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act) 33. Defendant’s facility located at 148 Eighth Avenue, New York, NY is a public accommodation within the meaning of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181; 28 C.F.R. § 34. Defendant has failed to make adequate accommodations and modifications to its facility located at 148 Eighth Avenue, New York, NY 35. Defendant has failed to remove all architectural barriers that are structural in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 36.104, New York State Human Rights Law § 292(9), and New York City Administrative Code § 8-102(9) (“place or provider of public accommodation”). 36. There exist readily achievable modifications which would make Defendant’s public accommodation accessible and readily usable by Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 37. Defendant failed to make the necessary readily achievable modifications to its public accommodation. 39. It is not impossible for Defendant to remove the architectural barriers which exist at its facility. 40. Defendant failed to design and construct its facility that is readily accessible to and usable by Plaintiff in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12183(a)(1). 41. It is not structurally impracticable for Defendant’s facility to be accessible. 42. Defendant failed to alter its facility to the maximum extent feasible in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12183(a)(2). 43. Defendant’s facility is not fully accessible to, or readily useable by individuals with disabilities. 45. Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, on the basis of their disability, in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of its public accommodation in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(a). 46. Defendant has subjected Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, on the basis of their disability, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, denial of the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of Defendant in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 47. Defendant has afforded Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, on the basis of their disability, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 48. Defendant has provided Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, on the basis of their disability, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different or separate from that provided to other individuals in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 49. Defendant has not afforded plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations in the most integrated setting appropriate in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(1)(B). 51. Defendant has imposed or applied an eligibility criteria that screened out or tended to screen out Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). 52. Defendant has failed to make reasonable modifications in their policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to Plaintiff in violation of 42 U.S. Code § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 53. Defendant should have achieved accessibility by January 26, 1992. 54. The barriers to access Defendant’s facility continue to exist. 55. Reasonable accommodations exist which do not impose an undue hardship on the operation of the Defendant’s program or activity. 56. Reasonable accommodations could be made which do not fundamentally alter the nature of the Defendant’s program or activity. PLAINTIFF’s SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Violations of New York State Human Rights Laws) 57. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant has not provided Plaintiff and others similarly situated with evenhanded treatment in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 60. Defendant has, because of Plaintiff’s disability, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from or denied Plaintiff any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of their public accommodation. 61. Defendant has demonstrated that the patronage or custom thereat of Plaintiff and others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited. 62. Defendant and its agents discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 63. Defendant discriminated in against Plaintiff by creating, fostering, and otherwise failing to prevent or remedy the discrimination against Plaintiff, in violation of New York State Human Rights Law § 296. 64. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant unlawful discrimination in violation of the New York State Human Rights Laws, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish and emotional distress. PLAINTIFF's THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (Violations of New York State Civil Rights Laws) 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 66. On the basis of Plaintiff’s disability, Defendant has violated his Civil Rights. 67. Consequently, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the penalty prescribed by Civil Rights Law § 40-c and 40-d, in the amount of $500 for each and every violation. 68. Pursuant to NY Civil Rights law, defendant is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 70. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 71. In violation of New York City Admin. Code § 8-107(4), Defendant has not reasonably accommodated Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 72. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, Defendant has unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 73. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent and employee of Defendant’s public accommodation, have, because of the actual or perceived disability of the Plaintiff, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from and denied Plaintiff the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 74. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, on the basis of Plaintiff’s disability, Defendant has demonstrated that the patronage or custom of Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable, and not acceptable. 75. Pursuant to New York City Human Rights Law § 8-502, notice of this action has been served upon New York City's Commission on Human Rights. 76. As a direct and proximate result of the disability discrimination perpetrated by defendant in violation of the New York City Human Rights Laws, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer mental anguish and emotional distress, including but not limited to depression, humiliation, stress, embarrassment, anxiety, loss of self-esteem and self- confidence, and emotional pain and suffering. 77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference all allegations set forth in this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 78. Reasonable accommodations and modifications are necessary to enable Plaintiff and all others similarly situated the ability to enjoy the non-restricted access and use of the public accommodation in question. 79. Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff reasonable accommodations and modifications in violation of NYC Human Rights Laws 8-107(15). 80. In violation of New York City Admin. Code 8-102(4) and (18), and 8-107(4) and 8- 107(15), Defendant has not reasonably accommodated Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 81. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, Defendant has unlawfully discriminated against Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 82. Reasonable accommodations and modifications are necessary to enable Plaintiff and all others similarly situated the ability to enjoy the non-restricted access and use of the public accommodation in question. 83. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent and employee of Defendant’s public accommodation, have, because of the actual or perceived disability of the Plaintiff, directly or indirectly, refused, withheld from and denied Plaintiff the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. 84. In violation of New York City Admin. Code, Defendant has demonstrated that, because of Plaintiff's disability, the patronage or custom of Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, is unwelcome, objectionable, and not acceptable.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a cryptocurrency exchange company, and owns and operates the website, www.binance.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.binance.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse cryptocurrency for purchase, view research, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March 2021, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various cryptocurrency for purchase, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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(Collective Action Claim for Violation of FLSA) (Individual Claim for Violation of the FLSA) (Individual Claim for Violation of the AMWA) 22. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 23. During part of the three (3) years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a "helper" for Defendant's commercial flooring company. 24. Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions were classified by Defendant as independent contractors. 25. Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions were paid an hourly rate by Defendant. 26. The basic duties of Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions included providing the necessary tools at a job site, laying tile and cleaning up a job site for Defendant's customers. 27. Defendant required Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions to satisfy whatever needs and requirements Defendant and Defendant's customers had. 28. Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions were hired to work for Defendant for an indefinite period of time. 29. Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions did not share in Defendant's profits. 31. Defendant made decisions on advertising Defendant's business without the input of Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions. 32. Defendant entered into contracts with its customers and Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions did not sign contracts with Defendant's customers. 33. Defendant set the prices for its customers for flooring and installation work without input or negotiation from Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions. 34. Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions did not advertise themselves as independent contractors. 35. Defendant made decisions on what new business to pursue or take without the input of Plaintiffs, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions. 36. Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions did not negotiate contracts or prices with Defendant's customers. 37. Defendant expected Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions to follow Defendant's policies regarding their employment. 38. Defendant recorded the regular working time of Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions via text message. 39. Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions worked more than forty (40) hours in most workweeks. 42. Plaintiff, other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions worked an average of ten to fifteen hours of overtime in most workweeks for Defendant for which they were not lawfully compensated. 43. At all relevant times herein, Defendant has deprived Plaintiff and all others similarly situated of an overtime premium for all of the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a week. 44. Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the way it paid Plaintiff and all others similarly situated violated the FLSA and the AMWA. 45. Defendant purposefully and knowingly misclassified Plaintiff and all others similarly situated as independent contractors. V. 46. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 4 7. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 49. In conformity with the requirements of FLSA Section 16(b ), Plaintiff has attached hereto as Exhibit "A" his written Consent to Join this lawsuit. 50. The relevant time period dates back three (3) years from the date on which Plaintiff's Original Complaint-Collective Action was filed and continues forward through the date of judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 51. The members of the proposed FLSA Collective are similarly situated in that they share these traits: A. They were classified by Defendant as independent contractors and thus exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA; B. They were paid hourly rates; C. They recorded their time in the same manner; and D. They were subject to Defendant's common practice not paying a lawful overtime premium for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per work week. 52. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact number of the potential members of the FLSA Collective but believes that the group exceeds 10 persons. 54. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 55. Plaintiff asserts this claim for damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the FLSA. 56. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 57. At all relevant times, Defendant was Plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of the FLSA, 29. U.S.C. § 203. 58. 29 U.S.C. § 207 requires any enterprise engaged in commerce to pay all employees one and one-half (1.5) times their regular wage for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a week, unless an employee meets certain exemption requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 213 and all accompanying Department of Labor regulations. 59. Defendant misclassified Plaintiff as an independent contractor. 60. Despite the entitlement of Plaintiff to overtime payments under the FLSA, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff an overtime rate of one and one-half (1.5) times his regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in each one-week period. 62. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for monetary damages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, for all violations that occurred within the three (3) years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 63. Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendant acted in good faith in failing to pay Plaintiff as provided by the FLSA, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate. 64. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 65. Plaintiff brings this collective action on behalf of all other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions employed by Defendant to recover monetary damages owed by Defendant to Plaintiff and members of the putative collective for unpaid overtime compensation for all the hours he and they worked in excess of forty (40) each week. 66. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions, former and present, who were and/or are affected by Defendant's willful and intentional violation of the FLSA. 67. 29 U.S.C. § 207 requires employers to pay employees one and one-half (1.5) times the employee's regular rate for all hours that the employee works in excess of forty (40) per week. 69. Like Plaintiff, these other installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a week. 70. Defendant failed to pay these workers at the proper overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a week, despite their entitlement thereto. 71. Because these employees are similarly situated to Plaintiff, and are owed overtime for the same reasons, the opt-in collective may be properly defined as: All hourly-paid installers, helpers, polishers and similar positions who worked within the three (3) years preceding the filing of this Complaint. 72. Defendant's conduct and practice, as described above, has been and is willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 73. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged in this Complaint, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and all those similarly situated for, and Plaintiff and all those similarly situated seek, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees as provided by the FLSA. 7 4. Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendant acted in good faith in failing to pay Plaintiff and all those similarly situated as provided by the FLSA, Plaintiff and all those similarly situated are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate. 75. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 77. Defendant misclassified Plaintiff as an independent contractor. 78. At all times relevant herein, Defendant was Plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of the AMWA, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-4-203( 4 ). 79. Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-4-211 requires employers to pay all employees one and one-half (1.5) times regular wages for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a week, unless an ~mployee meets the exemption requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 213 and accompanying Department of Labor regulations. 80. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff an overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a week as required under the AMWA. 81. Despite the entitlement of Plaintiff to payment of lawful overtime payments under the AMWA, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff a lawful overtime premium. 82. Defendant's conduct and practices, as described above, was willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 83. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for, and Plaintiff seeks, monetary damages, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, civil penalties and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees as provided by theAMWA. 84. Alternatively, should the Court find the Defendant acted in good faith in failing to pay Plaintiff as provided by the AMWA, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate. IX. FLSA § 216(b) Collective

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a children’s clothing company that owns and operates www.sproutsanfrancisco.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in January of 2021, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.sproutsanfrancisco.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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(In the Alternative) RESCISSION OF OPERATING AGREEMENT AND UNJUST ENRICHEMTN (Brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the Rule 23 Class) 14. Defendant Flowers Foods, Inc. is a corporation whose business consists of developing, baking, and distributing bakery and snack food products to retail customers, using a centralized network of communication, distribution, and warehousing facilities. Distributors are integrated into Flowers' existing network of operations. Three of Defendant Flowers Foods's bakeries and several of its warehouses are operated by Defendants LePage and CK. 16. The Distributors then deliver the product to Defendants' retailer-customers at the time and place specified by Defendants. 17. The distribution agreement between Defendants and its Distributors (including Plaintiffs) has no specific end date and can be terminated by either party at any time with limited notice. 18. Defendant Flowers Foods markets its bakery and snack products to retailers such as Wal-Mart, Harris Teeter, Target, Dollar General, and other grocery stores and mass merchants. Defendant Flowers Foods negotiates with the retailers to set virtually all terms of the relationship including: a) wholesale and retail prices for products; b) service and delivery agreements; c) shelf space to display products; d) product selection; e) promotional pricing for products; f) the right to display promotional materials; g) print advertisements in retailers' newspaper ads; and h) virtually every other term of the arrangement. 19. In some cases, Flowers Foods negotiates and agrees with retailers and fast food restaurants to manufacture and distribute the retailer's store brand (or private label) bread products. 21. Some fresh-baked products are identical to shelf stable products but Flowers sells the warehouse branded product at a lower price than the fresh branded product in direct competition with Distributors. 22. The relationship between each member of the proposed Classes and Defendants is essentially the same in material respects. 23. Defendants reserved the right to control Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed Classes in the performance of the manner and means of their work. 24. The work performed by Plaintiffs and Distributors simultaneously benefits or benefited both Flowers Foods, Inc. and any Flowers subsidiary with whom the Distributor entered a distributor agreement. Plaintiffs and Distributors were hired for the purpose of distributing products for Flowers Foods, Inc. 25. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Classes must strictly follow Defendants' instructions and adhere to the pricing, policies, and procedures negotiated between Defendants and their retailer-customers. 26. Distributors use Defendants' hand-held computer to log the delivery, and Defendants bill customers using the data entered into the computer by the Distributors. The terms of the sale are negotiated between Defendants and its retailer-customer. 28. Defendants retain the exclusive right to control the manner and means by which Plaintiffs and the Distributors perform their jobs. 29. Defendants represented to Plaintiffs and other Distributors that they would run their businesses independently, have the discretion to use their business judgment, and have the ability to manage their businesses to increase profitability. 31. Plaintiffs and members of the Classes were, or are, required to accept Defendants' conditions of employment or face termination. 32. In another example, Defendants routinely modify a Distributor's product orders to increase the amount of the order. If a Distributor refuses the additional product, Defendants bill the Distributor for the product and deduct the cost from the Distributor's wages. 33. Defendants require the Distributors to process all transactions through a hand-held computer it provides to them. The hand held computer controls the product prices, maintains customer information, tracks mileage, and monitors business performance. 35. Distributors' investment in equipment to operate their route is relatively low. Many distributors use their personal vehicles and a trailer to transport Flowers products to retailers. Apart from the purchase of a small trailer, there is no other investment necessary because Defendants provide computer equipment, administrative support, warehouse space, advertisements, promotional materials, bakery trays, market advice, strategic development, and virtually every other business necessity. Plaintiffs and Distributors typically drive a small box truck five days a week, and routinely use their small personal cars to transport Flowers products. Defendants even arrange for insurance and vehicle financing on behalf of Distributors; Distributors pay for the insurance through wage deductions. 36. The distribution job performed by Plaintiffs and Distributors does not require specialized skills. 37. Plaintiffs and Distributors provide services that are an integral part of Defendants' enterprise, a baked goods distribution system. 38. Despite their pervasive control over the means and manner of the Plaintiffs' and Distributors' work, Defendants have uniformly classified all Distributors as "independent contractors." 40. Plaintiffs and Distributors have incurred expenses for equipment, insurance, product loss, product return, and other expenses that Defendants have required them to purchase or pay, or that are necessary for their work. 41. Plaintiffs and Distributors work, on average, a total of 50-55 hours during a seven-day workweek for which no Plaintiff or, upon information and belief, member of the proposed Classes has received overtime premium wages. 42. Defendants' mischaracterization of the Distributors as "independent contractors," the concealment or non-disclosure of the true nature of the relationship between Defendants and the Distributors, and the attendant deprivation of substantial rights and benefits of employment are part of an on-going unlawful practice by Defendants which this Court should enjoin. 43. Plaintiffs bring Count I of this Complaint as a collective action, alleging violations of the FLSA on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals. The proposed FLSA Collective Class is defined as: All persons who are or have performed work as "Distributors" for any Defendant in the State of Vermont under a "Distributor Agreement" or a similar written contract that they entered into during the period commencing three years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the trial in this action. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify this definition prior to conditional certification of the FLSA Collective Class. 44. Plaintiffs have consented in writing to be a part of this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs' signed consent forms are attached as Exhibit A. 46. Plaintiffs and members of the FLSA Collective Class routinely worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours in a week without overtime compensation. 47. Plaintiffs and members of the FLSA Collective Class routinely drove their personal vehicle in the performance of their work for Defendants and/or drove a box truck with a gross motor vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds or less. 48. Upon information and belief, Defendants knew that Plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals performed work that required overtime pay and knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated individual's overtime wages due and owing. 49. Defendants have therefore operated under a scheme to deprive Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Class of overtime compensation by failing to properly compensate them for all time worked. 50. Defendants' conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and has caused significant damages to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Class. 51. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals, and notice of this lawsuit should be sent to them. Those similarly situated individuals are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants' payroll records. 53. Numerosity: Members of the Rule 23 Class are so numerous that their individual joinder is impracticable. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs. However, upon information and belief, it is in excess of 40 individuals. The true number of Class members is, however, likely to be known by Defendants, and thus, Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by first class mail, electronic, and published notice. 55. Typicality: Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the other members of the Rule 23 Class. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that, like other distributors, Plaintiffs were misclassified as "independent contractors" when they actually were statutory and common-law employees, and were therefore deprived the protections of employee status under the law. Plaintiffs had the same duties and responsibilities as other Rule 23 Class members, and were subject to the same policies and practices, and the same or substantially similar conditions of employment. 57. Predominance: This case should be certified as a class action because the common questions of law and fact concerning Defendants' liability predominate over any individual questions, including the amount of damages incurred by each person. 58. Superiority: A class action is the only realistic method available for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Rule 23 Class. The expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impracticable for members of the Rule 23 Class to seek redress individually for the wrongful conduct alleged in this Complaint. Were each individual member required to bring a separate lawsuit, the resulting multiplicity of proceedings would cause undue hardship and expense for the litigants and the Court, and create the risk of inconsistent rulings, which would be contrary to the interest of justice and equity. Litigating these claims in a single action will streamline discovery and avoid needless repetition of evidence at trial. 59. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 60. Section 207(a)(1) ofthe FLSA provides in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any work week is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a work week longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 62. For purposes of the FLSA, the employment practices of Defendants were and are uniform in all respects material to the claims asserted in this Complaint throughout the State of Vermont. 63. Plaintiffs and the other members of the FLSA Collective Class, either regularly or from time to time, worked more than 40 hours per week, but did not receive overtime pay. 64. At all relevant times, Defendants have had gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000. 65. In committing the wrongful acts alleged to be in violation of the FLSA, Defendants acted willfully in that they knowingly, deliberately, and intentionally failed to pay overtime premium wages to Plaintiffs and other members of the FLSA Collective Class. 66. As a result of Defendants' failure to pay overtime premium wages, Plaintiffs and the other members of the FLSA Collective Class were damaged in an amount to be proved at trial. 67. Therefore, Plaintiffs demand that they and the other members of the FLSA Collective Class be paid overtime compensation as required by the FLSA for every hour of overtime worked in any work week for which they were not compensated, plus interest, damages, penalties, and attorneys' fees as provided by law. 68. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding Paragraphs. 70. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding Paragraphs. 71. As established above, Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class members are employees, not independent contractors. 72. It is unlawful under 21 V.S.A. § 342(a)(1) for an employer to require or permit an employee to work without paying compensation for all hours worked. 73. It is unlawful under 21 V.S.A. § 384(b) for an employer to require or permit a non-exempt employee to work in excess of 40 hours per week without paying overtime. 75. The position of Distributors does not meet the standards for any exemption under Vermont Wage Law, 21 V.S.A. § 384(b). 77. Defendants' actions, described above constitute continuing violations of Vermont's Employment Practices Laws. 78. As set forth above, the Plaintiffs and other members of the Rule 23 Class have sustained losses in compensation as a proximate result of defendants' violations of Vermont Law. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Rule 23 Class members, seek damages in the amount of their unpaid earned compensation, including for amounts unlawfully deducted, plus liquidated damages, as provided by 21 V.S.A. §§ 347 and 395, as well as for penalties as provided by law under 21 V.S.A. §§ 345 and 394. 79. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and Rule 23 Class members, seek recovery of their attorneys' fees and costs, as provided by 21 V.S.A. §§ 347 and 395. 80. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 81. The Vermont Consumer Fraud Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices m commerce. 9 V.S.A. § 2453. 82. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class members are "consumers" within the meaning of the Act because they "purchase[], lease[], contract[] for, or otherwise agree[] to pay consideration for goods or services not for resale in the ordinary course of [their] trade or business but for the use or benefit of his or her business or in connection with the operation of his or her business." 9 V.S.A. § 2451a(a). 84. A deceptive act or practice is a material representation, practice, or omission likely to mislead a reasonable consumer. See, e.g., Madowitz v. Woods at Killington Owners Ass'n Inc., 93 A.3d 571,579 (Vt. 2014). 85. Defendants' acts, including but not limited to Defendants' failure to disclose their competing interests to Plaintiffs in connection with Plaintiffs' purchase of their Distributorship, was an unfair or deceptive omission that is actionable under the statute. 86. Defendants' represented to Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class members that they would not act in such a way as to undermine Distributors' business and that they would cooperate with Distributors in their sales efforts. In reality, Defendants acted to undermine Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class members business by: a. Requiring Distributors to pay the costs to deliver near-zero profit margin store brand bread so that Flowers Foods may have a competitive advantage with the retailer with respect to other product lines; b. Requiring Distributors to service locations that are unprofitable (i.e. the Distributor essentially services the location for free or at a loss when he includes the cost of vehicle fuel and related expenses) in a particular territory so that Defendants can enjoy the right to service other locations for the retailer, which may be profitable for the Defendants; c. Other unfair and deceptive acts that undermined Plaintiffs' and the Rule 23 Class members' business. 88. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have been adversely affected and directly harmed by these Defendants' representations, practices, and omissions because it caused them to have fewer orders to fill, sell less product, and consequently, affected their profits. 89. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class seek all the statutory remedies to which they are entitled under 9 V.S.A. § 2461(b), including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, a multiplier to be applied to those damages, prejudgment interest, costs and attorneys' fees. 90. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding Paragraphs. 91. As shown above, despite the express terms of the Distribution Agreement, Plaintiffs' and the Rule 23 Class members' relationship with Defendants satisfies the test for employment and not for independent contractor status. 92. As a result of this mischaracterization, Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have been deprived of the benefits of employment and have been forced to pay substantial sums of their own money for work-related expenses. 93. The Distribution Agreement is therefore void as against the public policy of Vermont and must be rescinded. 95. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have rendered services to the Defendants, with the Defendants knowledge, and under circumstances that make it reasonable for the Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class to expect payment and inequitable for the Defendants to retain. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class are therefore entitled to the quantum meruit value of the services rendered to Defendants. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (Brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the Rule 23 Class) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. Overtime Violations (Brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the FLSA Collective Class) VIOLATION OF VERMONT EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LAW 21 V.S.A. §§ 341 et seq. (Brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the Rule 23 Class) VIOLATION OF VERMONT'S CONSUMER FRAUD ACT 9 V.S.A. § 2451 et seq. (Brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the Rule 23 Class)

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13. Upon information and belief, and at all relevant times herein, Defendants were engaged in the business of purchasing, renting, installing, operating and managing portable toilets in the New York tri-state area. See http://www.callahead.com. 14. At all times relevant herein, Defendants, individually and/or jointly, employed hundreds of employees at any given time and hundreds of employees during the class period. 15. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants, individually and/or jointly, from on or about July 24, 2017 to on or about September 22, 2017. 16. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a technician transporting, lifting, installing and servicing portable toilet. 17. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was paid at a regular rate of $17.50 an hour. 18. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff reported to Defendants’ location each day where he was given a list of jobs for the day. Plaintiff then spent approximately 12-15 hours during the day, four to five days a week, completing the assigned work as he was required to do by Defendants. However, in general, Plaintiff was not paid for more than ten work hours a day. On a few occasions when Plaintiff worked a fifth day (Friday), in a work-week, he was 4 paid at 1.5 times his regular hourly rate for about 10 overtime hours worked – even though Plaintiff worked more than 10 hours of overtime on such days. For example, for the week ending September 15, 2017, Plaintiff worked 54 hours 51 mins (in four days) and was only paid for 40 hours at his regular rate. For the remaining 14 hours 51 minutes, Plaintiff was not paid any wages including overtime wages. This example is reflective of Defendants’ payment pattern throughout Plaintiff’s employment with them and throughout the class period with respect to Plaintiff and the putative class members. 19. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff worked approximately 50-75 hours a week and likely more, 4-5 days a week. 20. Plaintiff’s hours worked and wages paid will be refined after Defendants produce employment, time and wage records it was required to keep under the FLSA and NYLL. 21. Plaintiff incorporates herein, accurate records of his time, wages and employment that Defendants were required to keep pursuant to the FLSA and NYLL. Accurate copies of Plaintiff’s wage and time records that Defendants were required to keep pursuant to 29 USC 211, 29 CFR 516 and NYLL 195, 12 NYCRR 142.2-6 are incorporated herein by reference. 22. At all times relevant herein and for the time Plaintiff was employed by Defendants, Defendants failed and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff an overtime rate of one and one half times his regular rate of pay for each and all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week for each week in which such overtime was worked. 23. Upon information and belief, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the putative class members at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate for each and all overtime hours worked (hours over 40 in a week). 24. At all times relevant herein, Defendants did not provide Plaintiff and the putative class members with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1). 25. At all times relevant herein, Defendants did not provide Plaintiff and the putative class members with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3) – the wage statements provided to 5 Plaintiff did not state all hours worked nor all wages earned by Plaintiff, among other deficiencies. 26. The violations set forth herein as to Plaintiff, also apply to putative class members. 27. Upon information and belief and at all times relevant herein, Defendants, individually and/or jointly had annual revenues and/or expenditures in excess of $500, 000. Plaintiff references and incorporates herein, accurate copies of records of Defendants’ business volume and revenues as well as business operations and commerce that Defendants were required to keep and maintain under the FLSA including under 29 CFR 516. 28. Upon information and belief and at all times relevant herein, Defendants conducted business with companies outside the State of New York. 29. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein, Defendants and Plaintiff conducted business with insurance companies outside the State of New York. 30. At all times applicable herein and upon information and belief, Defendants utilized the goods, materials, and services through interstate commerce such as construction equipment, materials and supplies. 31. At all times applicable herein, Defendants conducted business with vendors and other businesses outside the State of New York. 32. Defendants as a regular part of their business, makes payment of taxes and other monies to agencies and entities outside the State of New York. 33. Defendants as a regular part of their business, engaged in credit card transactions involving banks and other institutions outside the State of New York. 34. At all times applicable herein and upon information and belief, Defendants utilized the instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as the United States mail, electronic mail, the internet and telephone systems. 6 35. Upon information and belief, and at all relevant times herein, Defendants failed to display federal and state minimum wage/overtime posters. 36. Upon information and belief, and at all relevant times herein, Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff of his federal and state minimum wage and overtime rights and failed to inform Plaintiff that he could seek enforcement of such rights through the government enforcement agencies. 37. The termination of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants is under review and investigation. Plaintiff may assert wrongful termination claims at a later time in a separate action. 38. The “present” or the “present time” as used in this complaint refers to the date this complaint was signed. 39. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated who opt into this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 38 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 40. The named Plaintiff has consented to be part of this action by the filing of this action on his behalf and with his consent. 41. The FLSA cause of action is brought as a collective action on behalf of the named Plaintiff and all others who are/were similarly situated and who file consents to opt-in to the action. 7 42. The class of similarly situated individuals as to the FLSA cause of action is defined as current and former employees of Defendants, who 1) worked more than forty hours in a week, within at least the three-year period, preceding the filing of this complaint; and 2) were not paid at an overtime rate of at least 1.5 times their regular rate for each and all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week as also explained above. 43. Although the precise number of putative class members is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number is based are presently within the sole control of Defendant, upon information and belief, there are approximately hundreds of members of the class during the class period. 44. The class definition will be refined as is necessary, including after discovery if necessary. 45. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated, were employed by Defendants, individually and/or jointly, within the meaning of the FLSA – 29 U.S.C 201 et Seq. 46. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly similarly-situated, were engaged in commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce and/or Defendants constituted an enterprise(s) engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a). 47. Upon information and belief and at all times relevant herein, Defendants transacted commerce and business in excess of $500,000.00 annually or had revenues and/or expenditures in excess of $500,000.00 annually. 48. At all times relevant herein, Defendants, individually and/or jointly, failed and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff, and all those similarly similarly-situated as class members, overtime compensation at rates not less than 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for each and all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a work week, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207. 8 Relief Demanded 49. Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff, and all those similarly-situated, are entitled to recover from Defendants, individually and/or jointly, their unpaid overtime wage compensation, plus maximum liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of the action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 50. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated as class members, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 49 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 51. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 52. The class of similarly-situated individuals as to the overtime cause of action under the NYLL is defined as current and former employees of Defendants, who: 1) were employed by Defendants within the State of New York; 2) worked more than forty hours in a week, within at least the six-year period, preceding the filing of this complaint; and 4) not paid at an overtime rate of at least 1.5 times their regular rate for each and all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week as also explained above. 53. The class definition will be refined as is necessary, including after discovery if necessary. 54. Although the precise number of putative class members is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number is based are presently within the sole control of Defendants, upon information and belief, there are hundreds of members of the class during the class period. 55. Upon information and belief, the putative class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 9 56. Upon information and belief, there are questions of law or fact common to the class – whether the putative class was paid at least 1.5 times the applicable regular rate for all hours in excess of forty in a week. 57. Upon information and belief, the claims of the representative party are typical of the claims of the class. 58. The representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 59. The Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 60. There are questions of law and fact common to the class which predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the class, including: (a) Whether, Defendants failed and/or refused to pay the Plaintiff and the putative class members at a rate of at least one and one half (1 ½) times their regular hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty each week within the meaning of New York Minimum Wage Act and the regulations thereunder – 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2. 61. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy - particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate Defendants and in light of the large number of putative class members. 62. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated as class members, were employed by Defendants, individually and/or jointly, within the meaning of the New York Labor Law, §§ 2 and 651 and the regulations thereunder including 12 NYCRR § 142. 63. At all times relevant herein, Defendants, individually and/or jointly failed to pay and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated as class members, overtime compensation at rates not less than 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for each and all hours 10 worked in excess of forty hours in a work week, in violation of the New York Minimum Wage Act and its implementing regulations. N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 650 et seq.; 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2. Relief Demanded 64. Due to Defendants’ NYLL overtime violations, Plaintiff, and all those similarly-situated, are entitled to recover from Defendants, individually and/or jointly, their unpaid overtime compensation, maximum liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, and costs of the action, pursuant to NYLL § 663(1). 65. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated as class members, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 63 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 66. Plaintiff sues on her own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 67. The class of similarly-situated individuals as to the cause of action for NYLL 195(1) and NYLL 195(3) violations is defined as current and former employees of Defendants who: 1) were not provided with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1), or 2) were not provided with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3). 68. The class includes but is not limited to employees who did not receive wage statements, employees who received wage statements but whose wage statements did not reflect all hours worked or all wages earned, and employees who did not receive the required wage notices setting forth the regular and overtime rate of pay among other information. 69. The class definition will be refined as is necessary, including after discovery if necessary. 11 70. Although the precise number of putative class members is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number is based are presently within the sole control of Defendants, upon information and belief, there are hundreds of members of the class during the class period. 71. Upon information and belief, the putative class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 72. Upon information and belief, there are questions of law or fact common to the class – (a) whether Defendants, individually and/or jointly, failed to provide Plaintiff with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1), and (b) whether Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the putative class with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3). 73. Upon information and belief, the claims of the representative party are typical of the claims of the class. 74. The representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 75. The Defendants, individually and/or jointly, have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 76. There are questions of law and fact common to the class which predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the class, including: (a) whether Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1), and whether Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the putative class with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3). 77. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy - particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate Defendant and in light of the large number of putative class members. 12 78. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated as class members, were employed by Defendants, individually and/or jointly, within the meaning of the New York Labor law, §§ 190 et seq., including §§ 191, 193, 195 and 198. 79. At all times relevant herein, Defendants, individually and/or jointly, failed and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff and the class members with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1) – Plaintiff and the class are therefore entitled to and seeks to recover in this action the maximum recovery for this violation, plus attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-b), as well as an injunction directing Defendants to comply with FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT - 29 U.S.C 201 et Seq. (Overtime) NYLL § 190, 191, 193, 195 and 198 NYLL 650 et Seq. (Unpaid Overtime)

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(NYLL Minimum Wage Violations) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the NYLL Class (FLSA Minimum Wage Violations) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Failure to Provide Annual Wage Notices in Violation of NYLL § 195) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the NYLL Class 108. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the NYLL Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 109. As set forth above, during the NYLL Period, Defendants have failed to supply Plaintiff and the NYLL Class with wage notices as required by NYLL § 195(1). 21 110. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL entitle Plaintiff and the NYLL Class to recover damages of fifty dollars per person affected for each work day that Defendants failed to provide them with wage notices, up to a total of $5,000.00 per person affected, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. (Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements in Violation of NYLL § 195) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the NYLL Class 105. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the NYLL Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 106. As set forth above, during the NYLL Period, Defendants failed to furnish accurate wage statements to Plaintiff and the NYLL Class, in violation of NYLL § 195 by providing wage statements that did not provide the requisite details and information. 107. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL entitle Plaintiff and the NYLL Class to recover damages of one hundred dollars per person affected for each work week that such violations occurred, up to a total of $5,000.00 per person affected, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. (Failure to Pay Spread-of-Hours) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the NYLL Class 100. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the NYLL Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 101. Plaintiff and the NYLL Class members regularly worked more than 10 hours in a workday. 102. 12 NYCRR 146-1.6(a) states that “[o]n each day on which the spread of hours exceeds 10, an employee shall receive one additional hour of pay at the basic minimum hourly rate.” 20 103. As set forth above, during the NYLL Class Period, Defendants have willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and the NYLL Class additional compensation of one hour’s pay at the basic minimum hourly wage rate for each day during which they worked more than 10 hours. 104. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL have significantly damaged Plaintiff and the NYLL Class and entitle them to recover from Defendants their unpaid spread-of-hours wages, an additional amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. (NYLL §§ 191 et seq. Violations for Failure to Pay Wages) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the NYLL Class (NYLL §§ 193 et seq. Unlawful Deductions) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the NYLL Class (Violation of IRC § 7434) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the IRC Class 111. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the IRC Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 112. 26 U.S.C. § 7434 provides that where any person willfully files a fraudulent information return with respect to payments purported to be made to any other person, such other person may bring a civil action for damages against the person filing such information return. 113. As set forth above, during the IRC Class Period, Defendants willfully filed fraudulent information returns with respect to payments purported to be made to Plaintiff and the IRC Class. These information returns falsely stated that taxable income was received by Plaintiff and the IRC Class in the form of wages and/or tips that were never actually paid. As a result, Plaintiff and the IRC Class suffered increased tax liability. 114. Defendants’ violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7434 entitle Plaintiff and the IRC Class to recover damages of the greater of: $5,000 per person or the actual economic damages sustained as a proximate result of the filing of the fraudulent information return (including any costs attributable to resolving the deficiencies asserted as a result of such filing), plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 22 13. Federal and state law require employers to pay employees a minimum wage. 14. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective and the NYLL Class any minimum hourly wage and they were instead compensated solely through customer tips. 15. Arguably, Defendants could have paid certain tipped employees at the lower tip- credit minimum wage so long as the “tips” or “gratuities” that such tipped employees receive, 5 when added to the hourly wages, meet or exceed the standard hourly minimum wage, and so long as all tips received by the employees are retained by the employees. 16. However, although academic here given that Defendants did not pay any hourly wage to service employees, Defendants were not entitled to avail themselves of a reduced minimum wage by applying the tip credit because, inter alia, Defendants required service employees to share and/or pool their tips with non-service employees such as Kitchen Chefs, Counter Chefs and other employees who did not perform “tipped” duties or have any meaningful customer interaction. Uncompensated Work Time 17. Defendants also routinely failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class for all hours worked. 18. For instance, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class who worked the morning shift were required to arrive up to two hours before customers arrived to make preparations for the lunch shift, including by cleaning menus and receipt books, wiping down tables, counters and computers, cleaning and refilling sauce and salt dispensers, cutting limes, making frozen margaritas and more. 19. However, the time that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class spent preparing for the morning shift was uncompensated because they were not paid any hourly wage and given that they were not servicing customers, they were not paid tips. 20. Upon the conclusion of their scheduled shifts, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class were often required to remain at Pedro’s – well after the Restaurant was closed to customers – to clean the premises, wipe down glasses, put away inventory and package utensils for the next shift. 6 21. However, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class were not compensated for post-closing time because they were not paid any hourly wage and given that they were not servicing customers, they were not paid tips. Unlawful Deductions and Spread-of-Hours Violations 22. Defendants also unlawfully deducted wages from Plaintiff and the NYLL Class. For example, Defendants unlawfully deducted from the tips they earned if a customer walked out on a bill, if they spilled a drink and had it replaced or if there was a cash register shortage at the end of the night. 23. The NYLL provides that employees are entitled to an extra hour of wages at the minimum wage rate on days when those employees work more than 10 hours, which is called “spread-of-hours” pay. 24. While Plaintiff and the NYLL Class often worked double shifts in which they worked more than 10 hours in a single workday, they were never paid spread-of-hours pay. Failure to Provide Wage Notices and Accurate Wage Statements 25. Defendants never provided Plaintiff and the NYLL Class with wage notices setting forth their rates of pay or any of the additional information required by NYLL § 195(1). 26. Defendants also never provided accurate wage statements to Plaintiff and the NYLL Class detailing the rate of compensation, the time period covered by the paycheck, the number of hours worked during the applicable time period and many other details required by 34. Plaintiff brings her FLSA claims as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other similarly-situated persons who were employed by Defendants as “Waiters,” “Servers,” “Bussers,” “Bartenders” or other similar “tipped” positions during the three year limitations period covered by the FLSA (the “FLSA Collective Period”). 8 35. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were similarly situated, had substantially similar job requirements, were paid in the same manner and under the same common policies, plans and practices, and were subject to Defendants’ practice of willfully failing and refusing to pay them at the legally required minimum wage for all hours worked and requiring tipped employees to disburse part of their tips with non-tipped employees. 36. During the FLSA Collective Period, Defendants were fully aware of the duties performed by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective, and that those duties were not exempt from the minimum wage of the FLSA. 37. As a result of Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein, Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 206 by not paying Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked. 38. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful, repeated, knowing, intentional and without a good-faith basis, and significantly damaged Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 39. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for the full amount of their unpaid minimum wages, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, plus the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 40. While the exact number of the FLSA Collective is unknown to Plaintiff at the present time, upon information and belief, there are at least 40 other similarly-situated persons who were employed by Defendants as “Waiters,” “Servers,” “Bussers,” “Bartenders” or other similar “tipped” positions during the FLSA Collective Period. 41. Plaintiff is currently unaware of the identities of the members of the FLSA Collective. Accordingly, Defendants should be required to provide Plaintiff with a list of all 9 persons employed by Defendants as “Waiters,” “Servers,” “Bussers,” “Bartenders” or other similar “tipped” positions during the FLSA Collective Period, along with their last known addresses, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, so Plaintiff can give the FLSA Collective notice of this action and an opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to participate in it. 42. Plaintiff brings her NYLL claims as a class action pursuant to FRCP 23 on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other similarly-situated persons who were employed by Defendants during the six year limitations period (the “NYLL Class Period”) as “Waiters,” “Servers,” “Bussers,” “Bartenders” or other similar “tipped” positions who were: (i) not paid the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked; (ii) unlawfully denied tips and gratuities; (iii) not paid wages for all hours worked; (iv) denied wages due to unlawful deductions; (v) denied spread-of-hours pay; and (vi) not furnished with accurate wage statements or wage notices. 43. The basic job duties of the NYLL Class were the same as or substantially similar to those of Plaintiff, and the NYLL Class members were paid in the same manner and under the same common policies, plans and practices as Plaintiff. 44. The members of the NYLL Class, like Plaintiff, all have been subject to the same unlawful policies, plans and practices of Defendants, including not paying the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked, unlawfully retaining gratuities, not paying wages for all hours worked, making unlawful deductions, not paying spread-of-hours pay, not furnishing accurate wage statements and not furnishing wage notices. 10 45. During the NYLL Class Period, Defendants were fully aware of the duties performed by Plaintiff and the NYLL Class, and that those duties were not exempt from the minimum wage and other applicable provisions of the NYLL and/or its regulations. 46. As a result of Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein, Defendants violated the NYLL and/or its regulations. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL and/or its regulations were willful, repeated, knowing, intentional and without a good faith basis, and significantly damaged Plaintiff and the NYLL Class. 47. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the NYLL Class for the full amount of their unpaid minimum wages, the tips or gratuities unlawfully distributed to non-service employees, the unpaid wages owed, the unlawfully deducted wages, unpaid spread-of-hours pay, the statutory penalties for failure to distribute accurate wage statements and wage notices, an additional amount as liquidated damages, plus the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff and the NYLL Class. 48. Certification of the NYLL Class’ claims as a class action is the most efficient and economical means of resolving the questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of the NYLL Class. Plaintiff has standing to seek such relief because of the adverse effect that Defendants’ unlawful compensation policies and practices have had on her individually and on the NYLL Class. Without class certification, the same evidence and issues would be subject to re-litigation in a multitude of individual lawsuits with an attendant risk of inconsistent adjudications and conflicting obligations. Certification of the NYLL Class is the most efficient and judicious means of presenting the evidence and arguments necessary to resolve such questions for Plaintiff, the NYLL Class and Defendants. 11 49. Plaintiff’s claims raise questions of law and fact common to the NYLL Class. Among these questions are: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the NYLL Class members within the meaning of the NYLL; b. Whether Defendants paid Plaintiff and the NYLL Class members the minimum wage for all hours worked during the NYLL Class Period; c. Whether Defendants illegally required Plaintiff and NYLL Class members to share their tips with to non-tipped employees, such as Kitchen Chefs and Counter Chefs and other individuals who were not working in customarily tipped positions and/or did not have meaningful contact with customers; d. Whether Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the NYLL Class their wages earned constitutes a violation of NYLL § 191; e. Whether Defendants failed to pay spread-of-hours pay to Plaintiff and the NYLL Class; f. Whether Defendants failed to furnish accurate wage statements to Plaintiff and the NYLL Class; g. Whether Defendants failed to furnish wage notices to Plaintiff and the NYLL Class; and h. Whether Defendants’ violations of the NYLL and/or its regulations were willful. 50. These common questions of law and fact arise from the same course of events, and each class member will make similar legal and factual arguments to prove liability. 51. Plaintiff is a member of the NYLL Class that she seeks to represent. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the NYLL Class. The relief Plaintiff seeks for the unlawful policies and practices complained of herein are also typical of the relief which is sought on behalf of the NYLL Class. 52. Plaintiff’s interests are co-extensive with those of the NYLL Class that she seeks to represent in this case. Plaintiff is willing and able to represent the NYLL Class fairly and to 12 vigorously pursue her similar individual claims in this action. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in labor and employment class action litigation, and who are able to meet the time and fiscal demands necessary to litigate a class action of this size and complexity. The combined interests, experience and resources of Plaintiff and her counsel to litigate the individual and NYLL Class claims at issue in this case satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 53. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the NYLL Class, making final injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the NYLL Class as a whole. 54. Injunctive and declaratory relief are the predominant relief sought in this case because they are the culmination of the proof of Defendants’ individual and class-wide liability and the essential predicate for Plaintiff’s and the NYLL Class’ entitlement to monetary and non- monetary remedies to be determined at a later stage of the proceedings. 55. The common issues of fact and law affecting Plaintiff’s claims and those of the NYLL Class members, including the common issues identified above, predominate over any issues affecting only individual claims. 56. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of the NYLL Class. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 57. The cost of proving Defendants’ violations of the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor regulations makes it impracticable for Plaintiff and the NYLL Class to pursue their claims individually. Maintenance of a class action promotes judicial economy by consolidating a large class of potential plaintiffs litigating identical claims. The 13 claims of the NYLL Class interrelate such that the interests of the members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Additionally, the questions of law and fact common to the NYLL Class arise from the same course of events and each class member will make similar legal and factual arguments to prove the Defendants’ liability. 58. The NYLL Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of the NYLL Class is unknown to Plaintiff at the present time, upon information and belief, there are at least 40 similarly-situated persons who were/are employed by Defendants as “Waiters,” “Servers,” “Bussers,” “Bartenders” or other similar “tipped” positions during the NYLL Class Period. 59. Plaintiff is currently unaware of the identities of the members of the NYLL Class. Accordingly, Defendants should be required to provide Plaintiff with a list of all persons employed by Defendants as “Waiters,” “Servers,” “Bussers,” “Bartenders” or other similar “tipped” positions during the NYLL Class Period, along with their last known addresses, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, so Plaintiff can give the NYLL Class notice of this action and an opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to participate in it. Internal Revenue Code Claims 60. Plaintiff brings her Internal Revenue Code claims as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself individually and on behalf of all persons employed by Defendants during the six year limitations period (the “IRC Class Period”) who were subjected to Defendants’ unlawful filing of fraudulent information returns with the IRS. 61. The members of the IRC Class, like Plaintiff, were/are subjected to Defendants’ unlawful filing of fraudulent information returns with the IRS. 14 62. The claims of Plaintiff described herein are typical of the claims of the IRC Class she seeks to represent. 63. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the IRC Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions and employment litigation. 64. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the IRC Class, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the IRC Class, which include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendants filed fraudulent information returns with the IRS as to Plaintiff and the IRC Class; b. Whether Defendants reported that Plaintiff and the IRC Class received taxable income on account of unpaid wages and/or tips; c. Whether Defendants reported that Plaintiff and the IRC Class were provided wages and/or tips that were not actually provided; d. Whether taxable income was imputed to Plaintiff and the IRC Class for unpaid wages and/or tips; e. Whether Plaintiff and the IRC Class suffered increased tax liability on account of Defendants’ filing of false information returns; and f. Whether Defendants’ violations of the Internal Revenue Code were willful. 65. These common questions of law and fact arise from the same course of events, and each class member will make similar legal and factual arguments to prove liability. 66. Plaintiff is a member of the IRC Class that she seeks to represent. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the IRC Class. The relief Plaintiff seeks for the unlawful policies and practices complained of herein are also typical of the relief which is sought on behalf of the IRC Class. 15 67. Plaintiff’s interests are co-extensive with those of the IRC Class that she seeks to represent in this case. Plaintiff is willing and able to represent the IRC Class fairly and to vigorously pursue her similar individual claims in this action. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in labor and employment class action litigation, and who are able to meet the time and fiscal demands necessary to litigate a class action of this size and complexity. The combined interests, experience and resources of Plaintiff and her counsel to litigate the individual and IRC Class claims at issue in this case satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 68. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the IRC Class, making final injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the IRC Class as a whole. 69. Injunctive and declaratory relief are the predominant relief sought in this case because they are the culmination of the proof of Defendants’ individual and class-wide liability and the essential predicate for Plaintiff’s and the IRC Class’ entitlement to monetary and non- monetary remedies to be determined at a later stage of the proceedings. 70. The common issues of fact and law affecting Plaintiff’s claims and those of the IRC Class members, including the common issues identified above, predominate over any issues affecting only individual claims. 71. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of the IRC Class. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 72. The cost of proving Defendants’ violations of the IRC and the supporting Federal Regulations makes it impracticable for Plaintiff and the IRC Class to pursue their claims 16 individually. Maintenance of a class action promotes judicial economy by consolidating a large class of potential plaintiffs litigating identical claims. The claims of the IRC Class interrelate such that the interests of the members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Additionally, the questions of law and fact common to the IRC Class arise from the same course of events and each class member will make similar legal and factual arguments to prove Defendants’ liability. 73. The IRC Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of the IRC Class is unknown to Plaintiff at the present time, upon information and belief, there are at least 40 similarly-situated persons who were/are employed by Defendants on whose behalf Defendants filed fraudulent information returns with the IRS during the IRC Class Period. 74. Plaintiff is currently unaware of the identities of the members of the IRC Class. Accordingly, Defendants should be required to provide Plaintiff with a list of all persons employed by Defendants on whose behalf Defendant filed fraudulent information returns during the IRC Class Period, along with their last known addresses, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, so Plaintiff can give the IRC Class notice of this action and an opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to participate in it. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective, realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 76. The FLSA requires covered employers, such as Defendants, to pay all non- exempt employees the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked. 17 77. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were not exempt from the requirement that Defendants pay them the prevailing minimum wage under the FLSA. 78. As set forth above, during the FLSA Collective Period, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked for Defendants. 79. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked, Defendants violated the FLSA. 80. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have significantly damaged Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective and entitle them to recover the total amount of their unpaid minimum wages, an additional equal amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the NYLL Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 82. The NYLL requires covered employers, such as Defendants, to pay all non- exempt employees the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked. 83. Plaintiff and the NYLL Class were not exempt from the requirement that Defendants pay them the prevailing minimum wage under the NYLL. 84. As set forth above, during the NYLL Class Period, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and the NYLL Class the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked for Defendants. 85. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the NYLL Class the prevailing minimum wage for all hours, Defendants violated the NYLL. 18 86. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL have significantly damaged Plaintiff and the NYLL Class and entitle them to recover the total amount of their unpaid minimum wage, an additional amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the NYLL Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 88. The NYLL requires covered employers, such as Defendants, to pay employees all the wages they are owed with the requisite frequency. 89. Plaintiff and the NYLL Class were not exempt from the requirement that Defendants pay them all the wages they are owed with the requisite frequency. 90. As set forth above, during the NYLL Class Period, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and the NYLL Class all the wages they were owed with the requisite frequency. 91. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the NYLL Class all the wages they are owed with the requisite frequency, Defendants violated the NYLL. 92. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL have significantly damaged Plaintiff and the NYLL Class, and entitle them to recover the total amount of their unpaid wages, an additional amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. 93. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the NYLL Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein 19 94. The NYLL prohibits covered employers from making certain deductions from the wages of employees. 95. As set forth above, during the NYLL Class Period, Defendants unlawfully deducted amounts from the wages of Plaintiff and the NYLL Class. 96. Defendants did not make said deductions in accordance with the provisions of any law or any rule or regulation issued by any governmental agency. 97. Plaintiff and the NYLL Class did not authorize Defendants in writing to make said deductions, and said deductions were not for the benefit of Plaintiff or the NYLL Class. 98. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful deductions from the wages of Plaintiff and the NYLL Class, Defendants violated the NYLL. 99. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL have significantly damaged Plaintiff and the NYLL Class and entitle them to recover the total amount of the wages that were deducted from their pay, an additional amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. Minimum Wage Violations New York Labor Law Claims

win

(Failure to Pay Wages & Overtime Wages – NYLL, Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Himself and the Class Members) (Failure to Pay Overtime Wages – FLSA, Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Himself and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs) (Notice & Wage Statement Violations – NYLL §195, Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Himself and the Class Members) 16. Plaintiff brings the First Claim for Relief as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons employed by Defendants as non- exempt employees during the three years prior to the filing of the original Complaint in 4 this case as defined herein. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”. 17. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements, job duties and pay provisions, and are and have been subject to Defendants’ decision, policy, plan, practice, procedure, routine and rules to willfully fail and refuse to pay them the legally required overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. The claims of the Plaintiff herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 18. Other non-exempt employees currently or formerly employed by Defendants should have the opportunity to have their claims for violations of the FLSA heard. Certifying this action as a collective action under the FLSA will provide other construction workers to receive notice of the action and allow them to opt in to this action if they so choose. 19. The First Claim for Relief is properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to §216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last addresses known to Defendants. 2.2, (b) whether Defendants provided Class Members with the notices required by NYLL § 195(1), and (c) whether Defendants provided Class Members with sufficiently detailed wage statements as required by NYLL § 195(3). 20. Plaintiff brings the Second and Third Claims for Relief pursuant to the Fed. R. Civ. P. (“FRCP”) Rule 23, to recover unpaid wages, unpaid overtime pay, and 5 other damages on behalf of all individuals employed in the State of New York by Defendants as non-exempt construction employees at any time during the six years prior to the filing of the original Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class Members” and/or the “Class”. 21. The number, names and addresses of the Class Members are readily ascertainable from the records of the Defendants. The dates of employment and the rates of pay for each Class Member, the hours assigned and worked, and the wages paid to them, are also determinable from Defendants’ records. Notice can be provided by means permissible under FRCP Rule 23. 22. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class Members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will benefit the parties and the Court. While the precise number of such persons is unknown to the Plaintiff and is presently within the sole control of Defendants, Plaintiff believes that through discovery he will obtain evidence to establish that there are at least 40 members of the Class. 23. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims of the Class Members, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each Class Member in separate actions. All the Class Members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, in that they were not compensated for overtime hours worked as required by 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2, and that Defendant failed to provide them with proper notices and wage statements as required by NYLL §195. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class Members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class Member. 6 24. As fellow employees of Defendants, which failed to adequately compensate Plaintiff and the members of the Class as required by law, Plaintiff and the other Class Members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 25. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff has retained Gennadiy Naydenskiy, Esq., a competent and experienced employment litigator. 26. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because the losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual Class Members are relatively small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class Members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual 7 members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of Class Members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 27. Upon information and belief, employees of Defendants in these types of actions are often afraid to individually assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation and former employees are fearful of bringing individual claims because the fear that doing so could harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. A class action provides Class Members who are not named in the Complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 28. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members, including: (a) whether Defendants required Class Members to work uncompensated overtime and failed to adequately compensate the Class Members for all hours worked as required by 12 NYCRR § 142- 29. Absent a class action, many of the Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendants will retain the proceeds of their violations of the 30. Defendants operate a construction and demolition company based out of Stony Brook, New York. Defendants employ various non-exempt construction worker employees who are assigned to perform construction and/or demolition work for Defendants. 31. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants employed Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members as construction and/or demolition workers. 32. Defendants assigned Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members to various construction-related activities, including but not limited to, demolition 33. Throughout the first year of Plaintiff’s employment, Defendants scheduled Plaintiff to work- between five and six days a week, from 7am until 5pm, with a half- hour lunchbreak. 34. However, throughout the first year of his employment, Plaintiff worked between five and six days a week, from 6:30am until 7pm, with a half-hour lunchbreak. 35. During the last approximate 2 months prior to the end of his employment, Defendants scheduled Plaintiff to work 3 days per week. 36. Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members regularly worked over 40 hours per workweek. Despite Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members regularly working in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants failed to pay them overtime premiums as required by law. 37. Defendants paid Plaintiff a flat rate of $125 per day. Defendants did not properly compensate Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members at 9 the lawful overtime rates of one and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay as required by law for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 38. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the Class Members with the notices required by NYLL §195(1). 39. Defendants violated NYLL § 195(3) by failing to furnish Plaintiff and the Class Members with a statement with every payment of wages, listing, among other things, hours worked, rates paid, gross wages, deductions and net wages, and an explanation of how such wages were computed. 40. Defendants knew of, and/or showed reckless disregard for, the practices by which Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees of Defendants were not paid overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of overtime premiums would economically injure Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members, and that they violated the FLSA and the NYLL. 41. Defendants committed the foregoing acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully against the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class Members. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 10 43. Throughout the statute of limitations period covered by these claims, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 44. At all relevant times, Defendants willfully, regularly, repeatedly and knowingly failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs the required overtime rates for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, seeks damages in the amount of their respective unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated (double) damages as provided by the FLSA for overtime violations, attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 46. Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful, and because Defendants failed to post the notices required by the FLSA, the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255 should be equitably tolled for, at the very least, the six-year NYLL statute of limitations period. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 48. It is unlawful under New York law for an employer to suffer or permit a non-exempt employee to work without paying overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any workweek. 11 49. Throughout the Class Period, Defendants willfully, regularly, repeatedly and knowingly failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members at the required overtime rates for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 50. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, Plaintiff and the Class Members have sustained damages, including loss of earnings, in an amount to be established at trial. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, seek damages in the amount of their respective unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to NYLL, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 53. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and the Class Members with notice as required by NYLL § 195, in English or in the languages identified by Plaintiff and each Class Member as his/her primary language, containing their rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with NYLL § 191; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of 12 business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 54. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff and each Class Member with an accurate statement of wages as required by NYLL § 195, containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; and net wages. 55. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover damages and/or statutory penalties from Defendants, as provided for by NYLL § 198, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

lose

14. Defendant designs fitness apparel and gear for men, women and children. Defendant sells its products on its Website and at third-party retailers across the Country, including but not limited to Flywheel Sports, with locations throughout New York City, and REI, located at 303 Lafayette Street, New York, New York. 15. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace. Through the Website, customers can learn about Defendant’s products, including recent collections; learn about sizing, materials used, and technological features; read product reviews; learn about customizable products and request a quote; learn about the return policy; and locate third- party retailers. 16. The Website is integrated with its third-party retailers, serving as their gateway. Through the Website, Defendant’s customers are, inter alia, able to: learn information about the stores’ locations and contact information and get directions to the third-party retailers. 17. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Fischler and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its third-party retailers. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Fischler and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access -7- to Defendant’s third-party retailers and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 18. Plaintiff Fischler cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 19. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about January 13 21, 2020, Plaintiff Fischler encountered multiple access barriers that denied him the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s third-party retailers. Because of these barriers he was unable to, substantially equal to sighted individuals: a. Know what is on the Website. This is in part due to the non-text images lacking proper alternative text. On the home page, there are images labeled only “image.” He had difficulty learning about Defendant’s products because not all sub-links are accessible. For example, if a sighted user hovers over the link for Men, several sub- links appear. Hovering is a feature that, unless coded properly, is consistently inaccessible to screen reader users. In this case, some of the sub-links are detected by the screen reader but others are missed. For example, under “Men” he was able to locate links to the sidewalk sale and collections but the links for apparel, fear and accessories were not detected. With assistance for a sighted user, Plaintiff Fischler was able to find a link for navigation which gave him access to those links, however the navigation link was not labeled as clickable and when he subsequently tried to navigate those links with his arrow keys, the links disappear. Plaintiff Fischler was unable to learn about Defendant’s third-party retailers because when he tried to enter his zip code it told him there was an -8- error. He needed assistance from a sighted user to know he need to select a location from an auto-populated list in order to access results. Lastly, Plaintiff Fischler was unable to learn about warranties. When he selected the link, there was no alert that anything had loaded and focus was not redirected. Ultimately, he was unable to find any information. b. Navigate the Website. This Website was difficult to navigate using a screen reader. As mentioned above, not all links are accessible using a screen reader. In addition to the difficulties listed above, Plaintiff Fischler was unable to locate the menu at the top of the page that a sighted user can click on to access links such as “blog”, “product info”, etc. Rather a screen reader user must navigate to the footer to find these links. There are unlabeled elements throughout the Website. For example, on the store finder page, there are several unlabeled buttons. Plaintiff Fischler was unable to complete a purchase using a screen reader. He was unable to detect color options, and although he was able to locate size options, he was unable to select a size. When he tried to add an item to his cart, there was no alert that he had been successful and he was unable to locate a link to his cart to confirm it had been added. 20. Plaintiff Fischler was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant websites: a. Lack of alt-text for images. b. Fieldset elements are not labeled with legend elements. c. Document titles are blank. d. Tables are not properly labeled. -9- e. Frames do not have a title. f. Some pages have the same title so the title cannot be used to distinguish pages. g. Form controls have no label and no programmatically determined name. h. Forms have fields without label elements or title attributes. i. Webpages have duplicate IDs which cause problems in screen readers. j. Radio button groups are not contained in a fieldset element. k. Webpages have no headings, headings are not nested correctly, and at least twenty (20) headings are empty. l. Links use general text like “click here” which doesn’t explain the link purpose. m. Several links on a page share the same link text, but go to different destinations. n. Webpages have markup errors. Defendant Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 21. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Fischler, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Fischler encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from -10- accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting third-party retailers selling Defendant’s products and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals. 22. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, view goods and service items, learn about Defendant’s third- party retailers; learn about Defendant’s products; and complete a purchase, as sighted individuals can. 23. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 24. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Fischler and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff Fischler alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Fischler, as a member of a protected class. -11- 25. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 26. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 27. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Fischler seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Fischler to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.0 AA compliant; b. Training Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. -12- 28. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 29. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 30. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 31. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 32. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s third-party retailers during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 33. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal -13- enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s third-party retailers during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 34. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in the stores selling Defendant’s products during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 35. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: a. Whether Defendant’s third-party retailers are places of “public accommodation”; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; c. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and e. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. -14- 36. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 37. Plaintiff Fischler will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 38. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 39. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. -15- 40. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 41. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 42. The third-party retailers selling Defendant’s products are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s third-party retailers. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 45. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: -16- [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 46. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Fischler, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 47. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Fischler requests the relief as set forth below. -17- 48. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 50. The third-party retailers selling Defendant’s products in the State of New York constitute sales establishments and public accommodations under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of these stores. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these stores. 51. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which is accessible to residents of the State of New York. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 52. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its third-party retailers to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 53. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, -18- practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 54. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 55. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 56. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Defendant has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or -19- b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 57. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and the third-party retailers selling its products under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 58. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 59. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 60. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 62. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. -20- 63. The NYCHRL provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 64. The third-party retailers selling Defendant’s products in New York City are sales establishments and public accommodations within the meaning of the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with these stores. 65. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which is accessible to residents of the City of New York, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 66. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 67. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). -21- 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 70. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 71. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 72. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. -22- 73. Under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 74. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its products, which are sold in stores through the country, and it fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 76. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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26. Defendant is one of the world’s largest passenger-cruise lines, offering cruises, vacation packages, and other travel services to consumers nationwide. In efforts to drum-up business, Defendant would uniformly send marketing text messages to hundreds, if not thousands, of consumers at a time and provided different types of offers and savings for future purchases. 27. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent at least one thousand illegal text messages over the last four years preceding this lawsuit. 38. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of two (2) nationwide classes of similarly situated individuals. 39. The first class is the “No Consent to Text Class,” of which is defined as: [1] All persons in the United States [2] within the four years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint [3] whose cellular telephone number [4] was sent one or more text message [5] marketing, advertising, and/or otherwise promoting goods, services, or events [6] from Defendant, or another person or entity acting on Defendant’s behalf, [7] by and through an automatic telephone dialing system or equipment [8] and Defendant lacked the class member’s express written consent to send such text message(s). 40. Plaintiff is a member of the No Consent to Text Class. 41. The second class is the “DNC Class,” of which is defined as: [1] All persons in the United States [2] within the four years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint [3] whose cellular telephone number [4] was sent one or more text message [5] marketing, advertising, and/or otherwise promoting goods, services, or events [6] from Defendant, or another person or entity acting on Defendant’s behalf, [7] whereby said cellular telephone number was placed on the national do-not-call registry more than thirty-one (31) days prior to the class member being sent the subject text message(s) [8] and Defendant lacked the class member’s express written consent to send such text message(s). 42. Plaintiff is a member of the DNC Class. 43. Defendant and their employees or agents, Plaintiff’s attorneys and employees, the Judge this action is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress are excluded from the Classes. 44. The Classes are so numerous and geographically widespread that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, as well as common experience of the size of automated dialing campaigns, there are easily more than one thousand persons in each Class. 53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-52 as if fully set forth herein. 54. It is a violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b) to call a person's cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system. The TCPA also specifically prohibits the use of an unsolicited text messages to advertise the sale of goods and services. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B); 47 58. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-52 as if fully set forth herein. 59. It is a violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(c) to call a person who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 60. Defendant, or some person on its behalf, sent one or more marketing text messages to Plaintiff and others’ cellular telephone numbers when said numbers had been registered on the national do-not-call registry for more than 31 days. 61. Such text messages were sent without Plaintiff’s or the class members’ express written consent. 62. Defendant's text messages were negligently placed, or alternatively, willfully placed despite prior knowledge of the TCPA. 63. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of herself and the class and against Defendant that provides the following relief: (A) Statutory damages of $500 per violation, and up to $1,500 per violation if proven to be willful; (B) A permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant from violating the TCPA in the future through calling cell phones registered with the national do-not-call registry; (C) A declaration that Defendant made calls to numbers registered with the national do-not-call registry, and violated the TCPA in making such calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the class; and (D) Any other relief the Court finds just and proper. VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (THE NO CONSENT TO TEXT CLASS) VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) (THE DNC CLASS)

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23. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated for Defendants’ violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227 (hereinafter “TCPA”). 24. The TCPA prohibits sending a text message solicitation to a cellular telephone using an auto-dialer without the prior express written consent of the called party. 56. Plaintiffs brings this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. 58. Excluded from the Classes are Defendants and any entities in which Defendants have a controlling interest; Defendants’ agents and employees; any Judge and Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judges’ staffs and immediately families, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress. 59. Plaintiffs does not know the exact number of members in the Classes, but a simple internet search of Everalbum reveals hundreds of complaints. 60. Plaintiffs and the Classes have been harmed by the acts of Defendants. 61. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 62. The joinder of all Class Members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. 63. The Classes can be easily ascertained through records maintained by Defendants and/or through phone records maintained by Plaintiff, the Classes, and their wireless carriers. 65. As a person who received a text message from Defendants to his cellular phone using an automatic telephone dialing system without his prior express consent, and whose telephone number was on the “Do-Not-Call” registry, Plaintiffs assert claims that are typical of each putative Class member. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and have no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 67. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide relief is essential to compel Defendants to comply with the TCPA. The interest of class members in prosecuting separate claims is small. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the text messages at issue are all automated and the class members, by definition, did not provide the prior express consent required under the statute to authorize calls to their cellular phones. 68. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 69. Plaintiffs and the Autodialer Class incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 71. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) et seq., Plaintiffs and the Autodialer Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 72. Plaintiffs and the Autodialer Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 73. Plaintiffs and the Autodialer Class incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 74. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) et seq. 75. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and the Autodialer Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 76. Plaintiffs and the Autodialer Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 78. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) et seq., as codified at 47 CFR § 64.1200. 79. Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) are separate, distinct, and cumulative with violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). 80. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) et seq., Plaintiff and the DNC Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 81. Plaintiffs and the DNC Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 82. Plaintiffs and the DNC Class incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 83. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 84. Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) are separate, distinct, and cumulative with violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). 85. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) ET SEQ. (On behalf of the DNC Class) KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) ET SEQ. (On behalf of the Autodialer Class) NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) ET SEQ. (On behalf of the DNC Class) NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) ET SEQ. (On behalf of the Autodialer Class)

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Brief description of cause Unpaid overtime State Statutes

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13. Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendants who worked for Defendants in the years from approximately 2005 until 2015. She worked for Defendants in Colorado. 14. As a condition of her offer of employment from Defendants, Plaintiff, along with every other employee of Defendants, was required to provide personal identifying information including first and last name, address, Social Security number, and to fill out tax forms providing additional confidential information to Defendants. 15. Defendants retains this and other confidential information that is provided, by all current and former employees, on various computer systems. 17. Plaintiff and Defendants’ employees also have an expectation of privacy and confidentiality in their salary information and tax information that is maintained on Defendants’ systems. 18. Defendants employ hundreds of people across three states. As a result, Defendants are well versed in the requirements of confidentiality and obligations to safeguard and not disclose confidential information. 19. On May 2, 2016, Plaintiff received a letter from a “Return Mail Processing Center” in Portland, Oregon. The appearance of the letter and the nature and identity of the sender indicate that the communication was a form letter of the type that is mass produced and distributed in bulk to many recipients. The letter contained a subject line stating, “Notice of Data Breach” and was attached to a document entitled, “Steps You Can Take to Protect Against Identify Theft and Fraud.” 20. The Notice of Data Breach indicates that, on April 8, 2016, Defendants experienced “an incident that may affect the security of your personal information” and describes that Defendants disclosed “2015 IRS Tax Form W-2 information” to cyber-criminals engaged in an email spoofing attack. Before it was determined that the request was fraudulent, Defendants disclosed the Plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ names, home addresses, Social Security numbers, and 2015 compensation data. 21. The Data Breach was not actually detected by Defendants until April 22, 2016, which was14 days after Defendants had disclosed the confidential information of its employees. 23. On information and belief, the improper disclosure of this information affects numerous, perhaps hundreds, of Defendants’ employees, all of whom had their confidential PII disclosed without their authorization or consent. 24. In fact, on information and belief, every employee of Defendants in the year 2015, whether they are a current or former employee, had their information improperly disclosed as a result of the Data Breach. 25. Cyber-attacks of this nature against American corporations are commonplace and foreseeable. 26. Similar computer intrusions occur routinely in which cyber-criminals impersonate a high level executive within the corporation and send “phishing” or “spoofing” emails to employees of a company in which they request either access to confidential and sensitive information, or the transfer of money. 27. These types of attempted intrusions into the computer systems of corporations are commonly referred to as Business E-mail Compromise Scams (“BEC”) and phishing scams. 28. As a result, law enforcement and cyber-security professionals consistently warn corporations about this exact type of cyber threat and provide best practice guidelines and trainings for preventing, detecting, and dealing with cyber-attacks. 30. This information is at heightened risk at or around the April tax filing deadline as cyber-criminals attempt to file for and/or obtain fraudulent tax refund payments. 31. The Federal Bureau of Investigation provides updates and notifications of cyber- security threats including warnings about this exact type of threat. 32. In addition, the United States government and private security research firms widely distribute reports about new types of malicious cyber-security threats that should have put Defendants on notice that they were at risk. 33. Despite these and other warnings and having known or should have known of the potential for cyber-security threats, Defendants failed to maintain reasonable and adequate security measures to safeguard Plaintiff’s and other employees’ PII. 34. Given the recent increase of data breaches aimed at American corporations, Defendants should have adopted, implemented, and maintained security measures to protect their confidential data, including employees’ PII. Instead, Defendants failed to adopt, implement, or maintain the necessary security measures and chose instead to remain at risk for cyber-attacks and implemented only minimal precautions after they learned of the Data Breach. 36. Defendants also failed to maintain or employ reasonable intrusion prevention and detection protocols that would have prevented and immediately detected the breach and disclosure of confidential information as it occurred. 38. As a result of Defendants’ acts and omissions, including its negligent security practices, current and former Defendants employees are subject to an increased and concrete risk of identity theft and tax fraud due to the exposure of their personal and financial information, and they will have spent and will have to continue to spend substantial time and money securing their personal information and accounts and protecting their identities. 39. Defendants’ employees already have been the victim of identity theft and fraudulent tax filing. For example, using the information disclosed by Defendants in the Data Breach, cyber-criminals submitted a fraudulent return the IRS using Plaintiff’s PII. Consequently, Plaintiff’s tax return was rejected for filing by the IRS, her tax refund has been delayed, and she has been forced to take steps to address the harm caused by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in the Data Breach. 40. Identity thieves and cyber-hackers use another’s personal and financial information including the person’s name, address, Social Security number, and financial information, without permission, to commit fraud and other crimes. Identity thieves may commit various types of crimes, from immigration fraud, obtaining a driver’s license or identification card in the victim’s name, using the victim’s information to obtain government benefits, to filing a fraudulent tax return using the victim’s information to obtain refund payments. 42. There is a strong likelihood that current and former Defendants’ employees, are already or will become victims of identity fraud given the breadth of information about them that has been compromised and is now in the hands of cyber-criminals. 43. Javelin Strategy & Research reported in its 2014 Identity Fraud Study that “[d]ata breaches are the greatest risk factor for identity fraud.” In 2013, “one in three consumers who received notification of a data breach became a victim of fraud.” Javelin also found increased instances of fraud other than credit card fraud, including “compromised lines of credit, internet accounts, and e-mail payment accounts such as PayPal.” 44. Defendants’ employees’ will need to monitor their accounts and credit, and will also need to pay for credit monitoring or credit reports to make sure their credit and identity is not harmed by thieves. Individuals whose bank information becomes compromised may have to pay fees to their banks for new debit and credit cards, or have to pay fees to have the cards shipped faster so that they do not have to wait weeks to make purchases on their accounts. These individuals may also lose access to their funds and time and money by spending hours on the phone or in person with banks and credit agencies trying to reverse unauthorized charges, clear up credit issues, order new cards, or deal with the devastating effects of tax fraud. 46. Plaintiff has already expended time, effort, and financial resources to begin to deal with the devastating effects of having her most sensitive information compromised and now in the hands of criminals. 47. The United States government and privacy experts acknowledge that it may take years for identity theft to come to light and be detected, and following the Data Breach, current and former Defendants employees are now at risk for identity theft and tax fraud for the rest of their lives. V. 48. Plaintiff bring this action on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals. 50. As enumerated above, Defendants engaged in common acts, practices and policies that violated the Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks certification of the proposed class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

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11. On June 12, 2018, Bank received, on his residential telephone line, a telephone call (the “First Call”) whose Caller Identification (“Caller ID”) information included a telephone number (the “First Caller ID Number”). 12. The First Caller ID Number was not the actual number from which the First Call was placed. 13. The First Caller ID Number contained the same area code and the same three-digit prefix as the telephone number to which the First Call was placed. 14. The use, by telemarketers, of a fake Caller ID that makes a call appear to be from a nearby location is known as “neighborhood spoofing.” 2 15. The use of the First Caller ID Number constituted neighborhood spoofing. 16. Upon the answering of the First Call, a message was played by an artificial or pre- recorded voice (“a Pre-Recorded Message”) that stated that the call was from “the National Hearing Center.” 17. On June 20, 2018, Bank received, on his residential telephone line, a telephone call (the “Second Call”) whose Caller ID information included a telephone number (the “Second Caller ID Number”). 18. The Second Caller ID Number was not the actual number from which the Second Call was placed. 19. The Second Caller ID Number contained the same area code and the same three-digit prefix as the telephone number to which the Second Call was placed. 20. The use of the Second Caller ID Number constituted neighborhood spoofing. 21. Upon the answering of the Second Call, a Pre-Recorded Message stated that the call was from “the National Hearing Center.” 22. Sirlin has, at all relevant times, done business as the National Hearing Center. 23. Sirlin hired one or more third parties to place thousands of telephone calls that included, and that were materially similar in substance and methodology to, the First Call and the Second Call. 24. On June 22, 2018, Bank received, on his residential telephone line, a telephone call (the “Third Call”) whose Caller ID information included a telephone number (the “Third Caller ID Number”). 25. The Third Caller ID Number was not the actual number from which the Third Call was placed. 3 26. The Third Caller ID Number contained the same area code and the same three-digit prefix as the telephone number to which the Third Call was placed. 27. The use of the Third Caller ID Number constituted neighborhood spoofing. 28. Upon the answering of the Third Call, a Pre-Recorded Message was followed by the playing of a second Pre-Recorded Message that stated that the call was from “Medical Alarms.” 29. Sirlin has, at all relevant times, done business as “Medical Alarms.” 30. Sirlin hired one or more third parties to place thousands of telephone calls that included, and that were materially similar in substance and methodology to, the Third Call. 31. The First Call, the Second Call, the Third Call (“Bank’s Calls”), and the telephone that were materially similar in substance and methodology to Bank’s Calls (collectively, as the “Mass Telemarketing Calls”) were made with equipment that was capable of storing telephone numbers to be called and that was used, either alone or in conjunction with other equipment, to disseminate a pre-recorded message to the telephone numbers that were called without the use of an operator. 32. The Pre-Recorded Messages of the Mass Telemarketing Calls did not state, at their beginning, the full name of the person on whose behalf the calls were placed. 33. The Pre-Recorded Messages of the Mass Telemarketing Calls did not state the address of the person on whose behalf the calls were placed. 34. The Pre-Recorded Messages of the Mass Telemarketing Calls did not state the telephone number of the person on whose behalf the calls were placed. 35. The Mass Telemarketing Calls were made without the prior express written consent of any person who had the legal right to provide such consent. 4 40. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges, and incorporates herein, each and every allegation contained in paragraphs “1” through “35” inclusive of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 41. The placement of the Mass Telemarketing Calls violated 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1). 42. Bank and Members of the Federal Class are entitled to statutory damages of $500 per violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(3)(B). 43. In the event that Defendant willfully or knowingly violated 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1), Bank and the other members of the Federal Class are entitled to up an additional $1,000 per violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Sections 227(b)(3)(C). 44. Bank and the other Members of the Federal Class are entitled to an Order, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(3)(A), enjoining Defendant from violating 47 U.S.C. Section 227(b)(1). 45. Bank repeats and re-alleges, and incorporates herein, each and every allegation contained in paragraphs “1” through “35” inclusive of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 46. The placement of the Mass Telemarketing Calls to New York Class Members violated GBL Section 399-p(3)(a). 47. Bank and the other Members of the New York Class are entitled to statutory damages of $50 pursuant to GBL Section 399-p(9). 48. Bank and the other Members of the New York Class are entitled to an Order, pursuant to GBL Section 399-p(9), enjoining Defendant from violating GBL Section 399-p(3)(a) 49. Bank and the other Members of the New York Class are entitled to reasonable legal fees pursuant to GBL Section 399-p(9). 6 50. Bank brings this action as a Class Action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of all persons to whose residential or cellular telephone one or more Mass Telemarketing Calls were made during the Federal Class Period. 51. Bank brings this action as a Class Action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of all persons to whose residential or cellular telephone one or more Mass Telemarketing Calls were made during the New York Class Period. 52. Bank believes that there are thousands of individuals whose claims are similar to Bank’s claims, and, furthermore, that Bank’s claims are typical of the claims of absent Class Members. Members of each Class have sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s wrongful conduct in the same manner in which Bank has sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 53. Bank will fairly and adequately protect the interests of each Class. Bank has no interests that are antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the Members of the Classes. Indeed, Bank’s interests are, for purposes of this litigation, coincident with the interests of the other Class Members. 54. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Because each of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all Members is impracticable, and because the damages suffered by most of the individual Members of the Classes are too small to render prosecution of the claims asserted herein economically feasible on an individual basis, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impractical for Members of the Classes to adequately address the wrongs complained of herein. Bank knows of no impediments to the effective management of this action as a class action. 55. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions that affect only individual Federal Class Members. Among those questions are: 7 (i) whether Sirlin hired one or more third parties to make telephone calls that violated Section 227(b)(1) of the TCPA; (ii) whether Defendant willfully or knowingly violated Section 227(b)(1) of the TCPA; (iii) whether the Members of the Federal Class are entitled to damages as a result of Defendant’s violations of Section 227(b)(1) of the TCPA, and, if so, how much; and (iv) whether the Members of the Federal Class are entitled to injunctive relief as a result of Defendant’s violations of Section 227(b)(1) of the TCPA. 96. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions that affect only individual New York Class Members. Among those questions are: (i) whether telephone calls were made to residential or cellular telephone lines by, on behalf of, at the direction of, with the approval of, or with the authorization of Defendant using equipment that was capable of storing telephone numbers to be called and that was used, either alone or in conjunction with other equipment, to disseminate a pre-recorded message to the telephone numbers that were called without the use of an operator, wherein the telephone number to which the such calls were made was a New York telephone number, that is, a telephone number having an area code of 212, 315, 347, 516, 518, 585, 607, 632, 656, 716, 718, 845, 914, 917, or 929 (ii) whether Defendant violated GBL Section 399-p(3)(a); (iii) whether the Members of the New York Class are entitled to damages as a result of Defendant’s violations of GBL Section 399-p(3)(a); (iv) whether the Members of the New York Class are entitled to injunctive relief as a result of Defendant’s violations of GBL Section 399-p(3)(a); and (v) whether the Members of the New York Class are entitled to reasonable legal fees as a result of Defendant’s violations of GBL Section 399-p(3)(a). 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20. Commencing no later than September 18, 2016, Plaintiff began receiving unsolicited phone calls to his wireless phone ending in the number -0806, for which Plaintiff provided no consent to call. 38. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 39. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following Classes: Auto-Dialer Class: Any person in the United States who (1) Defendant or its agents placed a call; (2) to that person’s cellular telephone number; (3) through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system as set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(3); and (4) where Defendant has no record of prior express consent for such individual to make such call or where the individual revoked consent, within four years prior to the filing of the Complaint through the date of final approval. Text Message Class: Any person in the United States who (1) Defendant or its agents placed a text message call; (2) to that person’s cellular telephone number; (3) through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system as set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(3); and (4) where Defendant has no record of prior express consent for such individual to make such text message call or where the individual revoked consent, within four years prior to the filing of the Complaint through the date of final approval. 40. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. 41. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 52. Each such telephone call and text message described herein was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. By using such equipment, Defendant was able to in effect make hundreds or thousands of phone calls and/or text messages simultaneously to lists of thousands of consumers’ wireless phone numbers without human intervention. 53. The foregoing acts and omissions by Defendant and its agents constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 56. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above paragraphs 1 through 43 inclusive, of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 57. Each such telephone call and text message was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. By using such equipment, Defendant was able to in effect make hundreds or thousands of phone calls simultaneously to lists of thousands of consumers’ wireless phone numbers without human intervention. 58. The foregoing acts and omissions by Defendant and its agents constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 et seq. 59. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 60. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 61. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 62. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 63. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 64. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 65. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 66. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ.

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16. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23. 18. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 19. Excluded from the Class is Flagstar Bank, its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, any entity in which Flagstar Bank has a controlling interest, all customers who make a timely election to be excluded, governmental entities, and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members. 20. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impractical. The Class consists of thousands of members, the identity of whom is within the knowledge of and can be ascertained only by resort to Flagstar Bank’s records. 22. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class and those common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. 24. Other questions of law and fact common to the Class include: a. The proper method or methods by which to measure damages, and b. The declaratory relief to which the Class is entitled. 26. Plaintiffs are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and have retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of class actions. 27. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the amount of each individual Class member’s claim is small relative to the complexity of the litigation, and due to the financial resources of Flagstar Bank, no Class member could afford to seek legal redress individually for the claims alleged herein. Therefore, absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses and Flagstar Bank’s misconduct will proceed without remedy. 29. Flagstar Bank is in the business of providing its customers with a variety of banking services. One of the services provided by Flagstar Bank for customers who open a checking account is the ability to make electronic withdrawal transactions. For example, a customer has the ability, through an electronic check, to pay a bill online through funds in the customer’s Flagstar Bank checking account. As a result, Flagstar Bank is notified instantaneously when the transaction is processed, and has the option to accept or decline transactions at such time. 30. Based upon information and belief, Flagstar Bank employs sophisticated software to automate its overdraft system. This program maximizes the number of overdrafts, and thus, the amount of overdraft fees charged per customer. 32. Plaintiffs and all members of the Class maintain or maintained a checking account with Flagstar Bank. The terms of Flagstar Bank’s checking accounts are contained in standardized account holder agreements, presented to its customers on a “take it or leave it” basis, drafted and imposed by Flagstar Bank, which was the party of vastly superior bargaining strength, and thus constitute agreements of adhesion. A representative copy of the “Terms and Conditions and Disclosure Guide” (the “Deposit Agreement”), covering customers maintaining accounts in Michigan, which is 37 pages long, single-spaced and in small font, is attached as Exhibit B. 33. The Deposit Agreement states that (“We process checks and similar items second–in the order in which they are received for the business day on which they are processed.” (p. 9, emphasis added). 35. In an effort to maximize overdraft revenue, Flagstar Bank manipulates and reorders debit transactions from highest to lowest during given periods of time. Flagstar Bank’s reorders transactions for no reason other than to increase the number of exorbitant overdraft fees it can charge. This practice violates numerous consumer protection laws and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Flagstar Bank Deposit Agreement. 36. In addition, Flagstar Bank misleads its customers regarding its reordering practices. Instead of unequivocally telling its customers that it will reorder debits from highest to lowest, the Bank states in its contract that they process checks in the order in which they are received for the business day on which they are processed. This statement is deceptive and/or unfair because it is, in fact, Flagstar Bank’s practice to always reorder debits from highest to lowest. Flagstar Bank’s practices thus violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Bank Deposit Agreement as well as the consumer protection laws of Michigan. 38. Notwithstanding the instantaneous nature of these electronic debit transactions, under Flagstar Bank’s posting system, it fails to post charges in the order in which they are assessed or received. Flagstar Bank developed a policy and employs a practice whereby account charges and debits are posted to its customers’ accounts out of chronological order for the sole purpose of maximizing the number of overdraft transactions and, therefore, the amount of overdraft fees charged to its customers. 39. Instead of processing such transactions in chronological order, Flagstar Bank processes them starting with the largest debit and ending with the smallest debit, so as to generate the largest possible number of overdrafts and the greatest possible amount of overdraft fees. 41. Flagstar Bank’s policy and practice of posting charges from largest to smallest, rather than chronologically, or from smallest to largest, is specifically designed to maximize the generation of overdraft fees by triggering overdraft fees for account charges that would not otherwise result in such fees. 42. Flagstar Bank enforces an unconscionable policy whereby charges assessed are posted to customers’ accounts in a non-chronological order, from highest to lowest, and are held for multiple days and then batched together, to maximize the number of overdraft transactions and fees. Flagstar Bank’s processing practices substantially increase the likelihood that customers’ smaller charges will result in multiple overdraft fees. The practices provide Flagstar Bank with substantially higher service fee revenues than it would otherwise achieve absent these practices. 44. Flagstar Bank actively promotes the convenience of its electronic debiting, but fails to provide customers with accurate balance information. When customers execute account transactions, they generally do not have access to an accurate balance register or balance information. 45. Flagstar Bank provides inaccurate balance information to its customers through its electronic network. In certain cases, Flagstar Bank informs its customers that they have a positive balance when, in reality, they have a negative balance, despite the Bank’s actual knowledge of outstanding debits and transactions. 46. Even when Flagstar Bank has actual knowledge of outstanding transactions which have already created a negative balance in a customer’s account, it encourages the customer to incur more overdraft charges by approving— rather than prudently declining— subsequent debit card purchases and other electronic transactions. 48. At the time its electronic checks are used, Flagstar Bank is able to determine, almost instantaneously, whether there are sufficient funds in a customer’s account to cover that particular transaction. The Bank has the technological capability to decline transactions (which it does when a pending transaction would exceed a pre- determined, overdraft tolerance limit for the account), or notify customers at that very moment that the particular debit transaction would result in an overdraft. Flagstar Bank could give customers the option to decline the transaction to avoid incurring the overdraft fee, but it does not do so because it seeks to maximize the amount of revenue generated through its assessment of overdraft fees. 50. Flagstar Bank fails to make Plaintiffs and Class members aware that they can opt out of its overdraft scheme upon request, thereby avoiding any overdraft fees from being charged. F. Flagstar Bank’s Overdraft Policies and Practices Are Contrary to Best Practices 51. By engaging in the conduct described herein, Flagstar Bank has failed to follow the list of “best practices” for overdraft programs set forth in the “Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs” (“Joint Guidance”) issued by the United States Department of the Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration (collectively, the “Agencies”). A copy of the Joint Guidance is attached as Exhibit C. These “best practice” recommendations include: “Provide election or opt-out of service. Obtain affirmative consent of consumers to receive overdraft protection. Alternatively, where overdraft protection is automatically provided, permit consumers to ‘opt-out’ of the overdraft program and provide a clear consumer disclosure of this option.” 70 F.R. 9127-01, 9132. 53. The Joint Guidance also advises banks to “[a]lert customers before a transaction triggers any fees. When consumers attempt to withdraw or transfer funds made available through an overdraft protection program, provide a specific consumer notice, where feasible, that completing the withdrawal may trigger the overdraft fees.” 70 F.R.D. 9127, 9132. The Joint Guidance further advises that “[t]his notice should be presented in a manner that permits consumers to cancel the attempted withdrawal or transfer after receiving the notice.” Id. 54. Similarly, the list of “best practices” recommended in “Overdraft Protection: A Guide for Bankers,” issued by the American Bankers Association, includes offering customers the option of “opting out” of any overdraft programs, and informing customers, before they access funds, that a particular transaction will cause them to incur an overdraft fee. A copy of “Overdraft Protection: A Guide for Bankers” is attached as Exhibit D. 57. Flagstar Bank’s wrongful overdraft policies and practices described above harmed Plaintiffs and members of the Class. The following allegations regarding certain of the named plaintiffs are made for purposes of illustrating the harm and damage sustained by Plaintiffs and members of the Class as a result of Flagstar Bank’s wrongful overdraft policies and practices. 58. Plaintiff James Lossia Jr. is a current or former checking account customer of Flagstar Bank. 59. On or about March 2, 2015, Mr. Lossia had a balance in his Flagstar Bank Checking account of approximately $3,925.99. Mr. Lossia attempted to make the following electronic check debit transactions from his account on the same day in the following order: (1) $100.00 to DISCOVER DC PYMNTS DCIINTNET (2) $185.71 to BARCLAYCARD US - CREDITCARD (3) $200.00 to DISCOVER DC PYMNTS DCIINTNET (4) $200.00 to CHASE - EPAY. 87. Plaintiffs and Flagstar Bank have contracted for bank account deposit, checking, ATM and debit card services, as embodied in Flagstar Bank’s Deposit Agreement and related documentation. 88. Under the laws of Michigan, where Flagstar Bank does business, good faith is an element of every contract pertaining to the assessment of overdraft fees. Whether by common law or statute, all such contracts impose upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Good faith and fair dealing, in connection with executing contracts and discharging performance and other duties according to their terms, means preserving the spirit—not merely the letter—of the bargain. Put differently, the parties to a contract are mutually obligated to comply with the substance of their contract in addition to its form. Evading the spirit of the bargain and abusing the power to specify terms constitute examples of bad faith in the performance of contracts. 90. Flagstar Bank has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Deposit Agreement through its overdraft policies and practices as alleged herein. 91. Plaintiffs and the Class have performed all, or substantially all, of the obligations imposed on them under the Deposit Agreement. 92. Plaintiffs and members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of Flagstar Bank’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 93. Plaintiffs repeat paragraphs 1 through 92 above. 95. Considering the great business acumen and experience of Flagstar Bank in relation to Plaintiffs and the Class, the great disparity in the parties’ relative bargaining power, the inconspicuousness and incomprehensibility of the contract language at issue, the oppressiveness of the terms, the commercial unreasonableness of the contract terms, the purpose and effect of the terms, the allocation of the risks between the parties, and similar public policy concerns, these provisions are unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable as a matter of law. 96. The imposition of overdraft charges which exceed the amount overdrawn (e.g., the imposition of a $36 charge on an overdraft of less than $36) is itself unconscionable. Such charges are not reasonably related to the Bank’s cost of covering the overdraft and/or its risk of nonpayment (where the Bank pays the overdraft), or to the Bank’s cost of returning the item unpaid (where the Bank does not pay the overdraft). 97. Plaintiffs and members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of Flagstar Bank’s unconscionable policies and practices as alleged herein. 98. Plaintiffs repeat paragraphs 1 through 97 above. A. Flagstar Bank Breach of Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Unconscionability

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(As to all Defendants) 13. Plaintiff brings two actions pursuant to Rules 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and Rule 23(c)(4)(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated individuals admitted to the custody of the Allegheny County Jail during the proposed class period. 14. Class Definition—Class I: the first Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows: All detainees in the custody of the Allegheny County Jail who were held in housing units where correctional officers of the opposite sex were assigned to posts within open view of unclothed detainees, including, but not limited to: when detainees were using the restroom, showering, or changing clothes. The class period commences on December 18, 2018 and extends to the date on which Allegheny County is enjoined from, or otherwise ceases, enforcing its policy, practice, and custom of assigning correctional officers to posts within open view of unclothed detainees of the opposite sex. Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendants and any and all of their respective affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, employees, or assignees. 16. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a Class Action under Federal Law and satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of maintaining a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 17. The members of the Classes are so numerous as to render joinder impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are thousands of citizens who are held in custody at the Allegheny County Jail every month—most, if not all, of whom are members of the Proposed Class. Upon information and belief, the size of each of the Proposed Classes totals at least tens of thousands of individuals, some of whom have had their civil rights violated on multiple occasions. 18. Upon information and belief, joinder of all of these individuals is impracticable because of the large number of Class Members and the fact that Class Members are likely dispersed over a large geographical area, with some members presently residing outside of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and this Judicial District. Furthermore, upon information and belief, many members of the Classes are low-income persons, may not speak English, and likely would have great difficulty in pursuing their rights individually. 20. Plaintiff Bianca Morris’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff Bianca Morris and all members of the Classes sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ course of conduct. The harms suffered by Plaintiff Bianca Morris are typical of the harms suffered by the members of the Classes. 21. The representative Plaintiff, Ms. Morris, has the requisite personal interest in the outcome of the action and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff Bianca Morris has no interests that are adverse to the interests of the members of the Class. 22. Plaintiff Bianca Morris has retained counsel with substantial experience in the prosecution of class action and civil rights litigation, including successful litigation of civil rights cases. Plaintiff’s counsel has the resources, expertise, and experience to successfully prosecute this action against Defendants. Counsel for the Plaintiff knows of no conflicts among the members of the Classes or between counsel and members of the Classes. 23. This action, in part, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. As such, the Plaintiff seeks Class Certifications under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), in that all Members of the Proposed Class were subjected to the same policies and actions of the Defendants. In short, Defendants acted on the grounds generally applicable to all members of the Class. 25. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions that affect only individual members of the class. These common questions include: (1) whether Defendants’ written and/or de facto policy of assigning correctional officers of the opposite sex to posts where they continually view detainees in the nude is unconstitutional, and whether such written and/or de facto policies existed during the Class period, and (2) whether Defendants’ written and/or de facto policy of assigning correctional officers of the opposite sex to posts where they view detainees in the nude while detainees are being strip searched is unconstitutional, and whether such written and/or de facto policies existed during the Class period. 26. A Class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all of the individual members of the Class is impracticable given the large number of members of the Class and the fact they are dispersed over a large geographical area. Furthermore, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the class to redress the wrongs done to them. The cost to the federal court system of adjudicating thousands of individual cases would be enormous. Individualized litigation also would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a Class Action in this District presents far fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and the court system, and protects the rights of each member of the Classes. 28. In the alternative to certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Plaintiff also seeks partial certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 29. In the Allegheny County Jail, detainees are housed in six separate pods or cell blocks. 30. The pods within the Allegheny County Jail are typically single-gender. 31. Within the pods are large areas for detainees to congregate during the day, often referred as dayrooms. 32. On the perimeter of the dayrooms are rows of cells for the detainees to be housed. 33. Each cell typically houses two detainees. Within each cell is a toilet and sink. The toilet is freestanding with no barrier for privacy. 34. The door to the cell is solid metal with a window into the cell. 35. During times that detainees must be confined to their cells, correctional officers must make rounds to ensure that the detainees are in their cells. 36. Routinely, correctional officers of the opposite sex are assigned to posts where they are required to look into each cell to take count. 37. Accordingly, correctional officers of the opposite sex often observe detainees in states of undress in their cells while the detainees are using the restroom or changing clothes. 39. The Defendants do not have a policy of announcing when a correctional officer of the opposite sex is approaching the detainees’ cell, thus preventing the detainees to cover up their genitals and/or breasts. 40. The Plaintiff acknowledges that taking count of detainees when they are in their cells is important and necessary. It is unnecessary, however, for detainees, such as the Plaintiff and members of the proposed classes, to have their genitals and/or breasts exposed to correctional officers of the opposite sex while the detainees are using the restroom, changing their clothes, and/or showering. This policy, pattern and/or custom of the Defendants is unconstitutional and unnecessary. 41. Upon information and belief, Defendants instituted a written and/or de facto policy, custom, or practice of posting correctional officers of the opposite sex to posts where they viewed detainees in the nude. Upon information and belief, Defendants did not have a policy, custom, or practice of ordering the correctional officers of the opposite sex from announcing themselves before they approached the detainees in states of nudity. 42. Defendants’ policies, practices, and customs, as addressed above, are both offensive and absurd considering the important privacy interests that detainees hold as it relates to their naked bodies. 44. As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to correctional officers of the opposite gender pursuant to these written and/or de facto policies, the victims of the unlawful practices—each member of the Classes, including Plaintiff—has suffered or will suffer psychological pain, humiliation, and mental anguish. Fact Applicable to the Class Allegation II 45. Oftentimes, in the Allegheny County Jail, detainees are strip searched to check for contraband. 46. During strip searches, the detainees remove all of their clothing and correctional officers check under the detainees’ feet and armpits, between their buttocks, and around their genitals. Men are required to lift their testicles, and women are required to lift their breasts. 47. Due to the extremely intrusive nature of strip searches, strip searches should be held in a secluded area and conducted by a correctional officer of the same gender as the detainee. 48. However, the Allegheny County Jail routinely conducts strip searches of detainees in an open area with correctional officers of the opposite sex nearby and observing the detainees in the nude as their bodies, including their cavities, are being examined. 49. The Defendants do not have a policy that requires correctional officers of the same sex as the detainees to be assigned to posts where strip searches are being conducted within visibility. 50. The Defendants do not have a policy that prohibits strip searches from being conducted in open areas where correctional officers of the opposite sex may inadvertently be in. 52. The Plaintiff acknowledges that conducting strip searches to check for contraband is important and necessary. It is unnecessary, however, for detainees, such as the Plaintiff and members of the proposed classes, to be strip searched in the presence of correctional officers of the opposite sex. 53. Upon information and belief, Defendants instituted a written and/or de facto policy, custom, or practice of posting correctional officers of the opposite sex to posts where they viewed detainees being strip searched. Upon information and belief, Defendants had a policy, custom, or practice of permitting strip searches in open areas where correctional officers of the opposite sex may inadvertently be. 54. Defendants’ policies, practices, and customs, as addressed above, are both offensive and absurd considering the important privacy interests that detainees hold as it relates to their naked bodies. 55. Pursuant to these written and/or de facto policies, each member of the Classes, including Plaintiff, were exposed to correctional officers of the opposite sex while in stages of undress. Conducting strip searches in this way is unreasonable, as there is no justification for detainees to have their nude bodies exposed to correctional officers of the opposite sex. 56. As a direct and proximate result of being exposed to correctional officers of the opposite gender pursuant to these written and/or de facto policies, the victims of the unlawful practices—each member of the Classes, including Plaintiff—has suffered or will suffer psychological pain, humiliation, and mental anguish. Facts Specific to Plaintiff Bianca Morris 58. All of Ms. Morris’ charges were later dismissed. 59. Over the four months when Ms. Morris was held at the Allegheny County Jail, Ms. Morris was strip searched numerous times. 60. Often times when Ms. Morris was strip searched, she was not in a secluded area. Further, while Ms. Morris was always strip searched by a female correctional officer, male correctional officers were often mere feet away, observing the strip search being conducted and saw her naked body being examined. 61. Additionally, while being housed in her all female pod, Ms. Morris was observed by male correctional officers while she was using the toilet. 62. Specifically, Ms. Morris was housed in a pod with other female detainees. 63. Male correctional officers were posted within the all-female pod. 64. When Ms. Morris and other detainees were required to be locked in their cells, male correctional officers were assigned to look through the women’s cell windows to take count. 65. As it follows, Ms. Morris genitals, buttocks, and breasts were viewed by correctional officers while she was in her cell utilizing the toilet and changing clothes. 66. The male correctional officers assigned to take count of the female detainees and look into the females’ cells did not alert the women that they were approaching; therefore, the women could not cover up their naked bodies before the male correctional officers looked into their cells. 68. Defendants’ conduct of monitoring pretrial detainees of the opposite sex while using the toilet and being strip searched constitutes an unreasonable search of pretrial detainees in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further, Defendants’ conduct constitutes an invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy. 69. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful strip searches conducted pursuant to a written and/or de facto policy, Plaintiff has suffered psychological pain, humiliation, and mental anguish. 70. The averments of the previous paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 71. Section 1983 provides that: “every person who, under color of [law] of any State. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights. . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 72. Actions against state officials seeking redress for violations of constitutional rights may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 73. Pretrial detainees, including Plaintiff, are “persons” within the meaning of 42 85. The averments of the previous paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 86. Section 1983 provides that: “every person who, under color of [law] of any State. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights. . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 87. Actions against state officials seeking redress for violations of constitutional rights may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 88. Pretrial detainees, including Plaintiff, are “persons” within the meaning of 42 Fact Applicable to the Class Allegation I HARPER individually and in his official capacity as Warden of the Allegheny County Jail, DAVID ZETWO, individually and in his official capacity as Chief Deputy Warden of the Allegheny County Jail, and SIMON WAINWRIGHT, individually and as Deputy Warden of the Allegheny County Jail, Defendants. PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (As to all Defendants)

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VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: t 375 Falsc Clains Act O 400 StateReapportionment D 410 Antitrust O 430 Banks md Bmking ú 450 Commerce ú 460 Deportation t 470 Raoketeer Inlluenced md Conupt Orgiliätions I 480 Consumer C¡edit 0 490Cable/SatTV O S5oSecuritieVComoditiel Exchange f, 890 Other Statutory Actions D 891 Agricultural Acts D 893 Environrnental Matt€rs O 895 Freedom of tnfomation Act 0 896 Arbit¡"¿tion 0 899 Aúninistrative Præedure Act/Review oÌ Appcal of Agenry Decision O 950 Constihrtionality of State Slatutes V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in one Box only) El Original f 2 Removedfronr Proceeding State Court 0 3 Remanded from Appellate Court Brief description of cause:

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10. MTA NYC Transit administers 24 subway lines with 468 stations within Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens, as well as the Staten Island Railway and the New York City buses. 11. Within the last three years and continuing to date, while working in the position of administrative staff analyst on behalf of defendant, plaintiff’s job duties include meeting with employees to gather information about their job duties and completing paperwork about the meetings, preparing notices of examination for civil service jobs, ensuring all paperwork is completed correctly, and formatting and proofreading examinations for civil service jobs. 12. Within the last three years and continuing to date, plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, have been scheduled by defendant to work 12-hour shifts on Saturdays six or seven times each year. 13. During the weeks that he has been scheduled to work 12-hour shifts on Saturdays, plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, have been scheduled to work, and have actually worked, at minimum of 47 hours. 14. During the weeks that plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, have been scheduled to work 47 or more hours, due to Saturday shifts, defendant MTA New York City Transit has paid plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, straight time for all hours worked in excess of 40 during the workweek, instead of time-and-a-half. 5. Plaintiff is, and at all times material herein has been, employed by MTA New York City Transit, in the position of “Administrative Staff Analyst (Non-Manager).” Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated analysts who work or have worked for defendant at all times material herein. 6. Plaintiff brings this action for a declaratory judgment, back pay, and other relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to remedy the defendant’s willful and unlawful violations of federal law complained of herein. 7. Plaintiff, while employed by defendant, has been at all material times an “employee” within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 8. Defendant MTA New York City Transit, among other things, is a juridical entity amenable to suit under the FLSA in that it is, and was at all times material hereto, a public agency within the meaning of Section 3(x) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(x). 9. Defendant MTA New York City Transit a public benefit corporation pursuant to N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 1200 et seq. MTA New York City Transit has a principal office and place of business located at 130 Livingston Plaza, Brooklyn, NY 11201. 3 FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT FLSA OVERTIME BE PAID AT THE RATE OF ONE AND ONE-HALF TIMES THE PLAINTIFF’S REGULAR RATES OF PAY AND INSTEAD COMPENSATING PLAINTIFF WITH

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13. On or about August 31, 2016, Synchrony mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding an alleged debt owed to Synchrony. A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A. 15. Exhibit A states: 16. Exhibit A states that September 15, 2016 is the last day for payment and if Plaintiff pays by this date, she "may continue with the contract as though [she was] not late." 17. On or about September 8, 2016, Synchrony mailed another debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding the same alleged debt owed to Synchrony. A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit B. 18. Upon information and belief, Exhibit B is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 19. Exhibit B states: 20. On or about September 29, 2016, Central Credit Services, LLC ("CCS") mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding the same alleged debt owed to Synchrony, referred to in Exhibit A. A copy of this letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit C. 21. Exhibit C was the first letter that CCS sent to Plaintiff with respect to Plaintiff’s alleged Synchrony debt. 23. Exhibit C states: 24. Exhibit C also states: 25. Exhibit C, thus, represents that the debt had been accelerated and the full balance is now due. 26. Despite Exhibit A’s statement that September 15, 2016 was the last day for payment to cure default and "continue with the contract as though you were not late," and despite Synchrony’s and CCS’s representations that the debt had been placed with CCS for collection (Exhibit C) and that the debt had been accelerated and the full balance was now due, on or around September 27, 2016, Synchrony sent Plaintiff an account statement for the same account, demanding a minimum payment of $344.00. A copy of this statement is attached to this complaint as Exhibit D. 27. Synchrony’s representation in Exhibit A that the last day for payment to cure default is September 15, 2016 in order to continue with the contract as though Plaintiff was not late is false and misleading, especially when the consumer is subsequently presented with account statements requesting minimum payments lower than the total balance (Exhibit D). 28. The unsophisticated consumer cannot determine whether the debt had been accelerated or not, or how much debt is actually due. Exhibit C seeks the entire amount of the debt, $2021.00, but Exhibit D seeks only $344.00. 30. Upon information and belief, CCS and Synchrony work in a scripted process to collect Synchrony debts such as Plaintiff’s. 31. Upon information and belief, CCS is fully aware of the contents and representations in Exhibit A, 32. Upon information and belief, CCS is fully aware that Synchrony sends Exhibit A to consumers approximately one month before CCS mails a letter in the form of Exhibit C. 33. Upon information and belief, CCS is fully aware that Synchrony continues to send statements to consumers seeking a “minimum payment” and not representing that the entire balance is due. 34. Plaintiff was confused by Exhibits A-D. 35. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused by Exhibits A-D. 36. Plaintiff had to spend time and money investigating Exhibits A-D. 37. Plaintiff had to take time to obtain and meet with counsel, including traveling to counsel’s office by car and its related expenses, including but not limited to the cost of gasoline and mileage, to advise Plaintiff on the consequences of Exhibits A-D. 38. The FDCPA presumes that violations cause injury to consumers. Congress authorized an award of statutory damages for violations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). 40. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 41. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(a) specifically prohibits “The false representation of – the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 43. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) requires: (a) Notice of debt; contents Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing— (1) the amount of the debt; 44. The FDCPA requires the debt collector to state the amount due on the date the collection letter is sent, “without “obscur[ing] it by adding confusing other information (or misinformation).” Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 875-76 (7th Cir. 2000); Marshall-Mosby v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 2000); Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997). 45. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j) states that a debt collector may not: “Claim, or attempt or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge or reason to know that the right does not exist.” 47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 48. This claim is brought against Defendant CCS. 49. CCS represented to Plaintiff and class members that their Synchrony accounts had been accelerated by seeking to collect the entire balance and not just the amount actually due. 50. Prior to sending Exhibit C, which demands payment of the balance of the PayPal credit account, CCS was aware that Synchrony would continue to send statements seeking a “minimum payment” lower than the balance. 51. At the time it sent Exhibit C to the class, CCS knew that Synchrony would continue to send class members account statements seeking a “minimum payment” lower than the account balance. 52. CCS made false, misleading and confusing representations about the amount of the debt. 53. CCS’s conduct violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692g and 1692g(a). 54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. This claim is brought against both defendants. 56. Original creditors, including Synchrony, are debt collectors under the WCA. Wis. Stat. § 427.103; Hartman, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. 57. In Exhibit C, CCS represented to Plaintiff and class members that their Synchrony accounts had been accelerated so that the entire balance was due. 58. In fact, when CCS sent Exhibit C, CCS and Synchrony both knew that Synchrony would continue to send class members account statements seeking a minimum payment of less than the entire balance. 59. CCS’s and Synchrony’s conduct violates the Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wis. Stat. §§ 427.104(1)(j) and 427.104(1)(L). 60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. This claim is brought against both defendants. 61. Exhibits A and C provide facially conflicting deadlines for payment. 62. CCS’s and Synchrony’s conduct violates the Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wis. Stat. §§ 427.104(1)(h) and 427.104(1)(L). 64. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 65. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether Exhibits A, C and D violate the FDCPA and/or the WCA. 66. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 67. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 68. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a heating and air conditioning servicer that operates AIRE SERV Offices as well as the AIRE SERV website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with its Office. 22. Defendant operates AIRE SERV offices (its “Offices”) across the United States, including its New York Office located at 109 St. Lawrence Avenue, West Brownville, NY 13615. 23. Its Office constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s Office provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including Office locations, including the areas it serves, information pertaining to the heating and air conditioning services it offers, information about its 24/7 emergency service, including the ability to schedule a free estimate, and related goods and services. 25. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Offices. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Offices and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and the ability to schedule a free estimate of Defendant’s physical Offices on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Offices are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Offices. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq.

win

11. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by 47 U.S.C § 153 (39). 12. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 35. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Com- plaint as though fully stated herein. 48. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and mul- tiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 49. As a result of Defendant’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory dam- ages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Com- plaint as though fully stated herein. 52. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and mul- tiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not lim- ited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 53. As a result of Defendant’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 54. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibit- ing such conduct in the future. 56. As a result of Defendant’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 57. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such con- duct in the future. 59. As a result of Defendant’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 60. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such con- duct in the future. 61. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

win

(For Common Law Copyright Infringement Against All Named Defendants and Does 1-10) (For Unfair Competition Against All Named Defendants and Does 1-10) 19. Plaintiff’s Pre-1972 Recordings are the product of a significant investment of time, effort, money and creative talent in creating, manufacturing, advertising, promoting, selling and licensing its recordings. In return, Plaintiff receives revenues, royalties and other compensation from its ongoing licensing and exploitation of these works. 21. CBS provides the Broadcast Service to members of the public in New York and elsewhere, and broadcasts sound recordings through numerous radio stations in New York, including, without limitation, the following: WCBS – 101.1 FM, Classic Hits; WBMP – 92.3 FM, Top 40; and WWFS – 102.7 FM, Adult Contemporary. Among the sound recordings that CBS publicly performs, reproduces and distributes through the Broadcast Service are the Recordings. 22. The Internet Service is provided by CBS to members of the public in New York and elsewhere, and delivers and streams (and licenses others to deliver and stream) music through its stations’ websites, and through smart phones and tablets through its downloadable Android and iOS Apps. Among the sound recordings that CBS publicly performs, reproduces, and distributes through the Internet Service are the Recordings. 23. CBS understands that having a vast and complete range and array of music is critical to the success of any music service, which is why Pre-1972 Recordings constitute a significant part of the Music Service. Through the Internet Service, CBS offers and advertises live radio simulcast, which allows a user to select and listen to the live audio simulcast of hundreds of radio stations throughout the United States, inclusive of radio stations owned by CBS. Many of these radio stations are dedicated to Pre-1972 Recordings. CBS promotes these stations in order to establish and increase its user base, popularity, and revenue. 25. CBS has reproduced, performed, distributed and otherwise exploited via the Music Service the Recordings without Plaintiff’s consent. CBS knows that it does not have any license, right, or authority to reproduce, perform, distribute or otherwise exploit via the Music Service any Pre-1972 Recordings (including the Recordings). CBS also knows which of the recordings its reproduces, performs, distributes or otherwise exploits via the Music Service are Pre-1972 Recordings. 26. CBS’s entire business is built around selling access to music and selling the music. CBS delivers audio advertisements to its users in between songs and displays (through the Internet Service, including mobile apps) visual ads while music is playing. 27. Although a significant portion of CBS’s revenue earned in 2014 is attributable to Pre-72 Recordings, and though CBS capitalizes on its customers’ desire to listen to these recordings, CBS has not licensed from Plaintiff or paid to Plaintiff any royalties or other compensation. 28. By its conduct, CBS deprives Plaintiff and the Class of the revenues to which it and membes of the Class are entitled. CBS’s refusal to pay for its continued use of Pre-72 Recordings directly contravenes New York law and policy, which always have provided equal, if not greater, rights to owners of sound recordings than the federal Copyright Act. 30. This broad protection afforded to Pre-72 Recordings is consistent with the recognition by New York courts of critical, important public policy interests in providing strong state law protection for sound recordings. These interests include ensuring that record companies receive compensation from their substantial expenditure of effort, skill and money in creating, marketing and exploiting recorded performances, as well as ensuring that the owners of sound recordings possess adequate remedies against those who misappropriate and profit from such performances. New York’s protections for sound recordings thus are complete, providing exclusive ownership and rights in Pre-72 Recordings that are not limited in any way, and that include any conduct by which individuals or entities seek to unfairly compete and profit from the skill and labor of Plaintiff by appropriating and exploiting Pre-72 Recordings for their own benefit, including by unauthorized and unlicensed reproduction and public performance of these recordings. 31. The need for effective state law protection of Pre-72 Recordings is especially great today. Pre-72 Recordings comprise a significant and important share of the overall body of existing musical recordings, and include some of the most popular and valued recordings in history. 32. To address the anticipated shift in music consumption habits and the rise of digital radio services and, therefore, the need to provide federal protection for the performance of copyrighted sound recordings, Congress passed the Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act (“DPRA”), granting owners of post-72 copyrighted sound recordings the right to “perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). 34. Plaintiff brings this class action on its own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated owners of Pre-1972 Recordings (the “Class” or “Class Members”) to put an end to CBS’s wholesale infringement and misappropriation of their Pre-1972 Recordings and to obtain damages, including punitive damages, and injunctive relief. Simply stated, CBS has disregarded Plaintiff and the Class’s exclusive ownership of their Pre-1972 Recordings in New York, impaired their ability to sell, lawfully exploit, or otherwise control their Pre-1972 Recordings as permitted under New York law and misappropriated same for its own financial gain. CBS’s conduct is causing, and will continue to cause, enormous and irreparable harm to Plaintiff and the Class unless compensatory and punitive damages are awarded against CBS and it is enjoined and restrained from engaging in further infringement and misappropriation of the Pre-1972 Recordings. 35. Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of itself individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated owners of Pre-1972 recordings, which recordings were reproduced, performed, distributed or otherwise exploited by CBS via the Music Service in New York. The proposed Class is comprised of and defined as follows: All owners of sound recordings of musical performances that initially were “fixed” (i.e., recorded) prior to February 15, 1972, which sound recordings were reproduced, performed, distributed and/or otherwise exploited by CBS via any form or method of delivery or storage (e.g., terrestrial broadcast, Internet, computer, server, etc.) in New York (the “Class”). 37. The Class for whose benefit this action is brought is so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members of the Class whose identity can be readily ascertained from third party, music industry sources and from CBS’s database files and records. Therefore, the Class can be readily located and notified of this action. 38. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, and Plaintiff’s interests are consistent with and not antagonistic to those of the Class it seeks to represent. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have sustained actual pecuniary loss and face irreparable harm arising out of CBS’s continued course of conduct as complained of herein. 39. Plaintiff does not have any interests that are adverse to, or which conflict with, the interests of the absent members of the Class and it is able to fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of such Class. Plaintiff has raised viable statutory, misappropriation, unfair business practices, and conversion claims of the type reasonably expected to be raised by members of the Class, and will vigorously pursue those claims. Plaintiff is represented by experienced, qualified and competent counsel, who are experienced in complex commercial litigation, class action procedures, and the legal subject matter of this dispute. Plaintiff and its counsel are committed to prosecuting this action vigorously. 42. Defendants have engaged in common law copyright infringement and unfair competition, which has affected all members of the Class such that final and injunctive relief on behalf of the Class as a whole is efficient and appropriate. 43. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 42, above, as though set forth in full herein. 44. The Pre-1972 Recordings are unique intellectual property subject to common law copyright protection under the law of the State of New York. 45. As the owners of valid common law copyrights or exclusive licensees in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, Plaintiff and the Class possess the exclusive rights to reproduce, perform, distribute or otherwise exploit the Pre-1972 Recordings, and license, or refrain from licensing, others to do so. 46. Plaintiff and the Class have not authorized or licensed Defendants to reproduce, perform, distribute or otherwise exploit the Pre-1972 Recordings in any manner. 47. The distribution, reproduction, performance or other exploitation by Defendants of unauthorized copies of the Pre-1972 Recordings, including, without limitation, those listed in Schedule A, constitute infringement of Plaintiff and the Class’s common law copyrights in such recordings and violation of their exclusive rights therein. Plaintiff and the Class have invested substantial time and money in the development of their Pre-1972 Recordings. 49. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendants’ copyright infringement of the Pre-1972 Recordings, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in an amount that is not as yet fully ascertained but which Plaintiff is informed and believes, and alleges thereon, exceeds $5,000,000, according to proof. 50. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and alleges thereon, that in engaging in the conduct described above, Defendants acted with oppression, fraud and/or malice. Defendants’s conduct has been despicable and undertaken in conscious disregard of Plaintiff and the Class’s rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of punitive damages against Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish and make an example of them, according to proof. 51. Defendants’ conduct is causing, and unless enjoined and restrained by this Court, will continue to cause, Plaintiff and the Class great and irreparable injury that cannot fully be compensated or measured in money, and for which Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctions, prohibiting further violation of Plaintiff and the Class’s rights in and exclusive ownership of their Pre-1972 Recordings in New York. 52. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 42, above, as though set forth herein. 53. Plaintiff and the Class’s Pre-1972 Recordings are valuable assets to them. Plaintiff is engaged in the selling and licensing of all forms of distribution, reproduction, performance or other exploitation of its Pre-1972 Recordings, including, without limitation, by selling physical compact discs and digital Phonorecord deliveries and licensing the master use in audio-visual recordings, such as movies and commercials. From inception, such Pre-1972 Recordings have generated for Plaintiff millions of dollars in revenues from such selling and licensing activities. 55. Defendants have not paid anything to Plaintiff or the Class for distributing, reproducing and performing the Pre-1972 Recordings. Without expending any time, labor or money of its own, Defendants have simply appropriated the commercial qualities, reputation and salable properties of the Pre-1972 Recordings, including, without limitation those recordings listed on Schedule A, by unfairly and directly competing with Plaintiff and the Class’s use, sale, distribution and exploitation of the Pre-1972 Recordings. In so doing, Defendants have undermined Plaintiff and the Class’s substantial creative and financial investment for Defendants’ own commercial benefit. 56. Defendants have usurped for themselves the fruits of Plaintiff and the Class’s financial and creative investments. Defendants are profiting from the results of Plaintiff and the Class’s expenditures and skill without having to incur any expense or risk of its own in relation to the Pre-1972 Recordings. Furthermore, Defendants’ unauthorized use of the Pre-1972 Recordings is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or connection between Plaintiff and the Class, and Defendants. 58. Defendants’ acts constitute a misappropriation of Plaintiff and the Class’s property and rights in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, and constitute misappropriation and unfair competition under New York law. 59. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ misappropriation and unfair competition, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover all proceeds and other compensation received or to be received by Defendants from their misappropriation and unfair competition of the Pre-1972 Recordings. Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged, and Defendants have been unjustly enriched, in an amount that is not as yet fully ascertained but which Plaintiff is informed and believes, and alleges thereon, exceeds $5,000,000, according to proof at trial. Such damages and/or restitution and disgorgement should include a declaration by this Court that Defendants are constructive trustees for the benefit of Plaintiff and the Class, and an order that Defendants convey to Plaintiff and the Class the gross receipts received or to be received that are attributable to Defendants misappropriation of the Pre-1972 Recordings. 60. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and alleges thereon, that by engaging in the conduct as described above, Defendants acted with oppression, fraud and/or malice. Defendants’ conduct has been despicable and undertaken in conscious disregard of Plaintiff and the Class’s rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of punitive damages against Defendants, and each of them, in an amount sufficient to punish and make an example of them according to proof at trial.

lose

Defendants’ Sta tus As an “Employer” (FLSA Overtime Violations) (Ohio Overtime Violations) (Ohio Class) 11. At all times relevant, Defendant Family First Caregivers, LLC (“Defendant Family First”) was an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), and corresponding provisions of Ohio law including the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 12. At all times relevant, Defendant Jim Nowak was an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), and corresponding provisions of Ohio law including the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 13. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendant Nowak had significant ownership interest in Defendant Family First. 14. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendant Nowak had significant operational control of all or at least significant aspects of the day-to-day operations of Defendant Family First. 15. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendant Nowak personally made decisions wi th regards to significant aspects of the day-to-day functions of Defendant Family First. 16. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendant Nowak, in addition to Defendant Family First, had the authority to hire and fire employees, including Plaintiff. 17. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendant Nowak, in addition to Defendant Family First, was responsible for maintaining employment records. 18. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendant Nowak, in addition to Defendant, Family First, determined the rate and method of Plaintiff’s wages. 4 19. During all times material to this Complaint, Defendant Family First functioned largely for the profit of Defendant Nowak. 20. Defendants’ non-exempt employees included Plaintiff, the Potential Opt- Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and all members of the Ohio Class. At all times relevant, Defendants were an enterprise within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), and an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). Non-Exempt Employees’ 21. Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and all members of the Ohio Class are current or former non-exempt employees of Defendants who were paid on an hourly basis and not paid overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in one workweek. 22. Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and the members of the Ohio Class frequently worked more than forty (40) hours in a single workweek, many times in excess of ten per day, entitling them to overtime compensation under the FLSA and Ohio wage-and-hour statutes. Defendants’ Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation 23. The FLSA, and Ohio law required Defendants to pay overtime compensation to its Home Health Aids. 24. Defendants unlawfully failed to pay overtime compensation to its Home Health Aids. 25. Defendants knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class was entitled to overtime pay under state and/or federal 5 law. 26. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 27. Plaintiff brings this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability “prescribed by the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer … by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 28. The Potential Opt-Ins who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff with respect to Defendants’ FLSA violations consist of: All present and former Home Health Aids employed by Defendants during the period three years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who were not paid overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in one workweek. 29. Such persons are “similarly situated” with respect to Defendants’ FLSA violations in that all were non-exempt employees of Defendants, all were subjected to and injured by Defendants’ unlawful practice of failing to pay overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in one, and all have the same claims against Defendants for unpaid overtime compensation as well as for liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 30. Conditional certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that such persons may be sent a Court- authorized notice informing them of the pendency of this action and giving them the opportunity to “opt in.” 31. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of similarly-situated persons but 6 avers, upon information and belief, that they consist of over 40 persons. Such persons are readily identifiable through the payroll records Defendants has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 33. Plaintiff also brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and other members of a class of persons who assert claims under the laws of the State of Ohio (the “Ohio Class”), defined as: All present and former Home Health Aids employed by Defendants during the period t w o years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who were not paid overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in one workweek. 34. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of class members but aver, upon information and belief that it consists of over 40 persons. The number of class members as well as their identities are ascertainable from the payroll records Defendants has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 35. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to: Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other class members all overtime pay due to them? 7 Whether Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and other class members overtime pay due to them in violation of the FLSA and Ohio law was willful? Whether Defendants kept adequate records of the hours worked by Plaintiff and the other class members? 36. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendants, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of other class members. 37. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of other class members. Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action litigation, including wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 38. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendants’ liability to the class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 39. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 8 P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 40. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 41. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on behalf of herself and the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 § 216(b). Plaintiff’s written consent to becoming a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) has been filed with the Court. 42. The FLSA requires that Defendants’ Home Health Aids receive overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 43. Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins should have been paid overtime compensation at the rate of one-half times their “regular rate” for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 44. Defendants failed to pay the overtime compensation to Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins. 45. By engaging in that practice, Defendants willfully violated the FLSA and regulations thereunder that have the force and effect of law. 46. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins were injured in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid overtime compensation” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 9 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the Defendants, and costs of the action.” 47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 48. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, on behalf of herself, the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and all members of the Ohio Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 49. At all times relevant, Defendants was an employer covered by the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 50. Defendants violated the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, by failing to pay overtime compensation to its Home Health Aids. 51. Defendants’ violations of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03 injured Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins, and the Ohio Class members in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to that statute. 52. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.10(A) provides that Defendants, having violated § 4111.03, is “liable to the employee[s] affected for the full amount of the overtime wage rate, less any amount actually paid to the employee[s] by the employer, and for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court.” and JIM NOWAK, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

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(Failure to Pay Overtime in Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act) 10. As a MSW for Defendant, Plaintiff conducted home visits to patients receiving home care from Defendants. Plaintiff worked for Defendant out of both its Valdosta, Georgia office, and its Nashville, Georgia office, providing home health care to GHHS’ clients. 12. Defendant paid Plaintiff and other home health workers a fee for each patient visit according to a fee schedule. For example, Plaintiff earned a set fee of $65 for conducting each patient evaluation visit and of $40 for conducting each patient routine visit. See Exhibit B. This pay structure was memorialized in writing by GHHS. See Exhibit C. 13. Defendant also paid Plaintiff and other home health workers on an hourly basis for time spent attending regular staff meetings, in-service training, and required office time. The amounts of such payments were tied to the duration of the meetings, trainings and time spent in the office. See Exhibit C. 14. Plaintiff was paid on the same “per visit” basis when she worked out of the Valdosta, Georgia office, as when she was working out of the Nashville, Georgia office. 15. Plaintiff and other home health workers often work over 40 hours per week. For example, Plaintiff typically worked between 50 and 60 hours per week. 16. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and other home health workers overtime premium compensation for hours worked over 40 per week. 17. In failing to pay proper overtime compensation to Plaintiff and other home health workers, Defendant acted knowingly and with reckless disregard of the FLSA. 18. Plaintiff asserts her FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the following potential Opt-In Plaintiffs: All current and former home health workers employed by Defendant at any time since August 25, 2014, who were paid, in-part, on a fee-per-visit basis. 20. Plaintiff and the potential Opt-In Plaintiffs are “similarly situated” as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because, among other things, Defendant did not pay Plaintiff or the potential Opt-In Plaintiffs proper overtime when they worked more than 40 hours in a week. 21. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 22. Plaintiff and those she seeks to represent pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) are employees of Defendant who are entitled to the FLSA’s protections. 23. Defendant is an employer covered by the FLSA. 24. The FLSA requires that covered employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” their regular rate of pay. See 29 U.S.C. § 207. 25. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime premium compensation to Plaintiff and similarly situated home health employees. 26. In violation of the FLSA, Defendant has acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions. 9. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Medical Social Worker (“MSW”) from approximately October 2016 through approximately June 2017.

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38. In or around May, 2016, Donald J. Trump (“Trump”) became the presumptive nominee of the Republican Party for President of the United States, by virtue of amassing the number of pledged delegates around the United States and territories, to secure the nomination at the Republican National Convention. 39. Trump’s presidential campaign team, working in conjunction with local Republican Party members in the San Francisco Bay Area, organized a Trump campaign rally to take place on June 2, 2016, at the McEnery Convention Center in San Jose, California. 40. Upon learning of the planned Trump Rally, several organizations, including Silicon Valley Rising and the South Bay Labor Council began to organize and promote a “Dump the Trump” counter-rally and protest, scheduled for the same day, and organized to take place outside the McEnery Convention Center. 41. Liccardo, the mayor of San Jose, is a registered Democrat and an outspoken critic of Trump. 42. Just prior to the Trump Rally, and in accordance with its policies, the San Jose Police Department shut down the streets surrounding the convention center to vehicle and pedestrian traffic. 43. In a public statement before the Trump Rally, Police Chief Garcia stated, “we will do everything possible to protect the First Amendment, those attending our Community, and our Officers.” 44. Despite this representation, Defendants not only failed to protect those attending the Trump Rally, but created the danger that ultimately harmed the class members and deprived them of their constitutional and statutory rights. San Jose Police Direct Rally Attendees into the Mob of Violent Protesters 46. Outside this exit, a police line directed the Trump supporters to turn north and to proceed along Market Street, into the crowd of violent anti-Trump protesters. 47. The police also actively prevented the Trump Rally attendees from proceeding south along Market Street, away from the anti-Trump protesters, or from leaving the convention center through alternative exits. 48. As detailed below, the class members were chased and subjected to violence, harassment, and intimidation on the basis of their real or perceived political affiliations, and several were beaten, victimized by theft, had objects such as bottles and eggs thrown at them by the protesters in full view of hundreds of police officers. Protesters also hurled insults, accused the class members of being racists, and held signs reading, “We need socialism” and “A vote for Trump is a vote for fascism,” while others waved Mexican flags. At least one individual was seen burning an American flag, and another burning a hat displaying Trump’s “Make America Great” campaign slogan. 49. The violence continued to escalate, until dozens of fights had broken out amongst the crowd, leaving many class members bruised and bloodied. The City Defendants Fail to Protect Class Members from the Dangers They Created 50. The City Defendants instructed and directed the police officers and other City employees not to intervene in the many brutal attacks made against the Trump Rally attendees, or otherwise failed properly to train the police officers to protect against the same. 51. Instead of stopping the attacks, and as a result of the direction of the City Defendants, several officers and other city personnel, including members of the San Jose Fire Department, refused to respond to pleas for help from several of the Trump supporters. These refusals were made despite the fact that the San Jose police officers were armed and, in many cases, wearing riot gear, and were often mere feet away from ongoing acts of physical violence. 53. The San Jose Police Department failed to declare the demonstration an unlawful assembly until a full thirty minutes or more of violent altercations had ensued, following the conclusion of the Trump Rally. 54. It was not until approximately one hour after the Trump Rally’s conclusion that police brought out megaphones and told demonstrators to leave or face arrest. 55. Very shortly after these events, Liccardo used the situation as a platform to express his personal political views, and cast blame on Trump for the violence, stating publicly: San Jose police officers performed admirably and professionally to contain acts of violence and protect individuals’ rights to assemble, protest, and express their political views. While it’s a sad statement about our political discourse that Mr. Trump has focused on stirring antagonism instead of offering real solutions to our nation’s challenges, there is absolutely no place for violence against people who are simply exercising their rights to participate in the political process. 56. On information and belief, the City Defendants acted with discriminatory animus against the class members, based upon the real or perceived political affiliations of the class members, intending to prevent, or with reckless disregard that their conduct would so prevent, the class members from supporting the candidate of their choice, and to discourage others from doing the same. 57. In so doing, the City Defendants violated the class members’ constitutional and statutory rights to free speech, peaceful assembly, and due process. 58. The Plaintiffs and class members were subjected to the violent acts of approximately four hundred anti-Trump protesters, without police intervention, because the City Defendants required the class members to exit the Trump Rally directly into the mob located a block away, in furtherance of the City Defendants’ own political objectives and biases. The individual stories and claims of the Plaintiffs are set forth below. Hernandez and Haines-Scrodin Are Repeatedly Struck in the Face 59. Hernandez and Haines-Scrodin attended the Trump Rally, exited the east-northeast exit of the McEnery Convention Center, and were directed by the San Jose police to walk through the anti-Trump protesters, rather than being allowed to turn south, in the direction of safety. 61. The anti-Trump protester also yelled racial slurs at Hernandez and Haines-Scrodin. 62. Hernandez suffered a broken nose, abrasions, and other severe bodily injuries as a result of the attack, as well as severe emotional distress. 63. Haines-Scrodin also suffered bodily injuries and severe emotional distress as a result of the attack. 64. Despite the San Jose police being in close proximity to this attack, the San Jose police did not intervene or offer their assistance, and failed to do so at the direction of the City Defendants. Frank and Nathan Velasquez Are Assaulted; Nathan Is Struck by Anthony Yi 65. Frank Velasquez and his son, Nathan Velasquez, attended the Trump Rally and exited the east-northeast exit of the convention center. 66. After being directed by the San Jose police to walk through the anti-Trump protest, rather than to the south, Anthony Yi, an anti-Trump protester, took Nathan Velasquez’s hat, which Nathan had been wearing. 67. After running approximately twenty-five yards, however, Yi slipped and fell near the intersection of San Carlos Street and Almaden Boulevard. 68. As Yi had taken more than one hat from the Trump supporters, Frank Velasquez picked one up to determine whether this hat was the one taken from Nathan. 69. Nathan then tried to help Yi get back on his feet, as well as determine whether either of the other hats were the hat that Yi had taken from him. 70. As Yi stood up, Yi struck Nathan in the head with his fist, causing Nathan severe bodily harm, including a concussion, and severe emotional distress. 71. Yi also possessed a knife at this time, but dropped the knife on the ground during the altercation. 72. Immediately following the attack, Nathan was pursued by a reporter who asked Nathan Velasquez several questions pertaining to the events that just occurred. 74. Shortly thereafter, Nathan and his father moved quickly back to the police line, which was about one hundred yards away from the location of the original attack on the corner of San Carlos Street and Almaden Boulevard, and were pursued by Yi and five or six other protesters. 75. After explaining the situation to the police, Frank and his son were permitted to stand in vicinity of the police, where they hoped that the violent attacks against them would not continue. 76. Nathan Velasquez has been unable to work due to his injuries and the emotional distress caused by Yi’s conduct. Frank Velasquez has also suffered emotional distress arising from these events, which have negatively affected his ability to manage the affairs of his San Jose based business, particularly as his customers, employees, and vendors have witnessed an unclear narrative of these events on national news, as well as witnessing police standing by and doing nothing to prevent the assaults. Protesters Taunt, Chase, Corner, and Throw Eggs at Casey 77. Casey, who was wearing a Trump jersey that she purchased on her way into the convention center, decided to the leave the Trump Rally about an hour after arriving, and was met with the same police line, which refused to intervene between the protesters and those departing the Trump Rally, and which directed her into the waiting, violent mob. 78. As she walked away from the police line, however, Casey began to feel uncomfortable due to the chants and taunts being shouted at her by the crowd of protesters. 79. Two protesters, one wearing a green shirt and the other wearing a black and white mask, approached Casey, raised their middle fingers in her direction, and began yelling, “Fuck Trump!” 80. As Casey continued to make her way through the protest, the crowd began to follow and throw objects at her. 82. Bystanders inside the Marriot began yelling to let her inside as the protesters continued to surround and throw objects at Casey, including approximately seven eggs, a tomato, and a bottle of water, while others spat at her. She was struck in the head by at least one egg that smashed upon impact. 83. The crowd continued to yell “Fuck Trump” as they attacked her, while she remained trapped between the large crowd of violent protesters and the closed Marriot doors. 84. Eventually, the Marriot guards opened the doors and allowed Casey to escape the mob. 85. Despite the police officers being nearby, and having directed Casey into the violent mob in the first place, the police did not take any action to come to Casey’s aid. I.P. Is Assaulted and Denied Assistance by the San Jose Fire Department 86. I.P., a fourteen-year-old minor, attended the Trump Rally with his father, Craig Parsons. 87. After the rally concluded, I.P. and his father exited the east-northeast exit of the McEnery Convention Center, where a line of police officers prevented I.P. and his father from turning right, to safety. Instead, I.P. and his father were directed by police to turn left, into the anti- Trump protesters. 88. Thereafter, I.P. was struck in the back of his head, twice, by H.A., without warning, and without seeing the attacker approaching. 89. At this time, members of the crowd began repeatedly shouting, “Kill him!” 90. I.P. then ran towards a nearby San Jose Fire Department vehicle while being chased by a mob of anti-Trump protesters, and asked for the Fire Department employees’ assistance. 91. The San Jose Fire Department refused to offer I.P., a minor, any assistance, despite his pleas for help and the imminent danger. 92. Shortly after being denied help, I.P. was chased by protesters and S.M. tackled I.P. to the ground. 93. Still, the San Jose Police and Fire Departments, which were present in large numbers in the vicinity, failed to come to I.P.’s aid. 95. I.P.’s father, Craig Parsons, saw I.P. cross the skirmish line, approached the police, told them that I.P. was his son, and requested to cross the skirmish line to be with I.P., a recent victim of several violent attacks. 96. The police denied Craig Parsons’ request. Zambetti Is Beaten with a Bag of Rocks 97. Zambetti also attended the Trump Rally, left through the east-northeast exit and was directed by the San Jose police to walk through the anti-Trump protest, rather than through alternative, safe routes. 98. Shortly after following the directions of the police, Zambetti was hit in the head by an individual with a bag containing hard objects, which Zambetti believes to have been rocks. Assault (By Barbara Arigoni against DOES 36-38) 299. Arigoni incorporates by reference all allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 300. DOES 36-38 intentionally, willfully, wantonly, and maliciously threatened to harmfully and offensively touch Arigoni, and to inflict severe bodily injury, in a manner so as to cause Arigoni to reasonably believe she was about to be harmed. 301. In light of DOES 36-38s’ violent demeanor and conduct surrounding these events, including but not limited to pulling Arigoni’s hair and breaking her glasses, a reasonable person in Argioni’s situation would have been offended by the threatened, violent touching. 302. At no time did Arigoni consent to DOES 36-38s’ threatened conduct. 303. As a direct and proximate result of DOES 36-38s’ threatening conduct, coupled with the present ability to carry out such threats, Arigoni felt imminent apprehension of such contact, and she therefore suffered severe emotional distress and other injuries to her person, in an amount to be shown according to proof. 304. As a direct and proximate result of DOES 36-38s’ conduct, Arigoni was harmed in an amount according to proof at trial. 305. Arigoni is informed and believes and alleges thereon that such acts directed towards her were malicious and belligerent, and the acts were done with a conscious disregard of Arigoni’s right to be free from such tortious and criminal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294, entitling Arigoni to punitive damages, in addition to compensatory damages, in an amount appropriate to punish and set examples of DOES 36-38. Plaintiffs Attend Donald Trump Rally

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35.151(a)(2)(i). Furthermore, any facility or part of a facility that is altered on or after the effective date of the ADA, by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity that affects usability, must, to the maximum extent feasible, be accessible and usable by individuals with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b)(1). Defendants’ failure to design their parking lots, interior aisles, restrooms, and fitting rooms in their stores in a manner that is accessible to and usable by customers with mobility disabilities violates the ADA because it is not structurally impracticable to do so and is required by the ADA. iii. Failure to Maintain Accessible Features in Violation of the ADA 163. The U.S. Department of Justice regulations to Title III of the ADA require that places of “public accommodation [] maintain in operable working condition those features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities,” unless the interruption in service or access is isolated or temporary or due to maintenance or repairs. 28 C.F.R. § 36.211(a). 164. Defendants have failed to maintain accessible features at their Kohl’s department stores, including accessible paths of travel throughout their stores and accessible routes to merchandise displays, wall shelving, sales counters, fitting rooms, and restrooms. 165. Defendants unlawfully fail to maintain accessible aisles in their stores, and as such the members of the Class are unable to approach, examine, or even purchase much of the merchandise on display. 166. Failure to maintain accessible features, primarily including inaccessible paths of travel and routes, has been prevalent and consistent, and is not due to maintenance or repairs, but rather to corporate policies or practices, or the lack thereof, relating to accessibility for people with mobility disabilities. 36 iv. Failure to Make Reasonable Modifications to Policies in Violation of the ADA 167. The access barriers outlined herein are the result of Defendants’ policies, practices, or procedures and/or the absence of policies, practices or procedures for enforcing the ADA. These “policies, practices, or procedures” impose barriers to access within the meaning of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), throughout Kohl’s department stores. These policies, practices and procedures include, but are not limited to: a. Approval of standardized aisles, counters, and equipment that are inaccessible to individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters; b. Failure to maintain accessible features, such as accessible paths of travel through merchandise aisles and accessible parking spaces; and c. Failure to ensure that other elements of the department stores, such as merchandise displays and fitting and rest rooms, meet the requirements of the ADA and are accessible to customers with mobility disabilities. 168. Pursuant to the ADA, places of public accommodation must “make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 169. Defendants’ failure to make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures necessary to afford individuals with disabilities access to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of their stores, violates the ADA and irreparably injured Plaintiffs, the ERC’s members, and the Class. 37 170. Modification of Defendants’ policies, practices, and procedures will not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 36.406. 154. All or nearly all Kohl’s department stores were newly constructed or modified after the effective date of the ADA, January 26, 1992. At the time of Kohl’s initial public offering (“IPO”) on May 19, 1992, it is believed that Kohl’s operated 76 department stores. It has since grown to operate approximately 1,146 department stores in 49 states. See Fact Book at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=60706&p=irol-faq. Therefore, all or nearly all of Kohl’s department stores must comply with the ADA. 155. After January 26, 1992, Kohl’s erected new structures or modified existing structures to create a “unique store format” for all or nearly all of its stores. This unique store format is marked by wide main aisles and narrow side aisles, among other things, and that resulted in inaccessible interior paths of travel and merchandise displays, and other elements. 156. Defendants’ failure to design and construct their stores in conformance with the Standards violates Title III because design and construction of their stores to conform to the Standards would not have been structurally impracticable. 157. The Standards require that, where feasible, all “walks, halls, corridors, aisles, skywalks, tunnels, and other spaces that are part of an accessible route shall comply with 4.3.” Standard 4.3.1. “At least one accessible route shall connect accessible buildings, facilities, elements, and spaces that are on the same site.” Standard 4.3.2(2). 158. Defendants’ denial of accessibility to interior paths of travel, in violation of Standard 4.3, is pervasive. In excess of 90 percent of the 41 stores surveyed by the ERC contain aisles that are too narrow in at least one department, and most contain several inaccessible aisles. 34 The existence of inaccessible aisles at the vast majority of stores surveyed by ERC and used by its members demonstrates that Defendants routinely violate Standard 4.3. 159. The Standards further require that accessible parking spaces “shall be at least 96 inches (2440 mm) wide. Parking access aisles shall be part of an accessible route to the building or facility entrance and shall comply with 4.3[̓s]” requirements for accessible routes.” Standard 4.6.3. Moreover, Standard 208.2.4 requires that one out of every six or fraction six parking spaces be a van parking space. Defendants’ failure to provide accessible parking spaces is pervasive, in violation of Standards 4.6.3 and 208.2.4. 160. Defendants’ stores contain other architectural and structural barriers to accessibility for persons with mobility disabilities in violation of the ADA. These violations include, but are not limited to: inaccessible sales and service counters; inaccessible merchandise displays; inaccessible fitting rooms; inaccessible restrooms; and other barriers. 161. The access barriers at Kohl’s department stores constitute unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability because they denied and continue to deny individuals with disabilities, including members of the ERC, the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations provided by Kohl’s department stores. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 162. The 2010 ADA standards for accessible design and construction state that places of public accommodation constructed on or after 1992, the effective date of the ADA, must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. 35.151(a)(1). Only where a public entity can demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable to meet the requirements is full compliance excused. Structural impracticability applies when the unique characteristics of the terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility features. 28 C.F.R. 35 57. Defendants have discriminated against, and continue to discriminate against, customers with mobility disabilities as more fully set forth in this Complaint. 58. Both prior to and following its survey of Kohl’s department stores around the nation, the ERC was contacted by nearly two dozen individuals who faced barriers to accessibility in their neighborhood Kohl’s department stores. 59. Each of the individual plaintiffs encountered some or all of the accessibility barriers described in this class action complaint at Defendant Kohl’s Department Stores due to his or her use of a wheelchair. 60. Upon information and belief, class members have experienced the same barriers to full accessibility that the individual plaintiffs and ERC members who use wheelchairs have experienced, and such barriers exist in Defendants’ stores throughout the United States. 61. Class members have been injured by Defendants’ failure to comply with the ADA. 62. Plaintiff Fisher, Plaintiff Prentiss, Plaintiff Ryan, Plaintiff Kamal, Plaintiff Lee, and the Equal Rights Center, ("Proposed Class Representatives") seek to maintain this action as a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to the question whether the inaccessible paths of travel, sales and service counters, merchandise displays, and fitting rooms, restrooms and parking spaces at Kohl’s Department Stores nationwide violate Title III of the ADA and the NYHRL. 16 63. The class consists of all people with mobility disabilities who use wheelchairs or are otherwise disabled due to mobility-related issues, who were denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any Kohl’s Department Store in the United States on the basis of disability because of the presence of a narrow aisle, inaccessible sales or service counter, inaccessible merchandise display, inaccessible parking spaces, inaccessible fitting rooms, or inaccessible restrooms, among other barriers. 64. There are approximately 3.6 million individuals in the United States who have mobility disabilities and rely on the use of wheelchairs according to the 2010 Report from the United States Census Bureau. Brault, Matthew W., “Americans With Disabilities: 2010,” Current Population Reports, P70-131, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC, 2012. As such, the class identified is believed to consist of thousands of members, and joinder of all such class members in this lawsuit is impracticable. 65. The question of the compliance of the paths of travel, sales and service counters, merchandise displays, parking spaces, fitting rooms, and restrooms with Title III of the ADA is common to the class. 66. The claims of the Proposed Class Representatives are typical of the claims of the class. The individual plaintiffs, like all other members of the class, each use a wheelchair for mobility and claim that Defendants have violated the ADA by designing the layout of the stores resulting in inaccessible paths of travel, sales and service counters, merchandise displays, parking spaces, fitting rooms, and restrooms after the effective date of the ADA. 17 67. The Proposed Class Representatives will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class because they have retained counsel with extensive experience in litigation brought under the ADA and with class action litigation. 68. The Proposed Class Representatives have no interests that conflict in any way with those of the class. 69. This action may be maintained pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), because Defendants' actions in designing inaccessible paths of travel, inaccessible sales and service counters, inaccessible merchandise displays, inaccessible parking spaces, inaccessible fitting rooms, , and inaccessible restrooms at Kohl’s Department Stores are actions that apply generally to the class. Injunctive or declaratory relief, therefore, is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. VI. 70. Plaintiffs reallege and reincorporate by reference all other allegations in this Complaint as though set forth fully herein. Devora Fisher 71. Plaintiff Devora Fisher is an ERC member and has encountered barriers to accessibility at the Kohl’s department stores located in Glenview, Arlington Heights, Niles, and Vernon Hills, Illinois. 72. Devora has been living with the effects of Agenesis of the Corpus Callosum since birth, along with scoliosis and other conditions which necessitates her use of a manual wheelchair. Devora also wears lymphedema soft boots on her feet. Devora is an accomplished artist and entrepreneur who owns and operates Frames by Devora, where she paints picture and photograph frames for sale on the company’s website, and at local craft and art fairs. 18 73. Since October 2012, Devora has been and is now still a loyal customer of Kohl’s department stores at 2201Willow Road in Glenview, Illinois; 590 Golf Mill Ctr. in Niles, Illinois; 800 W. Dundee Road, Arlington Heights, Illinois; and 235 N. Milwaukee in Vernon Hills, Illinois. Devora has and still now regularly shops at one or more of those Kohl’s store locations 3 to 4 times monthly mainly for picture frames and supplies for her business. Ms. Sheila Fisher accompanies Devora to those stores and maneuvers Devora’s wheelchair throughout those stores. Devora intends to continue to shop at those stores and will increase the frequency of her store visits if they are made accessible. 74. In all four store locations, there is an absence of accessible routes as required by the Standards between certain merchandise aisles, fixed displays and between certain movable displays that preclude Sheila from maneuvering Devora’s wheelchair to access merchandise in those aisles, and on those displays. In addition, certain of those stores have narrow checkout aisles, tall customer service desks and furniture blocking access to the restrooms. 75. The narrow space between displays increase the risk that Devora’s feet may hit one of those displays causing injury or snag one of her foot cushions, regardless of how careful Sheila is maneuvering Devora’s wheelchair, as occurred on October 20, 2012 in the Golf Mills store in Niles, Illinois. 76. On the vast majority of occasions where Devora has encountered accessibility barriers, Sheila has verbally addressed the issues to store and regional managers, each of whom have assured Sheila that those issues will be corrected, but, as of the date of this complaint they still remain, and in some instances, the number of inaccessible aisles have increased. 77. At the Arlington Heights store location, Sheila is not able to maneuver Devora’s wheelchair down merchandise aisles in the Men’s Department, they must confront furniture 19 immediately inside the entrance to the women’s restroom area that blocks access, and have encountered inaccessible customer service desk aisles. 78. At the Glenview store location, Sheila is not able to maneuver Devora’s wheelchair down merchandise aisles in the Home Goods, Shoes, Luggage, Girls’, Men’s, Linens, and the Boys’ Departments as the aisles are too narrow for Devora’s wheelchair. In addition, the aisles to the fitting rooms are also very narrow and cannot be accessed with Devora’s wheelchair. 79. At the Golf Mills store in Niles, a significant number of merchandise aisles in the Women’s Department (for purses, coats, and clothing), in the Men’s, Housewares, Shoes and Home Décor Departments are very narrow, which makes it impossible for Sheila to maneuver Devora’s wheelchair down the merchandise aisles in those departments. 80. At the Vernon Hills store the main aisles have oversized displays that leave little room to maneuver Devora’s wheelchair around them and the merchandise aisles throughout the majority of the store are very narrow and inaccessible for Devora’s wheelchair. In the Women’s Shoe Department the aisles are extremely narrow and it makes it difficult for Sheila to even turn Devora’s wheelchair into an aisle in that department to access the merchandise. 81. Despite Sheila Fisher’s repeated complaints, barriers to accessibility remain in place at the Glenview, Arlington Heights, Niles and Vernon Hills Kohl’s department stores, which prevent Devora Fisher from using and enjoying the store to the same degree as the general population. Edith Prentiss 82. Plaintiff Edith Prentiss, an ERC member, encountered barriers to accessibility at the Kohl’s department store located in Long Island at 106 Ronkonkoma Ave, Lake Ronkonkoma, NY 11779. 20 83. Ms. Prentiss has been a loyal Kohl’s customer for several years, and has regularly visited the location in Lake Ronkonkoma, Long Island every few months. She last went this past spring/early summer. She enjoys the selection of merchandise Kohl’s offers and intends to continue to visit the store often in the future if it is made accessible. 84. Ms. Prentiss has persistently experienced issues with the aisles in the Long Island Kohl’s department store. The aisles are too narrow, and the clothing in the plus size clothing section is thicker and wider, making the aisles there even more crowded. Thus, it is impossible for Edith to maneuver her wheelchair through the aisles there. 85. Because of existing barriers to accessibility, Ms. Prentiss cannot shop on her own; she needs assistance from another person to get clothing from the plus size clothing section for her. Monica Kamal 86. Plaintiff Monica Kamal is an ERC member and has encountered barriers to accessibility at the Kohl’s department stores located in Madison and Monona, Wisconsin. 87. Ms. Kamal is the founder and Executive Director of the Madison Wisconsin Chapter of the National Spinal Cord Injury Association. She uses a manual wheelchair because of her disability. 88. Ms. Kamal has been and is a loyal customer of Kohl’s department stores located at 7401 W. Town Way in Madison, and 2501 W. Broadway and Monona, Wisconsin. Ms. Kamal has been at both of those stores within the last 12 months. Her last visit to the Monona location was on September 17, 2014 and to the West Towne location, in and around Christmas 2013. Ms. Kamal intends to continue to shop at Kohl’s if and when it becomes accessible. 21 89. Ms. Kamal has learned to bring someone with her to both of the store locations as it is very difficult for her to get around given the accessibility barriers. At both stores, she cannot access Women’s and Juniors’ clothing and the Bedding and Small Appliances Departments because the merchandise aisles are too narrow, there are displays in the main aisles blocking her access, and there are often displays impeding the merchandise aisles. As a result, she must ask her companion to go down certain aisles and retrieve merchandise for her. Because she is unable to access much of the Kohl’s department store, she is prevented from shopping independently and with the same ease as the general population. 90. At the Monona store there are very limited parking slots for accessible vans. Ms. Kamal drives an accessible van. On the numerous occasions she has visited that location, she has been unable to find available accessible parking and she has to use two adjacent non-accessible parking spots to ensure that she has sufficient room to egress and ingress her accessible van. However, when she parks in the non-accessible parking spots, she is often a considerable distance away from the accessible entrance to the store, and she is always exposed to the traffic within the parking lot as there are no safe paths of travel out of the way of traffic and to the accessible entrance. 91. At both locations, the customer service counters are too high for her to be seen or to properly communicate with employees manning those counters, and the bathroom doors are too heavy for Ms. Kamal to independently open. 92. Barriers to accessibility as experienced by Ms. Kamal remain in place at the Madison and Monona Kohl’s department store locations, which prevent Ms. Kamal from using and enjoying the stores to the same degree as the general population. 22 Jean Ryan 93. Plaintiff Jean Ryan, an ERC member, also encountered barriers to accessibility at a Kohl’s department store located at 8973 Bay Parkway, Brooklyn, New York, of which she is a loyal customer. 94. Ms. Ryan has visited the store three times this summer alone, and last visited on October 15, 2014. Ms. Ryan appreciates Kohl’s affordable plus size clothing and children’s clothing, as well as other merchandise. Ms. Ryan intends to continue to visit the Bay Parkway Kohl’s department store regularly in the future if made accessible. 95. Unfortunately, Ms. Ryan faces significant physical impediments each and every time she tries to shop at the Bay Parkway location. She routinely encounters narrow department aisles, especially in the Women’s clothing section on the first floor, Women’s plus size clothing section, Juniors’ clothing section, (baby) Toys’ section, and some aisles in the Home Goods Department. Because she is unable to access much of the Kohl’s department store she wishes to use, she is prevented from shopping independently and with the same ease as the general population. 96. On her most recent visit on October 15, 2014, Ms. Ryan was not able to reach the point of sales device because the customer service counter was too high. She was able to swipe her credit card but was not able to see anything on the screen as it was not at eye level. When looking for baby clothes, some “onesees” caught on her wheelchair because the aisles were too narrow in that section. In the seasonal aisle, Ms. Ryan almost knocked over a Christmas tree when trying to get past it. 97. On her visit on September 19, 2014, Ms. Ryan entered the store about 45 minutes after the store had opened and encountered piles of hangers littering the isles in various 23 departments such as Women’s clothing (ladies’ active wear; plus sizes for women), Juniors clothing (kids’ pajamas) and in the Men’s Department. Ms. Ryan was not able to navigate those isles. 98. Because racks and tables of merchandise were too close to one another, Ms. Ryan was not able to shop independently for infants clothing, women’s plus sizes, ladies’ clothes, lingerie, men’s clothes, girls’ clothes, toys, and jewelry. 99. The accessible mirror in the Lingerie Department was obstructed by diagonally placed displays with no room for a wheelchair to get through. So Ms. Ryan was not able to use it. 100. Ms. Ryan then tried to order some clothing from the Kohl’s kiosk near the Customer Service area, but it timed out when she was about to check out. Because Ms. Ryan has declining vision, she takes longer to read print. Due to this timeout, she was not able to order what she wanted. 101. On another visit in July of 2014, clothes were caught in Ms. Ryan’s wheelchair in the plus size section and she was not able to move. There were also no mirrors in this section, and she was not able to get to the only accessible mirror, which was in the shoe section, because a bench was blocking access. 102. In the Juniors’ clothing section, the clothes were sticking out of racks on both sides of the aisle, making it impassable for Ms. Ryan’s wheelchair. 103. Ms. Ryan could also not even get close to the baby toys in the Toys Department. 104. Because the greeting cards and seasonal section had insufficient room to turn, Ms. Ryan could not independently exit when she entered that aisle. Columns were blocking certain other aisles. 24 105. Despite Ms. Ryan’s repeated complaints, barriers to accessibility remain in place at the Brooklyn Kohl’s department store, which prevent Ms. Ryan from using and enjoying the store to the same degree as the general population. Regina Lee 106. Plaintiff Regina Lee, an ERC member, also encountered barriers to accessibility at a Kohl’s department store located at 12024 Cherry Hill Road in Silver Spring, Maryland, which she frequented at least twice a month to look at the items on sale. 107. Ms. Lee last visited the Silver Spring Kohl’s store on June 11, 2014. During all of her visits to that store she was confronted with narrow merchandise aisles and would have to navigate around sales displays particularly in the front of the store that impeded her path of travel, and frustrated her ability to independently shop at that store location. 108. As a result, Ms. Lee always made sure to be accompanied by an individual when visiting the Silver Spring Kohl’s store in order to access inaccessible areas of the store. 109. Since June 11, 2014, Ms. Lee has not gone back to that store because she found maneuvering through the aisles and navigating around sales displays at the front of the store to be too difficult, frustrating and she could not enjoy the store to the same degree as the general population. 110. Ms. Lee intends to frequent again the Silver Spring Kohl’s store location if and when it becomes accessible. 25 ERC 111. Plaintiff ERC is a membership organization having members who use wheelchairs. 112. The ERC brings this case on its own behalf and as a representative of its members, whose right to live in and enjoy a community free from discrimination on the basis of physical disability has been infringed by Defendants. 113. The ERC also brings this case because Defendants’ discriminatory behavior has damaged the ERC by frustrating its mission and by causing the ERC to divert resources that it would have used to provide counseling, outreach and education, and referral services. Instead of providing these services to its members and the community, the ERC has devoted resources to identifying and investigating Defendants’ discriminatory policies and practices, attempting to contact Defendants to correct Defendants’ discriminatory policies and practices, and to counseling individuals who have been denied access to Kohl’s department stores. 114. The participation of individual ERC members in the lawsuit is not required either to resolve the claims at issue or to formulate relief. VII. Discrimination on the Basis of a Disability in Violation of the New York Human Rights Law (N.Y. Exec. Law §290, et seq.) On Behalf of Plaintiff ERC 171. At all times relevant to this action, the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290, et seq. (“NYHRL”), and the guidelines promulgated by the New York State Division on Human Rights were in full force and effect in New York and the ERC’s members had a right not to be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their disability by Defendants. 172. The NYHRL makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for any “place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability . . . of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y. Exec. § 296(2)(a). 173. Plaintiff ERC is a person within the meaning of the NYHRL. N.Y. Exec. § 292(1). 174. Each Kohl’s department store located in New York is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the NYHRL. N.Y. Exec. § 292(9). 175. Defendants have violated and continue to violate the NYHRL because Kohl’s department stores in New York have inaccessible interior paths of travel, making navigating through the stores difficult to near impossible for people who use wheelchairs or scooters. 176. Defendants’ policies and practices, including approving, maintaining, and designing inaccessible New York Kohl’s department stores, deny individuals with mobility disabilities, including the ERC, its members, and class members the full and equal enjoyment of 38 the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the Defendants’ stores. 177. Defendants’ conduct has harmed Plaintiff ERC and will continue to harm the ERC until Defendants are ordered by this Court to make Kohl’s department stores accessible to individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and other individuals with mobility disabilities. Defendants’ conduct has harmed Plaintiff ERC by: 1) frustrating of the mission of the ERC to achieve equality of access for persons with mobility impairments and the elimination of discrimination against persons with disabilities in places of public accommodation; and 2) diverting the ERC’s resources necessary to identify and counteract Defendants’ unlawful discriminatory practices. 178. For their violations of the NYHRL, and in accordance with N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., Defendants are liable to Plaintiff ERC for costs, attorneys’ fees, and compensatory damages in amounts to be determined at trial, and all other available relief. Discrimination on the Basis of a Disability in Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.) On Behalf of All Plaintiffs 136. On July 12, 1990, Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) . 30 137. Title III of the ADA states that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any public place of accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 138. The ERC is an organization whose mission includes achieving equality of access for persons with mobility impairments and the elimination of discrimination against persons with disabilities in public accommodations. The ERC’s members include persons with disabilities within the meaning of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102. 139. Kohl’s department stores are “place[s] of public accommodation” within the meaning of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). 140. Defendants are “private entit[ies] who own[], lease[] (or lease[] to), or operate[] a place of public accommodation,” and therefore have obligations under Title III of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 141. Title III makes it “discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class . . . with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(A)(ii). 142. Defendants’ failure to provide access to and throughout their stores for individuals with mobility impairments denied and continues to deny, on the basis of their disability, the ERC and its members, the same access to Defendants’ goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations as the access provided to individuals without disabilities. 31 143. Defendants’ discriminatory conduct denies individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters access to much of the merchandise not located on the wide main aisle of their Kohl’s department stores, preventing individuals with physical disabilities from accessing the full range of merchandise available to individuals without disabilities. Alternatively, individuals with disabilities who wish to access the entire store and its features are forced rely on other individuals to reach inaccessible merchandise located on narrow side aisles or on inaccessible merchandise displays, denying them the ability to shop independently. 144. Defendants further deny individuals with physical disabilities access to their Kohl’s department stores because designated accessible parking spots are either nonexistent or too narrow to be accessed by individuals with disabilities. 145. At all times relevant to this action, the ADA was in full force and effect in the United States, and Plaintiff ERC and its members had a right not to be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their disability by Defendants. i. Reduction of Accessibility in Violation of the ADA 146. The ADA requires a place of public accommodation to make alterations to a facility “in such a manner that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2). 147. The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) regulations to Title III of the ADA require that “[a]ny alteration to a place of public accommodation or a commercial facility, after January 26, 1992, shall be made so as to ensure that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(a)(1). 32 148. At the time of Kohl’s initial public offering (“IPO”) on May 19, 1992, Kohl’s operated 76 department stores. It has since grown to operate approximately 1,146 department stores in 49 states. See Fact Book at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=60706&p=irol- faq. Therefore, all or nearly all of Kohl’s department stores must comply with the ADA. 149. After January 26, 1992, Kohl’s erected new structures or modified existing structures to create a “unique store format” for all or nearly all of its stores. This unique store format is marked by wide main aisles and narrow side aisles, among other things. This unique store format resulted in inaccessible interior paths of travel and merchandise displays, and other elements. 150. The Standards prohibit alterations that “decrease, or [have] the effect of decreasing accessibility or usability of a building or facility below the requirements for new construction at the time of alteration.” Standards § 4.1.6(1)(a); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. A. 151. The creation of inaccessible side aisles and merchandise displays at Kohl’s department stores violates the Standards because these alterations decreased the accessibility and usability of the stores below the requirements for new construction. 152. The alterations made by Defendants to the Kohl’s facilities violate the ADA’s and the DOJ’s requirements that alterations enhance accessibility to the maximum extent feasible for people with disabilities, and conflict with the prohibitions in the Standards against alterations that decrease accessibility or usability of a place of public accommodation. ii. Architectural and Structural Barriers in Violation of the ADA 153. Title III of the ADA requires places of public accommodation to design and construct facilities built after the effective date of the ADA in conformance with the Standards, 33 to the extent that such is not structurally impracticable. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1); 28 C.F.R. §

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10. A simple statement that the debt was owed to TeleCheck, would have sufficed to identify effectively the name of creditor to whom the debt was then owed. Moreover, the placement of the current creditor information within the privacy notice made it unlikely that anyone would see -- let alone understand it. 11. Defendant’s collection actions complained of herein occurred within one year of the date of this Complaint. 12. Defendant’s collection communications are to be interpreted under the “unsophisticated consumer” standard, see, Gammon v. GC Services, Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994). 13. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-12. 14. Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires that, within 5 days of Defendant’s first communication to a consumer, they had to provide Ms. Parker with an effective validation notice, containing, among other disclosures, “(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;” see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 15. Defendant’s form collection letter violates § 1692g(a)(2) of the FDCPA because it failed to identify effectively that TeleCheck was the current creditor to whom the debt was owed. See, Braatz v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, 2011 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 123118 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Walls v. United Collection Bureau, 2012 4 4 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 68079 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Deschaine v. National Enterprise Systems, 2013 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 31349 (N.D. Ill. 2013); and Pardo v. Allied Interstate, 2015 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 125526 (S.D. Ind. 2015). 16. Defendant’s violation of § 1692g of the FDCPA renders it liable for statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 17. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-12. 18. Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires that, within 5 days of Defendant’s first communication to a consumer, the Defendant provide the consumer with an effective validation notice, i.e., notice that the consumer has 30 days after receipt of the notice to challenge the validity of the debt, or any portion of the debt, and seek verification of it. 19. Specifically, nowhere in Defendant’s initial collection letter to Ms. Parker (Exhibit C) did it set forth the statutorily-required 30-day validation notice. Moreover, Defendant did not provide Ms. Parker with a 30-day validation notice within 5 days of Defendant’s initial collection communication to Ms. Parker. Accordingly, Defendant has violated § 1692g of the FDCPA. 20. Defendant’s violation of § 1692g of the FDCPA renders it liable for statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. See, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 21. Plaintiff, Luana Parker, brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of Indiana from whom 5 5 Defendant attempted to collect a delinquent consumer debt, via the same initial form collection letter (Exhibit C), that Defendant sent to Plaintiff, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s form letter violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by § 1692k(a)(2) of the FDCPA. 22. Defendant TRS regularly engages in debt collection, using the same form collection letter they sent Plaintiff Parker, in their attempts to collect delinquent consumer debts from other consumers. 23. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendant TRS attempted to collect delinquent consumer debts by sending other consumers the same form collection letter they sent Plaintiff Parker. 24. Plaintiff Parker’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this class action complaint affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. This class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 25. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 6 6 26. Plaintiff Parker will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class action proposed is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this class action complaint will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff Parker has retained counsel experienced in class action litigation, including class actions brought under the FDCPA. 7. Ms. Parker fell behind on paying her bills, including a debt she allegedly owed to Goes Loving Care. Defendant TRS sent Ms. Parker an initial form collection letter, dated May 18, 2015, which stated that it was about: “Customer: Goes Loving Care”. The letter also stated that Ms. Parker should “See reverse side for important information including the Federal Validation notice, and the enclosed Telecheck Privacy Statement”. A copy of Defendant’s letter is attached as Exhibit C. 8. The “Federal Validation” notice is the information that is required by § 1692g of the FDCPA, i.e., that the consumer has 30 days to dispute the debt, the name of the current creditor, etc., see, 15. U.S.C. § 1692g. 9. The backside of Defendant’s letter did not contain a validation notice, but it 3 3 did state under the “Privacy Statement” that the “current creditor”, TeleCheck Services, Inc., had certain policies. Defendant’s letter failed to explain what the relationship or difference was between the “Customer” and the “Current Creditor”, see, Exhibit C. Violation Of § 1692g – No Effective 30-Day Validation Notice Violation Of § 1692g(a)(2) Failure To Identify Effectively The Current Creditor

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15. Plaintiff re-avers and re-alleges Paragraphs 1 through 14 above, as though fully set forth herein. 17. 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1) states, inter alia, that “if an employer employs an employee for more than 40 hours in any work week, the employer must compensate the employee for hours in excess of 40 at the rate of at least one and one and half times the employee’s regular rate...” 18. Plaintiff Tanti Hutapea (“Tanti”): Tanti worked for Defendants from August 2017 to October 2019, and again from December 2019 through December 2020. 19. Tanti worked at the Iron Sushi located in downtown Miami, at 120 SE 3rd Ave., in Miami, Florida. At all material times, Tanti was responsible for all tasks at the restaurant, including dealing with customers, assisting with food preparation, cleaning tables, restrooms, and the kitchen, and all other such tasks. 20. Tanti worked between 60 and 70 hours per week, every week, without breaks. 21. In 2017, she was paid $11/hour, starting in 2018, she was paid $12/hour, and from December 2019 through December 2020, she was paid $14/hour. She was not paid time and a half for any overtime hours. 22. Plaintiff Ferdenand Delos Santos (“Ferdenand”): Ferdenand worked for the Defendants from 2014 through December 2020. 23. Ferdenand worked at the Iron Sushi located in Dadeland, at 9030 SW 72nd Pl., in Miami, Florida, and sometime would work at the downtown Miami location on Friday. 24. Ferdenand was responsible for all tasks at the restaurant, including dealing with customers, assisting with food preparation, cleaning tables, restrooms, and the kitchen, and all other such tasks. 26. Through May 2020, Ferdenand was paid $12/hour. From May through December 2020, he was paid $13/hour. He was not paid time and a half for any overtime hours. 27. Defendants’ failure, through today’s date, to pay amounts owed pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, is willful and intentional. Defendants knew of the overtime requirements of the Act and either intentionally avoided or recklessly failed to investigate proper payroll practices as they relate to the law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled, and specifically request, liquidated damages in an amount equal to double the unpaid time and a half that is due and owing. 28. Further, upon information and belief, Defendants have employed other individuals during the subject time period, and each of these individuals was not paid a full and proper overtime wage as required by Federal law, and Plaintiff reserves the right to add additional persons to this action plaintiffs, and to move this Court for certification of a collective action. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, TANTI HUTAPEA and FERDENAND DELOS SANTOS, respectfully request certification of a collective action of all current and former employees of Defendants, IRON SUSHI LLC and MASAMITSU OCHI, and an award to Plaintiffs and the collective of at least double all unpaid overtime wages as provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as all reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation costs from the Defendants, IRON SUSHI LLC and MASAMITSU OCHI, jointly and severally, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, and judgment for all such other amounts as this Court may deem and equitable under the circumstances. 30. Through the term of Plaintiffs’ employment, Defendants would keep and retain all tips received (whether in cash or by credit card) for themselves. This was a complete retention by restaurant ownership of tips earned by employees, without any accounting made therefor. 31. Occasionally and on their own timetable, Defendants would remit amounts to Plaintiffs claiming that those amounts – which were clearly well short of amounts left as tips – were the share of tips to which Plaintiffs were entitled. 32. Plaintiffs know of no tip pooling agreement (whether valid or invalid). When asked where the rest of the money left as tips went, Plaintiffs were always told that it was needed “to pay taxes.” 33. Defendants have thus asserted dominion and control over Plaintiffs’ property (tip funds), inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ ownership therein, and have taken and converted those tip funds for their own purposes, improperly. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, TANTI HUTAPEA and FERDENAND DELOS SANTOS, respectfully request an award in their favor, and against Defendants, IRON SUSHI LLC and MASAMITSU OCHI, in an amount equal to all tips improperly withheld, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation costs, and all such other amounts as this Court may deem and equitable under the circumstances. CONVERSION FEDERAL OVERTIME WAGE LAW VIOLATIONS

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a coupon company that owns and operates www.retailmenot.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in January of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.retailmenot.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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15. Bitcasa provides “cloud” (i.e., remote) data storage services to consumers. Using Bitcasa’s services, customers can upload and store their electronic data remotely on Bitcasa’s servers. Case3:14-cv-05005-WHA Document1 Filed11/13/14 Page4 of 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 5 - 33. Plaintiff Shawn Romack initially signed up for Bitcasa’s Infinite plan in 2013, paying $99 for a one-year subscription to the service. 34. In approximately June 2014, Mr. Romack renewed his subscription to the Infinite plan for an additional one-year period, at a cost of $99. Mr. Romack’s one-year subscription was ongoing, and had several months remaining, at the time Bitcasa made its October 23, 2014 announcement and change in policy eliminating the Infinite plan. 35. On October 23, 2014, Bitcasa sent Mr. Romack an email stating that Bitcasa was eliminating the Infinite plan, and that, by no later than November 15, 2014, he had to either accept a different Bitcasa plan that was nearly ten times more expensive than his Infinite plan, and which was subject to storage limits that his Infinite plan was not subject to, or remove all of his data from Bitcasa’s systems, with the warning that if he did not accept the new costlier plan, any of his data remaining on Bitcasa’s system as of November 15, 2014 would be permanently deleted by Bitcasa. 36. As of October 23, 2014, Mr. Romack had approximately between 7 and 8 terrabytes of data stored on Bitcasa’s systems pursuant to his Infinite plan. Case3:14-cv-05005-WHA Document1 Filed11/13/14 Page8 of 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 9 - 43. Plaintiff brings this class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and the proposed members of the “Class” pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 44. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following “Class”: Case3:14-cv-05005-WHA Document1 Filed11/13/14 Page9 of 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 10 - 53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. Case3:14-cv-05005-WHA Document1 Filed11/13/14 Page11 of 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 12 - 60. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though alleged in this Count. 61. A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract, including in the contracts between Bitcasa and Plaintiff and the Class members. 62. Where a contract vests one party with discretion, the duty of good faith and fair dealing applies, and the party exercising the discretion must do so in a manner that satisfies the objectively reasonable expectations of the other party. A party may not perform an agreement in Case3:14-cv-05005-WHA Document1 Filed11/13/14 Page12 of 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 13 - 68. Bitcasa’s practices alleged herein constitute unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (the “UCL”). 69. Bitcasa has violated, and pursuant to its plans will violate, the “unlawful” prong of the UCL, including through its contractual breaches alleged herein. 70. Bitcasa has violated, and pursuant to its plans will violate, the “unfair” prong of the UCL by its conduct alleged herein. Case3:14-cv-05005-WHA Document1 Filed11/13/14 Page13 of 47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 - 14 - Breach of Contract (On Behalf the Class) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (On Behalf of the Class) INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY OR CONSEQUENTIAL (INCLUDING LOSS Violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (On Behalf of the Class)

win

14. Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and a class of similarly-situated persons. Whether Defendants did so directly or with the assistance of a third party (yet unknown to Plaintiffs), Defendants are directly liable for violating the TCPA. 15. Plaintiff has received at least one of Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile. A true and correct copy of the fax Plaintiff received on February 26, 2013 is attached as Exhibit A. 17. Exhibit A is a one-page document Defendants sent by fax advertising Defendants’ continuing education vacation packages. 18. Exhibit A states “St. John’s University & Getaway Seminars Inc. Present Continuing Education Vacation Seminars.” Exhibit A. 19. Exhibit A informs recipients that the continuing education programs have flexible schedules and that participants need not attend all three days. Exhibit A. 20. Exhibit A advertises the quality of each vacation destination, describing vacation destinations as having the “best pool”, being the “place to be”, “perfect for romance or family fun”, and “a perfect way to end the year.” Exhibit A. 21. Exhibit A contains a telephone number and website to register for Defendants’ vacation packages. Exhibit A. 23. The Contact Us page of the website listed on Defendants’ fax advertisement includes the address, telephone number, and email address for St. John’s University College of Pharmacy and Health Sciences. Exhibit B. 24. Exhibit A does not include the mandatory opt-out notice required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 25. Plaintiff did not expressly invite or give permission to anyone to send Exhibit A or any other advertisement from Defendants to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 26. On information and belief, Defendants sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 39 other persons in violation of the TCPA. 27. Plaintiff and the other class members owe no obligation to protect their fax machines from Defendants. Their fax machines are ready to send and receive their urgent communications, or private communications about patients’ medical needs, not to receive Defendants’ unlawful advertisements. 29. Excluded from the class are Defendants, any entity in which either Defendant has a controlling interest, each of Defendants’ officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns, and any Judge assigned to this action, including his or her immediate family. 3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 30. On information and belief, Defendants’ fax advertising campaigns involved other, substantially-similar advertisements also sent without the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Plaintiff intends to locate those advertisements in discovery. 32. Numerosity/impracticality of joinder. On information and belief, the class consists of more than 39 persons and, thus, is so numerous that individual joinder of each member is impracticable. The precise number of class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiffs, but will be obtained from Defendants’ records or the records of third parties. 34. Typicality of claims. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other class members, because Plaintiff and all class members were injured by the same wrongful practices. Plaintiff and the members of the class received Defendants’ advertisements by facsimile and those advertisements did not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Under the facts of this case, because the focus is upon Defendants’ conduct, if Plaintiff prevails on its claims, then the other putative class members will prevail as well. 35. Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the class it seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and TCPA litigation in particular, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and its counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interest of members of the class. 38. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 39. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons against Defendants. 40. The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine….” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1). 41. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s express invitation or permission.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4). 42. Exhibit A advertises Defendants’ continuing education vacation packages. Exhibit A. 43. Defendants sent Exhibit A to Plaintiff and the fax machines of other health professionals to promote their vacation packages. 45. The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if it determines that a violation was knowing or willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 46. Here, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1) (C) by sending advertisements by facsimile (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and the other class members without their prior express invitation or permission. 50. Here, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1) (C) by sending an advertisement by facsimile (such as Exhibit A) to Plaintiff and the other class members without their prior express invitation or permission. 51. Furthermore, Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) and (E) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii) & (v) by failing to include a compliant opt-out notice. Exhibit A. 52. In violation of the TCPA, Defendants’ fax does not inform recipients that Defendants’ failure to comply with an opt-out request within 30 days is unlawful. 54. Contrary to the TCPA, the Defendants’ faxes fail to provide recipients two methods for opting out, instead providing only a telephone number. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) (iv) (I). Furthermore, it is unclear whether Defendants’ telephone number is available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week as required. 56. Defendants’ failure to include a compliant opt-out notice on their fax advertisements makes irrelevant any express consent or established business relationship (“EBR”) that otherwise might have justified Defendants’ fax advertising campaigns. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 57. The TCPA is a strict liability statute and Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if Defendants’ actions were negligent. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 58. If Defendants’ actions were knowing or willful, then the Court has the discretion to increase the statutory damages up to three times the amount. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 60. St. John’s is liable for the fax advertisements at issue because it approved the faxes to be sent, participated in the activity giving rise to or constituting the violation, the faxes were sent on its behalf, or under general principles of vicarious liability, including actual authority, apparent authority and ratification. 61. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for Defendants or anybody else to fax advertisements about Defendants’ goods, products, or services, that Plaintiff and the other class members did not have an established business relationship with Defendants, that Exhibit A is an advertisement, and that Exhibit A did not display a compliant opt-out notice as required by the TCPA. 63. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii). 64. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons and against Defendants. 65. By sending advertisements to their fax machines, Defendants improperly and unlawfully converted the class’s fax machines to Defendants’ own use. Where printed (as in Plaintiff’s case), Defendants also improperly and unlawfully converted the class members’ paper and toner to Defendants’ own use. Defendants also converted Plaintiff’s time to Defendants’ own use, as Defendants did with the valuable time of the other class members. 66. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 68. Defendants knew or should have known that their misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. 69. Plaintiff and the other class members were deprived of the use of the fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendants. CONVERSION TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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38. On or about April 6, 2020, Mr. Kull submitted a complete, thorough, and timely application to DEFENDANT BANK to obtain a PPP loan. In doing so, Plaintiff relied on the representations of the of DEFENDANT BANK, whose written communications made it clear to Plaintiff as a consumer that PPP applications would be processed in a “first-come, first-served queue” and that they were focusing their efforts on “small businesses.” Knowing he could only receive one PPP loan, and knowing that DEFENDANT BANK did not accept applications from businesses that had applied for PPP loans with any other financial institution, Plaintiff believed that DEFENDANT BANK would be his best choice for obtaining funding under the PPP. 39. After submitting the PPP loan application, Plaintiff waited to get funded. While Plaintiff waited to get funded, Mr. Kull made strategic business decisions, invested his personal finances in his business, made personnel decisions, and took other steps in reliance on DEFENDANT BANK’s representations that their lending would be focused on businesses with under 50 employees and would be “first-come, first served.” 40. On information and belief, DEFENDANT BANK did not focus their lending efforts on businesses with under 50 employees and did not process the applications in a “first- come, first-served” manner. DEFENDANT BANK did not follow the SBA Regulations or the intent of The Senate and Congress in distributing the PPP funds. Instead, DEFENDANT BANK moved high-dollar applications from large- and mid-sized companies to the “front of the line” in order to maximize their origination fees on these Federally backed loans at taxpayer expense. DEFENDANT BANK enriched themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the putative class of 54. Plaintiff hereby restates, realleges, and incorporates by reference all foregoing paragraphs. 55. New York prohibits “deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state ....” N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a). 56. An individual “injured by reason of any violation of this section may bring an action in his own name to enjoin such unlawful act or practice, an action to recover his actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h). 57. DEFENDANT BANK committed the above-described acts willfully and/or knowingly. 58. DEFENDANT BANK’s wrongful and deceptive acts have caused financial injury and economic damages to Plaintiff and Class Members and unless enjoined, will cause further irreparable injury. 60. As a direct and proximate result of the above violations of § 349 of the General Business Law, Plaintiff and class members have suffered compensable harm and are entitled to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and to recover actual damages, costs and attorney’s fees. 61. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs and further alleges as follows. 62. Unjust enrichment is a quasi-contract claim designed to prevent “a person [from] enrich[ing] himself unjustly at the expense of another.” IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 879 N.Y.S.2d 355, 907 N.E.2d 268, 274 (2009). To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment in New York, a plaintiff must establish 1) that the defendant benefitted; 2) at the plaintiff's expense; and 3) that equity and good conscience require restitution.” Kaye v. Grossman, 202 F.3d 611, 616 (2d Cir.2000). 64. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 65. To state a claim for Fraudulent Concealment, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant had a duty to disclose material information and failed to do so, that the omission was intentional so as to defraud or mislead the plaintiff, that the plaintiff relied on the omission and that the plaintiff suffered damages. 66. Due to the nature of the transaction and contemplated contract between them, Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff and the Class to reasonably disclose facts material to that transaction and to not hide or obscure facts material to that transaction. 68. At all relevant times, Defendants actively concealed those material facts from the public and their PPP loan applicants, by intentionally omitting to disclose such facts and by intentionally misleading the Plaintiff and Class with affirmative statements that were not true. 69. Even if Defendants made some partial representations, Defendants still made efforts to suppress material facts and did not fully disclose and contextualize the material facts known only to them. 70. Plaintiff and the Class reasonably relied on Defendants’ representations in choosing to apply for a PPP loan with DEFENDANT BANK. As a direct result of Defendants’ fraudulent concealment of facts material to the PPP loan application transaction, Plaintiff and the Class were induced to apply with Defendants and as a proximate result suffered economic and financial harm On Behalf of The Class Against All Defendants (Fraudulent Concealment) On Behalf of The Class Against All Defendants (Violation Of New York State General Business Law §§ 349-350 – Deceptive and Misleading Business Practices) On Behalf of The Class Against All Defendants (Unjust Enrichment)

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27. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 28. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the following two classes: Class A All persons within the United States to whom RAC or its agent/s and/or employee/s called said person’s cellular telephone through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint where such person was not a customer of RAC. Class B All persons within the United States to whom RAC or its agent/s and/or employee/s called said person’s cellular telephone with an artificial or prerecorded voice within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint where such person was not a customer of RAC. 29. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believes the class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. B. Numerosity 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated and/or prerecorded message calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers, without the called party’s prior express consent, throughout the United States. The members of the Classes, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 38. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 39. Defendant negligently placed multiple automated and prerecorded/artificial voice calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express consent. 40. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA. 44. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 45. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple automated and prerecorded/artificial voice calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without their prior express consent. 46. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 47. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). A. The Class Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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1. 1. Wells Fargo’s Duties to (1) Notify the Warrantors and Other Parties to the Governing Agreements When It Discovers a Breach of the R&Ws; and (2) Enforce the Warrantors’ Obligations to Cure, Substitute or Repurchase Defective Mortgage Loans 1. Wells Fargo Discovered No Later than April 13, 2011 that the Covered Trusts’ Warrantors Breached Their R&Ws, Thus Triggering Wells Fargo’s Duty to Enforce the R&W Claims 1.  Wells Fargo Failed to Notify the Warrantors and Other Parties to the Governing Agreements of R&W Breaches and Failed to Enforce the Warrantors’ Obligations to Cure, Substitute or Repurchase Mortgage Loans Breaching the Warrantors’ R&Ws, as Required by the Governing Agreements and the TIA ...............................72  1.  Wells Fargo’s Duties to (1) Notify the Warrantors and Other Parties to the Governing Agreements When It Discovers a Breach of the R&Ws; and (2) Enforce the Warrantors’ Obligations to Cure, Substitute or Repurchase Defective Mortgage Loans ......................19  2. Wells Fargo’s Duties upon the Occurrence of Servicer Events of Termination 2.  Wells Fargo’s Duties upon the Occurrence of Servicer Events of Termination ................................................................................................21  2.  Wells Fargo Had Actual Knowledge of SEOTs No Later than April 13, 2011, Thus Triggering Its Duties to Act Under the Governing Agreements and the TIA ............................................................................46  a.  Shortly After the Covered Trusts Were Formed, Wells Fargo Became Aware of Widespread Loan Servicing Abuses, and by the End of October 2010, Wells Fargo Learned that the Master Servicers and Servicers Were Committing SEOTs as to the Mortgage Loans in the Covered Trusts ...............................................................................49  b.  By April 13, 2011, There Was No Doubt that Wells Fargo Had Actual Knowledge that the Covered Trusts’ Master Servicers and Servicers Had Committed SEOTs with Respect to the Mortgage Loans in the Covered Trusts ..................58  c.  After April 2011, Wells Fargo Had Actual Knowledge that the Master Servicers and Servicers Were Continuing to Commit the Same SEOTs and Were Also Committing New and Additional SEOTs with Respect to the Mortgage Loans in the Covered Trusts .....................................................................64  d.  Wells Fargo Also Knew that Successor Servicer Ocwen Was Committing SEOTs ................................................................64  2.  Wells Fargo Failed to Perform Its Duties with Respect to SEOTs as Required by the Governing Agreements and the TIA ...........................74  3. Wells Fargo’s Heightened Duty to Prudently Protect Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Interests as Though They Were Wells Fargo’s Own Interests During an SEOT 3.  Wells Fargo Failed to Exercise All of Its Rights and Duties Under the Governing Agreements as a Prudent Person Would, as Required by the Governing Agreements and the TIA ...............................76  3.  Wells Fargo’s Heightened Duty to Prudently Protect Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Interests as Though They Were Wells Fargo’s Own Interests During an SEOT ..........................................................................23  34. The Warrantors that sold the Mortgage Loans that were ultimately transferred into the Covered Trusts engaged in a nearly identical securitization process that was repeated thousands of times by them and others during 2006 and 2007, the time period when the Mortgage Loans were originated, warranted and transferred to the Covered Trusts. Investor demand for RMBS was skyrocketing during this period, and the Warrantors and other RMBS securitizers were hard pressed to meet that demand. RMBS securitizations proliferated during 2006 and 2007, and were extremely profitable for all involved in their sale. Hundreds of billions of dollars of RMBS were packaged and sold to the investing public, and billions of dollars in profits were pocketed by the Warrantors, Master Servicers/Servicers and other securitizers, including Wells Fargo. In addition, Wells Fargo also profited handsomely, and continues to profit, from the explosion in RMBS trusts caused by the skyrocketing sales, as it is an RMBS trustee to hundreds of RMBS trusts, including the Covered Trusts. 35. RMBS securitizations involve the conversion of thousands of illiquid residential mortgage loans like the Mortgage Loans into bond-like instruments – the RMBS certificates at issue herein – which trade over the counter in capital markets. 37. Typically, after aggregating the Mortgage Loans, the Warrantors then grouped the Mortgage Loans into large pools, which they then sold and transferred to the Covered Trusts’ “Depositors” for ultimate transfer to the Covered Trusts and Wells Fargo as Trustee. In many cases, the Depositors were shell companies related to the Warrantors and/or Master Servicers/Servicers. These sales from the Warrantors to the Depositors were typically accomplished via agreements called “Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreements” or similarly titled agreements (collectively, the “MLPAs”). 38. The Governing Agreements refer to and incorporate the MLPAs. In the Governing Agreements and/or MLPAs, the Warrantors: (i) make numerous R&Ws concerning the credit quality and characteristics of the Mortgage Loans and vouch for the accuracy of all data they provide about the Mortgage Loans; (ii) promise to cure, substitute or repurchase Mortgage Loans that do not comply with those R&Ws; and (iii) typically state that the Trustee will ultimately have the right to enforce the R&Ws against the Warrantors. 39. After the Mortgage Loans are sold and transferred from the Warrantors to the Covered Trusts’ Depositors, the Depositors then transfer the Mortgage Loans, along with the rights to enforce the Warrantors’ R&Ws, to the Trustee for the benefit of plaintiff and the class, and in exchange, the Trustee transfers the RMBS certificates to the Depositors. 4. Wells Fargo’s “Duty of Trust” to Avoid Conflicts of Interest with Plaintiff and the Class 4.  Wells Fargo’s “Duty of Trust” to Avoid Conflicts of Interest with Plaintiff and the Class ................................................................................24  4.  Wells Fargo Failed to Discharge Its Common Law Duty of Trust Owed to Plaintiff and the Class .................................................................76  E.  Plaintiff and the Class Have Suffered Significant Damages Due to Wells Fargo’s Breaches of the Governing Agreements and Common Law and Its Violations of the TIA .............................................................................................77  F.  Plaintiff May Sue Wells Fargo as Trustee .............................................................79  V.  41. After the Covered Trusts’ securitizations are closed and their RMBS certificates are sold to investors, the Mortgage Loans must be serviced. Thus, the Governing Agreements designate certain entities to be the Master Servicers and/or Servicers of the Mortgage Loans and require that they service the Mortgage Loans legally, and with the same degree of skill and care as “prudent” loan servicers. Whenever a Master Servicer/Servicer fails to ensure the legal and “prudent” servicing of the Mortgage Loans, a “Servicer Event of Termination,” or SEOT, occurs and the Trustee is required to take certain actions to protect plaintiff and the class when it becomes aware of the event. 42. Plaintiff’s and the class’s RMBS certificates entitle them to the cash flows generated by the Mortgage Loans. The Covered Trusts, as with other RMBS trusts, are structured such that the risk of loss is divided among different “classes” or “tranches” of RMBS in each Covered Trust. Each class or tranche of the Covered Trusts has a different level of credit risk and reward (the interest or yield), including different levels and types of credit enhancement or protection, and different priorities to payment from the cash flows generated by the Mortgage Loans (the payment priority and distribution is called the payment “waterfall”). Because the classes/tranches have different credit enhancements and different priorities of claim to the cash flow, they are assigned different credit ratings by the credit rating agencies and they sell at different yields or coupons. However, nearly all of the classes/tranches of the RMBS are required to be rated as “investment grade” securities by a credit ratings agency before they can be sold. As previously alleged, the credit ratings agencies require that the Warrantors make R&Ws, and they base their credit ratings of the RMBS certificates on such R&Ws. 44. The Governing Agreements set forth Wells Fargo’s powers and its duties to plaintiff and the class. The Covered Trusts are governed by PSAs (Pooling and Servicing Agreements) or TAs (Trust Agreements), and related agreements such as the MLPAs (Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreements) and/or SAs (Servicing Agreements), which the PSAs and TAs reference and incorporate when relevant. The Governing Agreements for each Covered Trust are substantially similar to one another and impose substantially similar duties on Wells Fargo. Accordingly, the ABFC 2006-OPT1 PSA (Exhibit A hereto) is used as a representative example of the Governing Agreements for both of the Covered Trusts. 45. While the Governing Agreements set forth the powers and responsibilities of Wells Fargo, the TIA supplements the Governing Agreements. The TIA was enacted in 1939 because Congress recognized that previous abuses by trustees had adversely affected investors and the national interest. In enacting the TIA, Congress desired to ensure that there were certain minimum federal protections available to investors, which are deemed to be incorporated into the Governing Agreements. Those minimum protections are discussed infra at ¶¶59-62. 48. The Warrantors’ R&Ws are specifically referenced in the Governing Agreements, along with the Warrantors’ obligations to cure, substitute and/or repurchase any defective Mortgage Loans. See ABFC 2006-OPT1 PSA §2.03(a). 49. Importantly, the Governing Agreements also provide that whenever Wells Fargo discovers a breach of a Warrantor’s R&W concerning a Mortgage Loan that materially affects plaintiff and the class, Wells Fargo “shall promptly notify” the breaching Warrantor and other parties to the Governing Agreement. ABFC 2006-OPT1 PSA §203(a). Thereafter, the breaching Warrantor is required to promptly “cure such breach.” Id. If the Warrantor fails to cure the breach within a specified time, then “the Trustee shall enforce such [Warrantor’s] obligation . . . under the [MLPA] and cause such [Warrantor] to repurchase such Mortgage Loan” or “substitute” a new loan in its place. Id. 5. Wells Fargo’s Duties and Obligations Under the TIA 5.  Wells Fargo’s Duties and Obligations Under the TIA ...............................25  C.  The Covered Trusts Suffer from Serious Defects Because Wells Fargo Failed to Perform the Duties Required of It Under the Governing Agreements, the TIA and Common Law ...............................................................26  51. Wells Fargo also has obligations under the Governing Agreements and TIA whenever it learns of Servicer Events of Termination (or SEOTs) by a Master Servicer or Servicer.4 Under the Governing Agreements, an SEOT by a Master Servicer or Servicer occurs whenever there is any failure by the Servicer [or Master Servicer, as applicable] . . . duly to observe or perform, in any material respect, any . . . covenants, obligations or agreements of the Servicer [or Master Servicer] as set forth in this Agreement, which failure continues unremedied for a period of 30 days, after the date . . . on which written notice of such failure, requiring the same to be remedied, shall have been given to the Servicer [or Master Servicer], by the Trustee . . . . ABFC 2006-OPT1 PSA §7.01(a)(ii). 53. In order to properly, legally and “prudently” service the Mortgage Loans pursuant to the Governing Agreements, the Master Servicers and Servicers must, inter alia: (1) ensure that the payments by borrowers are properly and legally collected and promptly submitted to the Covered Trusts; (2) ensure that timely and legal notices are sent to borrowers; (3) ensure that appropriate insurance is in place when required; (4) ensure that accurate information about the Mortgage Loans is maintained; (5) ensure that the Covered Trusts’ “REO” properties5 are properly maintained; and (6) ensure that the Mortgage Loans are legally, prudently and properly modified or foreclosed when necessary. See generally ABFC 2006-OPT1 PSA, Art. III, §§3.01-3.31. 55. Because the failure to properly service the Mortgage Loans, or report breaches of the Warrantors’ R&Ws, is so harmful to plaintiff, the class and the Covered Trusts, when Wells Fargo becomes aware of an SEOT it is required by the Governing Agreements to act quickly. Thus, upon becoming aware of an SEOT, Wells Fargo is required by the Governing Agreements and TIA: (1) to notify the offending Master Servicer or Servicer of its SEOT and require its cure (ABFC 2006-OPT1 PSA §7.01(a)(ii)); and (2) to give notice of uncured SEOTs to plaintiff and the class. Id. §7.04(b); see also 15 U.S.C. §77ooo(b). In addition, if the offending Master Servicer or Servicer does not cure the SEOT within the prescribed period of time, the Governing Agreements give Wells Fargo the power to terminate and replace the offending Master Servicer or Servicer, or take over its servicing duties. See ABFC 2006-OPT1 PSA §§7.01(b), 7.02(a). 57. Moreover, this heightened duty is not limited or applied only to Master Servicers’/Servicers’ SEOTs. Instead, under the Governing Agreements, once an SEOT exists, “[Wells Fargo] shall exercise” all of the “rights and powers vested in it by th[e] [Governing] Agreement[s],” not just those pertaining to the Master Servicers/Servicers. Id. Thus, Wells Fargo’s heightened duty of care also requires it to prudently enforce the R&W claims against the Warrantors as though Wells Fargo were seeking to protect its own interests. 59. The TIA imputes certain terms into the Governing Agreements to protect investors. The TIA imposes two sets of duties and obligations on Wells Fargo – one set “prior to default,” and the other set “in case of default,” much like the Governing Agreements. 60. Under the TIA, prior to a default, a Trustee must perform “such duties as are specifically set out in” the Governing Agreements. 15 U.S.C. §77ooo(a)(1). This reflects the Governing Agreements’ pre-default provisions that require Wells Fargo to “perform such duties and only such duties as are specifically set forth in this Agreement.” ABFC 2006-OPT1 PSA §8.01(a). Thus, prior to a default, the TIA requires Wells Fargo to perform all the duties assigned to it by the Governing Agreements. 61. In addition, under the TIA, a Trustee must “give to the indenture security holders . . . notice of all defaults known to the trustee, within ninety days after the occurrence thereof.” 15 U.S.C. §77ooo(b) (citing 15 U.S.C. §77mmm(c)). Thus, Wells Fargo is required to inform plaintiff and the class of any SEOTs and any other “defaults,” i.e., the Warrantors’ breaches of their R&Ws, within 90 days. 63. As set forth herein, Wells Fargo is liable to plaintiff and the class for failing to discharge the duties required of it by the Governing Agreements, the TIA and the common law. In addition, all of Wells Fargo’s duties mandated by the Governing Agreements, the common law, and the TIA as alleged herein were continuing in nature, and required Wells Fargo to continuously discharge such duties as long as Wells Fargo was Trustee of the Covered Trusts. When Wells Fargo discovered R&W breaches by the Warrantors and learned of SEOTs by the Master Servicers/Servicers, as alleged herein, Wells Fargo was required to act prudently, quickly and continuously to protect plaintiff and the class. Wells Fargo utterly failed to act as required, thereby breaching the Governing Agreements and common law, and violating the TIA, causing plaintiff, the class and the Covered Trusts to suffer over $740 million in damages. C. The Covered Trusts Suffer from Serious Defects Because Wells Fargo Failed to Perform the Duties Required of It Under the Governing Agreements, the TIA and Common Law A. The Securitization Process for the Mortgage Loans A.  The Securitization Process for the Mortgage Loans ..............................................15  B.  Wells Fargo’s Duties as Trustee for the Covered Trusts .......................................18  VI.  DERIVATIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS ......................................................................82  COUNT I .......................................................................................................................................84 

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25. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of individuals defined as: All Persons within the United States whom Bursey, within one year before the date of this Complaint, attempted to collect interest on an alleged consumer debt – that MSW retained Bursey to collect – that Bursey did not have the right to collect. 26. Defendants, their employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 34. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if set forth in full. 35. Based upon the foregoing, Defendant’s conduct violated the FDCPA. 36. Plaintiff alleges that to the extent that Defendants’ actions, counted above, violated the FDCPA, those actions were done knowingly and willfully. 37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., Plaintiff and the members of the Class have suffered injury, and may recover from Defendant one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) in statutory damages in addition to actual damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 38. The violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., described herein present a continuing threat to members of the Class and members of the general public in that Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendants continue to engage in these practices, and will not cease doing so unless and until forced to do so by this Court. 7. Within one year prior to the filing of this action, Defendant contacted Plaintiff to collect an alleged debt originally stemming from a credit account with Credit One Bank with account number ending in 6437 (“alleged debt”). FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (By Plaintiff and The Class Against All Defendants)

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84. Plaintiffs incorporate here the previous allegations of this Complaint. 85. This count arises from Defendant’s violations of the FLSA by failing to pay overtime to Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members when they worked over 40 hours in individual workweeks. 86. Plaintiff Pettenato was not exempt from the overtime provisions of the Violation of the Colorado Minimum Wage Act (Class Action) 108. Plaintiff Law incorporates here the previous allegations of this Complaint. 109. This count arises from Defendant’s violations of the CMWA by failing to pay overtime to Plaintiff Law and the Colorado Class when they worked over 40 hours in individual workweeks. Page - 15 110. Defendant classified Plaintiff Law as exempt from the overtime provisions of the CMWA. 111. Defendant classified the Colorado Class as exempt from the overtime provisions of the CMWA. 112. Plaintiff Law was not exempt from the overtime provisions of the CMWA. 113. The Colorado Class was not exempt from the overtime protections of the Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Collective Action) Violation of the New York Labor Law (Class Action) 100. Plaintiff Pettenato incorporates here the previous allegations of this Complaint. 101. This count arises from Defendant’s violations of the NYLL by failing to pay overtime to Plaintiff Pettenato and the New York Class when they worked over 40 hours in individual workweeks. 102. Defendant classified Plaintiff Pettenato as exempt from the overtime provisions of the NYLL. 103. Defendant classified the New York Class as exempt from the overtime provisions of the NYLL. 104. Plaintiff Pettenato was not exempt from the overtime provisions of the

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43. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following class:10 All persons who shipped one or more parcels through UPS’s retail affiliates and were charged a Delivery Area Surcharge exceeding the amount listed in UPS’s Retail Rates at any time beginning four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this action until trial of this action. The class does not include any UPS directors, board members, or executives who otherwise meet the class definition. 44. This case is a prototypical class action. Certifying this case will vindicate “the purposes behind class actions: eliminating the possibility of repetitious litigation and providing small claimants with a means of obtaining redress for claims too small to justify individual litigation.” Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 659 n.12 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 249 (3d Cir. 1975)). The proposed class satisfies all of the necessary criteria under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and (3), and a class action is appropriate for the following reasons (among others): 53. UPS, by using its network of independently owned and operated affiliates to overcharge and defraud retail customers, conducted the affairs of an enterprise though a pattern of racketeering in violation of RICO. 54. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .” 55. UPS is a “person” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). UPS is “an entity capable of holding legal or beneficial interest in property.” Id. Indeed, UPS generated $58.4 billion in revenue in 2015, and held much of that revenue in corporate accounts. Moreover, UPS owns a wide variety of real property, including buildings, trucks, and computer systems. 85. 49 U.S.C. § 13708(b) provides that “[n]o person may cause a motor carrier to present false or misleading information on a document about the actual rate, charge, or allowance to any party to the transaction.” 86. 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(2) provides that “[a] carrier or broker providing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under chapter 135 is liable for damages sustained by a person as a result of an act or omission of that carrier or broker in violation of this part.” This provision creates a private right of action. See Fulfillment Services Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 528 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2008). 87. UPS is “person” within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 13708(b). Under settled agency principles, UPS is also vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees, who are also “person[s]” within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 13708(b). 88. UPS is a motor carrier within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 13708(b). 91. “Liability in restitution derives from the receipt of a benefit whose retention without payment would result in the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the claimant.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 39(1) (2010); See Stone v. White, 1937 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937) (citing The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 53; Woodward, Law of Quasi-Contracts, s 2.); 1 G. Palmer, Restitution §§ 1.2, 2.2–2.3 (1978). 92. By overcharging retail customers for the Delivery Area Surcharge, UPS has received a benefit whose retention without payment would result in the unjust enrichment of UPS at the expense of the Plaintiff and the class members. 93. Under federal common law principles, a common carrier may not charge customers an amount exceeding the carrier’s published rate. See 2 Robert Hutchinson et al., A Treatise on the Law of Carriers, as Administered in the Courts of the United States and England § 804 (3d ed. 1906). By charging more than its published rate, UPS has caused damage to Plaintiff and the class. Conducting the Affairs of an Enterprise in Violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (Asserted on Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Providing False or Misleading Information in Violation of the Interstate Commerce Act 49 U.S.C. § 13708(b) (Asserted on Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) UPS’s Business Unjust Enrichment Due to Failure to Adhere to Published Rates in Violation of Federal Common Law (Asserted on Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4111.03) 14. Defendant manufactures laboratory equipment and instruments for distribution to its customers worldwide. 15. Defendant employed Plaintiff Chance Clark as a manufacturing employee between October 2018 and July 2019. Specifically, Plaintiff was an assembly worker. 16. Defendant employed other similarly situated employees as manufacturing employees. 17. Defendant classified Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees as non-exempt and paid them an hourly wage. 18. Defendant subjected Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to the same policies, practices and procedures, including pay policies, practices, and procedures. 19. Plaintiff worked on average between 50 and 60 hours per week. (Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked) 20. Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees were only paid for work performed between their scheduled start and stop times, and were not paid for the following work performed before and after their scheduled start and stop time: a) changing into and out of personal protective equipment; b) getting tools and equipment that were necessary to perform their Case: 2:20-cv-04232-MHW-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 08/20/20 Page: 3 of 10 PAGEID #: 3 4 manufacturing work; c) walking to their assigned area of the manufacturing floor; and/or d) performing their manufacturing work. 21. The time Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees spent a) changing into and out of personal protective equipment; b) getting tools and equipment that were necessary to perform their manufacturing work; c) walking to their assigned area of the manufacturing floor; and/or d) performing their manufacturing work was an integral and indispensable part of their principal activities, was required by Defendant, and was performed for Defendant’s benefit. 22. Changing into and out of personal protective equipment; b) getting tools and equipment that were necessary to perform their manufacturing work; c) walking to their assigned area of the manufacturing floor; and/or d) performing their manufacturing work are intrinsic elements of their job duties. Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees cannot dispense with these tasks if they are to be able to perform their work. 23. Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees were not paid for time spent a) changing into and out of personal protective equipment; b) getting tools and equipment that were necessary to perform their manufacturing work; c) walking to their assigned area of the manufacturing floor; and/or d) performing their manufacturing work. 24. The amount of time Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees spent on this required and unpaid work amounted to approximately 10 to 20 minutes each day. 25. As a result of Defendant’s practices and policies, Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees were not compensated for all of the time they worked, including all of the overtime hours they worked over 40 each workweek. Case: 2:20-cv-04232-MHW-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 08/20/20 Page: 4 of 10 PAGEID #: 4 5 (Defendant Willfully Violated the FLSA) 26. Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. 27. Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on his own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 28. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff himself is a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All former and current manufacturing employees of Thermo Fisher Scientific Asheville LLC between August 20, 2017 and the present. 29. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at several hundred persons. 30. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and are acting on behalf of their interests as well as his own in bringing this action. 31. These similarly situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees Case: 2:20-cv-04232-MHW-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 08/20/20 Page: 5 of 10 PAGEID #: 5 6 and costs under the FLSA. 32. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of himself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as: All former and current manufacturing employees of Thermo Fisher Scientific Asheville LLC in the State of Ohio between August 20, 2017 and the present. 33. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least several hundred persons. 34. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to its manufacturing employees for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; and (b) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff and other members of the class for Defendant’s violation of R.C. § 4111.03 and § 4111.10. 35. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Named Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other Ohio Class members. 36. Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. His interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and-hour litigation and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this Case: 2:20-cv-04232-MHW-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 08/20/20 Page: 6 of 10 PAGEID #: 6 7 case. 37. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 38. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 40. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees for all time worked and overtime compensation at a rate of one and one- half times their regular rate of pay for all of the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 and 29 CFR § 785.24. 41. Defendant’s failure to keep records of all of the hours worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek by Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 29 CFR § 516.2(a)(7). Case: 2:20-cv-04232-MHW-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 08/20/20 Page: 7 of 10 PAGEID #: 7 8 42. By engaging in the above-mentioned conduct, Defendant willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly violated the provisions of the FLSA. 43. As a result of Defendant’s practices and policies, Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees have been damages in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 45. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees for all time worked and overtime compensation at a rate of one and one- half times their regular rate of pay for all of the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the OMFWSA, R.C. § 4111.03. 46. Defendant’s failure to keep records of all of the hours worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek by Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees violated the OMFWSA, R.C. § 4111.03. 47. By engaging in the above-mentioned conduct, Defendant willfully, knowingly and/or recklessly violated the provisions of the OMFWSA. 48. As a result of Defendant’s practices and policies, Plaintiff and other similarly situated manufacturing employees have been damaged in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the OMFWSA.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third-party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 23. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and are heavily integrated with Defendant’s physical location. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s physical location and the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 27. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 28. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical location, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical office on its Website, information about skin products and related items for sale, screening tests, skin treatments, contact details and information about the company, medical treatment options, featured medical posts and videos, online forms and instructions, services and specialties, and other important information. 29. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 32. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 35. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s physical location and hours of operation and otherwise research related products and services available via the Website. 36. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s Website and physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location as well, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 44. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 49. Defendant’s physical location are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s physical location. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with their locations and is a gateway thereto. 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 53. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 54. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 57. Defendant’s physical location is located in State of New York and constitutes sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with its physical location and is a gateway thereto. 58. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 59. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in her or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 78. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 84. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is heavily integrated with its establishments and is a gateway thereto. 85. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical location in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 88. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the City Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 89. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense and punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502(a). 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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87. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 88. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of GC Services Limited Partnership and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. -12- 89. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of GC Services Limited Partnership, and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 90. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 91. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 92. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 93. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The -13- principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on -14- information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. 94. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 95. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 96. Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 97. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 98. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through ninety seven (97) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. -15- 99. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of two classes. 100. The first class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about May 18, 2017; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692g(a)(1) for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt, for misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed by Plaintiff and for failing to accurately state the amount of the debt in the initial communication. 101. The second class consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form as the letter sent to Plaintiff on or about May 18, 2017; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10) and 1692g for sending a collection letter which failed to effectively provide the Validation Rights Notice required by law, and for engaging in deceptive practices. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 102. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 103. Because the Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt -16- Collection Practices Act. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows: (a) Statutory damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k); (b) Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and (c) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances. Dated: Brooklyn, New York October 22, 2017 /s/ Maxim Maximov_____ Maxim Maximov, Esq. Attorneys for the Plaintiff Maxim Maximov, LLP 1701 Avenue P Brooklyn, New York 11229 Office: (718) 395-3459 Facsimile: (718) 408-9570 E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable. /s/ Maxim Maximov_____ Maxim Maximov, Esq. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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10. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 11. Pac Tox, is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the fax. 13. Pac Tox, either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and other recipients in sending the fax. 14. Each fax refers to a website registered to Pac Tox. 15. The fax has a “remove” number at the bottom that is associated with the mass broadcasting of advertising faxes. 16. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with Defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisement to Plaintiff. 17. The fax does not contain an “opt out” notice in the form required by 47 U.S.C. § 227. 18. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 19. On information and belief, Defendant has transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Michigan. 20. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff or other recipients of Defendant’s unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 21. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 22. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 24. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 25. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 26. Defendant violated the TCPA even if its actions were only negligent. 27. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 28. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons (b) who, on or after a date four years prior to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. §1658), (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of Defendant Pac Tox, promoting its goods or services for sale (d) and which did not contain an opt out notice as described in 47 U.S.C. §227. 30. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether Defendant engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; b. The manner in which Defendant compiled or obtained its list of fax numbers; c. Whether Defendant thereby violated the TCPA; 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 33. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 9. On December 5, 2014, Business Health Solutions, P.C. received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine.

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15. Teligent researches, develops, produces, supplies, and sells generic pharmaceutical products. 16. On May 2, 2017, Teligent filed a Form 8-K with the SEC (the “May 2017 8-K”) that highlighted the Company’s revenue growth in the first quarter of of 2017. On the earnings call following the May 2017 8-K’s release, Grenfell-Gardner stated that “[t]his growth has been driven by a combination of new product launches and competitive supply chain dynamics to which Teligent has been able to respond effectively.” Then, in discussing “what comes next[,]” Grenfell- Gardner took his praise of Teligent’s supposedly well-run R&D-approval-production-launch process one step further: Over the coming quarter, our team is focused on delivering products in the existing product pipeline, responding to FDA [Food and Drug Administration] and Health Canada inquiries and preparing for the final submissions for 2017. This is the crunch period of GDUFA [Generic Drug User Fee Amendments] Year 5 and Year 4 overlap for FDA submissions. And we are committed to upholding our responsibilities with respect to the FDA to ensure the timely processing of our applications. I would point out that the two approvals that we received in this past quarter were great examples of the benefit of this discipline. With one application approved at 18 months and the other at just over 14 months. To the extent that we can replicate these timely approvals with our current investments in R&D, we will continue to deliver value in the form of the return on these investments as we launch products to the market. We have 33 ANDAs [Abbreviated New Drug Applications] on file with the FDA today that represent a total addressable market of approximately $2 billion[.] 17. The forgoing was false and misleading because Defendants failed to disclose product non-conformities in R&D and non-compliance with applicable regulations. 19. Teligent’s press release quotes Grenfell-Gardner attributing the drop in revenue to FDA approval delays and competition: ‘“This third quarter has been challenging for Teligent. These results and our revised outlook for the remainder of the year, are a result of the knock-on effect of ANDA approval delays and increased competition in one of our largest products[.]’” 20. On the earnings call following the release of the November 2017 8-K, Grenfell- Gardner stated that the Company experienced and addressed undefined manufacturing issues: New product launches during the quarter certainly helped to mitigate some of the economic impact of the Lidocaine volume declines. However, new launches do take time to ramp up. In addition, our team faced manufacturing challenges, for instance related to an excipient in a high-volume product that was being provided to us with particles that had the potential to adulterate our finished goods. The team spent a significant amount of effort in resolving these challenges, which they now have. However, the engineering expenses related to the fix contributed to lower-than-anticipated margins in the quarter. These activities combined with lower lidocaine sales resulted in margins below our expectations. 23. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a Class consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired Teligent securities on U.S. exchanges during the Class Period and were damaged upon the revelation of the alleged truth (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are: Defendants herein; the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times; members of Defendants’ immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns; and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 24. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, Teligent common stock was actively traded on the NASDAQ. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are thousands of members in the proposed Class. The members of the proposed Class may be identified from records maintained by the Company or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using customary forms of notice that are commonly used in securities class actions. 26. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interest, antagonism, or conflict with the members of the Class. 27. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: a. whether the federal securities laws were violated by Defendants’ acts as alleged herein; b. whether statements made by Defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented material facts about the business, operations, and management of Teligent; c. whether Defendant Grenfell-Gardner caused Teligent to issue false and misleading financial statements during the Class Period; d. whether Defendants acted knowingly or recklessly in issuing false and misleading financial statements; e. whether the prices of Teligent common stock during the Class Period were artificially inflated because of Defendants’ conduct complained of herein; and f. whether the members of the Class have sustained damages and, if so, what is the proper measure of damages. 29. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud- on-the-market doctrine in that: a. Defendants made public misrepresentations and/or failed to disclose material facts during the Class Period; b. the omissions and misrepresentations were material; c. Teligent common stock is traded in an efficient market; d. the Company’s shares were liquid and traded with moderate to heavy volume during the Class Period; e. the Company traded on the NASDAQ and was covered by multiple analysts; f. the misrepresentations and omissions alleged would tend to induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of the Company’s securities; and g. Plaintiff and members of the Class purchased, acquired, and/or sold Teligent common stock between the time Defendants failed to disclose or misrepresented material facts and the time the true facts were disclosed, without knowledge of the omitted or misrepresented facts. 30. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 32. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 33. This Count is asserted against all Defendants and based upon violations of §10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 34. During the Class Period, Defendants engaged in a plan, scheme, conspiracy, and course of conduct, pursuant to which they knowingly or recklessly engaged in acts, transactions, practices, and courses of business that operated as fraud and deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; made various untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. Such scheme was intended to, and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, as alleged herein; (ii) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of Teligent common stock; and (iii) cause Plaintiff and the other members of the Class to purchase, or otherwise acquire, Teligent common stock and options at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan, and course of conduct, Defendants took the actions set forth herein. 36. By virtue of their positions at Teligent, Defendants had actual knowledge of the materially false and misleading statements and material omissions alleged herein and intended thereby to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or in the alternative, Defendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts as would reveal the materially false and misleading nature of the statements made, although such facts were readily available to Defendants. Said acts and omissions of Defendants were committed willfully or with reckless disregard for the truth. In addition, each Defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that material facts were being misrepresented or omitted, as described above. 37. Information showing that Defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth is peculiarly within Defendants’ knowledge and control. As the senior manager and director of Teligent, Grenfell-Gardner had knowledge of the details of Teligent’s internal affairs. 39. During the Class Period, Teligent common stock was traded on an active and efficient market. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, relying on the materially false and misleading statements described herein, which Defendants made, issued, or caused to be disseminated, or relying upon the integrity of the market, purchased or otherwise acquired shares of Teligent common stock at prices artificially inflated by Defendants’ wrongful conduct. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class known the truth, they would not have purchased or otherwise acquired said securities, or would not have purchased or otherwise acquired them at the inflated prices that were paid. At the time of the purchases and/or acquisitions by Plaintiff and the Class, the true value of Teligent common stock was substantially lower than the prices paid by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. The market price of Teligent common stock declined sharply upon public disclosure of the facts alleged herein to the injury of Plaintiff and Class members. 40. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants knowingly or recklessly, directly or indirectly, have violated §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 42. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 43. This Count is asserted against Defendant Grenfell-Gardner and based upon violations of §20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78(t)(a). 44. During the Class Period, Grenfell-Gardner participated in the operation and management of Teligent and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of Teligent’s business affairs. Because of his senior position as the Company’s President and CEO, he knew the adverse non-public information alleged herein. 45. As officer and director of a publicly owned company, Grenfell-Gardner had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information, with respect to Teligent’s financial condition and operations, and promptly correct any public statements issued by Teligent that had become materially false or misleading. 47. Grenfell-Gardner, therefore, acted as a controlling person of Teligent. By reason of his senior management positions and being a director of Teligent, Grenfell-Gardner had the power to direct the actions of Teligent and exercised same to cause the Company to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein. Grenfell-Gardner exercised control over the general operations of Teligent and possessed the power to control the specific activities that comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class complain. 48. By reason of the above conduct, Defendant Grenfell-Gardner is liable pursuant to §20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by Teligent. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period Violations of §20(a) of the Exchange Act Against Defendant Grenfell-Gardner Violations of §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants

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