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10. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer class (the “Class”): • All New York consumers who received a collection letter from Defendant attempting to collect an obligation owed to or allegedly owed to Synchrony Bank, that contains the alleged violations arising from Defendant’s violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692(g) (e), et seq. • The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 12. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “11” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 13. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 15. On or about September 1, 2016, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter. See Exhibit A. 16. The letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 17. The letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 18. Said September 1, 2016 Collection Letter provided that the alleged amount due was $1,733.00. 19. Said September 1, 2016 Collection Letter was the first letter sent out by Defendants. 20. Said September 1, 2016 Collection Letter further stated: “The total account balance as of the date of this letter is shown above. Your account balance may increase because of interest or other charges, if so provided in your agreement with your creditor.” 21. Defendant was attempting to collect on Plaintiff’s purportedly overdue Synchrony Bank debt. 22. Defendants could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 23. On information and belief, Defendants sent a written communication, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the state of New York within one year of the date of this Complaint. First Count 15 U.S.C. §1692g Validation of Debts 24. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “23” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 26. The written notice must contain the amount of the debt. 27. The written notice must contain the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 28. The written notice must contain a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector. 29. The written notice must contain a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. 30. The written notice must contain a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 31. One such requirement is that the debt collector provide “the amount of debt.” 15 U.S.C. 1692(a)(1). 32. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the amount of debt, but to convey such clearly. 33. The letters both set forth a “Balance Due.” 35. The letters fail to include the “safe harbor” language concerning the accrual of interest and/or fees as set forth in Jones v. Midland Funding, LLC, 755 F. Supp. 2d 393, 398 (D. Conn. 2010), adhered to on reconsideration, No. 3:08-CV-802 RNC, 2012 WL 1204716 (D. Conn. Apr.11, 2012). 36. The letters state, “The total account balance as of the date of this letter is shown above. Your account balance may increase because of interest or other charges, if so provided in your agreement with your creditor.” 37. The letters fail to advise Plaintiffs that if Plaintiffs pay the balance “as of the date of the letters,” an adjustment may be necessary after Defendant receives payment. 38. The letters fails to advise Plaintiffs that Defendant will inform Plaintiffs of the balance difference before depositing payment. 39. The letters fail to advise Plaintiffs what portion of the balance “as of the date of this letter” is principal. 40. The letters fail to advise Plaintiffs what portion of the balance “as of the date of this letter” is interest. 41. The letters fail to advise Plaintiffs what portion of the balance “as of the date of this letter” is late fees. 42. The letters fail to advise Plaintiffs of the interest rate. 43. The letters fail to advise Plaintiffs of the amount of potential late fees. 45. The letters fail to advise Plaintiffs the amount of money the balance “as of the date of this letter” will increase per week. 46. The letters fail to advise Plaintiffs the amount of money the balance “as of the date of this letter” will increase per month. 47. The letters fail to advise Plaintiffs the amount of money the balance “as of the date of this letter” will increase in any measurable period. 48. The letters, because of the aforementioned failures, would render the least sophisticated consumer unable to determine the amount of his or her debt. 49. Because Defendant state the balance “as of the date of this letter” “may” increase, the least sophisticated consumer could also reasonably believe that the debt could be satisfied by remitting the balance at any time after the receipt of the letter. 50. Because Defendant state the balance “as of the date of this letter” “may” increase, the least sophisticated consumer could also reasonably believe that the balance was accurate only on the date of the letter because of the continued accumulation of interest and/or late fees. 51. If the interest is continuing to accrue, the least sophisticated consumer would not know how to satisfy the debt because the letter fails to indicate the applicable interest rate, or date of accrual. 53. Furthermore, no additional fees or interest is currently accruing on this account. 54. For these reasons, Defendant failed to clearly state the amount of the debts. 55. For these reasons, Defendant failed to unambiguously state the amount of the debts. 56. For these reasons, the letters would likely make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to the amount of the debt. 57. For these reasons, the letters would likely make the least sophisticated consumer confused as to the amount of the debt. 58. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g as it failed to clearly, explicitly and unambiguously convey the amount of debt. Second Count 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. False or Misleading Representations 59. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “57” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 60. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 61. While § 1692e specifically prohibits certain practices, the list is non-exhaustive, and does not preclude a claim of falsity or deception based on non-enumerated practice. 62. A collection letter is also deceptive under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if it is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer. 64. As previously alleged, the least sophisticated consumer could also reasonably read the letters to mean that the balance “as of the date of the letter” was dynamic due to the continued accumulation of interest. 65. As previously alleged, the least sophisticated consumer could also reasonably read the letters to mean that the balance “as of the date of the letter” was dynamic due to the continued accumulation of late fees. 66. As previously alleged, the least sophisticated consumer could also reasonably read the letter to mean that the account balance may increase because of interest or other charges, when there is no additional interest or other charges being levied on the account. 67. Because the letters are susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer, they are deceptive under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 68. Because the letters can reasonably be read by the least sophisticated consumer to have two or more meanings, one of which is inaccurate, as described, they are deceptive under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 69. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by using a false, deceptive and misleading representation in its attempt to collect a debt.

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30. Plaintiff still has and had, at all relevant times to this action, telephone facsimile service at (714) 633-7470 at its place of business at 436 South Glassell St., Orange, CA 92666. 31. Plaintiff receives facsimile transmissions (“faxes”) at this number, using a telephone facsimile machine (“fax machine”). 32. On May 17, 2017, Defendant, without Plaintiff’s express invitation or permission, arranged for or caused a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited fax advertisement, advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, to Plaintiff’s fax machine located at its principal place of business. A copy of the fax advertisement is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is incorporated herein by reference. 33. Exhibit A was wholly unsolicited in that Defendant sent it to Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s express invitation or permission. In addition, as stated above, Exhibit A does not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. 34. Exhibit A identifies property, goods, or services advertised by Defendant, including an open bar and a happy hour. 35. Exhibit A is not the only recent unsolicited faxed advertisement from Defendant to Plaintiff. 37. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against Defendant pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further investigation reveal that any Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 38. Numerosity: At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of Class Members, but among other things, given the nature of the claims and that Defendant’s conducted consisted of a standardized fax campaign and widely disseminated standardized fax electronically sent to particular telephone numbers, Plaintiff believes, at a minimum, there are hundreds of Class Members. Plaintiff believes that the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action rather than incremental individual actions will benefit the Parties and the Court by eliminating the possibility of inconsistent or varying adjudications of individual actions. 39. Upon information and belief, a more precise Class size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to Defendant’s fax and marketing records. 42. One or more questions or issues of law or fact regarding Defendant’s liability are common to all Class Members and predominate over any individual issues that may exist and may serve as a basis for class certification under Rule 23(c)(4). 43. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same course of conduct that violates the TCPA. 44. Plaintiff and members of the Class each received at least one fax advertisement, advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, which contained no opt-out notice with a facsimile number, which Defendant sent or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 45. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, TCPA litigation, and class-action litigation. 47. Class-Wide Injunctive Relief and Rule 23(b)(2): Moreover, as an alternative to or in addition to certification of the Class under Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendant have acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members as a whole. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of Class Members on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class in order to enjoin and prevent Defendant’s ongoing violations of the TCPA, and to order Defendant to provide notice to them of their rights under the TCPA to statutory damages and to be free from unwanted faxes. 48. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference. 49. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of the Class defined above against Defendant for violation of the TCPA and the rules prescribed under it by the FCC. 51. Defendant sent or caused to be sent hundreds or thousands of these advertisements exemplified by Exhibit A. Plaintiff and each Class Members received at least one of them. 52. Each of the foregoing unsolicited advertisements violated the TCPA because they failed to contain the opt-out notice required by 47 U.S.C § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv); and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii). 53. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). 54. If it is found that Defendant willfully or knowingly sent or caused to be sent fax advertisements to Plaintiff and the members of Class in violation of the TCPA, Plaintiff requests an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227)

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21. Mr. Khan seeks conditional certification of this case as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See also, Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995). The “similarly situated” standard at the initial conditional certification stage is lenient, plaintiff’s burden is not heavy, the evidence needed is minimal and the existence of some variations between potential claimants is not determinative of lack of similarity. Prejean v. O’Brien’s Response Mgmt., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158948 *15. 22. Further, when a motion for conditional certification involves a potential class of employees that worked for separate, but related, employers, courts have reserved consideration of whether the separate employers are joint employers for a final, stage two determination. Velazquez v. FPS LP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107073, *16, 2014 WL 3843639 (Hon. Harmon, J.), quoting McKnight v. D. Houston., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 794, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (Hon. Rosenthal, J.). 24. Plaintiff seeks notice to issue to all non-exempt employees of the Defendants who together were victims of Defendants’ widespread and identical violations of the FLSA. 25. Plaintiff worked overtime hours for which he received straight-time pay. 26. Defendants’ wide-spread policy and practice violated the FLSA because it allows the Defendants not to pay their employees’ overtime hours at the required premium overtime pay rate at time-and-one-half of the employee’s base hourly rate. See 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1). 27. By failing to document the overtime pay owed to Plaintiff and to Members of the Plaintiff Class, the Defendants also committed repeated and willful violations of the recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA. See, 29 U.S.C. §211(c); 29 C.F.R. §516. 29; and C.F.R. §516.27. 28. During the class period, the Defendants owned, controlled and operated the aforementioned businesses, and they set this pay policy shared by all such businesses. 29. The common policy of paying straight-time wages for overtime hours worked by employees is prima facie evidence of “some identifiable facts or legal nexus [that] bind the claims so that hearing the cases together promotes judicial efficiency.” McKnight v. D. Hous., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (Rosenthal, J.). 30. Members of the Plaintiff Class (including Mr. Khan) have been victimized by Defendants’ ill-conceived patterns, practices, and policies that violate the FLSA. 31. Plaintiff’s experience was typical of the experiences of Members of the Plaintiff Class as it pertains to unpaid overtime; and, the specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the Plaintiff Class do not prevent collective treatment because of said legal nexus binding them together as a class. 33. All current and former non-exempt employees, regardless of job title, job requirements, or rate of pay, to whom the Defendants denied overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 in one or more workweek, are similarly situated to Plaintiff, and are thus appropriate members of the Plaintiff Class. 34. All current and former non-exempt employees employed by business establishments that the Defendants owned / controlled, who at any time during the three years prior to the date of filing of this action to the date of judgment were denied overtime compensation in any given workweek may properly be included as members of the Plaintiff Class. 35. Thus, the class Mr. Khan seeks to represent is comprised of all store clerks (a) who were paid at a straight-time rate for hours worked in excess of forty in any workweek during the relevant period and (b) who worked or currently work at any gasoline station and/or convenience store owned individually or jointly and/or managed now or in the past by Defendant Nizar Ali, or by any legal entity in which Defendant Nizar Ali has an ownership interest. 36. Individuals who opt into the collective action will be added to the litigation, and copies of their written consents to join a collective action will be filed with the Honorable Court. VI. 37. Defendants employed Mr. Khan as a store clerk at their Shell branded gasoline station and convenience store doing business as “Timber Creek Food Mart” from August 1, 2018 until September 3, 2018. 38. During his employment, Mr. Khan worked overtime hours. 39. At the time Mr. Khan was hired, he was informed that his pay rate would be $12.00 per hour, and that Plaintiff would not receive any overtime pay. 41. Mr. Khan performed duties that included operating the cash register, assisting customers with gasoline and other purchases from the convenience store, and upkeep and cleaning of the premises. 42. As determined by the Defendants at the outset of Mr. Khan’s employment, he received no overtime wages despite working well in excess of 40 hours a week. 43. Similarly, all Members of the Plaintiff Class that seek to be a part of this collective action received no overtime wages because Defendants have a wide-spread policy of paying straight-time wages for overtime worked. 44. The Defendants together controlled Mr. Khan’s terms and conditions of employment, including decisions relating to payment of some but not all wages due (i.e., non- payment of overtime wages), Mr. Khan’s hourly pay rate, and the number of hours Mr. Khan worked during each workweek. 45. The Defendants own(ed), control(led) and / or operate(d) the businesses where Mr. Khan and Members of the Plaintiff Class worked, and the Defendants had authority over the operations of such businesses. 46. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully rewritten herein. 47. Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff time-and-a-half rate for hours in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 49. During their employment with the Defendants, Plaintiff Khan and Members of the Plaintiff Class worked overtime hours on a weekly basis at the request of their employer. 50. Plaintiff and Members of the Plaintiff Class were informed that no overtime would be paid despite being required to work overtime hours on a weekly basis. 51. Plaintiff and Members of the Plaintiff Class received no overtime wages resulting from Defendants’ policy of paying straight-time for overtime hours worked. 52. Because Defendants have a wide-spread policy and practice of not paying employees’ overtime, Defendants and the businesses they controlled committed repeated and willful violations of 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 53. As such, Plaintiff and Members of the Plaintiff Class sue for their unpaid overtime wages falling within the three-year period preceding the filing of this civil action, and continuing thereafter until time of jury verdict and judgment. 54. Plaintiff and Members of the Plaintiff Class also seek liquidated damages in amounts equaling the unpaid overtime wages. 55. Further, Plaintiff and Members of the Plaintiff Class seek attorney’s fees and costs for bringing this action pursuant to the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. §216(b) states that “[t]he court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 56. Plaintiff and Members of the Plaintiff Class seek post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law, assessed upon all damages, including attorney’s fees and costs. Violation of the FLSA – Failure to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and all others similarly situated

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15. Defendants manage both egg farms and egg processing plants. On their farms, Defendants raise pullets and laying hens and produce eggs. In their processing plants, Defendants’ employees clean, sort, and package both eggs produced on their own farms and eggs produced by other farmers. 17. During the relevant time period, Defendants assigned Plaintiffs, who regularly worked in one of the plants in Chillicothe, Texas; Prosper, Texas; and Nebo, Oklahoma, to work in the other of these three locations or elsewhere for the Defendants 18. Each day, and often at multiple times during a workday, Defendants assigned and reassigned each of the Plaintiffs to work either on their farms or in their processing plants, as needed. Within the three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit, each of the Plaintiffs worked regularly both on Defendants’ farm and in Defendants’ processing plant in Chillicothe, Texas. Plaintiffs Bautista and Casillas also worked at various times within the three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit on Defendants’ farms and in Defendants’ processing plants in Prosper, Texas and Nebo, Oklahoma. The Class Members worked either exclusively in Defendants’ processing plants, or regularly on both the Defendants’ farms and in the processing plants. 19. The Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ duties in Defendants’ processing plants included cleaning, sorting, packing, and preparing eggs for shipment. 20. During all of the relevant period, each of Defendants’ processing plants in Chillicothe, Texas; Prosper, Texas; and Nebo, Oklahoma, as long as it was in operation; regularly processed eggs from other farmers and companies. 21. The Plaintiffs and Class Members regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but Defendants paid them only their regular rates for their overtime hours instead of one and one- half times their regular rates of pay. 22. The Plaintiffs and Class Members also were regularly forced to work “off the clock”—work time that was not recorded and for which they were not compensated. 24. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and Class Members overtime at the proper rate—using their regular hourly rate of pay for overtime hours worked instead of time and a half this rate. 25. Defendants knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out their illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay minimum wage and overtime compensation with respect to the Plaintiffs and Class Members. 26. The Class Members are similarly situated to the named Plaintiffs in that their relevant job duties were the same as the Plaintiffs’ and they were subject to the same illegal pay policies or practices that are relevant to this action. 27. Several of the Class Members have requested to participate in this case as opt-in plaintiffs. The written consents of some of these individuals are included with this complaint. 28. The Defendants’ failure to pay minimum wage and overtime compensation at the rates required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Class Members. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ experience is typical of the experience of the Class Members. 30. As a collective action, Plaintiffs seek this Court's appointment and\or designation as representatives of a group of similarly situated individuals as defined herein.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number, belonging to Defendant, (424) 219-9959. 21. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the four proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). The class concerning the ATDS claim for no prior express consent (hereafter “The ATDS Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 22. The class concerning the ATDS claim for revocation of consent, to the extent prior consent existed (hereafter “The ATDS Revocation Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had revoked any prior express consent to receive such calls prior to the calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 8. Beginning in or around April of 2016 and continuing through June of 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numbers ending in -1636, -7210, -6147, -3803, -5154, and -1080 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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10. For example, the Terms and Conditions inform a customer: If another transaction is presented for payment in an amount greater than the funds left after the deduction of the temporary hold amount, that transaction will be a nonsufficient funds (NSF) transaction if we do not pay it or an overdraft transaction if we do pay it. You will be charged an NSF or overdraft fee according to our NSF or overdraft fee policy. See Terms and Conditions, p. 2 (emphasis added) (Exh. A hereto). 11. City National’s Fee Schedule establishes that a $36 fee will be charged for either an “Non-Sufficient Funds (NSF) or overdraft fee” per item. See Fee Schedule (Exh. B hereto). 12. City National breaches its contract when it charges more than one $36 NSF Fee on the same item, since the contract states—and reasonable consumers understand—that the same item can only incur a single NSF Fee. 13. This abusive practice is not universal in the financial services industry. Indeed, major banks like Chase—the largest consumer bank in the country—do not charge more than one 4 NSF Fee on the same item when it is reprocessed. Instead, Chase charges one NSF Fee even if an item is resubmitted for payment multiple times. 14. City National’s Terms and Conditions never disclose this practice. To the contrary, the Terms and Conditions indicate it will only charge a single NSF Fee on an item. A. Plaintiff Noe’s Experience. 15. Ms. Noe has been assessed multiple fees that should not have been assessed against her checking account. As alleged below, City National reprocessed a previously declined transaction additional times in order to assess multiple fees on a single item. 16. In July 2018, Ms. Noe attempted an electronic payment to Cashland in the amount of $52.10. 17. City National rejected payment of that transaction due to insufficient funds in Plaintiff’s account and charged her a $36 NSF Fee for doing so. Plaintiff does not dispute the initial fee, as it is allowed by City National’s Terms and Conditions. 18. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, and without her request to City National to reprocess the item, however, weeks later, on August 8, 2018, City National processed the same transaction yet again, which City National referred to as a “RETRY PYMT” on Plaintiff’s statement. 19. Again City National rejected the transaction due to insufficient funds and charged Plaintiff another $36 NSF Fee. 20. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, and without her request to City National to reprocess the item, on August 22, 2018, City National processed the same transaction yet again – and again referred to the item as a “RETRY PYMT”. 21. And again, City National rejected the transaction due to insufficient funds and charged Plaintiff yet another $36 NSF Fee for doing so. 5 22. In sum, City National assessed Plaintiff $108 in NSF Fees based on a single payment of $52.10. 23. Ms. Noe’s payment to Cashland was a single transaction as is laid out in City National’s contractual documents, capable at most of receiving a single NSF Fee (if City National returned it) or an overdraft fee (if City National paid it). 24. On May 6, 2019, Ms. Noe attempted a payment to Wal-Mart in the amount of $25.13. 25. City National rejected payment of this transaction due to insufficient funds in Plaintiff’s account and charged her a $36 NSF Fee for doing so. Once again, Plaintiff does not dispute this initial NSF Fee, as it is allowed by City National’s Terms and Conditions. 26. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, and without her request to do so, City National reprocessed the same item a week later on May 13, 2019. This transaction, like the Cashland example above, was also designated as a “RETRY PYMT” on Plaintiff’s statement. 27. Again City National rejected the transaction due to insufficient funds and charged Plaintiff another $36 NSF Fee. 28. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, and without her request to do so, City National reprocessed the item a third time (another “RETRY PYMT”) ten days later on May 24, 2019. 29. Yet again City National rejected the transaction due to insufficient funds and charged Plaintiff a third $36 NSF Fee for doing so. 30. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, and without her request to do so, City National reprocessed the item a fourth time on June 7, 2019. 31. Yet again City National rejected the transaction due to insufficient funds and charged Plaintiff a fourth $36 NSF Fee for doing so. 6 32. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, and without her request to do so, City National reprocessed the item a fifth time two weeks later on June 21, 2019. 33. Yet again City National rejected the transaction due to insufficient funds and charged Plaintiff a fifth $36 NSF Fee for doing so. 34. In sum, City National assessed Plaintiff $180 in NSF Fees based on a single payment of $25.13. B. The Imposition of Multiple NSF Fees on a Single Transaction Also Violates City National’s Online Representations. 35. Beyond the language found in the Terms and Conditions and Fee Schedule, City National’s online disclosures also inform customers that only a singular NSF Fee can be assessed on checks, ACH debits, and electronic payments. 36. City National’s website informs its account holders: If you write a check or make a recurring payment for more money than you have in your account, City will return the item unpaid and a $36 NSF fee will be assessed against your account. 37. Thus City National does not provide any information to its customers that would inform them that a single check or single recurring payment becomes a new item each time it is rejected for payment then reprocessed, especially when—as here—Plaintiff took no action to resubmit the item. 38. There is zero indication anywhere in the Terms and Conditions, the Fee Schedule, or the City National website that informs its customers that the same check or recurring payment could possibly incur multiple NSF Fees. 39. Even if City National reprocesses an instruction for payment, it is still the same check or recurring payment. The Bank’s reprocessing is simply another attempt to effectuate an accountholder’s original order or instruction. 7 40. Indeed, the language noted above makes clear that it is the action of the accountholder, and only the accountholder, that creates an item: “If you write a check or make a recurring payment. . .” As alleged herein, Plaintiff took only a single action to make a single payment; she may therefore be charged only a single fee. 41. Moreover, by expressly linking overdraft fees and NSF Fees in the Fee Schedule, City National bolsters the reasonable assumption that only a single fee can be assessed on an item. Here’s why: For an item charged an “overdraft fee” and thus paid into overdraft, there is no chance it can be subject to reprocessing and thus no chance it could be subject to a second or third fee, since it has already been paid. No reasonable contract reading could allow the other fee mentioned in the disclosure—the NSF Fee—to be treated so differently and assessed two or three times on the same item. 42. The disclosures described above never discuss a circumstance where City National may assess multiple NSF Fees for an item that was returned for insufficient funds and later reprocessed one or more times and returned again (incurring an NSF Fee). 43. In sum, City National promises that one $36 NSF Fee will be assessed per check or payment, and these terms must mean all iterations of the same instruction for payment. As such, City National breached the contract when it charged more than one fee per item. 44. Reasonable consumers understand any given authorization for payment to be one, singular check or payment as those terms are used in City National’s Terms and Conditions. 45. Taken together, the representations and omissions identified above convey to customers that all submissions for payment of the same transaction will be treated as the same “item,” which the Bank will either authorize (resulting in an overdraft item) or reject (resulting in a returned item) when it decides there are insufficient funds in the account. Nowhere does City 8 National disclose that it will treat each reprocessing of a check or ACH payment as a separate item, subject to additional fees, nor do City National customers ever agree to such fees. 46. Customers reasonably understand that the Bank’s reprocessing of checks or payments are simply additional attempts to complete the original order or instruction for payment, and as such, will not trigger additional NSF Fee. In other words, it is always the same item. 47. Banks like City National that employ this abusive multiple fee practice know how to plainly and clearly disclose it. Indeed, other banks and credit unions that do engage in this abusive practice disclose it expressly to their accountholders—something Defendant here never did. 48. For example, First Hawaiian Bank engages in the same abusive practices as Defendant, but at least currently discloses it in its online banking agreement, in all capital letters, as follows: 56. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rule 23. The National Class includes: All persons who, within the applicable statute of limitations period, were charged multiple NSF Fees for a single item in a City National checking account (the “Multiple NSF Fee Class”). The West Virginia sub-class includes: All persons residing in the State of West Virginia who, within the applicable statute of limitations period, were charged multiple NSF Fees for a single item in a City National checking account (the “West Virginia Sub-Class”). 57. Excluded from the Classes are Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries and affiliates, their officers, directors, and the members of their immediate families, and any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, the legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns of any such excluded party, the judicial officer(s) to whom this action is assigned, and the members of their immediate families. 58. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Classes and/or to add subclasses if necessary before this Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 59. The questions here are ones of common or general interest such that there is a well- defined community of interest among the members of the Classes. These questions predominate over questions that may affect only individual class members because City National has acted on 11 grounds generally applicable to the Classes. Such common legal or factual questions include, but are not limited to: a) Whether City National improperly charged more than one NSF Fee on the same item; b) Whether City National’s conduct violates the contract; c) Whether City National’s conduct violates the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; d) Whether City National’s conduct constitutes unjust enrichment; e) Whether City National’s conduct constitutes unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce within the meaning of W.Va. Code § 46A-6-104; and f) The appropriate measure of damages. 60. The parties are numerous such that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, and subject to class discovery, the Classes consist of thousands of members or more, the identities of whom are within the exclusive knowledge of and can be ascertained only by resort to City National’s records. City National has the administrative capability through its computer systems and other records to identify all members of the Classes, and such specific information is not otherwise available to Plaintiff. 61. It is impracticable to bring members’ of the Classes individual claims before the Court. Class treatment permits a large number of similarly situated persons or entities to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, expense, or the possibility of inconsistent or contradictory judgments that numerous individual actions would engender. The benefits of the class mechanism, including providing injured persons or entities with a method for obtaining redress on claims that might not be practicable to pursue individually, substantially outweigh any difficulties that may arise in the management of this class action. 12 62. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Classes in that they arise out of the same wrongful business practices by City National, as described herein. 63. Plaintiff is more than an adequate representative of the Classes in that Plaintiff has a City National checking account and has suffered damages as a result of City National’s contract violations, City National’s violations of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, City National’s unjust enrichment, and City National’s violation the West Virginia Consumer Credit And Protection Act (W.Va. Code § 46A-6-104). In addition: a) Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and has retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of class actions and, in particular, class actions on behalf of consumers against financial institutions; b) There is no conflict of interest between Plaintiff and the unnamed members of the Classes; c) Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the management of this litigation as a class action; and d) Plaintiff’s legal counsel has the financial and legal resources to meet the substantial costs and legal issues associated with this type of litigation. 64. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the maintenance of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 65. City National has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to each of the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole. 66. All conditions precedent to bringing this action have been satisfied and/or waived. 67. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Amended Petition as if fully set forth herein. 68. Plaintiff and City National contracted for checking account services, as embodied in the Terms and Conditions and Fee Schedule. 69. City National breached the terms of the Terms and Conditions and Fee Schedule. 70. Plaintiff and members of the putative Class have performed all of the obligations on them pursuant to the Bank’s Terms and Conditions and Fee Schedule. 71. Plaintiff and members of the putative Class have sustained monetary damages as a result of each of Defendant’s breaches. 72. Plaintiff and City National contracted for checking account services, as embodied in the Terms and Conditions and Fee Schedule. 73. All of the relevant states (with the possible exception of Texas) mandate that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing govern every contract. For banking transactions, this is also mandated by the Uniform Commercial Code that has been adopted in each state. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing constrains Defendant’s discretion to abuse self-granted contractual powers. 74. This good faith requirement extends to the manner in which a party employs discretion conferred by a contract. 75. Good faith and fair dealing, in connection with executing contracts and discharging performance and other duties according to their terms, means preserving the spirit—not merely the letter—of the bargain. Put differently, the parties to a contract are mutually obligated to comply with the substance of their contract in addition to its form. Evading the spirit of the bargain and 14 abusing the power to specify terms constitute examples of bad faith in the performance of contracts. 76. Subterfuge and evasion violate the obligation of good faith in performance even when an actor believes his conduct to be justified. A lack of good faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. Other examples of violations of good faith and fair dealing are willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s performance. 77. City National breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as explained herein. 78. Each of Defendant’s actions was done in bad faith and was arbitrary and capricious. 79. Plaintiff and members of the putative Class have performed all of the obligations imposed on them pursuant to the Terms and Conditions. 80. Plaintiff and members of the putative Class have sustained monetary damages as a result of each of Defendant’s breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 81. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Amended Petition as if fully set forth herein. 82. This Count is brought solely in the alternative. Plaintiff acknowledges that his breach of contract claim cannot be tried along with unjust enrichment. 83. To the detriment of Plaintiff and the Class, Defendant has been, and continues to be, unjustly enriched as a result of its wrongful conduct alleged herein. 15 84. Plaintiff and the Class conferred a benefit on Defendant when they paid Defendant the fees that were not disclosed or allowed for in the in the Terms and Conditions and Fee Schedule. 85. Defendant unfairly, deceptively, unjustly, and/or unlawfully accepted said benefits, which under the circumstances, would be unjust to allow Defendant to retain. 86. Plaintiff and the Class, therefore, seek disgorgement of all wrongfully obtained fees received by Defendant as a result of its inequitable conduct as more fully stated herein. 87. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Amended Petition as if fully set forth herein. 88. City National engages in trade or commerce in West Virginia and offers overdraft “protection” services to its customers, which services necessarily include, but are not limited to, financial services, bank account services, and the extension of consumer credit. 89. Banking accounts, financial services, overdraft protection, and processing, payment, and rejection of debit card transactions constitute a “service” as defined by W.Va. Code 9. As alleged herein, City National’s “TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF YOUR ACCOUNT” (“Terms and Conditions”) and its Fee Schedule convey to customers that a single $36 NSF Fee will be assessed when an item, including an electronic payment item, is returned for insufficient funds. BREACH OF CONTRACT AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (On Behalf of Plaintiff, the Multiple NSF Fee Class, and the West Virginia Sub-Class) 13 I. CITY NATIONAL CHARGES MORE THAN ONE NSF FEE ON THE SAME ITEM UNJUST ENRICHMENT (In the Alternative to COUNT I) (On Behalf of Plaintiff, the Multiple NSF Fee Class, and the West Virginia Sub-Class) VIOLATION OF WEST VIRGINIA CONSUMER CREDIT AND PROTECTION ACT (W.Va. Code § 46A-6-104, et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the West Virginia Sub-Class)

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1. Plaintiff Glen Ellyn Pharmacy, Inc., brings this action to secure redress for the actions of defendant ScriptPro, LLC, in sending or causing the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227 (“TCPA”), the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2 (“ICFA”), and the common law. 10. On July 19, 2011, plaintiff Glen Ellyn Pharmacy, Inc., received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine. 11. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 12. Defendant ScriptPro, LLC, is responsible for sending or causing the sending of the faxes. 13. Defendant ScriptPro, LLC, as the entity whose products or services were 3 advertised in the faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of the faxes. 14. Defendant ScriptPro, LLC, either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 15. Each fax refers to a website registered to defendant ScriptPro, LLC. 16. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to plaintiff. 17. On information and belief, the faxes attached hereto were sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 18. On information and belief, defendants have transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Illinois. 19. There is no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendants’ unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 2. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited fax advertising. Unsolicited fax advertising damages the recipients. The recipient is deprived of its paper and ink or toner and the use of its fax machine. The recipient also wastes valuable time it would have spent on something else. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving and sending authorized faxes, cause wear and tear on fax machines, and require labor to attempt to identify the source and purpose of the unsolicited faxes. 20. The faxes did not contain an opt-out notice that complied with 47 U.S.C. §227. 21. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 22. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 23. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, 4 whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 24. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 25. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 26. Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent. 27. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 36. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 37. Defendants engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of ICFA § 2, 815 ILCS 505/2, by sending unsolicited fax advertising to plaintiff and others. 38. Unsolicited fax advertising is contrary to the TCPA and also Illinois law. 720 ILCS 5/26-3(b) makes it a petty offense to transmit unsolicited fax advertisements to Illinois residents. 39. Defendants engaged in an unfair practice by engaging in conduct that is contrary to public policy, unscrupulous, and caused injury to recipients of their advertising. 40. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. 41. Defendants engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce. 42. Defendants’ conduct caused recipients of their advertising to bear the cost thereof. This gave defendants an unfair competitive advantage over businesses that advertise lawfully, such as by direct mail. For example, an advertising campaign targeting one million recipients would cost $500,000 if sent by U.S. mail but only $20,000 if done by fax broadcasting. The reason is that instead of spending $480,000 on printing and mailing his ad, the fax 7 broadcaster misappropriates the recipients’ paper and ink. “Receiving a junk fax is like getting junk mail with the postage due”. Remarks of Cong. Edward Markey, 135 Cong Rec E 2549, Tuesday, July 18, 1989, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 43. Defendants’ shifting of advertising costs to plaintiff and the class members in this manner makes such practice unfair. In addition, defendants’ conduct was contrary to public policy, as established by the TCPA and Illinois statutory and common law. 44. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 52. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 53. By sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes, defendants converted to their own use ink or toner and paper belonging to plaintiff and the class members. 54. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, plaintiff and the 9 class members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes. 55. By sending the unsolicited faxes, defendants appropriated to their own use the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes and used them in such manner as to make them unusable. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 56. Defendants knew or should have known that such appropriation of the paper and ink or toner was wrongful and without authorization. 57. Plaintiff and the class members were deprived of the paper and ink or toner, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 58. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 59. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons with Illinois fax numbers (b) who, on or after a date five years prior to the filing of this action, or such shorter period during which faxes were sent by or on behalf of defendant ScriptPro, LLC, and on or before a date 20 days following the filing of this action, (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of defendant ScriptPro, LLC, promoting its goods or services for sale (d) that did not contain an opt-out notice such as is described in 47 U.S.C. §227. 60. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 61. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether defendants engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax 10 advertisements; b. Whether defendants thereby violated the TCPA; c. Whether defendants thereby committed the tort of conversion; d. Whether defendants thereby engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of the ICFA. e. Whether defendants thereby converted the property of plaintiff. 62. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 63. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 64. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendants is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 65. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendants for: a. Appropriate damages; b. An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; c. Costs of suit; d. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 11 s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Michelle R. Teggelaar Julie Clark Heather A. Kolbus INTRODUCTION

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(Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)) (Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (1)(A)) 22. Sekure offers various payment technologies for businesses. 23. One of Sekure’s strategies for marketing its payment services and generating new customers is telemarketing. 24. Sekure’s telemarketing involves the use of an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) to solicit business. 25. Sekure uses ATDS equipment that has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, that includes autodialers and predictive dialers and that plays a prerecorded message once the calls connect. 26. The dialing system used by Sekure is the Five9 predictive dialer, a dialing system that is subject to the TCPA’s ATDS protections. 27. The Five9 predictive dialer works by loading a list of telephone numbers electronically into the dialer, and with the push of a single button, calls are made automatically and sequentially from that list. 28. Sekure has engaged in this conduct despite the fact that it was previously sued for violating the TCPA’s ATDS provisions and entered into a class action settlement. 29. Since that time, Sekure has also begun to employ the use of pre- recorded messages to generate new business. 50. Class Definition. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiffs brings this case on behalf of a class (the “Class”) defined as follows: All persons to whom: (a) Sekure and/or a third party acting on Sekure’s behalf made one or more non-emergency telephone calls; (b) promoting Sekure’s goods or services; (c) to their cellular telephone numbers; (d) through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (e) at any time in the period that begins February 2, 2018 through the date of trial. 59. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 60. The foregoing acts and omissions of Sekure and/or its affiliates or agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Sekure’s behalf, constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making non-emergency calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiffs and members of the Class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 61. As a result of violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by Sekure and/or its affiliates or agents and/or other persons or entities acting on its behalf, Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to an award of $500 in damages for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers 63. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 64. As a result of knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by Sekure, its affiliates or agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on its behalf, Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). IX. SOLUTIONS G.P., d/b/a SEKURE MERCHANT SOLUTIONS, Defendant. Case No. 8:18-cv-1981

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15. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and as a class action under Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking relief on behalf of the following class (the “Class”): All persons or entities who purchased or sold SSA bonds in the secondary market directly from Defendants in the United States from at least as early as January 1, 2005 through the present (the “Class Period”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their employees, parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co- conspirators, whether or not named in this Complaint, and all federal governmental entities. 16. The Class is so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff believes that thousands of individuals and entities transacted in SSA bonds directly with Defendants during the Class Period. 17. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other Class Members because they all sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ common course of conduct in violation of the law as described in this Complaint. The injuries and damages of each Class Member were directly caused by Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 18. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and has no interests adverse to the interests of absent Class Members. 19. Plaintiff is represented by counsel who is competent and experienced in class action litigation, including antitrust class action litigation. 53. Much like the U.S. Treasury borrows money by issuing bonds, supranational organizations, sub-sovereign entities, and government agencies issue bonds to raise capital. 54. “Supranational debt” is debt issued by supranational organizations – entities created as a result of collaboration between foreign governments to serve a particular purpose. Supranational debt includes debt issued by the European Investment Bank (“EIB”); the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), a member of the World Bank group; and the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”).5 55. Debt issued by national governments is called “sovereign debt.” Examples of sovereign debt include U.S. Treasury bills, notes, and bonds; French OATs (Obligations Assimilables du Tresor); and German Bunds. 56. Debt issued by political subdivisions within a country is called “sub-sovereign debt.” Examples include debt issued by Canadian provinces or German states (Landers). 58. Sub-sovereign and agency entities typically issue bonds in their local currency. However, these SSA bond issuers can and do issue debt in other currencies under certain circumstances, including the following: (a) SSA bond issuers may seek to take advantage of lower borrowing costs. For example, European SSA bond issuers may issue bonds in U.S. dollars because of lower costs associated with borrowing in U.S. dollars compared to borrowing in Euros. (b) Issuers may issue SSA bonds in U.S. dollars to diversify their investor base to include a broader number of U.S. investors. (c) Volatility in a local currency, which can lead to devaluation of the SSA bonds issued in that currency, may encourage an entity to issue debt in currencies with more stability (whether perceived or real). For example, if the Japanese government prints more Japanese yen, i.e., increasing the money supply, in order to meet existing national debt obligations, the Japanese yen becomes less valuable relative to other currencies. This devaluation of the yen impacts investors of yen-denominated SSA bonds by potentially causing them to lose money in real terms, i.e., relative to having invested in debt denominated in a different currency. Thus, to reduce this risk and attract a larger and broader base of investors, an entity may issue debt in other, less volatile currencies. 60. Banks, including Defendants, compete with each other to provide underwriting services for SSA bonds. An important criterion in an issuer’s selection of an underwriter is the bank’s ability to provide liquidity in the secondary market. For example, an EIB official stated that “[l]ike all responsible issuers, we too monitor our secondary market liquidity and turnover. In other words, we also monitor trading performance of dealers.”7 A former trader at one of the bank Defendants acknowledged: “Issuers conduct empirical measurements and publish a chart. They use these charts to award business . . . . So say, you are bank Z, you will get told by the issuer where you rank on that chart to incentivize you to do more secondary business.”8 Thus, issuers often favor those banks with a proven track record of providing liquidity in the secondary market. B. Pricing of SSA Bonds 61. Similar to other bonds, the prices of SSA bonds are stated in terms of the bond’s par value, coupon, and maturity date. A bond’s par value is its face value, payable on the bond’s maturity date. A bond’s coupon is the interest rate that the bond issuer must pay an investor. Coupons are paid to the bond-holder periodically – usually every 6 months, although that can vary – until the bond reaches maturity. 63. A bond’s attractiveness can also be stated in terms of its yield. Yield is a figure that shows the return that an investor receives by holding the bond to maturity. Bond price and yield have an inverse relationship: lowering one will result in a rise in the other. 64. This inverse relationship is due to the fact that a bond’s price will be higher when it pays a coupon that is higher than prevailing interest rates. As market interest rates increase, bond prices decrease. Because yield takes into account both a bond’s coupon and its price, yield can be an effective means to compare bonds with different coupons and prices. 65. As a result of their relative safety, SSA bonds usually trade at a price that is comparable to sovereign debt. In industry parlance, the price spread between SSA bonds and sovereign debt is known as a “safe spread” – i.e., the incremental yield over the sovereign debt counterpart but with the potential for minimal additional credit risk. 66. The risk premium associated with SSA bonds over their sovereign bond counterparts can depend on a number of factors, including the level of credit risk associated with the guarantor; the level of political risk faced by the issuer; and the level of inherent liquidity risk, which itself is determined with respect to the tenor, size, and currency mix of the SSA bonds. C. Resale of SSA Bonds in the Secondary Market 68. Customers seeking to purchase or sell SSA bonds will contact one or more banks, such as Defendants (or a broker who then contacts one of the Defendants), and request pricing for a particular SSA bond. The bank will quote the price for an SSA bond in terms of a “bid” price or an “ask” price. The bid price represents the maximum price at which a dealer will purchase the SSA bond; the ask price represents the minimum price at which a dealer will sell the SSA bond. The difference between these two values is the “bid-ask spread” (or “spread”), which reflects the dealer’s profit for acting as a market maker and assuming the risk that it may be unable to purchase or sell the SSA bond in the future at better prices than it is offering at the time to its customer. 69. As is typical in many financial markets, trading of SSA bonds is done through telephonic and, increasingly, electronic means. Orders are taken by salespersons at dealers, which are then relayed to bond traders at the banks’ trading desks so they can be filled. 70. Defendants dominate the secondary market, acting as “market makers” that provide liquidity to investors by their willingness to buy and sell SSA bonds whenever an investor seeks to do so. 72. SSA bonds are generally regarded as highly secure investments, and SSA bond issuers are generally characterized by having “well-diversified, high performing portfolio of assets with . . . strong capital ratios and healthy liquidity buffers.”9 74. As a result of both explicit and implicit guarantees on their debt, SSA bond issuers enjoy very high credit ratings, and their bonds are considered “investment grade,” i.e., low risk of default. 75. Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) and Moody’s, two leading credit rating agencies, rate SSA bond issues. A bond is considered investment grade if its credit rating is “BBB-” or higher by S&P, or “Baa3” or higher by Moody’s. E. Increased Popularity of SSA Bonds 76. Recent global economic crises and the consequent aversion for investment risk have resulted in the SSA bond market becoming an increasingly important sector within the overall bond market because of SSA bonds’ relatively low risk profiles. Indeed, investor demand for SSA bonds has increased steadily between 2005 and the present, with the SSA bond market tripling in size over the period 2005-2012. 77. SSA bonds have remained a popular investment, and more recently, there has been an increased demand specifically for U.S. dollar-denominated SSA bonds. 79. As a result, many European entities found that issuing SSA bonds in U.S. dollars provided greater economic opportunities – both in terms of funding costs and generating investor appetite. Indeed, CADES, a French SSA bond issuer, noted that conditions created a “favorable cross-currency basis swap [between U.S. dollars and euros that] has allowed us to swap the proceeds back into euros to achieve very attractive all-in funding costs.”13 A. Background of the SSA Bond Market

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18. Front air bags for both drivers and passengers are a fundamental safety feature in modern vehicles. Federal statutes and regulations promulgated by NHTSA have, for over 20 years, required all passenger cars to have front air bags for drivers and passengers. These laws and regulations also require the air bags to meet certain crash-safety standards. 19. NHTSA’s regulations have further required, for over 12 years, that all passenger cars have “advanced air bags,” which must have sensors to detect when children and smaller adults are sitting in the front passenger seat and either deactivate the air bag or deploy the air bag with less force when appropriate. 20. Automotive companies now equip most, if not all, models of vehicles with an Occupant Classification System (“OCS”) – a system of sensors that detect the detect the presence of a front-seat passenger, the passenger’s approximate weight, and the passenger’s seating position. OCS data is used to determine if the airbag should be deployed, and the velocity at which it should be deployed in a collision. Different airbag deployment velocities are used depending upon the weight of the front-seat passenger. 22. Nissan marketed and advertised (and continues to market and advertise) its vehicles, including the 2015 Altimas, as safe and reliable. 23. For example, Nissan’s website lists the standard “Nissan Advanced Air Bag System with dual-stage supplemental front air bags with seat-belt and occupant-classification sensors” as a reason why consumers should purchase a 2015 Altima.2 24. The web pages for other Nissan vehicles promote similar safety features of the other Nissan models affected by the 2016 recall. The same information is routinely given to customers at Nissan dealerships in brochures and is readily available on the internet to any interested car buyer in the form of digital brochures. 26. In March 2014, Nissan launched a safety recall campaign to reprogram the OCS ECU in several different models of 2013 and 2014 Nissan vehicles manufactured prior to March 2014. See Exhibit 1 at p. 4. 27. Nissan describes the defect as follows: In the subject vehicles, a small number of rare passenger ingress scenarios and unusual seating postures immediately upon entering the vehicle, can cause the Occupant Classification System (OCS) to initially classify an adult passenger as a child or classify an occupied seat as an “empty seat.” In both of such rare instances, the passenger airbag will be suppressed. If the vehicle begins driving while this condition is present, the current OCS logic will lock this classification until the vehicle comes to a stop and remains stationary for 12-13 seconds. In the case of a child classification, the current logic is designed to illuminate the Passenger Airbag Indicator (PABI) light, alerting the customer that the air bag is disabled. However, if the initial classification is “empty seat,” the PABI light will not illuminate and there is no indication to the seat occupant that the air bag is suppressed. In both instances, this issue may cause the passenger airbag not to deploy as designed in a crash, increasing the risk of injury to the front passenger seat occupant. Nissan will also address a supply chain error which led to a small number of incorrect OCS control unit service parts being installed on certain Nissan Pathfinder vehicles during service. If this occurred, incompatibility may cause the OCS not to perform as designed and the passenger airbag not to deploy as designed in a crash, increasing the risk of injury to the front passenger seat occupant. See Exhibit 1, at p. 3-4. 29. In short, the 2014 recall stems from a defect in the OCS software. The software installed in the Nissan Vehicles’ OCS may incorrectly determine that the passenger seat is empty when it is, in fact, occupied. When that happens, the front passenger seat air bags would fail to deploy in an accident, increasing the possibility of injury or death to the front seat passenger. The 2014 Recall Did Not Remedy the OCS Defect 30. Despite the 2014 recall, Nissan noted an elevated warranty claims rate in relation to the OCS system in its vehicles, indicating that the OCS defect persisted in many, if not all, of the affected models of Nissan vehicles. See Exhibit 1, at p. 4. 31. Despite the fact that Nissan had been aware of the OCS defect for a significant period of time, the 2014 recall did not properly fix the defect in many, if not all, of the affected models of Nissan vehicles. 32. Despite many Nissan vehicle owners going through the time-consuming process of bringing their vehicles to a Nissan dealer for service to fix the OCS defect, the defect remained, indicating that those procedures were insufficient to repair the OCS defect. 34. In late December 2015 to January 2016, Nissan became aware of three incidents where the OCS system “may not” have performed as designed in a crash. 35. These incidents, along with the continued complaints from Nissan owners, led to another Nissan OCS recall beginning in April 2016 (the “2016 recall”). 36. During or about April 2016, Nissan began sending the Interim Owner Notification for NHTSA Recall 16V-244 (“ION”) to owners of 2015 Altimas, as well as owners of many other years and models of Nissan vehicles, as set forth directly below. See ION, attached hereto as Exhibit 3. 38. The ION advised Nissan owners, including, but not limited to, owners of 2015 Altimas, that the reason for the 2016 recall was as follows: The Occupant Classification System (OCS) is designed to classify the size and weight of the front seat passenger and, under certain conditions, automatically turn OFF the passenger air bag. The OCS system is designed to only deploy the front passenger airbag when the front passenger seat is occupied by an adult. In the affected vehicles, the OCS software may incorrectly classify the passenger seat as empty when it is occupied by an adult. If the OCS does not detect an adult occupant in the passenger seat, the passenger airbag would be deactivated. Failure of the passenger airbag to deploy during a crash (where deployment is warranted) could increase the risk of injury to the passenger. See Exhibit 3. 39. Despite the fact that Nissan admitted to its customers that their vehicles contained a dangerous defect that could cause serious injury or death to a passenger, Nissan did not have parts available to provide repairs to the affected vehicles at that time. See Exhibit 3. Plaintiff’s 2015 Altima and Defective OCS 40. On or about October 10, 2015, Plaintiff purchased and took delivery of a 2015 Nissan Altima from Uftring Nissan (“Uftring”) in Peoria, Illinois, Vehicle Identification Number 55. Another 2015 Altima owner reported the following to NHTSA on or about February 27, 2018: 61. Another 2015 Altima owner reported the following to NHTSA on or about October 28, 2016: 73. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as members of the proposed class defined as follows (the “Class”): All individuals or entities who purchased or leased a 2015 Nissan Altima in the State of Illinois within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 75. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all its member is impractical. While the exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Class includes thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that the Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Nissan and its authorized dealers. 76. This suit is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) because the Class is so numerous that joinder of all its members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class Action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. 78. As an individual who purchased a 2015 Nissan Altima in the State of Illinois within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. 79. Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the Class. 81. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other Class members not parties to such adjudications or that would substantially impair or impede the ability of such non-party Class members to protect their interests. 82. Nissan has acted or refused to act in respect generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with regard to the Class as a whole. 83. The size and definition of the Class can be identified through Nissan’s records, Nissan’s agents’ records and/or other third parties’ records. 84. Plaintiff hereby adopts and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 83 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 85. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Chapter 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. (“Warranty Act”) is applicable to Plaintiff in that the 2015 Altima was manufactured and purchased after July 4, 1975, and cost in excess of ten dollars ($10.00). 86. Plaintiff purchased the 2015 Altima, a consumer product, during the written warranty period applicable to the 2015 Altima and was entitled to enforce the written warranties against Defendant. 88. Plaintiff’s purchase of the 2015 Altima was accompanied by written factory warranties covering any nonconformities or defects in material or workmanship, including the OCS defect described herein. 89. Defendant’s written warranty was a basis of the bargain of the sale between Dealership and Plaintiff. 90. Plaintiff’s purchase of the 2015 Altima was induced by these written warranties and Plaintiff relied upon these written warranties to his detriment. 91. Plaintiff has fully complied with all of his obligations under the written warranties. 92. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s failure to comply with its express written warranties by failing to correct the OCS defect as described herein, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer damages and, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1), is entitled to bring suit for such damages and other legal and equitable relief, including attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with this action. 93. Plaintiff hereby adopts and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 92 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 94. The 2015 Altima purchased by Plaintiff was subject to implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7), running from Defendant to Plaintiff. 95. Defendant appointed Uftring as its agent for purposes of transferring the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose to Plaintiff. 97. Defendant is prohibited from disclaiming or modifying any implied warranty when making a written warranty to a consumer. 98. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2308, Plaintiff’s 2015 Altima was impliedly warranted to be fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was intended and for the particular purpose for which it is used by Plaintiff. 99. The above-described defects and nonconformities, including the OCS defect, present in the 2015 Altima render the 2015 Altima unfit for the ordinary purpose for which it was intended and for the particular purpose for which it is used by Plaintiff. 100. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s breach of implied warranties, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer various damages. Air Bags and the Occupant Classification System Breach of Written Warranty Pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Breach of Implied Warranties Pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 8,000. UPDATED 10/18/16*LJ THE CONSUMER STATED AFTER THE RECALL WAS PERFORMED, THE LIGHTED ILLUMINATED AGAIN. THE NOTIFIED. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 51,000. THE VIN WAS NOT AVAILABLE. PLEASE ASSIST ME IN GETTING THIS SAFETY ISSUE RESOLVED. I CONTACTED NISAN AGAIN AND THEY HAVE NOT RETURNED MY CALL. SAFETY ISSUE IN WHICH NO ONE SEAMS TO CARE ABOUT. YOU WOULD THINK THAT WITH ALL OF THE RECENT TROUBLES WITH AIRBAGS, SOMEONE WOULD

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12 13 22 ACT 23 3 4.1. Plaintiff brinbs this action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated Class members pursuant to CR 23 of the Washington Civil Rules. 4.2. Plaintiff asserts and seeks certification of the following class (the putative "Class"):) A11 persons and entities within the State of Washington that have made first-party property damage claims under contracts of automobile insurance with American Farrtily that provided for payment of the actual cash value of the policyholder's vehicle (less any applicable deductible) in the event of total loss, and (1) where policyholders experienced a total loss of their insured vehicle covered under such policy, (2) where such claims for total loss were evaluated by American Family using the Autosource valuation system, and (3) where such claims were paid by American Family to the policyholder or a lienholder without the parties agreeing to use, and using, an alternative appraisal process described in the policyholder's policy. 4.3. Numerosity. The members of the putative Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all members is impracticable. The identity and precise number of putative Class tnembers, thotiah unknown to Plaintiff, is reasonably ascertainable from American Family's records. Because American Family controls a sizeable market share ofthe local automobile insurance industry, and the large number of claims that it settles with respect to total loss vehicles, the putative Class is estimated to comprise many thousands of people. 4.4. Commonality and Predominance. This action involves common questions of law and fact as to the claims of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class, which predominate over any questions affecting individual putative Class members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: ' Plaintiff maintains the right to create additional subclasses or classes, if necessary, and to revise these definitions to maintain a cohesive class which does not require individual inquiry to determine liability. 5.1. American Family advertises and sells automobile policies in the State of Washington that include first-party physical damage coverages including Comprehensive, Collision and Underinsured Property Damage. 5.2. American Family's policies give American Family the choice to settle a loss claim under its property damage coverages in one of two ways: a) By paying the cost to repair the covered vehicle, minus any applicable deductible; or b) By paying the "actual cash value" of the covered vehicle (prior to being damaged), minus any applicable deductible. 5.3. American Family deems vehicles to be a total loss when the cost to repair the vehicle exceeds the veliicle's "actual cash value." 5.4. "Actual cash value" is not a defined term in American Family's auto policies. 5.5. The settlement of total loss claims in the State of Washington is regulated by 6 6.1 Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as if fiilly set forth 4 I I herein. 5 6.15 American Family's conduct is egregious and pervasive, and without regard to the 9 transportation needs of its insureds. 10 6.17 As a result, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover damages including 13 attorney's fees, prejudgment interest and exemplary damages. 14 6.12 The Autosource system used by American Family violates WAC 284-30-391 19 because it uses a statistically invalid methodology. Specifically, the practices of deducting 6 20 percent from the advertised price of comparable vehicles to account for "typical negotiation." 21 The Autosource system violates specific provisions of WAC 284-30-391 by reducing total loss 22 payments tln•ough deductions that are not verifiable and not based on local, current data. 23 ' 6.14 Through its use of this invalid methodology, American Family is elevating its 7 own financial interests over that of its first party insureds. 8 6.16 American Family's conduct violates the common law duty of an insurer to act in 11 good faith. 12 6.19 Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged as a result of American Family's 18 wrongful use of an invalid methodology to value policyholders' total loss claims. 19 6.11 WAC 284-30-391 sets forth the standards of practice for settlement of total loss 14 vehicle claims. It requires insurer to, among other things, pay the fair market value of the 15 policyholder's vehicle immediately pi-ior to the incident in which it was damaged. If a 16 computerized source is used to make this determination, the system must use statistically valid 17 criteria. 18 6.13 Due to this and other wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to 24 recover their actual damages, including damages sufficient to make them whole for American 25 6.18 American Family has breached the implied covenant ofgood faith and fair 16 dealing owed to Plaintiff and the Class. 17 6.29 The Court should enjoin American Family fi-om engaging in further deceptive 23 acts and practices pursuant to RCW 19.86.090. 24 25 6.2 American Family entered into policies of automobile insurance with Plaintiff and 6 other members of the putative Class. These policies govern the relationship between American 7 Family, Plaintiff, and other Class Members, and they likewise govern the handling of total loss 8 claims. 9 6.21 The business of insurance affects the public interest. 24 25 6.27 American Family used an invalid methodology to wrongfully reduce the amounts 15 paid to its insureds with total loss claims. 16 6.28 An actual and justiciable controversy has arisen and now exists between the Class 17 and American Family concerning American Family's system form detennining Actual Cash 18 Value. The Class is entitled to a judicial declaration from this Court of the rights of the Class 19 and obligations ofAmerican Faniily under the policies. The Class is entitled to a judicial 20 declaration that American Family has acted in violation of Washington insurance regulations and in bad faith by using an invalid methodology to underpay total loss claims. This action is timely 21 and appropi-iate under applicable law. 22 6.20 Plaintiff and the Class ai-e entitled to recover actual and consequential damages 20 including attorney's fees and prejudgment interest.. 21 6.26 Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to be paid the Actual Case Value of vehicles 13 determined to be total losses. 14 6.3 The insurance policies at issue were drafted by American Family or its agents. 10 6.4 The insurance policy at issue with Plaintiff is essentially identical in all material 11 respects with the policies entered into with other Class Members. 12 6.5 Plaintiff and other Class Members perfonned their material duties as provided in 13 their policies; 14 6.6 The policies of insurance American Family issued to Plaintiff and other members 15 of the putative Class provide that in the event of a total loss, American Family will pay the 16 "actual cash value" (ACV) of the loss. 17 6.7 In proposing and makinQ ACV payments under the policies with Plaintiff and 18 members ofthe putative Class, American Family b•eached its contractual duties to Plaintiffand 19 the putative Class, including the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, by: 20 a. deducting an arbiti-ary, fixed percentage of the "appraised" value of the insured vehicle as determined by an automated and systematically 21 determined Audatex valuation, ostensibly based upon "negotiation" 22 fi-om listed pi-ices published by auto dealers; 23 24 25 7 MUNA NOOR on behalf of herself and all 8 other similarly situated, me 9 Plaintiffs, 10 0 FAIR DEALING 15

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16. On May 5, 2016 Kroger announced that Equifax systems had been subject to the Data Breach, and that an unknown number of current and former associates’ W-2s had been obtained by unauthorized persons. The PII in employee’s W-2s includes names, addresses, Social Security numbers, alternative identification numbers, wage information, employment information, and other personal information. 17. Defendant Equifax has yet to acknowledge the breach, or notify victims of the Data Breach. 18. According to a Kroger spokesman, other companies which rely upon Equifax for W-2 services may have also been subject to the Data Breach, as the inadequate security measures, discussed infra, were the standard Equifax operating method.3 B. Equifax Promised to Protect Its Customers’ Employees’ PII, but Maintained Inadequate Data Security 20. With Regard to W-2s in particular, prior to the Data Breach, Equifax explained “[a]s W-2 data is sensitive and subject to federal regulations, every precaution is taken to ensure both security and accuracy. Equifax performs extensive testing and reviews before distribution.”6 Equifax further reassured customers that “Equifax makes it easy to manage administration related to W-2s through web Manager. This user- friendly online tool is seamlessly integrated into all Equifax services, and can only be accessed by authorized staff members with a valid user ID and PIN.”7 (emphasis added) 21. Prior to the Data Breach, Equifax promised its customers and everyone about whom it collects PII that it would reasonably protect their PII. Equifax’s privacy policy stated, in relevant part: “We have built our reputation on our commitment to deliver reliable information to our customers (both businesses and consumers) and to protect the privacy and confidentiality of personal information about consumers.”8 23. Despite that admonition, Defendant set default passwords and PIN numbers for its W-2 services as the last four digits of individual’s social security numbers and the four digit year of birth for those individuals. 24. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII (in the form of at a minimum their W- 2s) was disclosed to Equifax, and Equifax compiled, maintained, and furnished Class Members’ PII, in connection with Class Members’ acquisition of services, through Defendant’s “The Work Number” service. Equifax is allowed to perform such services, involving such sensitive information, only if it adheres to the requirements of laws meant to protect the privacy of such information, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”). Equifax’s maintenance, use, and furnishing of such PII is and was intended to affect Plaintiff and other Class Members, and the harm caused by disclosure of that PII in the Data Breach was entirely foreseeable to Equifax. 25. Equifax touts itself as an industry leader in data breach security and often promotes the importance of data breach prevention. Equifax offers services directly targeted to assisting businesses who have encountered a data breach.10 26. Equifax expressly advises businesses which have lost customer data to “Quickly Notify Those Affected”; “Provide Personalized Communication”; and “Offer Credit Protection.”11 Despite those admonitions, to date, Equifax has not reached out to affected employees, and has not provided personalized communications to those affected, or offered credit protection to those whose W-2s were compromised by the Data Breach. C. Impact of the Data Breach 28. The exposure of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Social Security numbers in particular poses serious problems. Criminals frequently use Social Security numbers to create false bank accounts, file fraudulent tax returns, and incur credit in the victim’s name. Neal O’Farrell, a security and identity theft expert for Credit Sesame calls a Social Security number “your secret sauce,” that is “as good as your DNA to hackers.”13 Even where data breach victims obtain a new Social Security number, the Social Security Administration warns “that a new number probably will not solve all [] problems . . . and will not guarantee [] a fresh start.”14 In fact, “[f]or some victims of identity theft, a new number actually creates new problems.” One of those new problems is that a new Social Security number will have a completely blank credit history, making it difficult to get credit for a few years unless it is linked to the old compromised number. 30. The risks that Plaintiff and Class Members bear as a result of the Data Breach cannot be fully mitigated by credit monitoring because it can only help detect, but will not prevent, the fraudulent use of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII. Instead, Plaintiff and Class Members will need to spend time and money to protect themselves. For instance, credit reporting agencies impose fees for credit freezes in certain states. In addition, while credit reporting agencies offer consumers one free credit report per year, consumers who request more than one credit report per year from the same credit reporting agency (such as Equifax) must pay a fee for the additional report. Such fees constitute out-of-pocket costs to Plaintiff and Class Members. D. Equifax Was Required to Investigate and Provide Timely and Adequate Notification of the Data Breach under Federal Regulations 34. Further, “[w]hen a financial institution becomes aware of an incident of unauthorized access to sensitive customer information, the institution should conduct a reasonable investigation to promptly determine the likelihood that the information has been or will be misused. If the institution determines that misuse of its information about a customer has occurred or is reasonably possible, it should notify the affected customer as soon as possible.” See id. 35. Credit bureaus are “financial institutions” for purposes of the GLBA, and are therefore subject to its provisions. See TransUnion LLC v. F.T.C., 295 F.3d 42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Under Regulation Y promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, “credit bureau services15” are “so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.” Since Equifax is a credit bureau and performs credit bureau services, it qualifies as a financial institution for purposes of the GLBA. 37. Upon information and belief, Equifax failed to “develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive information security program” with “administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” that were “appropriate to [its] size and complexity, the nature and scope of [its] activities, and the sensitivity of any customer information at issue.” This includes, but is not limited to, Equifax’s failure to implement and maintain adequate data security practices to safeguard Class Members’ PII; (b) failing to detect the Data Breach in a timely manner; and (c) failing to disclose that Defendants’ data security practices were inadequate to safeguard Class Members’ PII. 38. Upon information and belief, Equifax also failed to “develop and implement a risk-based response program to address incidents of unauthorized access to customer information in customer information systems” as mandated by the GLBA. This includes, but is not limited to, Equifax’s failure to notify appropriate regulatory agencies, law enforcement, and the affected individuals themselves of the Data Breach in a timely and adequate manner. 39. Equifax has also failed to notify affected customers as soon as possible after it became aware of unauthorized access to sensitive customer information, and has failed to communicate directly with Class Members to date. E. Equifax Failed to Comply with FTC Requirements 40. According to the FTC, the failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data constitutes an unfair act or practices prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. 42. The FTC also has published a document entitled “FTC Facts for Business” which highlights the importance of having a data security plan, regularly assessing risks to computer systems, and implementing safeguards to control such risks. 43. And the FTC has issued orders against businesses that failed to employ reasonable measures to secure customer data. These orders provide further guidance to businesses with regard to their data security obligations. 44. By failing to have reasonable data security measures in place, Equifax engaged in an unfair act or practice within the meaning of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 45. Plaintiff brings all claims as class claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (c)(4). A. Nationwide Class 46. Plaintiff brings the negligence, negligence per se claims and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Counts I, II and IV) on behalf of a proposed nationwide class (“Nationwide Class”), defined as follows: All natural persons and entities in the United States whose personally identifiable information was acquired by unauthorized persons in the data breach announced by Kroger on May 5, 2016. B. Georgia Subclass 48. Plaintiff also brings the negligence and negligence per se claims (counts III and IV) separately on behalf of the Georgia Subclass, in the alternative to bringing those claims on behalf of the Nationwide Class. 49. Except where otherwise noted, “Class Members” shall refer to members of the Nationwide Class and the Georgia Subclass, collectively. 50. Excluded from the Nationwide Class and the Statewide Subclass are Defendants and their current employees, as well as the Court and its personnel presiding over this action. 51. The Nationwide and Statewide Subclass meet the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) for all of the reasons set forth in Paragraphs 39-47: 52. Numerosity: The Nationwide and Statewide Subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Kroger employees more than 431,000 people, who may be subject to the Data Breach.16 The parties will be able to identify each member of the Nationwide Class and Statewide Subclass after Defendants’ document production and/or related discovery. 54. Typicality: All Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Nationwide Class, and each Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Statewide Subclass. 55. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Nationwide Class and Statewide Subclasses. Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to, or in conflict with, the Class Members. There are no claims or defenses that are unique to Plaintiff. Likewise, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in class action and complex litigation, including data breach litigation, that have sufficient resources to prosecute this action vigorously. 56. Predominance: The proposed action meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the Nationwide Class and Statewide Subclass predominate over any questions which may affect only individual Class Members in any of the proposed classes, including those listed in paragraph 40, supra. 58. Absent a class action, the majority of Class Members would find the cost of litigating their claims prohibitively high and would have no effective remedy. 59. Risks of Prosecuting Separate Actions: Plaintiff’s claims also meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) because prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards for Equifax. Equifax continues to maintain the PII of the Class Members and other individuals, and varying adjudications could establish incompatible standards with respect to: Defendants’ duty to protect individuals’ PII; and whether the injuries suffered by Class Members are legally cognizable, among others. Prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would also create a risk of individual adjudications that would be dispositive of the interests of other Class Members not parties to the individual adjudications, or substantially impair or impede the ability of Class Members to protect their interests. 60. Injunctive Relief: In addition, Defendants have acted and/or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Nationwide and Statewide Subclass, making injunctive and/or declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). Defendants continue to (1) maintain the PII of Class Members, and (2) fail to adequately protect their PII. 61. Certification of Particular Issues: In the alternative, the Nationwide and Statewide Subclass may be maintained as class actions with respect to particular issues, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 63. Equifax owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class Members, arising from the sensitivity of the information and the foreseeability of its data safety shortcomings resulting in an intrusion, to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding their sensitive personal information. This duty included, among other things, designing, maintaining, monitoring, and testing Equifax’s security systems, protocols, and practices to ensure that Class Members’ information adequately secured from unauthorized access. 64. Equifax’s privacy policy acknowledged Equifax’s duty to adequately protect Class Member’s PII. 65. Equifax owed a duty to Class Members to implement intrusion detection processes that would detect a data breach in a timely manner. 66. Equifax also had a duty to delete any PII that was no longer needed to serve client needs. 67. Equifax owed a duty to disclose the material fact that its data security practices were inadequate to safeguard Class Member’s PII. 68. Equifax also had independent duties under state laws that required Equifax to reasonably safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII and promptly notify them about the Data Breach. 69. Equifax had a special relationship with Plaintiff and Class Members from being entrusted with their PII, which provided an independent duty of care. Plaintiff’s and other Class Members’ willingness to entrust Equifax with their PII was predicated on the understanding that Equifax would take adequate security precautions. Moreover, Equifax had the ability to protect its systems and the PII it stored on them from attack. 70. Equifax’s role to utilize and purportedly safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII presents unique circumstances requiring a reallocation of risk. 72. But for Equifax’s breach of its duties, Class Member’s PII would not have been accessed by unauthorized individuals. 73. Plaintiff and Class Members were foreseeable victims of Equifax’s inadequate data security practices. Equifax knew or should have known that a breach of its data security systems would cause damages to Class Members. 74. Equifax’s negligent conduct provided a means for unauthorized intruders to obtain Plaintiff’s and the Nationwide Class Member’s PII and consumer reports. 75. As a result of Equifax’s willful failure to prevent the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class Members suffered injury, which includes but is not limited to exposure to a heightened, imminent risk of fraud, identity theft, and financial harm. Plaintiff and Class Members must more closely monitor their financial accounts and credit histories to guard against identity theft. Class Members also have incurred, and will continue to incur on an indefinite basis, out-of-pocket costs for obtaining credit reports, credit freezes, credit monitoring services, and other protective measures to deter or detect identity theft. The unauthorized acquisition of Plaintiff’s and Class Member’s PII has also diminished the value of the PII. 76. The damages to Plaintiff and the Class Members were a proximate, reasonably foreseeable result of Equifax’s breaches of its duties. 77. Therefore, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 78. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-61 as if fully set forth herein. 80. Equifax violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to use reasonable measures to protect PII and not complying with applicable industry standards. Equifax’s conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of PII it obtained and stored and the foreseeable consequences of a data breach in their systems, including specifically the immense damages that would result to consumers. 81. Equifax’s violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act constitutes negligence per se. 82. Members of the Class and Subclass are within the class of persons Section 5 of the FTC Act was intended to protect as they are individuals engaged in trade and commerce, and bear the risk associated with defendant’s failure to properly secure their 97. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-61 as if fully set forth herein. 98. Under Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-912(a), “[a]ny information broker … that maintains computerized data that includes personal information of individuals shall give notice of any breach of the security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of this state whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. The notice shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay … .” A. The Data Breach Compromised the PII of Thousands of Consumers NEGLIGENCE (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class and the Statewide Subclass) NEGLIGENCE PER SE (On behalf of the Nationwide Class and the Statewide Subclass) VIOLATION OF THE GEORGIA SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION ACT Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-912, et seq. (On Behalf of the Georgia Subclass)

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PRACTICES ACT 10. Plaintiff is a user of telephone services for her personal use and a "consumer" as that term is defined by §1692a(3) of the FDCPA. 11. Plaintiff incurred an alleged debt for goods and services for personal, family or household purposes, with regards to a cellular phone account with T-Mobile (“alleged debt” herein). 12. The alleged debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by §1692a(5) of the FDCPA, i.e. – telephone services for personal use. 13. Due to her financial circumstances, Plaintiff could not pay the alleged debt, and it subsequently went into default. 14. Plaintiff has information and belief that the last payment on the alleged debt was prior to January 1, 2016. 15. The alleged debt was subsequently assigned to Southwest Credit for the purposes of collecting the alleged debt. 18. The language of the Letter further indicated that the Letter was also a solicitation to resolve the alleged debt for a discount. The Letter also created a false sense of urgency by stating that “we are not obligated to renew this offer”. 19. The Letter further indicated an account balance of $1978.01. 20. However, Defendants’ records and/or the records of T-Mobile show Plaintiff’s last payment was made on her account at least four or more years before the date of the Letter, February 27, 2020. 22. The Letter which sought to collect a time barred alleged debt was false and misleading to the unsophisticated/least sophisticated consumer in so much as at the very least it failed to disclose in any way that a) the alleged debt was time barred debt and unenforceable, and b) that any partial payment could reinstate the applicable statute of limitations. See Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 2016). 23. The Letter was a "communication" as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 24. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, John Does, approved, directed, and/or supervised the preparation and sending of letters in the form of Exhibit A to Ms. Traylor and the class members. 25. Plaintiff further alleges that Exhibit A was misleading and created a significant risk of harm as contemplated by the FDCPA and constitutes a concrete injury in-fact as articulated in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 27. Plaintiff re-alleges the above paragraphs as if set forth fully in this count. 28. 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A) and (10) of the FDCPA provide as follows: 30. Plaintiff re-alleges the above paragraphs as if set forth fully in this count. 31. 15 U.S.C. §1692f of the FDCPA provides as follows: PRACTICES ACT

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15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) 15. In 2003, FACTA was enacted by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush. One of FACTA’s primary purposes was to amend the FCRA through the addition of identity theft protections for consumers. 16. One FACTA provision was specifically designed to thwart identity thieves’ ability to gain sensitive information regarding a consumer’s credit or debit account from a receipt which the consumer discarded or lost. Codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g), this provision provides: Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no person that accepts credit or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of sale or transaction. (“Receipt Provision”). 18. Thus, FACTA gave companies a generous three-year window within which to comply with the Receipt Provision. 19. Notwithstanding the fact that it had years to comply, Defendant continues to issue receipts at the point of sale or transaction that contain more than 5 digits from the credit card or account number or the expiration date, in direct violation of the Receipt Provision. 20. Even prior to FACTA’s enactment, the payment card industry began requiring merchants to comply with requirements that were at least as rigorous as FACTA’s requirements. For example, upon information and belief, (i) effective July 1, 2003 for new machines, Visa instituted a receipt truncation policy limiting the information on receipts given to cardholders to the last four digits of the account number, and requiring the expiration date to be eliminated altogether, and (ii) effective July 1, 2006 for existing machines, it mandated the same truncation requirements. Upon information and belief, these requirements were (and continue to be) set forth in a manual entitled Rules For Visa Merchants, Card Acceptance and Chargeback Management Guide. 21. Defendant accepts Visa cards and is a party to a contract requiring compliance with the these truncation requirements, and thus upon information and belief had knowledge of 23. Similarly, Heartland Payments Systems, Inc. (“Heartland”) provides credit card processing services similar to Global’s, but on a smaller scale. In 2003, Heartland disseminated a pamphlet warning merchants that, in printing credit card receipts, they would soon be required to (i) truncate all but the last four digits of the account numbers, and (ii) eliminate the expiration date. Thereafter, in 2006, Heartland disseminated another pamphlet warning merchants that the cardholder’s receipt should include only the last 4 or 5 digits of the account number, and should not include the card’s expiration date. 24. Thus, upon information and belief, Defendant further had knowledge of FACTA and the Receipt Provision through publications and other communications from payment system vendors. 25. Likewise, many grocer and retail trade associations apprised their merchant members of FACTA’s account number truncation and expiration date elimination requirements. There was, therefore, no shortage of public disclosure on the matter. 26. Upon information and belief, Defendant had knowledge of FACTA and the Receipt Provision through trade association notifications. 28. In anticipation of the December 4, 2006, deadline, many credit card companies, including, but not limited to, VISA and MasterCard advised companies of the need for compliance with the Receipt Provision. Additionally, many credit card companies, such as VISA and MasterCard, implemented policies well in advance of the effective date to ensure compliance with the Receipt Provision, by themselves, as well as that of their customers. For example, on March 6, 2003, VISA’s CEO, Carl Pascarella, held a press conference on Capitol Hill with Senators Dianne Feinstein, Judd Gregg, Jon Corzine, and Patrick Leahy and publicly announced VISA USA’s new truncation policy to protect consumers from identity theft. 29. The vast majority of persons who print credit or debit card receipts comply with the Receipt Provision, including the vast majority of grocers in the same area that Defendant operates that are far, far smaller than Defendants. 48. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and as a class action for Defendant’s violation of section 1681c(g) of the FCRA, pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the following Class: All persons in the United States to whom, from two years prior to the filing of this Complaint, and continuing through resolution of this case (the “Class Period”), Defendant provided an electronically printed receipt at the point of sale or transaction on which Defendant printed or caused to be printed the expiration date of the person’s credit or debit card. 49. Specifically excluded from the Class are: (a) all federal court judges who preside over this case and their spouses; (b) all persons who elect to exclude themselves from the Class; (c) all persons who have previously executed and delivered to Defendant releases of all their claims for all of their Class claims; and (d) Defendant’s employees, officers, directors, agents, and representatives and their family members. 5. The truncation section of the FCRA was thus designed to combat the rising tide of identity theft experienced throughout the nation in recent years. Such a practice, if followed, reduces an identity thief’s ability to obtain valuable account information relating to a consumer. 50. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of Class numbers is known only to Defendant, Plaintiffs aver upon information and belief that the Class numbers in the hundreds, if not thousands. 52. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. 53. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs are committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Further, Plaintiffs have secured counsel experienced in handling consumer class actions. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests that might cause them to not vigorously pursue this claim. 54. This action should be maintained as a class action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, with respect to individual members, which would establish incomplete standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Class, as well as a practical matter be dispositive of interests of other members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 55. Defendant has acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunction relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 56. Whether Defendant failed to comply with the Receipt Provision as detailed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) can be easily determined by a review of Defendant’s policies and ministerial inspection of Defendant’s business records. 58. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 59. During the Class Period, Plaintiffs and members of the Class were provided receipts by Defendant that failed to comply with the Receipt Provision. 6. Despite the simple steps necessary to comply, and despite abundant notice, Defendant has simply chosen to ignore complying with the FCRA and FACTA. As such, consumers who purchase goods from Defendant do not receive the full benefits of section 1681c(g) and are uniformly burdened with an elevated risk of identity theft. 60. The Receipt Provision, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c(g)(1), states as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of sale or transaction. This section applies to any “device that electronically prints receipts” (subsequently referred to in this complaint as “device” or “devices”) for point of sale transactions. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c(g)(3). 61. Defendant employs the use of such devices at its retail locations. 62. During the Class Period, at the retail locations of Defendant, Plaintiffs and members of the Class were provided with receipts by Defendant that failed to comply with the Receipt Provision. 63. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on the basis of such information and belief allege, that Defendant was aware, before the Class Period began, of both the Receipt Provision as well as the need to comply with such provision. 65. Upon information and belief, Defendant was required by VISA, MasterCard, and/or other credit card companies to comply with the Receipt Provision. 66. Notwithstanding the significant amount of time to prepare for FACTA and its accompanying provisions, including, but not limited to, the Receipt Provision; knowledge of the Receipt Provision and FACTA as a whole; the repeated number of reminders of FACTA and its accompanying provisions; the requirements imposed by VISA, MasterCard, and other credit card companies; compliance with the Receipt Provision by Defendant in other operations; and, the compliance by the majority of Defendant’s peers and competitors, Defendant knowingly, willfully, intentionally, and recklessly violated and continues to violate the FCRA and the Receipt Provision. 67. Defendant’s violations of the FCRA expose Plaintiffs and members of the Class to an elevated risk of identity theft. 68. As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of the FCRA and FACTA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and members of the Class for statutory and punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 7. A plaintiff need not demonstrate that he or she was a victim of identity theft to prevail on a claim for statutory damages under the FCRA upon a showing that a defendant willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). 8. The FCRA provides that any “person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to 1) statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000; 2) punitive damages; and, 3) attorney fees and costs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). number of opportunities for identity thieves to pick off' key card account information.

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13. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 14. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Nevada; b. to whom Defendant RFGI sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. on behalf of Defendant DRS; d. that deceptively implied marking a collection item as “Paid” on a credit report would offer a resolution of the consumer’s credit report; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 15. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 17. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s letter, violates 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e. 18. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 20. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 21. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 24. The Why Not/Kmart obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 25. The alleged Why Not/Kmart obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 26. Defendant DRS, a debt collector, and the subsequent owner of the Why Not/Kmart debt, contracted the Defendant RFGI to collect the alleged debt. 27. Defendants RFGI and DRS collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation October 1, 2019 Collection Letter 28. On or about October 1, 2019, Defendant RFGI sent Plaintiff a collection letter on behalf of Defendant DRS (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt. See Exhibit A. 29. The Letter offers settlement options to resolve the debt for less than the balance owed. 30. The letter further states in pertinent part: “Upon receiving your final payment, your account will be closed and satisfied in full! Within 30 days of your final payment clearing, you will receive a letter stating your account has been satisfied in full and closed to keep for your records. We will also update any derogatory/negative marks on your credit report as “Paid” in reference to this account within 4-6 weeks of final payment.” 32. This is deceptive because updating the consumer’s credit report to a “Paid” status will not deliver the resolution that the letter intends to convey, because the debt would still be reported as a collection item without effectively any resolution on the consumer’s credit report. 33. It is deceptive to imply a perceived benefit of resolution to a consumer thereby coercing them into making settlement payments when there actually is no resolution. 34. The consumer could be misled into making a settlement payment to resolve their credit report based on the letter, in the hopes of fully resolving their credit report when, in actuality the benefit does not exist. 35. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 36. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 37. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 38. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 40. Due to the fact that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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(BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE) (BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY) (BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY) (VIOLATION OF MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT) 62. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and as a class action, pursuant to the provisions of Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following classes: All persons or entities in the United States who are current or former owners and/or lessees of a Class Vehicle (the “Nationwide Class”). All persons or entities who purchased or leased a Class Vehicle in the State of California (the “California Class”). (collectively, the “Class,” unless otherwise noted). 63. Excluded from the Class are individuals who have personal injury claims resulting from the defect in the MyFord Touch system. Also excluded from the Class are Ford and its subsidiaries and affiliates; all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class; governmental entities; and the judge to whom this case is assigned and his/her immediate family. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the Class definition based upon information learned through discovery. 64. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of his claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claim. 65. This action has been brought and may be properly maintained on behalf of each of the Classes proposed herein under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 72. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as though fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class. 74. Plaintiff is a “consumer” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 75. Ford is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)-(5). 85. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as though fully set forth herein. 86. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class. 91. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as though fully set forth herein. 92. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class. 96. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as though fully set forth herein. 97. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class. 98. Ford is and was at all relevant times a merchant with respect to MyFord Touch-equipped motor vehicles. A. Introduction of MyFord Touch A.  Introduction of MyFord Touch ................................................................ 5  B.  Description of MyFord Touch ................................................................. 7  C.  MyFord Touch Has Been Plagued with Serious Defects ...................... 11  D.  The TSBs and Warranty Extension ........................................................ 12  E.  Similar Experiences and Complaints by Consumers ............................. 16  F.  Fallout From the MyFord Touch Problems ........................................... 22  VI.  ACT) ................................................................................................................. 27  COUNT II: (BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY) .................................. 29  COUNT III: (BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS MERCHANTABILITY) .................................................................................. 31  B.  Claims Brought on Behalf of the California Class ................................ 32  NOW THEY FINALLY DO BUT DO NOT SAY WHEN A FIX WILL BE AVAILABLE. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT OPTION WAS NOT WORKING BEFORE THEY HAD ME SIGN A LEASE FOR THE CAR. ALOT THE MEMORY. IT HELPED, BUT IT STILL FAILED, AT TIMES. THE SECOND TIME, HE RETURNED TO THE DEALER, THEY INSTALLED AN UPDATED PROGRAM FROM FORD THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO CORRECT THE MALFUNCTIONING SYSTEM. A TYPICAL PROBLEM WAS THE SYSTEM LOCKING UP, THE SCREEN WOULD FREEZE AND THERE WAS NO CONTROL OVER THE HEATER/AIR CONDITIONER OR RADIO VII.  CLAIMS FOR RELIEF .................................................................................... 27  A.  Claims Brought on Behalf of the Nationwide Class .............................. 27 

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16. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 17. Plaintiff brings this FLSA collective action on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), specifically, on behalf of: All hourly paid non-exempt Employees who are or were employed by Defendant since January 1, 2105, and who were not paid overtime compensation during weeks which they worked more than forty (40) hours per week (the “FLSA Collective Class”). 18. Excluded from the FLSA Collective Class is Defendant, its legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has or had a controlling interest in Defendant. 19. Plaintiffs are unable to state the exact number of the class without discovery of Defendant’s books and records but estimate that the class exceeds several hundred individuals. 20. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Collective Class time and one half their regular rate of pay for hours worked beyond forty hours in a work week. 4 21. Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated and consistent. Moreover, Defendant’s conduct was willful and in bad faith and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class. 22. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class, and, as such, notice should be sent out to the FLSA Collective Class. There are numerous similarly situated, current and former Employees of Defendant who have been denied wages in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a Court supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the action. Those similarly situated Employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s records. 23. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 24. Plaintiffs brings this action on his own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a Class consisting of: All hourly paid non-exempt Employees who are or were employed by Defendant since January 1, 2015 and who were not paid overtime compensation during weeks which they worked more than forty (40) hours per week (the “Florida Class”). 25. Excluded from the Florida Class is Defendant, its legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has or had a controlling interest in Defendant. Also excluded are persons and entities who submit timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the Florida Class. 26. Defendant systematically fails and refuses to pay Employees any overtime compensation. The members of the Florida Class are so numerous that joinder of all members in one proceeding is impracticable. 5 27. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other Florida Class members because they were hourly-wage Employees who were never paid overtime compensation even for weeks during which they worked more than forty (40) hours per week. Plaintiff and other Florida Class members have sustained similar types of damages as a result of Defendant’s failure to comply with the FLSA, the FMWA and the Florida Constitution. Plaintiff and other Florida Class members have been injured in that they have been uncompensated or under-compensated due to Defendant’s common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. 28. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Florida Class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action and wage and hour litigation. There is no conflict between the Plaintiff and the Florida Class. 29. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the Florida Class that predominate over any questions solely affecting them individually and include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Whether Defendant failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Florida Class for all of the compensable time that they performed job related duties; (b) Whether Defendant failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Florida Class for all of the compensable time that they worked for Defendant in violation of the 33. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 34. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed and continues to 7 employ, Employees, including Plaintiff and each of the members of the FLSA Collective Class. 35. Plaintiff consents in writing to be a part of this action pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of Plaintiff’s Opt-in form. As this case proceeds, it is likely that other individuals will sign consent forms and join as Plaintiffs. 36. The FLSA requires each covered employer such as Defendant to compensate all non-exempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours per workweek. The FLSA also requires each covered employer to pay the minimum wage for all hours worked. 37. Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Class were and are entitled to be paid minimum wage and overtime compensation for all hours worked over forty hours per week. 38. Defendant, pursuant to its policies and practices, failed and refused to pay minimum wage and overtime premiums to Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Class for all of their hours worked. 39. By failing to compensate Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective Class for minimum wage and overtime compensation, Defendant has violated, and continues to violate, the FLSA. 40. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective Class, seeks damages in the amount of her overtime compensation, liquidated interest, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective Class, seek recovery of 8 attorneys’ fees and costs, to be paid by Defendant, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 43. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 44. Pursuant to Article X, § 24 of the Florida Constitution, and pursuant to statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 448.01, et. seq., Defendant is and was required to pay the Florida Class an overtime minimum wage set by Florida state law. The state’s wage requirements apply to Defendant and protect the Florida Class. 45. As set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, Defendant has knowingly and willfully refused to pay overtime minimum wages due to Plaintiff and the Florida Class in violation of Florida law. 46. Defendant was not and is not permitted by Florida law, or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, to withhold or divert any portion of the Plaintiff’s and the Florida Class’ wages that concern this lawsuit. 47. Defendant was not authorized by Plaintiff or any Florida Class member to withhold, divert or deduct any portion of their unpaid wages which are the subject of this lawsuit. 48. Pursuant to Florida law, employers such as Defendant who intentionally fail to pay an employee wages in conformance with Florida law shall be liable to the employee for the wages that were intentionally not paid, and court costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in recovering unpaid wages. 49. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Florida Class, seek the amount of underpayments based on Defendant’s willful failure to pay minimum wages for all hours worked, 9 as provided by Florida law, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class) VIOLATION OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION AND FLORIDA MINIMUM WAGE ACT (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Florida Class)

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10. Defendant United HealthCare is a leading health insurer that offers a variety of insurance plans and services to group and individual consumers nationwide. 11. As part of an overall marketing plan to advertise its programs and services, United HealthCare sends unsolicited faxes to doctors and their organizations. A copy of the fax advertisement received by Plaintiff is attached as Exhibit A. 12. The unsolicited faxes advertise the commercial availability and quality of United HealthCare’s “Online self service [tools] for providers,” including: (a) “Link,” United HealthCare’s “most powerful” tool that allows doctors to “transact[]” online with United HealthCare to “Save Time and Increase Productivity,” maintain “Superior Documentation,” and “Save on Paper Costs”; and (b) United HealthCare’s training webinars. 14. The fax advertisements, however, fail to provide recipients with proper opt-out notice information required by the TCPA and implementing regulations. Specifically, the faxes fail to provide notice identifying a fax number and domestic contact telephone number for fax recipients to transmit their opt-out requests. 15. Defendant United HealthCare sends these fax advertisements to consumers with which it has no existing business relationship, and without express invitation or permission, in violation of the TCPA. 16. United HealthCare uses a fax machine, computer, or other device to send the fax advertisements at issue. 17. On May 5, 2018 at approximately 9:57 am, United HealthCare used a fax machine to send an unsolicited fax advertisement to Plaintiff. A copy of the fax advertisement is attached as Exhibit A. 18. The fax advertisement promoted the commercial availability and quality of United HealthCare’s goods and services, which doctors and their organizations are among the consumers of. 19. The fax advertisement failed to contain the required opt-out notice identifying a fax number and telephone number for fax recipients to transmit their opt-out requests. 21. Class Definitions: Plaintiff Broward Psychology brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually and on behalf of a Class of similarly situated individuals defined as follows: All persons and entities who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this action, (2) received a telephone fax advertisement, (3) sent from or on behalf of United HealthCare, (4) and from whom United HealthCare (a) did not have a record of prior express consent to send the fax advertisements or (b) claims to have obtained consent in the same manner as it claims to have obtained consent from plaintiff. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the class definitions following appropriate discovery. 22. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant faxed unsolicited advertisements to thousands of individuals and entities who fall into the definition of the Class. Class membership can be easily determined from Defendant’s records. 24. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) How Defendant gathered, compiled, or obtained the fax numbers of Plaintiff and the Class; b) Whether Defendant’s faxes advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services; c) Whether Defendant sent the fax advertisements without first obtaining Plaintiff and the Class’s prior express permission or invitation to do so; and d) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful such that Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages. 25. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 27. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this case. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 28. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 29. The TCPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement. . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 31. The faxes sent by Defendant advertised the commercial availability and quality of its goods and services and were therefore commercial in nature, constituting advertisements under the TCPA. 32. Defendant sent the fax advertisements at issue to Plaintiff and other members of the Class without their prior express invitation or consent, and despite the lack of an existing business relationship between it and members of the Class. 33. By sending the unsolicited fax advertisements to Plaintiff and other members of the Class without their prior express invitation or permission, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 34. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered actual damages, including the conversion or loss of paper and toner consumed in the printing of the faxes, the loss of use of the recipients’ fax machines during the time required to receive, review and route the unauthorized faxes, as well as increased labor expenses. 35. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are therefore entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages for each violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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13. On information and belief, Defendants receive some or all of the revenues from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendants profit and benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A. 14. Plaintiff did not give prior express invitation or permission to Defendants to send the fax. 15. On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited facsimiles to Plaintiff and at least 40 other recipients or sent the same and other advertisements by fax without first receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission or without having an established business relationship as defined by the TCPA and its regulations. 16. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 18. Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Classes is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty. 20. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)): The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and each member of the classes the same or similar faxes or faxes which did not contain the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission. 21. Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)): The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class members. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. 22. Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties. 25. The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 26. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5). 29. Defendants’ Other Violations. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission. By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 30. The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 31. The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is an audio product manufacturing company, and owns and operates the website, www.thehouseofmarley.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.thehouseofmarley.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse headphones and speakers for purchase and delivery, view accessories, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in January 2021, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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18. The Individual Defendants actively participate in the day-to-day operation of the Restaurant. For instance, the Individual Defendants personally hire and fire employees, supervise and direct the work of the employees, and instruct the employees how to perform their jobs. 19. The Individual Defendants create and implement all crucial business policies at the Restaurant, and make decisions concerning the number of hours the employees work, the amount of pay that the employees are entitled to receive, and the manner and method by which the employees are to be paid. 20. The Corporate Defendants are associated as a single enterprise, utilizing Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees in a fungible and interchangeable manner ,as workers in the business operated by the Defendants. 21. The Corporate Defendants each engaged m related activities, namely, providing restaurant services to the general public for profit. The Corporate Defendants shared Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, acted in the interest of each other with respect to employees, paid their employees by the same plan or scheme, and were under common control. 22. The Corporate Defendants were controlled by the same owner or owner group, operating as a unified operation and, upon information and belief, each provided mutually supportive services to the substantial advantage of the other such that each entity was operationally interdependent of each other and, therefore, may be treated as a singie enterprise. 5 23. On or about December 19, 2014, Defendants hired Plaintiff to work as a non-exempt food preparer/kitchen helper, porter, and handyman at the Restaurant. 24. Neither at the time of his hire nor anytime thereafter did Defendants provide Plaintiff with a written wage notice setting forth his regular hourly rate of pay and his corresponding overtime rate of pay. 25. Plaintiff continuously worked for Defendants in those capacities until on or about March 6, 2020. 26. Throughout the entirety of his employment, Plaintiff worked seven (7) days per week and, although his work shift fluctuated slightly each day and week, he typically worked twelve (12) hours per day from 8:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. 27. Plaintiff was not provided with a designated meal or rest break at any time during his daily work shift. 28. Plaintiff was not required to punch a time clock or other time-recording device at the beginning and end of each work shift. 29. Throughout the entirety of his employment, Plaintiff was not paid proper overtime compensation. Throughout the entirety of his employment, Plaintiff was paid at the rate of $750 per week straight time for all hours worked, and worked approximately eighty-four (84) hours per week. Work performed above forty (40) hours per week was not paid at the statutory rate oftime and one-half as required by state and federal law. 30. Defendants knowingly and willfully operate their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in 6 direct violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 31. Defendants knowingly and willfully operate their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees a "spread of hours" premium for each day that the length of their work shift exceeds ten (10) hours, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 32. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, and during the course of Plaintiffs employment, Defendants failed to maintain accurate and sufficient wage and hour records. 33. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as class representative on behalf of himself and all other current and former non-exempt employees who have been or were employed by Defendants since September 1, 2017 through the end of the opt-in period as ultimately set by the Court (the "Collective Action Period"), and who were compensated at rates less than time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per workweek (the "Collective Action Members"). 34. The collective action class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than forty ( 40) Collective Action Members who worked for Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack adequate financial 7 resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this matter should be certified as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 35. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members and has retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the fields of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 36. This action should be certified as a collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of either inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 3 7. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a collective action. 38. Questions oflaw and fact common to the members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants 8 have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the common questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate wage and hour records for all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members; c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; d. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per workweek, in violation of the FLSA and the regulations promulgated thereunder; e. Whether Defendants' violations of the FLSA are willful as that terms is used within the context of the FLSA; and, f. Whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. 39. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 40. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants' wrongful conduct. 9 41. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 42. Plaintiff brings his New York Labor Law claims on behalf of all persons who were employed by Defendants at any time since September 1, 2014 (the "Class Period") who were non-exempt employees and who have not been paid statutory overtime compensation in violation of the New York Labor Law (the "Class"). 43. Upon information and belief, the persons in the Class identified herein are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the identity and precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of Defendants, the Class consists of all non-managerial current and former "back of the house" employees and, therefore, is so numerous that joinder is impracticable and most of whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. 44. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation, where individuals lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant. 45. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 46. Plaintiff has committed himself to pursuing this action and has retained counsel experienced in employment law and class action litigation. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the NY Class members. Plaintiff understands that, as class representative, he assumes a fiduciary responsibility to the Class and Collective Action Members to represent their interests fairly and adequately, and that he must consider the interests of the Class and Collective Action Members just as he would represent and consider his own interests, and that he may not favor his own interests over those of the Class or Collective Action Members. 48. Plaintiff recognizes that any resolution of a class action lawsuit, including any settlement or dismissal thereof, must be in the best interests of the Class and Collective Action Members. Plaintiff understands that in order to provide adequate representation, he must remain informed of litigation developments and that he may be called upon to testify in depositions and at trial. 49. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the Class and Plaintiffs claims are typical of the Class. 50. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions solely affecting the individual members of the Class, including but not limited to: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class members within the meaning of the New York Labor Law; b. Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate wage and hour records for all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Class members; 11 c. What proof of hours worked is sufficient where the employer fails in its duty to maintain time records; d. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class members overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per workweek, in violation of the New York Labor Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder; e. Whether Defendants' violations of the New York Labor Law are willful as that terms is used within the context of the New York Labor Law; and, f. Whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, liquidated and statutory damages, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements. 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs "l" through "50" of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 52. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 12 53. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 54. Upon information and belief, during each of the three (3) most recent years relevant to the allegations herein, the Corporate Defendants each individually had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 55. Upon information and belief, during each of the three (3) most recent years relevant to the allegations herein, the Corporate Defendants jointly had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 56. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were entitled to be paid at the rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 57. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members overtime compensation in the lawful amount for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 58. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one- half to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per work week, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(l) and 215(a). 59. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members at the statutory overtime rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per week, when they knew or should have known such was due 13 and that non-payment of overtime compensation would financially injure Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 60. As a result of Defendants' failure to properly record, report, credit and/or compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members, Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.A.§§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 21 l(c) and 215(a). 61. Defendants failed to properly disclose or appnse Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members of their rights under the FLSA. 62. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violation of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to the FLSA. 63. Due to the reckless, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid overtime compensation, an equal amount as liquidated damages, and prejudgment interest thereon. 64. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 65. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs "l" through "64" of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 14 66. Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class members within the meaning of New York Labor Law§§ 2 and 651. 67. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and the Class members by failing to pay them overtime compensation at the rate of time and one- half for each hour worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours in a workweek. 68. Employers are required to pay a "spread of hours" premium of one (1) additional hour's pay at the statutory minimum hourly wage rate for each day where the spread of hours in an employee's workday exceeds ten (10) hours. New York State Department of Labor Regulations§ 146-1.6. 69. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and the Class by failing to pay "spread of hour" premiums to Plaintiff and the Class for each day their work shift exceeded ten (10) hours pursuant to New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 70. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and the Class of their rights under the New York Labor Law. 71. Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff and the Class with a statement with every payment of wages listing their gross wages, deductions and net wages, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(3) and New York State Department of Labor Regulations§ 146-2.3. 72. Defendants failed to keep true and accurate records of hours worked by each employee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate, the wages paid to all employees, and other similar information in contravention of New York Labor Law § 661. 15 73. Defendants failed to establish, maintain, and preserve for not less than six (6) years payroll records showing the hours worked, gross wages, deductions, and net wages for each employee, in contravention of the New York Labor Law § 194( 4), and New York State Department of Labor Regulations§ 146-2.1. 74. Neither at the time of their hiring, nor anytime thereafter, did Defendants notify Plaintiff and the Class members in writing of their regular and overtime rates of pay and their regularly designated payday, in contravention of New York Labor Law § 195(1 ). 75. Due to the Defendants' New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime compensation, unpaid "spread of hours" premiums, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to New York Labor Law§§ 663(1), 198. 76. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labor Law§ 663(1), as well as statutory and liquidated damages pursuant to the New York State Wage Theft Prevention Act. [Violation of th~ Fair Labor Standards Act] [Violation of the New York Labor Law]

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46. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Florida. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). 48. The text message received by Plaintiff originated from telephone number 267-613- 9146, which is owned and/or controlled by Defendant. Further, this is a “spoofed” number in that it is not active and states that it is disconnected if a call is attempted to the number. 49. The text message received by Plaintiff is identical to the generic messages received by thousands of other individuals as outlined above. This fact establishes that Defendant used an ATDS in transmitting the above text message to Plaintiff. 50. The link (http://app.ever.pics/Uldk/He9qv6ygwx) provided in the text message received by Plaintiff is a link to Defendant’s website (www.ever.com), where Plaintiff was encouraged to download the Ever App. Therefore, Defendant’s text message constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services – i.e. Defendant’s mobile application. 51. Plaintiff received the subject text within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 52. Plaintiff has never used Defendant’s application or services, has never downloaded the Ever App on her mobile device, and has never had any type of relationship with Defendant. 53. Plaintiff has never provided Defendant her telephone number, or provided any type of consent to receive automated text messages from Defendant. 54. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 5368 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 5368 Number. 56. Defendant’s text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused a disruption to her life as a result of Defendant’s deceptive statement suggesting that photographs of Plaintiff were being displayed on Defendant’s platform without her permission (“…just recommended you check out your photos on Ever.”). 57. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 58. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following classes: All persons residing within the United States who received telephone calls and/or text messages from Defendant to their cellular telephone within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action, for the purpose of selling or attempting to sell Defendant’s goods and/or services using an automatic telephone dialing system, and who did not provide prior express consent for such call(s). Numerosity 59. Upon information and belief, based on the widespread Internet complaints about Defendant’s telemarketing text messages, the members of the class are believed to number in the thousands or millions such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 61. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: a. Whether Defendant sent non-emergency text messages to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an autodialer and/or prerecorded message; b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express consent to make such calls; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 62. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. Defendant routinely places automated calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone thus, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Typicality 63. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 65. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all members of the Classes are economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While the aggregate damages sustained by the Classes are in the millions of dollars, the individual damages incurred by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant’s wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every member of the Class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. 66. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. For example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties to such actions. 67. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. Defendant violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited text messages to Plaintiff and the Class members on their cellular phones without first obtaining their prior express consent and using equipment which constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system for the express purpose of marketing Defendant’s goods and/or services. 70. As a result of the aforementioned violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in negligent violation of the TCPA, or up to $1,500 in statutory damages for each call in willful violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)

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11. Plaintiff brings this action as a state-wide class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the FRCP, on behalf of himself and all New Jersey consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who were harmed by the Defendant’s conduct in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 12. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as: All New Jersey consumers for whom Defendant communicated to any person credit information, which is known to be false and/or for whom Defendant failed to communicate to any person that a disputed debt was disputed as set forth herein. The class definition may be subsequently modified or refined. The Class period begins one year prior to the filing of this Action. 17. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 18. Sometime prior to July 7, 2020, Plaintiff allegedly incurred one or more financial obligations ("OBLIGATION or OBLIGATIONS") for which Defendant reported information to one or more national credit reporting agencies. 19. The OBLIGATIONS arose out of a transaction, in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 20. Plaintiff incurred the OBLIGATIONS by obtaining goods and services which were primarily for personal, family and household purposes. 22. The OBLIGATIONS did not arise out of a transaction that was for business use. 23. Each OBLIGATION is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 24. At some time prior to July 7, 2020, the OBLIGATIONS were placed with Defendant for the purpose of collection. 25. At the time the OBLIGATIONS were placed with Defendant for the purpose of collection, the OBLIGATIONS were past due. 26. At the time the OBLIGATIONS were placed with Defendant for the purpose of collection, the OBLIGATIONS were in default. 27. At the time the OBLIGATIONS were referred to GEM RECOVERY for the purpose of collection, the OBLIGATIONS were in default. 28. Plaintiff caused to be delivered to Defendant a letter dated July 7, 2020, which was addressed to Defendant. Exhibit A, which is fully incorporated herein by reference. 29. The July 7, 2020 letter was sent to Defendant in connection with the collection of the 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 41. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with its attempts to collect debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 42. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA in connection with Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 43. By failing to communicate that the OBLIGATION was disputed to one or more of the credit reporting bureaus, Defendant engaged in a false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of the debt. 44. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing the character or legal status of the debt. 45. By failing to communicate that a disputed debt was disputed, Defendant made a false representation of the character or legal status of the debt. 46. By communicating credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false, Defendant made a false representation of the character or legal status of the debt. 48. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by communicating to any person credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false. 49. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by failing to communicate to any person that the OBLIGATION was disputed. 50. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by failing to communicate to one or more of the credit reporting bureaus that the OBLIGATION was disputed. 51. Section 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 52. By failing to communicate that the OBLIGATION was disputed as described herein, Defendant engaged in a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect the debt. 53. Congress enacted the FDCPA in part to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 54. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 55. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to have the Defendant abide by its obligations under the FDCPA and those specifically found at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). 56. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have suffered harm as a direct result of the abusive, deceptive and unfair collection practices described herein. 57. Plaintiff has suffered damages and other harm as a direct result of the Defendants’ actions, conduct, omissions and violations of the FDCPA described herein. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS

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11. In 1988, after the public disclosure of then-Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s (and his family’s) video viewing records, members of the United States Senate warned that records of consumers’ purchases and rentals of audiovisual and written materials offer “a window into [their] loves, likes, and dislikes,” and that “the trail of information generated by every transaction that is now recorded and stored in sophisticated record-keeping systems is a new, more subtle and pervasive form of surveillance.” S. Rep. No. 100-599, at 7–8 (1988) (statements of Sens. Simon and Leahy, respectively). 12. Congress responded by passing the federal Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (“VPPA”)—which, as enacted, regulates a certain type of 2:15-cv-13716-PDB-EAS Doc # 1 Filed 10/20/15 Pg 4 of 22 Pg ID 4 5 business (a “video tape service provider”) and a narrow subset of consumer information (that is, “information which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services”). Although this statute initially also sought to “protect[] the selection of books that [consumers] read,” 134 Cong. Rec. S5399 (May 10, 1988), the final version of the VPPA was limited to video materials. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710. 13. The Michigan Legislature, however, decided that the federal VPPA didn’t go far enough, and expressed concern that Michigan consumers’ “choice[s] in reading, music, and video entertainment [were] a private matter, and not fit for consideration by gossipy publications, employers, clubs, or anyone else.” H.B. No. 5331 (Jan. 20, 1989). 14. As a result, in 1989, the VRPA was enacted “to preserve personal privacy with respect to the purchase, rental, or borrowing of certain materials[,]” including written materials such as books and magazines. M.C.L. Ch. 445. The VRPA therefore provides, in relevant part, that: a person, or an employee or agent of the person, engaged in the business selling at retail, renting, or lending books or other written materials, sound recordings, or video recordings shall not disclose to any person, other than the customer, a record or information concerning the purchase lease, rental, or borrowing of those materials by a customer that indicates the identity of the customer. 29. Plaintiff Julie Bush is a citizen of the State of Michigan. 30. Bush purchased a subscription to Inc. from Mansueto in or around December 2014. 31. Inc. is a magazine published, owned, and operated by Mansueto. 32. Bush has never agreed in writing or otherwise to allow Mansueto to sell or disclose her Personal Reading Information to any unrelated third parties. 33. Bush did not receive notice of such disclosures before Mansueto 2:15-cv-13716-PDB-EAS Doc # 1 Filed 10/20/15 Pg 10 of 22 Pg ID 10 11 disclosed her Personal Reading Information to unrelated third parties. 34. Mansueto has disclosed, and continues to disclose, Bush’s Personal Reading Information (i.e., information that identifies Bush as having purchased a subscription to Inc.)—without obtaining her permission or providing prior notice— to data mining companies, who append the information with data from their own records. 35. During this same time period, Mansueto has also disclosed—and continues to disclose—Bush’s Personal Reading Information to other unrelated third party companies, including so-called “database cooperatives” without first obtaining her consent or giving her prior notice of the disclosures. 36. These disclosures to unrelated third party companies squarely violate the VRPA. 37. Further, and even though it lacked permission to even disclose her Personal Reading Information in the first place, Mansueto profited from its disclosures of Bush’s Personal Reading Information. 38. Ultimately, what Bush received (a subscription without privacy protections) was substantially less valuable than what she paid for (a subscription with accompanying privacy protections). Had she known that Mansueto would disclose her Personal Reading Information to third parties without her permission, Bush would not have purchased her subscription. Thus, Bush has suffered concrete 2:15-cv-13716-PDB-EAS Doc # 1 Filed 10/20/15 Pg 11 of 22 Pg ID 11 12 economic harm in the form of the monies paid to Mansueto in exchange for the magazine subscription. 39. Class Definition: Plaintiff Bush brings this action on behalf of herself and a proposed Class, defined as follows: All Michigan residents who purchased subscriptions to a Monsueto magazine. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 40. Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder of each Class member is impracticable. Defendant has disclosed the Personal Reading Information of thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Ultimately, members of the Class will be easily identified through Defendant’s records. 2:15-cv-13716-PDB-EAS Doc # 1 Filed 10/20/15 Pg 12 of 22 Pg ID 12 13 41. Commonality and Predominance: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Those questions with respect to the Class include, but are not limited to: (a) Whether Mansueto is “engaged in the business of selling at retail” books or other written materials (i.e., magazines); (b) Whether Mansueto obtained written permission before disclosing Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Personal Reading Information to third parties; (c) Whether Mansueto’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Personal Reading Information violated the VRPA; and (d) Whether Mansueto was unjustly enriched through its conduct described herein. 42. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other Class members. Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct, based upon Defendant’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Personal Reading Information. 43. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class members, and have the financial resources to do so. 2:15-cv-13716-PDB-EAS Doc # 1 Filed 10/20/15 Pg 13 of 22 Pg ID 13 14 Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interest adverse to those of the other Class members. 44. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 45. Superiority: Class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, as joinder of all Class members is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual Class members will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the Class members to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual basis. Even if Class members could sustain individual litigation, it would not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the 2:15-cv-13716-PDB-EAS Doc # 1 Filed 10/20/15 Pg 14 of 22 Pg ID 14 15 complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 46. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the definition of the Class as necessary based upon information learned in discovery. 47. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 48. As a magazine publisher that sells subscriptions directly to consumers, Mansueto is engaged in the business of selling written materials at retail. See 68. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 69. Bush and the Class members conferred a benefit on Mansueto by providing Mansueto with their Personal Reading Information and paying Mansueto for their magazine subscriptions. Mansueto received and retained the information and money belonging to Bush and the Class when Plaintiff and the Class purchased their subscriptions to Mansueto’s publications. 70. Because Mansueto received and processed Bush’s and the Class’s subscription payments and Personal Reading Information, and because Mansueto processes and fulfills the subscriptions and discloses Bush’s and the Class’s Personal Reading Information to third parties, Mansueto appreciates and/or has knowledge of such benefits. 71. Under the VRPA, Bush and the Class members were entitled to confidentiality in their Personal Reading Information as part of their subscriptions. 72. Under principles of equity and good conscience, Mansueto should not be allowed to retain the full amount of money Bush and the Class paid for their 2:15-cv-13716-PDB-EAS Doc # 1 Filed 10/20/15 Pg 19 of 22 Pg ID 19 20 subscriptions, or the money it received by disclosing Bush’s and the Class’s Personal Reading Information because Mansueto failed to comply with the VRPA. 73. Bush and the other Class members have suffered actual damages as a result of Mansueto’s unlawful conduct in the form of the monies paid for their magazine subscriptions, which they wouldn’t have purchased had they known of Mansueto’s unlawful disclosure practices. 74. To prevent inequity, Mansueto should return to Bush and the Class all monies that they paid for their magazine subscriptions, and disgorge any profits derived from the disclosures at issue. 75. Accordingly, on behalf of herself and the Class, Plaintiff seeks an order declaring that Mansueto’s conduct constitutes unjust enrichment, and awarding Plaintiff and the Class restitution in an amount equal to that which they paid to Mansueto for their magazine subscriptions, as well as disgorgement of all profits derived by Mansueto as a result of its unlawful disclosures of Bush’s and the Class’s Personal Reading Information. I. An Overview of the VRPA. Unjust Enrichment (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of M.C.L. § 445.1712 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a graduation apparel and jewelry company that owns and operates www.jostens.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in January of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.jostens.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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66. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through sixty five (56) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 67. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of two classes. 68. Class A consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letters as -10- the letters sent to the Plaintiff on or about October 16, 2015 and October 19, 2015; and (a) the collection letters were sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letters were not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiff asserts that the letters contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(2)(B), 1692e(10) 1692f and 1692f(1). 69. Class B consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about October 16, 2015; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt and for misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed by the Plaintiff. 70. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that form collection letters are at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. -11- C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such collection letters (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 71. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 72. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 73. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 74. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. -12- Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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10. This unsolicited marketing text message received read: This T-Mobile Tuesday, Score a free 6” Oven Roasted Chicken sub at SUBWAY, just for being w/ T-Mobile. Ltd supplies. Get app for details: 11. Additionally, the text message references the web link “t-mo.co”. 12. Upon information and belief, when consumers click on the web link http://t- mo.co/ around the time of receipt of the text message, the consumers would be directed to a webpage for T-Mobile that, inter alia, advertises the “T- Mobile App” and “T-Mobile Tuesdays.” 30. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of Plaintiff and on behalf of all others similarly situated. 31. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the class (the “Class”), consisting of: All persons within the United States who received any text message from Defendant or its agent/s and/or employee/s, which was substantially similar or identical to the text messages alleged in Paragraph 10 of the Complaint, to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 32. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believe the members of the Class number in the tens of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 33. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agent(s), illegally contacted Plaintiff and the members of the Class via their cellular telephones by using an ATDS for marketing purposes, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiffs and the members of the Class previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the members of the Class. Plaintiff and the members of the Class were damaged thereby. 47. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 48. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 49. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 50. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 9. On or about September 3, 2016, Subway sent a text message to Fishman’s cellular telephone number ending in “3728,” using an “automatic telephone dialing system,” (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), and prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seek for Plaintiff and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Costs of suit. • Attorneys’ fees pursuant to, inter alia, the common fund doctrine. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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15. Plaintiff allegedly incurred a debt to Defendant’s predecessor in interest, “Navient” for an educational loan (the “Debt” or “debt”). 16. She was was thereafter plagued by Navient’s calls for years commencing sometime between 2014 and 2017 to present. 17. The debt allegedly originated in or about October 2004. 18. In 2010, Plaintiff ceased making payments on the alleged debt. 20. However, in or about 2014 and as late at 2017, Navient begain placing numerous calls to her cell phone and informed her she owed payments on the debt. 21. During this time, Plaintiff repeatedly requested Navient cease contacting her by telling Navient’s representatives to “stop calling” her cell phone. 22. Indeed, Navient’s collection calls continued several months prior to filing the instant suit resulting in a separate lawsuit brought against Navient for its illegal debt collection conduct in this same court.2 23. At some point within the last year, Navient transferred, sold, assigned or otherwise conveyed the Debt to WWR for collection. 24. Thereafter, WWR engaged in placing numerous pre-recorded calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to collect the debt from the Plaintiniff even though Plaintiff already demanded that such communications cease thereby revoking concent to receive such communications on numerous prior instances. 25. Indeed, within the several weeks prior to filing the instant complaint (let alone statutory four year prior under the TCPA), Plaintiff received numerous calls from WWR from the following phone number: (800)-837-0603. 27. The calls dialed and complained of here were made using an artificial or prerecorded voice without prior express consent to place such calls to Plaintiff’s cell phone. 28. However, Defendant placed artificial or prerecorded voice calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone without consent in violation of the TCPA even after she advised WWR to cease calling her cell phone. Indeed, Defendant’s illegal artificial or prerecorded voice calls have continued until days before filing this complaint. 29. The telephone number Defendant used to contact Plaintiff was and is assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 30. Defendant’s calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were not for “emergency purposes.” 31. Plaintiff suffered actual harm and loss, since each of the unwanted calls depleted Plaintiff’s cell phone’s battery, and the cost of electricity to recharge the phone is a tangible harm. While small, this cost is a real one, and the cumulative effect can be consequential, just as is true for exposure to X-rays resulting from Defendant’s unwanted phone calls to Plaintiff’s cell phone. 33. Plaintiff has a common law right to privacy. E.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 1155, 193 (1890). Congress sought to further protect that right by enacting the TCPA. 34. “[W]hen a person must endure the bother of unwanted calls in the privacy of her home, her harm is similar to other traditional injuries that courts have long recognized, such as invasion of privacy and nuisance.” Toldi v. Hyundai Capital Am., No. 2:16-CV—01877-APG-GWF, 2017 WL 736882, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 23, 2017). 35. Plaintiff was also personally affected, since Plaintiff felt Plaintiff’s privacy had been invaded when Defendant placed calls to Plaintiff’s phone line without any consent to do so. 36. The injury suffered by Plaintiff is concrete because Defendant’s violations caused Plaintiff to suffer an invasion of privacy. 38. Plaintiff proposes to represent the following Class consisting of and defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone call(s) from Defendant or its agent(s) and/or employee(s), not for an emergency purpose, on said person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of an artificial or prerecorded voice within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 39. WWR and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class, as well as the Court and its officers and employees. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several hundreds, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 40. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of WWR in at least the following ways: WWR, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using artificial or prerecorded voice messages, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members as discussed above. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 42. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through WWR’s records or WWR’s agents’ records. 43. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: i. Whether, during the proposed class period, WWR or its agent(s) placed any calls utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice messages to the Class (other than a message made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; ii. Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violations; and iii. Whether WWR and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 45. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the WWR’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and WWR will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 46. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 48. WWR has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 49. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 50. Defendant negligently placed multiple calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiffs without Plaintiffs’ prior express consent using a prerecorded voice and/or artificial messages. 51. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA. 52. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 54. Plaintiffs repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 55. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiffs without Plaintiffs’ prior express consent using prerecorded voices and/or artificial messages. 56. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 57. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Dated: October 3, 2018 Respectfully submitted, By /s/ David H. Krieger, Esq. David H. Krieger, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9086 George Haines, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9411 Shawn Miller, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 7825 Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, (47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.) Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, (47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.)

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(Under NYTL § 1139 and 20 NYCRR §§ 534.2 and 534.8 for Violations of § 526.5(c)(4)) (Violations of GBL § 349) 24. As relevant here, Costco’s coupon booklets were distributed in two different standard formats before the beginning of the Class Period: (i) the pre-August 8, 2013 format; and (ii) the format effective on and after August 8, 2013 until the beginning of the Class Period. 29. Beginning with the coupon booklet valid October 3-27, 2013, an “Instant Savings” notation in small print was again included for many of the coupons immediately above the “$[X] OFF” and any applicable quantity limit for the pictured product. However, unlike the pre-August, 2013 format, there was no asterisked message below the “Instant Savings” notation stating “See inside cover for terms and conditions.” An “Instant Savings” notation was not added for the limited number of coupons that included a blue arrow pointing at the price and stating “Book Or App Required,” or the “ONLINE-ONLY OFFER” coupons. 30. No other changes were made to the format of the coupon booklets prior to the beginning of the Class Period. As with the August 8-September 1, 2013 coupon booklet, the coupon booklets did not include any reference to “Manufacturer’s coupon” for the coupons that were not “ONLINE-ONLY OFFERS,” and the coupon booklets did not include any statement that “[t]he instant savings in this booklet are Manufacturers’ savings” for the coupons that included an “Instant Savings” notation. And the coupons themselves did not show that they were “manufacturers’ coupons” and that the reduced price was the result of a “manufacturer’s reimbursement” to Costco. B. Costco’s Coupon Booklets During the Class Period 34. The Costco receipt issued to customers for warehouse purchases is produced in a standard, computer generated, structured data format. Generally, for each item purchased, the receipt includes a line that lists the assigned identifying item number, a brief textual description of the product such as a name abbreviation, and the full price. 35. For taxable items, the receipt includes a letter code to the right of the price which depends on the rate at which the Sales Tax is charged. For example, an “A” to the right of the price indicates that Sales Tax is charged at the full rate imposed by New York—for items including but not limited to household cleaning and paper products, home goods like sheets and towels, and taxable beverages like beer and soft drinks. An “F” to the right of the price is assigned to items of clothing, which if priced at less than $110 per item, are exempt from New York State Sales Tax but may still be subject to county sales tax. 37. For items purchased involving coupon price reductions, the coupon number, generally the notation “CPN/[Item number]” and the amount of the coupon’s price reduction are listed on a line immediately below the line for the item whose price is reduced by that coupon. 38. Only by manually totaling the full price of all “A” taxable items on the receipt and applying the stated sales tax rate shown on the receipt can customers determine that Costco has charged Sales Tax on the full price rather than the reduced price of purchased items involving the coupons. And even then, the customers would have to subtract the total coupon- related price reductions for all “A” taxable items to calculate the amount of Costco’s Sales Tax liability that Costco has illegally charged the customers on the full price rather than the reduced price of their coupon-related warehouse purchases subject to Sales Tax, and Costco’s liability for Sales Tax under § 526.5(c)(4) that it has illegally shifted its to its New York customers. By contrast, all of this information and the related computations for all New York customers can be derived from the structured data that resides and is maintained in Costco’s computer systems. 41. Plaintiff brings this action, individually and as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3), on behalf of the following class: All Costco customers who, for the period beginning three years prior to the commencement of this action and continuing up to and including the present (the “Class Period”), paid New York State Sales Tax to Costco for their purchases at Costco’s New York warehouses on the full price rather than the reduced price of taxable items when the price reduction was based on a coupon issued by Costco in its monthly coupon booklet (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Costco and Costco’s directors, officers, parents, affiliates, subsidiaries and successors. 42. Plaintiff and the Class satisfy the requirements for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 43. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Although the number of members of the Class is not precisely known to Plaintiff at this time and can be determined only from appropriate discovery, it is reasonably estimated based on the 18 Costco warehouses in New York State and the average number of members and cardholders per warehouse worldwide as disclosed in Costco’s Form 10-K that the Class includes many hundreds of thousands and probably in excess of one million members. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with the Class, and Plaintiff has retained competent counsel with extensive experience in consumer and other types of class actions involving, among other things, deceptive consumer acts and practices regarding taxes under the New York Tax Law, to further ensure the protection of those interests and who intends to prosecute this action vigorously. 48. Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. 49. Costco has violated § 526.5(c)(4) by charging and collecting from Plaintiff and the Class Sales Tax for their purchases at Costco’s New York warehouses on the full price rather than the reduced price of taxable items when the price reduction was based on a coupon issued by Costco in its monthly coupon booklet, thereby illegally shifting its liability for Sales Tax on the difference between the full price and the reduced price to Plaintiff and the Class. 50. Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Costco’s illegal Sales Tax practices. 52. Costco is liable for, and should be required to repay to Plaintiff and the Class, the Sales Tax that Costco has illegally shifted to and collected from them, in an amount to be determined at trial. 53. Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates each and every allegation in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim. 54. In determining what types of conduct may be deceptive practices under GBL § 349, the courts of New York have applied an objective standard which asks whether the “representation or omission [is] likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances,” while taking into account not only the impact on the “average consumer” but also on “the vast multitude which the statutes were enacted to safeguard ... including the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but are governed by appearances and general impressions.” 55. Costco’s Sales Tax practices described in this Complaint constitute deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of services in this State which affects the public interest under GBL § 349. 56. Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Costco’s conduct. 58. Additionally, because Costco has willfully or knowingly violated § 349, Plaintiff and the Class each are entitled to recover an amount not to exceed three times their actual damages up to $1,000. I. Costco’s Monthly Coupon Booklets And Coupons During The Class Period Do Not Indicate That The Coupons Are “Manufacturers’ Coupons,” And Do Not Disclose That The Reduced Price Is The Result Of A “Manufacturer’s Reimbursement” To Costco

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13. On or about August 7, 2012, Plaintiff withdrew funds from the ATM inside Brother’s Deli, located at 41 Market Street, Lynn, Massachusetts (the “Brother’s ATM”). 14. At the time Plaintiff used the Brother’s ATM, it was owned and operated by Defendant. 15. At the time Plaintiff used the Brother’s ATM, a fee notice was inconspicuously posted near the bottom of the machine, below the currency dispensing slot. A true and correct copy of a photograph of the Brother’s ATM is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 16. As shown in Exhibit A, the “Fee Notice” is placed in an inconspicuous location, at or below knee level and out of eyesight of any person accessing the Brother’s ATM. 17. At the time Plaintiff used the Brother’s ATM, he was charged a service fee in the amount of $2.75. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s receipt from the Brother’s ATM is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 18. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 19. The Class of consumers that Plaintiff seeks to protect is defined as: All persons who within the one year period preceding the initiation of this action were charged a transaction fee for use of the Brother’s ATM. B. Numerosity 21. Upon information and belief, since the date of Plaintiff’s transaction at the Brother’s ATM, Defendant has not posted a conspicuous notice disclosing the amount of the service fee on the outside of the Brother’s ATM. 22. The members of the Class are therefore believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 23. Although the exact numbers and identities of class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are thousands of individuals throughout Massachusetts who have claims identical to Plaintiff’s. Therefore, bringing the action as a class will fairly ensure the adequate representation of all who may sue. C. Common Questions of Law and Fact 24. Plaintiff identifies the following questions of fact and law common to the Class which predominate any questions affecting only individual Class members: a) Whether Defendant was, at all relevant times during the class period, an ATM operator who imposed a fee on consumers for providing host transfer services; b) Whether the Brother’s ATM provided disclosure in a prominent and conspicuous location that the ATM transaction was subject to the imposition of a specified fee; and c) Whether Defendant imposed fees on consumers without notice. 26. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members since each of the claims arises from the use of an ATM owned and operated by Defendant in their regular course of business. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 27. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members, all of whom are victims of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. 28. All of the Class members’ claims arise from substantially the same course of conduct and specific activities complained of herein and require application of identical legal principles. 29. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and consumer class claims and who stands ready, willing and able to represent the Class and advance the costs of this litigation. F. Proceeding via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 30. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 31. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive, and therefore would have no effective remedy at law. 32. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the court and the litigants and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 34. The amount of money at issue is such that proceeding by way of a class action is the only economical and sensible manner in which to vindicate Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) provides that any ATM operator who imposes a fee on any consumer for providing host transfer services must provide a notice stating: (i) The fact that a fee is imposed by such operator for providing the service; and (ii) The amount of any such fee. 37. The notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) must “be posted in a prominent and conspicuous location on or at the automated teller machine at which the electronic fund transfer is initiated by the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(B)(i). 38. In addition, 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(c) provides: No fee may be imposed by any automated teller machine operator in connection with any electronic fund transfer initiated by a consumer for which a notice is required under subparagraph (A), unless: (i) The consumer receives such notice in accordance with subparagraph (B); and (ii) The consumer elects to continue in the manner necessary to effect the transaction after receiving such notice. 40. 12 C.F.R. 205.16(c) further provides: An automated teller machine operator must comply with the following: (1) Post the notice required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section in a prominent and conspicuous location on or at the automated teller machine 41. In addition, 12 C.F.R. 205.16(e) states: An automated teller machine operator may impose a fee on a consumer for initiating an electronic fund transfer of a balance inquiry only if: (1) The consumer is provided the notices required under paragraph (c) of this section; and (2) The consumer elects to continue the transaction or inquiry after receiving such notices. 42. Defendant is an automated teller machine operator who provided host transfer services at all times relevant to this action. 43. Defendant failed to comply with the EFTA in connection with providing such services to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class as the notice on the Brother’s ATM was in neither a prominent nor conspicuous location. 45. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s violations of the EFTA in that they were charged a fee that was not properly disclosed. 46. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693m, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for the amount of actual damages incurred, as well as for statutory damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and the costs of this action. A. The Class Violation of the EFTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, et seq., (On Behalf of All Class Members)

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10. Defendant uses the mails, telephone, the internet and other instruments of interstate commerce in engaging in the business of collecting past-due or defaulted debts or alleged debts of natural persons which arise from transactions which are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 12. Defendant has asserted that Plaintiff incurred or owed a certain financial obligation arising from an account originating from Honda Financial Services (“Debt” or “Account”). 13. The Debt arose from one or more transactions which were primarily for Plaintiff’s personal, family, or household purposes. 14. The debts alleged to be owed by Plaintiff and those similarly situated were incurred for personal, family or household purposes. 15. Defendant contends that the Account is past-due and in default. 16. At some point after Plaintiff’s alleged default, the original creditor of the Account determined that the debt was uncollectable. 17. Sometime after default, the creditor of the Account either directly or through intermediate transactions assigned, placed, transferred or sold the Debt to Defendant for collection. 18. The Account was past-due and in default when it was placed with or assigned to Defendant for collection. 19. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant acted in an attempt to collect the Debt. B. False Threat of Interest and Other Charges 20. In an attempt to collect the Debt, Defendant mailed a collection letter to Plaintiff on July 10, 2015 (“7/10/15 Letter”). 21. A true copy of the 7/10/15 Letter, but with redactions, is attached as Exhibit A. 23. The 7/10/15 Letter states, “The balance in the amount of $17051.59 is due in full at this time.” 24. The 7/10/15 Letter further states: “Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day your payment may be greater.” 25. On information and belief and contrary to the statement contained in the 7/10/15 Letter, at no time after July 10, 2015 did the original creditor of the Account add “interest” to the Account. 26. On information and belief and contrary to the statement contained in the 7/10/15 Letter, at no time after July 10, 2015 did the original creditor of the Account add “late” charges to the Account. 27. On information and belief and contrary to the statement contained in the 7/10/15 letter, at no time after July 10, 2015 did the original creditor of the Account add “other changes” to the Account. 28. On information and belief, contrary to statements contained in the 7/10/15 Letter, at no time does Defendant add “interest” to consumer debts, which are similar to the Account, and which it seeks to collect. 29. On information and belief, contrary to statements contained in the 7/10/15 Letter, at no time does Defendant add “late charges” to consumer debts, which are similar to the Account, and which it seeks to collect. 31. On information and belief, Defendant is not legally or contractually permitted to add “interest” to the Account. 32. On information and belief, Defendant is not legally or contractually permitted to add “late charges” to the Account. 33. On information and belief, Defendant is not legally or contractually permitted to add “other charges” to the Account. 34. On information and belief, Honda Financial Services ceased sending periodic statements and stopped charging additional interest and fees prior to Defendant’s sending of the 7/10/15 Letter. 35. In fact, the balance for the Account remained the same at $17,051.59. See Defendant’s collection letter dated February 7, 2016 attached as Exhibit B. 36. Defendant’s statement that “[b]ecause of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day your payment may be greater” is false, deceptive, and misleading to the least sophisticated consumer because Defendant falsely suggests that the amount of the debt will increase from day to day because of interest, late charges, and other charges when, in fact, the original creditor has stopped charging interest and fees. 37. Such a false statement makes Plaintiff and the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to the amount allegedly owed to Honda Financial Services, and uncertain as to how much additional interest, late charges, and other charges would continue to accrue. 41. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 42. Subject to discovery and further investigation which may cause Plaintiff to modify, narrow or expand the following class definition at the time Plaintiff moves for class certification, Plaintiff seeks certification of a Class initially defined as follows: All natural persons residing in the State of New Jersey to whom, beginning July 9, 2015 through and including the final resolution of this case, Defendant sent one or more letter(s) in attempts to collect a consumer debt, which letter contained the same or materially similar language: “Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day your payment may be greater.” 43. Plaintiff seeks to recover statutory damages, attorney’s fees and costs on behalf of all class members under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 44. The Class for whose benefit this action is brought is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 46. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. The FDCPA statutory scheme provides for statutory damages payable to each class member. A class action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of the claims of the Class and will foster economies of time, effort and expense. 47. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. 48. The questions of law and/or fact common to the members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 49. Plaintiff does not have interests antagonistic to those of the Class. 50. The Class, of which Plaintiff is a member, is readily identifiable. 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and has retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of consumer litigation. Proposed Class Counsel have investigated and identified potential claims in the action; have a great deal of experience in handling class actions, consumer and other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in this action. 53. Plaintiff does not anticipate any difficulty in the management of this litigation. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, reasserts and incorporates herein the allegations contained in the preceding and following paragraphs. 55. Plaintiff and those similarly situated are “consumers” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) because they are natural persons allegedly obligated to pay a debt, in which the money, property, insurance, or services, which was the subject of the transaction, was primarily for personal, family and/or household purposes. 56. The debts alleged to be owed by the Plaintiff and those similarly situated are consumer “debts” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 57. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 58. The 7/10/15 Letter, copy of which appears in Exhibit A, is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 59. The letters, which are the same or similar in form to the 7/10/15 Letter, sent by Defendant to other New Jersey consumers are “communications” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 61. Defendant’s use of the written communications as described above, sent to Plaintiff and those similarly situated, violated the FDCPA in one or more of the following ways: a. Defendant made false, deceptive or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e; b. Defendant made false representations of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A); c. Defendant threatened to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5); d. Defendant used false representations or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collection a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). e. Defendant used unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f; f. Defendant attempted to collect any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1); and g. Defendant failed to properly disclose the amount of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 62. The violations of the FDCPA described herein constitute per se violations. 63. Based on any one or more of those violations, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and those similarly situated for damages, attorney’s fees and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 7. Defendant is not in the business of extending credit, selling goods or services to consumers. 8. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect past-due or defaulted debts allegedly owed to others which were incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 9. Defendant is in the business of collecting past-due or defaulted debts or alleged debts of natural persons. A. Background

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70. Plaintiffs and Collective Members were at all relevant times hereto, improperly classified and paid by the Defendants as independent contractors. 71. Plaintiffs and Collective Members were employed by Defendants as “Groomers” and/or “Pet Stylists.” 72. Upon hiring Plaintiffs and Collective Members, Defendants require Plaintiffs to sign “Contractor Agreements” as either an “Apprentice Groomer,” “Senior Groomer,” “Salon Manager,” or “Assistant Manager.” 73. According to the Contractor Agreement, the duties and responsibilities of an apprentice groomer include learning to groom pets; assisting senior groomers and managers; tracking personal payroll and sales; assisting with staff paperwork; assisting in ordering, inventory, stock, and product review; wearing provided smocks and/or shirts in the salon; assisting with customer service; and performing other salon duties that arise. 74. According to the Contractor Agreement, the duties and responsibilities of a senior groomer include assisting in daily salon management; tracking personal sales; assisting with general salon paperwork; assisting with inventory, stock, and product review; wearing provided smocks in the salon; assisting with customer service; and performing other salon duties that arise. 75. According to the Contractor Agreement, the duties and responsibilities of an assistant manager include assisting in daily salon management; tracking personal sales; assisting with general salon paperwork; assisting with inventory, stock, and product review; wearing provided smocks in the salon; assisting with customer service; and performing other salon duties that arise. DECLARATORY RELIEF 166. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Collective Members, reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 167. Plaintiffs and Defendants have a FLSA dispute pending, which the Court has jurisdiction to hear pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as a federal question exists. 168. The Court also has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. 169. Plaintiffs may obtain declaratory relief. 170. Defendants employed Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. 171. Defendants’ business is an enterprise covered by the FLSA, as concerns its employer-employee relationship with Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. 172. Plaintiffs were individually covered by the FLSA. 173. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are entitled to minimum wage pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 206 and overtime pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207. 174. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are entitled to an equal amount of liquidated damages as Defendants’ policy of failing to pay minimum wage and overtime remain in effect. 175. The damages suffered by Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are ongoing. 176. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated will suffer future damages for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 177. Defendants did not rely on a good faith defense in their failure to abide by the provisions of the FLSA and failure to pay minimum wage and overtime. 178. It is in the public interest to have these declarations of rights recorded as Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action serves the useful purposes of clarifying and settling the legal relations at issue, preventing future harm, and promoting the remedial purposes of the Misclassification of Plaintiffs and Collective Members as Independent Contractors

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(Brought Individually and on a Collective Basis Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (Rule 23 Class Action) Violations of Texas Common Law FAILURE TO PAY WAGES 1.5 times their regular rate, in violation of the FLSA. 6 18. Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated call center employees’ primary job duties include handling incoming calls and providing customer service, among other non-exempt duties. 19. Plaintiffs and similarly situated call center employees hold titles such as “call center representatives” and “call center agents,” among others (hereinafter referred to as “call center employees”). 20. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff and other call center employees regularly worked off-the-clock. 21. In order to perform their jobs, Defendant’s call center employees are required to boot up their computers, log into various computer programs, among other tasks, before they can take their handle their first incoming call at the start of their scheduled shifts. 22. In order to perform their jobs, Defendant’s call center employees are required to close/shut down all their computer programs and systems after the end of their scheduled shifts. 23. In order to perform their jobs and meet Defendant’s deadlines, Defendant’s call center employees are required to perform additional work activities, such as handling paperwork and attending meetings, outside of their scheduled shifts. 24. The activities call center employees performed outside of their scheduled shifts benefited Defendant and were essential to their responsibilities as call center employees. 25. Defendant required Plaintiff and other call center employees to perform these activities outside of their scheduled shifts but prohibited call center employees from clocking in 2 See Defendant’s website: https://www.empereon-constar.com/about/who-we-are.html (Last Accessed October 5, 2020). 5 for this time. Defendant’s policy compelled them to perform these activities without clocking in for it and therefore perform it off-the-clock. 26. The U.S. Department of Labor recognizes that call center jobs, like those held by Defendant’s call center employees, are homogenous and it issued Fact Sheet #64 in July 2008 to alert call center employees to some of the abuses which are prevalent in the industry. One of those abuses, which is occurring in this case, is an employer’s refusal to pay for work “from the beginning of the first principal activity of the workday to the end of the last principal activity of the workday.” Fact Sheet #64 at p. 2. The Department of Labor’s Fact Sheet #64 specifically condemns an employer’s non-payment of an employee’s necessary pre-shift activities: “An example of the first principal activity of the day for agents/specialists/representatives working in call centers includes starting the computer to download work instructions, computer applications and work-related emails.” Additionally, the FLSA requires that “[a] daily or weekly record of all hours worked, including time spent in pre-shift and post-shift job-related activities must be kept.” Id. 27. As a result of Defendant’s company-wide policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff and other call center employees to perform these tasks outside of their scheduled shift hours, Plaintiff and other call center employees have not been compensated for all hours worked. 28. As non-exempt employees, Plaintiff and other call center employees were entitled to full compensation for all overtime hours worked at a rate of 1.5 times their “regular rate” of pay. 29. Because Plaintiff and other call center employees typically worked at least 40 hours in a workweek, they were not paid for time spent working in excess of 40 hours in a workweek at 30. For example, in the pay period of March 30, 2020 through April 12, 2020 Plaintiff worked over 40 hours in each workweek, as well as additional hours off-the-clock. 31. Defendant has been aware of its obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week to Plaintiff and other call center employees but has failed to do so. 32. Defendant knew or could have easily determined how long it took for its call center employees to complete their start-up, shut down, and additional work tasks outside of their scheduled shift hours and could have properly compensated call center employees for this work they performed, but did not. 33. At all relevant times, Defendant was Plaintiff’s “employer” and Defendant directed and directly benefited from the work performed by Plaintiff and other call center employees off- the-clock. 34. At all relevant times, Defendant controlled Plaintiff’s and all other call center employees’ work schedule, duties, protocols, applications, assignments, and employment conditions. 35. Defendant knew or should have known that the time call center employees spent performing start-up, shut down, and additional work activities outside of their scheduled shifts is compensable under the FLSA. 36. At all relevant times, Defendant was able to track the amount of time that Plaintiff and other call center employees spent in connection with these start-up, shut down, and additional work activities outside of their scheduled shifts; however, Defendant failed to document, track, or pay them for such work. 37. At all relevant times, Defendant’s policies and practices deprived Plaintiff and other call center employees of wages owed for the start-up, shut down, and additional work activities 7 Plaintiff and other call center employees performed outside of their scheduled shifts, in violation of the FLSA and Texas common law. 38. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on her own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former call center employees who worked for Defendant in any of their locations in the United States at any time within the three years preceding the commencement of this action and the date of judgment. (hereinafter referred to as the “Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 39. With respect to the claims set forth in this action, a collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because the employees described above are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Collective of employees on behalf of whom Plaintiff brings this collective action are similarly situated because (a) they have been or are employed in the same or similar positions; (b) they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practice, policy, or plan; and (c) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories. 40. The employment relationships between Defendant and every Collective member are the same and differ only in name, location, and rate of pay. The key issues – the amount of uncompensated work time owed to each employee – do not vary substantially from Collective member to Collective member. 41. The key legal issues are also the same for every Collective member: time spent booting up and shutting down their computer, logging in and out of computer programs, and performing other work tasks essential to their responsibilities as call center employees off-the- clock is compensable under the FLSA. 8 42. Plaintiff estimates that the Collective, including both current and former employees over the relevant period, will include at least hundreds of members. The precise number of Collective members should be readily available from a review of Defendant’s personnel and payroll records. 43. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on her own behalf and on behalf of: All current and former call center employees who worked for Defendant in the state of Texas at any time within the four years preceding the commencement of this action and the date of judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004. (hereinafter referred to as the “Rule 23 Class”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 44. The members of the Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all Rule 23 Class members in this case would be impractical. Plaintiff reasonably estimates that there are several hundred Class members. Rule 23 Class members should be easy to identify from Defendant’s computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records. 45. There is a well-defined community of interest among Rule 23 Class members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Class. These common legal and factual questions, include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Rule 23 Class members worked off-the-clock; b. Whether Defendant maintained a policy or practice of failing to pay Rule 23 Class members for work performed off-the-clock; c. Whether Defendant contractually agreed to pay Rule 23 Class members for all hours worked; 9 d. Whether Defendant failed to pay Rule 23 Class members for all hours worked; e. Whether Defendants’ violations of Texas common law were willful and/or in good faith. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Rule 23 Class in that she and all other Rule 23 Class members suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s common and systemic payroll policies and practices. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same policies, practices, promises and course of conduct as all other Rule 23 Class members’ claims and her legal theories are based on the same legal theories as all other Rule 23 Class members. 47. Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 Class and has retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of nationwide wage and hour class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has interests that are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the Rule 23 Class. 48. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Rule 23 Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer. Prosecution of this case as a Rule 23 Class action will also avoid duplicative lawsuits being filed in state and federal courts throughout the nation. 49. Defendant’s corporate-wide policies and practices affected all class members similarly, and Defendant benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each class member. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same legal theories as all other class members. Therefore, this case will be more manageable and efficient as a Rule 23 class action. Plaintiffs and their counsel know of no unusual difficulties in this case. 10 50. Since the elements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied in this case, class certification is appropriate. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action”). 51. Because Defendant acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Rule 23 Class and declaratory relief is appropriate in this case with respect to the Rule 23 Class as a whole, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is also appropriate. 52. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein and further alleges as follows. 53. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was an employer under 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) of the FLSA, subject to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 54. Defendant is engaged in interstate commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA. 55. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and other Collective members were “employees” of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) of the FLSA. 56. Plaintiff and other Collective members either (1) engaged in commerce; or (2) engaged in the production of goods for commerce; or (3) were employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 57. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant “suffered or permitted” Plaintiff and other Collective members to work and thus “employed” them within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) of the FLSA. 11 58. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant required Plaintiff and other Collective members to perform start-up, shut down, and additional work activities outside of their scheduled shifts as described herein, but failed to pay these employees the federally mandated minimum wage or overtime compensation for such time. 59. The uncompensated start-up, shut down, and additional work activities performed by Plaintiff and other Collective members was an essential part of their jobs and these activities and the time associated with these activities is not de minimis. 60. In workweeks where Plaintiff and other Collective members worked 40 hours or more, the uncompensated time should have been paid them at the federally mandated rate of 1.5 times each employee’s regularly hourly wage. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 61. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were knowing and willful. Defendant knew or could have easily determined how long it took for its call center employees to perform these start- up, shut down, and additional work activities outside of their scheduled shifts and Defendant could have properly compensated Plaintiff and the Collective for such time, but did not. 62. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), provides that as a remedy for a violation of the Act, an employee is entitled to his or her unpaid wages (and unpaid overtime if applicable) plus an additional equal amount in liquidated damages (double damages), plus costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 63. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 64. Plaintiff further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 12 608853, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D. Tex. June 29, 1983). 65. The Texas Common-Law Class Members are entitled to recover their unpaid “straight time” or “gap time” wages for services rendered on behalf of Defendant. These claims are independent of Plaintiff’s claims for unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the FLSA, and they are therefore not preempted by the FLSA. See Carman v. Meritage Homes Corp., 37 F.Supp.3d 860, 867 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 66. The Texas Common-Law Class Members provided valuable services for Defendant, at Defendant’s direction and with Defendant’s acquiescence. 67. Defendant accepted Plaintiff’s and the Texas Common-Law Class Members’ services and benefited from their timely dedication to Defendant’s policies and adherence to Defendant’s schedule. 68. Defendant was aware that Plaintiff and the Texas Common-Law Class Members expected to be compensated for the services they provided to Defendant. 69. Defendant has therefore been benefited from services rendered by Plaintiff and the Texas Common-Law Class Members and Plaintiff and the Texas Common-Law Class Members are entitled to recover pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum meruit.

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19. At all relevant times, JCT was Plaintiff’s “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA and California law. 20. Throughout the time period beginning four years prior to the filing of this lawsuit, through the present, JCT has employed numerous Drivers and contracted with numerous retail and wholesale clients around the country to provide transportation services. 21. JCT requires prospective Drivers, including Plaintiff, to report to a location in Oklahoma before beginning their employment. While there, prospective Drivers, including Plaintiff, spend approximately four days completing orientation. During this time period, Drivers, including Plaintiff, are trained on running an “owner-operator” trucking business and on JCT’s policies and procedures. Drivers, including Plaintiff, pay, or agree to pay, JCT and/or its affiliates for specified equipment, services, and other fees. Among these equipment fees, JCT requires Drivers, including Plaintiff, to enter into truck lease agreements with a leasing company, including Three Diamond Leasing, LLC. On information and belief, Three Diamond Leasing, LLC is a subsidiary of JCT. The costs paid by Drivers, including Plaintiff, are in excess of $500.00 within one year of the time Drivers, including Plaintiff, begin operating trucks on behalf of JCT. 22. JCT requires prospective Drivers, including Plaintiff, to undergo a physical examination and to submit to drug and alcohol testing. Drivers must agree to continue to submit to drug and alcohol testing throughout their employment. 5 48. Plaintiff brings his FLSA claims as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as to claims for minimum wage violations, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. The FLSA Collective that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows: All current and former Drivers who were employed by JCT to provide transportation services within the United States at any time during the period beginning three years prior to the filing of this Complaint, and continuing through the present. 49. Plaintiff’s claims for violations of the FLSA may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, because Plaintiff’s FLSA claims are similar to the claims of the Collective members. 50. The Collective members are similarly situated, as they have substantially similar job duties and requirements and are subject to a common policy, practice, or plan that misclassifies them as exempt independent contractors, and thus requires them to perform work without compensation in violation of the FLSA. 9 54. First, Plaintiff seeks to maintain his California state law claims as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, Plaintiff seeks to certify the following Rule 23 Sub-Class (the “First Sub-Class”): All current and former Drivers who were employed by JCT to provide transportation services in the State of California at any time during the period beginning four years prior to the filing of this action and continuing through the present. 55. Second, Plaintiff seeks to maintain his Oklahoma state law claims as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, Plaintiff seeks to certify the following Rule 23 Sub-Class (the “Second Sub-Class”): All current and former Drivers who entered into an agreement with JCT to provide transportation services in the State of Oklahoma, including, but not limited to, those who signed a lease agreement with Three Diamond Leasing, LLC, among others, at any time during the period beginning three years prior to the filing of this action and continuing through the present. 56. The two Sub-Classes set forth above are referred to collectively as the “Class.” Members of each Sub-Class are referred to as members of the “Class” or “Class members.” 10 65. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 66. JCT violated the FLSA by knowingly failing to maintain records of all hours worked. 67. JCT violated the FLSA by knowingly failing to compensate Plaintiff and putative FLSA Collective members for all hours worked and by knowingly failing to pay Plaintiff and putative FLSA Collective members the federally mandated minimum wage in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206 for all hours worked. 14 71. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 72. JCT intentionally and willfully pays Plaintiff and putative Class members below minimum wage by opting to pay Drivers at a rate determined per mile driven on route. After deducting costs for expenses, tools and equipment from Plaintiff and Class members’ wages, Driver compensation is lowered substantially. After deductions, Drivers often make less than the state-mandated minimum wage for each hour they work. 73. Labor Code § 1194(a) provides as follows: Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs of suit. 15 80. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 81. Labor Code § 200(a) defines wages as “all amounts for labor performed by employees of every description, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained by the standard of time, task, piece, commission basis or other method of calculation.” 16 90. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 91. JCT routinely denies timely meal periods to Plaintiff and putative Class members. Despite long work days regularly lasting well in excess of eight hours, deadlines imposed by JCT prevent Plaintiff and putative Class members from taking a meal period. When Drivers do get a meal period, they are often untimely. In addition, when Plaintiff and putative Class members work more than ten hours in a day, JCT regularly does not make a second meal period available to them. 92. Plaintiff and putative Class members are not paid one hour of premium pay for the missed meal periods. 93. Similar to meal periods, JCT routinely fails to make rest periods available to Plaintiff and putative Class members. Plaintiff’s and putative Class members’ schedules do not allow them to take rest periods throughout the day. When available, rest periods are often too short. Plaintiff and putative Class members do not receive premium pay for their missed rest periods as required by California law. 94. Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 and IWC Wage Orders 9-2001(11) and 9-2001(12) require JCT to authorize and permit meal and rest periods to its employees. Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 and the applicable Wage Order prohibits employers from employing an employee for more than five hours without a meal period of not less than thirty minutes, and from employing an employee more than ten hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than thirty minutes. Labor Code § 226.7 and the applicable Wage Orders also require employers to authorize and permit employees to take ten minutes of net rest time per four hours or major fraction thereof of work, and to pay employees their full wages during those rest periods. Unless the employee is relieved of all duty during the thirty-minute meal period and ten-minute 18 99. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 19 Coerced Purchases California Labor Code § 450 (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) 122. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 123. California Labor Code § 450 prohibits an employer or agent, or other person, from compelling or coercing any applicant for employment or employee to purchase any thing of value, including any fee of any type to apply for employment, to receive or complete an application for employment, or for an employer to provide, accept or process an application for employment. 124. JCT violated California Labor Code § 450 by compelling and/or coercing Plaintiff and the putative Class alleged herein to lease or purchase vehicles and other equipment directly from JCT or other companies. 125. Wherefore, Plaintiff and the putative Class request relief as hereinafter provided. Constructive Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation (On Behalf of the Second Sub-Class) 183. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 184. In Oklahoma, the concealment of material facts which one is bound under the circumstances to disclose, constitutes constructive fraud. A duty to speak may arise from partial disclosure, the speaker being under a duty to say nothing or to tell the whole truth. One conveying a false impression by the disclosure of some facts and the concealment of others is guilty of fraud, even though his statement is true as far as it goes, since such concealment is in effect a false representation that what is disclosed is the whole truth. 185. As noted above in paragraphs 159-164, JCT offered Plaintiff and the Class the Driving Opportunity from which they would be able to develop a career and earn positive income. Once JCT embarked on making such a business offer to the Plaintiff and putative Class, JCT owed them a duty of full disclosure. Plaintiff and the putative class relied on such offer, representations, and omissions in purchasing the Driving Opportunity. However, JCT did not 34 Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, 15 Okl. St. §§ 752, et seq. (On Behalf of the Second Sub-Class) 172. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 173. The Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act (OCPA), 15 Okl. St. §§ 752, et seq. bars deceptive and unfair trade practices in connection with “the advertising, offering for sale or 32 Deceptive Trade Practices Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 78 Okl. St. §§ 52, et seq. (On Behalf of the Second Sub-Class) 178. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 179. The Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 78 Okl. St. §§ 52, et seq. bars deceptive trade practices including “Knowingly mak[ing] a false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits or quantities of goods or services or a false 33 Failure to Authorize and Permit and/or Make Available Meal and Rest Periods California Labor Code §§ 203, 223, 226.7, 512, and 1198 (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 204, and 221-223 (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) Failure to Pay Wages and Minimum Wage Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. (On Behalf of Collective) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage California Labor Code §§ 200, 1182.11, 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 1198 (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) Failure to Reimburse for Necessary Business Expenditures California Labor Code § 2802 (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) Failure to Maintain Proper Payroll Records California Labor Code § 1174 (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) 105. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 106. JCT does not maintain proper records Plaintiff and putative Class members, including of all hours worked in a pay period, as required by California law. 20 Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements California Labor Code § 226 (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) 114. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 21 Statutory Penalties Pursuant to PAGA Labor Code § 2699(f) (On behalf of All Aggrieved Employees) 221. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 222. Labor Code § 2699(f) provides: For all provisions of this code except those for which a civil penalty is specifically provided, there is established a civil penalty for a violation of these provisions, as follows: . . . (2) If, at the time of the alleged violation, the person employs one or more employees, the civil penalty is one hundred dollars ($100) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred dollars ($200) for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation. 223. To the extent than any violation alleged herein does not carry penalties under Labor Code § 2699(a), Plaintiff seeks civil penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 2699(f) for Plaintiff and Class members each pay period in which he or she was aggrieved, in the amounts established by Labor Code § 2699(f). 224. Pursuant to Labor Code § 2699.3(a)(1) and (2), Plaintiff has provided the LWDA with notice of his intention to file this claim. Sixty-five calendar days have passed without notice from the LWDA. Plaintiff satisfied the administrative prerequisites to commence this civil action in compliance with § 2699.3(a). 225. Plaintiff seeks the aforementioned penalties on behalf of the State, other aggrieved employees, and themselves as set forth in Labor Code § 2699(g), (i). 41 Statutory Penalties Pursuant to PAGA California Labor Code § 2699(a) (On behalf of All Aggrieved Employees) 207. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 208. Labor Code § 2699(a) provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any provision of this code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies or employees, for a violation of this code, 38 UNJUST ENRICHMENT (On Behalf of the Second Sub-Class) 191. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 192. Because of JCT’s wrongful and fraudulent conduct and its failure to disclose material facts as described above, Plaintiff and the Drivers have conferred benefits upon JCT. 193. JCT was at all relevant times aware that the benefits conferred upon it by the Drivers were the result of its wrongful conduct. 194. Allowing JCT to retain these unjust profits and other benefits would offend traditional notions of justice and fair play. Under these circumstances, it would be inequitable and unjust for JCT to retain the benefits and allowing it to do so would induce companies to engage in fraudulent and/or other wrongful conduct to increase profits. 195. JCT is in possession of funds and benefits that were wrongfully obtained from Drivers and such funds should be restored and/or disgorged as ill-gotten gains. 36 Unlawful Business Practices California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. (On Behalf of Members of both the First and Second Sub-Classes) 196. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 197. The UCL prohibits unfair competition in the form of any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. 198. Business and Professions Code § 17204 allows a person injured by the unfair business acts or practices to prosecute a civil action for violation of the UCL. 199. Beginning at an exact date unknown to Plaintiff, but at least since the date four years prior to the filing of this suit, JCT has committed further acts of unfair competition as defined by the UCL, by engaging in the unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts and practices described above, through its violations of the Oklahoma Business Opportunity Sales Act set forth above. 200. The violations of these laws serve as unlawful predicate acts and practices for purposes of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. 201. The acts and practices described above constitute unfair, unlawful and fraudulent business practices, and unfair competition, within the meaning of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Among other things, the acts and practices have taken from Plaintiff and the Class money and wages rightfully earned by them, while enabling JCT to gain an unfair competitive advantage over law-abiding employers and competitors. 202. Business and Professions Code § 17203 provides that a court may make such orders or judgments as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition. Injunctive relief is necessary and appropriate to prevent JCT from repeating the unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts and practices alleged above. 37 Unlawful Business Practices California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) 141. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 142. The UCL prohibits unfair competition in the form of any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. 143. Business and Professions Code § 17204 allows a person injured by the unfair business acts or practices to prosecute a civil action for violation of the UCL. 144. Labor Code § 90.5(a) states it is the public policy of California to vigorously enforce minimum labor standards in order to ensure employees are not required to work under 25 Unlawful Sale of Business Opportunities 71 Okla. Stat. §§ 806, 808, 819, 824 (On Behalf of the Second Sub-Class) 153. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 154. The Oklahoma Business Opportunity Sales Act regulates the sale of a “business opportunity” in the State of Oklahoma. 155. “Business opportunity” means a contract or agreement, between a seller and purchaser, express or implied, oral or in writing, wherein it is agreed that the seller shall provide the purchaser any products, equipment, supplies, or services enabling the purchaser to start a business and the seller represents directly or indirectly, orally or in writing, inter alia, that the seller or a person specified by the seller will provide or assist the purchaser in finding accounts for the purchaser’s services; or that the seller will provide a marketing plan. 156. “Marketing plan” means advice or training, provided to the purchaser by the seller or a person recommended by the seller, pertaining to the sale of any products, equipment, supplies or services and the advice or training includes, but is not limited to, preparing or providing, inter alia, training regarding the promotion, operation, or management of the business opportunity; or operational, managerial, technical or financial guidelines or assistance. 157. 71 Okla. Stat. § 806 provides: It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any business opportunity … in this state unless the business opportunity is registered under the provisions of the provisions of the Oklahoma Business Opportunity Sales Act or is exempt under Section 803 of this title. 158. 71 Okla. Stat. § 808(a) provides: It shall be unlawful for any person to offer or sell any business opportunity required to be registered pursuant to the Oklahoma Business Opportunity Sales Act unless a written disclosure document is filed pursuant to Section 807 of this title is delivered to each purchaser at least ten (10) business days prior to the execution by a purchaser of any contract or agreement imposing a binding legal obligation on the purchaser or the payment by a purchaser of any consideration in connection with the offer or sale of the business opportunity. 28 Waiting Time Penalties California Labor Code §§ 201-203 (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) 131. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 132. JCT does not provide Plaintiff and putative Class members with their wages when due under California law after their employment with JCT ends. 133. Labor Code § 201 provides: If an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately. 134. Labor Code § 202 provides: If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting. 135. Labor Code § 203 provides, in relevant part: If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.5, 202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days. 24 Willful Misclassification California Labor Code § 226.8 (On Behalf of the First Sub-Class) 126. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 127. JCT intentionally and willfully characterized Plaintiff and members of the class as independent contractors rather than employees in violation of California Labor Code § 226.8. 23

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15. Treatment for Inpatient care for mental illness, substance abuse or detoxification. A. The Banner Plan The Banner Plan is a self-funded plan, meaning that the plan sponsor, Banner Health, is responsible for paying or providing reimbursement for plan benefits. The Banner Plan provides reimbursement for “Covered Services,” which is defined as “the expenses incurred by or on behalf of a person” for the specified charges, including “charges made by a Physician or a Psychologist for professional services.” Among other things, the Banner Plan provides coverage for the following mental health benefits:

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36. Defendants own and operate approximately 480 Applebee’s restaurant franchises across 23 states throughout the United States. Defendants are the largest Applebee’s franchisee and are one of the largest franchisees in the United States. 37. In early 2019, Plaintiff patronized Defendants’ Applebee’s restaurant located at Steubenville Pike, 6570 PA-60, Pittsburgh, PA 15205 (the “Subject Property”). 38. Plaintiff regularly travels in and around the area where the Subject Property is located for shopping and dining. During these trips, he regularly visits restaurants for dining and to socialize with friends. Plaintiff wishes to access goods and services offered at Defendants’ restaurants during these trips. 41. Defendants’ failure to provide individuals with mobility disabilities accessible dining surfaces or accessible seating in its bar dining areas is discriminatory, segregationist, and in violation of the ADA. Just as Defendants could not exclude customers from the bar area based upon race, the ADA precludes Defendants from segregating customers based upon disability. 42. Though Plaintiff is serving as a tester in this case, Plaintiff has visited and enjoyed Defendants’ restaurants in the past and would like to patronize Defendants’ restaurants, including the Subject Property, in the future and be served at the bar; however, the lack of accessible seating at the bar’s dining surface has, and does, deter Plaintiff from patronizing Defendants’ restaurants. 44. Plaintiff has been, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to be, injured by Defendants’ failure to provide accessible dining surfaces and seating to persons with disabilities. 45. Plaintiff brings this action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and the following classes: (1) All individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and who have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of bar counter dining services offered to patrons at Defendants’ restaurants located within Pennsylvania because of the lack of accessible bar counter dining surface seating at those restaurants. (2) All individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and who have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of bar counter dining services offered to patrons at all other of Defendants’ restaurants located within the United States because of the lack of accessible bar counter dining surface seating at those restaurants. 46. Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and the Court, and will facilitate judicial economy. 47. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 49. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of class litigation under the ADA. 50. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole. 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the previous paragraphs. 52. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the defined putative class of individuals similarly situated. 53. Plaintiff is an individual with a mobility disability and uses a wheelchair for mobility. Plaintiff, accordingly, is an individual with a disability pursuant to the ADA, in that Plaintiff suffers a physical impairment substantially limiting one or more major life activities. Violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.

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27. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action seeks unpaid wages based on Defendant’s alleged failure to pay wages for rest breaks, alleging that Plaintiff and the putative class were not paid “separate and apart from the piece rate for rest breaks...” and “Defendant did not and does compensate its truck drivers for rest periods.” See Exh. A (Complaint), ¶¶ 14, 15, 34. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks recovery of unpaid wages for each day that Plaintiff and the putative class members experienced unpaid rest breaks. 31. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action alleges that Defendant failed to pay him and putative class members overtime wages: (1) for each unpaid rest break (“Rest Break Overtime”); and (2) for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week in violation of RCW 38. Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action alleges that Defendant “failed to meet its obligation to pay all wages due to Plaintiff and Class Members at the established regular pay periods.” See Exh. A (Complaint), ¶ 55. In connection with this claim, Plaintiff seeks “[d]ouble damages in an additional amount equal to the amount [of] wages unlawfully withheld during the Class Period.” Id. at ¶ 56, Prayer for Relief, ¶ E(ii). As set forth in the calculations pertaining to Plaintiff’s First and Second Causes of Action, above, the amount in controversy for alleged unpaid regular and overtime wages in connection with Plaintiff’s claims in this action is at least $2,110,299.31 ($848,551.37 + $1,261,747.94). Thus, the amount in controversy on Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action is at least $2,110,299.31. 49.46.130 (“Regular Overtime”). To be clear, Defendant denies and disputes that any “overtime” wages are due, owing or unpaid to Plaintiff and/or the putative class members under state law, including without limitation as a result of federal preemption. SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104-1064 TEL (206) 382-1000 | FAX (206) 386-7343 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a knives and outdoor gear manufacturing company that owns and operates www.bladehq.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in December of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.bladehq.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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(FLSA Overtime Violations) (Ohio Class) (Ohio Overtime Violations) 11. At all times relevant, Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), and corresponding provisions of Ohio law including the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 12. Defendant’s current or former EMTs, Paramedics, Field Training Officers, and Wheelchair Car Drivers (the “Putative Class”) are similarly situated to Plaintiff and may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Those current and former Putative Class members who were or are employed in Ohio are part of the Ohio Class. 13. At all times relevant, Defendant was an enterprise within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), and an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). Defendant’s Business 14. Defendant provides emergency and non-emergency medical transportation to its clients around the United States. Defendant has hundreds of offices and/or sub-stations throughout the United States and thousands of employees. Hourly Employees’ Compensation 15. Plaintiff, the Putative Class members who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and the members of the Ohio Class, were paid hourly wages and were provided a signing bonus. The signing bonus was non-discretionary and included as part of the Putative Class’ taxable earnings. 16. Defendant could require repayment of the signing bonus at any time during the first year of employment if Plaintiff or the Putative Class voluntarily or involuntarily terminated his or 4 her employment. Defendant could also require repayment of the signing bonus under other circumstances. 17. The express purpose of providing the signing bonus to the Putative Class members was to encourage the Putative Class members to become and remain employed with Defendant for at least one year. 18. Plaintiff and the Putative Class frequently worked more than forty (40) hours in a single workweek, entitling them to overtime compensation under the FLSA and the Ohio wage- and-hour statute. Defendant’s Miscalculation of Overtime Compensation 19. The FLSA, as well as Ohio law, required Defendant to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff and the Putative Class at one and one-half times their “regular rate,” and to include in the calculation of their regular rates “all remunerations for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee,” including the signing bonus. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(3); 29 C.F.R. 778.208, 778.217; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03(A) (incorporating FLSA standards). 20. The signing bonus was earned over a one-year period measured from Plaintiff and the Putative Class’ hire date. The bonus was not provided to Plaintiff and the Putative Class free- and-clear until after the expiration of the one-year period. Thus, the signing bonus had to be included in determining Plaintiff and the Putative Class’ regular rate for purposes of determining overtime during the entire one-year period. 21. Defendant unlawfully excluded the signing bonus in determining Plaintiff and the Putative Class’ “regular rates” for purposes of overtime compensation. Defendant thereby miscalculated and underpaid the overtime compensation it paid to hourly employees, including 5 Plaintiff and the Putative Class who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and the members of the Ohio Class. 22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 23. Plaintiff brings this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability” prescribed by the FLSA “may be maintained against any employer … by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 24. The Putative Class members who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations consist of: All present and former EMTs, Paramedics, Field Training Officers, and Wheelchair Car Drivers employed by Defendant during the three-year period preceding the commencement of this action to the present who received a signing bonus, and who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks during the one-year period following the employee’s hire date. 25. Such persons are “similarly situated” with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations in that all were hourly employees of Defendant, all were subjected to and injured by Defendant’s unlawful practice of excluding signing bonuses from the calculation of employees’ “regular rates” for overtime compensation, and all have the same claims against Defendant for unpaid wages and overtime compensation as well as for liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 26. Conditional certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that such persons may be sent a Court-authorized notice informing them of the pendency of this action and giving them the opportunity to “opt in.” 6 27. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of similarly-situated persons but avers, upon information and belief, that they consist of thousands of people. Such people are readily identifiable through the payroll records Defendant has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 28. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 29. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and other members of a class of persons who assert claims under the laws of the State of Ohio (the “Ohio Class”), defined as: All present and former EMTs, Paramedics, Field Training Officers, and Wheelchair Car Drivers employed by Defendant during the two- year period preceding the commencement of this action to the present who received a signing bonus, and who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks during the one-year period following the employee’s hire date. 30. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of class members but aver, upon information and belief, that they consist of thousands of people. The number of class members as well as their identities are ascertainable from the payroll records Defendant has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 31. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to: 7 a) Whether Defendant miscalculated the overtime compensation it paid to Plaintiff and other class members by excluding the signing bonus from the calculation of their “regular rates” for purposes of overtime compensation. b) Whether Plaintiff and other class members would have received additional overtime compensation if the signing bonus, had properly been included in their “regular rates” of pay, and, if so, in what amount. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of other class members. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of other class members. Plaintiff’s counsel have broad experience in handling class action litigation, including wage-and-hour litigation, and are fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 34. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 35. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. 8 Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 37. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on behalf of himself and the Putative Class members who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s written consent to becoming a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) is attached to this Complaint. 38. The FLSA requires that hourly and other non-exempt employees receive overtime compensation of “not less than one and one-half times” the employees’ “regular rate.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 39. Plaintiff and the Putative Class members should have been paid overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their “regular rate” for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 40. Defendant miscalculated and underpaid the overtime compensation it paid to Plaintiff and the Putative Class members by excluding the signing bonus from the calculation of their “regular rates.” The signing bonus was non-discretionary and promised to Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins as part of their compensation. 41. By engaging in that practice, Defendant willfully violated the FLSA and regulations thereunder that have the force and effect of law. 42. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Putative Class members were injured in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to 9 the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid overtime compensation” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 44. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, on behalf of himself and the Putative Class members who worked for Defendant in Ohio and who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and all members of the Ohio Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 45. At all times relevant, Defendant was an employer covered by the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 46. Defendant violated the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, by excluding the signing bonus from the calculation of employees’ regular rates for purposes of overtime computing compensation. The signing bonus was non-discretionary and promised to Plaintiff and the members of the Ohio Class as part of their compensation. 47. Defendant’s violations of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03 injured Plaintiff and the Putative Class members who worked for Defendant in Ohio, and the Ohio Class members in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to that statute. 48. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.10(A) provides that Defendant, having violated § 4111.03, is “liable to the employee[s] affected for the full amount of the overtime wage rate, less 10 any amount actually paid to the employee[s] by the employer, and for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court.” Defendant’s Status As an “Employer”

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1 21 22. Defendant ABS is a full service contracting company that provides janitorial, 2 maintenance, general contracting, and movie production services to both small and large clients. 3 Defendant Troy Strahan is an owner of ABS. 4 23. Defendants employ at least twenty manual laborers at each jobsite. Defendants 5 operate multiple jobsites simultaneously. Defendants required their employees to wear shirts 6 bearing the name “ABS” while working at their jobsites. 7 24. Defendants’ employees, including Plaintiff herein, regularly handle goods that are 8 moving or have moved in interstate commerce and/or perform duties which are closely related 9 and directly essential to such interstate activities. 10 25. Plaintiff normally worked more than forty hours a week for Defendants. On 11 average, Plaintiff worked between 50 and 55 hours per week. Defendants often required Plaintiff 12 to work at least six days per week. 13 26. Plaintiff was paid by check. 14 27. Defendants never paid Plaintiff one-and-half times his hourly rate for all hours 15 worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 16 28. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights under the FLSA because 17 Defendants knew or showed reckless disregard for the fact that their compensation practices 18 violated the FLSA. Defendants were and are aware of the custom and practice of overtime pay 19 from their experience and expertise in the industry in which they work. 20 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each of the preceding allegations as though 8 fully set forth herein. 9 33. Plaintiff brings the claims set forth in Count I, alleging violations of the FLSA, as 10 a putative collective action on behalf of himself and an “FLSA Overtime Class,” consisting of all 11 current and former employees of Defendants who are or have been employed by Defendants 12 performing manual labor during the three years immediately preceding the filing of this suit as 13 hourly or non-exempt employees and who, during that period, worked in excess of forty hours in 14 any work week and failed to receive premium pay, at the rate of one-and-a-half times their 15 regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 16 34. Defendants willfully violated the overtime provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 17 207(a) by not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees one-and-a-half times their 18 regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek from at least April 2015 and 19 continuing until the present. 20 6 Fair Labor Standards Act – FLSA Overtime Class 7

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11. HA provides air travel from North America, Asia, and the South Pacific to Hawaii. Otico applied for a customer service position with HA around October 2015 and was interviewed for the position in December 2015. 12. After completing the interview process, HA informed Otico that she was required to attend a mandatory training program, which was offered at various locations across the country. Otico registered for the program held in December 2015 at Oakland Airport. 13. Before the program started, HA sent Otico a welcome packet. The packet stated that the training program was approximately 10 days long, Monday through Saturday, from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. It further stated that it was mandatory to attend all training days in their entirety. The packet also stated that Trainees were required to review and study course material outside of class to prepare for quizzes and tests. The packets also stated that the training program covered, among other things, customer service functions and airport facilities. 25. Otico re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs. 26. Otico and the FLSA Collective were non-exempt employees of HA covered by the Title 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) of the FLSA, which states that an employee “means any individual employed by an employer,” and that an employer “includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 27. Under Title 29 U.S.C. § 206, Otico and the FLSA Collective are entitled to receive at least a minimum wage for all hours worked. Under Title 29 U.S.C. § 203(g), “hours worked” includes all hours employees are suffered or permitted to work. 28. HA required the FLSA Collective to attend training sessions, including Airport Customer Service Training. The FLSA Collective was entitled to be compensated for the time associated with attending training sessions. HA, however, failed to pay the FLSA Collective at least minimum wage for all of the time spent in mandatory training sessions, as well as the time spent studying for the training sessions, in violation of Title 29 U.S.C. § 206. 29. As a result Otico and the FLSA Collective suffered damages as they were not paid minimum wages for all hours actually worked. 30. Otico seeks collective-wide compensation for HA’s unlawful conduct and will take the appropriate steps to notify and join the FLSA Collective under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) via written joinder consents. 32. Otico re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs. 33. Under Title 29 U.S.C. § 207, Otico and the FLSA Collective were entitled to receive overtime at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. During their employment for HA, Otico and the FLSA Collective worked over 40 hours in a week. 34. HA had a policy and practice of willfully not paying Otico and FLSA Collective overtime wages for overtime hours worked. HA required Otico and the FLSA Collective to attend mandatory training sessions and studying for the training sessions. Performing those tasks required Otico and the FLSA Collective to work more than 40 hours during the workweek. 35. As a result, Otico and FLSA Collective suffered damages as they were not paid a proper overtime rate for all hours they worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 36. Otico seeks collective-wide compensation for HA’s unlawful conduct and will take the appropriate steps to notify and join the FLSA Collective under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) via written joinder consents. 37. Under Title 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), Otico and the FLSA Collective is entitled to recover the full amount of unpaid overtime wages, interest thereon, liquidated damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and the costs of suit. 38. Otico re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs. Failure To Pay Minimum Wages Under FLSA (By FLSA Collective Against HA) Failure To Pay Overtime Wages Under FLSA (By FLSA Collective Against HA) Failure to Pay All Hourly Wages Owed (By California Class Against HA)

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13. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “12” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 14. Some time prior to July 1, 2014, an obligation was allegedly incurred to DirecTV. 15. The DirecTV obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 16. The alleged DirecTV obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 17. DirecTV is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 18. Defendant contends that the DirecTV debt is past due. 19. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 20. DirecTV directly or through an intermediary contracted the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. 21. On or about July 1, 2014, the Defendant caused to be delivered to the Plaintiff a letter in an attempt to collect the alleged DirecTV debt. See Exhibit A. 23. The July 1, 2014 letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 24. The July 1, 2014 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 25. The July 1, 2014 letter was sent in an envelope that contained a glassine window. 26. Visible through the glassine window showing the return address of the Defendant was the Plaintiff’s user ID number and CS number. 27. These numbers constitute personal identifying information. 28. The account number is not meaningless – it is a piece of information capable of identifying [the consumer] as a debtor, and its disclosure has the potential to cause harm to a consumer that the FDCPA was enacted to address. Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F. 3d 299 (Third Cir. 2014). 29. Defendant’s actions as described herein are part of a pattern and practice used to collect consumer debts. 30. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 31. On information and belief, Defendant sent a written communication, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the State of New Jersey within one year of the date of this Complaint. 33. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 34. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f(8), a debt collector is prohibited from using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with the consumer by use of mails. 35. The Defendant violated said section by putting the Plaintiff’s User ID number and CS number visible on the July 1, 2014 letter. 36. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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15. Defendant is a seller of electronic cigarette products intended for the exclusive use by adult smokers. Through its Website, its sells various types of items relating to electronic cigarettes such as E-liquids, CBDs, Mods, Tanks, various accessories and starter kits. 17. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy, and practice to deny Plaintiff Nisbett and other blind or visually impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its online retail operations. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Nisbett and visually impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s retail operations and the numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 18. Plaintiff Nisbett cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using JAWS screen- reading software. 22. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Nisbett could independently navigate it, view goods and service items; learn about items, including construction; and easily complete a purchase, as sighted individuals can. 23. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Nisbett has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually impaired people. 25. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 26. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Nisbett seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 28. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 29. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Nisbett and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 30. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 31. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 32. Plaintiff Nisbett seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 34. Plaintiff Nisbett seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 36. Plaintiff Nisbett’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 37. Plaintiff Nisbett will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 38. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 40. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 41. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 42. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail services. The Website is a service that is integrated with its online retail operation. 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 44. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 46. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Nisbett, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 47. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Nisbett requests the relief as set forth below. 48. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website, which is accessible to residents of the State of New York, constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail operations. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with its retail operations. 51. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which is marketed to consumers in the State of New York. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 52. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its online retail operations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 54. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 55. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 57. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Nisbett and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its online retail operations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 58. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Nisbett seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 59. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 60. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 62. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 64. Defendant’s Website, which offers products available for purchase to consumers located in New York City is a sales establishment and public accommodation under NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with online retail operations. 65. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, which offers products for sale to consumers located in the City of New York, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 66. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 67. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 69. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Nisbett and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 70. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Nisbett seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 71. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 72. Plaintiff Nisbett is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Plaintiff Nisbett, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Nisbett contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its online retail operations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 76. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. In recent years, companies such as Defendant have turned to prerecorded calling as a way to communicate with telephone subscribers concerning both marketing and informational calls. 11. In order to legally place prerecorded calls to cellular phone numbers it must receive the cell phone subscriber’s prior express consent to do so for informational calls and written prior express consent for pre-recorded marketing calls. 12. However, in practice, when placing these prerecorded calls to cellular telephone subscribers, Defendant fails to obtain the appropriate consent as required by the TCPA to make such calls. 14. For various reasons, cellular telephone subscribers deactivate and relinquish their cellular telephone numbers. Once deactivated, the cellular telephone carrier reassigns the number to another subscriber – a practice known as “recycling.” Recycling times (i.e., the time between deactivation and reassignment) vary across carriers, generally ranging from 30 days to six months depending on location and demand. During the recycling period, the cellular telephone number is considered disconnected. 15. In some instances, the prior owner of a recycled telephone number may have consented to receiving prerecorded calls from Defendant. But, even if the prior owner consented, that consent does not transfer to the new recycled cellular telephone number’s owner. Ultimately, new owners of recycled cellular telephone numbers are given no choice in receiving, addressing, and in paying for Defendant’s prerecorded calls. 16. In response to the liability risk associated with recycled numbers, numerous commercially available services exist to help companies that call others using an artificial or prerecorded voice, such as Defendant, identify recycled numbers and non-consenting cellular subscribers. For instance, companies such as Infutor, Nextmark List, and Contact Center Compliance advertise their ability to instantly identify and flag disconnected telephone numbers from cellular telephone number data lists on a recurring basis (such as weekly or monthly). This type of service can identify disconnected numbers before they are recycled, thereby alerting companies such as Defendant that any consent associated with those telephone numbers has been terminated. 18. Rather, in an effort to increase revenue and skirt additional costs, Defendant simply treats the new recycled cellular telephone number owner as if he or she were the previous owner. As such, if the previous owner gave consent to receive Defendant’s prerecorded calls, Defendant continues to treat that consent as the consent of the new (unassociated) owner. New owners are then forced to incur the cost and annoyance of receiving Defendant’s prerecorded calls. 19. Worse yet, sometimes these unwanted calls continue for years (as in the present case) as the company continues to call the recycled number and does not update its caller details despite the new subscriber alerting the company that they are calling for the owner who no longer subscribes to the cell phone number. 20. Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) unsolicited prerecorded calls without the prior express consent of the call recipients. In so doing, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Classes, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 22. Over the time span of approximately three years, Plaintiff received repeated prerecorded telephone calls on its cellular telephone number from Defendant’s telephone number 612-435-8142. 23. When Plaintiff answered the calls from telephone number 612-435-8142, Plaintiff was greeted each time by a prerecorded voice identifying the call from UnitedHealthcare, asking to speak to “Tremaine.” Plaintiff would then be instructed to press #1 if the recipient was Tremaine, and to press #2 if not to be opted out. Plaintiff pressed #2 numerous times when receiving calls from Defendant in attempt to stop the calls. 25. Frustrated at receiving the unwanted prerecorded calls, Plaintiff tried calling the telephone number 612-435-8142 in order to stop the calls. However, Plaintiff could not speak to anyone because a prerecorded voice instructed Plaintiff to input Tremaine’s date of birth in order to continue and Plaintiff does not know a Tremaine or Tremaine’s date of birth. 26. Plaintiff was determined to get the calls to stop since they continued to call. Plaintiff called a different number that UnitedHealth uses, and upon being connected to a representative, provided its phone number and informed Defendant’s representative that Plaintiff is not familiar with anyone named “Tremaine” and to stop calling Plaintiff’s cell phone number. The representative informed Plaintiff that its phone number would be removed from its system. 27. Despite Plaintiff’s call to UnitedHealth, Plaintiff continued to receive pre- recorded calls on Plaintiff cellular phone. Plaintiff called another UnitedHealth phone number Plaintiff found on its website and provided its phone number to the representative. Plaintiff then explained that the calls are for “Tremaine,” not Plaintiff, and demanded that the calls to stop. The representative assured Plaintiff that Plaintiff’s phone number would be removed from their system. 28. Again, despite Plaintiff’s requests for UnitedHealth to stop calling, the calls continued to the cellular telephone. On September 21, 2017 and October 20, 2017, Plaintiff received two additional prerecorded telephone calls from Defendant using 612-435-8142. 29. Defendant continues to call Plaintiff’s phone number to this day several years later. 30. On one of the calls, the pre-recorded message was regarding a flu shot. Some of the other calls may have been marketing messages. 32. During all relevant times, Plaintiff did not have a relationship with UnitedHealth, or any of its affiliated companies, and never requested that UnitedHealth place prerecorded calls to it. Simply put, UnitedHealth did not possess Plaintiff’s prior express consent to place a telephone call to Plaintiff using a prerecorded voice. 33. By making unauthorized prerecorded telephone calls as alleged herein, UnitedHealth has caused cell phone subscribers actual harm in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy. In addition, the calls disturbed Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of its phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on Plaintiff’s phone. In the present case, a cell phone subscriber could be subjected to many unsolicited prerecorded telephone calls as UnitedHealth does not take care to ensure that the recipients of its prerecorded calls have given their prior express written consent to be called. 34. In order to redress these injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and Classes of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited prerecorded telephone calls to cellular telephones. 35. On behalf of the Classes, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring UnitedHealth to cease all unsolicited prerecorded telephone calling activities and an award of statutory damages to the class members, together with costs. 37. The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the class definition following appropriate discovery. 38. Numerosity: The exact size of the Classes are unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant placed prerecorded telephone calls to thousands of cellular telephone subscribers who fall into the definition of the Classes. Members of the Classes can be easily identified through Defendant’s records. 40. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest adverse to the Classes. 42. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth herein. 43. Defendant made prerecorded telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and other members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class without first obtaining prior express consent to receive such calls. 44. By making the unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and the Prerecorded No Consent Class members’ cellular telephones without their prior express consent, and by utilizing a prerecorded voice to make those calls, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 45. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class are each entitled a minimum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 46. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Prerecorded No Consent Class. 48. Defendant made unsolicited and unwanted prerecorded calls to telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Prerecorded Stop Class on their cellular telephones after they had informed Defendant, orally and/or through the Defendant’s automated prompt system, that they no longer wished to receive such calls from Defendant. 49. By making unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and other members of the Pre- recorded Stop Class’s cellular telephones using a prerecorded voice after they requested to no longer receive such calls, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by doing so without prior express consent. 50. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Prerecorded Stop Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited telephone calls on their cellular phones and, under Section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Prerecorded Stop Class. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Prerecorded No Consent Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Prerecorded Stop Class)

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13. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 14. Defendant is and at all times mentioned herein was, an entity that meets the definition of “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 15. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant conducts business in the State of Texas and within this judicial district. 16. During the relevant time period, Defendant called Plaintiff on his telephone while he was located in the State of Texas in an attempt to solicit a variety of pharmaceutical prescription products, including but not limited to, pain cream. Plaintiff received multiple such calls and has, at the time of the filing of this complaint, received approximately nine (9) calls from Defendant. 17. On information and belief, Defendant, or its agents, called Plaintiff on his telephone via an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS), as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). This ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 18. Plaintiff did not provide express consent to receive automated calls by Defendant on his telephone.6 20. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCC’s January 2012 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on Defendant to demonstrate that Plaintiff provided express consent within the meaning of the statute.7 VI. 21. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”). 22. Plaintiff proposes the following Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons within the United States who received a non-emergency telephone call from Defendant through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and who did not provide prior express consent for such calls. Collectively, all these persons will be referred to as “Class members.” Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest; Defendant’s agents and employees; any Judge and/or Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judges’ staffs and immediate families; and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 23. On information and belief, Plaintiff believes there are thousands of Class members geographically dispersed throughout the United States. Therefore, individual joinder of all members of the Class would be impracticable. 25. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 26. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The Class can be identified easily through records maintained by Defendant. 27. There are well-defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. The questions of law and fact involving the class claims predominate over questions that may affect individual Class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ telephones using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing they obtained prior express consent (i.e., consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated) to make such calls; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 28. As a person who received calls from Defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has no interests that are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 29. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer and employee protection statutes. 31. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 33. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 34. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 36. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 38. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 39. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 40. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. 41. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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20. Defendants operate a mental health support agency with offices in Yanceyville, Wilmington and Marion, North Carolina, and Douglasville, Georgia. 22. Plaintiff’s hours varied from week to week during her employment with Defendants, but she regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a workweek. 23. For example, during the workweek of June 24, 2019 to June 30, 2019, Plaintiff provided forty-eight (48) hours of peer support services. She was paid straight time for forty-eight (48) hours but was not paid an overtime premium for the eight (8) hours she worked over forty (40) in the workweek, nor was she compensated for her travel time between Defendants’ clients. 24. Likewise, during the workweek of July 1, 2019 to July 7, 2019, Plaintiff was paid for forty-eight (48) hours of work but not paid an overtime premium for the hours worked over forty (40) in the work, nor was she paid any wages for the time she spent traveling from one client to the next. 25. Upon information and belief, the collective and class members were also regularly scheduled to and did work more than forty (40) hours in a workweek. 26. Up until approximately January 2020, Defendants misclassified all peer support specialists as independent contractors when in fact, they were employees under the meaning of the FLSA and NCWHA. 27. The misclassified independent contractors, including Plaintiff, were required to comply with Defendants’ policies and procedures which were set forth in written company policies. 28. The misclassified independent contractors, including Plaintiff, were supervised by employees of Defendants, and were subject to discipline. 30. Defendants advertised and posted job openings on social media and labor sites for peer support specialists who were eventually assigned work by Defendants. 31. Defendants directed the work Plaintiff and all peer support specialists, and provided substantial oversight of their activities. 32. The work performed by Plaintiff and the collective and class members was integral to Defendants’ business. Without their work, Defendants could not have performed their contracted responsibilities for their clients. 33. Defendants profited directly from the work performed by Plaintiff and the collective and class members. 34. Plaintiff and the collective and class members could not negotiate their compensation with Defendants’ clients, and they did not share in the profits. 35. In short, Plaintiff and the collective and class members were economically dependent on Defendants. 36. Defendants paid misclassified independent contractors by the hour and paid straight time for all hours worked, except for travel time between Defendants’ clients, but failed to pay an overtime premium for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 37. In or about January 2020, Defendants reclassified the peer support specialists to regular W-2 employees, and began to pay overtime wages. 38. Nonetheless, Defendants failed to pay any wages for travel between clients, and did not consider travel time between clients as hours worked. 40. Plaintiff is aware of other current and former employees of Defendants who were subject to the same payroll practice. V. 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 70. Plaintiff files this action on behalf of herself and the Misclassification and Travel Overtime Collectives as defined above. 71. Defendants’ practice and policy of misclassifying their employees as independent contractors and not paying overtime affects Plaintiff and the Misclassification Collective members and is a willful violation of the FLSA. 72. Defendants’ practice and policy of not paying overtime for travel time affects Plaintiff and the Travel Overtime Collective members and is a willful violation of the FLSA. 73. The collective members are victims of Defendants’ unlawful compensation practices and are similarly situated to Plaintiff in terms of job duties, pay and employment practices. 74. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime compensation as required by the FLSA results from a generally applicable, systematic policy and practice and is not dependent on the personal circumstances of any individual employee. Thus, Plaintiff is similarly situated to the members of the Misclassification Collective and Travel Overtime Collective. 76. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 77. Plaintiff files this action on behalf of herself and the NCWHA Class as defined above. 78. Defendants’ practice and policy of travel time, including associated overtime, affects Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members and is a willful violation of the NCWHA. 79. NCWHA Class members are victims of Defendants’ unlawful compensation practices and are similarly situated to Plaintiff in terms of job duties, pay and employment practices. 80. Defendants’ failure to pay travel time as required by the NCWHA results from a generally applicable, systematic policy and practice and is not dependent on the personal circumstances of any individual employee. Thus, Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members are similarly situated employees. 81. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the NCWHA Class members do not prevent collective treatment under the NCWHA. All employees, regardless of their precise job requirements or rates of pay, are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours worked including the time spent traveling between Defendants’ clients. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 83. Plaintiff’s state law claims satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 84. The NCWHA Class meets the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) because Defendants have employed numerous peer support specialists in the state of North Carolina while requiring them to spend time traveling between clients without compensation. The precise number of NCWHA Class members should be readily available from a review of Defendants’ personnel, scheduling, time, payroll, and billing records, and from input received from the NCWHA Class members. 86. The NCWHA Class meets the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) because Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members were all employed by Defendants and performed their job duties without receiving entitled compensation owed for that work. 87. The NCWHA Class meets the fair and adequate protection requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) because there is no apparent conflict of interest between Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members, and because Plaintiff’s attorneys have successfully prosecuted many complex class actions, including wage and hour and collective actions, and will adequately represent the interest of Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members. 88. The NCWHA Class meets the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) because issues common to the NCWHA Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including, but not limited to, whether Defendants calculated the NCWHA Class members’ compensation under the same formula in the same way. 89. The Class meets the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) because allowing the parties to resolve this controversy through a class action would permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, or expense that numerous individual actions would engender. 91. Defendants knowingly, willfully, or in reckless disregard of the law, maintained an illegal practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the NCWHA Class members proper travel time wages, including associated overtime wages. XI. 92. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 93. At all times pertinent hereto, specifically including the collective and class periods, Defendants, Mann and Pickens, were owners, managers and/or executive officers of Ariel Community Care. 94. Defendants Mann and Pickens exercised supervisory and managerial responsibilities and substantial control over the terms and conditions of Plaintiff and the collective and class members’ work including, but not limited to, assigning work, hiring and firing employees. 95. Further, Defendants Mann and Pickens are or were solely and jointly responsible for the administration of the business affairs of Ariel Community Care and exercised complete control over the work situation and conditions of its employees. 97. Defendants Mann and Pickens were and are vested with authority to, and actually acted directly or indirectly for, and had operational control over Ariel Community Care’s business activities including managerial responsibilities for all aspects of operations and its employees. 98. Accordingly, Defendants Mann and Pickens are “employers” under the FLSA and the NCWHA, as such, are jointly and severally liable for damages for his failure to comply with the FLSA and the NCWHA including all damages claimed herein.

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12. On August 18, 2015, Defendant sent an unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiff’s ink-and-paper facsimile machine. The fax advertises insulin (the “Product”). It touts a “Blowout Sale this Week on Insulin!” A copy of this facsimile is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A. Attached as Exhibit B is a compilation of 43 other unsolicited fax advertisements sent by Defendant to Plaintiff. 13. Exhibit A is an exemplary of the junk faxes Defendant sends. 14. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff has received multiple fax advertisements from Defendant similar to Exhibit A. 15. Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express invitation or permission to send advertisements to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 16. Defendant’s faxes do not contain opt-out notices that comply with the requirements of the TCPA. 18. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is proper, as more information is gleaned in discovery. 19. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or controlled person of Defendant, as well as the officers, directors, agents, servants, or employees of Defendant and the immediate family members of any such person. Also excluded are any judge who may preside over this case and any attorneys representing Plaintiff or the Class. 20. Numerosity [Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)]. The Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impractical. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent illegal fax advertisements to hundreds if not thousands of other recipients. 22. Typicality [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)]. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all Class Members. Plaintiff received an unsolicited fax advertisement from Defendant during the Class Period. Plaintiff makes the same claims that it makes for the Class Members and seeks the same relief that it seeks for the Class Members. Defendant has acted in the same manner toward Plaintiff and all Class Members. 23. Fair and Adequate Representation [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)]. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the Class. 25. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 26. The TCPA provides strict liability for sending fax advertisements in a manner that does not comply with the statute. Recipients of fax advertisements have a private right of action to seek an injunction or damages for violations of the TCPA and its implementing regulations. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 27. The TCPA makes it unlawful to send any “unsolicited advertisement” via fax unless certain conditions are present. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). “Unsolicited advertisement” is defined as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 28. Unsolicited faxes are illegal if the sender and recipient do not have an “established business relationship.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i). “Established business relationship” is defined as “a prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a person or entity and a business or residential subscriber with or without an exchange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry, application, purchase or transaction by the business or residential subscriber regarding products or services offered by such person or entity, which relationship has not been previously terminated by either party.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(6). 30. Defendant faxed unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff that did not have compliant opt-out notices, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 31. Defendant knew or should have known (a) that Plaintiff had not given express invitation or permission for Defendant to fax advertisements about its products; (b) that Defendant’s faxes did not contain a compliant opt-out notice; and (c) that Exhibit A is an advertisement. 32. Defendant’s actions caused actual damage to Plaintiff and the Class Members. Defendant’s junk faxes caused Plaintiff and the Class Members to lose paper, toner, and ink consumed in the printing of Defendant’s faxes through Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ fax machines. Defendant’s faxes cost Plaintiff and the Class Members time that otherwise would have been spent on Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ business activities. 33. In addition to statutory damages (and the trebling thereof), Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief under the TCPA. 34. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 35. Plaintiff and the Members of the Sub-Class are “consumers” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(7). 36. Defendant is a “person” or “entity” as used in FDUTPA. 37. Pursuant to FDUTPA, unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful. 38. FDUTPA’s ‘unfair prong’ is also violated by a violation of “[a]ny law, statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance which proscribes unfair methods of competition, or unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable acts or practices.” Fla. Stat. 501.203(3)(c). Thus FDUTPA’s ‘unfair prong’ is violated by a violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 39. Within four years prior to the filing of this complaint and continuing to the present, Defendant violated FDUTPA by engaging in unfair practices against Plaintiff and the Sub-Class. 40. Defendant was engaging in “trade or commerce” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(8). 42. Defendant’s conduct, which caused substantial injury to Plaintiff and the Sub- Class could have been avoided, and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to any consumers or competition. 43. Defendant’s business acts and practices are also unfair because they have caused harm and injury-in-fact to Plaintiff and Sub-Class Members. 44. In addition to actual damages, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. 64.1200(a)(4)(iii). 64.1200(a)(4). INC., Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No.

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16. Defendant either owns, operates and/or controls its website, www.planetdodge.com, which offers services related to and heavily integrated with its brick and mortar show rooms and which offers such services such as viewing vehicle inventory, viewing specials and accessing coupons, applying for credit, or valuing a trade-in, within South Florida, to the public.1 18. The international website standards organization, W3C, has published WCAG 19. Plaintiff is a prospective customer who is interested in the good and services offered by Defendant at its brick and mortar locations. 2.0 AA (Version 2.0 of the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines). WCAG 2.0 AA provides widely accepted guidelines for making websites accessible to individuals with disabilities and compatible with screen reader software. These guidelines have been endorsed by the United States Department of Justice and numerous federal courts. 20. Plaintiff uses screen reader software in order to access a website's content. However, despite several attempts, Defendant’s website did not integrate with Plaintiff's software, nor was there any function within the website to permit access for visually impaired individuals through other means. Plaintiff was denied the full use and enjoyment of the facilities and services available on Defendant’s website as a result of access barriers on the website in conjunction with Plaintiff’s use and patronage of Defendant’s brick and mortar campus location in Boca Raton. 21. Plaintiff also researches locations prior to visiting in person in order to learn about accessible routes, and accommodations for disabled individuals in advance of an in-person visit. 22. Defendant’s website does not meet the WCAG 2.0 AA level of accessibility. 24. As a result of Defendant’s discrimination, Plaintiff was unable to use Defendant’s website and suffered an injury in fact including loss of dignity, mental anguish and other tangible injuries. Moreover, the digital barriers on Defendant’s website, Plaintiff is denied to participate in or benefit from the goods, services and accommodations afforded to the public. 25. The barriers at the website have caused a denial of Plaintiff s full and equal access multiple times in the past, and now deter Plaintiff from attempting to use Defendant’s website itself, and in conjunction with visiting its brick and mortar campus location. 26. If Defendant’s website was accessible, Plaintiff could independently research the available credit services, trade-in options, vehicle specials, access coupons vehicles in inventory and schedule appointments. 27. Although Defendant may have centralized policies regarding the maintenance and operation of its website, Defendant has never had a plan or policy that is reasonably calculated to make its website fully accessible to, and independently usable by people with visual impairments. 28. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually impaired individuals will continue to be unable to independently use Defendant’s website in violation of their rights under the ADA. 29. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all legally blind individuals who have attempted, or will attempt, to access Defendant’s website using screen reader software. 31. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 32. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s facilities and/or services due to Defendant’s failure to make its website fully accessible and independently usable as above described. 33. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of class litigation under the ADA. 34. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole.

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14. Epson markets and sells printers and Epson ink cartridges in the United States. Consumers can purchase printers directly from Epson or directly from retailers such as Staples, Best Buy, Walmart, Amazon and others. 15. The printers, usually, come with ink cartridges but those ink cartridges will eventually need to be replaced as the printer is used. The sale of replacement ink cartridges is an important source of revenue and profit for Epson as Epson ink cartridges range in price from approximately $10 to $150 or more for high-end printers. In many cases, the cost of replacement cartridges over the life of a printer is significantly larger than the cost of the printer itself. 72. Plaintiffs bring this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as a class action under Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 73. Plaintiffs bring this action and seek to certify and maintain it as a class action on behalf of themselves and a Nationwide Class, as defined below, or in the alternative, on behalf of State Subclasses, as defined below. A. The Nationwide Class 74. The Nationwide Class (the “Class”) is initially defined as follows: All United States residents who, within the applicable limitations period, owned or purchased an Epson Printer. Excluded from the Nationwide Class are Defendants, their employees, co- conspirators, officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors and wholly or partly owned subsidiaries or affiliated companies; class counsel and their employees; and the judicial officers or their immediate family members and associated court staff assigned to this case. B. The State Subclasses 82. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. The CFAA is a federal criminal statute that prohibits computer crimes, including unauthorized access to a computer, or access that exceeds any authorization and allows persons who have been damaged thereby to bring claims under the CFAA. VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA FALSE ADVERTISING LAW (“FAL”) (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500, ET SEQ.) VIOLATION OF THE CONNECTICUT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110A ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (“UCL”) (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200, ET SEQ.) VIOLATION OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS)

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(FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION) (Unjust Enrichment) (Violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.) 11. As a result, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class were deceived into purchasing furniture from Ashley with upholstery that, contrary to their reasonable beliefs and expectations, in fact did not consist of leather or was not of similar quality, strength, or durability as leather, instead being of such inferior quality, strength, or durability as to not hold up to normal wear and tear and begin to peel or disintegrate within a short period of time. 15. Plaintiff purchased the Furniture based on Defendant’s representations that the DuraBlend® upholstery was made of a “synthetic leather” designed to make the upholstery durable. Indeed, Defendant represented to Plaintiff that the Furniture was “as durable as leather.” However, Defendant sold the Furniture to Plaintiff without disclosing to her the percentage of leather scraps or fibers, if any, or the percentage of non-leather substances contained in it. Further, when Plaintiff purchased the furniture, she did not see, nor was she presented with, any hang tags or disclosures regarding the DuraBlend upholstery. Additionally, Defendant did not disclose to Plaintiff that the Furniture was of such nature and quality that it would not hold up to normal wear and tear and that it would begin to peel or disintegrate within a short period of time. 16. Plaintiff has continuously owned the Furniture since she bought it and has continuously kept it in her living room for her and her family’s normal course of use. In or about early 2016, Plaintiff discovered that the DuraBlend® upholstery on the Furniture was bubbling and peeling, causing pieces and particles of the top “leather”-like layer of all of the sofa cushions and arm rests and the recliner arm rests to come off and exposing the underlying material, which was coarse in texture and off-white in color. The pictures attached hereto as Exhibit A show the Furniture in this state. 18. Plaintiff paid a premium for the Furniture over the price of other similar products because she believed it was a product that was as durable as leather. 19. Had she known that DuraBlend® upholstery would not hold up to normal wear and tear and that it would begin to peel or disintegrate within a short period of time, she would not have purchased it or she would only have been willing to pay a significantly lower purchase price. 20. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as members of the proposed Class, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) are each met with respect to the Class defined below. 21. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following Class: All persons who purchased furniture with DuraBlend® upholstery from Defendant in the State of Florida. 22. The Class excludes: (1) Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and of its legal representatives, officers, directors, employees, assigns, and successors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff or immediate family; (3) any juror assigned to this action; (4) Class Counsel; (5) any persons who purchased furniture with DuraBlend® upholstery for resale or distribution as opposed to use and consumption; and (6) claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress. 24. Existence of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and the Sub-Class. These common legal and factual questions include: a. Whether Defendant misrepresented or omitted material facts in connection with the promotion, marketing, advertising, and sale of furniture with DuraBlend® upholstery; b. Whether Defendant’s acts and practices in connection with the promotion, marketing, advertising, and sale of furniture with DuraBlend® upholstery would deceive or mislead an objective, reasonable person; c. Whether Defendant breached its implied warranties; d. Whether Defendant has been unjustly enriched from the sale of furniture with DuraBlend® upholstery; and e. Whether Plaintiff and Class members have suffered damages as a result of the conduct alleged herein, and if so, the measure of such damages, and whether any other relief should be provided. 25. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class, because Plaintiff and all members of the Class purchased furniture with DuraBlend® upholstery based on the same false, deceptive or misleading claims or omissions. Plaintiff and all members of the Class therefore paid more for furniture with DuraBlend® upholstery or purchased furniture with DuraBlend® upholstery that they otherwise would not have. 27. Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance and Superiority. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to all other available means for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. In this regard, the Class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions is low given the magnitude, burden, and expense of individual prosecutions against a corporation as large as Defendant compared to the amount of individual damages. Individualized litigation also presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system presented by the legal and factual issues of this case. By contrast, the class action procedure here will have no management difficulties. 28. Rule 23(b)(2) Certification. Certification is also appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2), because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the Class as a whole. Ashley knowingly, affirmatively, and actively concealed the true nature, quality, or durability of the DuraBlend® upholstery from Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 30. Defendant’s business acts and practices alleged herein constitute unfair and/or deceptive methods, acts, or practices under Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. (“FDUTPA”). 31. At all relevant times, Plaintiff (and members of the Class) were “consumers” within the meaning of the FDUTPA, Fla. Stat. § 501.203(7). 32. Defendant’s conduct occurred in the conduct of “trade and commerce” within the meaning of the FDUTPA, Fla. Stat. § 501.203(8). 34. An objective, reasonable person would have been deceived by Defendant’s representations about DuraBlend® upholstery. 35. Defendant’s acts, omissions, and practices proximately caused Plaintiff and other members of the Class to suffer actual damages in the form of monetary loss because they paid a premium for a purportedly durable, blended leather product that is less valuable or entirely valueless as a result of its true characteristics. As a result, they are entitled to recover actual damages and attorney’s fees and costs of the suit, as well any other appropriate relief. 36. Additionally, injunctive and declaratory relief, including an order that Defendant immediately cease and desist its unfair and deceptive acts and practices, is available and appropriate under Florida Statutes § 501.211. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 28 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 38. Defendant marketed the DuraBlend® upholstery as a durable blended or bonded leather product. 39. Defendant knew at all material times the true nature of the DuraBlend® upholstery in the Class Furniture and that it in fact did not consist of leather and was not of similar quality, strength, and durability as leather, instead being of such inferior quality, strength, and durability as to not hold up to normal wear and tear and begin to peel or disintegrate within a short period of time. 41. Defendant knowingly and intentionally marketed and sold the DuraBlend® upholstery, which to a reasonable consumer had the appearance of leather and therefore led him/her to reasonably believe it consisted of leather and was of similar quality, strength, and durability as leather. Defendant further marketed the DuraBlend® upholstery as “blended leather,” using various monikers such as “Durable”, as well as the word “LEATHER” in its own right, further supporting the reasonableness of the reasonable consumer’s belief that the DuraBlend® upholstery consisted of leather and was of similar quality, strength, and durability as leather, when in fact it was not, which was known to Defendants. 42. As a result, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class were deceived into purchasing furniture from Ashley with upholstery that, contrary to their reasonable, justifiable beliefs and expectations, in fact did not consist of leather or was not of similar quality, strength, and durability as leather, instead being of such inferior quality, strength, and durability as to not hold up to normal wear and tear and begin to peel or disintegrate within a short period of time. 43. Defendant had a duty to disclose the above known material facts because Defendant knew that these material facts were unknown to Plaintiff and Class members, because Defendant was in a superior position of knowledge with regard to the Class Furniture and the true nature, quality, or durability of the DuraBlend® upholstery, and because Defendant chose to make certain representations (including suggesting that the upholstery was indeed composed of “leather” and was “durable”) that presented only a part of the true story and misled Plaintiff and Class members about the Class Furniture. 45. Defendant intended consumers, including Plaintiff and Class members to purchase Class Furniture based on Defendant’s misrepresentations. 46. Defendant’s misrepresentations as alleged and described herein have caused damage to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class in an amount to be shown at trial. 47. Defendant acted maliciously, wantonly, oppressively, deliberately, and with the intent to defraud Plaintiff and Class members. Defendant acted with reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and Class members. Therefore, Defendant’s conduct rises to a level that warrants the award of punitive damages in an amount sufficient to deter such conduct in the future. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 28 of the Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 49. Plaintiff and Class members conferred a benefit on Defendant by paying more for Class Furniture or purchasing Class Furniture that they otherwise would not have absent Defendant’s misrepresentations about DuraBlend® upholstery, and Defendant was aware of the benefit conferred and voluntarily accepted and retained that benefit. 51. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions, Plaintiff and Class members have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 8. In or about April of 2008, Ashley began incorporating an upholstery product into some of its furniture, including sofas, loveseats, sectionals, and ottomans, which it marketed as “blended leather upholstery” under the trade name DuraBlend®. 9. “Blended leather” is synonymous with “bonded leather,” a man-made material that incorporates leather scraps and fiber and mimics the appearance of leather. According to ConsumerAffairs.com, Bonded leather -- sometimes called "reconstituted" leather or just plain "vinyl" -- is not the whole skin of an animal, but left-over pieces of hide blended together to form a seamless piece of leather material. Genuine leather is made from entire pieces of animal hide and costs much more than items made with the bonded material. It's hard to tell the difference between the two, as once an item is made with bonded leather the appearance and smell are nearly identical. However, genuine leather typically feels a bit harder to the touch, and if used for sofas, its cushions tend to have a little less give than a bonded leather cushion. Manufacturers will also use many types of coats and permanent polishes to make bonded leather appear to be the real deal. * * * Many are sadly surprised when they realize the true difference between bonded and genuine leather is its durability, and plenty of retailers leave this important detail out just to close the sale. Bonded Leather Sofas vs. Genuine Leatther – What’s the Difference?, Consumer Affairs (Aug. 15, 2012), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2012/08/bonded-leather-sofas-vs-genuine- leather-whats-the-difference.html (last visited August 1, 2016).

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33. Plaintiff Ryoo Dental is a single doctor dental office located in Fullerton, California. 41. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of the following class of persons, hereafter, the “Class”: All persons in the United States who, within four years of the filing of this Complaint, subscribed to a telephone number that received a facsimile message: (i) sent by or on behalf of Defendants advertising Defendants’ products or services (ii) that did not contain the “opt-out” noticed required by the TCPA. 42. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their employees, agents, and members of the judiciary. 44. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 45. The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 46. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement,” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s express invitation or permission.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). 47. A sender may not transmit an advertisement unless: (i) it has an established business relationship with the recipient, (ii) it obtained the facsimile number voluntarily within the business relationship or the recipient voluntarily disseminated its number to the public, and (iii) the advertisement includes the requisite opt-out notice on the first page. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(D); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii). 7. The professional dental industry encompasses the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease and ailments of the teeth, gums and supporting bone. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (TCPA) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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15. North American Bancard is a payment processor provider for businesses. 16. However, North American Bancard’s contact with the potential new customers is limited, and the telemarketing is conducted by third parties, such as Integrated Payment Technologies. 17. In fact, Integrated Payment Technologies’s website, www.integratedpmt.com, redirects to a North American Bancard website. 18. Defendants’ strategy for generating new customers involves the use of an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) to solicit business. 19. Recipients of these calls, including Plaintiff, did not consent to receive them. The Automated Telemarketing Call From Defendants 20. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 21. Plaintiff’s telephone number, (818)-266-XXXX, is registered to a cellular telephone service, which is the number he received the call on. 63. Plaintiff and the proposed Dialer Class incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Dialer Class)

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(Collective Action Claim for Violation of FLSA) (Individual Claim for Violation of FLSA) 17. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully incorporated herein. 18. During Plaintiff’s employment, Defendant classified Plaintiff as non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA and paid Plaintiff an hourly wage. 19. Defendant’s apartment complex operates twenty-four (24) hours per day, seven (7) days per week. 20. Plaintiff’s duties during regular business hours included almost entirely office work, including processing move-ins and move-outs, evictions, and paperwork for federal rental assistance. 21. Defendant required that Plaintiff clock out at 5 o’clock pm, but often required her to continue to work after clocking out. 23. Plaintiff filled the role of maintenance staff and took care of tenants’ repair and maintenance requests. 24. Plaintiff does not seek compensation for time spent merely “on call,” but instead for actual “call-out” time when Plaintiff was called upon to perform job duties after regular hours. 25. Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid employees who lived on-premises were classified as hourly employees and paid an hourly rate. 26. Plaintiff and other hourly-paid employees worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week on a regular, typical basis while working for Defendants. 27. Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s and all other similarly situated employees’ off- the-clock work that was performed after hours but failed to pay them for most of that work. 28. As a result of Defendant’s policy requiring Plaintiff and similarly situated employees to perform maintenance and repair work after hours, they performed uncompensated labor. 29. In addition to the hourly rate, Plaintiff and similarly situated employees received rent credit. 30. These rent credits were a form of compensation to the Plaintiff and similarly situated employees. 32. Defendants knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its actions violated the 33. Section 778.208 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that all forms of compensation, such as rent discounts, “must be totaled in with other earnings to determine the regular rate on which overtime pay must be based.” 33. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 34. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 34. Therefore, Defendant violated the FLSA by not including all forms of compensation, such as the rent discount, in the regular rate when calculating Plaintiff’s and similarly situated employees overtime pay. 35. Plaintiff brings her FLSA claim on behalf of all other hourly-paid employees who lived on-premises and were employed by Defendants at any time within the applicable statute of limitations period, who were classified by Defendants as non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA, and who are entitled to payment of the following types of damages: A. Payment for all hours worked, including payment of a lawful overtime premium for all hours worked for Defendants in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek; and B. Liquidated damages; and C. Attorney’s fees and costs. 37. The members of the proposed FLSA Collective are similarly situated in that they share these traits: A. They were classified by Defendants as non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA; B. They were paid hourly rates; C. They recorded their time in the same manner; D. They lived on Defendants’ premises and received a rent credit; and E. They were subject to Defendants’ common policy of improperly calculating overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) per work week. 38. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact number of the potential members of the FLSA Collective but believe that the group exceeds one hundred (100) persons. 39. Defendants can readily identify the members of the Section 16(b) Collective. The names, physical addresses, electronic mailing addresses and phone numbers of the FLSA collective action Plaintiff are available from Defendants, and a Court-approved Notice should be provided to the FLSA collective action Plaintiff via first class mail, email and text message to their last known physical and electronic mailing addresses and cell phone numbers as soon as possible, together with other documents and information descriptive of Plaintiff’s FLSA claim. VI. 42. 29 U.S.C. § 207 requires employers to pay employees one and one-half (1.5) times the employee’s regular rate for all hours that the employee works in excess of forty (40) per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 43. Defendant classified Plaintiff as non-exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 44. Defendant violated 29 U.S.C. § 207 by not paying Plaintiff a proper overtime rate of compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 45. Defendant violated Section 778.208 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations by not including all forms of compensation, including rent discounts, for Plaintiff in her regular rate when calculating her overtime pay. 46. Defendant’s conduct and practice, as described above, has been and is willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 47. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged in this Complaint, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for, and Plaintiff seeks, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees as provided by the FLSA. 48. Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendant acted in good faith in failing to pay Plaintiff as provided by the FLSA, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate. 49. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 51. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all hourly-paid employees who lived on-premises, former and present, who were affected by Defendant’s willful and intentional violation of the FLSA. 52. 29 U.S.C. § 207 requires employers to pay employees one and one-half (1.5) times the employee’s regular rate for all hours that the employee works in excess of forty (40) per week. 29 U.S.C.S. § 207. 53. Defendant violated Section 778.208 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations by not including all forms of compensation, such as rent discounts, given to Plaintiff and those similarly situated in their regular rate when calculating their overtime pay. 54. In the past three years, Defendant have employed more than one hundred (100) hourly-paid employees who lived on-premises. 55. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and all or almost all hourly-paid employees who lived on-premises regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a week. 56. Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to pay these workers at the proper overtime rate. 57. Because these employees are similarly situated to Plaintiff, and are owed overtime for the same reasons, the opt-in collective may be properly defined as: All hourly-paid employees who lived on-premises within the three (3) years preceding the filing of the Complaint, to whom Defendants gave a rent discount or credit for a period covering at least one week in which the employee worked more than forty (40) hours. 59. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged in this Complaint, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and all those similarly situated for, and Plaintiff and all those similarly situated seek, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, and costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees as provided by the FLSA. 60. Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendant acted in good faith in failing to pay Plaintiff and all those similarly situated as provided for by the FLSA, Plaintiff and all those similarly situated are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest at the applicable legal rate.

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10. Defendant is a manufacturer that is engaged in the manufacture, marketing, supplying and distributing of printers advertised to have HP Smart Install included with the printer but in fact do not. 11. Consumers pay for the HP Smart Install feature as part of the payment for the printers. When consumers purchase the printer they are purchasing the printer for the features that are advertised to come with them. 12. Defendant profits from both the sale of the printers and the HP Smart Install feature. Without the HP Smart Install feature, many of the consumers would not have purchased these printers because of the difficulty of installing standard printers and the deterrence to the purchase of printers that the difficulty in installation causes. 13. In actual fact, the HP Smart Install feature is disabled and unavailable for use on the printers that the Defendant advertises them to have. 31. On or around April 25, 2015 Plaintiff went to a Staples store located at 3370 Yucaipa Blvd, Yucaipa, California, 92399, and purchased a LaserJet Pro P1102w printer (“the printer”). 32. For the printer, Plaintiff paid more than valuable consideration. 33. Including taxes and fees Plaintiff paid over $140.38. In addition, Plaintiff purchased other items from Defendant as ancillary to the purchase of the printer for more than valuable consideration. In total, including taxes and fees the total price of the purchase came out to $194.25. A receipt of the purchase is enclosed for the record (see “Exhibit B”). 34. Defendant manufactured the printer with all relevant packaging and materials. 35. On the box of the printer Defendant advertised easy printer software installation through the preinstalled HP Smart installed feature (see “Exhibit A”). In relevant part, the box said: “Start printing right away with effortless setup – no CD installation required – using HP Smart Install.” 51. Plaintiff brings this action, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, and thus, seeks class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 67. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth above. 68. Pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 17500, et seq., it is unlawful to engage in advertising “which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading...or...to so make or disseminate or cause to be so made or disseminated any such statement as part of a plan or scheme with the intent not to sell that personal property or those services, professional or otherwise, so advertised at the price stated therein, or as so advertised.” 69. California Business and Professions Code section 17500, et seq.’s prohibition against false advertising extends to the use of false or misleading written statements. 7. Consumers purchase printers advertised to have the HP Smart Install feature included with the printers. 70. Defendant misled consumers by making misrepresentations and untrue statements about the Class Products, namely, Defendant sold the printers advertised to have the HP Smart Install feature included fully knowing this feature was disabled and non-functional, and made false representations to Plaintiff and other putative class members in order to solicit these transactions. 79. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each allegation set forth above. 8. On the outside of the boxes of these printers, there is a statement assuring customers that these printers will be easy to install because of the inclusion of the HP Smart Install feature (See “Exhibit A”). 80. Actions for relief under the unfair competition law may be based on any business act or practice that is within the broad definition of the UCL. Such violations of the UCL occur as a result of unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business acts and practices. A plaintiff is required to provide evidence of a causal connection between a defendant's business practices and the alleged harm--that is, evidence that the defendant's conduct caused or was likely to cause substantial injury. It is insufficient for a plaintiff to show merely that the defendant's conduct created a risk of harm. Furthermore, the "act or practice" aspect of the statutory definition of unfair competition covers any single act of misconduct, as well as ongoing misconduct. 9. Consumers rely on the representations and advertisements of retailers in order to know which printers to purchase. The difficulty of having to install a printer can often times deter one from buying the printer. Violation of the California False Advertising Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq.) Violation of Unfair Business Practices Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.)

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1. In July 2002, Cincinnati Bell assigned the phone number (513) 947-1695 to my residential telephone line in Amelia, Ohio. That phone number has been assigned to my residential phone line ever since. Hereafter, all references to my residential telephone line are in regards to the line assigned to (513) 947-1695. 10. After listening to the caller continue to talk for some time, it became apparent that his initial premise for the call was false -- that he was not calling about something that was already a part of my March Duke Energy bill or about a change to my account that had already occurred, but instead he was calling to attempt to get me to switch my electric supplier to Censtar. When the caller attempted to get my verbal consent, the call was terminated. 11. John Doe Company represents the company that actually initiated the telephone calls. The identity of this company is not known at this time, despite due diligence, including pre-litigation inquiries to Censtar. It is not known whether John Doe Company is Censtar. 12. John Doe Company is either the same company as Censtar, or Censtar appointed John Doe Company as its agent and authorized and directed John Doe Company to make telephone solicitations to numbers on the national Do Not Call registry under circumstances in which those calls violate the TCPA. John Doe Company was acting within the scope of its authority as agent when it made its calls to me. 13. John Doe 2 represents one or more individuals who personally formulated, directed, controlled, had the authority to control, or participated in the acts and practices of John Doe Company set forth in this Complaint. The identity(ies) of John Doe 2 is not known at this time despite due diligence. 14. The complaint will be amended when the identities of the John Doe defendants are known. 4 Case: 1:17-cv-00047-MRB Doc #: 1-1 Filed: 01/17/17 Page: 7 of 14 PAGEID #: 10 15. On 10/6/2016, I send an email to Censtar which requested a copy of its written policy ,for maintaining a Do Not Call list. 16. Censtar's corporate counsel responded to my email. However, to date, I have not received a copy of Censtar's written policy for maintaining a Do Not Call list. 2. The phone number (513) 947-1695 is on the national Do Not Call registry (http://donotcall.izov) and has been since July 1, 2003. 1 Case: 1:17-cv-00047-MRB Doc #: 1-1 Filed: 01/17/17 Page: 4 of 14 PAGEID #: 7 270 E MAIN STREET BATAVIA, OHIO 45103-3040 2016 CVC 01716 7112 4369 4680 2804 366 3. The Defendants do not have an"established business relationship" with me as that term is defined in 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) and I have not given the Defendants express invitation or permission to call me. 34. On information and belief, Censtar, either directly or through its agents, made telemarketing calls substantially the same as the ones described herein to nearly all Duke Energy electric v 8 Case: 1:17-cv-00047-MRB Doc #: 1-1 Filed: 01/17/17 Page: 11 of 14 PAGEID #: 14 customers in Ohio. Moreover, nearly all of these calls were illegal because the calls violated the TCPA or the caller committed unfair or deceptive trade practices. 35. U.S. Bureau of Census estimates that there are 74,184 households in Clermont County, Ohio alone. Nearly all these households are Duke Energy customers. Accordingly, on information and belief, there are approximately seventy-four thousand persons just in Clermont County who have claims against the Defendants for unlawful telemarketing. 36. The proposed class shall consist of all individuals in Ohio who received a telephone solicitation by, or on behalf of, Censtar if such solicitation violated the TCPA. The class shall exclude agents, employees, officers, shareholders, and attorneys of the Defendants. 37. I am a member of the class. My claims are typical of the claims of the class. 38. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 39. There are questions of law or fact common to all members of the class, for example, whether the calls constitute "telemarketing" under the TCPA and whether the calls are unlawful under the 4. Starting March 2016, I received ten telephone calls to my residential phone line initiated by, or on behalf of, Censtar Energy Corp. ("Censtar"). The purpose of each call was to sell me residential electric services, namely to solicit me to switch my electricity supplier to Censtar. The calls occurred on 3/18, 3/25, twice on 4/21, 4/28, 4/30, 5/3, and thrice on 5/10 of this year. My caller ID displayed 937-249-0049 as the caller's number during each call. 5. During a call on 4/21, I spoke with a sale representative. The following was said during the first minute and a half of the call: Lucas: Yes Caller: Hi, Mr. Lucas Lucas: Uh huh Caller: Hi, this is Ricky. I was calling you about the Duke Enerev account on 7 Arrowhead Drive. How are you today? Lucas: Ok Caller: Good, uh the reason why we gave you a call Mr. Lucas, Duke sent out a notice for the month . of March inside your bill regarding the rate going down on the price protection for the summer months. Did you receive anything regarding Duke's energy choice program? Lucas: Uh, let's see, in the bill? Caller: For the month of March, correct. Uh huh. Lucas: I don't remember for the month of March Caller: Ok. And that's in Amelia, 7 Arrowhead Drive, Vincent Lucas? Lucas: Yeah. Residential li.. um service. 2 Case: 1:17-cv-00047-MRB Doc #: 1-1 Filed: 01/17/17 Page: 5 of 14 PAGEID #: 8 Caller: Right. It was showing the notice that they did send out Mr. Lucas, it was letting you know as of the next meter reading, the account did qualify for price protection for the summer months. So what that mean in English, the rate will be going down from the general market rate of 7.03 cent per kWh to a price protected rate of 6.69 and thev're going to guarantee that not to increase. Now it does, also indicates that you're not enrolled in any type of low government assistance programs like CAP or [unintelligible] LIHEAP. Is that correct also? Lucas: That's correct. Caller: Ok. Well that qualifies you for the discount. And um, thev're going to be sending out a confirmation letter in writing within 24 hours. Um, you did receive, did you receive a bill for the month of March, by the way? Lucas: Uh, let's see, I receive those things electronically, so uh ... Caller: Ok, ok I see. Ok, that could explain it. And um, do you have something to write with, I'11 give you a confirmation and we're going to send it out to you. Because it's gging to ao down on your next meter reading. 6. The caller was using a script deliberately designed to deceive me by trying to make me believe that the caller was calling on behalf of Duke Energy and that the caller was calling about a change to the electric account that had already appeared in my Duke Energy March bill, that the change was made by Duke Energy, that Duke Energy — not Censtar — was "going to guarantee [the price] not to increase," and that the change would occur automatically without any further action on my part. No mention of Censtar occurred up to this point in the call. The only thing that "they" could refer to in ¶ 5 is Duke Energy. The caller told me that "they" (i.e. Duke Energy) are "going to be sending out a confirmation letter in writing within 24 hours" and told me that this change was "going to go down on your next meter reading" — as if the change was a done deal — without even asking me if this is a change that I want. 7. On information and belief, Censtar wrote or approved the script that the caller used. Ke Case: 1:17-cv-00047-MRB Doc #: 1-1 Filed: 01/17/17 Page: 6 of 14 PAGEID #: 9 8. The caller did not mention Censtar until I asked who he was calling on behalf of. At that point, the caller admitted that he was calling on behalf of Censtar. 9: Nevertheless, the caller continued to insist that he was calling about something that appeared in my March Duke Energy bill. BATAVIA, OH 45103 SUMMONS Rule 4 1970 Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure

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10. Various hazardous substances, including trichloroethylene (“TCE”), a human carcinogen, were used at the Facility during GMI’s ownership and operation of the Facility. 11. During its ownership and operation of the Facility, GMI disposed of and released various hazardous substances, including TCE, into the environment at the Facility. 12. The hazardous substances and hazardous wastes, including TCE, released by GMI at the Facility have migrated and continue to migrate in vapor form onto or immediately adjacent to all properties in the Class Area. TCE vapors are present beneath, inside or adjacent to homes throughout the Class Area, threatening the health of all residents in the Class Area. Plaintiffs and members of the Class first learned in 2013 that properties in the Class Area were impacted and/or threatened by vapor intrusion of contamination emanating from the Facility. 13. As a result of GMI’s contamination, the value of properties in the Class Area has been severely diminished. Further, Plaintiffs and other members of the Class have been forced to live in homes impacted and/or threatened by vapor intrusion contamination, resulting in the loss of the reasonable use and enjoyment of their property, and aggravation and annoyance. 14. GMI has failed to adequately investigate and remediate the vapor intrusion contamination caused by its unlawful waste handling practices, which continues to migrate into and throughout the Class Area. 15. GMI has failed to adequately investigate and delineate the geographical scope of the vapor contamination emanating from the Facility. 17. Plaintiffs bring each of the claims in this action in their own names and on behalf of a class of all persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 18. The Class consists of all persons and non-governmental entities that own residential property within the “Class Area.” The geographical boundaries of the Class Area are depicted on the figure attached hereto as Exhibit 1.1 19. The Class Area consists of more than two hundred (200) properties. Upon information and belief, the Class consists of well more than one hundred (100) persons and/or legal entities, and is accordingly so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 20. There are core questions of law and fact that are common to each member of the Class, such as: whether there have been releases of hazardous substances and wastes, including TCE, at and from the Facility; whether such releases have migrated in vapor form into and impacted and/or threatened properties within the Class Area; whether GMI is legally responsible for the vapor contamination in the Class Area; whether Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged by the vapor contamination caused by the Facility; and whether GMI should be ordered to abate the vapor contamination present in the Class Area. 21. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class. All claims seek recovery on the same legal theories and are based upon GMI’s common course of conduct. 23. Plaintiffs have retained counsel who are competent and experienced in class action litigation, including environmental class action suits such as this one. 24. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the Class defined herein, repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 of the Complaint as paragraph 24 of this Count I, as though fully set forth herein. 25. GMI is a "person" as defined by Section 101(21) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9601(21). 26. The Facility is a “facility” as defined by § 101 (9) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). 27. GMI owned and operated the Facility during a time period when hazardous substances, including TCE, were disposed of into the environment at the Facility. GMI is thus a “covered person” that is liable under Section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). 28. Releases of hazardous substances, including TCE, from the Facility into the Class Area are continuing. 29. These releases have resulted in the migration of hazardous substances, including TCE in vapor form, into the Class Area. 31. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 of this Complaint as paragraph 31 of this Count II, as though fully set forth herein. 32. GMI had and has a duty to Plaintiffs and the Class not to permit or allow hazardous substances and hazardous wastes, including TCE, used at the Facility to impact and/or threaten Plaintiffs’ and Class Area properties. GMI also had and has a duty to promptly respond to known releases of contaminants in a manner which would prevent further vapor intrusion contamination, and otherwise protect Plaintiffs and the Class from this vapor intrusion contamination and the impacts it has on Class Area properties. 33. GMI has breached these duties by its negligent acts and omissions in owning, operating, maintaining, and controlling the Facility, by its improper release and disposal of contaminants, by its failure to properly handle, dispose of, contain and abate the hazardous wastes at, and released from, the Facility, and by its failure to promptly and effectively investigate and address the migration of vapor intrusion contamination off-site and into the surrounding residential areas. 34. GMI has also breached its duty to timely warn Plaintiffs and the Class of the actual and/or threatened vapor intrusion contamination of their properties, and the risk of personal harm due to the presence of PCE and TCE vapors within and beneath their homes. 36. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 and 31 through 35 of this Complaint as paragraph 36 of this Count III, as though fully set forth herein. 37. The Facility is a private nuisance to Plaintiffs and the Class. GMI remains in control of the Facility with respect to addressing the contamination present there and which continues to cause vapor intrusion contamination throughout the Class Area. 38. Contaminants improperly disposed at and released from the Facility continue to migrate in vapor form onto Class Area properties. 40. Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered substantial damage as a result of GMI’s control and ongoing maintenance of the Facility, a private nuisance. In addition to compensatory damages, Plaintiffs and the Class also seek injunctive relief under this Count, in the form of an injunctive order restraining and enjoining GMI from allowing continued vapor intrusion contamination of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ properties and compelling GMI to abate the vapor intrusion contamination it has caused in the Class Area. 41. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 and 31 through 40 of this Complaint as paragraph 41 of this Count IV, as though fully set forth herein. 42. GMI continues to cause and permit vapor intrusion contaminants to enter Plaintiffs’ and Class Area properties. This entry is unlawful and without the consent of Plaintiffs and the Class. 43. In addition, vapor intrusion contaminants that originate from the Facility are known, or should be known, by GMI to be present at, on and/or inside Class Area properties. In spite of this knowledge, GMI has failed to remove or otherwise sufficiently remediate these hazardous waste contaminants from Class Area properties. 45. The invasion of Class Area properties is unreasonable and unlawful. As a result of GMI’s continuing trespasses, the lawful rights of Plaintiffs and Class Members to use and enjoy their properties has been substantially interfered with, and Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged. In addition to compensatory damages, Plaintiffs and the Class also seek injunctive relief under this Count, in the form of an injunctive order restraining and enjoining GMI from allowing continued vapor intrusion contamination of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ properties and compelling GMI to abate the vapor intrusion contamination it has caused in the Class Area. 46. Plaintiffs repeat, reallege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 and 31 through 45 of this Complaint as paragraph 46 of this Count V, as though fully set forth herein. 47. GMI has acted in a willful and wanton manner and in reckless indifference to Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s health and property, and to the safety of the general public. 48. GMI knew that Plaintiffs and the Class are exposed to and/or threatened by this contamination, yet has intentionally failed to promptly and adequately investigate and mitigate the threat to Plaintiffs and the Class. 50. As a direct and proximate result of the willful, wanton and reckless acts and/or omissions of GMI, Plaintiffs and the Class have sustained damages. In addition to compensatory damages, Plaintiffs and the Class also seek injunctive relief under this Count, in the form of an injunctive order restraining and enjoining GMI from allowing continued vapor intrusion contamination of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ properties and compelling GMI to abate the vapor intrusion contamination it has caused in the Class Area. CERCLA COST RECOVERY, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) NEGLIGENCE PRIVATE NUISANCE TRESPASS WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT

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15. Work Management, Inc. provides the infrastructure to support the management and implementation of many of the core standard nuclear performance model processes. http://www.workmanagementinc.com/services/. 17. WMI staffed Compton to Exelon’s Colorado Bend 1 Power Plant in Wharton, Texas; the Southern Company’s Vogtle Power Plant in Waynesboro, Georgia; and Entergy’s Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant in Port Gibson, Mississippi. 18. Compton stopped working for WMI in February of 2019. 19. Compton was a Project Controls Scheduler on behalf of WMI. 20. Compton would provide online and outage scheduling. 21. Compton reported the hours she worked to WMI on a regular basis. 22. WMI did not guarantee Compton a salary. 23. Compton was paid $58 for every approved hour worked. 24. Compton’s offer letter listed her overtime rate at $58 per hour. 25. If Compton worked fewer than 40 hours in a week, she was only paid only for the hours worked. 26. But Compton normally worked more than 40 hours in a week. 27. Compton routinely worked 60 hours a week. 28. The hours Compton and the Putative Class Members’ work are reflected in WMI’s records. 29. WMI paid Compton at the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a workweek. 30. Rather than receiving time and half as required by the FLSA, Compton only received “straight time” pay for overtime hours worked. 31. This “straight time for overtime” payment scheme violates the FLSA. 32. WMI was and is aware of the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 34. Compton and the Putative Class Members perform job duties in furtherance of the power industry business sector and are subjected to similar compensation practices. 35. Compton and the Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime because of the same illegal pay practice. 36. Compton and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of 40 hours each week. 37. WMI did not pay Compton and the Putative Class Members on a salary basis. 38. WMI paid Compton and the Putative Class Members “straight time for overtime.” 39. WMI failed to pay Compton and the Putative Class Members overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 40. WMI knew, or acted with reckless disregard for whether, Compton and the Putative Class Members were paid on a salary basis or were exempt from the FLSA overtime requirements. 41. WMI’s failure to pay overtime to these hourly workers was, and is, a willful violation of the FLSA. 42. In March of 2019, WMI changed its straight time for overtime pay practice and started paying overtime. 43. WMI’s illegal “straight time for overtime” policy extends beyond Compton. 44. It is the “straight time for overtime” payment plan that is the “policy that is alleged to violate the FLSA” in this FLSA collective action. Bursell v. Tommy’s Seafood Steakhouse, No. CIV.A. H- 06-0386, 2006 WL 3227334, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2006); Wellman v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., No. CIV.A. 14-831, 2014 WL 5810529, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2014) (certifying “straight time for overtime” claim for collective treatment). 46. Any differences in job duties do not detract from the fact that these hourly workers were entitled to overtime pay. 47. The workers impacted by WMI’s “straight time for overtime” scheme should be notified of this action and given the chance to join pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 48. Therefore, the class is properly defined as: All employees of Work Management, Inc. who were, at any point in the past 3 years, paid “straight time for overtime.” (the “Putative Class Members”) 49. By failing to pay Compton and the Putative Class Members overtime at one-and-one- half times their regular rates, WMI violated the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 50. WMI owes Compton and the Putative Class Members the difference between the rate actually paid and the proper overtime rate. 51. Because WMI knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether its pay practices violated the FLSA, WMI owes these wages for at least the past three years. 52. WMI is liable to Compton and the Putative Class Members for an amount equal to all unpaid overtime wages as liquidated damages. 53. Compton and the Putative Class Members are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action.

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32. Plaintiff Flores was formerly employed by Defendants from in or around November 2016 until on or about end of November 2019. 33. Plaintiff regularly handled goods in interstate commerce throughout the course of her employment with Defendants, such as food, food ingredients and drinks, produced or manufactured out of state and distributed in New York. 34. Throughout her employment, Plaintiff was a waitress, serving beverages to Customers in the night shift. 35. At the time of her hiring, Individual Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff a salary of $35 per day for her work as a waitress/dancer. 36. Individual Defendants also agreed with Plaintiff that her schedule would six days per week, Wednesday through Sunday from 11:00 pm until 9:00 am and Mondays from 11:00 pm until 6:00 am or fifty (50) hours per week. 37. Throughout the duration of her employment, Plaintiff did not have any supervisory authority, nor did she exercise discretion or independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 38. Plaintiffs never had any managerial duties, such as hiring and firing employees, doing payroll and setting employees' hours of work. Defendants' Unlawful Corporate Practices 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 39. Defendants required Plaintiff to work and never compensated them at all for her work. 40. Plaintiff was never provided with any wage statements, time sheets, or other documents showing the amount of hours they each worked every week and the amounts they were owed. 41. Plaintiff was not provided with a wage notice at the time of hire or at any point thereafter. 42. Upon information and belief, while Defendants employed Plaintiff, they failed to post notices explaining the minimum and overtime wage rights of employees under the FLSA and NYLL and failed to inform Plaintiff of such rights. 43. Defendants repeatedly suffered or permitted Plaintiff to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week without paying them the appropriate premium overtime pay of one and one-half times the statutory minimum wage. 44. Defendants paid Plaintiff Vera a flat daily rate for all her hours of work 45. Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded record-keeping requirements of the FLSA and NYLL by failing to maintain accurate and complete timesheets and payroll records. 46. Plaintiff was never provided with a wage notice at the time of hire or at any point thereafter, noting her hourly wage increases. 47. Upon information and belief, while Defendants employed Plaintiff, they failed to post notices explaining the minimum and overtime wage rights of employees under the FLSA and NYLL and failed to inform Plaintiffs of such rights. 48. Plaintiffs has personal knowledge of other employees of Defendants who are 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 similarly situated and who also worked hours for which they were not paid minimum and overtime wages. 49. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206, 207, and 216(b), Plaintiffs brings her First and Second causes of action as a collective action under the FLSA on behalf of themselves and the following collective: All persons employed by Defendants at any time from November 12, 2019 to the present day (the “Collective Action Period”) who worked as non-exempt employees of the Defendants (the “Collective Action Members”). 50. A collective action appropriate in these circumstances because Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members are similarly situated, in that they were all subject to Defendants’ illegal policies of failing to pay wages at or above the statutory minimum and failing to pay overtime wages for all hours worked above 40 hours per week. 51. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members have substantially similar job duties and are paid pursuant to a similar, if not the same, payment structure. 52. The claims of the Plaintiffs stated herein are similar to those of the other employees. 53. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Collective Action Members, reallege and incorporates by reference all allegations made in all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 54. Defendants, throughout the majority of their employment period, paid Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members in amounts below the applicable statutory minimum wage for 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 their hours worked, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206. 55. Defendants’ unlawful conduct, as described in this Complaint, has been willful and intentional. Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, that the practices described in this Complaint were unlawful. Accordingly, a three-year statute of limitations applies pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 56. Plaintiffs realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 56. As a result of the Defendants' violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs, and the Collective Action Members have suffered damages by being denied wages at or exceeding the statutory minimum in accordance with the FLSA in amounts to be determined at trial and are thus entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b). 57. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Collective Action Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations made in all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime wages for all hours worked above 40 hours per week thereby violating the NYLL §§ 190 et seq. and the New York State Department of Labor regulations, 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 146-1.4. 58. Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiffs overtime compensation lacked a good faith basis within meaning of NYLL § 663. 58. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members appropriate overtime wages for all hours worked above 40 hours per week thereby violating the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) at a rate of one- and one-half times their regular rate of pay, but under no circumstances, below one- and one-half times the statutory minimum wage. 59. Defendants’ unlawful conduct, as described in this Complaint, has been willful and intentional. Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, that the practices described in this Complaint were unlawful. Accordingly, a three-year statute of limitations applies pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 59. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs is entitled to recovery of her unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, pursuant to NYLL § 198 (1-a). 60. As a result of the Defendants' violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members have been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and are thus entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 61. Plaintiffs realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 62. Defendants, throughout the majority of Plaintiffs’ employment, paid Plaintiffs less than the applicable statutory minimum wage for her hours worked in violation of NYLL § 652 and the supporting New York State Department of Labor regulations, including 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 146-1.2. 63. Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiffs the minimum wage lacked a good faith basis within the meaning of NYLL § 663. 64. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs is entitled to recover from Defendants her unpaid minimum wages, liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, pursuant to NYLL § 198 (1-a). 65. Plaintiffs realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 66. Defendants have failed to provide Plaintiffs with complete and accurate wage statements throughout her employment listing, inter alia, all her regular and overtime hours of work, her rate of pay, and the basis of pay, in violation of NYLL § 195(3). 67. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs is entitled to recover from Defendants’ statutory damages of Two Hundred and Fifty dollars ($250) per workday that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), pursuant to NYLL § 198 (1-d). 13 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 68. Plaintiffs realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 69. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs at the time of hiring or at any point thereafter, a notice containing the rate of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; the regular pay day designated by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business; the telephone number of the employer, and anything otherwise required by law, in violation of NYLL § 195(1). 70. Due to Defendants' violations of the NYLL § 195(1), Plaintiffs is entitled to recover from Defendants statutory damages of Fifty dollars ($50) per workday that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) pursuant to NYLL § 198 (1-b).-judgment interest, damages for emotional distress, attorney's fees, costs, and other such damages of an amount to be determined at trial, pursuant to N.Y. Executive Law § 297(9). 71. Defendant Tellez is jointly and severally liable for the aforementioned damages, since he incited, compelled and coerced the above discriminatory and unlawful conduct pursuant to N.Y. Executive Law § 296(6). 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Fair Labor Standards Act – Unpaid Overtime Wages (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members) Fair Labor Standards Act – Violation of Minimum Wage Requirements (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members) New York Labor Law – Failure to Provide Notice at Time of Hiring New York Labor Law – Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements New York Labor Law – Violation of Minimum Wage Requirements New York Labor Law – Unpaid Overtime Wages Plaintiff Concepcion Flores

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43. On or about December 15, 2000, Plaintiffs entered into a mortgage agreement with Pinnfund USA. 44. On or about January 1, 2007, Plaintiffs fell behind on their mortgage payments. 45. On May 16, 2008, foreclosure proceedings were initiated against Plaintiffs Fourteenth Judicial District, Rock Island County Illinois, case number 2008 Ch 226. 46. On January 19, 2009, to save their home, Plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, Case No. 09-80141 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.). 47. At the inception of the bankruptcy, Plaintiffs’ mortgage was serviced by Saxon Mortgage Services. 48. Plaintiffs’ amended Chapter 13 plan was confirmed by the bankruptcy court on July 23, 2009. The arrears to be paid on the mortgage was found to be $15,819.50. 49. Plaintiffs successfully made their Chapter 13 payments to cure their arrears. 50. During the course of the bankruptcy, on March 14, 2012, Saxon filed a notice of transfer of servicing rights to Ocwen. Ocwen thus acquired the servicing rights to Plaintiffs’ mortgage while the loan was in default. 52. Plaintiffs were granted a discharge on March 25, 2014. 53. On June 4, 2014, the bankruptcy court ordered (“Order on Final Cure”) that Plaintiffs mortgage was deemed current as June 3, 2014, and that Ocwen had waived any right to claim any additional payments or charges due from the Plaintiffs. 54. At the completion of their bankruptcy, Plaintiffs owed $52,729.05 on their loan. 55. Shortly after the bankruptcy ended, Ocwen dismissed the long-standing foreclosure suit. 56. In or around July 2014, Plaintiffs requested that Ocwen provide Plaintiffs with a pay-off quote. 57. On July 10, 2014, via U.S. Mail, Ocwen sent Plaintiffs a “Payoff Quote” that stated that Plaintiff owed $84,447.58 on their mortgage, including $28,391.00 in interest that had accrued during the bankruptcy, $2,248.85 for “Fee/Cost Adjustment,” and $738.35 in “Late Charges.” This was a materially false statement and an attempt to obtain monies from Plaintiffs that they did not owe as a result of the Notice of Final Cure Payment and Order on Final Cure. 58. Ocwen knew the charges were unlawful because it had received the Notice of Final Cure Payment and the Order on Final Cure. Further, Ocwen dismissed the foreclosure action, which demonstrated that Ocwen was aware that the mortgage was current. 59. In reliance on Ocwen’s fraudulent misrepresentations, Plaintiffs entered into a loan modification agreement in September 2014 that increased the principal balance on Plaintiffs’ loan to $82,112.07 – i.e., approximately $30,000 more than Plaintiffs actually owed. By increasing the principal balance of the loan, Ocwen unjustly increased its compensation in servicing the loan. 61. Ocwen has also been misreporting the status of Plaintiffs’ loan on Plaintiffs’ credit reports. The amounts owed on the mortgage that Ocwen has reported to credit reporting agencies, including to TransUnion regarding Plaintiff Robin Taylor, are inaccurate and do not account for the outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings. 62. By disregarding the bankruptcy proceedings and through its illegal, deceptive, and fraudulent acts, Ocwen has enriched itself at the expense of Plaintiffs and denied them the fresh start that Plaintiffs earned by successfully completing Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 63. Ocwen’s actions violated RICO, the FDCPA, the ICFA and the Illinois common law of unjust enrichment. 64. Plaintiffs bring this action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, as a class action under Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 66. Ocwen services thousands of mortgages that have been through Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, the proposed Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 68. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class and do not conflict with the interests of any other members of the Class in that the Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class were subject to the same wrongful policies and practices by Defendant. 70. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class who are not parties to the action, or could substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 71. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Classes would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Classes which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Classes. Such incompatible standards and inconsistent or varying adjudications, on what would necessarily be the same essential facts, proof and legal theories, would also create and allow to exist inconsistent and incompatible rights within the Plaintiff Class. 72. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because the Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class making final declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate. 74. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversies herein in that: a. Individual claims by the Class members are impractical as the costs of pursuit far exceed what any one individual Plaintiff has at stake; b. As a result, individual members of the Class have no interest in prosecuting and controlling separate actions; c. It is desirable to concentrate litigation of the claims herein in this forum; d. The proposed Class action is manageable. 75. Plaintiffs are not aware of any difficulties that will be encountered in the management of this litigation which should preclude its maintenance as a class action. 76. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-75, above, as if fully set forth herein. 77. Plaintiffs brings this cause of action on behalf of themselves and the members of the Nationwide Class. 78. Defendant is a “person” under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). 80. Plaintiffs and Class members are “person[s] injured in his or her business or property” by reason of Defendant’s violation of RICO within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §1962(c)) On Behalf of the RICO Class

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20. Defendant is a supplier of flour, ingredients, baking mixes, cookbooks, and baked goods, and owns and operates the website, www.kingarthurflour.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.kingarthurflour.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse specific cooking supplies and related baking products available for purchase and delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in February 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to browse cooking supplies and related baking products available for delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 28. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those specific Cooking supplies and related baking products available for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 29. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 32. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 34. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 35. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 36. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 37. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 38. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 45. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 46. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 52. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 57. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 59. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 74. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 75. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 81. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 84. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 86. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 87. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 88. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 90. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 91. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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22. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 23. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 24. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 25. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 26. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 27. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 5 28. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant caused correspondence, including a collection letter dated September 16, 2020, to be sent to Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 29. The Letter conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 30. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 31. The Letter is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g protects Plaintiff’s concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to receive clear, accurate and unambiguous collection letters from Defendant that would allow Plaintiff to identify the source of the alleged Debt and confirm that the alleged Debt was actually owed. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of these rights. 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff’s concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendant. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of these rights. 34. Plaintiff’s injury is “particularized” and “actual” in that the Letter that deprived Plaintiff of the aforementioned rights was addressed and sent to Plaintiff specifically. 35. Plaintiff’s injury is directly traceable to Defendant’s conduct because Defendant sent the Letter, and but for Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff would not have been deprived of the aforementioned rights. 36. Plaintiff has been misled by Defendant’s conduct. 37. Defendant’s conduct as described in this Complaint was willful, with the purpose to either harm Plaintiff or with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff that could result from Defendant’s conduct. 6 38. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court’s intervention, Defendant will continue to use abusive, deceptive, unfair and unlawful means in its attempts to collect the alleged Debt and other alleged debts. 39. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court’s intervention, Defendant will ultimately cause Plaintiff unwarranted economic harm. 40. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff wasted time, was caused to be confused and unsure as to Plaintiff’s rights, and ultimately sought counsel and advice causing Plaintiff the risk of incurring damages including reasonable attorneys’ fees in reviewing Plaintiff’s rights under the law and prosecuting this claim. 41. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff’s counsel was caused to expend time, energy, and money to investigate Plaintiff’s rights under the law and the legitimacy of the alleged Debt. 42. The deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 43. A favorable decision herein would redress Plaintiff’s injury with money damages. 44. A favorable decision herein would serve to deter Defendant from further similar conduct. 45. Plaintiff is enrolled in Medicaid. 46. Other than for co-pays, Medicaid patients may not be balance-billed. 47. The alleged Debt is not a co-pay, but rather represents unlawful balance billing. 48. By sending a collection letter to Plaintiff to collect on the alleged Debt, Defendant misrepresented the status of the debt as collectible, when it was not. 49. Plaintiff's injury is “particularized” and “actual” in that the letter that caused the 7 injury was addressed and sent to Plaintiff specifically. 50. Plaintiff's injury is directly traceable to Defendant's conduct because Defendant sent the Letter. 51. A favorable judicial resolution of Plaintiff's case would redress Plaintiff's injury with damages. 52. The deprivation of Plaintiff's rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 53. Plaintiff has been misled by Defendant's actions. 54. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court's intervention, Defendant will continue to use abusive, deceptive, unfair and unlawful means in its attempts to collect the Debt. 55. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court's intervention, Defendant will ultimately cause her unwarranted economic harm. 56. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff was forced to hire counsel and therefore has incurred damages including reasonable attorneys' fees in reviewing Plaintiff's rights under the law and prosecuting this claim. 57. As a result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff's counsel was forced to expend time and money to investigate the enforceability of the Debt. 58. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff can prove that all actions taken by Defendant as described in this Complaint were taken willfully, with either the desire to harm Plaintiff with knowledge that its actions would very likely harm Plaintiff, and/or with knowledge that its actions were taken in violation of the law. 59. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in the State of New York. 8 60. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter to collect the balance bill on a Medicaid debt, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 61. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 62. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 63. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 64. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 65. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. 9

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29. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and as a class action on behalf of all owners of Inhibitex common stock and their successors in interest, except Defendants and their affiliates (the “Class”). 31. Inhibitex describes itself as a biopharmaceutical company focused on the development of differentiated anti-infective products to prevent or treat serious infections. The Company’s research and development efforts focus on oral, small molecule compounds to treat viral infections, and in particular, chronic infections caused by HCV and herpes zoter, which is caused by the varicella zoster virus. The Company’s product candidates include INX-189, HCV Nucleotide Polymerase Inhibitors, FV-100, Staphylococcal Vaccines, and Aurexis. 32. The Company’s product candidates are entering a promising market. For example, a report by research firm Decision Resources states that the market for hepatitis C drugs is expected to soar to $16 billion in 2015 from $1.7 billion in 2010 in major commercial markets. 34. On September 19, 2011, the Company touted the progress of its product candidates by issuing a press release announcing the Company has recently commenced dosing in a 90-patient randomized, placebo controlled, treatment guided, Phase 2 clinical trial to evaluate the safety, tolerability and antiviral activity of INX-189 in combination with pegylated interferon and ribavirin in chronic HCV-infected genotype 2 and 3 treatment naïve patients. 59. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein. 60. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and not on behalf of the class. 61. Defendants have issued the Recommendation Statement with the intention of soliciting shareholder support of the Proposed Transaction. 63. The Recommendation Statement violates the Sections 14(d)(4) and 14(e) because it omits material facts, including those set forth above. Moreover, in the exercise of reasonable care, defendants should have known that the Recommendation Statement is materially misleading and omits material facts that are necessary to render them non-misleading. 64. The misrepresentations and omissions in the Recommendation Statement are material to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff will be deprived of his entitlement to make a fully informed decision if such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the expiration of the tender offer. 65. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein. 67. The Individual Defendants’ recommendation of the Proposed Transaction will result in change of control of the Company, which imposes heightened fiduciary responsibilities to maximize Inhibitex’s value for the benefit of the stockholders and requires enhanced scrutiny by the Court. 68. The Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and independence owed to the shareholders of Inhibitex because, among other reasons: (a) they failed to take steps to maximize the value of Inhibitex to its public shareholders and took steps to avoid competitive bidding; (b) they failed to properly value Inhibitex; and (c) they ignored or did not protect against the numerous conflicts of interest resulting from the directors’ own interrelationships or connection with the Proposed Transaction. 70. Unless enjoined by this Court, the Individual Defendants will continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the Class, and may consummate the Proposed Transaction, to the irreparable harm of the Class. 71. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. 72. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein. 73. The fiduciary duties of the Individual Defendants in the circumstances of the Proposed Transaction require them to disclose to Plaintiff and the Class all information material to the decisions confronting Inhibitex’s shareholders. 74. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty through materially inadequate disclosures and material disclosure omissions. 75. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class members are being harmed irreparably. 76. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. 78. As alleged in more detail above, Defendants Inhibitex, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Merger Sub have aided and abetted the Individual Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties. 79. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class members are being harmed. Aiding and Abetting (Class Claim Against Inhibitex, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Merger Sub) Breach of Fiduciary Duties (Class Claim Against Individual Defendants) Breach of Fiduciary Duty -- Disclosure (Class Claim Against Individual Defendants) Company Background and its Poise for Growth Violations of Section 14(d)(4) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act (Brought Individually Against Individual Defendants)

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18. Angus Steak & Egg Breakfast Sandwich and Angus Steak & Egg Wake-Up Wrap are registered trademarks of Defendant, and Defendant grants licenses to franchisees to operate the Dunkin’ Donut in the United States. 75. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit, both individually and as a class action on behalf of similarly situated purchasers of the Dunkin’ Donuts “Angus Steak and Egg Sandwich”, including on Plain Bagel, Croissant, English Muffin, Multigrain Flatbread, and Texas Toast and “Angus Steak and Egg Snack N’ Go Wrap”, also known as the “Angus Steak and Egg Wrap”, and formerly known as the “Angus Steak and Egg Wake-Up Wrap”, pursuant Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proposed Class is defined as: All persons in the United States who purchased Angus Steak and Egg Sandwich”, including on Plain Bagel, Croissant, English Muffin, Multigrain Flatbread, and Texas Toast and “Angus Steak and Egg Snack N’ Go Wrap”, formerly known as the “Angus Steak and Egg Wake-Up Wrap” and were charged a premium for their purchase of “steak” sandwiches and wraps. Excluded from the proposed Class are Defendant, its respective officers, directors and employees, any entity that has a controlling interest in Defendant, and all of its respective employees, affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assignees. Also excluded from membership in the Class is any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their family. Any claims for personal injury or consequential damages, not otherwise permitted under the facts pled herein, are 76. Plaintiff also seeks certification, to the extent necessary or appropriate, of a subclass of individuals who purchased the Products in the State of New York at any time during the Class Period (the “New York Subclass”). 77. The Class and New York Subclass shall be referred to collectively throughout the Complaint as the Class. 78. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition as necessary. 87. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 88. New York General Business Law Section 349 (“GBL § 349”) declares unlawful “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state . . .” 89. The conduct of Defendant alleged herein constitutes recurring, “unlawful” deceptive acts and practices in violation of GBL § 349, and as such, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members seek monetary damages and the entry of preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against Defendant, enjoining it from inaccurately describing, labeling, marketing, and promoting the Products. 90. There is no adequate remedy at law. 91. Defendant misleadingly, inaccurately, and deceptively presents its Product to 97. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in all the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350 provides, in part, as follows: False advertising in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state is hereby declared unlawful. 99. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 350a(1) provides, in part, as follows: The term ‘false advertising, including labeling, of a commodity, or of the kind, character, terms or conditions of any employment opportunity if such advertising is misleading in a material respect. In determining whether any advertising is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations made by statement, word, design, device, sound or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations with respect to the commodity or employment to which the advertising relates under the conditions proscribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual . . . 100. Defendant’s labeling and advertisements contain untrue and materially misleading statements concerning Defendant’s Products inasmuch as they misrepresent that the Products are Angus Steak and Egg Sandwich & Angus Steak and Egg Wrap when in fact they are Angus Patty and Egg Sandwich & Angus Patty and Egg Wrap, an inferior product. 101. Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members have been injured inasmuch as they relied upon the labeling, packaging and advertising and paid a premium for the Products which were—contrary to Defendant’s representations—do not include Angus “Steak”. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members [Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability brought on behalf of Plaintiff and proposed Class] 152. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 153. Defendant is in the business of manufacturing, distributing, marketing and advertising the above listed products. 154. Under the Uniform Commercial Code’s implied warranty of merchantability, the Defendant warranted to Plaintiff and Class Members that the Products include Angus “Steak”. 155. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability in that Defendant’s Products’ ingredients deviate from the label and product description, and reasonable [Breach of Express Warranty brought on behalf of Plaintiff and proposed Class] 127. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 128. Defendants provided Plaintiff and other members of the Class with written express warranties including, but not limited to, warranties that Dunkin’ Donuts Products were “Angus Steak” 129. These affirmations of fact or promises by Defendants relate to the goods and became part of the basis of the bargain. 130. Plaintiff and members of the Class purchased Products believing them to conform [Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness brought on behalf of Plaintiff and proposed Class] 158. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 159. Defendant knew or had reason to know that the Plaintiff and other Class Members were buying its Products with the specific purpose of buying products that contained premium Angus “steak”. 160. Plaintiff and the other Class Members, intending to eat a premium meat product, relied on the Defendant in selecting its Products to fit their specific intended use. 161. Defendant held itself out as having particular knowledge of the Defendant’s Products’ ingredients. 162. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ reliance on Defendant in selecting Defendant’s Products to fit their particular purpose was reasonable given Defendant’s claims and [False Advertising, Pursuant to the New York GBL §350 brought on behalf of Plaintiff and proposed New York subclass] [Negligent Misrepresentation brought on behalf of Plaintiff and proposed Class] 145. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 146. Defendants, directly or through their agents and employees, made false representations, concealments, and nondisclosures to Plaintiffs and members of the class. 147. In making the representations of fact to Plaintiffs and members of the class described herein, Defendants have failed to fulfill their duty to disclose the material facts set forth above. The direct and proximate cause of this failure to disclose was Defendant’s negligence and carelessness. 148. Defendants, in making the misrepresentations and omissions, and in doing the acts alleged above, knew or reasonably should have known that the representations were not true. Defendants made and intended the misrepresentations to induce the reliance [Unjust Enrichment brought on behalf of Plaintiff and proposed Class] 119. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 120. Plaintiff brings this claim individually, and on behalf of all similarly situated residents in and under the unjust enrichment laws of each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 121. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s misconduct as set forth above, Defendant has been unjustly enriched. 122. Specifically, by its misconduct described herein, Defendant has accepted a benefit (i.e., monies paid by Plaintiff and the proposed Class members for the purchase of the Product, at a premium of its Classic line of sandwiches) to the detriment of Plaintiff [Violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Acts of the Various States and District of Columbia brought on behalf of Plaintiff and proposed class] 108. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. [Violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Acts of the New York GBL §349 brought on behalf of Plaintiff and proposed New York subclass] [Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. brought on behalf of Plaintiff and proposed Class] 135. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 136. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the other members of the Class for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (the “Magnuson-Moss Act”). 137. Upon certification, the Class will consist of more than 100 named Plaintiffs. 138. The Magnuson-Moss Act provides that “a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under [the Magnuson-Moss Act], or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal equitable relief.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). 139. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were “consumers” as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (3). 140. At all relevant times, Defendant was a “supplier,” as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4), because it was a “person engaged in the business of making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers.” 141. At all relevant times, Defendant was a “warrantor,” as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. §2301(5), because it was a “supplier or other person who gives offers to give a written warranty or who is or may be obligated under an implied warranty.” 142. The Products that Plaintiff and the Class members purchased were “consumer products,” as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6), because the Products were

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10. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 28. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 29. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 30. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 40. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 41. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 42. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 43. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 45. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 48. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 49. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 50. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 51. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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25. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 26. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 27. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 28. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 29. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 30. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 31. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by letter (“the Letter”) dated June 8, 2018. (A true and accurate copy is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 32. The Letter conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 33. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 34. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 37. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) requires the written notice provide “the amount of the debt.” 39. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), a statement of “the amount of the debt” must accurately convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the debt. 40. The Letter claims that Plaintiff owes $4,071.00. 41. Plaintiff did not owe $4,071.00 at the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 42. Plaintiff did not owe $4,071.00 at the time Defendant sent Plaintiff the Letter. 43. Plaintiff did not owe $4,071.00 at the time Plaintiff received the Letter. 44. As such, Defendant did not clearly convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the alleged Debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 45. As such, Defendant did not accurately convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the alleged Debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 46. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 47. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 51. The Letter claims that Plaintiff owes $4,071.00. 52. Plaintiff did not owe $4,071.00 at the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 53. Plaintiff did not owe $4,071.00 at the time Defendant sent Plaintiff the Letter. 55. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $4,071.00 is a false representation made in connection with the collection of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 56. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $4,071.00 is a deceptive representation made in connection with the collection of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 57. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $4,071.00 is a false representation of the character of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 58. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $4,071.00 is the false representation of the amount of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 59. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $4,071.00 is the false representation of the legal status of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 60. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $4,071.00 is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 61. Defendant's allegation that Plaintiff owed $4,071.00 is a deceptive means in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 62. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 63. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 65. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) requires the written notice provide “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 66. The Letter claims the name of the creditor to whom the alleged Debt is owed is 75. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 76. The Letter claims that Plaintiff owes an alleged Debt to JHPDE FINANCE I, 98. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10)

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25. Plaintiff brings this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a proposed class defined as: Plaintiff and all persons within the United States, within the four years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or some person acting on Defendant’s behalf sent a text message to their cellular telephone advertising Defendant’s political campaign, through the use of the same or materially similar telephone dialing equipment as that which was used to send the texts at issue to the Plaintiff. (the “Class”) 26. Excluded from this class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant have a controlling interest; Defendant’s agents and employees; any Judge and Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of their staffs and immediate families; and any claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress. 27. The Class members for whose benefit this action is brought are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 29. The Class is comprised of hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals nationwide. 31. As a person that received at least one unsolicited text message without Plaintiff’s prior express written consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 32. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 34. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the Class. 35. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 36. Defendant has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate for the Class as a whole. 37. The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. 38. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy since, inter alia, the damages suffered by each class member make individual actions uneconomical. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs one (1) through thirty-nine (39) of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 39. Common questions will predominate, and there will be no unusual manageability issues. 40. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 41. Defendant sent text messages to Plaintiff and Class members on their cellular telephone numbers. 42. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 42. The text messages were sent using an “automatic telephone dialing system.” 43. The text messages were not sent for “emergency purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 43. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 44. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 44. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 45. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 46. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 48. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 49. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 50. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227(B)(1)(A)(III) TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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12. Defendant placed and continues to place repeated and harassing phone calls to consumers who allegedly owe a debt held by Defendant, or held by a third party on whose behalf Defendant is acting, and who never provided the number called to Defendant or the third party. Instead, Defendant acquires phone numbers through various means such as “skip tracing” or “number trapping.” 13. Defendant has placed calls for the purpose of debt collection to tens of thousands of consumers in the recent past. 14. In or around 2002, Plaintiff purchased a cellular telephone from Verizon. The cellular telephone did not work properly and, within one month of her purchase, Plaintiff returned the phone and did not purchase another. 15. In or around 2012, a debt of $1,026 appeared on Plaintiff’s credit report from Verizon. This debt incorrectly stems from Plaintiff’s 2002 Verizon purchase. Plaintiff does not owe any money to Verizon associated with her purchase of a cellular telephone. 16. Approximately three months after Plaintiff noticed the debt on her credit report, the debt became associated with Pinnacle Credit Services instead of Verizon. 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 28. Defendant and/or its agents made unsolicited telephone calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent to receive such calls. 29. Defendant made the telephone calls, or had them made on its behalf, using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(INVASION OF COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PRIVACY – UNAUTHORIZED MISAPPROPRIATION OF IMAGE) (INVASION OF COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PRIVACY - PUBLICLY PLACING PERSON IN FALSE LIGHT IN THE PUBLIC EYE) (UNAUTHORIZED MISAPPROPRIATION AND COMMERCIAL USE OF NAME, VOICE AND PHOTOGRAPHS – CIV. CODE § 3344) 10. Users can also create or join interest groups and “Like” pages, many of which are maintained by well-known products and companies as a means of advertising. 11. The Facebook “Like Button” is a very popular feature of DEFENDANT’S website, allowing users to express their appreciation of content such as other user’s Facebook status, comments, and posted photos. 12. Facebook users also have the ability to utilize their “Like Button” to endorse various companies’ products, services and advertisements. 13. A single click on a like button by a particular Facebook user will advertise to thousands of others that a particular user backs or likes a particular company’s product or service; a gigantic source of advertising. 14. DEFENDANT will routinely post a sponsored company’s advertisement on a user’s timeline, indicating to said user that one of his or her Facebook friends “Likes” that particular company, giving the impression of endorsement. 15. According to a recent Internet article, The Facebook “Like Button” is seen more than 22 billion times per day and is embedded in over 7.5 million websites. 29. PLAINTIFF brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). PLAINTIFF represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States whose Facebook profile was manipulated by DEFENDANT to give the impression to other Facebook users, including but not limited to their friends, family and acquaintances, that said person liked, endorsed and/or used a product/and or company that advertised on Facebook without the consent of said person to use their likeness and/or private data. 30. DEFENDANT and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. PLAINTIFF does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in millions, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 39. PLAINTIFF re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint and incorporates the same by reference as though set forth at length herein. 40. Continuing through the present, DEFENDANT knowingly used and is continuing to use PLAINTIFF’S and other Class members’ name and Facebook photos for DEFENDANT’S advantage, all without their prior consent. 41. As a direct and proximate result of said acts by DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF and other Class members have suffered damages, in an amount equal to the greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages suffered by them as a result of the unauthorized use, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. 42. The Facebook advertisements depicting PLAINTIFF’S likeness and the likeness of other Class members were not authorized to be used in any fashion by DEFENDANT because they were obtained without their consent; moreover, said advertisements were at no time to be distributed to the public. 47. PLAINTIFF re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 45 inclusive of this complaint, and incorporate the same by reference as though set forth at length herein. 48. By virtue of DEFENDANT’S wrongdoing and the facts alleged herein above, DEFENDANT, separate and apart from, any statutory violation of California Civil Code § 3344, committed an invasion of PLAINTIFF’S and other Class members’ right of privacy as recognized by the common law of the State of California, and as supported and protected by the Constitution of the State of California. 59. PLAINTIFF re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs of this complaint and incorporates the same by reference as though set forth at length herein. 60. DEFENDANT, without PLAINTIFF’S consent and the consent of other Class members, invaded PLAINTIFF’S and other Class members’ right of privacy by posting on Facebook advertisements of companies, products and/or services which contained PLAINTIFF’S and Class members’ misappropriated likenesses, purporting to promote said companies. 61. PLAINTIFF and other Class members are portrayed in these advertisements promoting said companies/products/services by “Liking” them with their Facebook profiles. (See Exhibit “A”). 62. Such disclosure by DEFENDANT created publicity in the sense of a public disclosure to a large number of people in that this was published on the Internet to thousands, perhaps millions of other Facebook users. 69. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 7. Founded in 2004, DEFENDANT is the world’s largest social media networking website with over a billion active users as of September of 2012. 77. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 78. DEFENDANT committed acts of false advertising as defined by California Business & Professions Code § 17500 et seq. by disseminating statements that were untrue or misleading in connection with advertising of sponsored pages, by creating the false impression that its users liked or promoted the products, services and/or companies in said pages, and by disseminating statements, including but not limited to its terms of use (including its Statement of Rights and Responsibilities and Data Use Policy), that were intended to lead reasonable consumers, including PLAINTIFF and Class members, to believe that Facebook was a medium intended to convey truthful information and that DEFENDANT would not create information about consumers or make false representations about them, in the manner alleged above. 79. DEFENDANT knew or should have known through the exercise of reasonable care that the statements were untrue and misleading and that PLAINTIFF and Class members would rely on them to their detriment. 8. Users must register to be able to use the website, after which they have the option to create a personal profile, add other users as “Facebook Friends,” exchange messages and receive automatic updates about their Facebook Friends when one of them updates his or her profile. 83. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 84. This cause of action is brought for violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). PLAINTIFF brings his cause of action on his own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated consumers within the meaning of Civil Code § 1781. 9. A user’s personal profile can consist of digital photographs, a wall for other users to write on, a list of interests, an educational history, as well as other personal information. 91. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 97. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 98. DEFENDANT entered into a contract with PLAINTIFF and Class members in part expressed in DEFENDANT’S user agreement and other terms and conditions of use whereby DEFENDANT agreed to provide its Facebook service to them in exchange for DEFENDANT’S access to their personal information and Facebook content so that it could, among other things, sell advertising space to marketers. 99. As part of this bargain, DEFENDANT agreed, whether explicitly or impliedly, not to interject false content and/or make false representations about PLAINTIFF and Class members that would be visible to other Facebook users, specifically users’ Friends, as this would diminish, reduce, and/or eliminate the value of the service to PLAINTIFF and Class members. 100. DEFENDANT materially breached this contract with PLAINTIFF and Class members by its conduct alleged herein, namely, by projecting false information to others, including their Facebook Friends 101. As a direct and proximate cause of DEFENDANT’s breach, PLAINTIFF and members of the Class have incurred damages in that they did not receive the benefit of the bargain for which they contracted and for which they paid valuable consideration in the form of their Facebook membership and presence, personal information, and Facebook content. Owing to DEFENDANT’S breach, PLAINTIFF and Class members overpaid for the bargained-for service and therefore are entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. BREACH OF CONTRACT NEGLIGENCE UNLAWFUL, UNFAIR, AND FRAUDULENT BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200, et seq. VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA FALSE ADVERTISING LAW (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 ET SEQ.) VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSUMER LEGAL REMEDIES ACT CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750 ET SEQ.

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20. At all relevant times, UPS has owned, operated, and/or controlled an international package delivery company. 21. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, the annual gross volume of sales made or business done by UPS’s operations was in excess of $500,000. 22. UPS maintains or has maintained facilities known as and located at, inter alia, 43rd Street in Manhattan; Manhattan South at Spring Street in Manhattan; World Trade Center in Manhattan; Manhattan North in the Bronx; Brush Avenue in the Bronx; Pelham Bay in the Bronx; Foster Avenue, Brooklyn; Maspeth, Queens; Queens North in Long Island City, Queens; Flushing, Queens; Laurelton, Queens; Elmsford, Westchester County; Mt. Vernon, Westchester County; Yorktown, Westchester County; Farmingdale, Nassau County; Melville, Suffolk County, all of which are located within the five boroughs of New York City or in the greater New York City area, where envelopes, parcels, packages, and freight are prepared and sorted for local delivery. 24. Since in or about 2014, UPS has employed workers in the full-time position of combination (“combo”) helper. 25. The combo helper position consists of any combination of (i) part-time preload, part-time hub or part-time local sort work and (ii) part-time driver’s helper. This means that a combo helper spends part of his or her shift preparing or sorting packages to be delivered locally, and the other part of his or her shift delivering packages with a driver. 26. The plaintiffs are employed as combo helpers. 27. Elizabeth Castro has worked as a combo helper since on or about September 2, 2014. Castro works out of the Maspeth facility located in Queens. Castro typically works a pre-load shift inside the facility in the early morning. After her pre-load shift is finished, she typically travels on a UPS truck with a driver to a delivery route. She has been assigned to various delivery routes, but principally to a succession of routes located in downtown Brooklyn, Williamsburg, Red Hook, and Dumbo, respectively, all in Brooklyn. Her travel time has varied considerably with these routes, but it is usually 50 minutes or more. Castro typically finishes her work day at the site of the delivery route. 29. Kaslyn Belgrave has worked as a combo helper since on or about September 9, 2014. Belgrave works out of the Foster Avenue facility located in Brooklyn. Belgrave typically begins her work day in the late morning, meeting the driver at a delivery route located in the Ocean Hill area of Brooklyn. After her delivery route shift is finished, she typically travels to the Foster Avenue facility driving her personal automobile or by public transportation. Her travel time from the delivery route to the facility averages about 25 minutes. Belgrave typically finishes her work day inside the facility. 30. Francis Cooper has worked as a combo helper since on or about September 4, 2014. Cooper works out of the Foster Avenue facility located in Brooklyn. Cooper typically begins his work day in the late morning, meeting the driver at a delivery route located in Canarsie, Brooklyn, or occasionally in the East Flatbush or another area of Brooklyn. After his delivery route shift is finished, he typically travels to the Foster Avenue facility driving his personal automobile. His travel time from the delivery route to the facility averages about 15 minutes. Cooper typically finishes his work day inside the facility. 32. Scott DiBona worked as a combo helper from on or about September 21, 2015 through on or about March 18, 2016. DiBona worked out of the Nassau County facility. DiBona typically worked a pre-load shift inside the facility in the early morning. After his pre-load shift finished, he typically traveled, driving his personal automobile, to meet a driver at a delivery route at a spot in the vicinity of 300 Crossways Park Drive in Woodbury. His travel time from the facility to the delivery route averaged about 30 minutes. DiBona typically finished his work day at the site of the delivery route. 33. David Gotay has worked as a combo helper since on or about August 11, 2014. Gotay works out of the Queens North facility located in Long Island City, Queens. Gotay typically begins his work day in the late morning, meeting the driver at a delivery route located in Astoria. After his delivery route shift is finished, he typically travels to the Queens North facility, driving his personal automobile. His travel time from the delivery route to the facility averages about 35 minutes. Gotay typically finishes his work day inside the facility. 35. At all times herein pertinent, and in the course of their duties as combo helpers, the plaintiffs have regularly handled products that had been moved in commerce. 36. Plaintiffs’ primary duties did not and do not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to any matters of significance. 37. Plaintiffs are non-exempt employees within the meaning of the FLSA and 49. Upon information and belief, defendant has, since 2013, employed over 120 different workers in the non-exempt position of combo helper. These employees had the same job duties as the named plaintiffs in this action. 50. Upon information and belief, by failing to compensate the combo helpers for their travel time, the defendant has failed to pay its combo helpers appropriate overtime pay when they worked over 40 hours in a week, and, where the combo helpers worked fewer than 40 hours in a week, has failed to appropriately compensate its combo helpers for all hours worked. 52. Other combo helpers employed by defendant should have the opportunity to have their claims for violations of the FLSA and NYLL heard. Certifying this action as a collective action under FLSA will provide other combo helpers the opportunity to receive notice of the action and allow them to opt in to such an action if they so choose. 53. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 256, consent forms executed by each plaintiff are annexed hereto. 54. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations made hereinbefore. 55. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), the named plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of the following class of persons (“the Class”): All persons who have been employed as full-time combo helpers by defendant during the period January 1, 2014 to the present. 56. The individuals in the class identified above are so numerous that joinder of all members of the class is impracticable. Upon information and belief, for the past six years, over 120 individuals have worked as full-time combo helpers for the defendant. 58. The claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class in that all of the named plaintiffs have incurred damage due to the policies and practices set forth in the factual allegations above. 59. The named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. The interests of the named plaintiffs are aligned with those of the Class, and the named plaintiffs have no conflicts of interest with the members of the Class. In addition, the named plaintiffs are represented by qualified and experienced counsel. 60. By engaging in the policies and practices set forth in the factual allegations above, defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making it appropriate for the Court to award final injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 62. For these reasons, the Class should be certified under FRCP 23(b)(2) or, in the alternative, under FRCP 23(b)(3). 63. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations made hereinbefore. 64. At all relevant times, by failing to compensate the plaintiffs for their travel time, the defendant has failed to pay plaintiffs at the statutorily required overtime rate of time and one half for the travel time worked by plaintiffs when they worked 40 or more hours in a week. 65. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, defendant did not pay other full-time combo helpers the statutorily required overtime rate of time and one half for travel time worked when they worked 40 or more hours in a week. 66. Defendant, by the above acts, has violated 29 U.S.C. § 207. 67. Upon information and belief, said violations are willful within the meaning 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 68. Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees have incurred, are now incurring, and will continue to incur monetary damages as a result of defendant’s acts unless and until this Court grants the relief requested herein. 70. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations made hereinbefore. 71. At all relevant times, defendant has not paid plaintiffs at the statutorily required overtime rate of time and one half for travel time worked by plaintiffs when they worked 40 or more hours in a week. 72. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, defendant did not pay other combo helpers the statutorily required overtime rate of time and one half for travel time worked by the combo helpers when they worked 40 or more hours in a week. 73. Defendant, by the above acts, has violated NYLL § 652 and 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2. 74. Upon information and belief, defendant has no good-faith basis to assert s that its actions were in compliance with the law, within the meaning of NYLL §§ 198, 663. 75. Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees have incurred, are now incurring, and will continue to incur monetary damages as a result of defendant’s acts unless and until this Court grants the relief requested herein. 76. No previous application for relief has been made for the relief requested herein. 77. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations made hereinbefore. 79. Additionally, NYLL § 191 requires the payment of wages at an employee’s agreed rate of pay for all hours worked within a specified time period. 80. Defendant failed to pay the plaintiffs for the travel time worked, even where the plaintiffs worked fewer than 40 hours in a week. 81. Defendant was also required to pay other full-time combo helpers for their travel time worked at their regular rates of pay, even where the combo helpers worked fewer than 40 hours in a week, but defendant failed to do so. 82. Defendant, by the above acts, has violated 12 NYCRR § 142-2.1(b) and AS TO ALL PLAINTIFFS (Failure to Pay Overtime Wage – FLSA) AS TO ALL PLAINTIFFS (Failure to Pay Overtime Wage – NYLL) AS TO ALL PLAINTIFFS (Failure to Pay for Each Hour Worked – NYLL)

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21. Defendant is a swimwear company that owns and operates the website, www.dolfinswimwear.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 24. Plaintiff most recently visited Defendant’s website in February of 2020 to potentially make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a user experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to enjoy the privileges and benefits of Defendant’s public accommodation. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contains a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances, an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by disabled individuals. 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 72. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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12. Beginning in or around June of 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone number ending in -3644, in an effort to collect an alleged debt owed from Plaintiff. 13. Defendant called Plaintiff from telephone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendant, including without limitation (760) 630-4665. 14. In its efforts to collect the alleged debt owed from Plaintiff, Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its daily calls to Plaintiff seeking to collect an alleged debt owed. 15. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 21. In addition to the facts pled above, at various times prior to the filing of the instant complaint, including within one year preceding the filing of this complaint, DEFENDANT contacted PLAINTIFF in an attempt to collect an alleged outstanding debt. 22. On or about November of 2016 through September of 2017, Plaintiff began receiving numerous letters from Defendant, in an attempt to collect upon an alleged debt. 23. On or about June through September of 2017, Plaintiff began receiving numerous calls from Defendant. 29. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 30. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any collection telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 40. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons residing in the United States, who, within the one (1) year preceding the filing of this Complaint, received collection correspondence, through the use of the United States Postal Service, from Defendant that attempted to charge interest, fees, or charges not authorized in the original agreement or by state law 41. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons residing in the United States, who, within the one (1) year preceding the filing of this Complaint, received collection correspondence, through the use of the United States Postal Service, from Defendant that attempted to charge interest, fees, or charges not authorized in the original agreement or by state law. 42. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 43. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of The Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that The Class includes thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that The Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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(Violation of TILA and Regulation Z arising from Defendants’ Payoff Statement) (on behalf of the Property Insurance Class) (Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.) (on behalf of the Facsimile Fee Class) (Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750 et seq.) (on behalf of the California Property Insurance Class) 23. On or about November 19, 2009, Plaintiff took out a mortgage, secured by her residential property, located at 905 Nogales Street in Sacramento (“the Property”), for the principal amount of $175,986.00 (“the Mortgage”). The footer of the Mortgage’s Deed of Trust states it is an “FHA CALIFORNIA DEED OF TRUST—MERS,” which indicates that it conforms to the servicing requirements established by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. 24. Section Four of the Mortgage’s Deed of Trust, entitled “Fire, Flood and Other Hazard Insurance,” requires the Borrower to maintain property insurance, and provides that the insurance policies “shall be held by Lender and shall include loss payable clauses in favor of, and in a form acceptable to, Lender.” 25. Section Four continues: All or any part of the insurance proceeds may be applied by Lender, at its option, either (a) to the reduction of the indebtedness under the Note and this Security Instrument . . . , or (b) to the restoration or repair of the damaged Property . . . . Any excess insurance proceeds over an amount required to pay all outstanding indebtedness under the Note and this Security Instrument shall be paid to the entity legally entitled thereto. 69. Plaintiff repeats the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. Defendant’s failure to account for insurance payments in its payoff statements has the effect of overstating and exaggerating Plaintiff’s obligation under the Mortgage, and thus constitutes an “[in]accurate statement of the total outstanding balance that would be required to pay the consumer’s obligation in full” (12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(c)(3)) and an “[in]accurate payoff balance” (15 U.S.C. § 1639g). 71. Consequently, Defendant’s payoff statement is in violation of TILA and Regulation Z. 72. Failure to account for insurance payments in payoff statements imposes drastic consequences upon the recipient Property Insurance Class members, such as Plaintiff. 73. In many jurisdictions, and under many mortgage agreements, a servicer must demand from a homeowner that she pay off the mortgage prior to its commencement of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. Additionally, payoff statements often serve as prima facie evidence in foreclosure proceedings of the amount due. 76. Plaintiff repeats the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 77. The Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §1750, et seq. (the “CLRA”), provides protection for California consumers against unfair, deceptive and unlawful practices, and unconscionable commercial practices. 78. Plaintiff and the California Property Insurance Class are “consumers” as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d). 79. Defendant’s deceptive practice of failing to account for insurance payments in its payoff, periodic and loan history statements to Plaintiff and the California Property Insurance Class violates Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a). For example, the practice represents that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law. The practice also represents that the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not. 80. Plaintiff has been harmed and has suffered an increased cost or burden due to Defendant’s actions, as described in the above paragraphs. 85. Plaintiff repeats the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. Defendants engaged in unlawful conduct under California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq., by charging a facsimile fee for providing a payoff statement when the payoff statement was instead sent by first class mail. 87. Defendant’s conduct is unfair in that it offends established public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, unconscionable, or substantially injurious to Plaintiff and members of the Facsimile Fee Class. The harm arising from Defendant’s conduct outweighs any legitimate benefit Defendant has derived from the conduct. 88. Defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions are material and likely to mislead a reasonable consumer. 89. Plaintiff relied on Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions. Defendant’s Rights Under the Mortgage to Administer Insurance Proceeds

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18. On August 12, 2016, Platinum published its Disclosure Statement dated August 4, 2016 to the Filings and Disclosure section of the OTCMarkets profile (the “August Disclosure Statement”). The August Disclosure Statement was signed by Defendant Baioni on August 8, 2016. 19. On August 13, 2016, Platinum published its consolidated financial statements for the six months ended June 30, 2016 and December 31, 2015 which provided the Company’s financial results and position for the first half of 2016. 21. On September 12, 2016, the Company announced its acquisition of TBX Group, stating that further details would be coming in the next few days. 24. On November 14, 2016, Platinum published its quarterly financial report for the period ending September 30, 2016 (the “3Q16 Quarterly Report”). The 3Q16 Quarterly Report provided the Company’s financial results and position for the period ending September 30, 2016. The 3Q16 Quarterly Report was signed by Defendants Baioni and Miller. 25. The 3Q16 Quarterly Report discussed the Company’s controls and procedure, stating in relevant part: Item 3 - Controls and Procedures Evaluation of Disclosure Controls and Procedures Our management, with the participation of our chief executive officer and chief financial officer, has evaluated the effectiveness of our disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of this quarterly reporting period. Based on that evaluation, our Chief Executive and Chief Financial officers have concluded that as of such date, our disclosure controls and procedures were effective. Changes in Internal Control There were no changes in our internal control over financial reporting identified in management’s evaluation during the period covered by this quarterly reporting period, that materially affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, our internal control over financing reporting. (Emphasis added). 30. On February 16, 2017, the SEC issued a release announcing the temporary suspension of trading in the securities of Platinum, stating in pertinent part: 34. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired Platinum securities publicly traded on the OTC Marketplaces during the Class Period (the “Class”) and were damaged upon the revelation of the alleged corrective disclosure. Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 36. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 37. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 39. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 41. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 42. Alternatively, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to the presumption of reliance established by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2430 (1972), as Defendants omitted material information in their Class Period statements in violation of a duty to disclose such information, as detailed above. 43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 45. During the Class Period and/or the Private Placement, the Company and the Individual Defendant, individually and in concert, directly or indirectly, disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 46. The Company and the Individual Defendant violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: • employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; • made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or • engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of Platinum securities during the Class Period and/or pursuant and/or traceable to the Private Placement. 48. Individual Defendant, who is the senior officer and/or director of the Company, had actual knowledge of the material omissions and/or the falsity of the material statements set forth above, and intended to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, acted with reckless disregard for the truth when they failed to ascertain and disclose the true facts in the statements made by them or other personnel of the Company to members of the investing public, including Plaintiff and the Class. 49. As a result of the foregoing, the market price of Platinum securities was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the falsity of the Company’s and the Individual Defendant’s statements, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class relied on the statements described above and/or the integrity of the market price of Platinum securities during the Class Period in purchasing Platinum securities at prices that were artificially inflated as a result of the Company’s and the Individual Defendant’s false and misleading statements. 50. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class been aware that the market price of Platinum securities had been artificially and falsely inflated by the Company’s and the Individual Defendant’s misleading statements and by the material adverse information which the Company and the Individual Defendant did not disclose, they would not have purchased Platinum securities at the artificially inflated prices that they did, or at all. 52. By reason of the foregoing, the Company and the Individual Defendant have violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and are liable to the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for substantial damages which they suffered in connection with their purchases of Platinum securities during the Class Period and/or pursuant and/or traceable to the Private Placement. 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 54. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendant participated in the operation and management of the Company, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the Company’s business affairs. Because of his senior positions, he knew the adverse non-public information regarding the Company’s business practices. 55. As officer and/or director of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendant had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to the Company’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by the Company which had become materially false or misleading. 57. The Individual Defendant, therefore, acted as a controlling person of the Company. By reason of his senior management positions and/or being director of the Company, the Individual Defendant had the power to direct the actions of, and exercised the same to cause, the Company to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein. The Individual Defendant exercised control over the general operations of the Company and possessed the power to control the specific activities which comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class complain. 58. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendant is liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by the Company. Materially False and Misleading Statements Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendant Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

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10. Defendant Shotgun Willie’s in Glendale, Colorado is an adult entertainment establishment owned and operated by Defendant Matthews, that caters to male clientele by providing entertainment by female dancers, including Plaintiffs and other Class members, in various stages of undress. 2 While the allegations in this Complaint and Jury Demand are generally written in the past tense, they apply equally to Class members who are currently employed by Defendants. 5 11. Defendants’ business model is predicated entirely on the exploitation of Plaintiffs and other Class members in order for its owners to earn a profit. 12. In order to maximize their own profits at the expense of Plaintiff and other Class members, Defendants improperly classified Plaintiffs and other Class members as independent contractors, failed to pay a minimum wage or overtime pay, regularly denied them and other members of the Class the full wages and tips they had earned, required them to pay various fees and fines in order to be allowed to work, and otherwise violated their legal rights as set forth herein. 13. Although Plaintiffs and other Class members were employed by Defendants, Defendants paid them no money for the work they performed. 14. Instead of paying Plaintiffs and other Class members for their work, Defendants actually required that Plaintiffs and other Class members pay Defendants before they were allowed to work. 15. The amounts that Defendants required Plaintiffs and other Class members to pay before being allowed to work depended on the time their shifts began. In order to work the more profitable late night shifts, Plaintiffs and other Class members were required to pay a larger fee to Defendants. 16. Defendants required Plaintiffs and other Class members to pay “House Fees” of up to $100 in order to be allowed to work. 17. In turn, Defendants used the money paid to them by Plaintiffs and other Class members in order to fund the operation of Shotgun Willie’s. 18. The only compensation received by Plaintiffs and other Class members was a portion of the gratuities or “tips” that they were given by customers. 6 19. In addition to charging Plaintiffs and other Class members various fees before allowing them to work, Defendants required that Plaintiffs and other Class members give a portion of their earned tips to the security guards (“bouncers”), the disk jockeys (“DJs”), doorperson, dance counters, and valets. 20. Defendants required Plaintiffs and other Class members to pay Defendants a fee of $5 for every personal (or private) dance provided to a customer. Defendants employed an individual who counted the number of private dances Plaintiffs and other Class members performed to ensure that the $5 fee was tallied and collected. 21. Defendants likewise required that Plaintiffs and other Class members pay additional fees in order to dance in the “champagne” or “VIP” rooms, in that they were required to pay the club $25 for each hour they were not on the stage dance rotation. When Plaintiffs and other Class members danced for customers in the “champagne” or “VIP” rooms, Defendants required them to charge $25 per song played and to then pay $5 of that money to Defendants. 22. Defendants arbitrarily fined Plaintiffs and other Class members for not dancing on stage during their shifts. 23. If Plaintiffs were engaged in a private dance when it was their “turn” to dance on stage, Defendants charged Plaintiffs $25. 24. The fees, fines, and tips that Defendants required Plaintiffs and other Class members to pay were unlawful “kickbacks.” 25. In addition to funding their operations through the fees demanded of Plaintiffs and other Class members, Defendants reaped the benefits of the substantial profits from door charges and drink sales without paying Plaintiffs and Class members a wage. 7 26. Furthering their exploitation, Defendants also failed to pay Plaintiffs and other Class members overtime wages for weeks during which they worked in excess of forty hours. Plaintiffs and other Class members were, and continue to be, employees of Defendants, not independent contractors. 27. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and other Class members are, and were, employees of Shotgun Willie’s under the Fair Standards Labor Act (“FLSA”) and Colorado Labor Code, and are, and were, entitled to a minimum wage, receipt of overtime pay, retention of all tips received, and all other benefits regularly conferred upon employees by statute. 28. At all relevant times, Defendants have been the employers of Plaintiffs and other Class members. 29. Defendant Debra Matthews, the owner and operator of Shotgun Willie’s. Defendant Matthews was also an employer in that she is consistently present at the club and is a hand-on owner/manager. Defendant Matthews is responsible for determining the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ employment as described more fully herein. Defendant Matthews also makes the hiring and firing decisions regarding Plaintiffs and other Class members. She personally disciplines and fines Plaintiffs and other Class members for alleged transgressions, regulates their appearance, and regulates their conduct. 30. Defendants intentionally and willfully misclassified Plaintiffs and other Class members as independent contractors in order to avoid paying them the minimum wage and/or overtime pay required under the FLSA and/or the Colorado Minimum Wage Act. 31. Defendants improperly withheld portions of Plaintiffs and Class member’s tips, and otherwise forced them to pay unlawful kickbacks. 8 32. Defendants also intentionally withheld other statutory rights and benefits, harming Plaintiffs and other Class members and causing them significant injury and financial loss. 33. Plaintiffs and other Class members received no wage payments from Defendants, but instead depended only on gratuities received from customers. 34. In many instances, Defendants’ practices resulted in Plaintiffs and other Class members earning less than minimum wage, in violation of federal and state law. 35. Defendants exercised significant control over Plaintiffs and other Class members. 36. Defendants controlled the amount that Plaintiffs and other Class members were allowed to charge for personal dances, setting the price at $25 per song, of which dancers were required to pay $5 to Defendants. 37. Defendants controlled the amount that Plaintiffs and other Class members were allowed to charge for dances in the champagne or VIP rooms. Plaintiffs were only allowed to charge customers $25 per song and $5 of that money went directly to Defendants. 38. Defendants required that Plaintiffs and other Class members work a minimum of two shifts per week. Plaintiffs and other Class members were required to work these shifts according to a set schedule imposed by Defendants. Each week, Plaintiffs and other Class members were required to request their shifts for the following week. These requests were then either approved or rejected by Defendants. 39. Defendants controlled Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ schedules. Specifically, Defendants did this by reserving the right to require Plaintiffs and other Class members to select the days they would be working a week in advance; setting a minimum number of sessions they must work that week; setting a minimum number of hours per 9 showtime; and charging a lesser fee if Plaintiffs and other Class members danced from 11 a.m. until 6 p.m. (the less lucrative shifts). 40. Defendants fined Plaintiffs and other Class members when they were late for one of their scheduled shifts, charged them higher house fees, or sent them home. 41. Defendants required Plaintiffs and other Class members to call Shotgun Willie’s by a certain time if they wanted to reschedule an assigned shift. If Plaintiffs and other Class members did not call and inform Shotgun Willie’s that they would not be attending a scheduled shift, they risked being fined, not being allowed to work their next shift, or terminated. 42. Defendants required Plaintiffs and other Class members to seek manager approval prior to leaving the club. Defendants required that Plaintiffs and other Class members be escorted individually to their vehicles when leaving the club. 43. Defendants required that Plaintiffs and other Class members check in and out with a manager at the beginning and ending of each shift. At the beginning of the shift, the manager would clock Plaintiffs and other Class members in. At the end of the shift, the manager would clock Plaintiffs and other Class members out. 44. If Plaintiffs and other Class members did not pay the House Fees charged by Defendants, they were not allowed to work. 45. Defendants often required that Plaintiffs and other Class members work extra weekday shifts prior to earning approval to work weekend shifts, which were more lucrative. 46. Defendants restricted Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ access to the premises of the nightclub. If Plaintiffs and other Class members were on the premises of any nightclub at any time when they were not scheduled to perform and they remained on the premise for more 10 than 20 minutes, they were deemed to be on shift. Defendants then forced some Plaintiffs and other Class members to pay the commensurate House Fee. 47. Defendants required Plaintiffs and other Class members to wear particular types of dress, styles of makeup, and maintain a certain level of fitness and grooming, and otherwise regulated their physical appearance. For example, Defendants required that Plaintiffs and other Class members wear make-up and have their hair in a particular fashion. Defendants required Plaintiffs to wear certain styles of clothing; for example, Defendants required one Plaintiff to buy new, black shoes because pink shoes were not allowed. Defendants required Plaintiffs and other Class members to lose weight in order to continue their employment. 48. Shotgun Willie’s had theme nights, wherein Plaintiffs and other Class members were required to wear certain clothing and make-up. For example, Plaintiffs and other Class members were required to dress in themed clothing for “redneck” parties, “white” parties, Halloween, and Star Wars-themed clothing on May the Fourth. 49. Defendants regulated Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ workplace conduct through oral and written guidelines and policies. 50. Defendants regulated Plaintiffs and other Class members by specifying the manner in which they danced, including types of movements that were allowed and those that were prohibited. 51. Defendants regulated Plaintiffs and other Class members by specifying the manner in which they interacted with customers, specifying types of interaction and conduct that were allowed and others that were prohibited. For example, Defendants arbitrarily fined Plaintiffs and other Class members for deciding not to dance on stage. If Plaintiffs were engaged in a private dance when it was their “turn” to dance on stage, Defendants charged Plaintiffs $25. 11 52. Defendants further regulated Plaintiffs and other Class members by requiring them to “tip out” the DJs, bouncers, doorperson, dance counters, and valets. 53. Defendants set the amount that customers were required to pay for use of the VIP room. 54. Defendants also required Plaintiffs and other Class members to pay a fee to work any given shift, in varying amounts depending on the time of evening. 55. Defendants additionally regulated Plaintiffs and other Class members by punishing them for failing to have government issued identification on their person at all times while on the premises; failing to appear for showtimes on two or more occasions during any calendar month; filing to timely commence their showtimes on two or more occasions during any calendar week; failing to pay any house fee when due; or – most remarkably – claiming that their business relationship with Defendants was that of employee-employer. 56. When Plaintiffs and other Class members began their shifts, the valet would take keys and identification for the night, would only give them back at the end of the night after Plaintiffs and other Class members had paid their house fees. 57. Defendants would strictly control the amount of alcohol that Plaintiffs and other Class members consumed while working. Upon starting a shift, Plaintiffs and other Class members would receive two drink coupons. These drink coupons did not entitle Plaintiffs and other Class members to free drinks. Rather, Plaintiffs and other Class members were required to buy their own drinks, but could only purchase two per shift (in accordance with their drink tickets). In this manner, Defendants ensured that Plaintiffs and other Class members consumed only two drinks per shifts. 12 58. Plaintiffs and other Class members did not have significant control over their opportunity for profit or loss. 59. Defendants were responsible for attracting customers, advertising, and maintaining food and alcohol availability and pricing. 60. The investment of Plaintiffs and other Class members was relatively minor compared to Defendants’ considerable investment in operating a nightclub. 61. Plaintiffs and other Class members established permanency at Shotgun Willie’s. 62. Plaintiffs and other Class members regularly worked at Shotgun Willie’s over the course of years. 63. Plaintiffs and other Class members did not exercise the skill required to elevate their status to independent contractors. 64. Plaintiffs and other Class members were not selected as dancers based on prior dancing experience, skill, or propensity and received no material training or instruction while employed by Defendants. 65. Plaintiffs and other Class members were an integral part of the success of the Defendants’ business. 66. Defendants’ business model was dependent on Plaintiffs and other Class members. 67. The totality of the circumstances surrounding Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ employment relationship with Defendants indicates economic dependence. Plaintiffs and other Class members were tipped employees entitled to full retention of all gratuities. 68. Plaintiffs and other Class members were tipped employees who customarily and regularly received more than $200 a night in tips. 13 69. Defendants improperly forced Plaintiffs and other Class members to share those tips with other employees. 70. Defendants intentionally denied Plaintiffs and other Class members their due minimum wage as tipped employees. 71. Plaintiffs and other Class members were therefore obligated to support themselves exclusively through the tips received from customers for performing exotic stage, table, lap, topless, nude and/or VIP room dances (hereinafter collectively referred to as “dance tips”). 72. The dance tips and customer payments for private room performances are tips, not wages or service charges. 73. Defendants did not directly receive any monies from customers for the dances performed by Plaintiffs and other Class members. Instead, Defendants depended on Plaintiffs and other Class members to give them the monies received by them. 74. Defendants treated the dance tips and the payments by customers for private room performances as tips by requiring Plaintiffs and other Class members to “tip-out” Defendants’ DJs, bouncers, doorperson, dance counters, and valets by paying them significant portions of the dance tips and pay for private rooms earned by Plaintiffs and other Class members. 75. These are unlawful “kickbacks” within the meaning of the FLSA. 76. The monies given to Plaintiffs and other Class members by the customers for the dances performed were not entered into Defendants’ gross receipts. 14 77. Defendants did not issue to Plaintiffs and other Class members W-2 forms, 1099 forms, or any other wage-related documents indicating any amounts paid from their gross receipts. 78. Employers may apply a tip credit to offset any minimum wage obligation owed to tipped employees only if the employer has informed the employee of the applicability of this provision in advance and the employee retains all tips received. 79. An employer may require employees to pool their tips only when the pool consists of employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. 80. Defendants never informed Plaintiffs and other Class members of the applicability of this provision in advance (instead telling them that it did not apply) and therefore were prohibited from applying a tip credit to offset Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ minimum wage. 81. DJs, bouncers, doorpersons, and dance counters are not employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. Defendants’ DJs, bouncers, doorpersons, and dance counters received regular paychecks valued at or above the hourly minimum wage. Therefore, the DJs, bouncers, doorpersons, and dance counters invalidated any tip pool and Plaintiffs and other Class members were entitled to retain the entirety of the tips received from customers. 82. Plaintiffs and other Class members were entitled to the full minimum wage due under the applicable federal and/or state law (including Colorado law) without any tip credit and to retain the full amount of any dance tips and pay for private room performances given to them by customers. 83. Plaintiffs and other Class members have suffered financial loss, injury, and damage as a result of Defendants’ failure to pay them minimum wages and/or overtime pay, 15 requiring them to pay stage and room fees, requiring them to pay a daily fee, and requiring them to share a percentage of their tips with the DJs, bouncers, doorperson, dance counters, and valets. Defendants intentionally and illegally mistreated Plaintiffs and other Class members and willfully violated the FLSA and the Colorado Labor Code. 84. All actions by Defendants described herein were willful, intentional, and not the result of negligence or good-faith but incorrect assumptions. 85. At all relevant times, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that the FLSA and Colorado Labor Code applied to Plaintiffs and other Class members and, that under the economic reality test, Plaintiffs and other Class members were obviously employees, not independent contractors, entitled to a minimum wage. 86. At all relevant times, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that Plaintiffs and other Class members were entitled to one and one half the minimum wage during weeks Plaintiffs and other Class members worked overtime. 87. At all relevant times, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that Plaintiffs and other Class members were tipped employees. 88. It is well-established (and was known or should have been known by Defendants) that exotic dancers are employees for purposes of the FLSA and state wage laws comparable to the Colorado Wage Claim Act, not independent contractors. See Donovan v. Tavern Talent and Placement Inc., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30955, at *6-*8 (D. Colo. Jan. 8, 1986); Jeffcoat v. State, Dep't of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1987); Martin v. Priba Corp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20143, 1992 WL 486911, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding dancers are employees under the FLSA); Reich v. Priba Corp., 890 F. Supp. 586, 593 (N.D. Tex. 1993); Harrell v. Diamond A Entm't, Inc., 992 16 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1997); 303 W. 42nd St. Enterprises, Inc. v. I.R.S., 181 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 1999); Doe v. Cin-Lan, Inc., No. 08-cv-12719, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107802, at *68, 2008 WL 4960170 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Chaves v. King Arthur's Lounge, No. 07-2505, 2009 WL 3188948 (Mass. Super. July 30, 2009); Morse v. Mer Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55636 (S.D. Ind. June 4, 2010); Thompson v. Linda & A., Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 139, 154 (D.D.C. 2011); Thornton v. Crazy Horse, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-251-TMB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82770, 2013 WL 2175753 (D. Alaska June 14, 2012); Bosco v. Tampa Food & Beverage, LLC, No. 8:11-cv- 1651-T-26AEP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 807, 2013 WL 49477, *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2013); Milano's v. Kansas Dep't of Labor, 296 Kan. 497 (Kan. 2013); Butler v. PP & G, Inc., Civ. No. WMN-13-430, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111262, 2013 WL 4026938, *5 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2013) (collecting case holding that exotic dancers are employees for FLSA purposes); Hart v. Rick's Cabaret Int'l, Inc., 09 CIV. 3043 PAE, 2013 WL 4822199 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013); Collins v. Barney’s Barn, Inc., et al., No. 4:12-CV-00685 SWW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184276 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 14, 2013); Stevenson v. Great Am. Dream, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-3359-TWT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181551, 2013 WL 6880921, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 2013); McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entm’t, LLC, 47 F. Supp. 3d 260, 273 (D. Md. 2014); Mason v. Fantasy, LLC, Civil Action No. 13-cv-02020-RM-KLM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97640 (D. Colo. July 27, 2015). 89. At all relevant times, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that the DJs, bouncers, doorpersons, and dance counters were not employees who customarily and regularly received tips and that they invalidated any tip pool. 90. At all relevant times, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that the dance tips and room fees received by Plaintiffs and other Class members were Plaintiffs and other 17 Class members’ sole property and that the dance tips and room fees were tips, not wages or service charges. 91. Defendants viewed the dance tips and customers’ room payments as tips by requiring Plaintiffs and other Class members to “tip-out” the DJs, bouncers, doorperson, dance counters, and valets using money earned by Plaintiffs and other Class members from dance tips and room payments. 92. At all relevant times, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded the requirement that they pay Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ wages finally and unconditionally or “free and clear.” 93. Defendants also willfully failed to meet the wage requirements of the FLSA by requiring Plaintiffs and other Class members to pay “kickbacks” directly or indirectly to Defendants, or to another person for Defendants’ benefit, including the whole or part of the wage delivered to Plaintiffs and other Class members. 94. Defendants refused to issue Plaintiffs and other Class members any tax documentation regarding their wages and employment. 95. Despite being aware of the FLSA’s and the Colorado Labor Code’s application to Plaintiffs and other Class members, Defendants intentionally and willfully chose to misclassify Plaintiffs and other Class members as independent contractors, to withhold minimum wages, to deny overtime pay, to require Plaintiffs and other Class members to share their tips with employees who do not customarily and regularly receive tips, to charge them improper fees and fines, and to otherwise violate their legal rights. 18 Collective/Class Allegations 96. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 97. All requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) are satisfied. 98. All members of the Class are victims of a single decision, policy, and/or plan designed by Defendants to intentionally deny Plaintiffs and other Class members of minimum wages and overtime pay, to require Plaintiffs and other Class members to pay various fees to work, to require Plaintiffs and other Class members to share a percentage of their tips, to charge them various fees, and to otherwise violate their rights. 99. The members of the Collective/Class to be certified against Defendants are defined as follows: All individuals, who at any time from the date three years prior to the date this Complaint was originally filed continuing through the present, worked as dancers at Shotgun Willie’s in Glendale, Colorado, and were designated as independent contractors. 100. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the exact number of potential Class members is currently unknown, on information and belief, the number of dancers who have worked for Defendants during the relevant time period exceeds 100 women. 101. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class including whether the Defendants violated the FLSA and the Colorado Wage laws by treating Plaintiffs and other Class members as independent contractors instead of employees, whether Plaintiffs and other Class members were denied minimum wages and/or overtime pay, whether the monies given to Plaintiffs and other Class members as dance tips and room fees are tips to which they are solely entitled, whether the DJs, bouncers, doorpersons, and dance counters are employees who 19 customarily and regularly receive tips, whether Defendants charged Plaintiffs and other Class members to work, whether Defendants intentionally denied Plaintiffs and other Class members the full retention of their tips, whether Defendants required Plaintiffs and other Class members to pay “kickbacks” in violation of the FLSA, and whether Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiffs and other Class members. 102. The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the class because they were not paid a minimum wage or overtime pay, were required to pay in order to work, and were required to share their tips like all other Class members. 103. The named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. The named Plaintiffs, like all Class members, have suffered financial loss, injury, and damage as a result of Defendants’ failure to pay them minimum wages and/or overtime pay, requiring them to pay fees in order to work, and requiring them to share a percentage of their tips with the DJs, bouncers, doorpersons, dance counters, and valets, and charging them various fines and/or kickbacks. 104. The named Plaintiffs have no interest that would be adverse to the interests of the Class. 105. The named Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in employment disputes and, particularly, claims against adult entertainment establishments under the FLSA and the Colorado Labor Code. 106. This class action is maintainable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). The prosecution of separate actions on behalf of individual class members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class. 20 107. This class action is maintainable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The questions of law and fact are common to Plaintiffs and predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 108. The named Plaintiffs are similarly situated to potential opt-in Plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Defendants have, and continue to, exploit their vulnerable workers. UNJUST ENRICHMENT Against Defendants Shotgun Willie’s and Matthews 143. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 144. By refusing to pay Plaintiffs and other Class members wages for hours worked, including overtime pay, requiring Plaintiffs and other Class members to share their tips, charging Plaintiffs and other Class members fees to work, and charging them improper fines, Defendants were unjustly enriched at the expense of and to the detriment of Plaintiffs and other Class members. 145. Defendants’ retention of any benefit collected directly and indirectly violated principles of justice, equity, and good conscience when they refused to pay Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ wages, required Plaintiffs and other Class members to share tips, and charged Plaintiffs and other Class members unreasonable fees and/or fines. As a result, Defendants have been unjustly enriched. 146. Plaintiffs and other Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants all amounts that Defendants have wrongfully and improperly obtained, and Defendants should be required to disgorge to Plaintiffs and other Class members the benefit they have unjustly obtained. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendants, and award them all relief allowed by law, including but not limited to the following: a. Issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as soon as possible to all dancers who worked for Defendants during any portion of the three years immediately preceding the filing of this action. Generally, this notice should inform them that this action has been filed, describe the nature of the action, and 26 explain their right to opt into this lawsuit without fear of reprisal, retaliation, or abuse by Defendants; b. Judgment against Defendants for an amount equal to Plaintiffs’ and other Class members unpaid back wages, overtime pay, fees, shared tips, fines, and all other unlawful kickbacks; c. Judgment against Defendants that its violations of the FLSA and the Colorado Wage Claim Act were willful; d. Liquidated Damages in amount equal to Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). e. All damages, penalties and other relief allowable under state law; f. Declaratory relief and other appropriate equitable relief, including injunctive relief; g. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest lawful rate; h. Attorneys’ fees and costs as allowed by law; i. Leave to add additional plaintiffs by motion, the filing of written consent forms, or any other method approved by the Court; and j. Such further relief as justice requires. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT - 29 U.S.C. 201, et. seq. Against Defendants Shotgun Willie’s and Matthews 109. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all paragraphs by reference all as if fully set forth herein. 110. This claim arises from Defendants’ willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq., for failure to pay Plaintiffs and other Class members a minimum wage and overtime pay to which they were entitled, requiring that they share their tips with DJs, bouncers, doorpersons, dance counters, and valets, charging Plaintiffs and other Class members various fees to work, charging Plaintiffs and other Class members inappropriate fines, and other unlawful kickbacks. 111. At all times relevant, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” engaged in commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA 29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq. 112. At all times relevant, Defendants have employed and continued to employ employees, including Plaintiffs and other Class members, who engage or engaged in commerce. 113. At all times relevant, upon information and belief, Defendants have had an annual gross volume of sales made or business done in excess of $500,000.00. 21 114. The minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq., apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiffs and other Class members. 115. The named Plaintiffs have consented in writing to be a part of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). As this case proceeds, it is likely that other individuals will sign consent forms and join as Class Members. 116. Pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, Plaintiffs and other members of the Class were entitled to be compensated at a rate of $7.25 per hour at all times relevant. 117. Pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, Plaintiffs and other members of the Class were entitled to be compensated at one and one-half the minimum wages for hours they worked over forty hours a week. 118. Defendants was not allowed to avail themselves of the federal tipped minimum wage rate under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et. seq., because Defendants provided no notice to employees of their intention to take a tip credit (instead telling them that it did not apply because they were independent contractors) and because Plaintiffs and other Class members were not allowed to retain all of their tip money. 119. Defendants demanded that Plaintiffs and other Class members pay “kickbacks” in the form of fees and tip shares. 120. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ unconditional wages, as Plaintiffs and other Class members were required to “kick back” fees and tips, directly or indirectly to Defendants or to others for Defendants’ benefit. 121. Defendants, pursuant to their policies and practice, refused and failed to pay a minimum wage and/or overtime pay to Plaintiffs and other Class members. 22 122. Defendants, pursuant to their policies and practices, charged Plaintiffs and other Class members various fees in order to work. 123. By failing to compensate Plaintiffs and other Class members, Defendants violated, and continue to violate, Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ statutory rights under FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 124. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255. 125. The named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all members of the Class of Plaintiffs, seek damages in the amount of their respective unpaid wages, liquidated damages as provided under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), repayment of fees, fines, tips, and other unlawful kickbacks, interest, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems proper and as set forth herein. 126. The named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all members of the Class of Plaintiffs, seek recovery of attorneys’ fees and cost to be paid by Defendants as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). VIOLATION OF THE COLORADO WAGE CLAIM ACT – C.R.S. § 8-4-101, et seq. Against Defendant Shotgun Willie’s 127. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 128. This claim arises from Defendants’ willful violation of the Colorado Wage Claim Act (“CWCA”), C.R.S. § 8-4-101 et seq., in that Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and Class members a minimum wage or overtime, required improper tip sharing, and otherwise violated their rights under this statute. 23 129. Defendants violated the Colorado Minimum Wage Act (“CMWA”), C.R.S. § 8- 6-101 et seq., as implemented by Colorado Minimum Wage Order (“MWO”) Numbers 30. 31, 32, and 33 by failing to pay a minimum wage and overtime pay to Plaintiff and other Class members to which they were entitled. 7 C.C.R. 1103-1. 130. At all times relevant, Defendants has been and continues to be an “employer” within the meaning of the CWCA, CMWA and MWO. 7 C.C.R. 1103-1(2). 131. At all times relevant, Defendants have employed and continues to employ employees, including Plaintiffs and other Class members. 132. The minimum wage and overtime provisions of the CWCA, CMWA and CMO apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiffs and other Class members. 7 C.C.R. 1103-1(4). Plaintiffs and other Class members are employees within the meaning of the CWCA, CMWA and MWO. 7 C.C.R. 1103-1(2). 133. Pursuant to the CMWA, Plaintiffs and other Class members were entitled to be compensated at a rate of $8.00 per hour from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014, $8.23 per hour from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015, $8.31 per hour from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016, and $9.30 per hour from January 1, 2017 to the present. 134. Pursuant to the CWCA and CMWA, if this Court determines that Plaintiffs and other Class members are tipped employees, Plaintiffs and other Class members were entitled to be compensated at a rate of $4.98 per hour from January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014, $5.21 per hour from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015, $5.29 per hour from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016, and $6.28 per hour from January 1, 2017 to the present. If Plaintiffs and other Class members tips combined with the wage owed during each aforementioned year did 24 equal the minimum hourly wage for non-tipped employees, as detailed in ¶ 136, Defendants were required to pay Plaintiffs and other Class members cash wages to cover the difference. 135. Pursuant to the CWCA and CMWA, Plaintiffs and other members of the Class were entitled to be compensated at one and one-half the minimum wages for hours they worked over forty hours per week. 136. Defendants provided no notice to the employees of their intention to take a tip credit (instead telling them that it did not apply because they were independent contractors), and Plaintiffs and other Class members were not allowed to keep all of their tip money. 137. Defendants, pursuant to its policies and practices, refused and failed to pay a minimum wage and/or overtime payments to Plaintiffs and other Class members. 138. Defendants, pursuant to their policies and practices, charged Plaintiffs and other Class members various fees in order to work. 139. By failing to compensate Plaintiffs and other Class members, Defendants violated, and continue to violate, Plaintiffs’ and other Class members’ statutory rights under the Colorado Wage Claim Act, including but not limited to the Colorado Minimum Wage Act. 140. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the CWCA and CMWA. C.R.S. § 8-4-122. 141. The named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, seek damages in the amount of their respective unpaid wages, interest, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems proper and as set forth herein. 142. The named Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class, seeks recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs to be paid by Defendants as provided by the CWCA, CMWA and

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12. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of a class, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The class consists of all natural persons with addresses in the State of New York who were the subject of a communication from Defendant, made within the time frame relevant to this action, which both sought to collect a personal or household debt less than $50.00 and contained the statement, “Subscriber to Experian, Transunion and Experian.” 14. For purposes of the class definition, the “time frame relevant to this action” is that period of time beginning one year prior to the filing of the original complaint in this action, through and including the date of class certification. 15. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is not practicable. On information and belief, there are at least 40 members of the class, including the Plaintiff. 16. There are questions of law and fact common to the class, which common questions predominate over any questions relating to individual class members. The predominant 1 Source: http://www.pmacollections.com/services.html (Last accessed: April 9, 2016). 4 common question is whether the Defendant threatened to take any action (i.e., report debts less than $50.00 to the credit bureaus) that was not intended to be taken. 17. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 18. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in class actions and FDCPA litigation. 19. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that: a. Individual actions are not economically feasible; b. Members of the class are likely to be unaware of their rights; c. Congress intended class actions to be a principal enforcement mechanism under the FDCPA. 20. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 21. A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt including but not limited to the threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). Likewise, a debt collector may not use any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 22. Defendant, through Exhibit A, sought to collect a debt from Plaintiff in the amount of $32.35 in part by impliedly threatening to report Plaintiff’s debt to the credit bureaus 5 despite its advertised policy and practice not to report balances of less than $50.00 to the credit bureaus. In so doing, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) and § 1692e(10). The implied threat to report Plaintiff’s debt to the credit bureaus constitutes both a threatened act that was never intended to be taken and a false or deceptive means of collecting debt. 23. Because Defendant’s unlawful collection communication employs one or more of the acts proscribed by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k. WHEREFORE, the Court should enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants for: (1) Statutory damages; (2) Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; (3) Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. Dated: Atlanta, Georgia April 11, 2016 The Law Offices of Shimshon Wexler, PC By: /s Shimshon Wexler Shimshon Wexler Attorney for Plaintiff 216 W 104th St., #129 New York, NY 10025 Tel: (212)760-2400 Fax: (917)512-6132 swexleresq@gmail.com licensed in New York and Georgia Plaintiff requests a trial by jury on all issues so triable. By: /s Shimshon Wexler 6 8. On or about March 9, 2016, Defendant sent, and Plaintiff received a reasonable time thereafter, a form debt collection letter alleging therein that Plaintiff owed a debt to Sheil Medical Labs in the amount of $32.35. A true and correct copy of the letter Plaintiff received is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 9. In addition to informing Plaintiff that the “amount is outstanding and past due,” Exhibit A unmistakably warns, in bold, capital letters, that Defendant is a “SUBSCRIBER TO DEFENDANT’S VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. 1692e

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13. Mr. Stewart worked for the Defendant Entities from December 8, 2011 through April 2015. 14. His primary responsibility was the personal assistant of Kaltner, the owner and chief executive officer of all the Defendant Entities. In that capacity, he assisted Kaltner with various miscellaneous tasks including ordering food, keeping track of schedules, booking appointments, booking all travel arrangements and shows, and cleaning and maintaining Kaltner’s office, and generally performing all miscellaneous tasks and responsibilities requested of him by Kaltner. 16. From December 2011 through April 2015, Mr. Stewart was paid an hourly wage of $52.08 and a weekly wage of $2,083.34. Mr. Stewart never received any compensation for any overtime work. 17. When Mr. Stewart started working for Defendant Entities, he was aware Defendant Entities offered all employees benefits including but not limited to health insurance, paid vacation days, paid vacation, withholdings and contributions towards Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) taxes. 18. None of these benefits were provided by Mr. Stewart during his course of employment for Defendant Entities. 19. Defendant Entities wrongfully and illegally classified Mr. Stewart and many other similarly situated employees as independent contractors. 20. In July 2012, Kaltner explicitly ordered all employees to “incorporate”. In October 2012, Defendant Entities paid Companies Incorporated to establish a LLC entity for Mr. Stewart and other employees, and thereafter claimed that all employees were independent contractors and worked for the corporations “owned” by the employees but set up by and paid for by Defendant Entities. 21. Defendant Entities did not compensate Mr. Stewart for overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 23. Defendant Entities did not provide Mr. Stewart and other class members with written notices about the terms and conditions of their employment upon hire in relation to their rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime pay. These notices were similarly not provided upon Mr. Stewart’s and other Class members’ pay increase(s). 24. Defendants committed the foregoing acts against Mr. Stewart, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class. 25. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 26. In October 2016, Mr. Stewart through counsel advised Defendants as to Defendants’ violation of the aforementioned statutes. Additionally, Mr. Stewart has initiated a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the New York State Department of Labor. 27. In retaliation for Mr. Stewart’s activities, on December 5, 2016, Defendants initiated a frivolous action against Mr. Stewart in the Southern District of New York, civil action no.: 7:16-cv-9337, asserting baseless allegations of trademark infringement and others to harass Mr. Stewart, taking advantage of his financial situation in order to pressure him against filing this action. 29. Mr. Stewart brings this action individually and on behalf of all other and former misclassified and/or non-exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) and who failed to receive overtime compensation pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, and plan to not provide required wage notices at the time of hiring, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 30. Upon information and belief, the Collection Action Members are so numerous the joinder of all members is impracticable. The identity and precise number of such persons are unknown, and the facts upon which the calculations of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are more than (15) Collective Action members, who have worked for or have continued to work for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not likely file individual suits because they fear retaliation, lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this case should be certified as a collection action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 32. This action should be certified as collective action because the prosecution of separate action by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 33. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 35. Mr. Stewart knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 36. Mr. Stewart and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 37. Mr. Stewart brings his NYLL claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F. R. C. P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all misclassified and/or non-exempt persons employed by Defendants Entities on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 39. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parities and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of the number is presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than fifteen (15) members of the class. 40. Mr. Stewart’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay overtime compensation. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Mr. Stewart and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 43. Upon information and belief, defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 44. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed Mr. Stewart and the Class within the meaning of the New York law; b. Whether Mr. Stewart and Class members are entitled to overtime under the New York Labor Law; c. Whether the Defendants provided wage notices at the time of hiring to Plaintiff and class members as required by the NYLL; d. At what common rate, or rates subject to common method of calculation were and are the Defendants required to pay the Class members for their work 46. At all relevant times, the Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation to their employees for their hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 47. As a result of the Defendants’ willful failure to compensate their employees, including Mr. Stewart and the Collective Action members, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a workweek, the Defendants have violated, and continue to violate, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C, §§ 201 et seq, including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a) (1) and 215(a), including the federal minimum wage. 48. As a result of the Defendants’ failure to record, report, credit and/or compensate their employees, including Mr. Stewart and the Collective Action members, the Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of their employees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a). 49. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 51. Mr. Stewart, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Collective Action Members and members of the Class repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 52. Defendants willfully violated Mr. Stewart’s rights and the rights of the members of the Class by failing to pay them overtime compensation at rates not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek in violation of the New York Labor Law and its regulations. 53. The Defendants’ New York Labor Law violations have caused Mr. Stewart and the members of the Class irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 55. Mr. Stewart, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Collective Action Members and members of the Class repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 56. The Defendants failed to furnish to the Mr. Stewart at the time of hiring a notice containing the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with section one hundred ninety-one of this article; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer, and anything otherwise required by law; in violation of the NYLL, § 195(1). 57. Due to the Defendants’ violation of the NYLL, § 195(1), Mr. Stewart is entitled to recover from the Defendants liquidated damages of $50.00 per workday that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of $5,000.00, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NYLL, § 198(1-b). 59. Mr. Stewart re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 60. The NYLL and supporting regulations require employers to provide detailed paystub information to employees every payday. NYLL §195-1(d). 61. Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the New York Labor Law with respect to compensation of each Plaintiff, and did not provide the paystub that comply with the law on or after Mr. Stewart’s payday. 62. Due to Defendants’ violations of New York Labor Law, Mr. Stewart is entitled to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, $250 for each workday of the violation, up to $5,000 for each Plaintiff together with costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to New York Labor Law N.Y. Lab. Law §198(1-d). 63. Mr. Stewart, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Collective Action Members and members of the Class repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 65. As a result of this misclassification, Mr. Stewart and all other similarly situated Collective Action Members and members of the Class suffered economic harm in connection with FICA taxes and the loss of benefits, whereas Defendants were enriched in the process. 66. Defendants’ engagement of willful misclassification was to illegally avoid compliance with unemployment insurance, Workers' Compensation, Social Security, tax withholding, temporary disability, and minimum wage and overtime laws that protect workers, depriving workers of the protections they deserve, and it is therefore against equity and good conscience to permit Defendants to retain the benefits. 67. Upon information and belief, Kaltner is the sole owner and officer of all Defendant Entities. 68. Upon information and belief stemming from Mr. Stewart’s employment as Kaltner’s personal assistant, based on records viewed by Mr. Stewart, Kaltner routinely used bank accounts of Defendant Entities to pay personal expenses including spousal support. 69. Upon information and belief, Defendant Entities routinely and freely intermingled finances, shared the same office, shared the same employees including Mr. Stewart, and were alter-egos of one another. 71. Upon information and belief, Kaltner used his dominance of the Defendant Entities to put into place and aforementioned policy of willful misclassification, resulting in Defendants’ unjust enrichment at the expense of Mr. Stewart and all other similarly situated Collective Action Members and members of the Class. 72. Mr. Stewart re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 73. Defendants willfully and unlawfully retaliated against Mr. Stewart for his engagement of protected activities, namely, reporting Defendants’ wrongful conduct as described in detail above. 74. In retaliating against Mr. Stewart, Defendants knowingly acted in deliberate disregard of Mr. Stewart’s rights by filing a frivolous action on December 5, 2016, in the Southern District of New York bearing civil action no.: 7:16-cv-9337, asserting baseless allegations of trademark infringement and others to harass Mr. Stewart. 75. Defendants conduct violated New York Labor Law § 215. the Time of Hiring]

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PAL’s Contract of Carriage 14. PAL’s refusal to refund customers violates its Contract of Carriage (“COC”), attached as Exhibit A.1 Specifically, this dispute is governed by Article 10 of PAL’s COC. Article 10, Section 1 provides that the “[r]efund of a Ticket or any of its unused portion . . . shall be subject to these Conditions of Carriage.” Unjust Enrichment 112. Plaintiff reincorporates and realleges each preceding paragraph herein. This claim is brought in the alternative to the contract-based cause of action. 113. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of herself and members of the Class. 114. Plaintiff and the Class conferred benefits on Defendants by purchasing airline tickets with PAL. 115. Defendants have been unjustly enriched in retaining the revenues derived from Plaintiff and Class Members’ purchase of airline tickets, where it has subsequently canceled or significantly changed the schedule for Class Members’ flights and have not issued a refund. Retention of those moneys under these circumstances is unjust and inequitable because Defendants’ failure to issue refunds is in violation of its Contract of Carriage, and is in violation of California law. These acts and omissions caused injuries to Plaintiff and the Class because they would not have purchased their airline tickets at all, or on the same terms, if the true facts were known. 116. Because Defendants’ retention of the non-gratuitous benefits conferred on them by Plaintiff and the Class is unjust and inequitable, Defendants must pay restitution to Plaintiff and the Class for its unjust enrichment, as ordered by the Court.

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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 HARLEY SEEGERT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, V. LAMPS PLUS, INC., a California corporation, and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendant. 1 Case No.: 18. Lamps Plus is the nation's largest lighting retailer. Lamps Plus is a privately 25 owned corporation, operating approximately 39 stores across the western United States, 26 including 27 locations in the State of California. Lamps Plus designs, manufacturers, and 27 sells a variety of lighting, furniture, and home decor, and provides in-home lighting 28 consultation and installation to its customers. The company directly markets its 6 23 The Fraudulent Sale Discounting Scheme 24 3 7. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals ("Class") 12 defined as follows: 13 14 15 16 17 18 All persons who, within the State of California, from July 5, 2013 through the present (the "Class Period"), purchased from Lamps Plus one or more Lamps Plus branded and/or trademarked products at a discount from the advertised "Compare At" price and who have not received a refund or credit for their purchase(s). 38. Excluded from the Class definition is Lamps Plus and its officers, directors, 19 employees, parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates; any Judge or Magistrate presiding over the 20 action and members of their families; and Plaintiffs and Defendant's Counsel. Plaintiff 21 reserves the right to expand, limit, modify, or amend this class definition, including the 22 addition of one or more subclasses, in connection with his motion for class certification, or 23 at any other time, based upon changing circumstances and/or new facts obtained during 24 discovery. 25 39. The members of the Class are so numerous thatjoinder of all members of the 26 Class is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the proposed Class contains 27 thousands of individuals who have been damaged by Lamps Pius's conduct as alleged 28 herein. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. 12 46. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 4 7. The UCL defines "unfair business competition" to include any "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent" act or practice, as well as any "unfair, deceptive, untrue or 9 misleading" advertising. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 17200. 10 11 48. The UCL imposes strict liability. Plaintiff need not prove that Lamps Plus intentionally or negligently engaged in unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices- but only that such practices occurred. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 "Unfair" Prong 49. A business act or practice is "unfair" under the UCL if it offends an established public policy or is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers, and that unfairness is determined by weighing the reasons, justifications, and motives of the practice against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victims. 50. Lamps Plus's actions constitute "unfair" business practices because, as alleged above, Lamps Plus engaged in misleading and deceptive price comparison advertising that represented false "Compare At" prices and corresponding deeply discounted prices. The discounted sale prices were nothing more than fabricated "regular" prices leading to phantom markdowns. Lamps Plus's acts and practices offended an established public policy of transparency in pricing, and engaged in immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous activities that are substantially injurious to consumers. 51. The harm to Plaintiff and Class members outweighs the utility of Lamps Pius's practices. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Lamps Plus's 15 63. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in every preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 64. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 17500 provides: It is unlawful for any ... corporation ... with intent .. . to dispose of . .. personal property ... to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated ... from this state before the public in any state, in any newspaper or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or proclamation, or in any other manner or means whatever, including over the Internet, any statement ... which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading . .. 18 70. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in every preceding 4 paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 3 5 71. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the CLRA, Cal. Civ. Code§ 1750, 6 et seq. Plaintiff and each member of the proposed Class are "consumers" as defined by 7 Cal. Civ. Code § 17 61 ( d). Lamps Plus' s sale of their merchandise to Plaintiff and the Class 8 were "transactions" within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(e). The products 9 purchased by Plaintiff and the Class are "goods" within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 10 176l(a). 11 72. Lamps Plus violated and continues to violate the CLRA by engaging in the 12 following practices proscribed by Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a) in transactions with Plaintiff 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 and the Class which were intended to result in, and did result in, the sale of Lamps Plus products: a. b. Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised; (a)(9); Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions; (a)(l3). 73. Pursuant to Section 1782(a) of the CLRA, on July 5, 2017, Plaintiffs counsel notified Lamps Plus in writing by certified mail of the particular violations of § 1770 of the CLRA and demanded that it rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers of Lamps Pius's intent to act. 74. If Lamps Plus fails to respond to Plaintiffs letter, fails to agree to rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above, or fails to give notice to all affected consumers within 30 days of the date of written notice, as proscribed by Section 1782, Plaintiff will move to amend his Complaint to pursue claims for actual, punitive, and 20 Violation of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") California Business & Professions Code Section 17200, et seq. Violation of California's False Advertising Law ("FAL") California Business and Professions Code Section 17500, et seq. Violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), California Civil Code Section 1750, et seq.

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10. Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent in this action were employed to perform work on various jobs for Defendant as part of its contracting business. 11. Defendant paid Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent “straight time”—i.e., the same hourly wage for every hour worked, regardless of whether such hours were in excess of 40 in a workweek. 12. Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent regularly worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 13. Defendant labeled the hourly payments for hours in excess of 40 in a workweek as “bonus” payments on the pay statements of Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent. 14. A pay statement of Charles Clouse from July 2017, which shows such a “bonus” payment, is attached hereto as Exhibit A as an example of the pay practice which applied to Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent. 15. The “bonus” payment of $143.00 shown on Exhibit A is actually a payment for 13 hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek made at Plaintiff Clouse’s then-current hourly rate of $11 per hour ($11/hour x 13 hours = $143.00). 16. The FLSA and KWHA require employers to pay employees at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of 40 in a workweek. 17. By failing to pay Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of 40 in a workweek, Defendant violated the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA and KWHA. 18. Defendant labeled these straight-time hourly payments for hours over 40 in a workweek, which it made to Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent at their regular rate of pay, as “bonus” payments, in order to conceal its violation of the overtime pay requirements of Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/10/20 Page: 3 of 9 - Page ID#: 3 4 the FLSA and KWHA. 19. Defendant also continued these practices despite formal and informal complaints by Plaintiffs about not receiving time-and-a-half and despite inquiries and investigations by the Kentucky Labor Cabinet. 20. Accordingly, Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent were entitled to one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for hours over 40 in a workweek and therefore acted willfully in failing to compensate all work time by these employees at the proper overtime rate. 21. Plaintiffs asserts their FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the following individuals: All current and former hourly-paid employees of Defendant at any time since January 10, 2017. (the “Collective Class”). 22. Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims should proceed as a collective action because Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees were paid in the same manner as described herein, and are, therefore, “similarly situated” as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and the associated decisional law. 23. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the following class of individuals: All current and former hourly-paid employees of Defendant at any time since January 10, 2015.1 (the “Rule 23 Class”). 1 The statute of limitations under the KWHA is five years. KRS 413.120(2). Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/10/20 Page: 4 of 9 - Page ID#: 4 5 24. Plaintiffs are members of the Rule 23 Class they seek to represent. 25. Since January 9, 2015, Defendant has employed more than 50 individuals who it paid in the manner described above and who therefore fall within the Rule 23 Class definition. Thus, the Rule 23 Class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members is impractical, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). 26. Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class share the same pivotal questions of law and fact, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class all overtime wages owed, pursuant to the same policies and in the same manner. As a result, the Rule 23 Class shares several factual and legal questions, including, for example: (1) whether they were entitled to one and one-half times their regular rate for hours over 40 in a workweek; and (2) whether Defendant violated the KWHA by paying purported “bonus” payments at their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek. 27. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Defendant’s violation of the overtime pay requirements of the KWHA was not the result of any Plaintiff-specific circumstances. Rather, it arose from Defendant’s common pay policies and practices, which Defendant applied generally to all of the hourly-paid employees who worked on jobs as part of its contracting business, including Plaintiffs. Thus, in advancing their own claims, Plaintiffs will also be advancing the claims of the Rule 23 Class. 28. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Rule 23 Class, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs’ interests are shared with the Rule 23 Class and Plaintiffs have no interests that conflict with those of the Rule 23 Class. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in representing classes of employees against their employers related to their employers’ failure to pay them properly under the law. Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/10/20 Page: 5 of 9 - Page ID#: 5 6 29. By failing to pay hourly paid employees all required overtime wages pursuant to its common pay practices and policies, Defendant has created a scenario where questions of law and fact common to the Rule 23 Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Thus, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter. Plaintiffs are entitled to pursue their claims as a class action, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 30. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 31. Plaintiffs assert this claim on behalf of themselves and members of the Collective Class who opt into this action by filing a consent form, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 32. Plaintiffs and the Collective Class are employees entitled to the FLSA’s protections. 33. Defendant is an employer covered by the FLSA. 34. The FLSA requires that covered employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek. 37. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 38. Plaintiffs assert this claim on behalf of themselves and members of the Rule 23 Class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 39. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class are employees entitled to the KWHA’s protections. 40. Defendant is an employer covered by the KWHA. 41. The KWHA requires that covered employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek. KRS 337.285. 42. Defendant pays Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class the same hourly rate for every hour worked including hours over 40 in a workweek and does not pay them at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek, in violation of the KWHA. 43. In violating the KWHA, Defendant has acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable KWHA provisions, for example, by seeking to conceal its violation on the pay statements of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class members and by ignoring formal and informal complaints from Plaintiffs and the Kentucky Labor Cabinet. Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/10/20 Page: 2 of 9 - Page ID#: 2 3 VIOLATION OF THE OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS OF THE KWHA VIOLATION OF THE OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS OF THE FLSA

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10. This action arises out of Defendant’s attempts to collect a credit card debt incurred for personal, family or household purposes. 11. On or about July 7, 2020, Defendant Credit Control, LLC caused a letter vendor to send Plaintiff the letter in Exhibit A. 12. The letter bears markings that are characteristic of one generated by a letter vendor. 13. In order to have the letter vendor send Plaintiff the letter in Exhibit A, Defendant had to furnish the letter vendor with Plaintiff’s name and address, the status of Plaintiff as a debtor, details of Plaintiff’s alleged debt, and other personal information. -2- 14. The letter vendor then populated some or all of this information into a prewritten template, printed, and mailed the letter to Plaintiff. 15. The FDCPA defines “communication” at 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3) as “the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” 16. The sending of an electronic file containing information about Plaintiff’s purported debt to a letter vendor is therefore a communication. 17. Defendant’s communication to the letter vendor was in connection with the collection of a debt since it involved disclosure of the debt to a third-party with the objective being communication with and motivation of the consumer to pay the alleged debt. 18. Plaintiff never consented to having Plaintiff’s personal and confidential information, concerning the debt or otherwise, shared with anyone else. 19. In limiting disclosures to third parties, the FDCPA states, at 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b): “Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.” 20. The letter vendor used by Defendant as part of its debt collection effort against Plaintiff does not fall within any permitted exception provided for in 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b). 21. Due to Defendant’s communication to this letter vendor, information about Plaintiff is within the possession of an unauthorized third-party. 22. If a debt collector “conveys information regarding the debt to a third party -- informs the third party that the debt exists or provides information about the details of the debt -- -3- then the debtor may well be harmed by the spread of this information.” Brown v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 804 F.3d 740, 743 (6th Cir. 2015). 23. Defendant unlawfully communicates with the unauthorized third-party letter vendor solely for the purpose of streamlining its generation of profits without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to such third-party. 24. In its reckless pursuit of a business advantage, Defendant disregarded the known, negative effect that disclosing personal information to an unauthorized third-party has on consumers. 25. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-24. 26. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s purported debt to the employees of an unauthorized third-party letter vendor in connection with the collection of the debt. 27. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f by using unfair means in connection with the collection of a debt – disclosing personal information about Plaintiff to third parties not expressly authorized under the FDCPA. 28. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class. 29. The class consists of (a) all individuals in New York (b) with respect to whom Defendant had a letter prepared and sent by a letter vendor (c) which letter was sent at any time during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 30 days after the filing of this action. 30. Plaintiff may alter the class definition to conform to developments in the case and discovery. -4- 31. On information and belief, based on the size of Defendant’s business operations and the use of form letters, there are more than 40 members of the class, and the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is not practicable. 32. There are questions of law and fact common to the class members, which common questions predominate over any questions relating to individual class members. The predominant common questions are whether Defendant’s practice as described above violates the

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(Against all Defendants) 13. Plaintiffs bring this action as a Class Action pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who are or were descendants of Freedmen minor allottees of the Five Civilized Tribes. 15. In 1898, the United States enacted the Curtis Act, allotting the land of the Five Civilized Tribes. The land was not allotted earlier under the Dawes Act. In 1908 Congress removed restrictions from Freedmen allotments, except land allotted to minors. Congress imposed specific fiduciary duties on the Secretary of Interior with respect to Freedmen minor allottees. Plaintiffs seek an accounting in relation to revenue from leases on land allotted to their minor Freedmen 16. The Class consists of thousands of persons located throughout the United States, thus, the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all Class members in impracticable. The exact number of Class members is not presently known to plaintiffs, but can readily be determined by appropriate discovery. 17. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse or antagonistic to those of the Class. 18. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Because the damages suffered by many individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the Class members to individually seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. 35. Plaintiffs allege all that has been alleged above as though fully restated herein. 36. Defendants have a duty under Section 6 of the Act of May 27, 1908 to provide an accounting to descendants of minor Freedmen of royalties derived from leases on restricted land held by Freedmen minors. 38. Defendants deny that they owe any fiduciary duty whatsoever to Plaintiffs and in so doing have denied Plaintiffs’ demand for an accounting. Secretary of the Interior : 1849 C. Street, NW : Washington, D.C. 20240 : : and : :

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22. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 23. Plaintiff represents and is a member of the Class, which includes all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited text message from Defendant, which text message was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient’s prior express consent, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 24. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the members of the Class number in the several hundreds, if not thousands. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 25. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the members of the Class via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the class members were damaged thereby. 34. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 35. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 38. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 39. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 40. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 41. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 7. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each member of the Class $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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15. “Founded in 1969, Curriculum Associates, LLC designs research-based print and online instructional materials, screens and assessments, and data management tools.” In 2018, Defendant appeared in the “37th annual Inc. 5000, the most prestigious ranking of the nation’s fastest-growing private companies.” See Defendant website: https://www2.curriculumassociates.com/aboutus/Press-Release-Curriculum- Associates-featured-on-37th-annual-Inc-5000.aspx. 16. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” engaged in the interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 18. Defendant paid Plaintiff and other Account Specialists on a salary plus bonus basis. 19. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and other Account Specialists any overtime premiums for hours worked more than forty (40) per week. 20. Defendant did not require Plaintiff and the other Account Specialists to utilize any timekeeping system during this time period. 21. Defendant uniformly applied its payment structure to all Account Specialists. 22. Defendant suffered and permitted Plaintiff and other Account Specialists to work more than forty hours per week without overtime compensation for all hours worked. For example, Plaintiff and other Account Specialists regularly worked at least five days a week. They usually began work in the early morning. In addition, Plaintiff and other Account Specialists regularly worked into the evenings and on the weekends, causing their hours worked to exceed forty in a week on a regular basis. 23. Defendant knew Plaintiff and other Account Specialists worked more than forty hours in a week because Defendant expected Plaintiff and Account Specialists to be available to receive phone calls and answer emails – from customers and from Defendant’s management employees – in the mornings, evenings, and on weekends. Also, for example, Plaintiff and other Account Specialists were expected to timely respond to customer inquiries and/or questions after receiving them. Plaintiff sometimes received these inquiries and/or questions in the evenings and on the weekends. 24. Defendant uniformly denied Plaintiff and other Account Specialists overtime pay. 26. Plaintiff and the other Account Specialists had the same duties of data entry and directly working with customers. 27. Plaintiff and other Account Specialists are and were entry-level employees who are and were entitled to minimum wages and/or overtime pay. 28. Plaintiff and other Account Specialists did not customarily and regularly make sales at their customers’ home or place of business. 29. Plaintiff and other Account Specialists did not regularly supervise the work of two or more employees. 30. Plaintiff and other Account Specialists did not exercise discretion and independent judgment as to matters of significance. 31. Plaintiff and other Account Specialists did not perform office work related to Defendant’s general business operations or its customers. 32. Plaintiff and other Account Specialists had no advance knowledge in a field of science or learning which required specialized instruction that was required to perform the job. 33. All Account Specialists are similarly situated in that they share common job duties and descriptions, Defendant treated them as exempt employees at relevant times, and were all subject to Defendant’ policy and practice that paid them a salary plus bonus, and they all performed work without overtime compensation for all hours worked. 35. Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and the other Account Specialists with accurate paychecks. 36. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and other Account Specialists for all of their overtime hours. Accordingly, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and other Account Specialists with all compensation owed to them, including their unpaid overtime, at the time they separated from the company. 37. Defendant are aware of wage and hour laws, as evidenced by the fact that they provide minimum wage and overtime compensation to other employees who are not Account Specialists. 38. Defendant’ conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and other Account Specialists. FLSA Collective 39. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of herself and other similarly situated employees as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly situated employees are: All persons who are, have been, or will be employed by Defendant as “Account Specialists,” “Senior Account Specialists,” and other individuals who worked in similar job titles within the United States at any time during the last three years through the entry of judgment in this case (“FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff will subgroup the FLSA Collective as necessary for certification and/or litigation purposes. 40. Upon information and belief, Defendant paid Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective on a salary plus bonus basis, and suffered and permitted them to work more than forty hours per week without overtime compensation. 42. Defendant’s conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 43. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective, and as such, notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective. There are numerous similarly situated, current and former employees of Defendant who have been denied overtime pay in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a Court supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s records. The Rule 23 Class 44. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 151 §§ 1, 1A, 1B and M.G.L. c. 149 §§ 148, 150, and Rule 23, Plaintiff brings the Massachusetts state law claims on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated which are all persons who Defendant employed in the state of Massachusetts at any time from three years back from the date this Complaint is filed until the entry of judgment in this case who held the position(s) of Account Specialist, Senior Account Specialist, and/or in other like jobs, were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the Massachusetts Labor Law, and who have not been paid for all hours worked, including overtime wages, in violation of the Massachusetts Labor Law. 46. The claims of the Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are typical because they worked in the same and/or similar job with the same/similar illegal wage practices. Further, Plaintiff seeks to recover damages on her own behalf and on behalf of the Rule 23 Class Members. 47. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because a series of such individual wage lawsuits would be duplicative, inefficient, and burdensome on this Court. This is particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court. 48. Defendant has acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 49. Plaintiff is committed to pursuing this action and has retained competent counsel who are experienced in wage and hour, and class action litigation. 51. Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 149, § 150, Plaintiff filed notice of her statutory claims with the Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General on February 14, 2019. 52. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint into this count. 53. The FLSA requires each covered employer such as Defendant to compensate all non- exempt employees at the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked up to forty hours per week, and a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours per work week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 54. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to be paid minimum wages and/or overtime compensation for all hours worked. 55. Defendant, pursuant to their policies and practices, failed and refused to pay minimum wages and/or overtime premiums to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for all of their hours worked. 57. By failing to record, report, and/or preserve accurate records of hours worked by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective, Defendant failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to each of their employees sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and other conditions and practice of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 58. The foregoing conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the FLSA Collective, seek damages in the amount of all respective unpaid minimum wages at the applicable rate and overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a work week, plus liquidated damages as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), interest, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the FLSA Collective seek recovery of all attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses of this action, to be paid by Defendant, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 61. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint into this count. 63. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint into this count. 64. As non-exempt employees, Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are entitled to be paid for all hours worked including overtime compensation. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime wages as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207 and Mass. Gen. L. c. 151 §§ 1, 1A, caused Plaintiff and the putative class members to be deprived of the full amount of their earned wages when same became due and payable, including upon their termination. 65. Defendant willfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class by failing to pay them for all hours worked including overtime hours in violation of M.G.L. c. 149, § 148. This claim is brought pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 149 § 150. 66. Defendant’s Massachusetts Labor Law violations have caused Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Collective Action under §216(b) of the FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT and Overtime Claims Rule 23 Class Action Massachusetts State Law Overtime Claims Rule 23 Class Action State Massachusetts Wage Act Claims

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1,182,239 TOTAL UNIVERSE / BASE RATE $170.00/M 1,182,239 DIRECT MAIL

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(FLSA Minimum Wage Violations) (FLSA Overtime Violations) 13. Defendant provides infrastructure solutions to gas, water, and electric utilities throughout the United States. As part of its infrastructure solutions, Defendant offers its customers communications infrastructure and meter deployment services. Case: 2:20-cv-00240-MHW-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/16/20 Page: 2 of 9 PAGEID #: 2 3 14. Defendant employs Customer Service Representatives as “independent contractors” to perform virtual call center services remotely from their homes. 15. On or about October 14, 2019, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as a Customer Service Representative to perform call center services for Defendant’s customers. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as an “independent contractor,” and Plaintiff worked remotely from her home. Plaintiff’s employment relationship with Defendant terminated on or about December 19, 2019. 16. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees are not paid an hourly wage by Defendant. Rather, Defendant paid Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees $1.50 per inbound or outbound phone call they made. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 17. Although Defendant classified Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees as independent contractors, the economic reality was that Plaintiff and others similarly situated were employees of Defendant. 18. The duties Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees performed for Defendant were an integral part of Defendant’s business, as they interfaced directly with Defendant’s customers to handle customer inquiries, schedule installations, and resolve customer complaints. 19. Defendant gave Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees a weekly work schedule defining the times that they were required to be logged into Defendant’s computer system and available to take calls. Defendant also scheduled Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees’ lunch breaks, and required them to request permission to take an unpaid rest break. 20. If Plaintiff or any other similarly situated employees were unable to work an assigned shift, they had to contact their supervisor to request time off, just as an employee would. Case: 2:20-cv-00240-MHW-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/16/20 Page: 3 of 9 PAGEID #: 3 4 21. Plaintiff’s and other similarly situated employees’ positions with Defendant did not require any unique or highly specialized skill, and whatever training was necessary for Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to perform their job duties was provided by Defendant. 22. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were not required to make any investment in specialized equipment to perform their job duties. Rather, they simply used their own computer and phone connection to log in remotely to Defendant’s computer network, and used Defendant’s software applications to perform their job duties. 23. In contrast, Defendant has invested substantial amounts of money implementing, configuring, and maintaining the software applications Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees used to perform their job duties, and will continue to do so. 24. Because Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees are dependent on calls being assigned to them from Defendant, they do not have the opportunity to increase their opportunities for profit or loss through managerial skill. 25. Defendant also has the right to control the manner in which Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees perform their work by, among other things, requiring them to follow Defendant’s processes for handling phone calls, and requiring them to meet Defendant’s quality and productivity expectations. 26. Furthermore, although Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were paid on a per-call basis, they were required to be available to take a call at any time during their scheduled shift, and to be logged into Defendant’s “queue” for calls even if there were no calls in the queue. Consequently, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were not permitted to effectively use for their own purpose the time they spent waiting for calls to be assigned, nor were they paid for this time. Case: 2:20-cv-00240-MHW-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/16/20 Page: 4 of 9 PAGEID #: 4 5 27. Accordingly, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were improperly classified as independent contractors, and should have been classified as non-exempt employees under the FLSA, thereby making them entitled to be paid the minimum wage, and one and one-half their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 per week. 28. During periods of low call volume, Defendant paid Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees less than the minimum wage. 29. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees regularly worked over 40 hours per workweek in the three years preceding the filing of this Action. 30. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees overtime compensation for all of the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) each workweek. 31. Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the 33. Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons who have been, are being, or will be, adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 34. The class that Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All current and former Customer Service Representatives who worked for Defendant at any time from three (3) years preceding the date of the filing of this Action to the present, and who were classified as independent contractors who were paid on a per-call basis. Case: 2:20-cv-00240-MHW-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/16/20 Page: 5 of 9 PAGEID #: 5 6 35. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and are acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. 36. These similarly situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action and allowed to opt-in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 38. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions on behalf of herself and other similarly situated employees who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s written consent to becoming a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) has been filed with the Court. 39. The FLSA requires that Defendants compensate employees at minimum wages for all hours worked. 40. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees at minimum wages. By engaging in that practice, Defendants willfully violated the FLSA and regulations thereunder that have the force and effect of law. 41. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were injured in that they did not receive minimum wages due to them pursuant to the Case: 2:20-cv-00240-MHW-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 01/16/20 Page: 6 of 9 PAGEID #: 6 7 FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid minimum wages” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the Defendants, and costs of the action.” 42. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 43. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees regularly worked over 40 hours per workweek in the three years preceding the filing of this Action. 44. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees overtime compensation for all of the hours they worked in excess of forty (40) each workweek. 45. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) each workweek violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 29 C.F.R. § 785.24. 46. Defendant’s failure to keep records of all hours worked for each workday and the total hours worked each workweek by Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(7). 47. By engaging in the above-mentioned conduct, Defendant willfully, knowingly, and/or recklessly violated provisions of the FLSA. 48. As a result of Defendant’s practices and policies, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees have been damaged in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the

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(Invasion of Privacy) (TCPA Violations) Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as if ) CASE NO: SAADIA BOLDEN on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated ) consumers 20551 Naumann Avenue 10. Ms. Bolden believes this to be true, because she could hear delay when she would pick up a call before an agent came on the line and because of the sheer volume of calls placed to her. 11. Credit One was calling Ms. Bolden to collect on an alleged account. 12. However, Ms. Bolden does not have an account with Credit One. 13. Moreover, Ms. Bolden never authorized Credit One to call her on her cell phone. 14. Ms. Bolden requested the calls to cease. Electronically Filed 01/08/2019 13:40 / / CV 19 909283 / Confirmation Nbr. 1592801 / CLSLP Nonetheless, Credit One continued to call her at a rate of four to six calls per day (4-6 15. calls/day), often back-to-back. For example, on Monday, November 12, 2018, Credit One called Ms. Bolden at 16. approximately, 4:08 p.m., 4:40 p.m., 5:11 p.m., and 5:45 p.m. Credit One placed its calls to Ms. Bolden using various different numbers to shield its 17. identity. For example, Credit One called Ms. Bolden from lines identified on caller ID as 216-666- 18. 7211, 216-666-7150, 216-666-7180, and 877-825-3242, among other numbers. During the telephone calls, which Ms. Bolden answered, the callers were always evasive. 19. Although they might identify themselves as calling from Credit One, they would not identify the person they were trying to reach and they would provide no information about the account they were attempting to collect from Ms. Bolden. Moreover, when Ms. Bolden would try to elicit information, Credit One's representatives would abruptly end the call. Calls would come back-to-back despite requests for the calls to cease during the 20. immediately preceding call. In this manner, Credit One placed well-over 100 unwanted, unauthorized, and harassing 21. calls to Ms. Bolden over a span of about a month. Credit One's callers were rude and harassing, and Ms. Bolden felt harassed, annoyed, and 22. invaded by the calls. As a result, Ms. Bolden sustained emotional and related physical injury, including, without 23. limitation, anxiety, frustration, annoyance, inconvenience, and nervousness. Credit One did not send Ms. Bolden anything in writing. 24. Electronically Filed 01/08/2019 13:40 / / CV 19 909283 / Confirmation Nbr. 1592801 / CLSLP 25. their attempt to collect on accounts alleged owed to them in Ohio and nationally. Credit One does so by using the telephone. 26. Credit One initiates telephone calls to consumers by an automatic telephone dialing system 27. and/or using a prerecorded voice. Credit One fails to properly identify itself and the purposes of its calls to the call recipients. 28. Credit One makes these calls without the express consent of call recipients. 29. Even if Credit One received consent at one time, it regularly fails to honor the requests of 30. recipients to cease the calls. In connection with the facts, events, and averments herein, Credit One acted willfully and 31. maliciously, with spite and ill will, and/or with reckless disregard for the rights of call recipients in general, and Ms. Bolden in particular. 32. on behalf of herself and two classes of other persons similarly-situated, to remedy the on­ going unlawful, unfair, and/or deceptive business practices alleged herein, and to seek redress on behalf of all those persons who have been harmed thereby. The first class, the "TCPA Class" shall be defined as all persons, who 33. a. Credit One called, or caused to be called, on a cell phone in the four years preceding the filing of the original complaint in this matter; and b. Where the calls were placed using an automated telephone system or employed the use of an electronic or prerecorded voice; and c. Where Credit One did not previously obtain the individual's express consent to receive the call; or, where such consent was previously received, but Credit One failed to honor a request to stop calling. Electronically Filed 01/08/2019 13:40 / / CV 19 909283 / Confirmation Nbr. 1592801 / CLSLP The second class, the "Invasion of Privacy Class" shall be defined as all persons in Ohio, 34. who a. Credit One called, or caused to be called, on a telephone in the two years preceding the filing of the original complaint in this matter; and b. Where the Credit One did not previously obtain the individual's express consent to receive the call; or, where such consent was previously received, but Credit One failed to honor a request to stop calling. 62. The class members are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. The exact size of the proposed classes and the identity of the members, believed to be in the hundreds or thousands, thereof, is readily ascertainable from Credit One's business records. There is a community of interest among the members of the proposed classes in that there 63. are questions of law and fact common to the proposed classes that predominate over questions affecting only individual members. These questions include but are not limited to whether, inter alia: a. Credit One placed the calls using an automated telephone system or employ the use of an electronic or prerecorded voice; b. Credit One placed calls to cell phones without first obtaining the express consent of call recipients; Credit One failed to stop calling consumers upon their requests to stop; d. The conduct described herein violated the TCPA; e. The conduct described herein constitutes an invasion of privacy. 64. Ms. Bolden's claims are typical of those of the classes she seeks to represent, and she will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the classes. Ms. Bolden is represented by counsel competent and experienced in both consumer protection and class action litigation. Electronically Filed 01/08/2019 13:40 / / CV 19 909283 / Confirmation Nbr. 1592801 / CLSLP A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this 65. controversy. Because the damages suffered by individual class members may be relatively small compared to the expense and burden of litigation, it would be impracticable and economically infeasible for class members to seek redress individually. The prosecution of separate actions by the individual class members, even if possible, would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members against Credit One. 66. fully rewritten herein. As described above, within the last four years, Credit One called Ms. Bolden and members 67. of the TCPA Class on their cellular telephones using an ATDS or predictive dialer and/or by using a prerecorded or artificial voice. Credit One placed these calls to Ms. Bolden and members of the TCPA Class without their 68. express permission and/or continued to place these calls after being directed to cease calling and knowing there was no consent to continue the calls. As such, each call placed to Ms. Bolden and members of the TCPA Class was made in 69. violation of the TCPA and is a separate violation thereof. Ms. Bolden and members of the TCPA Class are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory 70. damages for each call placed in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Moreover, because Credit One knowingly placed the calls to the cell phones of Ms. Bolden 71. and members of the TCPA Class without permission, Ms. Bolden and members of the Electronically Filed 01/08/2019 13:40 / / CV 19 909283 / Confirmation Nbr. 1592801 / CLSLP TCPA Class are entitled to treble damages, i.e. $1,500, for each call pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 72. Credit One's violations of the TCPA were willful and malicious, with spite and ill will, and/or with reckless disregard for the rights of Ms. Bolden and the Class. Thus, under the TCPA, Credit One is liable to the Ms. Bolden and the TCPA Class for a 73. minimum of $500 per phone call and up to $1,500 per call since the calls were made knowingly. 74. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every preceding paragraph as if fully rewritten herein. 75. By calling Ms. Bolden and members of the Invasion of Privacy Class incessantly and by calling their telephones without permission as described herein, Credit One intruded into private lives and activities of Mr. Bolden and class members of the Invasion of Privacy Class in an outrageous manner and in a manner that would cause (and did cause) mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities. 76. Resultingly, Credit One is liable to Mr. Bolden and members of each class for damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. On information and belief, Credit One regularly calls consumers and other individuals in Pursuant to Civ. R. 23 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, Ms. Bolden brings this action Within the past few months, Ms. Bolden received calls on her cell telephone from Credit One and/or its agents, demanding money in connection with an allegedly-outstanding debt. Credit One initiated these calls using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or by 9 employing the use of an electronic or prerecorded voice.

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30. PwC has three main channels, or “tracks,” for recruiting and hiring—Campus, Experienced, and Executive. PwC fills Junior Associate, Associate, and other entry-level positions through its Campus track. The Experienced track recruits applicants for Experienced and/or Senior Associate and Manager positions. Plaintiff challenges PwC’s hiring policies and practices with respect to its Campus track hiring, as well as a portion of its Experienced track hiring (i.e., non-management Experienced and/or Senior Associate positions). Executive track hiring is not at issue here. 32. In a 2014 Harvard Business Review article, the U.S. Chairman of PwC trumpeted PwC’s “strikingly young” workforce: “Because we recruit approximately 8,000 graduates annually from college and university campuses, two-thirds of our people are in their twenties and early thirties. We’ve always employed large numbers of young people.” According to its FY 2013 U.S. Corporate Responsibility Report, PwC hired approximately 3,200 Experienced hires and approximately 9,000 Campus hires. According to a 2016 article in The Atlantic, today PwC recruits about 11,000 new hires on college campuses each year. Campus Recruitment Track 33. PwC offices throughout the country use common employment policies to deter and screen out applicants ages 40 and older. The Campus track recruits applicants straight out of college. PwC fills entry-level positions such as Junior Associate and Associate through Campus hiring, and has designated recruiters for different schools. PwC also hires college students as interns (who may then be offered entry-level positions). 35. PwC’s second hiring channel, the Experienced hire track, posts open positions for Experienced and/or Senior Associates. Although anyone may apply for positions in this track, PwC’s unlawful bias against older workers, including its focus on attracting and retaining “Millennials” and its mandatory early retirement policy, systematically decreases older workers’ chances of being hired. Due to this bias, PwC intentionally denies applicants ages 40 and older employment in the Covered Positions because of their age. Professional Support 37. According to its FY 2013 U.S. Corporate Responsibility Report, PwC also assigns interns an associate coach, a career coach, and a relationship partner. 38. PwC offers all employees coaching, mentorship, and training to provide career advancement. PwC employees receive world-class learning opportunities through a system called “Learning at PwC,” where they have access to an in-depth catalogue of learning programs and specialized courses. This training program has been ranked number one for three years by Training magazine in its “Training Top 125,” which recognizes “the organizations with the most successful learning and development programs in the world.” Because of the opportunities it provides employees, PwC has repeatedly been named as one of the top three places to launch a career by BusinessWeek. 39. By disproportionally hiring young applicants, PwC deprives class and collective members of invaluable professional support that leads to future business and growth opportunities. Employment Policies 42. PwC also intentionally disfavors hiring people 40 years of age or older for the Covered Positions. PwC is very proud of its inordinately young workforce. In order to continue to attract and maintain “Millennials,” PwC intentionally screens out individuals ages 40 and older who apply for the Covered Positions and denies them employment opportunities. 43. PwC also has a mandatory retirement age of 60 for Partners. As a result, applicants ages 40 or over are less attractive to hiring personnel because their potential contributions to PwC appear limited when compared to those of similarly situated younger applicants. Because of PwC’s mandatory retirement policy, PwC’s hiring personnel are disincentivized from hiring applicants 40 years of age or older. 44. Together, PwC’s uniform employment policies systematically exclude and deter applicants and prospective applicants ages 40 and older. Business Opportunities 46. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this class and collective action on behalf of himself, individually, and all similarly situated applicants and prospective applicants ages 40 and older in the United States. This action seeks to end PwC’s discriminatory policies, patterns, and/or practices, and to make the class and collective whole by requesting the following remedies: injunctive relief to remedy systemic age discrimination; an award of back pay and front pay; liquidated damages; compensatory and punitive damages; and attorneys’ fees. 47. Plaintiff brings this collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) seeking liability-phase injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of a collective of all applicants and deterred prospective applicants for the Covered Positions ages 40 and older in the United States at any time from October 18, 2013 through the resolution of this action for claims under the ADEA. Plaintiff also brings this collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) for monetary damages and other make-whole relief on behalf of a collective of all applicants and deterred prospective applicants for the Covered Positions ages 40 and older in the United States at any time from October 18, 2013 through the resolution of this action for claims under the 54. Plaintiff is a member of the class he seeks to represent. 55. The members of the class identified herein are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of June 2015, PwC employs over 208,000 employees worldwide and approximately 53,000 in the North American region. Although Plaintiff does not know the precise number of all applicants and deterred prospective applicants ages 40 and older of PwC, the number is far greater than can be feasibly addressed through joinder. 57. The Representative Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class. 58. The Representative Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions, employment discrimination litigation, and the intersection thereof. 59. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because PwC has acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole. The class members are entitled to injunctive relief to end PwC’s common, uniform, unfair, and discriminatory policies and practices. 60. Class certification is also appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. The class members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of PwC’s common, uniform, unfair, and discriminatory policies and practices. The propriety and amount of punitive damages are based on PwC’s conduct, making these issues common to the class. 70. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 71. This Claim is brought by Representative Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the collective he represents. Plaintiff has timely filed charges with the EEOC and has thus exhausted his administrative remedies. Sixty days have passed since Plaintiff has filed charges with the 78. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 86. This Claim is brought by Representative Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the class he represents. Plaintiff has timely filed charges with the DFEH and has thus exhausted his administrative remedies. 87. PwC engages in an intentional, company-wide, and systematic policy, pattern, and/or practice of discrimination against applicants and prospective applicants ages 40 and older. PwC has intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff and the class in violation of the FEHA by, among other things: (a) Utilizing a biased recruitment system that deters prospective applicants ages 40 and older from applying for the Covered Positions; (b) Utilizing a biased recruitment system that excludes prospective applicants ages 40 and older from applying for the Covered Positions; (c) Utilizing a biased recruitment system that discriminates against prospective applicants ages 40 and older; (d) Implementing a mandatory early retirement policy that deters applicants ages 40 and over from applying to the Covered Positions; (e) Implementing a mandatory early retirement policy that causes PwC to discriminate against applicants ages 40 and over who apply to the Covered Positions; and (f) Systematically and intentionally discriminating against applicants ages 40 and older throughout the hiring process. 88. These company-wide policies are intended to and do have the effect of denying Plaintiff and class members employment opportunities because of their age. The discriminatory acts that constitute PwC’s pattern and/or practice of discrimination have occurred both within and outside the liability period in this case. 90. Age is not a bona fide occupational qualification for the Covered Positions. 91. As a direct result of PwC’s discriminatory policies and/or practices as described above, Plaintiff and the class have suffered damages including, but not limited to, lost past and future income, compensation, and benefits. 92. The foregoing conduct constitutes illegal, intentional discrimination prohibited by California Government Code section 12940(a). 93. Plaintiff requests relief as hereinafter described. Disparate Impact Discrimination (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(2)) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Collective) Intentional Discrimination (California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Intentional Discrimination (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1)) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Collective)

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a food and snack company that owns and operates www.utzsnacks.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in March of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.utzsnacks.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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12. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as:  All New Jersey consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from VISGILIO-MCGRATH, LLC concerning a judgment, which contained at least one of the alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. herein. The class definition may be subsequently modified or refined. The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 14. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 15. Sometime prior to July 14, 2016, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL, A N.J. CORP. (“MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL”). 16. The MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL obligation arose out of a transaction, in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 17. The MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 19. On or before July 14, 2016, MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL referred the MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL obligation to VISGILIO-MCGRATH, LLC for the purpose of collections. 20. At the time MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL referred the MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL obligation to VISGILIO-MCGRATH, LLC, the obligation was past due. 21. At the time MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL referred the MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL obligation to VISGILIO-MCGRATH, LLC, the obligation was in default. 22. Defendant caused to be delivered to Plaintiff a letter dated July 14, 2016, which was addressed to Plaintiff. Exhibit A. 23. The July 14, 2016 letter was sent to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the MOUNTAINSIDE HOSPITAL obligation. 24. The July 14, 2016 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 25. Upon receipt, Plaintiff read the July 14, 2016 letter. 26. The July 14, 2016 letter stated in part that: With reference to the above entitled matter, please be advised that there remains a judgment against you and in favor of my client, Mountainside Hospital, A N.J. Corporation. The total amount due currently stands at $2,374.68. 27. The July 14, 2016 letter also stated in part that: Until this is paid, it may appear on your credit report and adversely impact your credit. Therefore, if you wish to resolve this matter, prompt payment should be remitted directly to my office made payable to “Andrea Visgilio-McGrath, LLC, Trust Account. (emphasis added). 29. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) et seq., the period is generally limited to a 7 year period. 30. A payment made on a judgment has no effect as to whether a judgment continues to appear on a credit report or not. 31. A judgment appearing on a credit report will be deleted within the reporting period allowed pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) et seq. whether or not a payment is made on the judgment. 32. Defendant knew or should have known that its actions violated the FDCPA. 33. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 36. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 37. Collection letters and/or notices, such as those sent by Defendants, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” 38. Defendant’s collection letters and/or notices would cause the least sophisticated to be confused as to whether the judgment would remain on his or her credit report if the debt was paid. 39. Defendant’s collection letters and/or notices would cause the least sophisticated consumer to believe that making a payment of the judgment would have an effect on the whether the judgment continued to appear on credit reports. 40. Defendant’s letters were designed to cause the least sophisticated consumer to believe that making a payment of the judgment would have an effect on the whether the judgment continued to appear on credit reports. 41. The content of Defendant’s letter was designed to cause the least sophisticated consumer to believe that making a payment of the judgment would have an effect on the whether the judgment continued to appear on credit reports. 42. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with their attempts to collect debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. allows a consumer to attempt to remove any reporting that appears on a credit report which is inaccurate. 45. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) et seq. limits the reporting period that collection items may remain on a credit report to a 7 year period. 46. Defendants’ false, deceptive and misleading statement that “Until this is paid, it may appear on your credit report and adversely impact your credit. Therefore, if you wish to resolve this matter, prompt payment should be remitted directly to my office made payable to “Andrea Visgilio-McGrath, LLC, Trust Account.” would cause the least sophisticated consumer to believe that the alleged debt was being reported to one or more credit reporting agencies and that only a payment would cause it to be removed from the consumer’s credit history. 47. Section 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 48. Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by falsely representing that “Until this is paid, it may appear on your credit report and adversely impact your credit.” 49. Defendants’ attempt to collect the alleged debt through misrepresentations violated various provisions of the FDCPA including but not limited to: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10). 50. Congress enacted the FDCPA in part to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 51. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 53. Plaintiff and others similarly situated were sent letters which have the propensity to affect their decision-making with regard to the debt. 54. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have suffered harm as a direct result of the abusive, deceptive and unfair collection practices described herein. 55. Plaintiff has suffered damages and other harm as a direct result of the Defendants’ actions, conduct, omissions and violations of the FDCPA described herein. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants as follows: (a) Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a Class Action and certifying Plaintiff as Class representative and the attorneys, Joseph K. Jones, Esq., and Glen H. Chulsky, Esq., as Class Counsel; (b) Awarding Plaintiff and the Class statutory damages; (c) Awarding Plaintiff and the Class actual damages; (d) Awarding pre-judgment interest; (e) Awarding post-judgment interest. (f) Awarding Plaintiff costs of this Action, including reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses; and (g) Awarding Plaintiff and the Class such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Dated: December 31, 2016 s/ Joseph K. Jones Joseph K. Jones, Esq. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS

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14. Defendants provide services to drilling operations off the California coast, including on fixed oil platforms on the Outer Continental Shelf. Defendants employ hourly employees who work on these oil platforms and travel between them when necessary. Defendants mandate that these hourly workers perform their work in “hitches,” which are multiple-day shifts (typically seven days in length). 24. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-alleges each and every one of the allegations contained in the preceding and foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. Failure to Pay Overtime Premium Wages (29 U.S.C. § 207(a)) (Action Brought by Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves And the FLSA Collective Against All Defendants)

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15. Defendants are companies that sell auto protection plans. 16. To increase the reach of their efforts, Defendants and/or their authorized sales agents repeatedly called and sent prerecorded voice messages to thousands or possibly tens of thousands of cell phones at a time. 17. When the Class members answered their cell phones or listened to their messages expecting to hear from a real person, Defendants pulled a bait and switch by playing a prerecorded voice message. 18. Unfortunately, Defendants failed to obtain consent from Plaintiff and the Class before bombarding their cell phones with these illegal voice recordings. 20. Plaintiff answered the call and it was a prerecorded voice informing Plaintiff that her car warranty had expired and that she should “press one” to renew her auto warranty. 21. Plaintiff pressed one and was connected with Defendant Affordable’s live telemarketing agent named Kayla. 22. Kayla said that she was selling auto protection plans from Defendant Sunpath and Defendant Northcoast. 23. Plaintiff was then transferred to Samantha, who asked plaintiff for relevant details such as the make, model, and mileage of her car. 24. Samantha said that Plaintiff’s five-year warranty was expired and the only day to accept or decline to purchase a new protection plan was today. 25. Samantha said that the auto plan would cover the car for five years or up to 101,000 miles. 26. Plaintiff purchased and received a plan from Defendants. 27. Plaintiff never consented to receive calls from Defendants. Plaintiff has no relationship with Defendants. 28. Defendants’ calls violated Plaintiff’s statutory rights under the TCPA. 29. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) on behalf of itself and a class defined as follows: No Consent Class. All persons in the United States who: (1) from the last 4 years to present (2) received at least one telephone call; (3) on his or her cellular telephone; (4) that was called using an autodialer and/or played a prerecorded voice message; (5) for the purpose of performing or selling Defendants’ services; (6) where Defendants did not have any record of prior express written consent to place such call at the time it was made. 31. Numerosity: The exact number of the Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants placed telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 32. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. 33. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are made in a representative capacity on behalf of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the proposed Class and is subject to no unique defenses. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel to prosecute the case on behalf of Plaintiff and the proposed Class. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. 34. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinge on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 36. Superiority: Plaintiff’s case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of plaintiff’s controversy as joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in Plaintiff’s Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions ensured. 37. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 38. Defendants and/or its agent placed telephone calls to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written consent to do so. 39. Defendants’ calls were made for a commercial purpose. 40. Defendants played a prerecorded voice message to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the Class members as proscribed by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 42. Defendants and/or its agent made the violating calls “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 43. If the court finds that Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated this subsection, the court may increase the civil fine from $500 to $1500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(On behalf of Jane Doe individually) (Battery) (Common Law of New York, Florida, U.S. Virgin Islands, and France) 153. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each of the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 154. In committing the acts described above, Epstein intentionally subjected Jane to bodily contact that was harmful and offensive in nature. 155. Groff is liable for aiding and abetting Epstein’s actions. 156. Upon information and belief, Groff knowingly provided substantial assistance to Epstein in Epstein’s tortious actions against Jane. 157. Upon information and belief, Groff was aware at the time that she was playing a role in overall illegal and/or tortious activity by Epstein. 158. As a result of Epstein’s and Groff’s actions, Jane suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 39. Jane Doe’s early childhood was in a small city. She lived in Moscow from her teenage years until recently. In 2017, she was attending a university in Moscow and working part-time as an interpreter. She often used a Russian job posting website to find postings for part-time jobs working as an interpreter at conferences and other events. 41. Shortly after she applied for that job, Jane received a message on WhatsApp from an unknown number that connected Jane to a Russian woman who worked for Jeffrey Epstein. That woman asked Jane to send her résumé and photographs of herself, and then to send her Instagram handle. 42. The Russian woman set up a Skype call with another Russian woman who worked for Epstein, Woman 1. Woman 1 interviewed Jane over Skype, in Russian. Woman 1 emphasized in the interview that it was not merely a job, but an “investment” in herself, and an opportunity to build a successful career. Woman 1 told Jane that it was a financial company and that a man was looking for a personal assistant, but she did not tell Jane the name of the company or the full name of the man she would be working for. When Jane asked for more information, such as the name of the company or the identity of the CEO, Woman 1 told her that information was confidential. 43. A day or two later, Jane was invited to meet with Woman 1 in person at a coffee shop in Moscow. Woman 1 was with her mother during the meeting, which reassured Jane that there was nothing to be concerned about. During that meeting, Woman 1 told Jane about the great opportunities the job would provide her, such as traveling around the world and having her education paid for. Jane felt inspired by what the woman said, and eager to pursue this once-in- a-lifetime opportunity. 45. Another employee of Epstein’s who was based in New York, Woman 2, emailed Jane the airline ticket. The email chain indicated that the ticket had been sent to Woman 2 by another of Epstein’s associates working out of New York, Lesley Groff. 46. Groff knew or recklessly disregarded the facts and information that made clear that Epstein was trafficking Jane to Paris for commercial sex purposes, and that Epstein was doing so by means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, and/or a combination of such means. Epstein Traffics Jane to Paris and Sexually Assaults Her 47. Jane arrived in Paris from a flight paid for by Epstein and arranged by his New York-based employees/agents on or about September 9, 2017. On information and belief, Epstein used funds and/or financial institutions based in New York to arrange for Jane’s flight. 48. Epstein had arranged for a driver to pick Jane up at the airport and drive her to his third-floor flat. Jane marveled at how large Epstein’s home was: it appeared to have at least ten rooms, a gym, a huge living room, a huge office with a library on one side, and at least five guest bedrooms. Each of the guest rooms was stocked with pajamas, hygiene products, and other amenities. The flat was decorated in what Jane viewed as a “wealthy classical” style. Jane also noticed that there were photos of girls on the walls throughout the apartment, including of Woman 1 (the woman Jane had met in Moscow). Most of the girls in the photos looked quite young. 50. Jane introduced herself to Epstein, and he asked her some basic, normal questions about herself and about the job she was being interviewed for. 51. Epstein gave her approximately 500 euros in cash, and when Jane asked why he was giving that to her when she had just come for an interview, he said it was to pay her for coming. In fact, this money was payment for his own use of her for his sexual gratification, as she would later brutally learn. 52. After the meal, they returned to Epstein’s flat. Woman 1 was present, as was another one of Epstein’s assistants, Woman 3. 53. Woman 1 showed Jane to a bedroom where she would be staying, and told Jane she should change into the pajamas that were in her bedroom. Jane saw that the other girls had changed into similar pajamas as well. Jane found it strange and surprising that everyone had to put those pajamas on and could not just keep wearing their own clothes they had brought for themselves. Jane asked Woman 1 if she could stay in her room and sleep, as they had just had the interview and she had traveled that day. But Woman 1 said that Jane should stay awake and available outside her room because Epstein might want to talk to her. 54. A short time later, Epstein told his assistant Woman 1 to bring Jane to the massage room. Jane was led to that room, which she recalls being on one side, just past the gym and next to two of the bedrooms. The massage room was mostly dark. There was a shelf with what appeared to be facial-treatment masks, creams, and oil, and there were photos of naked females on the walls. Jane had the impression that they were girls and women whom Epstein knew. 56. After approximately 20 minutes, Woman 3 left, leaving Jane alone with Epstein in the massage room. Epstein instructed Jane to continue to massage him. Epstein then told Jane to take off the top half of her pajamas, but Jane refused. Jane felt frozen, confused and scared about what was happening. Epstein clearly noticed, and asked Jane why she was so embarrassed, and said in substance – both cajoling and shaming her – “You need to be more open, or you won’t get anywhere in life. Just relax.” Epstein made all this strange behavior seem normal and made Jane feel like it was her fault that she did not want to comply. Epstein then again directed Jane to strip down to just her bra and underwear and to lie down on the massage table. This time, Jane complied. 57. Epstein critiqued Jane’s body, telling her that she had more weight on her hips than she should, and told Jane that she needed to lose weight (although she was not remotely overweight). 59. Jane still felt frozen with enormous fear and confusion. Minutes earlier, everyone in this man’s luxurious house had seemed so happy, and suddenly she was in a room where the man who owned and dictated the entire atmosphere and had bought her plane tickets, paid for her housing and food and flown her here was forcing unwanted sexual acts on her. Jane felt utterly frozen and powerless. She was in a foreign country, she did not know anyone in the apartment, and Epstein had insisted to her that this was all normal and that she was at fault for failing to be “open.” Epstein continued masturbating until he ejaculated. Without missing a beat, and again acting as if everything were normal, he then told Jane to change her clothes and to meet him in his office. 60. Epstein then spoke with Jane in his office. Epstein mostly lectured Jane about her mentality and critically asked why she was so “closed.” He said that if she wanted to achieve anything, she should do what he told her to do, implying that the wealth and power he had were the result of his own genius and she could be part of it if she just followed his directions. Jane expressed that she had a college degree and was not looking for this kind of job, that this was not something she could ever imagine herself doing. She told him, in substance, “I thought this was a normal job. I did not think this sex part was involved,” but Epstein did not respond to that. 62. During the above conversations, Epstein effectively laid out his twisted thinking as to why he had focused on recruiting young women from former Soviet countries to be trafficked. 63. Jane was scheduled to return to Moscow the next day. Around 11:00 the following morning, Epstein told Jane to come to the massage room. He condescendingly asked if Jane had learned anything from their conversation the previous day, and urged her to change her mind and work for him. Epstein then instructed Jane to give him a massage, and she obeyed, feeling she had no choice. Epstein ordered Jane to take off her clothes, and she obeyed, leaving only her underwear on. Epstein ordered Jane to massage his chest and touch his nipples, and she obeyed. The massage went on for approximately 20 minutes. Partway through, Epstein began to masturbate with one hand. He ordered Jane to take her underwear off, and touched Jane’s genitals with the other hand, without her consent, while he masturbated. Throughout this encounter, Jane just kept thinking that she wanted to leave as soon as possible, while trying to keep a neutral facial expression and not show outwardly the fear, shame, and turmoil inside her. It was apparent to her that Epstein was angry with her because he thought she was too “closed” and did not do what he wanted. Eventually, Epstein ejaculated. He told her to change, pack for her flight, and come talk to him in his office before she left. 65. Jane went home shocked and confused. She still did not understand what the “job” was. She knew that she could not tell anyone about what had occurred in Paris, and did not know what to do. She also thought more and more about the fact that perhaps Epstein was right, that she was the one who was closed off and unable to see the opportunities he was offering her. 66. In the ensuing weeks, Epstein began communicating with Jane frequently by text and by Skype video chat. Epstein plainly was communicating to Jane from New York during some or all of these conversations. Epstein offered to send Jane money, and he asked her to send him nude photos of herself. Jane refused to do so, which angered Epstein. Jane explained to Epstein that she did not understand what the job he was offering her entailed, and asked him to explain. In response, Epstein gave her two “tasks” to do: to come up with an idea for a Christmas gift for Epstein to give all of his employees, and to design furniture for a new house of Epstein’s on his island. Jane thoughtfully and diligently prepared those tasks and emailed them to Epstein, but Epstein just ignored her work, giving the plain impression that those were not real assignments but simply attempts to get Jane to stop asking questions. Epstein Again Traffics Jane to Paris and Sexually Assaults Her 68. Upon information and belief, Groff, working from Epstein’s townhouse in New York City, took one or more actions to traffic and/or to facilitate the trafficking of Jane to Paris on this second occasion. 69. Once again, Epstein had a driver pick Jane up at the airport and take her to his flat. When Jane arrived at the apartment, the only people there were Epstein, Woman 3, and another driver of Epstein’s. 70. Soon after Jane arrived, Epstein told her it was time for a massage and sent her to the massage room. Epstein then came into the massage room, laid on the massage table, and ordered her to start massaging him. Partway through the massage, Epstein began to masturbate while Jane massaged him. He once again ordered Jane to take her underwear off, and began once again to touch and rub Jane’s genitals while he masturbated. Eventually, Epstein ejaculated. He then told Jane to change her clothes and meet him in his office, once again normalizing the sexual assault as part of some kind of business opportunity, albeit a fraudulent one. 72. Jane flew back to Moscow the next day. Before she went to the airport, Epstein again criticized her for not being more attentive to what he wanted, specifically telling her she should have asked his driver how Epstein likes his coffee prepared so she could make it for him without being asked. Jane then traveled back to Moscow. Epstein Fraudulently Traffics Jane to Florida Under the Guise of a Job and Rapes Her 73. After Jane returned to Moscow, Epstein told her that he had work for her to do, and that she should come to his home in Florida. Jane was still under the impression that a lucrative job and opportunities with Epstein’s business were being offered to her, and Epstein had groomed her to believe that she had no choice but to obey – that in fact it was her own limitations that made her question this opportunity. 74. On or about September 20, 2017, Epstein’s assistant Bella Klein, who worked out of New York City, wired Jane 2,000 Euros so she could apply for a U.S. visa to come to Epstein’s Florida home. Jane obtained the visa in early November. She was flown to Palm Beach and entered the United States from Russia on or about November 17, 2017. 76. When Jane arrived at the airport in Palm Beach, Epstein’s employees Woman 3 and a driver took Jane from the airport and drove her to Epstein’s mansion. 77. Epstein’s Palm Beach estate was as impressive as his Paris home. The palatial home had a pool, a poolhouse, a number of bedrooms, and there were two Cadillacs there. Before one entered the mansion, there was a small building that housed approximately three of Epstein’s employees, who appeared to be Southeast Asian, perhaps Filipino. There was another small house on the property with Epstein’s office, a gym, and a bathroom in it. Inside, the mansion was largely white, including the sofas and two end tables. There were books on the living room table, photos on the wall, and a decorative wooden bicycle. At one point during the visit, Epstein showed Jane a broken guitar on display and said that it had been a gift from Woody Allen. 78. The evening that Jane arrived, Epstein told the driver to show her into Epstein’s office. Epstein questioned her about her life in Moscow and what she was doing. Jane tried, tentatively, to assert herself, telling Epstein during the conversation that she was not able to have much stress in her life because of an underlying long-term disease which was exacerbated by stress. Epstein did not react emotionally to that, but told her that she did not need to worry because no one had stress in his house. At one point, Woman 3 came into the office. Epstein put on some current pop music and Woman 3 began dancing. Epstein suggested that Jane dance too, but Jane explained that she was very tired because she had been traveling all day. At that point, Jane went to her room for the night. Jane’s room, which was on the second floor of the mansion, looked like a typical hotel room. It had a private bathroom, and was stocked with pajamas and various personal hygiene items. 80. Epstein entered the massage room and closed all of the windows and doors to that room. He directed Jane to massage him starting with his legs and told her which oil to use. Epstein then ordered Jane to massage his chest and touch his nipples. At one point during the massage, Epstein appeared to notice that Jane appeared unhappy, and he got angry that she was not more enthusiastic and playful about what she was doing. Epstein angrily halted the massage and told Jane to take off her shorts and underwear. Jane declined to do so, and told Epstein, truthfully, that she had her period. Epstein said he did not care, and again ordered her to do so. Frightened and confused, Jane finally obeyed his order and took her underwear off. Epstein then physically turned Jane around and proceeded to have sex with her while standing behind her. This forcible rape went on for approximately five minutes, and Epstein ejaculated inside of Jane. 81. During this rape, Jane felt worse than she had ever felt in her life. It felt psychologically overwhelming, like she could not even understand what was happening to her. It felt like the rock bottom of her life. 83. Jane had traveled to Florida under the impression that she would meet some of Epstein’s employees in Florida so they could show her the work she was to do. But she was never given any specific work to do. Instead, when Epstein was not raping or otherwise forcing sexual acts on her, Jane found herself just sitting around, not understanding what she was supposed to be doing. 84. At one point while Jane was in Palm Beach, Epstein directed her to come to his office. She arrived, and Epstein was watching pornographic videos on a website. He began to show them to Jane. Epstein told her, in substance, “You should watch this and see how they do it.” At one point, Woman 3 came into the office while the pornographic videos were on, but she did not visibly react, once again messaging to Jane that this was “normal” behavior. With Woman 3 present, Epstein told Jane that she needed to learn to massage his penis better. He told her that Woman 3 had gone to Turkey and learned how to massage a man, and similarly referred to another girl, whose photo was on the table, who he said had done so as well. 86. The next morning, Epstein asked Jane, in substance, “Why don’t you do anything I want you to?” He told her she was not attentive to what he wanted. Once again, he criticized her for not asking one of his employees how to prepare his coffee so she could make it for him. He told Jane that she had bad energy, and he became brusque and rude towards her. His angry behavior made Jane afraid. 87. Before Jane left Palm Beach, Woman 3 approached her and said that Epstein was mad at Jane and that she should be more “open.” She said that Jane should consider herself lucky because she was able to see Epstein on three occasions, whereas most girls never came back after one visit. She told Jane, in substance, “If you want to make him happy, go back to his office and give him [oral sex]” to remedy that. Jane did not do that. Instead, she did her best to hide from Epstein for the final day she was in Florida. She left to walk on the beach when she could. When Epstein told her to go to the massage room once again, she made up an excuse and said that she was feeling sick because of something she ate. The next day, after spending three or four days in Florida, Jane flew back to Moscow. Epstein and His Associates Continue to Pressure Jane to Return 88. After Jane returned to Moscow in November 2017, Epstein continued to text her and to call her on Skype, often from New York. He again asked her to send nude photos of herself, and threatened that there would be negative consequences if she did not. Jane was afraid of Epstein and felt that she had no choice, so she eventually sent him two nude photos. 90. Jane was trying desperately to assert herself, but at the same time continued to think that perhaps she was wrong and this incredibly wealthy and successful man must be right, and that his paying attention to her made her special. 91. Epstein continued to contact Jane, including sending her a text in February 2018 wishing her “Happy Valentine’s Day” and sometimes sending photos to her. In the summer of 2018, when the World Cup was taking place in Russia, Epstein’s assistant Woman 3 called Jane, explained she was in Moscow, and asked if Jane would meet her. Jane agreed to meet her in a public place. Woman 3 took a picture with Jane, which she clearly intended to send to Epstein. Woman 3 again tried to convince Jane to see Epstein again, but Jane refused. In September 2018, Jane was in France for a conference. Woman 3 contacted her again, saying she had learned from Instagram that Jane was in France and asking if she would see Epstein again. Once again, Jane refused. Epstein Traffics Jane to New York Under the Pretense of Assisting Her Business 92. In 2018, Jane tried starting a new business in Russia, which put her under enormous pressure to succeed. She was working long hours for the company and participating in high-pressure programs and opportunities to bring the company a higher profile and investors. 94. Under enormous stress, with little sleep and the sense that many people were relying on her, Jane ultimately decided to reach out to Epstein’s employee, Woman 3, to ask her if she thought Epstein would help her with a ticket to New York and a place to stay while she was there. At that point, Jane convinced herself that she felt Epstein “owed” her for what he had done to her – the prior rape and assaults – and somehow also thought she could control these interactions in ways that would avoid or minimize further abuse. She also had echoes of Epstein telling her that she was special and believed he would provide her with the opportunity to take the meetings in New York to get the funding for her company that she desperately needed. Of course, she was wrong on all counts. 95. Woman 3 told Jane that Epstein would agree to help her, but wanted to talk to her first via Skype. On that call, Epstein began by expressing enormous anger, chastising Jane for having treated him poorly and having “run off” on him and “ignored” him. He belittled her, insulted her, and told her that she was a bad person, at the same time emphasizing that he was such a nice and good person that he would forgive her and still agree to help her. He made it clear that she was in debt to him for his magnanimity and forgiveness, and said she would have to do something for him. 96. Jane felt there was no turning back. She believed she could get the funding for her company and convinced herself that she could somehow “handle” the acts Epstein might potentially require of her in exchange; she said thank you to Epstein and accepted his help. She continued to simultaneously believe that somehow Epstein would in fact see her value and the importance of her company. 98. Jane was trafficked by Epstein to New York in early December 2018. Upon landing in New York City, Jane got into a taxi and thought she would be taken to the Manhattan apartment where Epstein and/or his associates had said she would be staying. On that drive, while she was in the midst of planning her business meetings for the following days, Jane received a phone call from Epstein. He told her that instead, they would immediately pick up Woman 3 and the two of them would be driven directly to a different airport. Before she knew it, and before she could embark on any of her plans in New York – the entire reason she had reluctantly communicated with Epstein again – Jane was placed on a plane from New York to Palm Beach.

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35. This is a class action on behalf of those who purchased or otherwise acquired Psychemedics common stock between July 26, 2016 and January 31, 2017, inclusive, excluding Defendants (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are officers and directors of the Company as well as their families and the families of the Defendants. Class members are so numerous that joinder of them is impracticable. 36. Common questions of law and fact predominate and include whether Defendants: (a) violated the Exchange Act; (b) omitted and/or misrepresented material facts; (c) knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements were false; (d) artificially inflated the price of Psychemedics common stock; and (e) the extent of and appropriate measure of damages. 37. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class. Prosecution of individual actions would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 38. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 40. During the Class Period, Defendants Psychemedics and the Individual Defendants, and each of them, carried out a plan, scheme, and course of conduct using the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and the mails, which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period did: (a) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of Psychemedics common stock; (b) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; (c) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Psychemedics common stock at inflated prices; and (d) cause them losses when the truth was revealed. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, Defendants Psychemedics and the Individual Defendants, and each of them, took the actions set forth herein, in violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. All Defendants are sued either as primary participants in the wrongful and illegal conduct charged herein or as controlling persons as alleged below. 41. In addition to the duties of full disclosure imposed on Defendants Psychemedics and the Individual Defendants as a result of their affirmative false and misleading statements to the investing public, these Defendants had a duty to promptly disseminate truthful information with respect to Psychemedics’s operations and performance that would be material to investors in compliance with the integrated disclosure provisions of the SEC, including with respect to the Company’s revenue and earnings trends, so that the market price of the Company’s securities would be based on truthful, complete and accurate information. SEC Regulations S-X (17 C.F.R. §210.01, et seq.) and S-K (17 C.F.R. §229.10, et seq.). 43. As a result of the dissemination of the materially false and misleading information and failure to disclose material facts as set forth above, the market price of Psychemedics common stock was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the fact that the market price of Psychemedics common stock was artificially inflated, and relying directly or indirectly on the false and misleading statements made knowingly or with deliberate recklessness by Defendants Psychemedics and the Individual Defendants, or upon the integrity of the market in which the shares traded, Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased Psychemedics stock during the Class Period at artificially high prices and, when the truth was revealed, were damaged thereby. 44. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class and the marketplace known of the true facts, which were knowingly or recklessly concealed by Defendants Psychemedics and the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would not have purchased or otherwise acquired their Psychemedics shares during the Class Period, or if they had acquired such shares during the Class Period, they would not have done so at the artificially inflated prices which they paid. 45. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants Psychemedics and the Individual Defendants have violated §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 17 46. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 48. In particular, the Individual Defendants had direct involvement in and responsibility over the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, are presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein. 49. By reason of such wrongful conduct, each of the Individual Defendants is liable pursuant to §20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their purchases of the Company’s common stock during the Class Period. For Violation of Section 10(B) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants For Violation of §20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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13. The United States has faced a foreclosure crisis over the past several years. To stem the tide early on, on October 3, 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and, on February 17, 2009, Congress amended the statute by passing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (collectively the “Act”), 12 U.S.C. § 5201 et. seq. (2009). The purpose of the Act is to grant the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system and ensure that such authority is used in a manner that “protects home values” and “preserves homeownership.” 12 U.S.C. § 5201. 14. The Act granted the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to establish TARP. 12 U.S.C. § 5211. Under TARP, the Secretary was empowered to purchase or make commitments to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions. Id. In exercising its authority to administer TARP, the Act mandates that the Secretary “shall” take into consideration the “need to help families keep their homes and to stabilize communities.” 12 U.S.C. § 5213(3). The Act further mandates, with regard to any assets acquired by the Secretary that are backed by residential real estate, that the Secretary “shall implement a plan that seeks to maximize assistance for homeowners” and that uses the Secretary’s authority over servicers to encourage them to take advantage of programs to “minimize foreclosures.” 12 U.S.C. § 5219. The Act grants authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to use credit enhancement and loan guarantees to “facilitate loan modifications to prevent avoidable foreclosures” and imposes parallel mandates to implement plans to maximize assistance to homeowners and minimize foreclosures. 12 U.S.C § 5220. 23. Burton and Nationstar entered into a HAMP TPP Agreement that was signed by Burton on April 30, 2009, and was thereafter signed by a representative of Nationstar. The TPP Agreement specifically states: I understand that after I sign and return two copies of the Plan to the Lender, the Lender will send me a signed copy of this Plan if I qualify for the Offer or will send me written notice that I do not qualify for the Offer. This Plan will not take effect unless and until both I and the Lender sign it and Lender provides me with a copy of this Plan with the Lender’s signature. 24. The TPP Agreement bears a “Trial Period Plan Effective Date” of May 6, 2009. 25. Nationstar sent Burton a signed copy of the TPP Agreement and did not send him notice that he did not qualify. 26. Burton timely made each of the $1,921.58 monthly trial payments due to Nationstar on May 6, 2009, June 1, 2009, and July 1, 2009. 27. Thereafter, Nationstar sent Burton a HAMP PMA. Burton executed the PMA promptly on August 25, 2009 and returned it to Nationstar. Nationstar, through one of its representatives, countersigned the PMA on or about October 9, 2009, and sent the signed PMA back to Burton. 28. Burton then waited for Nationstar to record and otherwise put his PMA into effect as its terms required. Burton telephoned Nationstar repeatedly, and was told that all the paperwork had been received and that Nationstar simply had to “book” the modification. The representative instructed Burton to keep paying the amount set forth in the PMA, or $1,915.20. 36. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. This class action is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of a nationwide class defined as follows: All homeowners nationwide who had executed permanent modification agreements (“PMAs”) with Nationstar from January 2008 through the present whose PMA Nationstar refused to honor by permanently modifying the borrowers’ loans. Excluded from the Class are: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; and (4) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons. Plaintiff anticipates that amending the Class Definition may become necessary following discovery. 37. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of the above-defined Class under Rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 38. Plaintiff does not know the exact size or identities of the members of the proposed Class, since such information is in the exclusive control of Defendant. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff sent a letter via certified mail to Defendant asking for any information Nationstar showing that its failure to modify Burton’s loan (even though he had a signed PMA) was a “one off” as opposed to a larger problem. Plaintiff’s letter explained that numerous complaints existed online regarding the company’s mortgage servicing activities. Nationstar refused to provide any documents indicating that, unlike with Burton’s loan, it properly and appropriately “booked” or otherwise effectuated and/or caused the loans of its other borrowers with signed PMAs to be permanently modified. 39. Plaintiff believes that the Class encompasses hundreds of individuals whose identities can be readily determined from Defendant’s books and records. Therefore, the proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 46. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations as if set forth fully herein. 47. Nationstar’s signed TPP Agreement is an enforceable contract requiring Nationstar to provide Burton an offer to permanently modify his loan, and the signed PMA is an enforceable contract for a permanent loan modification. Both contracts contain an offer by Nationstar in exchange for monthly trial payments or permanent modification payments. Burton accepted both agreements by signing and returning the agreements to Nationstar. He fulfilled his obligations under the contracts by keeping his representations true, making his trial payments, and providing several other forms of consideration, including additional exchanged promises and the foregoing of other opportunities. Breach of promise to permanently modify loans 48. Nationstar’s signed PMA with Burton specifically stated that, “If my representations in Section 1 continue to be true in all material respects, then this Home Affordable Modification Agreement (“Agreement”) will, as set forth in Section 3, amend and supplement (1) the Mortgage on the Property, and (2) the Note secured by the mortgage.” (See Preamble to PMA, Ex. A.) 57. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations as if set forth fully herein. 58. Every contract contains an implied covenant requiring that neither party act to disrupt the other’s ability to enjoy the benefit of the bargain. Furthermore, where a contract provides one of the Parties with discretion or sole authority to carry out obligations under the agreement for the benefit of the other Party, the Party enjoying such discretion and authority may not abuse it or exercise it in such a manner so as to deprive the other Party of the benefits of the contract. 59. Nationstar has intentionally and continuously acted in a manner so as to frustrate its borrowers’ ability to obtain modifications of their mortgages. Nationstar has abused its discretion under its PMAs, which require that it permanently modify its borrowers’ mortgages. Only Nationstar has the ability to effectuate the modifications that it has promised to provide. 60. By failing to “book,” record, or otherwise cause Burton’s and its other customers’ modifications to be put into effect, Nationstar has abused its authority under its PMAs, frustrated its borrowers’ ability to obtain the benefits of their signed PMAs, and accordingly breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 61. As a result of Nationstar’s breach, Burton and the Class Members have suffered damages as set forth in Paragraph 51 above. 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations as if set forth fully herein. 67. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations as if set forth fully herein. Fraudulent Misrepresentations 68. In its written PMAs provided to Burton and the Class, and executed by Burton on August 25, 2009, Nationstar expressly, intentionally, and knowingly misrepresented that if Burton’s and the Class Members’ representations continued to be true and correct, as determined by Nationstar prior to the Modification Effective Date, then their PMAs would “amend and supplement (1) the Mortgage on the property, and (2) the Note secured by the Mortgage” and that their loan documents would “automatically become modified on” the Modification Effective Date. 77. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations as if set forth fully herein. 80. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations as if set forth fully herein. 81. Nationstar’s practices constitute unfair business practices under the CLRA. 82. On January 28, 2013, Plaintiff Burton, through his counsel, sent via certified mail to Nationstar’s principal place of business in California (as well as to its headquarters in Texas), return receipt requested, a demand under the CLRA that Nationstar rectify within 30 days its continuing failure to follow HAMP and provide Burton and the other Class Members with the permanent modifications they were promised. The certified mail receipt was marked received by Nationstar’s California agent on February 1, 2013. 83. More than 30 days have passed and Nationstar has failed to respond to the demand made within the Notice. 84. As a result of Nationstar’s practices described herein, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered actual damages as set forth in Paragraph 51 above. 85. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above and below allegations as if set forth fully herein. 90. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations as if set forth fully herein. 91. HAMP Servicers like Nationstar are required to follow all other laws, including specifically the ECOA. Breach of Contract (On behalf of Plaintiff Individually and the Class) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (On behalf of Plaintiff Individually and the Class) Congressional Response to National Foreclosure Crisis Fraudulent Misrepresentation (On behalf of Plaintiff Individually and the Class) Promissory Estoppel (On behalf of Plaintiff Individually and the Class, pled in the alternative to Count I) Unjust Enrichment/Restitution (On behalf of Plaintiff Individually and the Class, pled in the alternative to Count I) Violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (On behalf of Plaintiff Individually and the Class) Violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) Cal. Civ. §§ 1750 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff Individually and the Class) Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff Individually and the Class)

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20. Defendant is an online glasses shop, and owns and operates the website, www.eyebuydirect.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.eyebuydirect.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse glasses and related eyewear products for purchase and delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in February 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to browse glasses and related eyewear products for purchase and delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 27. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 29. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 31. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 32. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 35. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 36. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 37. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 38. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 43. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 46. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 52. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 57. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 58. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 78. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 84. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 85. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 88. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 89. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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13. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 14. Plaintiffs bring this FLSA claim as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all persons in the United States, who, since September 2011, previously worked or currently work for Defendants as dispatchers or security personnel while they reside or resided on Defendants’ premises and were compensated with ‘rent credits’ but, through Defendants’ use of ‘rent credits’ to compensate them, were not properly paid overtime and/or minimum wage as mandated by the FLSA. 15. Plaintiffs bring this case as a collective action under the FLSA to recover unpaid minimum wage and/or overtime compensation, liquidated damages, statutory penalties, attorneys’ fees and costs, and damages owed to Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees of Defendants. 17. The precise number of FLSA Collective Plaintiffs can be easily identified and located using Defendants’ timesheets, payroll, rent credit records and other personnel records. Given the composition and size of the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, potential opt-in class members may be informed of the pendency of this Collective Action by direct mail. 19. In addition, because Defendants applied their unlawful employment and payment policies in the same manner to all potential members of the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, common issues of law and fact predominate, and therefore pursuing this matter as a collective action serves as the most expeditious use of the court’s time and resources, as well as avoiding multiple actions on these issues, with the potential for differing or inconsistent judgments. 21. Defendants are in the business of operating apartment complexes throughout the United States, including complexes in the greater New Orleans area. 22. In September 2011, Plaintiff Smith was hired by Defendants to act as dispatcher for a flat rate of pay of $20 per night or $40 per weekend day and night, paid to her in the form of “rent credits.” At that time, Plaintiff Smith was classified as Defendants’ “employee.” 23. Plaintiff Smith worked for Defendants at the Forest Isle apartment complex located on Woodlands Drive, New Orleans, Louisiana. 24. Plaintiff Smith worked for Defendants until October 2013. 25. While Plaintiff Smith was employed by Defendants, she lived on the apartment complex premises. 26. During Plaintiff Smith’s tenure as a dispatcher employed by Defendants, Defendants exercised total control over the time, place and manner of Plaintiff’s work. Plaintiff had no ability to control her schedule, the place or time she would work or who she would be working with during the time she spent working for Defendants. While she was working for Defendants, Plaintiff was forbidden from leaving the premises. 27. Defendants controlled the schedule, and time place and manner of the performance of job duties for all flat rate employees, including those who comprise the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 29. In February 2012, Plaintiff Trujillo was hired by Defendants to act as dispatcher for a flat rate of pay of $20 per night or $40 per weekend day and night, paid to her in the form of “rent credits.” At that time, Plaintiff Trujillo was classified as Defendants’ “employee.” 30. Plaintiff Trujillo worked for Defendants at the Forest Isle apartment complex located on Woodlands Drive, New Orleans, Louisiana. 31. Plaintiff Trujillo worked for Defendants until April 2012. 32. While Plaintiff Trujillo was employed by Defendants, she lived on the apartment complex premises. 33. During Plaintiff Trujillo’s tenure as a dispatcher employed by Defendants, Defendants exercised total control over the time, place and manner of Plaintiff’s work. Plaintiff had no ability to control her schedule, the place or time she would work or who she would be working with during the time she spent working for Defendants. While she was working for Defendants, Plaintiff was forbidden from leaving the premises. 35. Defendants controlled the schedule, and time place and manner of the performance of job duties for all flat rate employees, including those who comprise the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 36. Other persons employed by Defendants as dispatchers, life guards and “Unit 10” security personnel who lived on Defendants’ premises worked identical or substantially similar schedules for flat rates of pay, without regard to how many hours they worked, including those who comprise the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 37. Due to Defendants’ willful scheme to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated members of the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs in this manner, Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees were paid less than the federally-mandated rate of pay of $7.25 per hour. In addition, these employees, including Plaintiffs, were not paid overtime for their work for Defendants in excess of 40 hours per week. 38. Documentation concerning the number of hours actually worked by Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and other similarly situated employees and the compensation actually paid to Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and other similarly situated employees, including those who comprise the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, should be in the possession and custody and control of Defendants. 40. In violating the FLSA, Defendants acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA provisions with respect to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for reasons including but not limited to the fact that Defendants paid non- residents at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek and paid non-residents at a rate of pay that was at least the federally-mandated minimum wage rate for each hour that they worked. 41. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver all previous paragraphs of the Collective Action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 42. Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week for Defendants, but Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs were not compensated at the statutory rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for these overtime hours. 44. At all times material hereto, Defendants failed to comply with Title 29 and United States Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§516.2 and 516.4, by implementing a management policy, plan or decision that intentionally provided for the compensation of Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs as if they were exempt from coverage under 29 U.S.C. §§201 through 219, disregarding the fact that they were not exempt. 45. At all times material hereto, Defendants failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA. 46. Defendants’ actions were willful and/or showed reckless disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs at the statutory rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week when they knew, or should have known, such was and is due. 47. Defendants have failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 48. Due to the intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs have suffered lost compensation for time worked over forty (40) hours per week and are entitled to be paid this amount, plus liquidated damages. 50. Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver all previous paragraphs of the Collective Action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 51. Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs worked for Defendants for a flat rate of pay each night or shift that did not compensate them in an amount equal to or in excess of the federal minimum wage rate of pay for all hours worked. 52. Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs were, and are, entitled to be paid at a rate equal to or in excess of the federally-mandated minimum wage rate as set forth in the FLSA. 53. At all times material hereto, Defendants failed to comply with Title 29 and United States Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§516.2 and 516.4, by implementing a management policy, plan or decision that intentionally provided for the compensation of Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs as if they were exempt from coverage under 29 U.S.C. §§201 through 219, disregarding the fact that they were not exempt. 54. At all times material hereto, Defendants failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA. 56. Defendants have failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 57. Due to the intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs have suffered lost minimum wage compensation for time worked and are entitled to be paid this amount, plus liquidated damages. 58. Plaintiffs Smith and Trujillo and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 29 U.S.C. § 201 ET. SEQ. LABOR STANDARDS ACT 29 U.S.C. § 201 ET. SEQ.

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1. there is no explanation of the increase or note that the balance is increasing or will continue to increase; or 11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant Simm sent a. initial letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. where the current balance is listed as more than the charge-off balance; e. in two sub-classes where: 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect and/or has purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communication to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 17. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well- defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communication to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 2. where additional amounts that could be added or subtracted from the balance since charge-off are all listed as zero; and f. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 20. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 21. Some time prior to September 14, 2020, Plaintiff allegedly incurred an obligation to non-party U.S. Bank. 22. The obligation arose out of transactions incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, specifically a U.S. Bank personal loan. 23. The alleged U.S. Bank obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 24. U.S. Bank is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (4). 25. According to Defendant’s letter, U.S. Bank ‘listed’ Plaintiff’s account with Defendant Simm for collection. 26. Defendant Simm collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation - September 14, 2020 Collection Letter 27. On or about September 14, 2020, Defendant Simm sent Plaintiff an initial collection letter regarding the alleged debt. See Letter attached as Exhibit A. 28. The Letter states “BALANCE: $11,554.12” and then states: 61. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 62. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 63. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 64. Defendant violated said section by: a. Failing to state that the balance may increase despite that it could, and in fact, did; or alternatively, implying that it will continue to increase when in fact it would not; in violation of §1692e (10); and b. Stating zero amounts for additions to the charge-off amount despite that the balance had increased, in violation of §1692e (10); and c. Falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e (2). 65. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 66. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 67. In the alternative, Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 68. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 69. Defendant violated this section by unfairly a. failing to note that the balance may increase despite that it could, and in fact, did; b. Failing to state that the balance may increase despite that it could, and in fact, did; or alternatively, implying that it will continue to increase when in fact it would not; and c. Stating zero amounts for additions to the charge-off amount despite that the balance had increased; and d. Falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of the debt in violation. 70. By reason thereof, Defendant are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692f, et seq. of the FDCPA and Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 71. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 72. Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 73. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing -- (1) the amount of the debt 74. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g by failing to include a clear statement about the amount of the debt and whether it is static or dynamic despite the implications in the letter. 75. By reason thereof, Defendant are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692g et seq.

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203. This count is brought under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. and 42. U.S.C. § 12131 – 12134, and its implementing regulations. 204. Defendant CT DOC is a “public entity” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) and 28 215. This count is brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. and 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 – 794, et seq., and it implementing regulations. 216. Defendant CT DOC is a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 29

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(Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227) 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 33. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 34. The transmission of facsimiles to Plaintiff as set forth above, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 35. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). 36. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to an Order, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), enjoining Defendant from transmitting any advertisements in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).

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10. Exit Realty does not attempt to obtain consent from prospective agents before sending them texts marketing its brokerage services. And that is precisely what happened to Plaintiff. 11. On June 25 and July 17, 2018, Exit Realty sent unsolicited texts to Plaintiff’s cellular phone number, from short code 797-979, without Plaintiff’s consent: 12. Exit Realty’s unsolicited texts were a nuisance that aggravated Plaintiff, wasted his time, invaded his privacy, diminished the value of the cellular services he paid for, caused him to temporarily lose the use and enjoyment of his phone, and caused wear and tear to his phone’s data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components. 14. In sending the unsolicited text messages at issue, Exit Realty, or a third party acting on its behalf, used an automatic telephone dialing system; hardware and/or software with the capacity to store or produce cellular telephone number to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. This is evident from the circumstances surrounding the text messages, including the ability to trigger an automated response by replying “YES,” the text messages’ commercial and generic content, that substantively identical texts were sent to multiple recipients, that multiple texts were sent to the same recipient, and that they were sent from a short code, which is consistent with the use of an automatic telephone dialing system to send text messages. 15. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons who, on or after four years prior to the filing of the complaint, (1) were sent a text message to their cellular telephone number by or on behalf of Exit Realty, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) without their consent. 17. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant sent unsolicited text messages to thousands of individuals who fall into the Class definition. Class membership can be easily determined from Defendant’s records. 18. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff is a member of the Class, and if Defendant violated the TCPA with respect to Plaintiff, then it violated the TCPA with respect to the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained the same damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct. 19. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) How Defendant gathered, compiled, or obtained the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class; b) Whether the text messages were sent using an automatic telephone dialing system; c) Whether Defendant’s text messages were sent for the purpose of marketing Defendant’s products and/or services; d) Whether Defendant sent some or all of the text messages without the consent of Plaintiff and the Class; and e) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing such that Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages. 21. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 23. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of this complaint and incorporates them by reference. 24. Defendant and/or its agents agent transmitted text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using an automatic telephone dialing system. 25. These text messages were sent without the consent of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 26. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), entitling Plaintiff and the Class to a minimum of $500 in damages, and a maximum of $1,500 in damages, for each violation. 9. This case arises from Exit Realty’s use of unsolicited autodialed text messages to market itself to prospective agents and to obtain a split of those prospective agents’ commissions. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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