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13. The Account allegedly went into default with the original creditor prior to the filing of this Complaint. 14. After the Account allegedly went into default, the Account was sold to or otherwise transferred to Atlantic for collection. 15. Diverse then transferred the account to Atlantic for collection. 16. The Account constitutes a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) and is a “consumer debt” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(2). 17. Plaintiff disputes the amount Atlantic was attempting to collect on the Account. 18. Plaintiff requests that Atlantic cease all further communication on the Account. 19. Atlantic’s collector(s) were employee(s) of Atlantic at all times mentioned herein. 20. Atlantic acted at all times mentioned herein through its employee(s). 21. During the one year prior to the date of the filing of this Complaint, Atlantic and/or representative(s), employee(s) and/or agent(s) of Atlantic made telephone calls to Plaintiff to collect the Account. 22. On January 7, 2021, Atlantic attempted collections by sending Plaintiff a text message that stated: This text is from ARS. Leon Gomez we have documentation in our office that requires your immediate attention. We need to speak to you, or your attorney today regarding your paperwork received. Any questions or concerns, please call the office directly at 480-608-9011 and refer to Case# 2316489 while calling back. 24. On January 12, 2021, Atlantic attempted collections by again sending Plaintiff a text message that stated: This text is from ARS. Leon Gomez we have documentation in our office that requires your immediate attention. We need to speak to you, or your attorney today regarding your paperwork received. Any questions or concerns, please call the office directly at 346-396-2752 and refer to Case# 2316489 while calling back. 25. Atlantic used the language in the text messages transcribed above, specifically the language “documentation in our office” and “We need to speak to you or your attorney today regarding your paperwork received” and “case#” for the purpose of causing Plaintiff to believe that Atlantic would pursue legal action against Plaintiff if the account was not paid. 26. The language used by Atlantic in the voicemails transcribed above would cause the least sophisticated consumer to believe that Atlantic intended to sue Plaintiff on the account if the account was not paid. 27. Atlantic did not have the present intention of suing Plaintiff on the Account at the time the text messages transcribed above were sent for Plaintiff. 28. Further, the use of the word today in the context it was used, was used purposefully by Atlantic to create a false sense of urgency and to cause Plaintiff to believe that Atlantic would sue Plaintiff on the account if the account was not paid immediately. 29. The information communicated to Plaintiff by Atlantic was false, deceptive and misleading. 31. Atlantic told Plaintiff the above-described false information in order to trick, deceive and manipulate Plaintiff into transmitting money to Atlantic. 32. Atlantic did not inform Plaintiff in the text messages transcribed above that Atlantic was a debt collector or that Atlantic was attempting to collect a debt or that any information obtained by Atlantic would be used for the purpose of debt collection. 33. In the text messages transcribed above, Atlantic failed to inform Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s right to dispute the debt and/or request validation of the debt. 34. In all of the text messages transcribed above, Atlantic failed to provide Plaintiff with meaningful disclosures of its identity. 35. Atlantic’s purpose for the text messages transcribed above was to attempt to collect the Account. 36. The text messages each individually conveyed information regarding the Account directly or indirectly to Plaintiff. 37. The text messages each individually constituted a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C § 1692a(2). 38. The only reason that Atlantic and/or representative(s), employee(s) and/or agent(s) of Atlantic sent text messages to Plaintiff was to attempt to collect the Account. 39. All of the act(s) and omission(s) by Atlantic and/or its employees and/or agents alleged in the preceding paragraphs were done knowingly and willfully by Atlantic. 41. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of a Class of individuals consisting of all persons located in the State of Texas who, within the one year prior to the filing of this complaint, were contacted by Atlantic in an attempt to collect any purported debt of the person contacted and where the debt in question was incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes, and where the consumer received a text message from Atlantic that was the same as, or substantially the same as, one of the three text messages transcribed above, and/or where Atlantic failed to provide disclosure to any consumer within five days of the first communication with the consumer of the consumer’s right to dispute or request validation of the debt in question. 42. Excluded from the Class are Atlantic, all other defendants named herein, the officers and directors of Atlantic, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Atlantic has or had a controlling interest. 43. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members of the Class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery. The Class is ascertainable in that the names and address of all members of the Class can be identified in business records maintained by Atlantic. 45. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced and competent in class action litigation. 46. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual members of the Class may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for the members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 47. Issues of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate over any questions that may affect only individual members, in that Atlantic has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class. Among the issues of law and fact common to the Class are: a. Atlantic’s violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. as alleged herein; b. Atlantic’s conduct particular to the matters at issue was identical or substantially similar; and c. The availability of statutory penalties. 59. The previous paragraphs are incorporated into this Count as if set forth in full. 60. The act(s) and omission(s) of Atlantic and its representative(s), employee(s) and/or agent(s) violated 15 U.S.C. §1692d(6) and §1692e(2)&(3)&(5)&(8)&(10)&(11)&(14) and § 1692g(a). 61. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k Plaintiff seeks damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs from Atlantic. 63. The act(s) and omission(s) of Atlantic and its representative(s), employee(s) and/or agent(s) violated Tex. Fin. Code §392.304(a)(1)&(4)&(5)&(8)&(14)&(16)&(17)&(19). 64. Pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code § 392.403, Plaintiff seeks damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs from Atlantic. 65. Pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code § 392.403, Plaintiff seeks an injunction against Atlantic enjoining it from future violations of the Texas Finance Code as described herein. 66. In the alternative, without waiving any of the other causes of action herein, without waiving any procedural, contractual, statutory, or common-law right, and incorporating all other allegations herein to the extent they are not inconsistent with the cause of action pled here, Atlantic is liable to Plaintiff for invading Plaintiff’s privacy (intrusion on seclusion). Atlantic intentionally intruded on Plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion, or private affairs, and such intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 67. Plaintiff suffered actual damages from Atlantic as a result of Atlantic’s intrusion. 68. The previous paragraphs are incorporated into this Count as if set forth in full. 69. The act(s) and omission(s) of Atlantic and its representative(s), employee(s) and/or agent(s) in violation of Tex. Fin. Code §392.304(a)(1)&(4)&(5)&(8)&(14)&(16)&(17)& (19) are imputed to Travelers pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code § 392.102. BY ATLANTIC RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC BY ATLANTIC RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC BY ATLANTIC RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC CLASS ONE – FDCPA CLASS TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA FOR LIABILITY OF ATLANTIC RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC

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45. Defendants own and operate two Mexican restaurants and one deli in the Bronx, New York, named “Huaxcuaxtla Restaurant,” “El Cerrito Restaurant,” and “Comercial Mexicana.” 46. Huaxcuaxtla and El Cerrito serve and deliver their food to customers throughout the Bronx. 47. Comercial Mexicana is a deli that serves food and sells groceries as well as other everyday items to the public. 48. Upon information and belief, between both restaurants and the deli, Defendants employ a staff of approximately 20 employees at any given time. 49. Employees of the Restaurants hold various titles, including, inter alia: (i) Cook; (ii) Assistant Cook; (iii) Washer; (iv) Delivery Worker; (v) Server; (vi) Busser; and (vii) Cashier (collectively, “Restaurant Employees”). 50. The Restaurant Employees typically work an average of 50 to 70 hours per week, with some working as many as 77 hours per week. B. Failure to Pay Minimum, Overtime, and Spread of Hours Wages 52. Defendants systematically deny Restaurant Employees wages in several ways. 53. First, Defendants pay all Restaurant Employees at rates that are drastically below the applicable federal and State minimum wage rates during the relevant time period. 54. This common unlawful compensation scheme is communicated to Restaurant Employees and carried out by Crisantos and Romero directly. 55. Defendants’ practice results in Restaurant Employees being paid well below the applicable federal and State minimum wage for an average of 50 to 70 hours per week. 56. Second, Defendants never pay any of their Restaurant Employees at a rate of one and one-half times the applicable federal and State minimum wage rates for any of their hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 57. In other words, Defendants completely deny all Restaurant Employees, some who work over 70 hours per week, any overtime compensation at all. 58. Third, Defendants do not provide any of their Restaurant Employees with “spread of hours pay” when they work more than 10 hours a day – i.e., an additional hour of pay at the applicable State minimum wage rate on each day where the length of interval between the beginning and end of an employees’ work day exceeds 10 hours. C. Failure to Provide Notices of Pay Rate and Accurate Wage Statements 60. Throughout the statutory period, Defendants have never provided any of the Restaurant Employees with a Notice of Pay Rate. 61. The NYLL also requires that Defendants furnish the Restaurant Employees with accurate wage statements with each payment of wages. 62. Throughout the statutory period, Defendants have never furnished any wage statements at all to any of the Restaurant Employees. D. Plaintiff Adela Molina i. Background 63. Adela Molina worked at the Restaurants as an Assistant Cook, Delivery Worker, Server, Washer, and Cashier from approximately January 2010 through in or around January 2020. 64. Some of Ms. Molina’s duties as an Assistant Cook, Delivery Worker, Server, Washer, and Cashier included the following: serving food to the Restaurants’ customers; cleaning the Restaurants’ dining areas, kitchens, and bathrooms; restocking the Restaurants with supplies; managing the cash register; making food deliveries to the Restaurants’ customers; answering the Restaurants’ phones; and assisting the Cooks in meal preparation. 66. During this time, Ms. Molina consistently worked approximately 10 to 10.50 hours per day and approximately 60 to 63 hours per week. 67. From approximately January 2018 through January 2020, Ms. Molina generally worked five (5) days a week, from approximately 8:00 a.m. until approximately 6:00 p.m. or from 6:00 p.m. until approximately 4:00 a.m., but often worked an additional 15 to 30 minutes past the end of her shifts cleaning the Restaurants. 68. During this time, Ms. Molina consistently worked approximately 10 to 10.50 hours per day and approximately 50 to 52.50 hours per week. ii. Wage Violations 69. Beginning in approximately January 2014, Defendants informed Ms. Molina that they would pay her only $40.00 per day for working approximately 10 to 10.50 hours – amounting to only $4.00 to $3.80 per hour – significantly below the federal and the applicable State minimum wage rates. 70. Indeed, from approximately January 2014 through December 2015 and January 2017 through December 2017, Ms. Molina was paid $240.00 for working six (6) days a week. 71. This resulted in Ms. Molina being paid well below federal and the applicable State minimum wage rate for as many as 63 hours in a given week. 72. Ms. Molina was not paid any spread of hours pay for any shifts that she worked which exceeded 10 hours in length. 73. Further, Ms. Molina was never paid one and one-half times the applicable State minimum wage rate for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 75. For this week alone, Defendants failed to pay Ms. Molina an additional $420.00 in minimum wages1 and $110.00 in overtime wages.2 76. Starting in January 2018, Ms. Molina began working five (5) days a week. 77. Around this time, Defendants also increased her compensation to $75.00 per day for working approximately 10 to 10.50 hours – amounting to only $7.50 to $7.14 per hour. 78. Indeed, starting in January 2018, Ms. Molina was paid $375.00 for working five (5) days a week. 79. Despite the increased compensation, Defendants continued to deny Ms. Molina compensation at or above the applicable State minimum wage rate and sometimes even the federal minimum wage rate. 80. Moreover, Defendants continued to withhold spread of hours pay when Ms. Molina worked more than 10 hours per day. 81. Defendants similarly continued their common policy and scheme to never pay Ms. Molina any overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 82. By way of example, from May 8, 2018 to May 12, 2018, Ms. Molina worked 50 hours and received $375.00 for all 50 hours worked. 83. For this week alone, Defendants failed to pay Ms. Molina an additional $275.00 in minimum wages3 and $65.00 in overtime wages.4 85. Defendants never provided Ms. Molina with accurate wage statements. 86. In fact, Ms. Molina was not provided with any wage statements at all. 87. Ms. Molina had numerous conversations with other Restaurant Employees throughout the relevant time period, and they have confirmed that Defendants have never furnished a Notice of Pay Rate, or wage statements to any of the Restaurant Employees. 88. Through her conversations with other Restaurant Employees, Ms. Molina has learned that other Restaurant Employees were paid in a similar manner as herself. 89. Moreover, on occasion, Ms. Molina personally watched Defendants Crisantos and Romero paying other Restaurant Employees and saw that they were paid in the same manner as herself. E. Plaintiff Leticia Hernandez i. Background 90. Leticia Hernandez worked at the Restaurants as an Assistant Cook, Delivery Worker, Server, Washer, and Cashier from approximately January 2008 through in or around January 12, 2018, with intermittent periods therein during which she did not work for Defendants. 91. Some of Ms. Hernandez’s duties as an Assistant Cook, Delivery Worker, Server, Washer, and Cashier included the following: serving food to the Restaurants’ customers; cleaning the Restaurants’ dining areas, kitchens, and bathrooms; restocking the Restaurants with supplies; managing the cash register; making food deliveries to the Restaurants’ customers; answering the Restaurants’ phones; and assisting the Cooks in meal preparation. 93. During this time, Ms. Hernandez consistently worked approximately 10.50 to 11 hours per day and approximately 63 to 77 hours per week. 94. On several occasions, Ms. Hernandez worked this schedule for entire months without taking a day off. 95. From approximately January 2017 through January 2018, Ms. Hernandez generally worked four (4) to five (5) days a week, from approximately 6:00 p.m. until approximately 4:30 a.m., but often worked until 5:00 a.m. cleaning the Restaurants. 96. During this time, Ms. Hernandez consistently worked approximately 10.50 to 11 hours per day and approximately 42 to 55 hours per week. ii. Wage Violations 97. Beginning in approximately June 2014, Defendants informed Ms. Hernandez that they would pay her only $40.00 per day for working approximately 10.50 to 11 hours – amounting to only $3.80 to $3.63 per hour – significantly below the federal and the applicable State minimum wage rates. 98. Indeed, from approximately June 2014 through December 2016, Ms. Hernandez was paid $240.00 for working six (6) days a week or $280.00 for working seven (7) days a week. A. Background

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20. Chickens are highly sensitive and inquisitive animals. 22. Young chicks also exhibit varying degrees of object permanence—the ability to understand objects continue to exist even when they cannot perceive those objects. For example, days-old chicks retain the ability to tell the difference between shapes that are missing pieces and shapes that are merely partially hidden. Some chicks are even able to comprehend the continued existence of objects that have been completely hidden—an even more advanced form of object permanence. 23. Adult chickens are capable of even more cognitively and emotionally complex achievements. For example, chickens can perceive and predict time intervals. When encouraged to peck at a computer screen in six-minute intervals in order to receive food, chickens show they can estimate the passage of time by increasing their pecking frequency around the six-minute mark. 24. Chickens can also rationally discriminate between future outcomes and resist instant gratification to optimize future reward. When given a choice between a two-second delay followed by access to food for three seconds and a six- second delay followed by access for 22 seconds, chickens can hold out for the larger reward. 26. Chickens are capable of empathy—the ability to be affected by and share the emotional state of others. Hens watching their chicks exposed to even mildly negative stimuli (such as air puffs) vocalize in distress, spend less time grooming their feathers and more time standing alert, exhibit an increase in heart rate, and exhibit lower eye and comb temperatures (indicating constricted blood vessels and increased body core temperature). Hens exhibit similar responses even when they cannot hear the chicks’ distressed vocalizations. This suggests the hens can logically apply their knowledge of the unpleasant nature of air puffs. 27. Chickens pass cultural knowledge amongst themselves. Hens presented with a mixture of safe yellow and tainted blue corn kernels actively steer their chicks to yellow kernels. Hens who observe trained peers peck one of two keys for food learn to peck the same key. 29. Unsurprisingly, given their cognitive, emotional, and physical abilities and needs, chicken social interactions and hierarchies are complex. Hens and chicks begin calling to each other before the chicks have hatched. Mature chicken communication consists of at least twenty-four distinct vocalizations and a variety of displays. Chicken communication is “referential”—meaning that chickens modify their vocalizations and displays in order to convey information to others. For example, chickens will issue alarm calls of differing pitch and duration depending on both the type of predator and type of chickens present. A male chicken is more likely to issue an alarm call signaling aerial predators when hens are present. Chicken communication also demonstrates awareness of the perspectives of other animals—chickens will give longer alarm calls when under cover of a tree or bush, suggesting they understand the aerial predator cannot see them. 30. Each chicken is an individual with a distinct personality. Like humans, chickens can be more or less outgoing, brave, shy, fearful, or aggressive. Chickens’ personality quirks shape their interactions with other chickens. When placed together for the first time in reasonably sized social groupings, hens establish dominance hierarchies (called “pecking orders”). Chickens can recognize individuals, and distinguish which chickens are—or are not—part of their social group. When placed in new social groups, hens observe relationships between other hens and apply this information logically in order to inform their own interactions. 32. A growing population of American consumers believes it is important that the food industry treat farmed animals—including chickens—humanely. Many of these consumers base their purchasing decisions on animal welfare. These consumers are willing to spend more if it means that food sellers source their products from animals treated humanely. The food industry is well aware of, and monitors and reports on, this trend. 33. Defendants, under the Nellie’s corporate identity, design their egg cartons to appeal to these consumers. For example, cartons of Nellie’s eggs are emblazoned with a variety of the following cheerful slogans and representations of animal care: A. Chickens Are Sensitive, Inquisitive Animals Who Suffer if They Cannot Meet Their Physical, Behavioral, and Social Needs

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15. Chipotle owns and operates a nationwide chain of casual Mexican fast-food restaurants that has a fairly limited menu of tacos and burritos served on flour or corn tortillas, burrito bowls (a burrito without the tortilla), and salads. See Exhibit 1. Chipotle’s menu items can be filled with a selection of proteins such as chicken, steak, beef (“barbacoa”), pork (“carnitas”) or vegetables and tofu (“sofritas”). Customers can then select from a cafeteria style selection of toppings or condiments such as cheese, sour cream, salsa, guacamole, rice and beans. Chipotle also serves corn tortilla chips as well as a selection of soft-drinks like Coca-Cola, Diet Coke, Pibb Ultra and Sprite. Some Chipotle stores have alcoholic beverages such as beer and margaritas. 69. California Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation contained above, and incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. California Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the California Class. 70. The California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Civil Code section 1750, et seq., was designed and enacted to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices. To this end, the CLRA sets forth a list of unfair and deceptive acts and practices in Civil Code section 1770. 71. The CLRA applies to Chipotle’s actions and conduct described herein because it extends to the transactions involving the sale of goods or services for personal, family, or household use within the meaning of Civil Code section 1761. 72. At all relevant times, California Plaintiffs and members of the California Class were "consumers" as that term is defined in Civil Code section 1761(d). 81. California Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation contained above, and incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. California Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the California Class. 82. Each of the above deceptive and misleading advertising practices of Chipotle set forth above constitutes untrue or misleading advertising under the California False Advertising Law (“FAL”). Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq. 86. California Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation contained above, and incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. California Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the California Class. 87. Chipotle has engaged in unfair competition within the meaning of California Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq., because Chipotle’s conduct is unlawful, misleading and unfair as herein alleged. 88. California Plaintiffs, the members of the Class, and Chipotle are a “person” or “persons,” within the meaning of Section 17201 of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). A. Chipotle Markets Its Mexican Fast Food As Healthy Lifestyle Brand Violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq. On Behalf of the California Class Violation of California False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq. On Behalf of the California Class Violation of California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. On Behalf of the California Class Violation of Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201, et seq. On Behalf of the Florida Class

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21. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 22. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 4 23. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 24. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 25. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 26. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 27. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by two letters both dated December 8, 2018. (True and accurate copies of the letters are annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 28. The letters conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 29. The letters are “communications” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 30. The letters were the initial written communications Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 31. The letters were received and read by Plaintiff. 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to receive a clear, accurate and unambiguous validation notice, which allows a consumer to confirm that he or she owes the debt sought to be collected by the debt collector. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendant. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of this right. 34. The deprivation of Plaintiff's rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 5 37. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) requires the written notice provide “the amount of the debt.” 38. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), a statement of “the amount of the debt” must clearly convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the debt. 39. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), a statement of “the amount of the debt” must convey without ambiguity, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the debt. 40. The letters are for the same credit card ending in 11006. 41. The letters have different balances for the same credit card. 42. The first letter states the balance is $8,082.07, and the second letter states the balance is $1,113.75. 43. The least sophisticated consumer would be unsure whether the balance owed is $8,082.07 or $1,113.745. 44. The least sophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether the balance owed is $8,082.07 or $1,113.745. 45. The least sophisticated consumer would be unable to determine as to whether the amount of the alleged Debt is $8,082.07 or $1,113.745. 46. As a result, Defendant did not clearly convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the alleged Debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 47. As a result, Defendant did not accurately convey, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the alleged Debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 48. As a result, Defendant did not convey without ambiguity, from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, the actual amount of the alleged Debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 49. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 6 50. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 52. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 54. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318. 55. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319. 56. A collection letter also violates 15 63. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all 7 persons similarly situated in the State of New York. 64. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter substantially and materially similar to the Letter sent to Plaintiff, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 65. This action seeks a finding that Defendant's conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 66. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 67. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 68. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 69. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant's conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a cigar retail company that operates www.cigar.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services, including the ability to browse products for delivery, including cigar and related tobacco products, find information on promotions, as well as related goods and services available online. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in February 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to browse cigar and related tobacco products available for delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those specific Cigar and related tobacco products available for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 86. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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16. Encompass provides route reconnaissance, survey, map generation, well package development, title research, and other services for the oil and gas industry. See http://www.encompassservices.com/ 17. Encompass operates nationwide, with operations in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Texas, Minnesota, Colorado, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Maine. See http://www.encompassservices.com/contact-us 18. To offer these services, Encompass employs hundreds of field employees. 19. Encompass’ field employees’ job duties involve traveling to various job sites each day, operating oilfield related equipment, performing maintenance and troubleshooting on the equipment, and other duties required by Encompass. 20. These employees are paid a salary with job bonuses, day rates, or hourly with additional compensation. 22. The employees receiving a salary with job bonuses or day rates receive no overtime whatsoever. 23. The employees receiving hourly pay with additional monies do not receive overtime at the correct rate. 24. The FLSA, PMWA, and MA Acts require overtime to be paid at one and one half times the applicable “regular rate” of pay. 25. Encompass failed to include the additional money paid to hourly employees in calculating their overtime. 26. Plaintiff worked for Encompass in the surveying department. 27. Plaintiff used machetes and chainsaws to clear routes for pipelines. 28. Plaintiff walked oilfields, pastures, and farmland to assist a team in finding the path of least resistance during the pre-construction of a pipeline. 29. Plaintiff logged the location of obstacles, potential pipeline routes, and access points on maps. 30. Plaintiff operated surveying equipment. 31. Plaintiff set up survey markers. 32. Plaintiff manually operated survey guns. 33. Plaintiff assembled, maintained, disassembled, and carried survey related equipment. 34. Plaintiff used his hands and physical strength to clear obstacles from fields that may influence the pre-construction of pipelines. 35. Plaintiff worked long and hard hours in the field. 36. The majority of his work was routine and manual in nature, using hand tools and carrying heavy equipment. 38. Beyond being routine and manual in nature, all aspects of Plaintiff’s job was predetermined for him. 39. Encompass trains its employees how to operate the required equipment and perform the job. 40. Plaintiff was required to comply with Encompass’ strict policies and procedures governing each issue that arises throughout the job. 41. No specific degree or background is required to perform Plaintiff’s job; Encompass provides all the training necessary to perform the job the Encompass way. 42. Indeed, Plaintiff and all employees like him perform non-exempt job duties under the FLSA and related state laws. 43. Plaintiff and individuals like him work well over 40 hours a week; however, Encompass does not pay its employees overtime properly. 44. For doing the same or similar job duties, Plaintiff was paid under three different pay practices. 49. Encompass pays all of its field employees like Plaintiff under the pay practices described above. 50. Regardless of location, Encompass treats these employees the same and denied proper overtime. 52. Therefore, Encompass owes back overtime wages to all of their employees like Plaintiff. V. 53. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Encompass imposed on Plaintiff were similarly imposed on the field personnel employed in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and the rest of the United States. 54. Over one hundred employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which are in willful violation of the FLSA, PMWA, and the MA Acts. 55. Numerous other employees who worked with Plaintiff have indicated they were paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated properly for all hours worked as required by federal and state wage laws. 56. Based on his experiences and tenure with Encompass, Plaintiff is aware that Defendant’s pay practices or policies have been imposed on the FLSA 216(b) and Rule 23 Class Members. 57. The FLSA 216(b) and Rule 23 Class Members all were not afforded overtime compensation at the correct rates when they worked in excess of forty hours per week. 58. Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation as required by the FLSA, PMWA, and MA Acts result from generally applicable, systematic policies and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the class members. 59. Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the FLSA 216(b) and Rule 23 Class Members. 61. Plaintiff has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the FLSA 216(b) and Rule 23 Class Members, as defined herein. Like each member of the proposed classes, Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed under federal and state wage laws. 62. A hybrid class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 63. Absent this action, many FLSA 216(b) and Rule 23 Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Encompass will reap the unjust benefits of violating the applicable federal and state wage laws. 64. Furthermore, even if some of the FLSA 216(b) and Rule 23 Class Members could afford individual litigation against Encompass, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 65. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 67. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the FLSA 216(b) and Rule 23 Class Members’ claims. Plaintiff and the FLSA 216(b) and Rule 23 Class Members have sustained damages arising out of Encompass’ illegal and uniform employment policies. 68. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a class or collective action. 69. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective and class action treatment. VI.

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25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff cannabis products. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s various prices and specials which Defendant sends to promote its business. 27. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 0065 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 0065 Number. 30. Plaintiff has been registered with the national do-not-call registry since 2005. 32. The text messages originated from telephone number 562-478-6076, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 33. The number used by Defendant (562-478-6076) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 34. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 35. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 36. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 37. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 42. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 43. To transmit the messages at issue, the Platform automatically executed the following steps: a. The Platform retrieved each telephone number from a list of numbers in the sequential order the numbers were listed; b. The Platform then generated each number in the sequential order listed and combined each number with the content of Defendant’s message to create “packets” consisting of one telephone number and the message content; c. Each packet was then transmitted in the sequential order listed to an SMS aggregator, which acts an intermediary between the Platform, mobile carriers (e.g. AT&T), and consumers. d. Upon receipt of each packet, the SMS aggregator transmitted each packet – automatically and with no human intervention – to the respective mobile carrier for the telephone number, again in the sequential order listed by Defendant. Each mobile carrier then sent the message to its customer’s mobile telephone. 44. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 46. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention: 47. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 48. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she spent approximately ten minutes investigating the unwanted text messages including how they obtained her number and who the Defendant was. 49. Furthermore, Defendant’s text messages took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 51. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 52. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting Defendant’s goods and services, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and services; and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 53. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 56. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 57. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 64. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 65. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 66. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 67. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 68. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 69. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-61 as if fully set forth herein. 70. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 72. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 73. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 74. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 75. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 76. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”1 77. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 79. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 80. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 81. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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24. On or about March 13, 2020, Defendant caused the following automated text message to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 3993 (“3993 Number”): 25. Plaintiff is the sole user of the 3993 number. 26. Defendant’s text message constitutes telemarketing/advertising because it promotes Defendants business, goods and services. 27. Specifically, the text messages promote Defendant’s golfing membership services. 47. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 48. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message using the same type of equipment used to text message Plaintiff, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, for the purpose of advertising and/or promoting Defendant’s goods and/or services. 49. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 50. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the members of the Class number in the several thousands, if not more. 53. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and the Class Members’ cellular or residential telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that they obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 54. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to cellular telephone numbers is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 59. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. On or about February 9, 2015, ICR mailed a letter (“LETTER”) to 25. HOVERMALE seeks to certify a class of those persons to whom ICR sent a letter in an attempt to collect a student loan substantially in the same form as Exhibit 33. HOVERMALE realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 34. HOVERMALE is a “consumer” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 35. ICR is a “debt collector” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 36. The LETTER is a “communication” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 8. The purpose of ICR is and it is regularly engaged throughout the United States in the collection of financial obligations alleged to be due others. 9. Among other things, ICR’s website stated: MISSION STATEMENT: ICR is committed to providing superior debt recovery services while maintaining the highest level of professionalism and respect for all parties involved. This will be accomplished by the pledge to ensure that all consumer debtors maintain their dignity and self worth throughout the assistance being provided to them in resolving their outstanding debts. Since our inception in 1990, ICR has specialized in the recovery management and resolution of delinquent Perkins, Health Professional and Institutional student loans. ICR is fully registered and licensed to provide collection services in all 50 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, to the extent required by applicable law. In addition, ICR has experienced tremendous success resolving accounts from debtors in Europe and many other parts of the world.

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25. Defendant operates multiple stores throughout the United States, including its store located at 1339 W Cedar Ave, Denver, CO 80223. 26. Defendant offers its Website in connection with its physical locations. The goods and services offered by Defendant through its Website include but are not limited to the following: store locations and hours, contact information, the ability to make an online purchase, and related goods and services available both online and in stores. 27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s stores. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s stores and the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 28. Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen- reader user and uses it to access the Internet. 30. Due to Defendant’s failure to build its Website in a manner that is compatible with screen reader programs, Plaintiff is and was unable to understand, and thus is denied the benefit of, much of the content and services he wishes to access or use. For example: a. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. b. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. c. The Website also contains a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s stores on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 34. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. In fact, Plaintiff intends to return to the Website when it is equally accessible for visually-impaired consumers in order to complete his intended transaction, as it is more convenient for Plaintiff to access the Website to make a purchase than to travel to a physical location to make the same purchase. However, as long as the Access Barriers continue to exist on the Website, Plaintiff is prevented from making such a purchase. 35. These barriers, and others, deny Plaintiff full and equal access to all of the services the Website offers, and now deter him from attempting to use the Website and/or visit Defendant physical stores. Still, Plaintiff would like to, and intends to, attempt to access Defendant’s Website in the future to research the services the Website offers, or to test the Website for compliance with the ADA. 37. If the Website were accessible, i.e. if Defendant removed the access barriers described above, Plaintiff could independently research the Website’s offerings, including store locations and hours and promotions available at the its physical locations. 38. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually impaired people. 39. Though Defendant may have centralized policies regarding the maintenance and operation of its Website, upon and information and belief, Defendant has never had a plan or policy that is reasonably calculated to make its Website fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals with vision related disabilities. As a result, the complained of access barriers are permanent in nature and likely to persist. 40. The law requires that Defendant reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities by removing these existing access barriers. Removal of the barriers identified above is readily achievable and may be carried out without much difficulty or expense. 41. Plaintiff’s above request for injunctive relief is consistent with the work performed by the United States Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, and U.S. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (the “Access Board”), all of whom have relied upon or mandated that the public-facing pages of website complies with an international compliance standard known as Web Content Accessibility Guidelines version 42. Plaintiff and the Class have been, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to be, injured by Defendant’s failure to provide its online content and services in a manner that is compatible with screen reader technology. 43. Defendant has long known that screen reader technology is necessary for individuals with visual disabilities to access its online content and services, and that it is legally responsible for providing the same in a manner that is compatible with these auxiliary aids. 44. Indeed, the Disability Rights Section of the DOJ reaffirmed in a 2015 Statement of Interest before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts that it has been a “longstanding position” of the Department of Justice “that the ADA applies to website of public accommodations.” See National Association of the Deaf v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, No. 3:15-cv-300024-MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest in Opp. To Motion to Dismiss or Stay, Doc. 34, p. 4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“MIT Statement of Interest”); see also National Association of the Deaf. v. Harvard University, No. 3:15-cv-30023- MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Doc. 33, p.4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“Harvard Statement of Interest”). 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. While DOJ has rulemaking authority and can bring enforcement actions in court, Congress has not authorized it to provide an adjudicative administrative process to provide Plaintiff with relief. 48. Plaintiff alleges violations of existing and longstanding statutory and regulatory requirements to provide auxiliary aids or services necessary to ensure effective communication, and courts routinely decide these types of matters. 49. Resolution of Plaintiff’s claims does not require the Court to unravel intricate, technical facts, but rather involves consideration of facts within the conventional competence of the courts, e.g. (a) whether Defendant offers content and services on its Website, and (b) whether Plaintiff can access the content and services. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, thereby violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, like Plaintiff, are visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA by failing to remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 54. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. 55. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 56. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits throughout the United States. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant’s physical locations are a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 61. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 62. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 63. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 65. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 66. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 68. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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14. Based in Fort Worth, Texas, Pier 1 is a retailer of decorative home furnishings and gifts imported from countries around the world. Pier 1 maintains over 1,000 stores in the United States and Canada and operates as one segment consisting of the retail sales of decorative home furnishing, furniture, gifts, and related items. Although Pier 1 has traditionally been a “brick and mortar” retailer, during fiscal year 2013, the Company began to aggressively grow and develop online sales of its products. Specifically, on August 23, 2012, the Company announced the official launch of its new e-commerce website, Pier1.com. The Company launched Pier1.com as part of its “1 Pier 1” omni-channel initiative that sought to turn Pier 1 from an in-store retailer to a combined in-store and online retailer. 15. Through its new e-commerce website, the Company would allow customers to purchase products online and have them shipped directly to the Pier 1 store of their choice without incurring shipping charges. The new e-commerce website would also allow for easier navigation to locate the Company’s products while maintaining Pier 1’s renowned “treasure hunt” feel. With regards to the new e-commerce website, Chief Executive Officer Alex Smith expressed “extreme[] delight[] with the successful launch of our new e-Commerce enabled website, Pier1.com, which allows customers to shop our unique array of merchandise while selecting the shipping destination of their choice.” 59. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased the common stock of Pier 1 during the Class Period. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their families, directors, and officers of Pier 1 and their families and affiliates. 60. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. Pier 1 has over 86 million shares of common stock outstanding, owned by hundreds or thousands of investors. 62. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 63. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests which conflict with those of the Class. 64. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 70. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 71. During the Class Period, Defendants carried out a plan, scheme, and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (ii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Pier 1 common stock at artificially inflated prices. 72. Defendants: (i) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (ii) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading; and (iii) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of the Company’s common stock in an effort to maintain artificially high market prices for Pier 1 common stock in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 73. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about the Company’s financial well-being, operations, and prospects. 75. Defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions of material fact set forth herein, or recklessly disregarded the true facts that were available to them. Defendants engaged in this misconduct to conceal Pier 1’s true condition from the investing public and to support the artificially inflated prices of the Company’s common stock. 76. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially inflated prices for Pier 1 common stock. Plaintiff and the Class would not have purchased the Company’s common stock at the prices they paid, or at all, had they been aware that the market prices for Pier 1 common stock had been artificially inflated by Defendants’ fraudulent course of conduct. 77. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases of the Company’s common stock during the Class Period. 78. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 79. Plaintiff repeats, incorporates, and realleges each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. BACKGROUND For Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants For Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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1. Complaints Lodged with NHTSA 2. Customer Complaints on Third-Party Websites 31. The engines in the Class Vehicles produce power and then send that power to the 6L50 automatic transmission. The transmission then takes that power and delivers it to the rear drive wheels of the Class Vehicle, while ensuring the engine stays within predetermined revolutions per minute (“RPMs”). The transmission also seeks to maximize the efficiency of the Class Vehicles’ engines by balancing fuel consumption and torque. 32. As background, transmissions use toothed gears that interact with each other to produce torque. The term “gear ratio” refers to the relationship between gears. For example, if an input gear has 20 teeth and it interacts with an output gear that has 10 teeth, the 10-tooth gear must spin twice to fully spin the 20-tooth gear. A gear ratio is then calculated by taking the number of teeth on the output gear and dividing it by the input gear. In this example, the gear ratio would be 1:2 (typically expressed as 0.5:1). 34. The Class Vehicles were sold with a defective 6L50 Transmission that, among other things, slips, bucks, kicks, jerks and harshly engages; has premature internal wear, sudden acceleration, delay in downshifts, delayed acceleration and difficulty stopping the vehicle, and eventually suffers a catastrophic failure requiring replacement of the transmission. C. GM’s Longstanding Knowledge of the Defect 35. GM learned of the defective transmissions in 2014, if not earlier, and well before it began to sell and lease Class Vehicles, yet failed to disclose the Transmission Defect to Plaintiff and Class members through its advertising, including on vehicle window stickers or at the point of sale or lease. 37. Federal law requires automakers like GM to be in close contact with NHTSA regarding potential auto defects, including imposing a legal requirement (backed by criminal penalties) compelling the confidential disclosure of defects and related data by automakers to NHTSA, including field reports, customer complaints, and warranty data. See TREAD Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000). 38. Automakers, including GM, have a legal obligation to identify and report emerging safety-related defects to NHTSA under the Early Warning Report requirements. Id. Similarly, automakers, including GM, monitor NHTSA databases for consumer complaints regarding their automobiles as part of their ongoing obligation to identify potential defects in their vehicles, including safety-related defects. Id. Thus, GM knew or should have known of the many complaints about the Transmission Defect logged by NHTSA ODI, and the content, consistency, and large number of those complaints alerted, or should have alerted, GM to the Transmission Defect. 52. Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf, and on behalf of a nationwide class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3). Nationwide Class: All persons or entities in the United States who are current or former owners and/or lessees of a model year 2015- 2017 GMC Canyon and Chevrolet Colorado. 54. The Nationwide Class and the Florida Class shall be collectively referred to herein as the “Class.” Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its affiliates, employees, officers and directors, persons or entities that purchased the Class Vehicles for resale, and the Judge(s) assigned to this case. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify, change, or expand the various class definitions set forth above based on discovery and further investigation. 55. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claim. 56. Numerosity: Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff believes that hundreds of thousands of Class Vehicles have been sold and leased in the United States, and in each of the States that are within the Class. 58. Typicality: All of the Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class since Plaintiff purchased a Class Vehicle with a defective transmission, as did each member of the Class. Furthermore, Plaintiff and all members of the Class suffered monetary and economic injuries arising out of GM’s wrongful conduct. Plaintiff is advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of themselves and all absent Class members. 59. Adequacy: Plaintiff is an adequate representative because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class that she seeks to represent, she has retained counsel competent and highly experienced in complex class action litigation, and she intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. 61. GM has acted, and refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 62. Plaintiff and the Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 63. Plaintiff and the Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). 64. Defendant is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of 15 73. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 74. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the members of the Florida Class against Defendant. 75. Plaintiff and the members of the Florida Class are “consumers” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(7). 76. At all relevant times, Defendant was engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(8). 77. The purpose of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201, et seq., is to “protect the consuming public . . . from those who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Fla. Stat. § 501.202(2). 78. Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1). 80. Defendant has engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices, including representing that the Class Vehicles have characteristics, uses, benefits, and qualities which they do not have; representing that the Class Vehicles are of a particular standard and quality when they are not; advertising the Class Vehicles with the intent to not sell them as advertised; and otherwise engaging in conduct likely to deceive. Further, Defendant’s acts and practices described herein offend established public policy because of the harm they cause to consumers outweighs any benefit associated with such practices, and because Defendant fraudulently concealed the defective nature of the Class Vehicles from consumers. 82. Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered an injury in fact, including the loss of money or property, as a result of Defendant’s unfair, unlawful, and/or deceptive practices. In purchasing their Class Vehicles, Plaintiff and the other Class members relied on the misrepresentations and/or omissions of Defendant with respect to the reliability of the Class Vehicles. Defendant’s representations were untrue because the Class Vehicles were defectively designed and manufactured. Had Plaintiff and the other Class members known this, they would not have purchased their Class Vehicles and/or paid as much for them. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other Class members overpaid for their Class Vehicles and did not receive the benefit of their bargain. 84. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 85. Plaintiff bring this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the members of the Class against Defendant. 86. Defendant’s misrepresentations, nondisclosures, and/or concealment of material facts to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, as set forth above, were known, or through reasonable care should have been known, by Defendant to be false and material and were intended to mislead Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 87. Plaintiff and the Class were actually misled and deceived and were induced by Defendant to purchase the Class Vehicles which they would not otherwise have purchased, or would have paid substantially less for, absent Defendant’s fraudulent conduct. 89. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 90. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the members of the Class against Defendant. 91. Plaintiff and members of the Class conferred a benefit on Defendant by purchasing or leasing the Class Vehicles. 92. The benefit conferred by Plaintiff and members of the Class on Defendant was at the Plaintiff’s and Class members’ expense. 93. Defendant had knowledge that this benefit was conferred upon it. 94. Defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff, and its retention of this benefit under the circumstances would be inequitable. 95. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 97. Defendant expressly warranted that the Class Vehicles were of high quality and, at a minimum, would work properly. Defendant also expressly warranted that they would repair and/or replace defects in material and/or workmanship free of charge that occurred during the New Vehicle Limited Warranty and Powertrain Warranty. A. Brief Overview of the Class Vehicles’ Transmissions ACCELERATION AFTER GAS PEDAL IS PRESSED AND THEN CAN SURGE UNPREDICTABLY. I HAVE SEEN THIS ISSUE REPORTED IN GMC FORUMS BY OTHERS. GMC SAYS THERE ACCELERATING INTO THE TURN. AS A RESULT OF THE DELAY, I WAS NEARLY HIT BY ONCOMING TRAFFIC. THIS VEHICLE MODEL, 2016 GMC CANYON, HAS A HISTORY OF AND WHEN PULLING FROM ONE ROAD INTO TRAFFIC ON ANOTHER ROAD. THE SITUATION WHEN PULLING INTO TRAFFIC IS DANGEROUS BECAUSE THE TRUCK DOES NOT ANY PICK UP HAPPENS. DOESN'T SOUND LIKE MUCH, BUT NO OTHER CAR I HAVE HAD, DID THIS. AT THE SPEED OF ONCOMING VEHICLES, A 1-2 SECOND LAG CAN MEAN A 30 - 60 APPROXIMATE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 11,635. cc. DATE OF INCIDENT: December 6, 2017 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: December 6, 2017 BEING ARE BEING EXPERIENCED BY MANY CUSTOMERS. CHEVROLET IS NOT PROVIDING ANY SOLUTIONS". *TR] BREACH OF WRITTEN WARRANTY UNDER THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class, or Alternatively, the Florida Class) BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the State Classes) BULLETIN #PIP5342 WHICH STATES "SHUDDER OR CHUGGLE WHEN ACCELERATING AT LOW SPEEDS OF 12-15 MPH IN SECOND GEAR IS NORMAL OPERATION OF THE AUTOMATIC COMMON LAW FRAUD (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Florida Class) DRIVING BUT STRESSFUL AS WELL, BECAUSE I FEEL AS IF MY SAFETY IS IN JEOPARDY DUE TO THIS "LEARNING" TRANSMISSION. IT'S SO DISAPPOINTING. yy. DATE OF INCIDENT: July 30, 2016 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: September 17, 2016 FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 6,000. oo. DATE OF INCIDENT: October 1, 2015 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: July 1, 2016 GEAR BY 15 MILES PER HOUR AND NEVER GOES ABOVE 2K RPM'S??? I ADMIT I AM A BIT LIGHT-FOOTED ON DRIVING, WHICH GEAR, HESITATES AGAIN, AND THEN DROPS TO AN EVEN LOWER GEAR AND OVER ACCELERATES. WHAT I HAVE OBSERVED IS THAT THE VEHICLE IS TOO EAGER TO UPSHIFT MANUAL APPROACH IS TO CAUSE THE VEHICLE TO ACCELERATE RADICALLY IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF OBSCURED CORNERS AND UPHILL DRIVING. I BELIEVE THIS MORE LATER THE TRANSMISSION REACTS. IN HEAVY TRAFFIC, A COUPLE OF CARS GET BETWEEN ME AND THE CAR I WAS FOLLOWING BEFORE IT REACTS AND I HAVE TO NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE AND INFORMED THE CONTACT THAT THE REMEDY WOULD BE AT HIS EXPENSE. THE CONTACT STATED THAT HE WAS NEVER NOTIFIED BY THE NOTIFIED. THE VEHICLE WAS NOT REPAIRED. THE MANUFACTURER ISSUED A LETTER RELATED TO THE ISSUE (PIP 5342A, DATED 12/21/2015). THE APPROXIMATE FAILURE NOTIFIED OF THE FAILURE. THE FAILURE MILEAGE WAS 18,000. ...UPDATED 09/14/16 *BF pp. DATE OF INCIDENT: July 3, 2015 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: July 5, 2016 OF OWNERSHIP, BUT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I NEARLY HAD A DANGEROUS COLLISION. GMC SHOULD CORRECT THIS PROBLEM WITH THE TRANSMISSION NOT BEING IN THE REACTING WHEN YOU NEED TO GET THE POWER FROM THE ENGINE. ll. DATE OF INCIDENT: April 1, 2015 DATE COMPLAINT FILED: April 7, 2016 SLOW TRANSMISSION THAT IS ALWAYS IN THE WRONG GEAR. CURRENTLY I AM AT 7,000 MILES. THE ONLY THING THE TECH COULD SAY WAS NOT TO DRIVE IT IN STOP AND GO STOP AND GO CITY TRAFFIC. I THINK THE OVERARCHING PROBLEM HERE IS THE SHIFT POINTS THAT THE ECM HAS DETERMINED (OR BEEN THEN IT FINALLY PICKS A LOW GEAR AND VIOLENTLY THROWS THE DRIVER AND PASSENGERS BACK AND ROARS TO LIFE. THE 2 OR MORE SECONDS OF HESITATION COULD THE SAME CONDITIONS - DRY ROADS, DAYTIME, GOING DOWNHILL ON A HIGHWAY. THERE WERE NOT ANY WARNINGS, AND NONE OF THE SERVICE LIGHTS CAME ON. THEN JUMPS GEARS TO PICK UP SPEED. DRIVING ON CRUISE IN MODERATE HILLS, VEHICLE WILL NOT DOWN SHIFT SOON ENOUGH UNTIL EVENTUALLY ENOUGH SPEED IS THE VEHICLE WAS DRIVEN. IT'S GETTING WORSE.THIS DRIVER BELIEVES THE UNSAFE OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF THIS VEHICLE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, IS EXACERBATED TIME THEY DID A SOFTWARE UPDATE BUT STILL DOING SAME PROBLEM. DEALER SAY'S TRUCK NORMAL. WAITING FOR AN ACCIDENT BECAUSE TRANSMISSION WILL NOT TO GEAR. ITS FUNNY BECAUSE I HAVE DRIVEN A LOT OF VEHICLES AND NONE OF THEM HAVE DONE THAT OR TOOK THAT LONG TO SHIFT. I KNOW THE TRANSMISSION IS TO THE DEALER FOR AN EXHAUST SENSOR REPLACEMENT AND TOLD THEM ABOUT THE SHIFTING PROBLEM. THEY CLAIMED TO DO A COMPUTER UPDATE AND SAID IT WAS UNJUST ENRICHMENT (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the State Classes) VIOLATIONS OF THE FLORIDA DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (On Behalf of the Florida Class)

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15. Plaintiff received medical services from St. Charles- Catholic Health Services of Long Island. 16. At the time of receipt of the medical services, Plaintiff had health insurance under a Preferred Provider Organization (“PPO”) through AETNA. 17. At the time of the receipt of the medical services, Plaintiff provided the insurance information to the medical facility. 18. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff also documented the insurance details in the intake papers at the medical facility. 19. The medical facility nevertheless billed Plaintiff $1,042.00 (“the alleged Debt”). 20. New York State law forbids the billing of any unpaid balance directly to a patient who is covered by a PPO. 21. The alleged Debt represents such unlawful billing. 22. Despite this, at an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 23. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by written correspondence. 24. Rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party vendor to perform such activities on its behalf. 25. As part of its utilization of the third-party vendor, Defendant conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt to the third-party vendor by electronic means. 4 26. The information conveyed by Defendant to the third-party vendor included Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the account number, the entity to which Plaintiff allegedly owed the debt, and the fact that the alleged Debt concerned Plaintiff’s medical treatment, among other things. 27. Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to the third- party vendor is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 28. The third-party vendor then populated some or all this information into a prewritten template, printed, and mailed the correspondence to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction. 29. That correspondence, dated December 29, 2020, was received, and read by Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that correspondence (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 30. The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff’s concrete interests and rights. 32. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from collection efforts on debts Plaintiff does not owe. 33. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from unwarranted threats to Plaintiff’s credit rating. 34. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from the fear of being sued on debts Plaintiff does not owe. 35. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from debt collectors, including Defendant. 36. As set forth herein, Defendant deprived Plaintiff of these rights. 5 37. Plaintiff’s injury is “particularized” and “actual” in that the conduct that deprived Plaintiff of his rights was directed by Defendant to Plaintiff specifically. 38. Plaintiff’s injury is directly traceable to Defendant’s conduct because Defendant initiated the communications, and but for Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff would not have been deprived of his rights. 39. Plaintiff has been misled by Defendant’s conduct. 40. Defendant’s conduct as described in this Complaint was willful, with the purpose to either harm Plaintiff or with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff that could result from Defendant’s conduct. 41. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court’s intervention, Defendant will continue to use abusive, deceptive, unfair, and unlawful means in its attempts to collect the alleged Debt and other alleged debts. 42. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court’s intervention, Defendant will ultimately cause Plaintiff unwarranted economic harm. 43. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court’s intervention, Defendant will ultimately cause Plaintiff unwarranted harm to Plaintiff’s credit rating. 44. Plaintiff justifiably fears that, absent this Court’s intervention, Defendant will ultimately cause Plaintiff to be sued for a debt Plaintiff does not owe. 45. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff wasted time, was caused to be confused and unsure as to Plaintiff’s rights, and ultimately sought counsel and advice causing Plaintiff the risk of incurring damages including reasonable attorneys’ fees in reviewing Plaintiff’s rights under the law and prosecuting this claim. 6 46. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff’s counsel was caused to expend time, energy, and money to investigate Plaintiff’s rights under the law and the legitimacy of the alleged Debt. 47. The deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights will be redressed by a favorable decision herein. 48. A favorable decision herein would redress Plaintiff’s injury with money damages. 49. A favorable decision herein would serve to deter Defendant from further similar conduct. 50. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.” 52. The third-party vendor does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 53. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning the alleged Debt. 54. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 55. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 7 56. Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized a third-party vendor for these purposes thousands of times. 57. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor in this regard for the sole purpose of maximizing its profits. 58. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to such third-party. 59. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such private and sensitive information. 60. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 62. The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable. 63. Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to the third-party vendor. 64. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 65. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 66. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 8 67. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 68. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 69. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 70. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a certain amount of money when the consumer does not that amount is a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10). 71. As set forth in paragraphs 15 through 21 of this Complaint, Plaintiff did not owe the alleged Debt. 72. As such, Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff owed the alleged Debt is a false, deceptive, and/or misleading representation made in connection with the collection of the alleged debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 73. Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff owed the alleged Debt is a false representation of the character, amount, and/or legal status of the alleged debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 74. Defendant’s allegation that Plaintiff owed the alleged Debt is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 75. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 76. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 9 77. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 78. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 79. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 80. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 81. A collection letter also violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if it is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer. 82. For this reason, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their creditor, to disclose such information clearly and accurately. 83. The failure to provide the aforementioned disclosure makes the collection letter deceptive under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 84. The Letter states the Creditor as Tie Account Header (See below). 85. The Letter fails to clarify what Tie Account Header is or what it means. 86. Therefore, Defendant did not clearly and accurately convey the Creditor of the alleged debt and made its Letter susceptible to an inaccurate reading and confusing interpretation. 87. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 88. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all 10 consumers similarly situated in the State of New York. 89. Plaintiff seeks to certify two classes of: i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third-party vendor without obtaining the prior consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. ii. All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter stating the creditor entity to be Tie Account Header (See below), which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 90. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 91. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 92. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 93. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 94. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s 11 conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10) Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and § 1692f Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10)

win

35. Sterling is among the largest of the nation’s employment background screening companies, i.e., those that provide “consumer reports,” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(B), to employers. 36. In order to provide these consumer reports, Sterling investigates and reviews public record databases and assembles and/or maintains consumer files which contain public record information concerning, among other things, the alleged criminal record history of individuals. Sterling then sells this information to employers, including Hertz. 37. Upon information and belief, as part of the services Sterling offers to its employer customers, Sterling agrees to send FCRA- required “pre-adverse action” notices to consumers on behalf of its employer-customers. Upon information and belief, Hertz has contracted with Sterling to provide this service. Plaintiff Lee’s Experience 38. In June 2012, while in Richmond, California, visiting relatives, Mr. Lee was arrested. 39. Mr. Lee was subsequently charged with felony possession of a controlled substance for sale with a gang enhancement (the “June 2012 charges”). 40. While the June 2012 charges were pending, in May 2014, Hertz personnel Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page6 of 23 - 7 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 recruited Mr. Lee to interview for a counter sales representative position with Hertz at its Dollar/ Thrifty-branded car rental location at San Francisco International Airport. 41. At the time Hertz recruited him for a position with the company, Mr. Lee worked for a competitor car rental company in a similar position. 42. Mr. Lee interviewed for the position with Hertz sometime in the first half of May 2014. At the close of the interview, Mr. Lee was given an offer of employment, pending the processing of his application materials. 43. To begin this process, a Hertz representative instructed Mr. Lee to complete an online application by following a link sent to him via email. 44. Mr. Lee completed the online application as instructed. 45. On May 15, 2014, Mr. Lee received an email from Kimberly Kowallis (“Ms. Kowallis”), a field recruiter for Hertz, confirming his conditional offer of employment. 46. On May 27, 2014, after Mr. Lee had passed Hertz’s mandatory drug screening, he received an email from Ms. Kowallis with a link to an addendum to the Hertz application specific to California and Hawaii. The email requested that Mr. Lee complete the online application addendum. 47. Mr. Lee completed the online application addendum as instructed. 48. Also on May 27, 2014, Mr. Lee received an email from Ms. Kowallis with the subject line “Hertz Orientation Package.” This email provided information about Mr. Lee’s onboarding with Hertz. 49. Ms. Kowallis subsequently scheduled Mr. Lee to begin working for Hertz on June 9, 2014. After receiving confirmation of his start date with Hertz, Mr. Lee provided a notice of resignation, effective June 9, 2014, to his then-current employer. 50. At some point during the processing of Mr. Lee’s application, Hertz obtained one or more consumer reports from Sterling containing information about Mr. Lee’s background, one or more of which included information regarding the June 2012 criminal charges pending against Mr. Lee. Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page7 of 23 - 8 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 51. At no point during the processing of his employment application did Hertz provide Mr. Lee with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in the form of a written document that consisted solely of the disclosure, that it may obtain a consumer report for employment purposes, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). 52. Likewise, at no point during the processing of Mr. Lee’s employment application did Hertz obtain Mr. Lee’s authorization in the form of a written document for the procurement of a consumer report, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). 53. On June 3, 2014, Mr. Lee received a call from Ms. Kowallis informing him that Hertz would not hire him because of the criminal history information contained in his background check. Ms. Kowallis told Mr. Lee that she could not do anything about his rejection because the decision was based on “Hertz policy.” 54. Mr. Lee asked Ms. Kowallis for a copy of the background check information that Hertz had obtained and was instructed to contact Sterling. 55. Later that same day, Mr. Lee received an email from Ms. Kowallis confirming that Hertz had, indeed, rescinded his job offer because he did not meet the company’s “background qualifications.” 56. As a result of the criminal history information contained in the consumer report it procured from Sterling, Hertz stopped the onboarding process, and did not move forward with the job that it had offered Mr. Lee. 57. After Ms. Kowallis informed Mr. Lee that he would not be hired because of criminal history information contained in his background check on June 3, 2014, Mr. Lee contacted Sterling by phone and requested a copy of the consumer report that Sterling provided to Hertz in connection with Mr. Lee’s application for employment. 58. In response to Mr. Lee’s request, sometime on or after June 3, 2014, Sterling sent Mr. Lee by regular mail a copy of a consumer report prepared by Sterling, which included information about the June 2012 charges (the “June 3rd package”). Mr. Lee did not receive a copy the June 3rd package until sometime after June 3, 2014. Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page8 of 23 - 9 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 59. Sometime on or after June 4, 2014, Sterling sent to Mr. Lee by regular mail an undated letter that was inaccurately entitled “Pre-Adverse Action Notice,” and which bore Hertz corporate logo (the “June 4th Letter'”). Enclosed with the June 4th letter was a copy of a consumer report prepared by Sterling dated June 4, 2014, which contained information about the June 2012 charges. 60. Mr. Lee did not receive the June 4th Letter, which upon information and belief, was sent by Sterling pursuant to its contract with Hertz, until sometime after June 4, 2014. 61. The June 4th Letter informed Mr. Lee that, based on a “Criminal Report” provided by Sterling, Hertz was considering revoking Mr. Lee’s conditional offer of employment, subject to Mr. Lee successfully challenging the accuracy of the criminal report information. 62. At the time that Sterling mailed Mr. Lee the June 3rd package and the June 4th letter (as well as at the time Mr. Lee received them), however, Sterling had already provided Hertz with a copy of Mr. Lee’s consumer report containing information about the June 2012 criminal charges, and Hertz had already revoked Mr. Lee’s conditional offer of employment based upon information contained in that consumer report. Factual Allegations Common to All Class Members 63. Employers commonly use criminal background screening reports to determine employment eligibility. A significant percentage of these reports, however, contain incomplete, inaccurate, misleading, or improper records that can erroneously disqualify a job applicant or employee. Recognizing this danger, Congress provided strict reporting and disclosure requirements in the FCRA to ensure that prospective employees have the opportunity to review reports summarizing their background information and to contest any inaccuracies and illegal disclosures and/or provide additional information before these reports influence employment decisions. 64. The FCRA requires that “before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on [a consumer report],” the employer taking the adverse action must provide “the consumer Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page9 of 23 - 10 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 to whom the report relates” with: (i) a copy of the report; and (ii) a description in writing of the rights of the consumer under this subchapter, as prescribed by the [Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau under section 1681g(c)(3). 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i) and (ii). 65. The FCRA defines adverse action as either “a denial of employment or any other decision for employment purposes that adversely affects any current or prospective employee,” or “any action taken or determination that is . . . adverse to the interests of the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(k)(l)(B). 66. A consumer reporting agency’s delivery of a consumer report containing information likely to prove detrimental to the consumer’s ability to secure employment is an “adverse action” in itself under this section. See Mattiaccio v. DHA Grp., Inc., No. 12 Civ. 1249, 2014 WL 717780, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2014) (citing Adams v. Nat’l Eng’g Serv. Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 319, 332 (D. Conn. 2009) (summary judgment denied on grounds that a reasonable jury could deem CRA’s delivery of negative consumer report a FCRA “adverse action”)). 67. Hertz and Sterling have routinely and systematically failed to provide Plaintiff and other job applicants with a copy of their consumer reports prior to taking adverse actions against them. 68. Hertz and Sterling further have routinely and systematically failed to provide Plaintiff and other job applicants with a summary of their rights under the FCRA prior to taking adverse actions against them. 69. The FCRA also requires that employers “may not procure a consumer report or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with respect to any consumer,” unless: (i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be procured, in a document Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page10 of 23 - 11 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report by that person. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(B)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). 70. Hertz routinely and systematically violates these provisions by failing to (1) provide “clear and conspicuous” disclosures in writing, in a document that consists solely of the disclosures, that a consumer report may be obtained and (2) obtain applicants’ authorization in writing to procure a consumer reports for employment purposes. 71. Finally, the FCRA mandates that any consumer reporting agency that “furnishes a consumer report for employment purposes” and, in so doing, “compiles and reports items of information on consumers which are matters of public record and are likely to have an adverse effect upon the consumer’s ability to obtain employment” shall: 1) at the time such public record information is reported to the user of such consumer report, notify the consumer of the fact that public record information is being reported by the consumer reporting agency, together with the name and address of the person to whom such information is being reported; or 2) maintain strict procedures designed to [ensure] that whenever public record information which is likely to have an adverse effect on a consumer’s ability to obtain employment is reported it is complete and up to date. 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(1) and (2). 72. Sterling routinely and systematically fails to provide consumers with timely notice of its reporting of public-record information likely to have an adverse effect on the consumer’s ability to obtain employment. Sterling also routinely and systematically fails to maintain strict procedures to ensure that the public record information that it reports is complete and current. See Poore v. Sterling Testing Sys., 410 F. Supp. 2d 557, 572 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (expressing concern over the absence of “any information regarding any procedures that Sterling may employ to ensure” the accuracy of information received from various subsidiaries and Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page11 of 23 - 12 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 affiliates); Jones v. Sterling Infosystems, Inc., No. 14-cv-3076 (S.D.N.Y.). 73. In failing to fulfill either of these obligations, Sterling systematically violates 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a). 74. Defendants have acted willfully in violating the requirements of the FCRA. Defendants knew or should have known about their obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well-established by the plain language of the FCRA and in the promulgations and opinion letters of the Federal Trade Commission. 75. Despite Defendants’ awareness of their legal obligations, Defendants have acted consciously in breaching their known duties and depriving Plaintiff and other job applicants of their rights under the FCRA. 76. At a minimum, Defendants’ conduct has been reckless in failing to make an appropriate inquiry to ascertain its obligations under the FCRA. 77. Mr. Lee brings this Class Action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of himself and five classes of persons. 78. Plaintiff asserts the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action against Hertz and Sterling on behalf of the “FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class” and “FCRA Summary of Rights Class” defined as follows: FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class: All applicants for employment with Hertz in the United States within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final judgment who were subject to an adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in a consumer report without receiving a copy of the consumer report at least five business days prior to the adverse action, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i). FCRA Summary of Rights Class: All applicants for employment with Hertz in the United States within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final judgment who were subject to an adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in a consumer report without receiving a written description of their rights under the FCRA at least five business days prior to the adverse action, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii). Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page12 of 23 - 13 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 79. Plaintiff asserts the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action against Hertz on behalf of the “FCRA Disclosure Class” and the “FCRA Authorization Class” defined as follows: FCRA Disclosure Class: All applicants for employment with Hertz in the United States within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final judgment about whom Hertz procured a consumer report without providing a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consisted solely of the disclosure, prior to procuring the consumer report, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). FCRA Authorization Class: All applicants for employment with Hertz in the United States within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final judgment about whom Hertz procured a consumer report without obtaining the applicants’ authorization in writing prior to procuring the consumer report, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). 80. Plaintiff asserts the Seventh Cause of Action against Sterling on behalf of the “Adverse Public-Record Information Class” defined as follows: Adverse Public-Record Information Class: All applicants for employment with Hertz in the United States, except for in New York State, within five years of the filing of this complaint through the date of final judgment about whom Sterling delivered a consumer report to Hertz containing public-record information likely to adversely affect the applicant’s ability to obtain employment without either providing advance notice to the affected applicant or maintaining strict procedures to ensure the information reported was complete and up to date, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a). 81. The members of the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class, FCRA Summary of Rights Class, the FCRA Disclosure Class, the FCA Authorization Class, and the Adverse Public- Record Information Class are collectively referred to as “Class Members.” 82. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of above-defined classes based on discovery or legal developments. 83. The Class Members identified herein are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Hertz employs over 30,000 workers worldwide, with the vast majority located within the United States. Although Plaintiff does not know the precise number of job applicants Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page13 of 23 - 14 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 harmed by Defendants’ violations of FCRA, the number is far greater than feasibly could be addressed through joinder. The precise number is also uniquely within Defendants’ possession. 84. There are questions of law and fact common to Class Members, and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Common questions include, among others: a. whether Defendants violated FCRA by taking adverse action, based wholly or in part on information contained a consumer report, against Plaintiff and other members of the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class without first providing them with a copy of the consumer report and at least five business days to respond, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i); b. whether Defendants violated FCRA by taking adverse action, based wholly or in part on information contained in a consumer report, against Plaintiff and other members of the FCRA Summary of Rights Class without first providing them with a written summary of their rights under FCRA and at least five business days to respond, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii); c. whether Hertz violated FCRA by failing to provide Plaintiff and the FCRA Disclosure Class with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consisted solely of the disclosure, prior to procuring their consumer reports for employment purposes, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i); d. whether Hertz violated FCRA by failing to obtain from Plaintiff and the FCRA Authorization Class authorization in writing prior to procuring their consumer reports for employment purposes, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii); e. whether Sterling violated FCRA by failing either to inform Plaintiff of the Adverse Public-Record Information Class of its intent to deliver public-record information likely to adversely affect their ability to obtain employment or to maintain strict procedures sufficient to ensure that the adverse public-record information was complete and up to date; f. whether Defendants were willful in their noncompliance with the requirements of FCRA; Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page14 of 23 - 15 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 g. whether Defendants were negligent in their noncompliance with the requirements of FCRA; and h. whether equitable remedies, injunctive relief, statutory damages, compensatory damages, and punitive damages for Class Members are warranted. 85. Mr. Lee is a member of the classes he seeks to represent. Defendants failed to provide Mr. Lee with a copy of the consumer report or a notice of his rights under FCRA prior to taking adverse action against him, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) (i) and (ii). Additionally, Hertz failed to provide Mr. Lee with a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document consisting solely of the disclosure, or obtain from Mr. Lee authorization in writing to procure a consumer report for employment purposes prior to procuring such a report, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). Finally, Sterling failed to either inform Mr. Lee of its reporting to Hertz of public record information likely to adversely affect his ability to secure employment, or to maintain strict procedures sufficient to ensure that the information was complete and up to date, prior to delivering the information to Hertz, as required under 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a). 86. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the classes he seeks to represent. Upon information and belief, it is Defendants’ standard practice to take adverse action against applicants without first providing affected individuals with a copy of their consumer reports and a written summary of their rights under FCRA. Additionally, upon information and belief, it is Hertz’s standard practice to procure consumer reports without first providing a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to applicants, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, or obtaining their written authorization. Finally, upon information and belief, it is Sterling’s standard practice to deliver to Hertz public-record information likely to prove detrimental to the ability of applicants to obtain employment without first (a) notifying the applicants of the fact that the public record information is being reported and the name and address of the recipient; or (b) maintaining strict procedures to ensure the information is Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page15 of 23 - 16 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 complete and up to date. Mr. Lee is entitled to relief under the same causes of action as other Class Members. 87. Mr. Lee will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members. Mr. Lee has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in complex class actions, employment litigation, and the intersection thereof. There is no conflict between Mr. Lee and the Class Members. 88. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because the Defendants have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class Members, making declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate with respect to Mr. Lee and the Class Members as a whole. The Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief to end Defendants’ common, uniform, unfair discriminatory—and illegal— policies and practices. 89. Class certification is also appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of fact and law predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Class Members have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of Defendants’ uniform policies and practices. Because Defendants have maintained a common policy of failing to properly inform Class Members of their rights under FCRA, many Class Members are likely unaware that their rights have been violated. 90. The amount of each Class Member’s individual claim is also small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. The FCRA has statutorily specified damages, which Class Members will prove at trial are warranted, that will render calculation of damages for Class Members highly straightforward. The propriety and amount of punitive damages are based on Defendants’ conduct, making these issues common to Class Members. Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page16 of 23 - 17 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 91. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 92. Hertz procured consumer reports containing information regarding Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Members from a consumer reporting agency. 93. Hertz took adverse employment actions against Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Members based in whole or in part on the information contained within those consumer reports. 94. Prior to taking these adverse employment actions, Hertz failed to provide Plaintiff and each FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Member with a copy of his or her consumer report and a reasonable amount of time to respond. 95. As a result of Hertz’s actions, Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and effectively contesting the adverse action. 96. Hertz’s conduct was willful, making it liable for actual or statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 97. Alternatively, Hertz’s actions were negligent, rendering it liable for actual damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. 98. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 99. Hertz procured consumer reports containing information regarding Plaintiff and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class Members from a consumer reporting agency. Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page17 of 23 - 18 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 100. Hertz took adverse employment actions against Plaintiff and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class Members based in whole or in part on the information contained within those consumer reports. 101. Prior to taking these adverse employment actions, Hertz failed to provide Plaintiff and each FCRA Summary of Rights Class Member with a summary of his or her rights under FCRA and a reasonable amount of time to respond. 102. As a result of Hertz’s actions, Plaintiff and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and effectively contesting the adverse action. 103. Hertz’s conduct was willful, making it liable for actual or statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 104. Alternatively, Hertz’s actions were negligent, rendering it liable for actual damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. Background Information Hertz’s Failure to Provide Consumer Report Copy Prior to Taking Adverse Action (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Himself and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class) Hertz’s Failure to Provide Summary of Rights Prior to Taking Adverse Action (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii), Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Himself and the FCRA Summary of Rights Class) Sterling’s Failure to Provide Consumer Report Copy Prior to Taking Adverse Action (15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i), Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Himself and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class) 105. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as alleged above. 106. Sterling has compiled and delivered to Hertz consumer reports containing information regarding Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Members that were likely to prove harmful to the ability of Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Members to obtain employment. 107. Each instance of delivery of this information constituted an adverse action as defined by FCRA and prevailing case law. 108. Prior to taking these adverse employment actions, Sterling failed to provide Plaintiff and each FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Member with a copy of his or her consumer report. Case4:15-cv-02545-JSW Document1 Filed06/09/15 Page18 of 23 - 19 - Complaint for Violations of FCRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 109. As a result of Sterling’s actions, Plaintiff and the FCRA Consumer Report Copy Class Members have been deprived of their consumer rights and prevented from timely and effectively contesting the adverse action. 110. Sterling’s conduct was willful, making it liable for actual or statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 111. Alternatively, Sterling’s actions were negligent, rendering it liable for actual damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.

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19. SPS is a mortgage “servicer” as that term is defined by 12 C.F.R. § 1024.2(b) and 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(2). SPS is the current servicer of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ notes, and 6 mortgages on real property that secure those notes (collectively referred to hereinafter as the “loans”). 20. Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ loans are each a “federally related mortgage loan” as said term is defined by RESPA and Regulation X. 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1); 12 C.F.R. § 1024.2(b). 21. SPS is subject to the requirements of RESPA and Regulation X, and does not qualify for the exception for “small servicers”—as defined by 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(e)(4)—nor for the exemption for a “qualified lender”—as defined by 12 C.F.R. § 617.700. 22. Plaintiffs and Class members submitted RFIs and/or NOEs (collectively, the “RESPA Request Letters”) to SPS, each of which were “qualified written requests,” as that term is defined by 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). 23. In response to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters, SPS replied with form letters claiming an “active litigation” exception to its obligations, and otherwise refused to provide a substantive response to such correspondence. 24. Plaintiffs and certain Class members—i.e., members of “Subclass 1,” defined below—sent NOEs to SPS concerning SPS’s insufficient responses to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters (the “Follow-up NOEs”). 25. SPS failed to provide adequate responses to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters. Specifically, SPS has not provided any of the requested information or performed a reasonable investigation into or correction of any alleged errors concerning Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ loans, as required by 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36, and 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(B)-(C). 7 26. Plaintiffs and Class members were harmed because they incurred the expenses associated with sending the RESPA Request Letters—such as their time, postage, etc.—but they did not receive the information or the reasonable investigation into or correction of asserted errors to which they were legally entitled, pursuant to RESPA and Regulation X. 27. Subsequently, Plaintiffs and certain Class members—i.e., members of “Subclass 1,” defined below—sent NOEs to SPS concerning SPS’s insufficient responses to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters (the “Follow-up NOEs”). 28. In response to Plaintiffs’ and Subclass 1 members’ Follow-up NOEs, SPS again replied with form letters claiming an “active litigation” exception to its obligations, and otherwise refused to provide a substantive response to such correspondence. 29. Based upon its responses to Plaintiffs’ and Subclass 1 members’ Follow-up NOEs, SPS did not conduct any investigation into the specific errors made by the Plaintiffs and class members, nor did SPS attempt to correct those errors. Instead, SPS continued to rely on an “active litigation” exception, claiming that SPS would provide no response because the issues raised were the same or very closely related to the issues raised in pending litigation. 30. Had SPS adequately responded to Plaintiffs’ and Subclass 1 members’ RESPA Request Letters, Plaintiffs and Subclass 1 members would not have needed to send the Follow- up NOEs regarding SPS’s erroneous assertion of an “active litigation” exception to its obligations under RESPA and Regulation X. As such, Plaintiffs and Subclass 1 members were further harmed by SPS’s failure to adequately respond to their RESPA Request Letters because it required them to incur the expenses associated with sending the Follow-up NOEs—such as their time, postage, etc. 8 31. As most homeowners sending RESPA Request Letters are involved in defending against foreclosure, accepting this kind of conduct would allow creditors to hide behind the foreclosure process to unlawfully extinguish their obligations under RESPA and Regulation X. 32. Plaintiffs and Class members are asserting claims for relief against SPS for breach of the duties owed to them, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e), 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35, and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36. 33. Plaintiffs and Class members have a private right of action, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f), for the claimed breaches, and RESPA provides for remedies including actual damages, costs, statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees. 34. On December 13, 2017, Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, sent an NOE to SPS via Certified Mail (See, NOE sent from Plaintiffs to SPS, attached hereto as Exhibit 1 (“NOE #1”)). 35. On December 29, 2017, SPS responded to NOE #1 (“Response to NOE #1”) stating that “the issues presented in your letter are part of an ongoing litigation…Due to the current litigation, SPS believes that it would be more appropriate to refrain from providing a detailed response to you at this time” and that Plaintiffs could reach out to SPS’s counsel in the related foreclosure action involving Plaintiffs’ home. (See, SPS’s Response to NOE #1, attached hereto as Exhibit 2). 36. Plaintiffs were harmed by SPS’s failure to adequately respond to NOE #1 because it required them to incur costs relative to sending NOE #1—such as postage and attorneys’ fees—but they did not receive the correction of the alleged errors on the loan to which they were legally entitled, pursuant to RESPA and Regulation X. 9 37. Since SPS did not correct the errors alleged through NOE #1 and did not otherwise respond in compliance with 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(e), Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, sent an NOE to SPS on January 9, 2018. (See, NOE sent from Plaintiffs to SPS, attached hereto as Exhibit 3 (“NOE #2”)). 38. On January 29, 2018, SPS responded to NOE #2 (“SPS’s Response to NOE #2”) finally providing a substantive response to the issues presented through NOE #1 and reiterated through NOE #2. 39. To date, neither SPS, nor counsel for SPS, has provided any other follow-up to Plaintiffs’ RESPA Request Letters. 40. Had SPS adequately responded to NOE #1, Plaintiffs would not have needed to send NOE #2 to SPS. As such, Plaintiffs were harmed by SPS’s failure to adequately respond to NOE #1 because it required them to incur additional costs—such as postage and attorneys’ fees—relative to sending NOE #2. 41. Class Definition: Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals and entities (the “Class”), defined as follows: All loan borrowers in the United States (1) who submitted to SPS a “qualified written request,” as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B), in the form of a Request for Information or Notice of Error, (2) to whom SPS refused to provide information or perform a reasonable investigation into the asserted errors because of a cited “active litigation” exception. 42. Subclass 1 Definition: Plaintiffs also bring this action pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a subclass of similarly situated individuals and entities, defined as follows: All loan borrowers in the United States (1) who submitted to SPS a “qualified written request,” as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B), in the form of a Request for Information or Notice of Error, (2) to whom SPS refused to provide information or 10 perform a reasonable investigation into the asserted errors because of a cited “active litigation” exception, and (3) who submitted to SPS a second “qualified written request,” as defined by 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B), in the form of a Notice of Error related to SPS’s assertion of an “active litigation” exception. 43. Excluded from the Class and Subclass 1 are (1) Defendant; (2) Defendant’s agents; (3) any person(s) who executes and files a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) any persons who have had their claims in this matter finally adjudicated and/or otherwise released; and (5) the legal representatives, successors and assigns of any such excluded person. 44. Numerosity: Upon information and belief, the Class is comprised of more than 40 members. This conclusion is reasonable because SPS is one of the largest mortgage providers in the country, which, as of 2017, serviced more than 550,000 loans worth greater than $90 billion,3 and SPS sent form letters asserting an “active litigation” exception to Plaintiffs and Class members. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The exact number of members in the Class is presently unknown, can only be ascertained through discovery, and can easily be identified through Defendant’s records or by other means. 45. Commonality and Predominance: All members of the Class have been subject to and affected by a uniform course of conduct: specifically, SPS refusing to provide information in response to RESPA Request Letters by claiming an “active litigation” exception. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed classes that predominate over any individual questions. 46. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Plaintiffs and Class members were denied information to which they were entitled because Defendant 3 Servicer Evaluation: Select Portfolio Serving, Standard & Poor’s Global Ratings, October 10, 2017, https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/10266651 (last visited April 16, 2019) 11 unlawfully refused to produce information due to an erroneous “active litigation” exception, and Plaintiffs and Class members incurred damages as a result. 47. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will adequately represent the interests of the Class and do not have adverse interests to the Class. If individual Class members prosecuted separate actions it may create a risk of inconsistent or varying judgments that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. A class action is the superior method for the quick and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Plaintiffs’ counsel has extensive experience litigating consumer class actions. 48. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege paragraphs 1-47, with the same force and effect as though full set forth herein. 49. Plaintiffs and Class members submitted RESPA Request Letters to SPS, which were “qualified written requests,” as that term is defined by 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). (See, Exhibits 1 and 3). 50. Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters asserted that there were errors on their loans in need of correction or requested specific information related to their loans pursuant to 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 and 1024.36. 51. SPS failed to provide adequate responses to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters. Specifically, SPS did not provide the requested materials concerning specific information or the error resolutions related to the Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ loans as required by 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 and 1024.36 and 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(B) and 2605(e)(2)(C)(i), but instead replied with form letters claiming an “active litigation” exception to its obligations. (See, Exhibit 2). 12 52. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(g) did, and does, not permit SPS to assert an “active litigation” exception to responding to the requests contained in Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters. 53. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(f) did, and does, not permit SPS to assert an “active litigation” exception to responding to the requests contained in Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters. 54. SPS’s actions, in failing to fully respond to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters in compliance with 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 and 1024.36 and 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(B) and 2605(e)(2)(C)(i) or, alternatively, to state the reason under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(C)(i) and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(f)(1) or 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(g)(1), pursuant to which SPS determined it did not need to comply with 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35(e) and 1024.36(d) and 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(B) and 2605(e)(2)(C)(i), constitute clear violations of the requirements of 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(B) and 2605(e)(2)(C)(i), as interpreted by 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 and 1024.36, respectively. 55. Plaintiffs and Class members were harmed because they incurred the expenses associated with sending RESPA Request Letters—such as their time, postage, etc.—but they did not receive error resolution sought or the information to which they were legally entitled, pursuant to RESPA and Regulation X. 56. SPS is hiding behind a baseless “active litigation” exception in order to ignore its legal obligations to respond to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters in a timely manner. 57. SPS’s actions are believed to be the continuation of a pattern and practice of behavior in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ rights. 13 58. As a result of SPS’s actions, SPS is liable to Plaintiffs and Class members for actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(2)-(3). 59. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege paragraphs 1-47, with the same force and effect as though full set forth herein. 60. Plaintiffs and Subclass 1 members submitted RESPA Request Letters to SPS, which were “qualified written requests,” as that term is defined by 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). (See, Exhibit 1). 61. Plaintiffs’ and Subclass 1 members’ RESPA Request Letters requested the resolution of asserted errors or specific information related to their loans, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 or 1024.36. 62. SPS failed to provide adequate responses to Plaintiffs’ and Subclass 1 members’ RESPA Request Letters. Specifically, SPS did not provide the requested materials concerning specific information or the error resolutions related to the Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ loans as required by 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 and 1024.36 and 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(B) and 2605(e)(2)(C)(i), but instead replied with form letters claiming an “active litigation” exception to its obligations. (See, Exhibit 2). 63. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(g) did, and does, not permit SPS to assert an “active litigation” exception to responding to the requests contained in Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters. 64. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(f) did, and does, not permit SPS to assert an “active litigation” exception to responding to the requests contained in Plaintiffs’ and Subclass 1 members’ RESPA Request Letters. 14 65. SPS’s actions, in failing to fully respond to Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ RESPA Request Letters in compliance with 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 and 1024.36 and 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(B) and 2605(e)(2)(C)(i) or, alternatively, to state the reason under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(C)(i) and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.36(f)(1) or 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35(g)(1), pursuant to which SPS determined it did not need to comply with 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35(e) and 1024.36(d) and 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(B) and 2605(e)(2)(C)(i), constitute clear violations of the requirements of 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e)(2)(B) and 2605(e)(2)(C)(i), as interpreted by 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 and 1024.36, respectively. 66. As a result of SPS’s assertion of an erroneous “active litigation” exception to its obligations under RESPA and Regulation X, Plaintiffs and Subclass 1 members were required to send additional “qualified written requests,” as that term is defined by 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B), in the form of NOEs. (See, Exhibit 3). 67. Had SPS adequately responded to Plaintiffs’ and Subclass 1 members’ RESPA Request Letters, Plaintiffs and Subclass 1 members would not have needed to send NOEs regarding SPS’s erroneous assertion of an “active litigation” exception to its obligations under RESPA and Regulation X. 68. Plaintiffs and Subclass 1 members were harmed because they incurred the expenses associated with sending RESPA Request Letters—such as their time, postage, etc.—but they did not receive the error resolution or the information to which they were legally entitled, pursuant to RESPA and Regulation X. 69. Plaintiffs and Subclass 1 members were also harmed by SPS’s failure to adequately respond to their RESPA Request Letters because it required them to incur the time and expenses associated with sending NOEs. 15 70. SPS is hiding behind a baseless “active litigation” exception in order to ignore its legal obligations to respond to Plaintiffs’ and Subclass 1 members RESPA Request Letters. 71. SPS’s actions are believed to be the continuation of a pattern and practice of behavior in conscious disregard of the Plaintiffs’ and Subclass 1 members’ rights. 72. As a result of SPS’s actions, SPS is liable to Plaintiffs and Subclass 1 members for actual damages, statutory damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(2)-(3). VIOLATIONS OF 12 U.S.C. § 2605 AND 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 and 1024.36 (on behalf Plaintiffs and Subclass 1) VIOLATIONS OF 12 U.S.C. § 2605 AND 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.35 AND 1024.36 (on behalf Plaintiffs and the Class)

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22. Typically, U.S. Armed Forces enlistees must meet U.S. citizenship or permanent residence requirements. 10 U.S.C. § 504(b). However, 10 U.S.C. § 504(b)(2) authorizes the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military service departments to enlist certain non-U.S. citizens and non-permanent residents if enlistment of such individuals is “vital to the national interest.” Under this authority, DoD initiated the MAVNI program in 2008 and the program has continued to operate through the present, with brief interruptions and enlistment suspension periods. 23. The MAVNI program is designed to attract two types of recruits into the military: (a) health care professionals and (b) individuals who possess critical foreign language skills. DoD officials acknowledge that soldiers with these skills “are necessary to sustain effective military operations.” 24. Under MAVNI, DoD encouraged qualified individuals to enlist, touting the opportunity of an “expedited” path to U.S. citizenship. DoD contractually mandated that MAVNI enlistees – including Plaintiffs – apply for citizenship “as soon as the [service branch (e.g., the Army)] has certified [the MAVNI soldier’s] honorable service.” This citizenship opportunity was a powerful enticement to Plaintiffs and other such qualified individuals who contemplated MAVNI enlistment. 26. The commitment that each Plaintiff has undertaken to serve as a soldier in the U.S. Army Reserve is serious and substantial. As the standard MAVNI Army Reserve enlistment contract states, an agreement to enlist “is more than an employment agreement. It effects a change in status from civilian to military member of the Armed Forces.” As such, per the Enlistment/Reenlistment Document Armed Forces of the United States (DD Form 4/1), soldiers (a) are “[r]equired to obey all lawful orders and perform all assigned duties,” (b) are “[s]ubject to the military justice system” and, among other things, “may be tried by military courts-martial,” (c) may be “[r]equired upon order to serve in combat or other hazardous situations,” and (d) must otherwise “meet acceptable military standards” such that any failure to meet their service obligations as Selected Reservists can result in demotion and/or discharge from the service under other than honorable conditions. 28. As a member of the Selected Reserve, each soldier “may at any time, and without [his/her] consent, be ordered to active duty to complete a total of 24 months of active duty.” In times of war or national emergency declared by Congress, these soldiers may, without their consent, “be ordered to serve on active duty for the entire period of the war or emergency and for six (6) months after its end.” As members of the Selected Reserve, these soldiers may, without their consent, be ordered to 365 days of consecutive active duty whenever “the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission or for certain emergencies.” The Applicable Statutory and Regulatory Framework 30. The key language here is that certain non-U.S. citizens qualify for naturalization under this section with honorable service “as a member of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve or in an active-duty status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a) (emphasis added). This disjunctive language of the statute is clear and unequivocal: honorable service in the Selected Reserve is an independent basis for naturalization. Stated differently, naturalization under this statute is not dependent on an individual performing active-duty service. 31. The history of the statute reinforces the separate and independent import of these two clauses. While the prior version of the statute limited naturalization to those serving in an active-duty status, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, 117 Stat. 1392, 1693 (2003) amended the statute to add those serving as members of the Selected Reserve. Thus, Congress made clear that naturalization is available based on either service as a member of the Selected Reserve or service in active-duty status. 33. The regulations implementing 8 U.S.C. § 1440 are located at 8 C.F.R. Part 329, entitled “SPECIAL CLASSES OF PERSONS WHO MAY BE NATURALIZED: PERSONS 73. The named Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated. The named Plaintiffs seek to represent the below-described Class: 75. The members of Plaintiffs’ Class warrant class action treatment because they fulfill the certifying requirements under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time, recent DoD memoranda – including a May 19, 2017 “Action Memo” signed by DoD Under Secretaries, a July 27, 2017 memorandum from the Acting Secretary of the Army, and sworn statements by DoD representatives in the Nio Action – indicate that the proposed Class would consist of approximately 2,000 members. 76. The proposed Class meets the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) because the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 77. The proposed Class meets the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) because there are questions of law and fact common to the Class, including, for example, whether DoD has a mandatory duty to complete N-426 Forms and whether DoD’s “active-duty service” requirement for certification of a Form N-426 is contrary to law. 78. The proposed Class meets the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) because the claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of each of the Class members. Class members and Plaintiffs similarly are affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law, including 8 U.S.C. § 1440, that is described herein. 80. Furthermore, as contemplated by Rule 23(b)(1), if the individual members of the Class were to bring separate suits to address Defendants’ policies, practices, and actions and inactions, Defendants may address the cases of the named Plaintiffs but ignore the concerns of the remaining Class members, thereby exacerbating Defendants’ violations of the law. Resolving this matter as a class action also would serve the Court’s interest in judicial economy by avoiding overburdening the courts with individual lawsuits brought by each of the many enlistees recruited through the MAVNI program whose Form N-426 honorable service certifications are being withheld subject to DoD’s unlawful active-duty service requirement. 81. Alternatively, this case qualifies for class action treatment under Rule 23(b)(2) because Plaintiffs seek final injunctive and declaratory relief. This relief is appropriate for the whole Class as Defendants’ actions and/or refusals to act apply generally to the Class as a whole. The MAVNI Program and Plaintiffs’ Service Commitments

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 20. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 21. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following Massachusetts subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 23. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard-of-hearing persons access to the goods and services of the Website. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on the Website. 24. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; and (b) Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA. 25. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so that it could be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard-of-hearing. 27. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 28. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 29. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 30. Defendant operates the Website, which provides videos, information, and tutorials on a variety of topics related to fine jewelry. It delivers jewelry to people and businesses across the United States. 31. Defendant operates the Jewelers Company, a luxury jewelry and timepiece market with 5 locations across the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and New Hampshire area that are accessible to the public. 32. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 34. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard-of-hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 35. Defendant denies the deaf and hard-of-hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 36. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 37. The deaf and hard-of-hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including descriptions of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard-of-hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard-of- hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the videos on the Website. 39. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing people, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 40. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and Class members cannot access the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends or family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard-of-hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the services provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 41. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website. 43. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 44. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 46. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, and methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 48. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 49. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 51. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard-of-hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 52. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 53. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 28 C.F.R §36.211. 54. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I) it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 55. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 57. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 58. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Individuals who are deaf and hard-of- hearing have been denied full and equal access to the Website, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 59. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 60. Modifying its policies, practices, and services by providing closed captions to make its videos accessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business, nor would it pose an undue burden to this flourishing company. 62. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 63. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 64. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 65. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 66. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 67. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals the full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and hard-of-hearing.

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17. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of tipped workers at the four facilities as a collective action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b). Plaintiffs also bring this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of themselves and a class of all tipped workers at the four facilities for claims under New York State law. 18. The claims under the FLSA may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). The claims brought pursuant to New York State law may be pursued by all similarly-situated persons who do not opt out of the New York Class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 19. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of the members of the Classes is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs believe there are hundreds of individuals in the Class. 21. Common questions of law and fact exist that predominate over any questions only affecting Class members individually and include, but are not limited to, the following: a. whether Plaintiffs and the Class were entitled to receive service charges paid to Defendant and whether the Class received them; b. whether Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiffs and members of the Class all straight time and overtime compensation due to them; and c. whether Plaintiffs and the members of the Class were properly reimbursed for their required purchases of uniforms. 22. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class because their interests are in alignment with those of the members of the Class. They have no interests adverse to the Class they seek to represent, and have retained competent and experienced counsel. 23. The class action/collective action mechanism is superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by individual members of the Class may be relatively small when compared to the expense and burden of litigation, making it virtually impossible for members of the Class to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. 24. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the previous allegations as if fully set forth herein. 25. Defendant is an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 27. Defendant has willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class appropriate overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act by not calculating the workers’ overtime properly and by not paying them time and half for all hours worked over forty per work week. 28. Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to compensation for unpaid wages; an additional equal amount as liquidated damages; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 29. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the previous allegations as if fully set forth herein. 30. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are employees under New York law. 31. Defendant is an employer under New York law. 32. The “service charges” are really gratuities under New York law and must be paid to the workers under New York Labor Law Article 6 § 196-d. 33. Defendant unlawfully withheld and retained gratuities and portions of gratuities that reasonable customers would believe would be distributed to members of the class. 34. Defendant is liable to Plaintiffs and the Class in an amount to be determined at trial plus interest, attorney’s fees and costs. 35. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the previous allegations as if fully set forth herein. 37. As a result Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are entitled to restitution and other damages to be determined. FOR FAILURE TO PAY APPROPRIATE OVERTIME UNDER FEDERAL LAW FOR FAILURE TO REIMBURSE WORKERS FOR COSTS OF UNIFORMS UNDER NEW YORK LAW FOR WITHOLDING GRATUITIES UNDER NEW YORK LAW

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12. Prior to July 2015, Joseph Gallagher worked for Mercedes Benz, USA for 25 years. 13. His employment with Mercedes Benz, USA ended in July of 2015, when by way of false promises and misrepresentations, he was lured away by Joe Pepe, the COO of Pepe Auto Group, to accept a position of General Manager at Pepe’s, Mercedes- Benz of New Rochelle store. Pepe stated that he sought out Gallagher due to his experience with Mercedes Benz, and that Pepe wanted to minimize the employee turnover that has plagued the store since its existence. 14. Pepe offered Gallagher a job working as his general manager for his New Rochelle Mercedes Benz store (hereinafter referred to as “MBNR”). 15. In July of 2015, Gallagher entered into a three year employment agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement”) with Joe Pepe and MBNR. 16. Throughout his employment with MBNR he was a loyal and hardworking employee. 17. Shortly after the two year mark of Gallagher’s employment, without any warning, Pepe called Gallagher into his office to tell him that “it just isn’t working out.” 18. Pepe fired Gallagher that day without any reason, justification or prior warning. 19. Gallagher never received any written performance review, let alone one that identified any areas of unsatisfactory performance or recommendations of improvements that he could undertake. 20. To the contrary, Gallagher always received praise for his performance by Pepe and 72. Gallagher brings this collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) seeking liability-phase injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of a collective of all applicants and deterred prospective applicants for employment ages 55 and older. Plaintiff also brings this collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) for monetary damages and other make-whole relief on behalf of a collective of all applicants and deterred prospective applicants for employment ages 55 and older in the United States at any time from October 18, 2013 through the resolution of this action for claims under the ADEA. 74. There are many similarly situated collective members who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Notice should be sent to the collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b). 75. As part of its regular business practice, MBNR has intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the ADEA with respect to Plaintiff and the collective. 76. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to: a) willfully utilizing a biased recruiting system for entry-level accounting hiring that excludes, deters, and discriminates against workers ages 55 and over; and b) willfully implementing a termination policy that deters and discriminates against applicants ages 55 and over for employment; c) willfully refusing to hire applicants ages 55 and over for employment. 77. MBNR maintained and implemented these policies and practices with the purpose and effect of denying Plaintiff and other members of the collective employment opportunities because of their age. 78. These policies cannot be justified on the basis of reasonable factors other than age. 80. This Claim is brought by Representative Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the collective he represents. 81. Defendants have a pattern and practice of presenting older employees with unlawful release agreements that do not meet the standards required under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). after advising them that they will be terminated from their employment. 82. Defendants provided Plaintiff with a release that did not meet the standards required under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA). 83. Defendant’s general release did not refer to the rights or claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 84. Defendant’s general release did not advise the employee, in writing, to consult an attorney before accepting the agreement. 85. Defendant’s general release did not provide the employee with at least 21 days to consider the offer. 86. Defendant’s general release did not give Plaintiff seven days to revoke his signature. 87. Defendant’s general release did not include rights and claims that may arise after the date on which the waiver was executed. 88. Defendant’s failure to execute a general release which complies with the OWBPA under the ADEA is a violation of Plaintiff’s rights and thus, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for damages. 90. This Claim is brought by Representative Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the collective he represents. 91. Defendant employer discharged Plaintiff from his employment because of his age. 92. In doing this, Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and caused him harm 93. Plaintiff’s termination, because of his age, was not due to a bona fide occupational qualification which is allowed under the law. 94. Defendants maintain discriminatory policies, patterns, and/or practices that have an adverse impact on individuals ages 40 and older in violation of the ADEA and are not, and cannot be, justified by reasonable factors other than age. 95. Defendants have maintained these discriminatory policies, patterns, and/or practices both within and outside the liability period in this case. 96. As a direct result of Defendants’ discriminatory policies and/or practices as described above, Plaintiff and the collective have suffered damages including, but not limited to, lost past and future income, compensation, and benefits. 97. The foregoing policies, patterns, and/or practices have an unlawful disparate impact on employees and prospective employees ages 40 and older in violation of by 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). 98. Plaintiff requests relief as hereinafter described. Breach of Contract Fiduciary Breaching Duty 106. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 107. Defendant had a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff as it was Plaintiff’s employer and Plaintiff was not independently contracted or an at will employee. 108. Defendant injured Plaintiff and acted contrary to the interests of Plaintiff, to whom he owed a duty of loyalty to. 109. Damages were directly caused by Defendant’s misconduct and thus, Defendant is liable for those damages. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage 119. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 120. There was a clear business relationship between Plaintiff and Porsche. 121. Defendant interfered with this business relationship by speaking ill about Plaintiff’s business performance. 122. Defendant acted with the sole purpose of harming Plaintiff and used dishonest, unfair and improper means. 123. The harm done by Defendant caused injury to the relationship between Porsche and Plaintiff. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relationship 115. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 116. Defendant had knowledge of the employment contract between Porsche and Plaintiff. 117. Without reasonable justification or excuse, Defendant induced Porsche to break the employment contract by providing them with negative information about Plaintiff 118. By reason of Defendant’s inducement, Plaintiff has sustained damages. Malicious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage 128. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 129. There was a clear business relationship between Porsche and Plaintiff. 130. Defendant interfered with that business relationship by purposefully putting forward undesirable and untrue facts about Plaintiff’s employment practices. 131. Defendant acted with the sole purpose of harming Plaintiff by using dishonest, unfair and improper means. 132. Defendant’s dishonest and malicious means caused injury to Plaintiff’s relationship with Porsche. Unlawful Discriminatory Practices NY CLS §290 et seq. Violation of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq. Wrongful Discharge 104. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 105. Defendant wrongfully terminated Plaintiff and thus the contract of hiring was broken and Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for damages arising from this breach.

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10. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(3). The persons in the Class identified above are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number can be based are presently within the sole control of Defendants, upon information and belief there are at least around 50 Class Members, and there could be significantly more. 11. There are questions of law and fact common to Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed and/or jointly employed Plaintiff under New York law; b. Whether Defendants provided to their employees, at the time of each employee’s hire and on or before February first of each subsequent year of that employee’s employment, notices meeting the requirements outlined in NYLL § 195(1)(a); and c. Whether Defendants provided to their employees, with each payment of wages and wage statements meeting the requirements outlined in NYLL § 195(3). 12. The claims of representative parties are typical of the claims of the Class. 14. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation, where individual plaintiff lacks the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate defendants. 15. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making relief, including declaratory and/or injunctive relief, appropriate for the Class. 34. Plaintiff brings FLSA and NYLL claims on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons employed by Defendants. 35. Plaintiff was, at various times between 2009 and the present, employed as a building superintendent in buildings owned and/or operated by Defendants in New York. 37. All of the work that Plaintiff and proposed Class Members performed was assigned by Defendants and/or Defendants were aware of all the work performed by Plaintiff and Class Members, as well as hours that Plaintiff and Class Members worked. 38. Plaintiff was on call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Even when the Plaintiff was not actively working, he was nonetheless expected to be available to answer tenant calls and deal with any emergencies that arose. If at any point during the day or night he needed to leave building premises, he was required to call his Field Managers to notify them that they were leaving and to inform them of who would be covering the building during his absence. 39. When Plaintiff and Class Members accepted employment with Defendants, they were hired to work at fixed biweekly wage rates. 40. At all relevant times, Defendants had the right to control, and did in fact control, the hours, hourly pay, assignments and schedules of the named Plaintiff and all superintendents working at the residential complexes Defendants own and/or manage. 41. On information and belief, Defendants failed to pay Class Members overtime wages at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay of hours worked in excess of 40 per work week. 42. As described above, Defendants failed to pay the named Plaintiff minimum wages as required by law and/or overtime wages at a rate of one and one-half times their regular pay of hours worked in excess of 40 per work week. 44. As part of their regular business practices, Defendants intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA and NYLL. This pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to: a. Failing to record hours or to establish, maintain and preserve for not less than six years contemporaneous, true, and accurate payroll records; b. Willfully failing to pay Plaintiff and Class Members required minimum wages and/or one and one half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty per work week; c. Failing to provide Plaintiff and Class Members with yearly employment notices as required by NYLL § 195(1)(a); and d. Failing to provide Plaintiff and Class Members with wage statements upon each payment of wages as required by NYLL § 195(3). 45. At all relevant times, Defendants failed to post and/or keep posted a notice explaining employees’ rights under the FLSA, in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 516.4. 46. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ unlawful conduct as described herein is pursuant to a policy or practice of attempting to minimize labor costs by violating the FLSA and 49. At all relevant times, Huggins was and is employed as a building superintendent at one of the many multifamily residential complexes owned and operated by the Defendants. 50. Plaintiff lives in the complex where he works. He lives there for the primary purpose of being available to provide services on a 24 hour basis and would not live there but for the fact that he must be on site at all times to meet the requirements of his job. 51. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff has worked in excess of 40 hours Plaintiff sufficiently for all hours worked as required by law. 52. In addition to his hours actively working, Plaintiff was required to be on call to deal with any situation or need that arose in the buildings 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. When he needed someone to cover for him, he had to pay them out of his own pocket, which his supervisors knew. 53. Despite complaining to supervisors, Plaintiff has never been given time off except for two, two-week vacations over the course of a nearly six year employment, with one of those vacations being cut short when Defendants summoned Plaintiff to return to attend to building maintenance and repair issues that Defendants deemed were an emergency and could only addressed with Plaintiff returning from vacation. 54. At all relevant times, Defendants paid Plaintiff a fixed sum starting at $400 per week with minimum increases being periodically given. 55. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs. 57. Plaintiff consents to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 58. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and Class Members were employed by Defendants within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203€. 59. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and Class Members were engaged in commerce and the corporate Defendants were enterprises engaged in commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § § 206(A) and 207(a). 60. Defendants violated the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to pay them the minimum wage for each hour worked in each discrete work week, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C § 206(a)(1). 61. Defendants failure to pay Plaintiff and Class Members the minimum wage was willful within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 255. 62. Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and Class Members for their unpaid minimum wages, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and any other appropriate relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 63. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs. 64. Defendants violated the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to pay overtime compensation at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 per week, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 66. Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and Class Members for their unpaid overtime compensation, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and any other appropriate relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 67. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs. 68. Pursuant to NYLL 195(1)(a), every employer is required to provide his or her employees, in writing in English and in the language identified by each employee as the primary language of such employee, at the time of hiring, and on or before February first of each subsequent year of the employee’s employment with the employer, a notice containing the following information: the rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with section one hundred ninety-one if this article; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 69. Defendants knowingly failed to comply with this provision by failing to provide Plaintiff and Class Members with any kind of annual notice whatsoever, let alone an annual notice meeting the requirements laid out in ¶ 99. 70. NYLL § 198(1)(b) provides that any employee not provided such notice may collect damages for $50 for each work day that the violation occurred or continued to occur, up to a total of $5,000 per employee (together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees as well as appropriate injunctive and/or declaratory relief). 72. Defendants are therefore liable to Plaintiff and Class Members in the amount of $5,000 per employee, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and any other relief appropriate pursuant to NYLL § 198. 73. Plaintiff alleges and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs. 74. Pursuant to NYLL § 195(3), every employer is required to furnish each employee with a statement with every payment of wages, listing the following: the dates of work covered by that payment of wages, listing the following: the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; deductions; allowances; if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; and net wages. 75. Defendants knowingly failed to comply with this provision by failing to provide Plaintiff and Class Members with wage statements meeting the requirements laid out in ¶ 105. 76. NYLL § 198(1)(d) provides that any employee not provided appropriate wage statements may collect damage of $250 for each work day that the violation occurred or continued to occur, up to a total of $5,000 per employee (together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees as well as appropriate injunctive and/or declaratory relief). 77. During the course of Plaintiff and Class Members’ employment, Defendants consistently and willfully failed to provide them with adequate wage statements as required by New York law. 9. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff, and as such, notice should be sent to all others similarly situated. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who have been similarly underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join. Alejandro Huggins

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17. At all times relevant, Plaintiff is an individual residing within the State of California. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 49. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations of the FDCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. 50. As a result of each and every violation of the FDCPA, Plaintiff is entitled to any actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1); statutory damages for a knowing or willful violation in the amount up to $1,000.00 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) from each Defendant individually. VIOLATION OF THE ROSENTHAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT Cal. Civ. Code § 1788, et seq. [AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS] VIOLATION OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 ET SEQ. [AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS]

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1. anyone employed by counsel for Defendants in this action; and 1. The prosecution of separate actions by the individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual Class members which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; 1. a natural person; 1. natural persons; 6 1. whether Defendants violated the FDCPA; 2. who received a letter from MLA; 2. any Judge to whom this case is assigned, as well as their immediate family and staff. Numerosity 2. whether Plaintiff and other class members are entitled to statutory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees under the FDCPA; Typicality 7 2. who received a letter from MLA; 2. the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other Class members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; and 3. which letter failed to state the amount of any alleged debt or debts; 3. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with respect to the members of the Class as a whole. 9 /s/ 3. and which letter failed to state the amount of any alleged debt or debts. 35. The plaintiff, Britney Rudler, brings this action on behalf of herself and also on behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23. 36. Defendants have continuously sent letters virtually identical to Exhibit A to consumers since at least October of 2017. 37. Upon information and belief, Defendants have been sending such letters for a significantly longer period. 38. Plaintiff seeks to represent the Class (hereafter, “the Class”) defined as follows: 39. All members of the Class are also members of one or more of the subclasses. 4. and who received that letter within three years of the filing of the instant Complaint. 4. The class members are generally unsophisticated individuals unaware of the protections afforded them by the FDCPA, which rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. 40. Excluded from the Class and subclasses are: 41. The Class and subclasses potentially include hundreds of members and are sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 42. Although the exact number of Class members are unknown to Plaintiff, they are readily ascendable from Defendants’ records. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions 43. Common questions of law and fact exist as to Plaintiff and all members of the Class and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. 44. These common questions include, inter alia: 45. Plaintiff Rudler’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class because, among other things, Plaintiff is: 46. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims—based on the same acts and/or omissions as the claims of all other Class members—are typical of the claims of the Class. 47. In other words, all of the claims are based on the same factual and legal theories and the Plaintiff, together with each Class member, has been subjected the violations of the FDCPA by Defendants. Adequacy 48. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class members. Her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class she seeks to represent. 49. Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in prosecuting individual-against- large-entity litigation and with class actions. There is no reason why this Plaintiff and her counsel will not vigorously pursue this matter. Superiority 50. The class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims at issue herein. 51. The damages suffered by each individual Class member may be limited. Damages of such magnitude are small given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Defendant’s conduct. 8 52. Further, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class effectively to individually redress the wrongs done to them. Even if the members of the Class themselves could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. 53. Individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system presented by the complex legal and factual issues of the case. 54. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 55. In the alternative, the Class may be certified because: 56. Plaintiff re-alleges the above paragraphs as if set forth fully in this count. 57. Defendants MLA and Malevitis violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) by failing to disclose the amount of the debt in its initial communication with Plaintiff and the Class. 58. Plaintiff and Class members suffered confusion due to the Defendants’ failure to provide the amount of the alleged debt in its initial letter. 59. As a result of the Defendants’ violations of the FDCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of statutory damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees.

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22. “Ringless” voicemail technology was created, and is presently being used by unscrupulous companies, including Defendant, in an attempt to circumvent the TCPA. 24. “Ringless” voicemail technology works by delivering prerecorded messages en masse to the voicemail boxes of cellular subscribers. 25. However, calls made by utilizing this technology are not actually “ringless” since the prerecorded message that results triggers an audible notification to the consumer once the message is received. 26. Further, the method by which “ringless” voicemails are transmitted to cellular telephones is essentially the same as the method for transmitting text messages to cellular phones. This is significant because consumers are entitled to the same consent-based protections for text messages as they are for voice calls to wireless numbers. See Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 952 (noting that the FCC has determined that a text message falls within the meaning of “to make any call” in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)); Toney v. Quality Res., Inc., 2014 WL 6757978, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2014) (holding that defendant bears the burden of showing that it obtained plaintiff's prior express consent before sending her a text message). 28. Unlike robocalls and text messages, however, consumers are left powerless to block “ringless” voicemails from being transmitted to their phones. Thus, a consumer’s voicemail box could be rendered useless by just a handful of companies using the technology to market their businesses. 29. The purpose of a “ringless” voicemail is to communicate with or try to get into communication with a consumer through the consumer’s cellular telephone. 39. June 17, 2019, Defendant, transmitted the following prerecorded telemarketing call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 9941 (the “9941 Number”): Rebates for Ford turn ins. Rebates for non Ford trades. $300 in cash for used cars and trucks. And more offers than I can list in this call. Genuinely the most and the best programs we’ve ever offerred. We are lowering payments for customers and we would like to help you this week. Please come in. See over a thousand vehicles on sale. Great deals, great fun, and ice cream. The one and only Village Ford Tent Sale. Don’t miss this event nine to nine every day Monday through Thursday this week. For more information come in today or call us at (313) 263- 5190. Thank you. 41. Defendant’s prerecorded telemarketing call constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the future purchase, sell, or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., the sale of vehicles to Plaintiff. 42. The prerecorded telemarketing call originated from a telephone number owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant. 43. Plaintiff received the subject prerecorded telemarketing call within this District and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this District. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded telemarketing calls to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 44. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 45. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9941 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 9941 Number. 46. Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s prerecorded message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16-2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Every call uses some of the phone owner's time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”). 47. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 49. Excluded from the Class is Defendant, its officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, successors, subsidiaries and assigns, as well as the judge and court staff to whom this case is assigned. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the right to amend the Class definition if discovery of further investigation reveals that the Class should be modified. 53. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits prerecorded telemarketing calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 59. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 60. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 61. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class. 62. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 63. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. 65. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-58 as if fully set forth herein. 66. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 67. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to transmit artificial or prerecorded voice calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) “RINGLESS” VOICEMAILS ARE REGULATED BY THE TCPA

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25. UC is one of the nation’s most prestigious public university systems. 26. UC charges students for both tuition and fees on a per-term basis, with some UC schools maintaining academic calendars based on quarters and others based on trimesters. 27. UC San Diego primarily operates on a quarterly academic calendar with Fall, Winter, Spring and Summer terms. 46. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), (b)(3), and/or (c)(4), Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and the following Class: All persons who paid tuition, fees, and/or other costs to the University of California for 1) in-person classes for the Spring 2020 term or a subsequent term and 2) who did not receive the benefits for which they paid. 53. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully alleged herein. 54. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class. 55. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class entered into binding contracts with the Defendant which provided that Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would pay tuition and fees in exchange for on-campus, in-person educational, social, athletic, and other experiences. 56. As part of its contracts with Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and in exchange for adequate consideration that Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class provided, Defendant promised on-campus, in-person educational, social, athletic, and other experiences. 57. Defendant failed to provide the services that it was obligated to provide under its contracts with Plaintiff and the proposed Class. Defendant has retained tuition, fees and other payments paid by Plaintiff and the other Class members without providing them the promised benefits, instead providing those benefits for only a portion of the academic term. 58. By contrast, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class fulfilled their end of the bargain when they paid the monies due and owing for their full tuition and fees. 62. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully alleged herein. 63. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class in the alternative to the breach of contract claim brought in Count I. 64. Plaintiff and other members of the proposed Class conferred a benefit or enrichment on UC by paying tuition and required fees to UC which were beneficial to UC, at the expense of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 65. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class paid tuition and required fees and did not receive the full benefit of their bargain from UC, thus resulting in their impoverishment. 69. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully alleged herein. 70. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class. 71. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have a right to the in- person educational and extra-curricular services that they were supposed to be provided in exchange for their payments to UC. 72. Defendant intentionally interfered with the rights of Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed Class when it retained fees intended to pay for on- campus classes, facilities, and activities, while moving all classes to an online, remote learning format and discontinuing services and access to facilities for which Plaintiff and the members of the proposed Class had paid. 73. Defendant deprived the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class of their fees or of the right to the services for which their fees were intended to be used. 74. Class members demanded the return of the prorated, unused fees for the remainder of the Spring 2020 term and subsequent terms. 77. Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if fully alleged herein. 78. UC’s conduct is unfair in violation of the UCL because it violates California’s legislatively declared public policy, as set out in the California Education Code, including in the Donahoe Higher Education Act, against retention by educational facilities of excess sums from students, and maintaining college affordability. It also breaches UC’s agreements with its students. 79. UC’s conduct also is unfair, in violation of the UCL, because UC acted in an unethical, unscrupulous, tortious, oppressive, and substantially injurious manner, including by: a. Assessing fees for services students could not safely use or were barred from using; b. Refusing to refund fees to students who could not reasonably or responsibly avail themselves of the services the fees were paid for; and c. Failing to abide by its promises to students with respect to the education the students would receive. A. The UC System Breach of Contract Conversion Restitution Based On Quasi-Contract Unfair Conduct in Violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.) V.  CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ............................................................. 9  COUNT I Breach of Contract ......................................................................................... 12 

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25. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their employees, agents, and members of the judiciary. 27. The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 28. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement,” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s express invitation or permission.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). 30. The TCPA also provides that the Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if a defendant “willfully or knowingly” violated Section 227(b) or the regulations prescribed thereunder. 31. Defendants’ actions caused concrete and particularized harm to Plaintiff and the Class, as a. receiving Defendants’ faxed advertisements caused the recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in printing Defendants’ faxes; b. Defendants’ actions interfered with the recipients’ use of the recipients’ fax machines and telephone lines; c. Defendants’ faxes cost the recipients time, which was wasted time receiving, reviewing, and routing the unlawful faxes, and such time otherwise would have been spent on business activities; and d. Defendants’ faxes unlawfully interrupted the recipients’ privacy interests in being left alone and intruded upon their seclusion. 32. Defendants intended to cause damage to Plaintiff and the Class, to violate their privacy, to interfere with the recipients’ fax machines, or to consume the recipients’ valuable time with Defendants’ advertisements; therefore, treble damages are warranted under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 34. Defendants violated the TCPA by transmitting the Fax to Plaintiff and substantially similar facsimile advertisements to the other Class members without obtaining their prior express invitation or permission.

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(New York Fair Credit Reporting Act) 48. When a consumer notifies a debt collector that the consumer disputes “the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer’s file” the debt collector must “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file” within 30 days of receiving the consumer’s dispute. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). As part of the investigation, the debt collector must “provide notification of the dispute to any person who provided any item of information in dispute,” and the seen by a jury as merely basic automated checks that catch missing data fields on submitted forms, which do not go to the heart of whether a source of information is trustworthy. For example, when a consumer files a complaint contesting the accuracy of an item on his or her credit report, the sole action taken by Equifax is to contact the source of the information to verify if it is accurate. If the source says that it is, the inquiry ends . . . This does virtually nothing to determine the actual credibility of the source— which is what plaintiff asserts is lacking—or so a jury could reasonably conclude. While defendant does have some procedures that include a manual review of some disputes, a jury could reasonably find that almost none of the procedures include a review of the integrity of the information source itself. "), Sharf v. TransUnion, L.L.C., 2015 WL 6387501 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2015) (student loan servicer willfully violated FCRA by failing to conduct any investigation, deferring entirely to lender to determine accuracy), Saenz v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 2007 WL 2401745, at *7 (D. Or. Aug. 15, 2007) (when CRA is on notice that information is suspect, “it is not reasonable for the [CRA] simply to verify the creditor’s position without additional investigation”) White v. Trans Union, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (rejecting argument that confirmation of the accuracy of information from its original source is a reasonable inquiry as a matter of law) -10- notice must “include all relevant information regarding the dispute that the agency has received from the consumer….” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2)(A). 49. If a consumer disputes an account that appears on his or her credit, the debt collector must investigate to determine whether the account pertains to that consumer and should be part of that consumer’s credit history. As part of the investigation, the debt collector must notify the source of the disputed account about the consumer’s dispute and provide the source with all the relevant information provided by the consumer. Alternatively, the debt collector or the credit reporting agency can delete the derogatory information. 50. Defendants Equifax, Bank of America and GM Financial have long been aware of their obligations to properly investigate consumer disputes. It had the benefit of plain, unambiguous statutory language requiring a reasonable investigation of “the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer’s file” that is disputed by that consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 51. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a consumer reporting agency like Defendant Equifax, violates section 1681i(a)(1) if it fails to do a reasonable reinvestigation when a consumer disputes “information contained in his file.” Collins v. Experian Info. Sol’s, Inc., 775, F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[a] file is simply the information retained by the consumer reporting agency.”). 52. Other courts of appeals have for many years also instructed CRAs to reinvestigate any item that it reports and that a consumer disputes, regardless of the context. See Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 711-13 (3d Cir. 2010) (OFAC terrorist alerts that CRA keeps off site with another company but placed on its credit reports are in the consumer file and must be reinvestigated); Morris v. Equifax Info. Serv’s, LLC, 457 F.3d 460, 466- -11- 68 (5th Cir. 2006) (Equifax must reinvestigate store charge account that is on file kept by one of Equifax’s affiliates but which can be sold by Equifax in its credit reports); Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1986); Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982); Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2008); Steed v. Equifax Info. Serv’s, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-0437-SCJ, 2016 WL 7888039, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2016). 53. Equifax Information Services, LLC’s failure to investigate disputed account information is a result of its standard policies and practices adopted in reckless disregard of consumers’ rights under the FCRA. 54. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based on Equifax Information Services, LLC’s failure to comply with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a)(1) and 1681i(a)(2). 55. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 56. The class consists of all persons whom Defendants’ records reflect resided in the State of New York, who notified Equifax Information Services, LLC and / or Bank of America and GM Financialial of a dispute of an account appearing in their Equifax credit files and to whom the Equifax failed to include the statement of dispute with later copies of the Plaintiff's consumer report and reported the debt as “Charge-off” account, during the period beginning two years prior to the filing of this action and through the time of judgment. 57. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of class members is known only to the Equifax, Equifax has represented that it receives approximately 10,000 disputes a day, amounting to millions of disputes each year. Accordingly, Plaintiff estimates that each class has thousands of members. -12- 58. There are questions of law and fact common to the classes that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal questions are whether Equifax violated the FCRA by failing to reinvestigate and contact the source of the disputed inquiry, or delete it; and whether the violations were willful. 59. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the classes, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theory: a dispute to Equifax, one which Equifax did not investigate or delete as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1) and (2). Plaintiff received results of her disputes from Equifax with standard form language. Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the two-year class because she made her dispute within two years. 60. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter and have retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims under the FCRA. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interests that might cause them not to vigorously pursue these claims. 61. This action should be maintained as a class action because questions of law and fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Equifax’s conduct described in this Complaint stems from standard policies and practices, resulting in common violations of the FCRA. Class members do not have an interest in pursuing separate actions against Equifax, as the amount of each class member’s individual claim is small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution. Class certification also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments concerning Equifax’s -13- practices. Moreover, management of this action as a class action will not present any likely difficulties. In the interests of justice and judicial efficiency, it would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all class members’ claims in a single forum. 62. This action should be maintained as a class action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, as well as a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of class members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their rights. 63. At all times mentioned in this Complaint, Equifax was a "consumer reporting agency," as referred to in 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e). 64. At all times mentioned in this Complaint, Defendants Bank of America and GM Financial were Furnishers of information as referred to in 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 of the FCRA. 65. At all times mentioned in this Complaint, Defendants Bank of America and GM Financial were federally registered trade-marks representing the furnisher for disputed accounts which are the subject of this action. 66. Defendants Bank of America and GM Financial are reporting inaccurate credit information concerning the Plaintiff to one or more credit bureaus as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1681a of the FCRA. 67. Prior to the commencement of this action, Plaintiff disputed certain information about -14- Bank of America and GM Financial accounts on Plaintiff's Equifax consumer credit report. 68. Equifax Information Services, LLC subsequently notified the Plaintiff that it would investigate the said dispute. 69. Equifax Information Services, LLC’s investigation did not resolve the dispute and Plaintiff subsequently filed a statement of dispute. 70. The disputed account appeared on Plaintiff’s Equifax consumer report and in her file maintained by Equifax, yet did not include the said statement of dispute. 71. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, that the FCRA requires furnishers to conduct detailed examinations of the documents underlying customer transactions before responding to inquiries about a customer’s debt, instead of relying on computer databases that provide convenient, but potentially incomplete or inaccurate customer account information. See Johnson v, MBNA America Bank, No. 03123S (February 11, 2004). 72. Defendant’ investigation process did not live up to the standards of Johnson v, MBNA America Bank, No. 03123S (February 11, 2004). 73. Defendants’ investigation process did not live up to the standards of the Federal Trade Commission in the matter of U.S. v. Performance Capital Mgmt. (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2000). 74. Defendants violated the duty under 15 U.S.C. 1681i by verifying the above referenced account without obtaining any documentation in support of their contention that Defendants were legally responsible for the account. -15- 85. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, the previous paragraphs as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 86. Defendants Equifax, Bank of America and GM Financial failed to delete information found to be inaccurate, reinserted the information without following the NY FCRA, or failed to properly investigate Plaintiff's disputes. 87. Defendants Equifax, Bank of America and GM Financial failed to promptly re-investigate and record the current status of the disputed information and failed to promptly notify the consumer of the result of their investigation, their decision on the status of the information, and his rights pursuant to this section in violation of NY FCRA, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 380-f(a). 88. Defendants Equifax, Bank of America and GM Financial failed to clearly note in all subsequent consumer reports that the account in question is disputed by the consumer in violation of NY FCRA, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 380-f(c)(3). Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681i et. seq. Failure to Conduct Reasonable Investigation and Maintain Reasonable Accuracy

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23. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 24. The Plaintiff acquired the cellular telephone number, (843) 637- XXXX that got the pre-recorded message calls in October 2015. 25. The Plaintiff has used the cellular telephone number for both personal reasons, as well as to attempt to collect rent in arrears from tenants in the properties he owns. 27. The Defendants telemarketing efforts include the use of automated dialing equipment to send text messages. 28. On August 12, 2016, the Plaintiff received a call on his cellular telephone. 29. The Caller ID for the number that called the Plaintiff was (720) 634-7479. 30. When the Plaintiff answered the call there was a distinctive click and pause, then a pre-recorded message that advertised a home security system. 31. These facts, as well as the geographic distance between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, as well as the fact that this call was part of a nationwide telemarketing campaign demonstrate that the call was made using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS” or “autodialer”) as that term is defined in 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 32. When Mr. Fitzhenry was able to connect with a live individual, they attempted to sell him a home alarm system that would have been monitored by Guardian. 33. Mr. Fitzhenry was harmed by the pre-recorded calls because they were unwelcome intrusions on his privacy and because they occupied his telephone line from legitimate communications. 74. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 75. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 76. As a result of the Defendants’ violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 77. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants’ violation of the TCPA in the future. 79. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 80. As a result of the Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 81. Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by the Defendants in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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13. On or around September 6, 2017, Defendant called Plaintiff on his landline telephone ending 2045 in an attempt to collect a debt. Defendant called from the telephone number 800-551-0646. 14. On or around October 20, 2017, Plaintiff returned Defendant’s call using his cell phone ending 8165 to call Defendant at 800-551-0646 to inform Defendant that he was filing bankruptcy. 15. When Defendant answered the call, it went straight to a live representative. There was no pre-recorded warning that the call would be recorded, and the representative did not verbally provide any warning that the call would be recorded. 16. During the call, Defendant asked for the last four digits of Plaintiff’s social security number which Plaintiff provided. Defendant indicated there was an outstanding balance and they discussed Plaintiff’s pending bankruptcy. 17. At the end of the call, Plaintiff asked if the call was recorded and Defendant answered affirmatively. 18. Plaintiff was upset the call was recorded without his consent and ended the call. The call lasted about a minute and a half. 19. At no point during the conversation with Defendant was Plaintiff advised that the conversation was being recorded by Defendant, nor did Plaintiff consent to the call being recorded. 37. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other similar situated (“the CIPA Class”). Because Plaintiff’s cellular phone calls were recorded, the representative Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class he seeks to represent, persons whose cellular telephone calls were recorded by Defendant in the Class Period from one year prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of trial, with the Class defined as follows: Class: All persons from one year prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of trial, that engaged in a telephone conversation with Defendant, their employees, agents or other persons working on Defendant’s behalf, which was recorded by Defendant, their employees and agents, while engaging in such communication using a cellular telephone with a California area code (i.e., 209, 213, 310, 323, 408, 415, 424, 442, 510, 530, 559, 562, 619, 626, 650, 657, 661, 707, 714, 760, 805, 818, 831, 858, 909, 916, 925, 949, or 951). 38. Defendant, and its employees and agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. COLLECTIONS, INC., Defendant. Case No.: UNLAWFUL INVASION OF PRIVACY CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE SECTION 632.7

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11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an individual residing in the State of South Carolina, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §153(10). 12. DRS is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. §153(10). 13. DRS used instruments of interstate commerce for its principal purpose of business, which is the collection of debts. 14. DRS regularly collects, or attempts to collect, debts owed or due another. 15. DRS is a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA. 16. In July of 2012, plaintiff received a call from “Melissa Steel” claiming to be an attorney and telling him that he missed a court date back in 2007 and now has a judgment against him. The call from Ms. Steel was connected after a pause, which indicates a dialing system was used. 18. Plaintiff continued to receive calls from DRS on his cellular telephone. These telephone calls from DRS were an attempt to collect a debt relating to plaintiff and/or plaintiff’s wife. 19. Plaintiff never gave his cell phone number to any entity that either acquired or attempted to collect on this account. 20. Notwithstanding the fact Plaintiff did not provide DRS with his cellular number, DRS repeatedly contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 21. DRS’s website promotes its use of “virtual dialing solutions.” Virtual dialing solutions is equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 22. All telephone contact by DRS to Plaintiff on his cellular telephone occurred via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §227(a)(1), and all calls that are the subject of this Complaint occurred within four years of the filing of this Complaint. 23. The telephone calls placed by DRS to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone also used “an artificial or prerecorded voice” as described in 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A). 24. The telephone number Defendant dialed with a “prerecorded voice” that sounded automated was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 27. Plaintiff incorporates the above factual allegations herein. 28. Defendant made unsolicited commercial phone calls to the wireless telephone number of Plaintiff and the other members of the class using DRS’ virtual dialing solutions, which is equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 29. These phone calls were made without the prior express consent of Plaintiff or the class. 30. DRS has therefore violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii), which makes it unlawful for any person within the United States ... to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice ...” As a result of Defendant’s illegal conduct, the members of the class suffered actual damages and, under section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 32. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting DRS’s and Palisades’ violation of the TCPA in the future. 33. Plaintiff proposes the following class and sub-class, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons within the United States1 who, on or after four years prior to the filing of this action and 20 days following the filing of this action, received a non-emergency telephone call from Dynamic Recovery Services, Inc. to a cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and who did not provide prior express consent for such calls during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed. The sub-class consists of all persons who fit the class definition and were called by DRS for a debt owned by Palisades Collection, LLC. Collectively, all these persons will be referred to as “Plaintiffs” or “Class members.” Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and any entities in which Defendants have a controlling interest, Defendants’ agents and employees, the Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 35. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the classes, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether DRS made nonemergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether DRS can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent (i.e., consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated), during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed, to make such calls; c. Whether DRS’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; d. Whether DRS is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether DRS should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 36. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 37. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes including TCPA class actions. 40. Plaintiff incorporates the above factual allegations herein. 41. Defendant’s practice of placing calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone utilizing an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system” for non- emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiff’s prior express consent was harassing and annoying. Because Plaintiff kept his cellular telephone on or around his person everyday, he was unable to avoid Defendant’s calls. 42. Defendant violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §1692d, by attempting to harass and annoy Plaintiff by the calls to his cellular telephone. 43. Defendant also violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by falsely, deceptively, and misleadingly representing to Plaintiff that one of the callers was an attorney. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the class members and against Defendant for: A. Actual and Statutory damages; B. Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; C. Such other or further relief as the Court deems appropriate. FDCPA-INDVDUAL CLAIM TCPA (CELLULAR CALLS)

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28. RCCH operates a network of hospitals that provide healthcare services throughout the United States. 29. Defendants employ hundreds of hourly non-exempt workers similarly situated to Plaintiff across these hospital facilities. 89. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 90. Throughout the relevant time period, Defendants suffered and/or permitted Plaintiff to work additional time outside of her shift for work-related tasks. These tasks included, but were not limited to, checking on patients, locating and gathering equipment and supplies, responding to emergencies, reviewing or completing charting, and cleaning. 91. Plaintiff was actively discouraged from logging time outside the parameters set by Defendants. However, due to the demands of the job, Plaintiff routinely performed work-related tasks outside of her scheduled shift, before she clocked in and after she clocked out. Upon information and belief, Defendants treated Collective members similarly with respect to “off-the-clock” work. 92. Accordingly, consistent with the policies and procedures set up by Defendants, Plaintiff performed work for which she was not compensated. Defendants’ policies and practices favored Defendants at the expense of Plaintiff and Collective members. 97. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME COMPENSATION FOR “OFF-THE- CLOCK” WORK (FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION) VIOLATIONS OF RCW 49.12.020 AND WAC 296-126-092 FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEAL AND REST BREAKS AND ENSURE THOSE BREAKS ARE TAKEN VIOLATIONS OF 29 U.S.C. § 207 COUNT ONE FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME COMPENSATION FOR VIOLATIONS OF RCW 49.46.130 FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME (WASHINGTON CLASS ACTION)

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1. The amount of the debt; 13. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 15. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 16. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 17. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692d, 1692f, 1692g. 2. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 20. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 21. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. Some time prior to November 7, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Pentagon Federal Credit Union by the Plaintiff. 24. The Pentagon Federal Credit Union obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 26. Pentagon Federal Credit Union is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4). 27. Sometime thereafter, Defendant UHG purportedly purchased the alleged debt. 28. Defendant Eastpoint, a debt collector, was contracted by Defendant UHG, to collect the alleged debt which originated with Pentagon Federal Credit Union 29. Defendants Eastpoint and Defendants UHG collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I – November 7, 2019 Collection Letter 3. A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt-collector; 30. On or about November 7, 2019 Defendant Eastpoint sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Pentagon Federal Credit Union See Exhibit A. 32. The FDCPA further provides that ''if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty day period . . . that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed . . . the debt collector shall cease collection . . . until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt . . . and a copy of such verification is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.'' 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 33. Although a collection letter may track the statutory language, ''the collector nevertheless violates the Act if it conveys that information in a confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with uncertainty.'' Russell v. EQUIFAX A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (''It is not enough for a debt collection agency to simply include the proper debt validation notice in a mailing to a consumer-- Congress intended that such notice be clearly conveyed.''). Put differently, a notice containing ''language that 'overshadows or contradicts' other language informing a consumer of her rights . . . violates the Act.'' Russell, 74 F.3d at 34. 34. The letter states: “The account listed above has been assigned to this agency for collection. We are a professional collection agency attempting to collect a debt. Any information we obtain will be used as a basis to enforce a collection of this debt.” 35. This statement is threatening and confusing to the Plaintiff by saying that any information obtained will be used to enforce a collection of this debt. 37. This language completely overshadows the “G-Notice” by scaring Plaintiff into making payment immediately to avoid the means of enforcement threatened by the Defendant instead of exercising his statutory right to dispute the debt as provided by the FDCPA. 38. The letter is confusing and threatening to Plaintiff, causing distress and anxiety leading Plaintiff to retain an attorney to help him defend his rights as a consumer. 39. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 4. A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 40. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 41. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 42. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 43. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 44. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 45. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. 46. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692d, a debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person with the collection of the debt. 47. Defendant violated said section by harassing and oppressing Plaintiff by harassing him with threatening language. 48. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692d et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 49. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 5. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty- day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 50. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 52. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, with threatening language, which overshadows the ''g-notice'' language and coerces the consumer not to exert its rights under the 55. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 56. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 57. Defendant violated this section by falsely threatening and harassing Plaintiff with a letter containing threatening language. 58. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.

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1. An order certifying that Count I may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appointing Plaintiff and the undersigned counsel to represent the class as previously set forth and defined above; 14. Sometime prior to August 2018, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to Sprint related to a personal cell phone account in the Plaintiff’s name (the “Debt”). The Plaintiff’s personal cell phone account Debt with Sprint had an account number ending in “8404”. 15. The Debt arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which were the subject of the transaction were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, namely fees emanating from a personal cell phone account in the Plaintiff’s name that was issued by Sprint. 16. The Debt arose out of a cell phone account which Plaintiff opened for his personal use. 17. Plaintiff’s cell phone account that was issued by Sprint was neither opened nor used by Plaintiff for business purposes. 18. Plaintiff’s personal credit card account Debt to Sprint is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 19. Sometime after the incurrence of the Debt, but before the initiation of this action, Plaintiff was alleged to have fallen behind on payments owed on the Debt. 2. Adjudging that IC violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e; 21. The Debt was never assigned to IC. 22. Sprint never transferred, sold or assigned any of their property, interest or rights with regard to the Debt to IC. 23. No privity of contract exists between Defendant and Plaintiff such that Defendant has standing to sue Plaintiff for non-performance of any legal obligation of the Plaintiff arising from or with regard to the Debt. 24. Defendant is merely a third-party debt collector with no legal interest or right in the Debt. 25. Defendant contends that the Debt is past-due and in default. 26. At the time the Debt was referred to IC, the Debt was past-due. 27. At the time the Debt was referred to IC, the Debt was in default. 28. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant acted in an attempt to collect the Debt. 29. On or about August 22, 2018, IC mailed or caused to be mailed a letter (the “Letter”) to Plaintiff. (Annexed and attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true copy of the Letter dated August 22, 2018 sent by IC to Plaintiff, except the undersigned counsel has in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 redacted the financial account numbers and Plaintiff’s street address to protect his privacy). 3. An award of statutory damages for Plaintiff, and the class pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; 30. IC mailed the Letter dated August 22, 2018 attached as Exhibit A as a part of their efforts to collect the Debt. 31. Plaintiff received the Letter attached as Exhibit A in the mail. 32. Plaintiff read the Letter attached as Exhibit A upon receipt of the letter in the mail. 33. Exhibit A was sent in connection with the collection of the Debt. 34. Exhibit A seeks to collect the Debt. 36. Exhibit A conveyed information regarding the Debt including the Balance, IC Reference Number and a demand for payment. 37. The letter attached as Exhibit A is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 38. Exhibit A represents IC’s initial collection “communication” with the Plaintiff as communication is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 39. The Letter attached as Exhibit A states in relevant part in the top right portion: Balance Due: $2,205.92 4. Attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; and 40. Nowhere does the Letter attached as Exhibit A state, inform, or otherwise disclose that the “Balance Due” of $2,205.92 listed on the top right portion of the Letter may increase in the future because of interest and/or fees that will accrue on the Debt. 41. Interest and/or fees were in fact accruing on the Debt at the time Defendant sent the Letter attached as Exhibit A. 42. Interest and/or fees accrued on the Debt after Defendant sent the Letter attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff. 43. The Letter does not state that the holder of the debt, Sprint, would accept payment of the $2,205.92 amount in full satisfaction of the Debt if payment was made by a specified date. 45. The Debt has continued to accrue interest and/or fees after Defendant sent the August 22, 2018 Letter, and upon information and belief, the amount of the Debt is currently $2,222.55. 46. The upward change in the balance of the Debt between the August 22, 2018 Letter sent by IC ($2,205.92) and the current balance ($2,222.55) is because of fees that have accrued on the Debt. 47. Exhibit A is a computer-generated form letter. 48. IC’s debt collection practice is largely automated and utilizes standardized form letters. 49. On information and belief, the August 22, 2018 Letter attached as Exhibit A is a mass- produced, computer generated form letter that is prepared by IC and mailed to consumers in the State of New York, such as Plaintiff, from whom they are attempting to collect a debt. 50. Defendant used the same procedures they used in sending the letter attached as Exhibit A when sending the same and/or similar letters to other New York consumers. 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all the above paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 52. In sending the Letter attached as Exhibit A, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§1692, 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10). 54. In considering whether a collection notice violates Section 1692e, Courts in the Second Circuit apply the "least sophisticated consumer" standard. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993). 55. IC violated §1692e(2)(A) and §1692e(10) by flatly asserting in the Letter that the total amount of the Debt owed was a sum certain and by failing to inform Plaintiff that the total amount of the Debt may increase in the future because of interest and/or other charges. This assertion was untrue and known to be untrue because IC was hired to collect a debt that IC knew would increase because of interest and/or fees accrued and did in fact increase because of interest and/or other fees after the date of the Letter. 56. IC’s Letter attached as Exhibit A is misleading within the meaning of 15 U.S.C §1692e because a reasonable consumer could read the Letter and be misled into believing that they could pay their debt in full by paying the $2,205.92 amount listed under the “Balance Due” heading in the Letter. In fact, however, because interest and/or fees on the Debt was accruing, a consumer who paid the $2,205.92 amount listed under the “New Balance” heading would not have paid their debt in full. 58. Like in Avila, Defendant has violated the FDCPA because the amount of Plaintiff’s Debt was in fact increasing due to interest and/or charges, and the Letter attached as Exhibit A did not disclose or otherwise state that the Debt may increase in the future because of interest and/or fees, nor does the Letter use the “safe harbor” language discussed in Avila. Furthermore, the Letter does not state that the holder of the debt (Sprint) would accept payment of the “Balance Due” or “Current Balance” listed in the Letter in full satisfaction of the Debt if payment was made by a specified date. Therefore, like the letter at issue in Avila, Defendant’s Letter attached as Exhibit A similarly violates the FDCPA for the same reasons. 60. Plaintiff has alleged a concrete harm because the FDCPA creates a substantive right under §1692e to be free from abusive debt communications and Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA results in concrete harm to Plaintiff. See, Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Associates, P.C. 897 F.3d 75 (2d. Cir. July 23, 2018) 61. Be reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the proposed class for judgment that the Defendant’s conduct violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e and for statutory damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k. 62. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all the above paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 63. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 64. The class is initially defined as (a) all consumers; (b) with a New York address; (c) who were sent a letter from IC in a form materially identical or substantially similar to the Letter attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint; (d) which was not returned by the post office as undeliverable; (e) on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date 20 days after the filing of this action; and (f) where the debt IC was seeking to collect was accruing interest, fees and/or other charges. 65. The class definition above may be subsequently modified or refined. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

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2. For damages according to proof at the time of trial, plus interest; ON THE SECOND COUNT 3. For damages according to proof at the time of trial, plus interest; 4. For damages according to proof at the time of trial, including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in obtaining the benefits due under the policies issued by Continental to Selane and/or the Class Members, plus interest; and 5. For punitive damages in an amount to be determined at the time of trial; 6. For injunctive relief in accord with Selane’s contentions stated above; 65. Selane brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated. 7. For an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5; 77. Selane brings this action, in part, in equity to enjoin Continental’s scheme of unfair business practices. This Court has the power to enjoin such practices under California Business and Professions Code section 17205. Selane brings this action on behalf of all of the members of the general public of the State of California, as permitted by California Business and Professions Code section 17204. 78. Selane realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 77 above. 79. Selane brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the California Breach Subclass. 8. For declarations in accord with Selane’s contentions stated above; ON ALL COUNTS: 82. Selane realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 77 above. 83. Selane brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the Los Angeles Breach Subclass. 86. Selane realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 77, 79 through 81, and 83 through 85 above. 87. Selane brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the California Breach Subclass and Los Angeles Breach Subclass (collectively, “Breach Subclass” members). 88. Implied in the Policy was a covenant that Continental would act in good faith and deal fairly with Selane and the Breach Subclass members, that Continental would do nothing to interfere with right of Selane and the Breach Subclass members to receive benefits due under their respective CNA Connect policies, and that Continental would give at least the same level of consideration to the interests of Selane and the Breach Subclass members as it gave to its own interests. 96. Selane realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 77, 79 through 81, 83 through 85, and 87 through 95 above. 97. Selane brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the Class. 98. By its conduct alleged herein, Continental has engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices in violation of California Business & Professions Code sections 17200 et seq. (“UCL”). For Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Brought on Behalf of Selane and the California and Los Angeles Breach Subclasses) For Breach of Contract (Brought on Behalf of Selane and the Los Angeles Breach Subclass) For Unfair Business Practices - Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. (Brought on Behalf of Selane and the Class) For Breach of Contract (Brought on Behalf of Selane and the California Breach Subclass)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates a commercial website, www.hersheysstore.com and is a manufacturer and online retailer of chocolate, baked products, such as cookies, cakes, candy and gum. Defendant, through its website offers Hershey products through its multiple product lines such as KitKat, Reesses, Twizzlers and Hershey Kisses. Further, Defendant offers Merchandise and Gift Baskets to potential online consumers for order and delivery within 1-3 business days. Defendant’s website also offers information and solicits potential consumers to visit its “Hershey’s Chocolate World Attractions” and “HersheyPark.” Defendant’s website also offers exclusive deals and sale discounts through its website. 21. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 22. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient -8- JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 23. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March of 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information about Defendant’s website and products and services it offers, the ability to browse various models of products and goods, and related services available online. Plaintiff was unable to browse and proceed with the ordering process due to accessibility barriers. 24. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Lack of Alternative Text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt-text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen- reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the mouse moves over the picture. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, visually- impaired prospective customers are unable to determine what is on the -9- website, browse, look for Store locations and hours, the ability to browse the products, find information on promotions and coupons, and related goods and services available both in Stores and online. b. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users; c. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and d. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 25. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 26. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those specific goods and services available for purchase and delivery, because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. -10- 27. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 28. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 29. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 30. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 31. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . .42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). -11- 32. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 33. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 34. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated -12- to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 35. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 36. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. -13- 40. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 41. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. -14- 43. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 44. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 46. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 47. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 48. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). -15- 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 50. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 51. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. -16- 52. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 54. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 55. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 56. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 57. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 58. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless -17- such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 61. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or -18- c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 62. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 63. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 64. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 65. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 67. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. -19- 68. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 69. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 70. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 71. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 72. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. -20- 73. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 74. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 76. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 77. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 78. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are -21- being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 79. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 80. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 82. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 83. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 84. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This -22- inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 85. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 86. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 87. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 88. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under -23- § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 89. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 90. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 92. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 93. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 94. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. -24- Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 95. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. Unfortunately for consumers, Defendant utilized (and continues to utilize) a sophisticated telephone dialing system to call homeowners en masse promoting its services. 11. Unfortunately, in Defendant’s overzealous attempts to market its services, it placed (and continues to place) phone calls to consumers who never provided it with consent to call and to consumers with whom it had no relationship. Worse yet, Defendant placed (and continues to place) repeated and unwanted calls to consumers whose phone numbers are listed on the National Do Not Call Registry. Consumers place their phone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry for the express purpose of avoiding unwanted telemarketing calls like those alleged here. 12. Not surprisingly, Defendant’s practices have led to significant backlash from 4 consumers:1 • Yep someone called me at 730 this morning and stated they were Slomins Alarm.. I called them back to remove my # & was told that someone added my # on their account # which I don't know who it is and they can't remove your# unless you know who the person who has the acct to take you off • We get many calls from Slomins on several numbers. This is one of them. • These people call everyday and do not know how to take no for an answer. The gentleman most recently was very rude and pushy to the point Im ready to contact the Attorney General and file suit against them • Constantly getting calls on a number that I never even signed up for anything with. • Never answer the calls but frankly, it's getting annoying at this point. • Number has called later in the evening (8, 830, and 930) and when picked up the other side hangs up. • Slomins oil heating company keeps calling my cell phone continuosly! I told them i dont own a home and im not interested and they still keep calling!!!! 21. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and a Class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows: All individuals in the United States who: (1) received more than one telephone call made by or on behalf of Defendant within a 12-month period; (2) promoting Defendant’s products or services; (3) to a telephone number that had been registered with the National Do Not Call Registry for at least 30 days; and (4) for whom Defendant has no record of consent to place such calls. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant; Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, and predecessors; any entity in which Slomin’s or its parents have a controlling 6 interest; and the current or former employees, officers, and directors of Defendant, its parents, or any entity in which Slomin’s or its parents have a controlling interest; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 22. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant made telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be easily identified through Defendant’s records. 23. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited, to the following: (a) Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the TCPA; (b) Whether Defendant systematically made telephone calls to consumers whose telephone numbers were registered with the National Do Not Call Registry; (c) Whether Defendant systematically made telephone calls to consumers who did not previously provide Defendant and/or its agents with prior express consent to receive such phone calls; and (d) Whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct. 7 24. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct toward Plaintiff and the Class. 25. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and he has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 26. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 27. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy given that joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies 8 presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 28. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 29. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 30. The TCPA’s implementing regulation—47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)—provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or his telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government.” See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c). 31. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e) provides that 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers to the extent described in the Commission’s Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153, ‘Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,’” and the Commission’s Report and Order, in turn, provides as follows: 9 The Commission’s rules provide that companies making telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers must comply with time of day restrictions and must institute procedures for maintaining do-not-call lists. For the reasons described above, we conclude that these rules apply to calls made to wireless telephone numbers. We believe that wireless subscribers should be afforded the same protections as wireline subscribers. 32. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity. The procedures instituted must meet the following minimum standards: (1) Written policy. Persons or entities making calls for telemarketing purposes must have a written policy, available upon demand, for maintaining a do-not- call list. (2) Training of personnel engaged in telemarketing. Personnel engaged in any aspect of telemarketing must be informed and trained in the existence and use of the do-not-call list. (3) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call requests. If a person or entity making a call for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such a call is made) receives a request from a residential telephone subscriber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the person or entity must record the request and place the subscriber’s name, if provided, and telephone number on the do-not-call list at the time the request is made. Persons or entities making calls for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such calls are made) must honor a residential subscriber’s do-not-call request within a reasonable time from the date such request is made. This period may not exceed thirty days from the date of such request . . . . (4) Identification of sellers and telemarketers. A person or entity making a call for telemarketing purposes must provide the called party with the name of the individual caller, the name of the person or entity on whose behalf the call is being made, and a telephone number or address at which the person or entity may be contacted. The telephone number provided may not be a 900 number or any other number for which charges exceed local or long distance transmission charges. (5) Affiliated persons or entities. In the absence of a specific request by the subscriber to the contrary, a residential subscriber’s do-not-call request shall 10 apply to the particular business entity making the call (or on whose behalf a call is made), and will not apply to affiliated entities unless the consumer reasonably would expect them to be included given the identification of the caller and the product being advertised. (6) Maintenance of do-not-call lists. A person or entity making calls for telemarketing purposes must maintain a record of a consumer’s request not to receive further telemarketing calls. A do-not-call request must be honored for 5 years from the time the request is made. 33. Defendant made more than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiff and members of the Class within a 12-month period without their prior express consent to place such calls. Each such call was directed to a telephone number that had been registered with the National Do Not Call Registry for at least 30 days. Plaintiff and members of the Class never provided any form of consent to receive telephone calls from Defendant and/or Defendant does not have a record of consent to place telemarketing calls to them. 34. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to residential and wireless telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiff and the Class, without instituting procedures that comply with the regulatory minimum standards for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls. 35. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are each entitled to, inter alia, receive at least $500 in damages for each such violation of 9. Slomin’s is a home services company primarily operating out of the mid-Atlantic region, including New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Georgia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Within this area, Slomin’s offers homeowners home security systems, heating oil, and home cooling products. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. The 2015 FCC Order also clarified that telephone calls and text messages have the same protections under FCC rules, and that text messages are “calls” for purposes of the 39. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) & (b)(3) on behalf of herself, on behalf of all others similarly situated, and as a member of the “Class,” defined as follows: All persons in the United States of America to whom Defendant has placed any pre-recorded voice calls or sent any automated commercial text message for whom Defendant has no record of prior express consent and/or for whom Defendant has no record of providing the required disclosures between October 16, 2013 and the date of class certification of this action. 41. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend or otherwise alter the class definition presented to the Court at the appropriate time, or to propose or eliminate sub-classes, in response to facts learned through discovery, legal arguments advanced by Defendant, or otherwise. 42. Numerosity: Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is presently unknown, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that Class members number in the thousands of persons, if not more. 44. This action is properly maintainable as a class action for the reasons set forth herein. 45. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class she seeks to represent because Plaintiff, like the Class members, received phone calls and text messages from Defendant without providing prior express written consent to or receiving the required disclosures from Defendant. Defendant’s practices were and are uniformly directed to all consumers. Plaintiff and the Class sustained similar injuries arising out of Defendant’s conduct in violation of federal law. Plaintiff and the members of the Class she represents sustained the same types of damages and losses. Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the Class members and are based on the same legal theories. 46. Adequacy: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class she seeks to represent because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class members Plaintiff seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained highly competent counsel experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and the interests of members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel. 48. Certification of this class action is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) & (b)(3) because the questions of law or fact common to the respective members of the Class predominate over questions of law or fact affecting only individual members. Certification is also appropriate because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 49. Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is also appropriate because Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein. 52. Defendant placed commercial phone calls and left commercial mails to the mobile cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the Class. 53. Defendant sent commercial text messages (“calls” in FCC parlance) to the mobile cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the Class. 54. On information and belief, Defendant used an ATDS to send commercial text messages to the mobile cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the Class and used a pre-recorded voice to make calls to the cellular telephones and landline phones of the Plaintiff and the Class. 55. Defendant did not obtain express written consent prior to placing commercial phone calls or sending commercial text messages to Plaintiff or the Class. 56. Defendant did not provide to Plaintiff or the Class the disclosures required by the FCC concerning the use of a pre-recorded voice or ATDS. 57. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to, and seek, awards of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 59. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to, and seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 60. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 8. The purpose of the TCPA is to protect consumers from unwanted calls and text messages, such as those Defendant sent and made to Plaintiff. 9. Under the FCC’s July 10, 2015 Order (the “2015 FCC Order”) (Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; American Association of Healthcare Administrative Management, Petition for Expedited Declaratory Ruling and Exemption; et al, Federal Communications Commission, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961 (July 10, 2015)), companies wishing to place certain call or text messages must obtain prior express written consent. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. On behalf of Plaintiff and the Putative Class The TCPA

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Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiff’s claims are barred to the extent that any violation of the FDCPA was unintentional, resulting from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such error. WHEREFORE, the defendant requests that the plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that the court grant defendants such other relief as may be required by the interests of justice, including without limitation, costs of defense, including a reasonable attorney fee. Date: April 16, 2012

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22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in December of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.gocollette.com, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from a telephone number confirmed to belong to Defendant, 347-290-1237. 11. Defendant’s call constituted a call that was not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s call was placed to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 13. During all relevant times, Defendant did not possess Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 16. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereinafter, “The Class”), defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 17. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 18. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class’s members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 8. Beginning in or around March 20, 2020, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -5654, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violation of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and The Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violation of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and The Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 21. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.MANHATTAN.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in September 2017, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 35. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 43. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 44. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s school is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s school. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 49. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 52. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical location is located in State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 61. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 71. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 74. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 75. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 77. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 78. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 82. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 83. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 84. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 85. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. 87. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and the Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under the RA and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 88. Defendant’s violations of Sec. 504 of the RA were intentional or with deliberate indifference. 89. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff is entitled to damages from the Defendant. 90. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 91. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 92. Defendant’s locations are public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 93. Defendants are subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 94. Defendants are violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 96. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the City Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed City Sub-class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the City Sub-class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504

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16. In approximately November 2007, Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant. 17. From approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff performed compensable work on behalf of and at the direction of Defendant in the position of Field Specialist. 18. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Defendant classified Plaintiff and all other individuals employed in the position of Field Specialist as “salaried, non-exempt” for compensation purposes – meaning, Defendant compensated Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists with overtime pay for compensable work performed beyond forty (40) hours each workweek. 19. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists performed Inspection work. 21. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff’s and all other Field Specialists’ job duties primarily included physically performing non-destructive testing (such as welding inspections, pump testing inspections, aerial inspections, and ground ladder testing) on Defendant’s customers’ products. 22. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists physically performed their job duties outside, in weld shops, and/or in factories. 23. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists physically performed their job duties off-site and/or away from Defendant’s place of business. 24. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists did not perform their job duties in an office setting. 25. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff’s and all other Field Specialists’ job duties primarily included performing manual labor. 27. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists regularly travelled for special one-day assignments in other cities or locations during the work day and/or on weekends. 28. At times during Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists travelled away from home overnight on work days and/or on weekends. 29. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff’s and all other Field Specialists’ job duties primarily involved the use of skills and technical abilities in gathering factual information, applying known standards or prescribed procedures, determining which procedure to follow, and determining whether prescribed standards or criteria were met. 30. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff’s and all other Field Specialists’ job duties primarily involved performing specialized work along standardized lines involving well-established techniques, procedures, or specific standards that were catalogued or described in Defendant’s (or others’) manuals or handbooks within closely prescribed limits in order to determine the correct response to an inquiry or set of circumstances. 32. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists did not compare or evaluate possible courses of conduct and did not act or make decisions regarding matters of significance after various possibilities have been considered. 33. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists did not have authority to make an independent choice, free from immediate direction or supervision, or to waive or deviate from Defendant’s established policies and/or procedures without Defendant’s prior approval. 34. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists did not manage, run, or operate any department or division of Defendant. 35. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, no other employees of Defendant reported directly to Plaintiff or any other Field Specialists. 36. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant in the position of Field Specialist from approximately November 2007 to March 31, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists did not have the authority or actual ability to hire, fire, demote, promote, and/or establish the terms and conditions of any other employees’ employment at Defendant. 38. Effective April 1, 2017, Defendant changed Plaintiff’s and all other Field Specialists’ compensation classification status from “salaried, non-exempt” to “salaried, exempt” – meaning, Defendant would no longer compensate Plaintiff and all other Field Specialists with overtime pay for compensable work performed beyond forty (40) hours each workweek. 39. Subsequent to April 1, 2017, Defendant changed Plaintiff’s and all other Field Specialists’ job titles from “Field Specialist” to “Field Engineer.” 40. Subsequent to April 1, 2017, the job duties of the Field Engineer position did not change or differ in any way as they existed prior to April 1, 2017: the job duties of the “Field Engineer” position were exactly the same as the job duties of the “Field Specialist” position. 41. Prior to April 1, 2017, Plaintiff worked between approximately forty (40) to forty- five (45) hours per workweek. 42. Subsequent to April 1, 2017, Plaintiff worked between approximately forty-five (45) to fifty (50) hours per workweek. 43. Subsequent to April 1, 2017, Plaintiff and all other Field Engineers received only a bi-weekly salary as compensation for work performed beyond forty (40) hours each workweek. 44. Subsequent to April 1, 2017, Defendant did not compensate Plaintiff and all other Field Engineers at an overtime rate of pay for work performed beyond forty (40) hours each workweek. 46. Plaintiff and all other Field Engineers electronically record time worked each workweek via Defendant’s computer and/or software system. 47. Defendant has access to and records Plaintiff’s and all other Field Engineers’ electronically recorded time worked each workweek via its computer and/or software system. 48. Despite having a detailed record of time actually worked by Plaintiff and all other Field Engineers subsequent to April 1, 2017, Defendant did not properly and lawfully compensate Plaintiff and all other Field Engineers for all hours actually worked, including at an overtime rate of pay. 49. Defendant was or should have been aware that Plaintiff and all other Field Engineers primarily performed non-exempt job duties each workweek during their employment with it and, subsequent to April 1, 2017, were legally entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked beyond forty (40) in a workweek. 50. Defendant’s unlawful pay practices described above resulted in Plaintiff and all other Field Engineers being deprived of overtime pay for all hours worked beyond forty (40) in a workweek. 51. Defendant was or should have been aware that its policies in practice did not properly and lawfully compensate Plaintiff and all other Field Engineers at an overtime rate of pay for all hours worked beyond forty (40) in a workweek. 53. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful policies and practices as described above, Plaintiff and all other Field Engineers did not receive anywhere from approximately ten (10) minutes to twenty (20) hours of compensation at an overtime rate of pay for work performed each workweek. 54. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly situated employees include: FLSA Collective Class: All persons who are or have worked at and/or been employed by Defendant in the position of Field Specialist and/or Field Engineer within three (3) years prior to this action’s filing date (ECF No. 1) and who have not been compensated at an overtime rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek as a result of Defendant’s “salaried, exempt” compensation classification. 55. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class primarily performed non-exempt job duties each workweek subsequent to April 1, 2017 and, thus, were legally entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked beyond forty (40) in a workweek. 56. Defendant, as a matter of policy and practice, did not compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class for all hours of compensable work performed during a workweek. 58. Defendant suffered or permitted Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class to perform work during the workweek without proper compensation for all hours of work. The effect of such a practice was for Defendant to deny the FLSA Collective Class their agreed upon wages, including overtime compensation at one and one-half times the regular rate, for the hours worked that were not counted as work. 59. The Claim for Relief is brought under and maintained as an opt-in Collective Action pursuant to § 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), by Plaintiff on behalf of the FLSA Collective Class. 60. The FLSA Collective Class claims may be pursued by those who affirmatively opt in to this case, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 61. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class are and have been similarly situated, have and have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subject to Defendant’s decisions, policies, plans and programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules willfully failing and refusing to compensate them for each hour worked including overtime compensation. The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are the same as those of the FLSA Collective Class. 62. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class seek relief on a collective basis challenging, among other FLSA violations, Defendant’s practice of failing to properly and lawfully compensate employees for all hours worked including overtime compensation. 64. Defendant’s conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the putative FLSA Collective Class.

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37. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 38. Defendant negligently placed multiple automated calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 39. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA. 42. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 43. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple automated calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 44. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 45. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 46. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. A. The Class Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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16. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the factual allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs. 17. J&M Tank Lines, Inc. is a company that provides commodities such as sand, calcium carbonate, lime, flour, and salt. 18. J&M is headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama but has locations in Texas and Georgia. 19. Plaintiff and class members worked for J&M out of Odessa, Texas. 20. Luis Calvillo worked for J&M as a sand hauler from December 2014 to August 2015. His job duties are typical of a J&M sand hauler as described herein. Calvillo has worked for J&M in Texas and New Mexico. 22. The sand is used a proppant – a solid material designed to keep an induced hydraulic facture open during (or after) a fracturing treatment. 23. Sand is a critical part of the hydraulic fracturing process. 24. Sand haulers are an integral part of the hydraulic process. 25. The drilling operation takes place 24 hours a day. It is essential to have the right amount of sand ready and available to load into the blender used to mix the propellant into the fracking fluid. 26. J&M’s customers rely on Plaintiff and class members to be ready on site with their load of sand and be able to move up the line and unload their sand at the right time and the right location. The sand is unloaded into the “sand kings” which are huge containers that hold the sand during drilling operations. 27. The sand haulers’ work is an essential part of the well stimulation production process. 28. J&M required Plaintiff and class members to wait at the drilling site until it was their turn to unload their sand. 29. J&M required Plaintiff and class members to sit in their trucks and be on standby for up to 24 hours, 48 hours, or more at the drill site and be prepared to unload their sand. 30. According to company policy, sand haulers were paid a fixed amount per job and per load. These payments constituted a job rate and a piece rate respectively under the FLSA. 31. In addition, sand haulers were paid an hourly rate for the time they spent on standby, but only up to 12 hours. 32. Sand haulers were not paid for standby time of more than 12 hours. 34. The drive from the shop in Odessa to the drill sites in New Mexico was at least 3 hours each way. 35. Sand haulers were not paid for drive time to and from the drill site. 36. With respect to travel time, employees are entitled to compensation for travel time that is a “principal activity” of the employee. Vega v. Gasper, 36 F.3d 417 at 424 (5th Cir. 1994). 37. Plaintiff’s drive time between the shop and the drill sites was performed as part of the regular work of the employees in the ordinary course of business of J&M. 38. The travel time between the shop and the drill sites was necessary to the business and is performed by the employees, primarily for the benefit of J&M. 39. Such travel is not ordinary home to work travel, which is generally not a “principal activity” and thus non-compensable according to the Portal-to-Portal Act. 40. Because transporting the sand to the drill site was a principal activity of the sand haulers, it constituted compensable work time under the FLSA. 41. No advanced degree is required to become a sand hauler. In fact, J&M regularly hires sand haulers who have only a high-school diploma (or less). 42. Plaintiff does not have an advanced degree. Being a sand hauler does not require specialized academic training as a standard prerequisite. 43. To the extent sand haulers make “decisions,” the decisions do not require the exercise of independent discretion and judgment. 44. Instead, sand haulers apply well-established techniques and procedures. 45. If sand haulers evaluate sand quality, they do so using established standards. 47. Sand haulers are not permitted to deviate from established sand quality standards. 48. Sand haulers are blue collar workers. They rely on their hands, physical skills, and energy, to perform manual labor in the oilfield. 49. Sand haulers work long hours. While in the field, sand haulers regularly work more than 12 hours in a day, 7 days a week. 50. Sand haulers regularly work more than 90 hours in a week. As an example, Calvillo averaged 12 (or more) hours per day, each day that he worked. 51. However, J&M does not pay its sand haulers overtime under the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (“NMMWA”) for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. J&M does not pay sand haulers for compensable travel time, or for standby time of more than 12 hours. 52. As a result of J&M’s pay policies, Plaintiff and the New Mexico Class were denied the overtime pay required by state law. 53. Workers who are exempt from overtime under the FLSA due to the Motor Carrier Act exemption, may still be eligible for overtime pay according to state law such as the NMMWA. Pettis Moving Co. v. Roberts, 784 F.2d 439, 441 (2d Cir. 1986). 54. As a result of J&M’s pay policies, Plaintiff, the New Mexico Class, and the FLSA Class were denied the minimum wage pay required by state and federal law. 55. J&M keeps records of the hours its sand haulers work. 56. These records reflect the fact that Plaintiff and the FLSA Class worked more than 40 hours a week. 57. Plaintiff seeks compensation for unpaid minimum wage under the FLSA and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, as well as unpaid overtime under the NMMWA. 58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the factual allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs. 59. In addition to the Plaintiff, J&M employed dozens of other sand haulers within the past 3 years. 60. J&M paid (and pays) all its sand haulers a combination job rate, piece rate and hourly rate. 61. This is the same pay system J&M applied to the Plaintiff. 62. The FLSA Class members perform the job duties typical of a J&M sand hauler. 63. The FLSA Class is similarly situated to the Plaintiff. 64. The FLSA Class should be notified of this action and given the chance to join pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 65. Plaintiff brings state law claims on behalf of all sand haulers employed in New Mexico pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (the “New Mexico Class”). 66. J&M employed at least 40 sand haulers in New Mexico during the past 3 years. 67. These workers are geographically disbursed, residing in other states (such as Louisiana and Texas). 68. Because these workers do not have fixed work locations, sand haulers work in different states across the country in the course of a given year. 69. For example, Calvillo worked at least one workweek of more than 40 hours in both New Mexico and Texas from June 2015 to July 2015. 71. Plaintiff retained counsel who is experienced and competent in class action and employment litigation. 72. Plaintiff has no relevant interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the members of the classes. 73. Like each member of the proposed classes, Calvillo has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed under state law and unpaid minimum wages owed under both state and federal law. 74. A collective/class action suit, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 75. Absent these actions, many members of the classes likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and J&M will retain the proceeds of its violations of the FLSA and the applicable state labor law. 76. Furthermore, even if particular members of the classes could afford individual litigation against J&M, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 77. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 78. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact affecting the New Mexico Class as a whole. 79. The questions of law and fact common to the New Mexico Class predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. 81. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of members of the classes. 82. Plaintiff, the FLSA Class, and the New Mexico Class, have all sustained damages arising out of J&M’s wrongful and uniform employment policy. 83. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective or class action. 84. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the factual allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs. 85. By failing to pay Plaintiff and the New Mexico Class overtime at 1 and ½ times their regular rates, J&M violated the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, N.M.S.A. § 50-4-19 et seq. 86. J&M owes Plaintiffs and the Class overtime wages equal to 1 and ½ their regular rates for each overtime hour worked during the last three years. 87. J&M knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its failure to pay overtime violated the NMMWA. 88. J&M’s failure to pay overtime to Plaintiff and the Class is willful. 89. J&M owes Plaintiff and the Class an amount equal to all unpaid overtime wages as well as liquidated damages. 90. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action. 91. Defendants’ Sand Haulers routinely use hard hats, gloves, safety glasses, ear protection, hoses, hammers, Kenworth tractor, PeopleNet satellite tracking system, in performing their job duties of hauling specialized fracking sand from Texas to New Mexico. Thus the employees used, handled, sold, and/or worked on, goods or materials that were produced for or traveled in interstate commerce. 93. The conduct alleged in this Complaint violates the FLSA and New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (NMMWA), NMSA § 50-4-19 et seq. 94. J&M was and is an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA and the NMMWA. 95. At all relevant times, J&M employed Plaintiff, and each of the New Mexico Class members, as an “employee” within the meaning of the FLSA and the NMMWA. 96. Both statutes require employer like J&M to pay minimum wage to all non-exempt employees. 97. Plaintiff and the other New Mexico Class members are non-exempt employees who are entitled to be paid no less than minimum wage for all hours worked. 98. Within the applicable limitations period, J&M had a policy and practice of failing to pay minimum wage pay to the FLSA Class members for all their hours worked. 99. As a result of J&M’s failure to pay overtime to Plaintiff and the FLSA Class members at a rate not less than the minimum wage of $7.50 for all hours worked in New Mexico, and not less than $7.25 for other hours worked, J&M violated the NMMWA and the FLSA. 100. Plaintiff and the other New Mexico Class members seek the amount of their underpayments based on J&M’s failure to minimum wage, an equal amount as liquidated damages, and such other legal and equitable relief from J&M’s willful conduct as the Court deems just and proper. 101. Plaintiff and the New Mexico Class members also seek recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs of this action to be paid by J&M, as provided by the NMMWA. VIOLATION OF THE MINIMUM WAGE PROVISION OF THE FLSA AND NMMWA (FLSA CLASS)

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26. On or about September 5, 2019, Defendant sent the following telemarketing text message to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 3730 (the “3730 Number”): 27. Defendant’s text message was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 28. Defendant’s text message constitutes telemarketing because it encourages the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., purchasing Plaintiff’s house. 29. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s recent home purchases, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 31. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 32. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 3730 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 3730 Number. 33. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 34. The text messages originated from telephone number 713-804-8706, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 35. The number used by Defendant (713-804-8706) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 36. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a short code. 37. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 38. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 39. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 42. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 43. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 44. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 45. To transmit the messages at issue, the Platform automatically executed the following steps: a. The Platform retrieved each telephone number from a list of numbers in the sequential order the numbers were listed; b. The Platform then generated each number in the sequential order listed and combined each number with the content of Defendant’s message to create “packets” consisting of one telephone number and the message content; c. Each packet was then transmitted in the sequential order listed to an SMS aggregator, which acts an intermediary between the Platform, mobile carriers (e.g. AT&T), and consumers. d. Upon receipt of each packet, the SMS aggregator transmitted each packet – automatically and with no human intervention – to the respective mobile carrier for the telephone number, again in the sequential order listed by Defendant. Each mobile carrier then sent the message to its customer’s mobile telephone. 46. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 47. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 48. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention: 49. Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 50. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she spent approximately fifteen minutes investigating the unwanted text message including how they obtained her number and who the Defendant was. 51. Furthermore, Defendant’s text messages took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 52. Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 53. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 54. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting Defendant’s goods and services, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 55. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 58. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 59. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 64. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 65. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 66. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 67. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class as prior express consent was either never obtained or was revoked at the time Defendant’s calls were made. 68. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 69. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 70. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 71. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-63 as if fully set forth herein. 72. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 73. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 74. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls or had revoked their consent at the time Defendant’s calls were made, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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25. Plaintiff still has and had, at all relevant times to this action, telephone facsimile service at (714) 633-7470 at its place of business in Orange, California. Plaintiff receives facsimile transmissions (faxes) at this number, using a telephone facsimile machine (fax machine). 26. On or about April 29, 2019, Defendants, without Plaintiff’s express invitation or permission, arranged for or caused a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited fax advertisement, advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, to Plaintiff’s fax machine located at its principal place of business. A copy of the fax advertisement is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is incorporated herein by reference. 27. Exhibit A advertised an injection workshop in Los Angeles for $299 whereby CME (Continuing Medical Education) could be earned. 28. Exhibit A contains a Designation Statement, which states in part, “Albert Einstein College of Medicine designates this live activity for a maximum of 4.0 AMA PRA Category 1 CreditsTM.” 29. Exhibit A indicates contains this statement: “This activity is jointly provided by Albert Einstein College of Medicine and Scientiae, LLC.” 30. Exhibit A mentions Einstein more than a dozen times. 31. Exhibit A was unsolicited in that Defendants sent it to Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s express invitation or permission. 32. Exhibit A lacks the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. 41. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against Defendants pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is easily ascertainable. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further investigation reveal that any Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 42. Numerosity: At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of Class Members, but among other things, given the nature of the claims and that Defendants’ conducted consisted of a standardized fax campaign and widely disseminated standardized fax electronically sent to particular telephone numbers, Plaintiff believes, at a minimum, there are hundreds of Class Members. Plaintiff believes that the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action rather than incremental individual actions will benefit the Parties and the Court by eliminating the possibility of inconsistent or varying adjudications of individual actions. 43. Upon information and belief, a more precise Class size and the identities of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendants’ records, including, but not limited to Defendants’ fax and marketing records. 44. Members of the Class may additionally or alternatively be notified of the pendency of this action by techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice, website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable to this class and deemed necessary or appropriate by the Court. 47. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same course of conduct that violates the TCPA. 48. Plaintiff and members of the Class each received at least one fax advertisement, advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, which contained no purported opt-out notice, which Defendants sent or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 49. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in litigation in the federal courts, TCPA litigation, and class-action litigation. 51. Class-Wide Injunctive Relief and Rule 23(b)(2): Moreover, as an alternative to or in addition to certification of the Class under Rule 23(b)(3), class certification is warranted under Rule 23(b)(2) because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and members of Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members as a whole. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of Class Members on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class in order to enjoin and prevent Defendants’ ongoing violations of the TCPA, and to order Defendants to provide notice to them of their rights under the TCPA to statutory damages and to be free from unwanted faxes. 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the allegations from above. 53. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of the Class defined above against Defendants for violation of the TCPA and the rules prescribed under it by the FCC. 54. At all times material to this action, Defendants were each a person that used or caused to be used a “telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device” to send, to a “telephone facsimile machine” an “unsolicited advertisement” or an “advertisement” within the meaning of the TCPA and its regulations. 55. Defendants sent or caused to be sent hundreds or thousands of these advertisements exemplified by Exhibit A. Plaintiff and each Class Member received at least one of them. 57. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). 58. If it is found that Defendants willfully or knowingly sent or caused to be sent fax advertisements to Plaintiff and the members of Class in violation of the TCPA, such as Scientiae’s continued practices after getting sued in the Illinois Junk-Fax Case, Plaintiff requests an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendants, described in the preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227)

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27. Defendants are individuals and companies that either market their services to consumers and small businesses or aid and assist those Defendants by providing website hosting services. 28. Defendant FORMULA sells fast loans to small businesses. 29. Defendant DENTEMAX sells dental plans. 30. Defendant RMG is a debt collection company. 31. Defendants MILLS, WILSON, AND SHARPE sell information on how to make money. 32. To increase the reach of their efforts, Defendants repeatedly called and sent prerecorded voice messages to thousands or possibly tens of thousands of cell phones at a time. 33. When the Class members answered their cell phones or listened to their messages expecting to hear from a real person, Defendants pulled a bait and switch by playing a prerecorded voice message. 34. Unfortunately, Defendants failed to obtain consent from Plaintiff and the Class before bombarding their cell phones with these illegal voice recordings. 35. On January 18, 2019, Plaintiff received a call and voicemail from Defendant RMG. 36. Plaintiff listened to the message and it was a prerecorded voice asking Plaintiff to call Defendant RMG at 980-999-8205 and directing it to its website at resourcemanagementgrp.com. 37. When the call was returned, Defendant RMG had no explanation for why it called Plaintiff. 38. Defendant RMG’s website at resourcemanagementgrp.com is hosted by Defendant 70. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 71. Numerosity: The exact number of the Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants placed telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 72. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. 73. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are made in a representative capacity on behalf of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the proposed Class and is subject to no unique defenses. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel to prosecute the case on behalf of Plaintiff and the proposed Class. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. 74. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinge on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 76. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 77. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 78. Defendants and/or its agent placed telephone calls to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written consent to do so. 80. Defendants played a prerecorded voice message to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the Class members as proscribed by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 81. As a result of its unlawful conduct, Defendants repeatedly invaded Plaintiff’s and the Class’s personal privacy, causing them to suffer damages and, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), entitling them to recover $500 in civil fines for each violation and an injunction requiring Defendants to stop their illegal calling campaign. 82. Defendants and/or its agent made the violating calls “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 83. If the court finds that Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated this subsection, the court may increase the civil fine from $500 to $1500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(all Class Members) 10. When Plaintiff clicked on the “Cancel Air Reservation” section of Southwest.com, the website showed his itinerary, explained Southwest’s cancellation rules and procedures, and prompted him to “Please select what you would like to do with the balance of these funds”: “Nonrefundable” – “These funds will be held for future use.” Believing Southwest’s representation that his entire payment was “nonrefundable,” Plaintiff accepted a “"Travel Funds"” credit for the entire amount of his prepayment ($536.98). 11. Plaintiff is unable to use the full “"Travel Funds"” credit and part of his “"Travel Funds"” will expire on May 8, 2021. 12. Contrary to Southwest’s statement, the TSA fee is indeed refundable, and Southwest has itself promised to refund that fee as required by law. The subsequent sections explain these obligations. Southwest’s Contract of Carriage promise to refund a TSA fee to a passenger when required by governing regulation 14. This provision is no great victory for passengers—it obliges Southwest only to refund those fees for which governing regulations already require a refund. But that is exactly the situation for the TSA fees that Plaintiff prepaid. Governing regulation requires Southwest to refund a TSA fee to a passenger when the passenger cancels travel 15. Indeed, governing law requires refunds. See 49 CFR § 1510.9(b) (emphasis added): Any changes by the passenger to the itinerary are subject to additional collection or refund of the security service fee ... as appropriate. Plaintiff canceled his itinerary by cancelling it in full. This entirely obviates the basis for the security fee, per the calculation in 49 CFR § 1510.5(a). As a result, 1510.9(b) obliged Southwest to refund the fee – not to convert it into a “"Travel Funds"” credit for Plaintiff’s possible future use, but to return it to the Plaintiff 16. Secondary authorities confirm the plain meaning of 1510.9(b). The DHS Office of Audits in 2006 prepared a Review of the Transportation Security Administration Collection of Aviation Security Service Fees (DHS OIG-06-35). At page 9 (PDF page 13), the DHS report summarizes: “air carriers have no grounds to keep fees of any kind that are owed to the ticket purchaser or TSA.” 19. Plaintiff re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 20. In ordinary circumstances, a large number of passengers buy tickets for travel on Southwest, but then do not travel. In such circumstances, Southwest systematically fails to refund their TSA fee to them as required by law. 21. The COVID-19 pandemic has expanded the set of passengers who do not use their pre-purchased travel. 23. This action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class satisfies all of the requirements of Rule 23 for maintaining a class action. 24. Ascertainability. The members of the Class (collectively “class members”) are known to Southwest. Their identities are recorded in Southwest’s business records. Moreover, the Class Definition enables every putative class member to identify himself or herself as a member of the Class. 25. Numerosity. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. Plaintiff believes there are tens of thousands of members of the Class, who are geographically dispersed throughout the United States. 26. Existence and predominance of common questions of law or fact. There are questions of law or fact that are common to the Class, which predominate over questions affecting any individual class member. 28. Typicality. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members, and Defendant has no defenses that are unique to Plaintiff. 29. Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class and has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the class. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel who are experienced in the prosecution of consumer class action litigation. 30. Superiority. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims asserted herein. A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of time and expense that the prosecution of numerous individual actions would entail. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of in this action. Plaintiff does not anticipate any unusual difficulties in the management of this class action. 31. Plaintiff re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 33. Southwest nonetheless refused and failed to refund the TSA fee. In breach of its contracts with class members, Southwest represented that the TSA Fee was nonrefundable and issued a Southwest "Travel Funds" credit instead of refunding the TSA Fee. 34. As a direct result of Southwest’s breach of the Contract, Plaintiff and all other members of the Class suffered actual damages in the form of being denied their refundable TSA Fees and incurred reasonable and foreseeable economic harm. 9. On February 7, 2020, Plaintiff Jason Steele purchased a ticket to fly on Southwest Airlines. He paid $536.98, an amount that included airfare, all taxes, and a TSA fee. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and other circumstances, Mr. Steele was unable to travel as booked and he cancelled the ticket.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant operates MONEYGRAM Centers as well as the MONEYGRAM website, and offers it to the public and offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its Service Centers (hereinafter, its “Centers”). 21. Defendant operates MONEYGRAM Centers across the United States, including its location in New York City at 51 Astor Place, New York, NY 10003. 22. These Centers constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Centers provide to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of information and services including Center locations and hours, access to details regarding its many programs and services, including the ability to send money, pay bills, estimate fees, track a money transfer, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Centers. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Centers and the numerous facilities, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in August 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities and services of Defendant’s physical locations in New York. Because of these barriers he was unable to: find information about the Centers locations and hours, access details regarding its many programs and services, including the ability to send money, pay bills, estimate fees, track a money transfer, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 28. These access barriers have deterred Plaintiff from revisiting Defendant’s website and/or visiting its physical locations, despite an intention to do so. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired consumers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website, despite his intention to do so. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical Center locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Centers on its Website and other important information about the Centers locations and hours, access details regarding its many programs and services, including the ability to send money, pay bills, estimate fees, track a money transfer, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and learn about Defendant’s operations as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s Center locations and hours, access details regarding its many programs and services, including the ability to send money, pay bills, estimate fees, track a money transfer, promotional information, and other services available online and in Centers. 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Centers are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Centers. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or his civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant’s New York State physical locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 80. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 86. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 97. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.DEAN.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 31. Plaintiff, Jason Camacho, attended the NACAC college fair at Javits on Nov. 5, 2018 in order to obtain information from the college exhibitors presenting and marketing at the fair including the Defendant’s school. 32. Soon after attending the Javits fair, Mr. Camacho attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s school but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 35. The stated principles of NACAC members include “They strive to eliminate bias within the educational system based on …disability.”1 36. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant, that is a member of NACAC, intentionally violated NACAC’s basic principles to eliminate bias toward the disabled as well as federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. 37. NACAC maintains a business relationship with the New York Daily News newspaper which publishes full page advertisements for the NACAC college fairs at Javits and an onsite guide to the exhibitors which is distributed free of charge to attendees at the college fairs. Exhibitors, such as the Defendant, may participate in the New York Daily News advertisements and/or advertise in the onsite guide. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 40. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 41. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 42. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 44. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 48. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 56. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 58. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Defendant’s school and it’s exhibits at Javits are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s school. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 63. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 64. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 66. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant’s physical exhibit locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 87. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 90. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 92. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 97. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 98. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. DECLARATORY RELIEF 116. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 117. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 118. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504 VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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5. Plaintiffs are each insured by a health insurance plan that is sponsored by their employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) (the “Plans”). 6. The Plans are fully insured. 7. Blue Shield is responsible both for paying claims under the Plans and for administering the Plans. 8. Plaintiffs’ Plans cover in- and out-of-network treatments for illnesses and injuries as well as for mental illnesses and substance use disorders described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition (“DSM-5”) of the American Psychiatric Association. As such, Plaintiffs’ Plans cover residential and intensive outpatient treatment for mental illnesses and substance abuse disorders. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A) 188. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 189. Plaintiffs bring this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class. 190. Plaintiffs and the Class have been harmed, and are likely to be harmed in the future, by Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duty described hereinabove. 191. To remedy these injuries, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to seek, and do seek, an injunction prohibiting these acts and practices pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A), and seek a judgment in their favor ordering Defendants to reprocess claims for residential rehabilitation treatment and intensive outpatient treatment for substance abuse and mental health disorders that they previously denied in whole or in part, pursuant to new guidelines that are consistent with generally accepted professional standards and the Class members’ plans.

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1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 Court of Common Pleas New Case Electronically Filed: COMPLAINT August 12,2020 15:16 By: JAMES S. WERTHEIM 0029464 Confirmation Nbr. 2049889 19. In around August 2018, Plaintiff received a postcard from Superior Healthcare advertising a seminar regarding the use of stem cell therapy for back problems. 20. Plaintiff has had constant back problems for many years and was in severe pain daily. 21. She was desperate. 22. Before her appointment, Plaintiff reviewed Superior HealthCare’s website which made promises of a safe, effective and proven therapy. 23. She could not afford to pay for the $10,000 treatment out of pocket. 24. Superior Healthcare arranged for the financing of the $10,000 treatment through Defendant on the spot. 25. Without this funding, Plaintiff could never have undertaken the procedure. 26. Defendant implies that it will work with the provider regarding any complaints. 27. Defendant does not do so. 28. Defendant conspired with Superior Healthcare and preyed on Plaintiff, who was in a desperate state. 29. Plaintiff was harmed by Defendant’s actions. 30. Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount of at least $10,000. 31. Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages and attorney fees. 32. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as members of an Ohio class (the “Class”) preliminarily defined as: Electronically Filed 08/12/2020 15:16 / / CV 20 935892 / Confirmation Nbr. 2049889 / CLJSZ 4 (a) Residents of the State of Ohio at the time they received the treatment; (b) Who were treated at any facilities with any kind of stem cell therapy; (c) Whose treatment was financed by Defendant; (d) Within the four years prior to the date of the filing of this Complaint. 33. Excluded from the proposed Class are the judicial officers and their immediate family members and associated court staff assigned to this case, as well as all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the proposed Class. B. A Class Action is Superior 34. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 35. Numerosity. The proposed Class consists of at least hundreds or more persons, such that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 36. Commonality. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the Class members that relate to Defendant’s uniform conduct as set forth above. 37. Typicality. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the proposed Class because Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same legal theories, and Plaintiff has no interests that are antagonistic to the interests of the Class members. 38. Adequacy. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and has retained competent legal counsel experienced in class actions and complex litigation. Electronically Filed 08/12/2020 15:16 / / CV 20 935892 / Confirmation Nbr. 2049889 / CLJSZ 5 39. Common Questions of Law and Fact. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members, particularly because the focus of the litigation will be on the conduct of Defendant. The predominant questions of law and fact in this litigation include, but are not limited to: (a) Whether Defendant had any scientific evidence to support the claims that the treatment was clinically proven, was not experimental, that adverse side effects were not possible and that the procedure had FDA approval; (b) Whether Defendant’s conduct was necessary for the stem cell providers to provide the services; (c) Whether the stem cell providers engaged in fraud. 40. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, as the pursuit of hundreds of individual lawsuits would not be economically feasible for individual Class members, and certification as a class action will preserve judicial resources by allowing the common issues of the Class members to be adjudicated in a single forum, avoiding the need for duplicative hearings and discovery in individual actions that are based on an identical set of facts. 41. This proposed class action does not present any unique management difficulties. A. Class Definition MICHELLE OFFREDO ) CASE NO. 315 Sandstone Ridgeway ) Cleveland, OH 44017, )

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10. On or about June 3, 2014, Portfolio filed a Complaint (the “Collection Complaint”) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division-Special Civil Part, Camden County, against Garcia. 11. In the Collection Complaint, Portfolio sought a judgment for amounts allegedly owed by Garcia on an alleged Citibank, N.A. credit card account. 12. Portfolio alleged in the Collection Complaint that Garcia had entered into an agreement for a credit card with Citibank, N.A./Sears. 13. Portfolio further alleged that it was the purchaser and then-current owner of Garcia’s alleged Citibank credit card account, and that this alleged account was assigned to it by Citibank, N.A. on March 26, 2013. 14. Portfolio further alleged that Garcia had failed to make required payments and was in default in the amount of $6,139.75 on the alleged Citibank credit card account that Portfolio had acquired. 16. Garcia, by and through his then-retained counsel, filed an Answer to Portfolio’s Collection Complaint (the “Answer”), and therein denied all of Portfolio’s allegations pertaining to himself. 17. Garcia also asserted 22 affirmative defenses in his Answer and demanded judgment dismissing the Collection Complaint and awarding him attorney’s fees and costs of suit. 18. At or shortly after the time Garcia filed his Answer, he also served discovery requests on Portfolio and demanded, inter alia, a copy of the alleged application for credit on the alleged Citibank credit card account. 19. Portfolio provided copies of certain documents, but did not produce the original credit agreement. 20. Portfolio’s collection claim was scheduled for trial on January 13, 2015. On that day, Garcia and his counsel appeared for trial. 21. Neither Portfolio nor its counsel appeared in court on the day of trial, and the court dismissed the collection action. 23. Garcia paid the lawyer who represented him in defending against the Portfolio collection action several thousand dollars for his attorneys’ fees and case costs. 24. In the year preceding Garcia’s filing of this Class Action Complaint, Portfolio filed over 12,000 debt-collection lawsuits in the New Jersey Superior Courts, Law Division and/or Special Civil Parts against New Jersey residents. 25. A random sampling of almost 500 of the dockets for these Portfolio- filed lawsuits covering all 21 counties in New Jersey and all months from May 2014 to May 2015 in which a Portfolio lawsuit was filed in the particular county shows that Portfolio was represented by only six individual attorneys in all of these collection lawsuits: the four Portfolio in-house counsel based in Norfolk, Virginia who are listed on the Collection Complaint filed against Garcia—Carrie A. Brown, Esq.; Thomas M. Murtha, Esq.; Mark R. Garvey, Esq.; and Sheena Daneshyar, Esq; plus two outside counsel from a single law firm based in Hackensack, New Jersey—Glenn Garbus, Esq. and Ronald Ferraro, Esq. of Foster, Garbus & Garbus 30. This action is brought and may properly proceed as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. Plaintiff seeks certification of a Class and a Subclass initially defined as follows: 42. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-41 in their entirety as if they were fully set forth here. 43. Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members are “consumers” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 44. The debts owed or alleged by Defendant to be owed by Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members are consumer “debts” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 45. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 47. The debt-collection lawsuit complaints filed by Defendant against Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members falsely implied that Defendant was able to and intended to prove the claims asserted therein, when in fact Defendant was not able to and did not intend to prove those claims, but instead intended either to obtain a default judgment or to induce settlement by the consumer, or else to dismiss the lawsuit, without ever proving its claims. 48. By filing debt-collection lawsuit complaints against Plaintiff and Class and Subclass members without any ability or intent to prove the claims asserted therein, Defendant violated the following provisions of the FDCPA: A. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by using a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of alleged debts; B. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) by threatening to take action that is not intended to be taken; C. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by using false representations or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect alleged debts; D. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f by using unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of alleged debts. 50. Plaintiff and the Subclass have been damaged by Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA in the amounts of the losses of money they incurred to defend against, respond to, or otherwise resolve the collection lawsuits filed against them by Defendant. 51. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA, Plaintiff and the Subclass also are entitled to actual damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, demands judgment against Defendant as follows: A. For certification of this matter as a class action, appointing Plaintiff as representative of the Class and Subclass, and appointing the attorneys of Williams Cuker Berezofsky, LLC as class counsel; B. For maximum statutory damages for Plaintiff and the Class under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B); C. For actual damages for Plaintiff and the Subclass under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1); D. For reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit in connection with this action under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); E. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and F. For such other and further relief as Plaintiff and Class and/or Subclass members may be entitled to or as the Court deems equitable and just. 7. Portfolio is not in the business of extending credit or selling goods or services to consumers. 9. Portfolio regularly collects or attempts to collect debts allegedly owed to others that were incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

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(Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)) (Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)) 12. United Card Solutions offers various payment technologies for businesses. About United Card Solutions, United Card Solutions, http://unitedcardsolutions.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 13. One of United Card Solutions’s strategies for marketing its payment services and generating new customers is telemarketing. 14. United Card’s strategy for generating new customers involved the use of an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) to solicit business. 15. United Card uses ATDS equipment that has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, that includes autodialers and predictive dialers and that plays a prerecorded message once the calls connect. 16. Recipients of these calls, including Plaintiff, did not consent to receive such telephone calls. 17. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 18. Plaintiff’s telephone number, “(818)-700-XXXX,” is registered to a cellular telephone service. 19. On October 2, 2017, Plaintiff received a pre-recorded call from the Defendant. 39. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 40. The foregoing acts and omissions of United Card Solutions and/or its affiliates or agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on United Card Solutions’s behalf, constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making non-emergency calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the Class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 41. As a result of violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by United Card Solutions and/or its affiliates or agents and/or other persons or entities acting on its behalf, Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to an award of $500 in damages for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 42. Plaintiff and members of the Class are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting United Card Solutions, its affiliates and agents, and/or any other persons or entities acting on its behalf from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to any cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice.

win

47. In the spring of 2018, B.M. downloaded the Musical.ly App onto her iPad and her iPhone 6. At this time, B.M. was 10 years old. B.M.’s mother was unaware that her daughter had downloaded the app. 48. Thereafter, B.M. used the Musical.ly App on a daily basis, both for viewing videos as well as creating and posting videos of her own. 49. During the process of registering for the Musical.ly App, B.M. was required to provide her email address, phone number, username, first and last name, a short biography, and a profile picture. 50. Defendants never asked Ms. Scott for her verifiable parental consent – in any form or at any time – to collect, disclose, or use B.M.’s personal information, as required by COPPA. 51. Defendants never provided direct notice – as required by COPPA – to Ms. Scott regarding Defendants’ practices with regard to collecting, using and disclosing B.M.’s personal information, or regarding the rights of Ms. Scott or B.M. under COPPA. 66. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all preceding paragraphs contained herein. 67. Plaintiff and the Multi-StateClass members have reasonable expectations of privacy in their use of mobile phones and online activity. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Multi-State Classmembers have a reasonable expectation that children’s information will not be improperly collected and published or utilized without parental notification and consent. Plaintiff and the Multi-State Class members expect that children’s online behavior and private affairs will remain private and free of intrusion. The private affairs and concerns of children under the age of 13 include their personal and contact information that can be improperly collected and used without parental consent. Intrusion Upon Seclusion (Brought on Behalf of the Multi-State Class)

win

(FLSA: Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (FLSA-FAILURE TO PAY THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE) (NEW YORK LABOR LAW: Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) 21. At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class, performed non-exempt duties, including, but not limited to, cooking, preparation of food and dishwashing services for defendants customers. 22. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class were required to be paid overtime pay at the statutory rate of time and one-half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 23. Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in most workweeks in which they were employed by the Defendants. 24. Plaintiff regularly worked six (6) to eleven (11) hours per day, five (5) or six (6) days per week, or approximately 42 ½-54 hours per week, without overtime pay or spread of hours pay. 25. Plaintiff, and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class, were paid an hourly rate per hour of approximately $12.00 to $22.00 dollars for the first forty (40) hours worked per week, irrespective of the amount of hours worked. 26. Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class consistently worked over 40 hours per week but were not paid for any hours over 40 per week and their hourly rate fell well below the statutory minimum wage. 27. For example, for the week of March 3, 2014- March 9, 2014, Plaintiff GPIMENTEL worked fifty (50) hours, was only paid for the first forty (40) hours at an hourly rate, and was not paid for any hours worked over 40. 28. Defendants failed to compensate the Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class for time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at a rate of at least one and one-half times their regular hourly rate, throughout the entire term of their employment with the Defendants. 29. Defendants willfully disregarded and purposefully evaded record keeping requirements of the FLSA and the New York Labor Law by failing to maintain accurate time sheets and payroll records. 30. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class employees spread of hours pay in violation of New York Labor Law. Despite working over ten hours per day, Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class were not compensated an additional hours pay when they worked more than ten (10) hours in a day. 31. Defendants’ refusal and/or failure to pay overtime and spread of hours pay was knowing and willful. 32. Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class time off for meal and break periods. 33. On numerous occasions, Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class and New York Class received neither the thirty (30) minute noonday break period for employees who work shifts in excess of six (6) hours that extend over the noonday meal period, nor the twenty minutes between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. for those employed on a shift starting before 11:00 a.m. and continuing after 7:00 p.m. 34. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and other employees similarly situated, as authorized under 29 USC § 216(b). The employees similarly situated are: FLSA CLASS: All persons who are or have been employed by Defendants at MEMORIES PUB who were paid an hourly rate within three (3) years prior to this action’s filing date through the date of the final disposition of this action and who were subject to Defendants’ unlawful practice of (a) failing to pay the applicable minimum wage; and (b) failing to pay overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 35. Defendants meet the definition of an "employer" under the FLSA. By way of example only, Defendants control how much the FLSA Class members are paid, maintain all time records for the FLSA Class members, assigned and supervised all of the tasks given to the FLSA Class members, and maintained and exercised control as to how the FLSA Class members were to perform their tasks. 36. Each of the FLSA Class members are non exempt "employees" entitled to overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 37. During the FLSA Class Period, Defendants paid Plaintiff and the members of FLSA Class less than the statutory minimum wage. 38. Defendants also failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Class members any overtime premiums when they worked in excess of 40 hours in a given work week. Instead, Defendants paid Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class an hourly rate for all hours worked. For all employees, Defendants did not pay any compensation to the members of the proposed FLSA Class for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a given workweek. 39. In addition to the foregoing, Defendants otherwise failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class in accordance with the provisions of the FLSA and the U.S. Department of Labor regulations. 40. Defendants' conduct; as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class. 41. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the members of the FLSA Class, and as such, notice should be sent to the FLSA Class. There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who were subject to the aforementioned policies in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the issuance of a Court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendants' records. 42. Plaintiff also brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following defined class: New York Class: All persons who are or have been employed by Defendants at MEMORIES PUB who were paid an hourly or flat daily rate within six (6) years prior to this action's filing date through the date of the final disposition of this action and who were subject to Defendants' unlawful practice of (i) failing to pay minimum wage, (ii) failing to pay overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, (iii) failing to pay "spread of hours" pay, and/or (iv) failing to furnish wage statements that specifically enumerated certain criteria, as required by the New York Labor Law. 43. At all times during the New York Class Period, Defendants, as a matter of policy, (i) did not pay Plaintiffs or the New York Class members minimum wage or overtime premium pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek, (ii) did not pay Plaintiffs and the members of the New York Class "spread of hours" pay as required by the New York Labor Law, and (iii) failed to furnish wage statements required by the New York Labor Law. 44. Defendants failed to make, keep and/or preserve accurate records with respect to Plaintiff and the New York Class and failed to furnish to Plaintiff and the New York Class an appropriate statement of wages, in violation of the New York Labor Law. 45. Numerosity: The persons in the New York Class identified above are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 46. The New York Class Members are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. 47. Defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the New York Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the New York Class as a whole. 48. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to the New York Class that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the New York Class, including but not limited to: (a) Whether the Defendants unlawfully failed to pay proper compensation in violation of and within the meaning of the New York Labor Law Article 6, 190 et seq. and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 146; (b) Whether Defendants have failed to keep true and accurate time records for all hours worked by Plaintiffs and the New York Class; (c) What documents of hours worked is sufficient when an employer fails in its duty to maintain true and accurate time records; (d) What were the policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols and plans of Defendant regarding payment of overtime wages; (e) Whether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the New York Class overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per work week within the meaning of New York Labor Law Article 19, §650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 146; (f) The nature and extent of New York Class-wide injury and the appropriate measure of damages for the class; (g) Whether Defendants’ general practice of failing and/or refusing to pay Plaintiff and the New York Class overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per work week was done willfully or with reckless disregard of the federal and state wage and hour laws. 49. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours each week, failure to pay the minimum wage and spread of hours pay. 50. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the New York Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions and in labor and employment litigation. 51. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation, particularly in the context of a wage and hour litigation like the present action, where individual plaintiffs may lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against a corporate defendant. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant savings of these costs. The members of the New York Class have been damaged and are entitled to recovery as a result of defendants’ common and uniform policies, practices and procedures. Although the relative damages suffered by individual New York Class Members are not de minimis, such damages are small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation. In addition, class treatment is superior because it will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent judgments about defendants’ practices. 52. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 53. During the relevant period, Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Class worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, and because of Defendants’ above outlined violations of the FLSA, was not paid appropriate overtime compensation. 54. Defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as detailed in this Complaint. 55. Plaintiff has consented in writing to be party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 56. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, as described in this Complaint have been willful and intentional. 57. Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §255. 58. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Class are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 59. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 60. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Class were employees and Defendants have been an employer within the meaning of the New York Labor Law. 61. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the New York Labor Law and its supporting regulations apply to the Defendants. 62. Defendants employed Plaintiff and members of the New York Class for workweeks longer than forty (40) hours and willfully failed to compensate the Plaintiff and members of the New York Class for the time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week, at a rate of at least one and one-half times the regular hourly rate, in violation of New York Labor Law. 63. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and members of the New York Class overtime wages to which they were entitled under the New York Labor Law. 64. By Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and members of the New York Class overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, it has willfully violated the New York Labor Law Article 19, §650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, including 12 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 146. 65. Due to Defendants’ violations of the New York Labor Law, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 66. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 67. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was Defendants’ employee within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §203(e)(1). 68. At all times relevant, Defendants was Plaintiffs employer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §203(d). 69. At all times relevant, the applicable federal minimum wage is codified by 29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1). 70. Defendants willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Class the minimum wages for hours worked, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(a). 71. As a consequence of the willful underpayment of wages, Plaintiff and members of the FLSA Class are entitled to the unpaid minimum wages, liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper.

win

21. Defendant is an oat milk manufacturing company that owns and operates the website, us.oatly.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Upon information and belief, because OATLY INC..’s Website has never been accessible and because OATLY INC.. does not have, and has never had, an adequate corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that OATLY INC.. retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that OATLY INC.. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that OATLY INC.. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that OATLY INC.. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that OATLY INC.. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility-related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants) (Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants) 17. TechnipFMC plc provides oilfield services. The Company offers subsea, surface, onshore, and offshore solutions for oil and gas projects. TechnipFMC serves customers worldwide. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period 20. In the Q1 2017 10-Q, the Company stated, in relevant part: 27. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, TechnipFMC securities were actively traded on the NYSE. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by TechnipFMC or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 28. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 29. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 31. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 32. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that: • defendants made public misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts during the Class Period; • the omissions and misrepresentations were material; • TechnipFMC securities are traded in an efficient market; • the Company’s shares were liquid and traded with moderate to heavy volume during the Class Period; • the Company traded on the NYSE and was covered by multiple analysts; • the misrepresentations and omissions alleged would tend to induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of the Company’s securities; and • Plaintiff and members of the Class purchased, acquired and/or sold TechnipFMC securities between the time the defendants failed to disclose or misrepresented material facts and the time the true facts were disclosed, without knowledge of the omitted or misrepresented facts. 34. Alternatively, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to the presumption of reliance established by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2430 (1972), as Defendants omitted material information in their Class Period statements in violation of a duty to disclose such information, as detailed above. 35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 36. This Count is asserted against defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 38. Pursuant to the above plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, each of the defendants participated directly or indirectly in the preparation and/or issuance of the quarterly and annual reports, SEC filings, press releases and other statements and documents described above, including statements made to securities analysts and the media that were designed to influence the market for TechnipFMC securities. Such reports, filings, releases and statements were materially false and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and misrepresented the truth about TechnipFMC’s finances and business prospects. 39. By virtue of their positions at TechnipFMC , defendants had actual knowledge of the materially false and misleading statements and material omissions alleged herein and intended thereby to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, defendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts as would reveal the materially false and misleading nature of the statements made, although such facts were readily available to defendants. Said acts and omissions of defendants were committed willfully or with reckless disregard for the truth. In addition, each defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that material facts were being misrepresented or omitted as described above. 41. The Individual Defendants are liable both directly and indirectly for the wrongs complained of herein. Because of their positions of control and authority, the Individual Defendants were able to and did, directly or indirectly, control the content of the statements of TechnipFMC. As officers and/or directors of a publicly-held company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate timely, accurate, and truthful information with respect to TechnipFMC’s businesses, operations, future financial condition and future prospects. As a result of the dissemination of the aforementioned false and misleading reports, releases and public statements, the market price of TechnipFMC securities was artificially inflated throughout the Class Period. In ignorance of the adverse facts concerning TechnipFMC’s business and financial condition which were concealed by defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired TechnipFMC securities at artificially inflated prices and relied upon the price of the securities, the integrity of the market for the securities and/or upon statements disseminated by defendants, and were damaged thereby. 43. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, defendants knowingly or recklessly, directly or indirectly, have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 44. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases, acquisitions and sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure that the Company had been disseminating misrepresented financial statements to the investing public. 45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 46. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of TechnipFMC, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of TechnipFMC’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information about TechnipFMC’s misstatement of income and expenses and false financial statements. 48. Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Individual Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and public filings which TechnipFMC disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period concerning TechnipFMC’s results of operations. Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants exercised their power and authority to cause TechnipFMC to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein. The Individual Defendants therefore, were “controlling persons” of TechnipFMC within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In this capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct alleged which artificially inflated the market price of TechnipFMC securities. 49. Each of the Individual Defendants, therefore, acted as a controlling person of TechnipFMC. By reason of their senior management positions and/or being directors of TechnipFMC, each of the Individual Defendants had the power to direct the actions of, and exercised the same to cause, TechnipFMC to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein. Each of the Individual Defendants exercised control over the general operations of TechnipFMC and possessed the power to control the specific activities which comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class complain. 50. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by TechnipFMC. Background

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10. Whenever a customer uses the debit card, the transaction is processed electronically. Therefore, BOA is notified instantaneously when the card is swiped, and thus has the immediate option to accept or decline the transaction. 11. BOA uses a software program to automate its overdraft system. This system intentionally maximizes the number of overdrafts in order to charge each business customer the maximum amount of fees. Specifically, BOA accomplishes this by processing daily transactions starting with the largest debit and ending with the smallest, instead of processing such transactions in chronological order. 12. As a result of BOA’s processes set forth in paragraph 11, Plaintiff was charged overdraft fees that it would not have otherwise been charged had BOA processed the transactions in chronological order. 13. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 14. Plaintiff brings all claims herein as class claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Plaintiff hereby reserves the right to amend the class action allegations after further discovery on the matter has 2:13-cv-10840-BAF-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 03/01/13 Pg 5 of 10 Pg ID 5 4 of 8 occurred. The requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) are met with respect to the class defined below. A. Class Definition(s) 15. The Class is defined as: All persons or entities who hold a business checking account with Defendant Bank of America, N.A. Excluded from the Class are: Defendant, any entities in which it has a controlling interest, any of its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, employees and members of such persons immediate families, the presiding judge(s) in this case and his, her on their immediate family and Plaintiff’s counsel. B. Numerosity 16. At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact size of the class; however, due to the fact that BOA is one of the largest national banks in the United States, Plaintiff believes that the Class members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The number and identities of Class members is administratively feasible and can be determined through appropriate discovery and identification from Defendant’s records. C. Commonality 17. There are questions of law or fact common to the class, including at least the following: (a) Whether BOA obtains consent from its customers prior to processing transactions that will result in overdraft fees; (b) Whether BOA alerts its customers that a debit card transaction will trigger an overdraft fee, and whether BOA provides its customers with an opportunity to cancel such transactions; (c) Whether BOA manipulates and reorders debits from highest to lowest in order to maximize the number of overdrafts and thus the amount of fees it can charge. 2:13-cv-10840-BAF-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 03/01/13 Pg 6 of 10 Pg ID 6 5 of 8 D. Typicality 18. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the Class, and his claims are typical of all members of the class. E. Adequacy 19. Plaintiff is committed to pursuing this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of consumer class actions. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members and does not have interests adverse to the Class members and does not have interests adverse to the Class. F. The Prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) are Satisfied 20. This case satisfies the prerequisites of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The common questions of law and fact enumerated above predominate over questions affecting only individual members of the Class, and a class action is the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The likelihood that individual members of the Class will prosecute separate actions is remote due to the extensive time and considerable expense necessary to conduct such litigation, especially when compared to the relatively modest amount of monetary, injunctive and equitable relief at issue for each individual Class member. This action will be prosecuted in a fashion to ensure the Court’s able management of this case as a class action on behalf of the class 21. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 2:13-cv-10840-BAF-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 03/01/13 Pg 7 of 10 Pg ID 7 6 of 8 22. Plaintiffs and BOA contract for a business deposit checking account, which included ATM and debit card services. 23. Under the laws of the states where BOA conducts business, good faith is an element of every contract pertaining to the assessment of overdraft fees. Whether by law or statute, all such contracts impose upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 24. BOA’s overdraft policies are a breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing. 25. Plaintiff and the Class have performed all, or substantially all, of the obligations imposed on them under the Deposit Agreement. 26. Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages as a result of BOA’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 27. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 28. BOA’s overdraft policies and practices are substantively and procedurally unconscionable in that they; a. Do not disclose to customers that they have the option to “opt out” of the overdraft scheme; and b. Apply debit transactions according to the highest debt to the lowest instead of chronological order. 29. The provisions in the agreements between Plaintiff and BOA that allow for the conduct set forth in paragraph 28 are unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable as a matter of law. 30. The imposition of a overdraft charge which exceeds the amount overdraft is unconscionable. 31. Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of BOA’s unconscionable policies and 2:13-cv-10840-BAF-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 03/01/13 Pg 8 of 10 Pg ID 8 7 of 8 practices. 32. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 33. BOA has wrongfully collected overdraft fees from Plaintiff and the Class. 34. BOA assumed and exercised right of ownership of Plaintiff’s funds without authorization or legal justification. 35. Plaintiff and the class had a property interest in the funds that were converted by BOA. 36. BOA continues to retain these funds unlawfully with the consent of Plaintiff or the Class. 37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff has been permanently deprived of his property by Defendant’s unauthorized acts. 38. Pursuant to MCL § 600.2919(a), Plaintiff and the class is entitled to damages in the amount of three times the value of the converted property together with costs, interest and attorney fees. 39. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 40. BOA knowingly received and retained wrongful benefits and funds from Plaintiff, in conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and members of the Class. 41. BOA has been unjustly enriched at the expense of, and to the detriment of, Plaintiff and the Class. 2:13-cv-10840-BAF-RSW Doc # 1 Filed 03/01/13 Pg 9 of 10 Pg ID 9 8 of 8 42. Plaintiff re-alleges and hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding and subsequent allegation as though fully set forth herein. 43. BOA engages in unfair business practices relating to the imposition of overdraft fees on consumers, in violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. 44. BOA violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act by causing a probability of confusion with regard to the collection of a debt, and other provisions of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. MCL 445.901 MCL 445.903. 7. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a business customer of BOA. 8. At all times relevant, Plaintiff held a business checking account with BOA. 9. At all times relevant, one of the services BOA provided to Plaintiff, in connection with the business checking account, was to provide a business debit card, also known as a check card or ATM card. Brief description of cause: Breach of Contract; Contract Unconsionable vn, REQUESTED IN

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61. At all times relevant. Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of not paying employees overtime for working more than 40 hours per week, including altering Plaintiffs' time records, setting an artificial ceiling for hours ofpay. automatically deducting 30 minutes each day. and refusing to pay for time spent in broken-down trucks. 62. Plaintiffs worked more than 40 hours per week without overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40. 63. At all times relevant. Defendant knew, or should have known, that the FLSA applied to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. FLSA Violation

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13. There are two types of sunscreen products: chemical-based and mineral-based. Chemical-based sunscreens contain various synthetic, chemical active ingredients, such as Octisalate, Octocrylene, and Octinoxate, which protect the skin by absorbing ultraviolet (“UV”) radiation and dissipating it as heat.2 Conversely, mineral-based sunscreens, also known as “physical” sunscreens, use mineral active ingredients such as zinc oxide and/or titanium dioxide which cover the skin and act as a physical barrier, deflecting and scattering UV radiation. 29. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated consumers pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) and seeks certification of the following Class: California-Only Class Action All California consumers who, within the applicable statute of limitations period until the date notice is disseminated, purchased the Products. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and its officers, directors, and employees, and those who purchased the Products for the purpose of resale. 30. Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the proposed Class contain thousands of purchasers of the Product who have been damaged by Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. 38. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 39. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class. 40. As alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property at the time of purchase as a result of Defendant’s conduct because she purchased the Products in reliance on Defendant’s mineral-based representations, but purchased Products that actually contained chemical active ingredients. 52. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs 1 through 37 above as if fully set forth herein. 53. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class. 54. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq. (the “CLRA”). 55. Plaintiff is a consumer as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d). The Products are “goods” within the meaning of the CLRA. A. Chemical- vs. Mineral-Based Sunscreen Products Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act – Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq.

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13. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and subscriber of the number ending in 5290. 14. At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 5290 was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 16. Plaintiff applied for and received a Mastercard issued by Celtic Bank Corporation. 17. Over time, Plaintiff made personal charges on this credit card. 18. Plaintiff defaulted on payments. 19. Plaintiff’s account, once unpaid, was referred for collection. 20. Plaintiff started to receive phone calls from Defendant seeking to collect on Plaintiff’s $746.71 balance. 21. On numerous occasions, Plaintiff answered. 22. Often times, Plaintiff was met by an automated, machine-operated voice prompting Plaintiff to: “... please return this call …” 23. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff returned Defendant’s call only to tell them to stop calling. 24. Unfortunately, these phone calls continue. 25. To date, dozens of phone calls have been received from number(s) leading back to Defendant – including, (563) 217-4577 and (563)-514-4664. 26. Defendant’s phone calls resulted in aggravation that accompanies persistent and unwanted phone calls, anxiety, distress, increased risk of personal injury resulting from distraction, intrusion upon and occupation of Plaintiff’s cellular telephone capacity, invasion of privacy, loss of concentration, nuisance, stress, and wasted time. 28. Accordingly, Plaintiff is forced to expend energy and/or time consulting with attorneys to put an end to Defendant’s unlawful collection practices. 29. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 30. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Putative Classes”) defined as follows: FDCPA Class All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendant placed, or caused to be placed, a call; (2) within the one year preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification; (3) in connection with the collection of a consumer debt; (4) after he/she requested that Defendant cease calls to his/her telephone number. TCPA Class All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendant placed, or caused to be placed, a call; (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service; (3) using an artificial or prerecorded voice; (4) within the four years preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification; (5) after he/she requested that Defendant cease calls to his/her telephone number. 32. Upon information and belief, the members of the Putative Classes are so numerous that joinder of them is impracticable. 33. The exact number of the members of the Putative Classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can be determined only through appropriate discovery. 34. The members of the Putative Classes are ascertainable because the classes are defined by reference to objective criteria. 35. The members of the Putative Classes are identifiable in that their names, addresses and telephone numbers can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. B. Commonality and Predominance 36. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Putative Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Putative Classes. C. Typicality 38. This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. 39. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Classes will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution. 40. By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 41. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. E. Adequate Representation 42. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent and protect the interests of the Putative Classes. 43. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 44. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer class action litigation. 46. In Colorado, “to prevail on a claim for intrusion upon seclusion as a violation of one’s privacy, a plaintiff must show that another has intentionally intruded, physically or otherwise, upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, and that such intrusion would be considered offensive by a reasonable person.” Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Colo. App. 1998), cert. denied (Colo. Mar. 1, 1999). 47. This tort can encompass conduct such as persistent and unwanted telephone calls. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1073 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing High- Tech Inst., 972 P.2d, at 1067. 48. Defendant’s persistent and unwanted phone calls to Plaintiff violated Plaintiff’s right to privacy based on an intrusion upon her seclusion. See Dunlap v. McCarthy, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984); see generally W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts 117 (5th ed. 1984) (examples of intrusion upon seclusion include eavesdropping by wiretapping and persistent and unwanted telephone calls). 50. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. Violation(s) of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d 51. Section 1692d provides: [a] debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: (5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). 52. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) by repeatedly or continuously calling Plaintiff after being asked to stop. See Chiverton v. Federal Financial Group, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding that repeated calls after the consumer had asked debt collector to stop calling amounted to harassment). 53. The phone calls at issue were intended to be annoying, abusive, or harassing. 55. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as though fully set forth herein. 56. Defendant placed or caused to be placed dozens of non-emergency calls, including but not limited to the aforementioned collection calls, to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice without Plaintiff’s consent in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). 57. As plead above, Defendant used an artificial or pre-recorded voice which automatically played once Plaintiff answered Defendant’s phone calls. 58. As result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). Plaintiff is entitled to receive $500.00 in damages for each violation. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of FDCPA Class) Invasion of Privacy by Seclusion (On behalf of Plaintiff) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq.) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of TCPA Class)

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15. Apparently desiring to increase its sales, GB Cruise Line instituted a marketing program in which automated calls, more commonly known as robocalls, were placed to an unknown number of recipients. 16. One such technology to make robocalls is the use of “automatic telephone dialing systems,” known commonly as “robodialers.” 17. “Robodialing” is the use of computerized telephone systems to place calls automatically, without manually dialing numbers, and then deliver pre-recorded messages, or connect calls to live agents when the system detects that a live human has picked up. 18. Robodialing allows companies to place voluminous telephone solicitations at de minimis costs, without staffing large telephone boiler rooms with telephone agents. The process is almost entirely automated. 19. Unlike more conventional advertisements, robodialing, particularly to wireless phones, can actually cost their recipients money, because cell phone users must frequently pay their respective wireless service providers for “minutes” of airtime, or incur usage allocation deductions to their voice plans, regardless of whether or not the call is authorized. 21. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on GB Cruise Line to demonstrate that Plaintiff provided express consent within the meaning of the statute. See FCC Declaratory Ruling, 23 F.C.C.R. at 565 (¶ 10). 22. GB Cruise Line is a new company: it was formed on June 16, 2014 and began actual cruises from the Port of Palm Beach to Grand Bahama Island on or about February 2015. 23. In implementing these promotional robocalls, GB Cruise Line had no prior relationship with the recipients, and thus lacked their informed and express consent to receive robocalls. 24. The above-described calls violated the TCPA’s restriction on using an artificial or prerecorded voice to call consumers’ cellular telephones. Further, GB Cruise Line acted “knowingly” within the meaning of the TCPA by knowingly calling recipient consumers’ telephones using an artificial or prerecorded voice to call, without the prior express consent of the individual being called. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to the greater of the amount of their actual damages or $500 per call together, trebled. 26. Plaintiff pressed “1” to reserve his two free tickets. 27. Less than 30 minutes later, at 3:56 p.m. that same day, Plaintiff received a telephone call to his cell phone number from a man calling himself “Calvin.” The man stated: “this is Calvin from the Reservations Department.” Plaintiff inquired what company he was from, to which Calvin replied he was from “Grand Bahama Cruise Line” and referred Plaintiff to the following website: http://www.mygrandcruise.com/. 28. Plaintiff did not have any previous relationship, business or otherwise, with Grand Bahama Cruise Line. 29. Upon further inquiry, Plaintiff learned that the solicitation from Grand Bahama was in fact not true. There were expenses associated with the purportedly “free” cruise and required participation in a time-share marketing presentation. 31. Under the TCPA, and pursuant to the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on GB Cruise Line to demonstrate that Plaintiff and the Class Members provided express consent to receive such automated calls, as defined by the statute. 32. Clearly, the initial automated call was made as a ruse to obtain putative consent for the second call through a classic two-step “survey” scam; however, automated putative surveys done as devices to obtain “consent” to later calls are not exempt from the provisions of the TCPA, nor is the “consent” obtained by such prohibited calls sufficient to permit the follow-up calls.   33. Thus, the first call to the Plaintiff and the Class Members (which was made without any prior relationship with the recipient) was a TCPA violation, as it was not done as part of a legitimate survey, but only as a device to obtain consent for a second call.   The purported consent given, as it was procured through such a ruse, was not valid, meaning that the second call was also a TCPA violation. 35. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated (the Class or Class Members). Upon information and belief, GB Cruise Line repeatedly made (or directed to be made on its behalf) thousands of unsolicited telephone calls to Plaintiff and Class Members’ cellular telephones in violation of the 51. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-50 above. 52. The foregoing acts and omissions of GB Cruise Line constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 53. As a result of GB Cruise Line’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 54. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 55. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-50 above. 56. The foregoing acts and omissions of GB Cruise Line constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 58. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 59. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs. OF THE TCPA PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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10. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer class (the “Class”):  All New York consumers who received a collection letter from Defendant attempting to collect an obligation owed to or allegedly owed to PayPal, Inc. (“PayPal”), that contains the alleged violations arising from Defendant's violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e, et seq.  The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 11. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action:  Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from Defendant that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that is sent to hundreds of persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy);  There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories.  Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class.  A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action.  A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed to proceed without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains.  Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 12. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “11” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 13. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 14. Upon information and belief, within the last year Defendant commenced efforts to collect an alleged consumer “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5), when it mailed a Collection Letter to Plaintiff seeking to collect an unpaid tuition balance allegedly owing to PayPal. 15. On or around April 7, 2016 Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter. See Exhibit A. 16. The letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 17. The letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 18. Said April 7, 2016 Letter provided that the amount due was $273.08. 19. Said Letter also provided: “Logon to www.acibillpay.com to see the repayment options available to you.” 20. On May 26, 2016, upon following Defendant’s instructions and logging on to Plaintiff’s account, Plaintiff was indicated the following: “The account balance may periodically increase due to the addition of accrued interest or other charges as provided in your agreement with the original creditor or as otherwise permitted by law.” (See Exhibit A page 3). 21. As set forth in the following Complaint Defendant violated the FDCPA. First Count 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. False or Misleading Representations as to Status of Debt 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “21” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 24. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector is prohibited from using false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the collection of a debt. 25. Defendant violated §1692e by falsely suggesting that immediate payment of the balance would benefit Plaintiff financially by stating that the account balance stated above would be subject to change, and could be subject to interest, late charges or other charges. As the account balance Defendant seeks to collect never varies from the date of issuance of its Collection, and Defendant never makes an adjustment due to the terms of the original credit agreement after it receives payment in the amount 26. Defendant was attempting to collect on Plaintiff’s purportedly overdue with PayPal. 27. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s account with PayPal was charged-off and is not subject to change, and will never increase due to any terms of the original agreement. 28. Upon information and belief, the amount due and collected by Defendant will never change due to interest, late charges or other charges. 29. Defendant’s April 7, 2016 collection letter and the Screenshot of Defendant’s website taken on May 26, 2016 reflect the exact same balance allegedly due and owing to Defendant, further evidencing Plaintiff’s allegations. 30. Rather, upon information and belief, Defendant arbitrarily threatened that Plaintiff’s account may be subject to such fees, in an attempt at pressuring Plaintiff into paying the account quickly, so as to avoid these non-existent fees. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant has no legal or contractual right to change the amount that Plaintiff allegedly owes to the Creditor. 32. In the alternative, Defendant's letter misleadingly suggests that it would be of benefit to the Plaintiff money-wise if the Plaintiff would accept to make a payment immediately upon receipt of the letter, due to “interest or other charges” that could very well be added after the date of the letter. Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC, Nos. 15-1584(L), 15- 1597(Con), 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5327, at *8 (2d Cir. Mar. 22, 2016) ("The district court also expressed a concern that requiring debt collectors to disclose this information might lead to more abusive practices, as debt collectors could use the threat of interest and fees to coerce consumers into paying their debts. This is a legitimate concern. To alleviate it, we adopt the "safe harbor" approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000)...The court[in Miller] held that a debt collector who used this form would not violate the [FDCPA], "provided, of course, that the information [the debt collector] furnishes is accurate.") (emphasis added). 33. In fact, Defendant had no legal or contractual right to take such actions. 34. As the amount the Defendant is attempting to collect never in fact vary from the date of issuance, and Defendant never makes adjustments after it receives payment in the amount of the initial letter, the statement in its letter is false, deceptive and misleading.1 35. Defendants could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 36. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 1 Reeseg v. General Revenue Corporation, Civ. No. 2: 14-CV-08033-WJM-MF (D.N.J. July 27, 2015) ([Plaintiff] sufficiently pleads that the collection letter is deceptive under § 1692e(10). Moreover, a debt collector may not threaten "to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). For the reasons stated above, the least sophisticated consumer may also reasonably interpret the collection letter as a threat that [Defendant] may increase the amount owed, notwithstanding the fact that [Defendant] is contractually authorized to collect only the initial balance. . . . Additionally, the Court rejects [Defendant’s] argument that the collection letter contains the "safe harbor" language described in Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2000).); see also Kolganov v. Phillips & Cohen Associates, 2004 WL 958028 *3 (E.D.N.Y.) Second Count Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, et seq False or Misleading Representations as to the Rights of the Consumer 37. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “36” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 39. While § 1692e specifically prohibits certain practices, the list is non-exhaustive, and does not preclude a claim of falsity or deception based on any non-enumerated practice. 40. Collection letters are deceptive if they can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. 41. For purposes of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, the failure to clearly provide the consumer with complete and accurate information notifying them of their rights and obligations is unfair and deceptive to the least sophisticated consumer. 42. A collection notice is deceptive when it reasonably can be read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate.2 43. The question of whether a collection letter is deceptive is determined from the perspective of the “least sophisticated consumer.” 44. The language in the letter that states “Whenever $600.00 or more in principal of a debt is discharged as a result of settling a debt for less than the balance owing, the creditor may 2 Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1989). (Because the collection notice was reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading, it was deceptive within the meaning of the Act.); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir. 1993). (Collection notices are deceptive if they are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate.); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1996). (A collection notice is deceptive when it can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. The fact that the notice's terminology was vague or uncertain will not prevent it from being held deceptive under § 1692e(10) of the Act.) be required to report the amount of the debt discharged to the Internal Revenue Service” is a deceptive and misleading statement in violation of the FDCPA. 45. Here, the balance due and the settlement offer are not greater than the $600.00 IRS disclosure requirement; therefore, Defendant’s statement regarding tax consequences is irrelevant and misleading in violation of the FDCPA. 46. Although Defendant had no duty to disclose any potential tax ramifications,3 when Defendant chooses to give tax disclosures, it must do so in a way that it will not mislead the least sophisticated consumer as to the tax consequences. 47. Here, because the settlement offer is not greater than $600.00, Defendant’s statement regarding tax consequences is irrelevant. 48. Therefore, Defendant misrepresented the law by including a clause about an amount of debt higher than that owed by Plaintiff. 49. The gratuitous reference in Defendant’s letter that its client may contact the IRS regarding a negotiated resolution to the debt at issue in this letter is a collection ploy suggesting to the “least sophisticated consumer” that he or she could get in trouble with the IRS if the debt is settled for less than the full amount. 50. The statement in said letter is false and misleading, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2), and 1692e(10). 51. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance of the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure conformance to the law. 3 See. Altman v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs., 786 F.3d 191, 194, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7980, *7 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2015). "[T]he FDCPA does not require a debt collector to make any affirmative disclosures of potential tax consequences when collecting a debt.")

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85. Plaintiff asserts his claims on behalf of the Rule 23(b)(3) “Damages Class” defined as follows: All individuals who only completed the portion of Defendant’s process authorizing a credit pull that would not affect their credit scores, who did not complete an application for a specific loan product, and on whom Defendant made a hard credit inquiry in the two years predating the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the date the class list is prepared. 86. Plaintiff asserts his claims on behalf of the Rule 23(b)(2) “Injunctive Relief Class” defined as follows: All individuals who only completed the portion of Defendant’s process authorizing a credit pull that would not affect their credit scores, who did not completion an application for a specific loan product, and on whom Defendant made a hard credit inquiry in the four years predating the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the date the class list is prepared. 87. Plaintiff also asserts his claims for injunctive relief on behalf of a Rule 23(b)(2) “Injunctive Relief Two-Year Subclass” defined as follows: All individuals who only completed the portion of Defendant’s process authorizing a credit pull that would not affect their credit scores, who did not complete an application for a specific loan product, and on whom Defendant made a hard credit inquiry in the two years predating the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the date the class list is prepared. 94. Defendant represented to Plaintiff and the Damages Class that it would perform a soft inquiry only into Plaintiff and the Damages Class members’ credit. Defendant further represented that the inquiry it would do would not affect Damages Class members’ credit scores. These representations were false. 95. Defendant violated the FCRA by knowingly and willfully procuring information on Plaintiff and Damages Class members under false pretenses. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681q. 98. Defendant represented to Plaintiff and the Damages Class that it would perform a soft inquiry only into Plaintiff and the Damages Class members’ credit. Obtaining Consumer Information Under False Pretenses (On behalf of the Damages Class) Obtaining Consumer Reports Without a Permissible Purpose (On Behalf of the Damages Class)

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COrPoration For the purpose of answering the above, a corporation is deemed to be a resident of that county in which it has its principal place of business in that district. (2) Non-Resident defendant. If no defendant is a resident of a county in this district, please sel forth the county wherein the cause of action arose or the event complained of occurred. IV. The Counties in the Northern District of Ohio are divided into divisions as shown below. After the county is determined in Section III, please check the appropriate division. EASTERN DIVIStON

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13. On or about October 6, 2012, Plaintiff withdrew funds from an ATM at the People’s United Bank branch located at One Blachley Road, Stamford, Connecticut (the “Stamford ATM”). 14. At the time Plaintiff used the Stamford ATM, it was owned and operated by Defendant. 16. As shown in Exhibit A, the “Fee Notice” is placed in an inconspicuous location, at or below knee level and out of eyesight of any person accessing the Stamford ATM. 17. At the time Plaintiff used the Stamford ATM, she was charged a service fee in the amount of $3.00. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s receipt from the Stamford ATM is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 18. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 19. The Class of consumers that Plaintiff seeks to protect is defined as: All persons who within the one year period preceding the initiation of this action were charged a transaction fee for use of the Stamford ATM. B. Numerosity 20. Upon information and belief, Defendant has assessed thousands of illegal transaction fees through the use of the Stamford ATM. 21. Upon information and belief, since the date of Plaintiff’s transaction at the Stamford ATM, Defendant has not posted a conspicuous notice disclosing the service fee on the outside of the Stamford ATM. 22. The members of the Class are therefore believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 24. Plaintiff identifies the following questions of fact and law common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members: a) Whether Defendant was, at all relevant times during the class period, an ATM operator who imposed a fee on consumers for providing host transfer services; b) Whether the Stamford ATM provided disclosure in a prominent and conspicuous location that the ATM transaction was subject to the imposition of a specified fee; and c) Whether Defendant imposed fees on consumers without notice. 25. Defendant’s conduct in failing to post the required fee notice in a prominent and conspicuous location was intended and had the effect of causing damages to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. D. Typicality 26. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members since each of the claims arises from the use of an ATM owned and operated by Defendant in their regular course of business. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 27. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members, all of whom are victims of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. 29. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and consumer class claims and who stands ready, willing and able to represent the Class and advance the costs of this litigation. F. Proceeding via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 30. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 31. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive, and therefore would have no effective remedy at law. 32. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the court and the litigants and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 33. Prosecution of separate actions could result in inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Conversely, adjudications with respect to individual Class members would be dispositive of the interest of all other Class members. 34. The amount of money at issue is such that proceeding by way of a class action is the only economical and sensible manner in which to vindicate Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) provides that any ATM operator who imposes a fee on any consumer for providing host transfer services must provide a notice stating: (i) The fact that a fee is imposed by such operator for providing the service; and (ii) The amount of any such fee. 37. The notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A)(i) must “be posted in a prominent and conspicuous location on or at the automated teller machine at which the electronic fund transfer is initiated by the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(B)(i). 38. In addition, 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(c) provides: No fee may be imposed by any automated teller machine operator in connection with any electronic fund transfer initiated by a consumer for which a notice is required under subparagraph (A), unless: (i) The consumer receives such notice in accordance with subparagraph (B); and (ii) The consumer elects to continue in the manner necessary to effect the transaction after receiving such notice. 39. To enable enforcement of the EFTA, 12 C.F.R. 205.16(b) provides: An automated teller machine operator that imposes a fee on a consumer for initiating an electronic fund transfer or a balance inquiry shall: (1) Provide notice that a fee will be imposed for providing electronic fund transfer services or a balance inquiry; and (2) Disclose the amount of the fee. 41. In addition, 12 C.F.R. 205.16(e) states: An automated teller machine operator may impose a fee on a consumer for initiating an electronic fund transfer of a balance inquiry only if: (1) The consumer is provided the notices required under paragraph (c) of this section; and (2) The consumer elects to continue the transaction or inquiry after receiving such notices. 42. Defendant is an automated teller machine operator who provided host transfer services at all times relevant to this action. 43. Defendant failed to comply with the EFTA in connection with providing such services to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class as the notice on the Stamford ATM was in neither a prominent nor conspicuous location. 44. Pursuant to the EFTA, Defendant was prohibited from imposing any fee for host transfer services because Defendant failed to provide conspicuous notice that a fee would be charged. 45. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s violations of the EFTA in that they were charged a fee that was not properly disclosed. 46. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693m, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for the amount of actual damages incurred, as well as for statutory damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and the costs of this action. A. The Class Violation of the EFTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, et seq., (On Behalf of All Class Members)

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10. Plaintiff has never been convicted of any sex crimes and has never registered as a sex offender anywhere. 11. In fact, Plaintiff has historically worked as a driver transporting medical patients, usually elderly, between various locations and his criminal background history, even as it applies to something as simple as traffic infractions, is very important to him. 13. In late 2018, Plaintiff requested the disclosure of all the information in his consumer file from the Defendant. 14. Plaintiff wrote to the Defendant to seek a copy of this information. 15. In this letter, Plaintiff provided the Defendant with everything that it would need to identify him, including his First Name, Last Name, Generational Suffix, Street Address, City, State, Zip Code, and Date of Birth. 16. The Defendant regularly sells reports to its customers that provide the Defendant with less information than this. 17. Upon information and belief, the Defendant will sell criminal background reports to its customers that provide nothing more than a full name and a date of birth for the subject of the requested report. 18. The Plaintiff also provided the Defendant with a valid copy of his driver's license. 19. The Defendant responded to the Plaintiff on September 27, 2018. 20. The Defendant was able to identify the Plaintiff using the information that he provided with his dispute as described above. 21. The Defendant did not have any trouble or difficulty understanding who the Plaintiff was. 22. The Defendant would have sold a report about the Plaintiff to any of its customers that requested it on September 27, 2018. 24. The Defendant's response also did not contain "the sources of the information", as required by 15 U.S.C. §1681g(a)(2). 25. The Defendant's response also did not contain the "identification of each person...that procured a consumer report" about the Plaintiff for employment purposes within the preceding 2-year period, or for any other purpose during the preceding 1-year period, as required by 15 U.S.C. §1681g(a)(3)(A). 26. In fact - the Defendant's response did not contain anything relevant to the Plaintiff, and entirely failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. §1681g. 27. Instead, the Defendant responded by sending the Plaintiff a “Copy Request Form”, attached hereto as Exhibit "A", to complete and return before it would agree to provide him with the disclosure required by 15 U.S.C. §1681g. 28. The "Copy Request Form" required Plaintiff to (1.) restate all of the information that he had already provided to the Defendant, (2.) provide his full social security number, (3.) sign a separate "Authorization Release", providing the Defendant with authority to "release a copy of [his] background check report that [he] had requested." 29. Plaintiff did not merely request "a copy of his background check report." 30. Instead, as contemplated by the statute, Plaintiff broadly requested a copy of "all information that [the Defendant] had about [him], including any information that [it] would sell to a potential employer that ordered a report using [his] identifying and demographic information". 32. This intentionally adopted policy and procedure requiring consumers to sign the "Copy Request Form" as a pre-requisite to obtaining the full consumer disclosure that contained all information about the consumer within the Defendant's possession, together with the sources of the information and the identity of anyone who had obtained it in the past, as contemplated by Congress, violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 33. Upon information and belief, the Defendant implemented this artificial roadblock in order to reduce the number of disclosures that it would send out, and accordingly, the number of disputes that it would be required to process, investigate and respond to, in an effort to save money. 34. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681g by failing to disclose to the Plaintiff all the information contained his consumer file at the time of the request. 35. By requiring the Plaintiff to fill out an additional form, IntelliCorp deprived the Plaintiff of his consumer disclosure and its valuable information despite the requirements of the FCRA and according to the Defendant’s standard practices and procedures, thereby causing the Plaintiff to suffer informational injury. 36. The Plaintiff restates each allegation in the preceding paragraphs 1 through 35 as if set forth at length herein. 37. IntelliCorp violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) by failing to disclose all of the Plaintiff’s information that it maintained at the time of the request. 38. IntelliCorp violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2) by failing to disclose all the sources of the information maintained in the consumer's file at the time of the request. 40. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff brings this action for himself and on behalf of a class defined as follows: All natural persons residing in the United States (a.) who requested their consumer disclosure from IntelliCorp; (b.) to whom IntelliCorp responded within the two years preceding the filing of this action and during its pendency; (c.) to whom IntelliCorp sent a “Copy Request Form”; and (d.) to whom IntelliCorp did not send a copy of that consumer's disclosure. Excluded from the class definition are any employees, officers, or directors of IntelliCorp, any attorney appearing in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this action. 41. The Plaintiff incorporates his prior allegations and estimates that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Although the precise number of class members is known only to the Defendant, Plaintiff's counsel is aware from past litigation that IntelliCorp is an established business that sends out tens of thousands of consumer file disclosures each year. If IntelliCorp uniformly sent its "Copy Request Form" to each such individual, then the class size is at least that number, and certainly higher if the Court infers that there are some number of individuals (like the Plaintiff) who ultimately never received their file disclosure at all. 42. The Plaintiff’s claim is typical of those of the class members and are all are based on the same facts and legal theories. 44. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper. Prosecuting separate actions would create a risk of adjudications that would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair their ability to protect their interests. 45. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate in that the Defendant acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. 47. IntelliCorp violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) by failing to disclose all of the information maintained in its database at the time of the Plaintiff’s and each putative class member’s request. 48. IntelliCorp violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2) by failing to disclose all of the sources of the information maintained in its database at the time of the Plaintiff’s and each putative class member’s request. 49. IntelliCorp violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3) by failing to disclose the identity of each person that procured the information maintained in their database about the consumer at the time of the Plaintiff’s and each putative class member’s request. 50. The Defendant’s violations were willful, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n, or, in the alternative, negligent, entitling the Plaintiff and putative class members to recover under 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. 51. As a result of the Defendant’s violations, the Plaintiff and the putative class members suffered damages including informational injury, the inability to determine the sources of that information, and the inability to determine the identities of each person that procured their file. They are therefore entitled to recover statutory damages, punitive damages and attorneys fees and costs. 7. Plaintiff has historically been the victim of inaccurate credit reporting by various background check agencies. 8. One of these companies that sells so-called "wholesale" criminal records to a variety of other smaller background check companies previously sold records regarding the Plaintiff that falsely indicated that he was a sex offender registered in Virginia, and additionally that he had also registered as a sex offender in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 9. These reportings were both false. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g

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1. Whether Defendants made any call/s (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to Class members using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a telephone service; 17. Sometime prior to January 1, 2016, Plaintiff was assigned, and became the owner of a cellular telephone number ending in 0028 from her wireless provider. 18. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole subscriber, owner, and operator of a cellular telephone with an assigned number ending in 0028. Plaintiff is and has always been financially responsible for her cellular phone and its services. 19. Sometime after January 1, 2016, Plaintiff began receiving telephone calls from the Defendant using numbers such as 845-243-6549 and 917-819-8167, including three calls on May 26, 2016. 2. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and 20. Plaintiff answered one call on or around May 25, 2016 and told the Defendant to stop calling. 21. Upon answering said telephone call, Plaintiff noticed a pause between the time she answered and the time a representative got on the phone. 22. Based upon the above, Plaintiff believes the calls were initiated by an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”). 23. Plaintiff continued to receive calls even after notifying the Defendant to stop. 25. Plaintiff has never previously contacted DegreeMatch nor has Plaintiff had any type of business relationship with DegreeMatch. 26. Upon information and belief, and based off of above, the Defendants used an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), which is prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 27. The ATDS used by Defendants has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 28. The telephone numbers Defendants called were assigned to a cellular telephone service for which the Plaintiffs incurred charges for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 29. Plaintiffs did not provide prior express written consent to receive telephone calls from Defendant using an artificial or prerecorded voice utilizing an ATDS, as required by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 30. Under the Federal Communication Commission’s amended regulation which took place on October 16, 2013, telemarketers must obtain prior express written consent of the called party to autodial or leave prerecorded telemarketing calls to a wireless number and to leave prerecorded calls to residential landlines. 31. Defendant is and was aware that it is placing unsolicited robocalls to Plaintiff and other consumers without their prior written express consent. 32. These telephone calls by Defendants or its agents were therefore in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 34. Defendant’s action harmed Plaintiff by causing the very harm that Congress sought to prevent – a “nuisance and invasion of privacy.” 35. Defendant’s action harmed Plaintiff by trespassing upon and interfering with Plaintiff’s rights and interest in Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 36. Defendant’s action harmed Plaintiff by intruding upon Plaintiff’s seclusion. 37. Defendant’s action harmed Plaintiff by causing Plaintiff aggravation and annoyance. 38. Defendant’s action harmed Plaintiff by wasting the Plaintiff’s time. 39. Defendant’s action harmed Plaintiff in the loss of use of her phone during the time that her phone was occupied by incoming calls. 40. Defendant’s action harmed Plaintiff by depleting the battery life on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 41. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 42. Plaintiffs represent, and are members of, the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who (1) received any telephone call; (2) promoting Defendant’s services (3) where the call was initiated by an ATDS; and (4) for which the caller had no record of prior written express consent to make such call to the telephone number that received it. 44. Plaintiffs and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiffs and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiffs and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiffs and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiffs and the Class members. Plaintiffs and the Class members were damaged thereby. 45. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiffs reserve the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 46. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendants’ records or Defendants’ agent’s records. 47. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: 48. As persons who received numerous calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiffs’ prior express consent, Plaintiffs are asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiffs have no interest antagonistic to any member of the Class. 49. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few if any Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 50. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the TCPA. 51. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 52. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 53. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 54. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 55. As a result of Defendants negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 56. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 57. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 58. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 59. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 60. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.FTC.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 31. Plaintiff, Jason Camacho, attended the NACAC college fair at Javits on Nov. 5, 2018 in order to obtain information from the college exhibitors presenting and marketing at the fair including the Defendant’s school. 32. Soon after attending the Javits fair, Mr. Camacho attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s school but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 35. The stated principles of NACAC members include “They strive to eliminate bias within the educational system based on …disability.”1 36. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant, that is a member of NACAC, intentionally violated NACAC’s basic principles to eliminate bias toward the disabled as well as federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. 37. NACAC maintains a business relationship with the New York Daily News newspaper which publishes full page advertisements for the NACAC college fairs at Javits and an onsite guide to the exhibitors which is distributed free of charge to attendees at the college fairs. Exhibitors, such as the Defendant, may participate in the New York Daily News advertisements and/or advertise in the onsite guide. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 40. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 41. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 42. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 44. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 48. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 56. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 58. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 61. Defendant’s school and it’s exhibits at Javits are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s school. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 63. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 64. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 66. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant’s physical exhibit locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 78. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 87. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 90. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 92. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 96. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) defines “program or activity” as “all operations of…(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of education; or (B) a local educational agency…, system of career and technical education, or other school system.” 97. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 98. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. DECLARATORY RELIEF 116. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 117. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. and The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 118. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504 VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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29. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 30. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Classes, consisting of: a. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agents(s) and/or employee(s) within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. b. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agent(s) and/or employee(s) where said advertisements failed to notify the recipient of an ability to opt-out of receiving such fax advertisements from Defendant in the future. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believe the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. (Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227) (Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227) 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 40. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 45. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,

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(As an Alternative Claim in the Event the Agreements Do Not Constitute an ERISA Plan) (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) (Individual and Class Claims) 311. Plaintiffs and the members of the Contract Class hereby repeat, reiterate and re- allege each and every allegation in each of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 312. EmblemHealth entered into binding and enforceable contracts with Plaintiffs pursuant to which EmblemHealth would provide them and their eligible dependents with health benefits for life. 313. By withdrawing its retiree health coverage from Plaintiffs, EmblemHealth acted in a manner that, even if not expressly forbidden by any contractual provision, deprived Plaintiffs of the right to receive benefits under these contracts. 314. EmblemHealth’s implied promise to act in good faith and deal fairly with Plaintiffs is not contrary to any express provision in the contracts. 315. EmblemHealth’s breaches have caused Plaintiffs to suffer monetary and/or economic harm, for which they are entitled to an award of monetary damages and other relief. 35. Plaintiffs began working at EmblemHealth (or, if employed prior to September 2005, at either Group Health Incorporated or Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York, before the two companies merged to form EmblemHealth) and/or ConnectiCare as early as 1980. 36. At EmblemHealth, Plaintiffs held various prestigious positions within the Company, including, but not limited to, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Actuary, Chief Medical Officer, Chief Information Officer, General Counsel, President, Executive Vice President, Senior Vice President and Vice President. 37. Indeed, it was Plaintiffs who built EmblemHealth into the successful health insurance company it is today, worth approximately $10 billion and with more than 3 million active members. 38. Without the tireless efforts of Plaintiffs, EmblemHealth would not be nearly as successful as it has been over the last 36 years. II. EmblemHealth’s Promises to Plaintiffs 39. Despite their contributions to EmblemHealth’s success, however, EmblemHealth recently decided it will not honor its explicit and binding written agreements with Plaintiffs to repay them for their hard work through the provision of lifetime retiree health benefits. 41. EmblemHealth promised to provide these retiree health benefits to Plaintiffs for the duration of their lives, with no provisions for the Company to stop providing the retirement benefits at any earlier date or for any other reason save for the event that the individual became eligible for coverage under another employer-promulgated healthcare plan. 42. Each of the 24 Plaintiffs signed binding agreements with EmblemHealth and met the prerequisite conditions to receiving lifetime retiree health coverage. EmblemHealth, on the other hand, did not uphold its end of the deal. 43. The retirement plans created by, or benefits promised in, Plaintiffs’ various employment and separation agreements with EmblemHealth are unique and distinct from the Company’s various other retirement plans. That said, upon information and belief, the Company entered into similar contracts with other retired EmblemHealth executives. 44. Moreover, these contracts created an enforceable right to lifetime retiree health benefits consistent with the benefits provided to active EmblemHealth executives and not subject to unilateral withdrawal or revocation by the Company. I. Plaintiffs’ Contributions to EmblemHealth

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36. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of all persons or entities who acquired shares of Finisar common stock during the Class Period and who were damaged thereby (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 37. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Finisar stock was actively traded on the NASDAQ. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate Case5:11-cv-01252-EJD Document1 Filed03/15/11 Page11 of 15 44. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶1-43 by reference. 45. During the Class Period, defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 46. Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: (a) employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of Finisar common stock during the Class Period. 47. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially inflated prices for Finisar common stock. Plaintiff and the Class would not have purchased Finisar common stock at the prices they paid, or at all, if they had been aware that the market price had been artificially and falsely inflated by defendants’ misleading statements. 48. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶1-47 by reference. 49. The Company and the defendants acted as controlling persons of Finisar within the meaning of §20(a) of the 1934 Act. By reason of their positions with the Company, and their ownership of Finisar stock, the Company and the defendants had the power and authority to cause Finisar to engage in the wrongful conduct complained of herein. Finisar controlled the Company, Case5:11-cv-01252-EJD Document1 Filed03/15/11 Page13 of 15 For Violation of §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants For Violation of §20(a) of the 1934 Act Against All Defendants

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10. On or about July 11, 2019, Chase mailed an account statement to Plaintiff regarding an alleged debt owed to “JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.” A copy of this account statement is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A. 11. Upon information and belief, the alleged debt referenced by Exhibit A was incurred by use of a credit card, which was used exclusively for personal, family, and household purposes. 12. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form account statement, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 13. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form account statement, used by Chase to attempt to collect alleged debts. 15. Exhibit A includes the following representation which largely reflects the debt validation notice that the FDCPA requires to be included with the initial written communication to the consumer: 16. If Exhibit A was actually mailed on July 11, 2019, it would have been received on or after July 14, 2019. 17. If Exhibit A was received on July 14, 2019, the consumer would have until August 13, 2019 to mail out a request for validation. Chauncey v. JDR Recovery Corp., 118 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1997) (consumer triggers verification rights by mailing out written notice of dispute on thirtieth day after receiving validation notice). 18. Exhibit A also contains the following settlement offer: 19. The above offer requires that the consumer’s payment be received by August 25, 2019. 20. The above offer also states that MRS is “not obligated to renew this offer.” 22. Thus, any consumer who wished to take advantage of the settlement offer in Exhibit A would feel compelled to mail out payment on or before August 22, 2019. 23. The 30-day validation period identified in Exhibit A would end at or around the same time the consumer would feel compelled to mail out a payment to take advantage of the settlement offer in Exhibit A before it expires. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 24. Assuming the consumer sought verification at or near the end of the statutorily mandated 30-day validation period, there would be no way for MRS to provide verification in time for the consumer to tender payment in acceptance. 25. The unsophisticated consumer, realizing that the debt could not be verified before the settlement offer in Exhibit A expired and that MRS was not obligated to renew the offer would be unsure how, or whether, they could seek verification of the debt but accept the settlement offer if the debt could be verified. 26. The statement that a debt collector is “not obligated to renew” an offer tracks safe-harbor language that was created by the Seventh Circuit, which is meant to signal to the unsophisticated consumer that the offer may not actually expire on the expiration date because renewal of the offer is, at the very least, a possibility. Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). 28. In the context of an initial settlement letter, the unsophisticated consumer, believing that the foregoing of validation rights is a material aspect of the settlement offer, would understand the language that the debt collector is “not obligated to renew” to mean that the debt collector would most likely not renew the offer, since the debtor would no longer have validation rights to bargain away. See, e.g., Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt., No. 18-3119, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 1775 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 2020) (Rovner, J. concur.) (“The [Evory] language is no different from the creditors’ language of ‘limited time offer’ or a ‘time sensitive matter’ or ‘act now,’ and reinforces the idea that if the debtor does not act immediately, she may lose the opportunity to do so forever.”). 30. The unsophisticated consumer, wishing to take advantage of the settlement offer as long as it could be verified, might tender her payment to accept the settlement offer along with the notice of dispute. 31. The unsophisticated consumer would also not know whether or how they could receive her money back from Defendant if Defendant is unable to verify the debt or if the debt actually is not valid. See, e.g., Glackin v. LTD Fin. Servs., L.P., 2013 U.S. Dist. ELXIS 108031, at *7-8 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2013) (“an unsophisticated consumer would likely believe that setting up payment arrangements would act as a waiver of the right to dispute the debt.”) (emphasis added). 32. In fact, though the unsophisticated consumer would not realize it, the debt collector need not even verify the debt as long as it ceases further attempts to collect the debt. See Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assocs., 122 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 1997). 33. Thus, the purpose and effect of providing a settlement offer with a letter containing the validation notice is to discourage the unsophisticated consumer from submitting a written dispute. 35. Because the settlement offer in Exhibit A expires at or around the same time as the validation period, there is an apparent contradiction between the settlement offer and the validation notice. See Flood v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC, 176 P.3d 769, 776 (Colo. 2008) (“The extended time for taking advantage of the settlement offer – couched within a personalized assurance that all her rights will be preserved through oral communication – effectively misleads the consumer into delaying the transmission of the consumer’s written request for the verifying documentation, thereby causing the loss of valuable consumer rights.”). 36. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused about whether the settlement offer in Exhibit A would require them to forego their right to validate the debt. 37. The unsophisticated consumer would not know whether requesting verification of the debt would be interpreted as a rejection of the settlement offer. 38. The plain language of Exhibit A is unclear as to how MRS would proceed in the event that the consumer mailed a dispute along with a payment that was intended to accept the settlement offer in the case that the debt could be verified. 40. Where a consumer mails a dispute along with a payment that was intended to accept a settlement offer with an impending expiration date, whether the FDCPA requires a debt collector to proceed along any of the above paths is an open question in the Seventh Circuit. See Bailey v. TRW Receivables Management Services, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19638, *7-8 (D. Haw. Aug. 16, 1990) (“There is nothing in the statute which indicates that a debt collector is not required to provide verification where a consumer requests it after paying the debt.”). 41. Whether accepting payment, or even holding payment pending verification, is a “further attempt to collect the debt” is an open question in the Seventh Circuit. See Sambor v. Omnia Credit Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1243 (D. Haw. Feb. 5, 2002) (“Because the debt collector in Bailey had already collected the debt, there was no collection to ‘cease’ pending validation. In Bailey, keeping the consumer’s money was tantamount to continuing collection activity.”). 42. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether she had effectively exercised her validation rights by sending a payment along with a dispute letter. 43. The unsophisticated consumer may unwittingly reject a settlement offer by tendering the settlement payment along with her dispute letter. If the debt collector treated the acceptance of a settlement offer as a continuing attempt to collect a debt, see Sambor, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1243, the debt collector would need to return the settlement payment pending verification of the debt. 45. Moreover, the unsophisticated consumer would have no idea how to both seek verification of the debt and preserve the settlement offer in Exhibit A. 46. The consumer needs time to process the information contained in an initial debt collection letter before deciding whether to dispute, pay or take other action. This is the point of the 30-day period in 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a). 47. Prior to deciding whether to dispute a debt, a consumer may have to sort through personal records and/or memories to try to remember if the debt might be legitimate. She may not recognize the creditor – debts are freely assignable and corporations, especially banks, often change names. 48. The § 1692g validation period lasts for 30 days. It is the consumer’s right to request verification until the end of the 30-day period. If the request is not made until the end of the 30-day period, the verification request would not be processed, researched by the creditor, and returned to the consumer until long after settlement offer payment deadline has expired. The consumer would be left with no time to review the verification and determine whether to accept the settlement offer. 49. The unsophisticated consumer would have no idea how to both seek verification of the debt and preserve the settlement offers in Exhibit A. It is likely that the settlement offer would expire before the debt collector provides verification. The consumer would be left with little or no time to review the verification and determine whether to accept the settlement offer. 51. Defendant did not include explanatory language in Exhibit A. See, e.g., Bartlett, 128 F.3d 497, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1997). 52. Any explanatory language should make clear whether a dispute will extend the settlement offer while the debt collector is in the process of complying with its obligation to verify the debt. 53. Plaintiff was misled and confused by Exhibit A. 54. The unsophisticated consumer would be misled and confused by Exhibit A. The FDCPA 56. Moreover, Congress has explicitly described the FDCPA as regulating “abusive practices” in debt collection. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a) – 1692(e). Any person who receives a debt collection letter containing a violation of the FDCPA is a victim of abusive practices. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses”). 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits the “use [of] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 60. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f generally prohibits the "use [of] unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt." 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) requires that the debt collector identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed in a non-confusing manner. Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 500. See also Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2000) (statutory disclosures must be made in a non-confusing way): It is no excuse that it was “impossible” for the defendants to comply when as in this case the amount of the debt changes daily. What would or might be impossible for the defendants to do would be to determine what the amount of the debt might be at some future date if for example the interest rate in the loan agreement was variable. What they certainly could do was to state the total amount due--interest and other charges as well as principal--on the date the dunning letter was sent. We think the statute required this. 62. While Miller addressed a debt collector’s obligation to provide the amount of the debt under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), the Seventh Circuit has held that the standards for claims under § 1692e and § 1692g are the same. McMillan v. Collection Professionals, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2006). We cannot accept the district court’s view that claims brought under § 1692e or § 1692f are different from claims brought under § 1692g for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. Whether or not a letter is ‘false, deceptive, or misleading’ (in violation of § 1692e) or ‘unfair or unconscionable’ (in violation of § 1692f) are inquiries similar to whether a letter is confusing in violation of § 1692g. After all, as our cases reflect, the inquiry under §§ 1692e, 1692g and 1692f is basically the same: it requires a fact-bound determination of how an unsophisticated consumer would perceive the letter.”) 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 65. By providing a settlement offer which purportedly expires shortly after the 30-day validation period without explaining how the validation notice and settlement “deadline” fit together, Exhibit A includes representations which are false, deceptive, and misleading and overshadow the validation notice. 66. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692f, and 1692g(b). 67. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class, consisting of (a) all natural persons in the State of Wisconsin (b) who were sent a collection letter in the form represented by Exhibit A to the complaint in this action, (c) seeking to collect a debt for personal, family or household purposes, (d) between March 16, 2019 and March 16, 2020, inclusive, (e) that was not returned by the postal service. 68. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 69. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether the Defendants complied with the FDCPA. 70. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 72. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible.

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10. Plaintiff King began working for Defendant IBBI at the Knoxville Plasma location on or around July 18, 2013. 11. At the time of hiring Ms. King, Defendant told her she would become a Training Coordinator. This required, however, that she first train and work as a “floater” in different positions at Knoxville Plasma. After spending over a year as a floater, Ms. King was given the title and position of Training Coordinator in January 2015. 12. Ms. King worked exclusively in the position of Training Coordinator from January 2015 until May 2017. As a Training Coordinator, Ms. King’s job duties included training all new hires on the company’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); conducting training audits and assessments on employees; and conducting re-training for employees as needed due to errors and accidents, changes in the company’s SOPs, or company-announced variances from the SOPs. Ms. King also implemented annual trainings for all staff. All the trainings that Ms. King performed or implemented were developed by IBBI’s corporate managers, and she followed the training procedures, protocol, and curriculum as required by IBBI. 13. As Training Coordinator, Ms. King did not customarily or regularly direct the work of two or more other employees. She did not have the authority to hire or fire employees or to make suggestions or recommendations that are given particular weight with regard to hiring, firing, 4 or changing the status of other employees. The primary duties of a Training Coordinator do not involve the management of the company. 14. Ms. King’s primary duties as Training Coordinator did not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. On the contrary, she carried out specific tasks as required of her by her supervisors and IBBI’s corporate office. 15. The entire time that Ms. King worked exclusively as Training Coordinator, from 2015 until May 2017, IBBI paid her an hourly wage, including overtime wages at 1.5 times her normal hourly rate for any work done in excess of 40 hours per workweek. The entire time that Ms. King worked for IBBI before being appointed Training Coordinator, from July 2013 until early 2015, IBBI paid Ms. King an hourly wage, including overtime wages at 1.5 times her normal hourly rate. 16. In May 2017, Ms. King was given a new position as a Quality Assurance (QA) Coordinator in the Knoxville Plasma location. Ms. King was told that she would continue to do some Training Coordinator duties, assisting the one other Training Coordinator at that location, until a permanent replacement for her was hired. 17. Ms. King’s duties as QA Coordinator primarily involved reviewing and auditing the plasma center’s practices to ensure that the center was operating in compliance with SOPs and other corporate policies and mandates. Ms. King’s daily duties included such tasks as conducting morning “rounds” to check whether the center was properly staffed, that equipment was properly set up, that appropriate temperatures were maintained, that necessary supplies were stocked, and that log sheets were in place; running reports and/or reviewing reports that were run by managers of the center to ensure that all paperwork was prepared in compliance with SOPs and other company directives; and reviewing and/or preparing additional paperwork to ensure compliance 5 with SOPs and company directives. Other weekly or monthly tasks that QA Coordinators perform include such things as assessing equipment and storage conditions, reviewing the shipment process to make sure all policies were properly followed, and completing additional paperwork. 18. As QA Coordinator, Ms. King did not customarily or regularly direct the work of two or more other employees. She did not have the authority to hire or fire employees or to make suggestions or recommendations that are given particular weight regarding hiring, firing, or changing the status of other employees. The primary duties of a QA Coordinator do not involve the management of the company. 19. Ms. King’s primary duties as QA Coordinator did not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. On the contrary, she carried out specific tasks as required by her supervisors and IBBI’s corporate office. Her job was to assess whether corporate-mandated policies were being followed. 20. As QA Coordinator, Ms. King did not have authority to formulate or interpret the SOPs or other company polices. She made sure policies were executed as she was instructed by the corporate office. She did not have the authority to waive or deviate from any policies. She did not have the authority to discipline or penalize employees if they did not comply with corporate policies; instead, she reported any errors or deviations she found to her supervisors. 21. Defendant employs at least two QA Coordinators at each of its plasma centers in the nation. Upon information and belief, each whole blood center also employs QA Coordinators. The QA Coordinator job duties were approximately the same for each QA Coordinator. 22. From May 2017 until the end of 2017, during the first few months that Ms. King worked as a QA Coordinator, she and the one other QA Coordinator at Knoxville Plasma were 6 paid an hourly wage for all hours worked and were paid overtime wages at 1.5 times their normal hourly rate for any hours they officially reported that were in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 23. In order to complete their job duties, Ms. King and the other QA Coordinator routinely worked overtime hours. On numerous occasions in 2017, Knoxville Plasma’s Center Manager, Candice Thompson, complained to Ms. King and the other QA Coordinator that they were “working too much overtime” and that the corporate office was unhappy about this. Ms. King and the other QA Coordinator often worked “off the clock” so they could complete their job duties without upsetting their supervisors, and their supervisors were aware of this. 24. At the end of 2017, Ms. Thompson informed Ms. King and the other QA Coordinator that, effective 2018, they would become “salaried” employees. While their base annual salaries were increased, they were told that they would no longer receive overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. The reason given to them for this change was because they were working too much overtime. 25. The job duties of Ms. King and the other QA Coordinator did not change between 2017 and 2018, despite their classification being changed from “hourly” to “salaried.” 26. At the time that Ms. King and the other QA Coordinator became “salaried” employees, their supervisor, the Regional QA Manager, was paid hourly and still received overtime wages. She was switched to “salaried” pay sometime thereafter. 27. In addition to Ms. King and the other “salaried” QA Coordinator, Knoxville Plasma employed two other full-time QA Coordinators for short durations at different times in 2018 and 2019. These other two QA Coordinators were classified as “hourly” employees and were eligible to receive overtime pay. The “hourly” QA Coordinators had the same QA job duties as the 7 “salaried” QA Coordinators. All were supervised by the Regional QA Manager, as well as the Center Manager. 28. In addition to her QA Coordinator job duties, Ms. King continued to perform Training Coordinator job duties. During the entire time that Ms. King worked at Knoxville Plasma, the center never hired another permanent “backup” Training Coordinator to take Ms. King’s place. Therefore, she continued to perform Training Coordinator duties to assist the other Training Coordinator. From May 2017 until the end of her employment in October 2019, Ms. King spent an average of approximately 25 percent of her work time performing Training Coordinator duties. 29. The other Training Coordinator who worked throughout the time that Ms. King worked at Knoxville Plasma continued to be paid on an hourly basis and was eligible to receive overtime wages for working more than 40 hours in a workweek. This Training Coordinator did not generally work overtime hours, however. Instead, Ms. King, who was considered “salaried” beginning in 2018, often was expected to come into work early and stay late to complete both her QA and Training Coordinator duties, and she was not paid any overtime wages for doing so. 30. Both Ms. King and the other “salaried” QA Coordinator at Knoxville Plasma regularly worked more than 40 hours per week after they were changed to “salaried” employees and did not receive overtime wages. Defendant was aware they worked these long hours, as they often complained to their Center Manager and the Regional QA Manager about how long it was taking for them to accomplish their required tasks and that they were concerned that this would affect the quality of their work Ms. King, in particular, complained that she was not getting paid for all the work she was doing. She regularly worked 10 to 12-hour shifts, sometimes up to five times per week and occasionally on weekends. 8 31. On a Friday in August 2018, Ms. King’s workload was so much that she needed to work at least 14 hours that day and come in on Saturday to complete her work. Both the other QA Coordinator and the other Training Coordinator were on leave that day, so Ms. King had to perform all QA and all Training duties. Defendant had recently announced an SOP variance that it expected the center to implement the next day, requiring Ms. King to train all employees on the new policy right away. 32. On that day in August 2018, after first complaining in person to Ms. Thompson, Ms. King sent an e-mail to the Regional Quality Assurance Manager, Angie Long. In that e-mail, Ms. King complained that she had more work than could possibly be completed in one day, that she was having to routinely work several extra hours to complete her workload, and that she was required to stay late without extra compensation to do the work of the Training Coordinator. She also expressed concern about the quality of her work in light of the time she had to complete it. Ms. King sent this e-mail to Ms. Long on the recommendation of the Center Manager Ms. Thompson. 33. On the following Monday, Ms. Long requested to meet with Ms. King. She expressed that she was upset about Ms. King’s e-mail and had forwarded it to Ginger Manie, the Regional QA Director who worked in Defendant’s corporate office in Memphis. Ms. Long told Ms. King that Ms. Manie was “furious” about the e-mail and that Ms. Long had to talk Ms. Manie out of taking action against Ms. King. 34. After August 2018, Ms. King continued to work on Training Coordinator duties in addition to QA duties and continued to work overtime hours in order to accomplish her job duties. In 2019, Ms. Thompson decided to train two employees as Training Coordinator, in the hopes of hiring one of them permanently to take the position still being performed by Ms. King. However, 9 Defendant ultimately decided not to hire either as Training Coordinator, which resulted in Ms. King still having to work two job positions. 35. After August 2018, the other “salaried” QA Coordinator at Knoxville Plasma, who did not have Training Coordinator duties, also continued to routinely work overtime hours. 36. Like all other employees of IBBI, Ms. King used a payroll app set up by IBBI that showed a list of all employees and whether they were classified as “hourly” or “salaried.” Ms. King observed through this app that some of IBBI’s QA Coordinators around the country were classified as “hourly” and some as “salaried.” Upon information and belief, “salaried” employees are not paid overtime. 37. Upon information and belief, although the full-time Training Coordinators at Knoxville Plasma have been classified as “hourly” employees, Defendant classifies some of its Training Coordinators in other centers as “salaried” and does not pay them overtime. 38. The FLSA requires covered employers, such as Defendant, to compensate non- exempt employees at a rate of not less than 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 39. The primary job duties of QA Coordinators employed by Defendant are such that they should be paid overtime wages for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 40. The primary job duties of Training Coordinators employed by Defendant are such that they should be paid overtime wages for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 41. During the applicable statutory period, Ms. King’s primary job duties while working for Defendant, which included both QA Coordinator and Training Coordinator duties, were such that she should have been paid overtime wages for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 10 42. Upon information and belief, Defendant has a common policy or plan of classifying its employees, and particularly its QA Coordinators and Training Coordinators, as “salaried” or “hourly” depending on whether they regularly work overtime and without regard to whether their job duties actually qualify them as exempt from overtime compensation. As a result, several IBBI employees who should be paid overtime are not being paid in compliance with the FLSA. 43. In September 2019, Defendant scheduled its Regional Quality Assessment and Development Specialist, Marlene Downey-Waterstradt, to conduct an evaluation on Ms. King. This was Ms. King’s first formal evaluation by the corporate office. 44. Ms. King’s Center Manager and Regional QA Manager, both of whom work from the Knoxville Plasma center with Ms. King on a daily basis, had never counseled Ms. King about any performance-related concerns. At the time of Ms. King’s evaluation, she had been working as QA Coordinator for over two years. Defendant had previously selected her as qualified to conduct year-end corporate audits and had once chosen her to go to another of its plasma centers to temporarily fill in for a QA Coordinator. 45. In her evaluation of Ms. King, however, Ms. Downey-Waterstradt indicated several areas of concern. One of those areas of concern had to do with alleged mistakes in Ms. King’s personal QA training planner, in which she recorded the trainings that she completed throughout the year. Ms. King kept the planner for her use only, to assist her in making sure she completed all required trainings, and she did not use it as proof that her trainings had been done. Defendant maintains separate records that show what trainings have been completed by each employee and on which dates. 46. Ms. Downey-Waterstradt unnecessarily characterized the errors on Ms. King’s planner as “falsification,” which was an exaggeration of what was, at worst, an inadvertent and 11 irrelevant error. Ms. Downey-Waterstradt also conducted Ms. King’s evaluation in other ways that were less favorable as compared to how the other QA Coordinator at Knoxville Plasma had been evaluated, and she held Ms. King to unfair performance standards. For example, Ms. Downey-Waterstadt criticized Ms. King for not equally sharing the QA workload with the other QA Coordinator, disregarding the fact that Ms. King also was expected to perform Training Coordinator duties on a daily basis, which made it impossible for her to equally share the QA workload. 47. Before Ms. Downey-Watershadt completed her three-day evaluation, she called Ms. Manie to report her evaluation findings. Ms. Downey-Watershadt and Ms. Manie decided to end the evaluation early. Soon thereafter, Ms. Manie, Ms. Downey-Watershadt, and Ms. Long had a conference call about Ms. King’s evaluation. Upon information and belief, Ms. Manie referenced Ms. King’s prior overtime complaint in discussing what actions Defendant should take regarding Ms. King. 48. On October 11, 2019, Center Manager Candice Thompson called Ms. King into her office and told her that she had received an e-mail from Ginger Manie the night before instructing her to fire Ms. King. The reason given by Ms. Manie for Ms. King’s discharge was “falsification of records.” Ms. Thompson said she had tried to convince Ms. Manie not to fire Ms. King, but to no avail. Ms. King has never falsified any records and the reason given for her termination is a pretext for retaliation in response to her overtime complaints. 49. Defendant would not have discharged Ms. King but for her prior complaints related to her work hours and not receiving adequate compensation for her hours worked. 12 V.

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25. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 216(b), Plaintiffs bring their First Cause of Action as a collective action under the FLSA on behalf of themselves and the following collective: All persons employed by Defendants at any time since September 18, 2012 and through the entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) who worked as stock employees (the “Collective Action Members”). 26. A collective action is appropriate in this circumstance because Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members are similarly situated, in that they were all subjected to Defendants’ illegal policy of failing to pay overtime premiums for work performed in excess of forty (40) hours each week and failure to pay for all overtime hours due to improper shaving of hours. As a result of these policies, Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members did not receive the legally- required overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 27. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members have substantially similar job duties, and are paid pursuant to a similar, if not the same, payment structure. 6 28. Pursuant to the NYLL, Plaintiffs brings their Second through Fifth Causes of Action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and the following class: All persons employed by Defendants in New York at any time since September 18, 2009 and through the entry of judgment in this case (the “Class Period”) who worked as stock employees (the “Class Members”). 29. The Class Members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class Members are determinable from the records of Defendants. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under Rule 23. 30. The Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 31. Upon information and belief, there are in excess of forty (40) Class Members. 32. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual Class members. Such common questions will determine Defendants’ liability to all (or nearly all) Class Members. Common questions include: a. whether Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Class Members within the meaning of the NYLL; b. whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time records for all hours worked by Plaintiffs and the Class Members; c. whether Defendants “shaved” Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ hours when they clocked in late or clocked out early; d. whether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members wages for all hours worked; 7 e. whether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek; f. whether Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and the Class Members with a proper statement of wages with every wage payment as required by the NYLL; g. whether Defendants failed to provide proper wage notice to Plaintiffs and Class Members at the beginning of their employment and/or on February 1 of each year as required by the NYLL; h. whether Defendants’ failure to properly pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members lacked a good faith basis; and i. whether Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory damages, liquidated damages, interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys’ fees. 33. The answer to these questions would drive resolution of the litigation. If a judge and/or jury agrees with Plaintiffs on these issues, Defendants would be liable to all Class Members for their NYLL wage and hour violations. 34. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the Class Members’ claims. Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, are stock employees of Defendants who worked for Defendants pursuant to their corporate policies. Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, were, inter alia, not paid overtime premium pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a given workweek, not paid for all hours worked, not paid for spread-of-hours premiums when working did not receive proper wage statements and wage notices. If Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for the claims enumerated in this Complaint, they are also liable to all Class Members. 35. Plaintiffs and their Counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Class. There 8 are no conflicts between Plaintiffs and the Class Members, and Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit out of a desire to help all Class Members, not merely out of a desire to recover their own damages. 36. Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced class action litigators who are well-prepared to represent the interests of the Class Members. 37. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. Defendants are sophisticated parties with substantial resources. The individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate defendants. The individual members of the Class have no interest or capacity to bring separate actions; Plaintiffs are unaware of any other litigation concerning this controversy; it is desirable to concentrate the litigation in one case; and there are no likely difficulties that will arise in managing the class action. 38. At all relevant times, Defendants have been in the supermarket business. Upon information and belief, Defendants A. Dahran and M. Dahran, have owned, operated, and managed the supermarkets which comprise the Key Food Enterprise. 39. According to Key Food’s website, Defendants’ Atlantic Key Food and Nostrand Key Food are both open Monday through Saturday from 8:00 am until 9:00 pm and Sunday from 8:00 am until 8:00 pm; and Defendants’ Merrick Key Food is open Monday through Saturday from 7:00 am until 9:00 pm and Sundays from 7:00 am until 7:00 pm. (See www.keyfood.com). 40. Throughout the relevant time period, Defendants A. Dahran and M. Dahran have been constant presences at the Key Food Supermarkets and have taken active roles in ensuring that the supermarkets run in accordance with their procedures and policies. 9 41. Plaintiffs were generally supervised by Defendants’ managers at the supermarkets yet Plaintiffs frequently observed that their managers received direct orders from A. Dahran and M. Dahran. 42. Upon information and belief, Defendants employ their staff interchangeably in all of their various divisions of the Key Food Enterprise, including all three (3) Key Food Supermarket locations discussed herein. Plaintiffs’ Work for Defendants 43. Plaintiff N. Garcia initially worked for Defendants as a dairy stock employee at the Nostrand Key Food for approximately one (1) year, in or around 2010, and returned to work for Defendants from in or around April 2013 through on or about July 10, 2015, as a dairy and grocery stock employee at the Atlantic Key Food (the “N. Garcia Employment Period”). 44. Throughout the N. Garcia Employment Period, Plaintiff was typically scheduled to work approximately six (6) days per week, from approximately 8:00 am through approximately 6:00 pm, for a total of between approximately fifty-four and fifty-seven (54-57) hours per week. 45. Plaintiff A. Garcia worked for Defendants as a grocery and dairy stock employee at Defendants’ Key Food Supermarkets form in or around 2010 through in or around April 2013 (the “A. Garcia Employment Period”). From the beginning of the A. Garcia Employment Period until in or around 2012, Plaintiff worked at the Nostrand Key Food. Thereafter, until in or around the end of the A. Garcia Employment Period, Plaintiff worked at the Atlantic Key Food. 46. Throughout the A. Garcia Employment Period, Plaintiff was typically scheduled to work approximately six (6) days per week, from approximately 8:00 am through approximately between 7:00 pm and 8:00 pm, for a total of between approximately sixty and 10 sixty-three (60-63) hours per week. 47. Throughout their respective employment periods, for their work, Plaintiffs were similarly paid on a purported “salary” basis with certain deductions, regardless of the specific duties they performed. 48. During the time when N. Garcia worked at the Nostrand Key Food, N. Garcia was paid approximately $500.00 per week entirely in cash. During approximately the first year of Plaintiff N. Garcia’s employment at the Atlantic Key Food, N. Garcia was paid approximately $575.00 per week through a combination of check and cash. Thereafter, until the end of the N. Garcia Employment Period, N. Garcia was paid approximately $625.00 per week through a combination of check and cash. 49. Throughout the entirety of the A. Garcia Employment Period, A. Garcia was paid approximately $500.00 per week through a combination of check and cash. 50. As a result of Defendants’ policy of paying Plaintiffs on a purported “salary” basis, Plaintiffs were not paid overtime premiums when they worked more than forty (40) hours per week. 51. Throughout the relevant time period, Plaintiffs tracked the numbers of hours worked by punching in and punching out on a time clock system. However, they typically observed on numerous occasions that the time clock “shaved” their hours worked down to between approximately fifteen (15) minutes and one (1) hour when they clocked in only minutes late or clocked out early. As such, in addition to the unpaid overtime premiums, Plaintiffs did not get paid for all hours worked due to Defendants “time shaving” policy. 52. During their respective employment periods, when Plaintiffs worked fewer than their required hours, Defendants deducted money from their salary on a pro-rated hourly basis. 11 Accordingly, Defendants, in effect, treated Plaintiffs as “hourly” employees, rather than pay them an actual salary, yet they failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime premiums for hours worked over 40 each week. 53. Plaintiffs have spoken with other stock employees of Defendants, including stock employees who worked at the Merrick Key Food, who were similarly required to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week during the Class Period and similarly did not receive overtime premium pay for hours worked over forty (40) per workweek. 54. Plaintiffs have also spoken with other stock employees of Defendants, who were also subject to Defendants’ “time shaving” policy and, therefore were not paid for all overtime hours worked. 55. At no point during Plaintiffs’ employment did they receive a wage notice showing his hourly or overtime rate at the date of his hiring or by February 1 of each year. Also, Plaintiffs’ were never provided a wage statement with the cash payment they received each week, indicating the amount of hours they worked during the week, their regular rate, and/or their overtime rate. Defendants’ Unlawful Corporate Policies 56. Plaintiffs have spoken with other employees of Defendants, including employees who worked at the Merrick Key Food, who similarly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week during the Class Period and did not receive overtime premiums of one-half their regular hourly rate for hours over forty (40) each week. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and Class Members overtime premiums was a corporate policy of Defendants which applied to all of their stock employees throughout the relevant period. 57. Plaintiffs have also spoken with other stock employees of Defendants, who were 12 also not paid for all overtime hours worked as a result of Defendants’ “time shaving” policy. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and Class Members for all overtime hours worked at one and one-half their regular hourly rate was a corporate policy of Defendants which applied to all of their stock employees throughout the relevant period. 58. Plaintiff and the Class Members were all paid pursuant to the same corporate policies of Defendants, including failing to pay overtime compensation and spread of hours premiums. 59. Throughout the Class Period and, upon information and belief, continuing until today, Defendants have likewise employed other individuals like Plaintiffs in positions that require little skill and no capital investment. Upon information and belief, such individuals were not paid one and one-half when working in excess of forty (40) hours per week. Additionally, such individuals were not provided with proper wage notices at hiring, by February 1 of each year, or on a weekly basis. 60. Upon information and belief, throughout the Class Period and continuing until today, Defendants failed to maintain accurate and sufficient time and payroll records or provide such records to employees. Defendants failed to provide employees with proper wage statements each week and wage notice upon their hiring and/or on February 1 of each year and with accurate wage statements as required by NYLL § 195. 13 61. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Collective Action Members, repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 62. By “shaving” Plaintiffs’ hours and failing to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants have violated and continue to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a)(2). 63. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 64. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime caused Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. Plaintiffs and the Collective Action Members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime premium compensation, damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of the action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 65. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 66. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ rights by failing to pay overtime compensation at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of 14 pay for hours worked in excess of 40 each week, in violation of the NYLL and regulations promulgated thereunder. 67. Defendants’ failure to pay overtime premium compensation caused Plaintiffs and the Class Members to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime compensation, damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of the action pursuant to NYLL §§ 663(1) et seq. 68. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 69. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs and the Class Members notice as required by Article 6, § 195, in English or in the language identified by Plaintiffs and the Class Members as their primary language, containing Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay, if applicable; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with the NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; or any “doing business as” names used by the employer’ the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 70. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants fifty dollars ($50) per employee for each workweek that the 15 violations occurred or continue to occur, up to a maximum of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) per employee, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190, et seq., liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and injunctive and declaratory relief. 71. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, repeat and reallege each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs hereof with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 72. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs and Class Members with an accurate statement of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195, containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. 73. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each workweek that the violations occurred or continue to occur, up to a maximum of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) per employee, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, pre-judgment and post- judgment interest, and injunctive and declaratory relief. 16 Defendants’ Supermarkets FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT – UNPAID OVERTIME NEW YORK LABOR LAW – FAILURE TO PROVIDE WAGE NOTICE NEW YORK LABOR LAW – FAILURE TO PROVIDE WAGE STATEMENT NEW YORK LABOR LAW – UNPAID OVERTIME

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15. On June 2, 2020 Plaintiff received medical services from Good Samaritan Hospital. 16. Thereafter, Good Samaritan Hospital claimed Plaintiff incurred a debt of $150.00 for the medical services (“the alleged Debt”). 17. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 18. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 19. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 20. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 21. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 22. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by written correspondence. 23. Upon information and belief, rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party vendor to perform such activities on its behalf. 24. Upon information and belief, as part of its utilization of the third-party vendor, Defendant conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 4 25. Upon information and belief, the information conveyed by Defendant to the third- party vendor included Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the entity to which Plaintiff allegedly owed the debt, and the fact that the alleged Debt concerned Plaintiff’s medical treatment, among other things. 26. Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to the third- party vendor is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 27. Upon information and belief, the third-party vendor then populated some or all this information into a prewritten template, printed, and mailed the letter to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction. 28. That letter, dated December 1, 2020, was received and read by Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 29. The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 30. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.” 32. The third-party vendor does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 33. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning the alleged Debt. 5 34. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 35. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized a third-party vendor for these purposes thousands of times. 37. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor in this regard for the sole purpose of maximizing its profits. 38. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to such third-party. 39. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such private and sensitive information. 40. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 41. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 42. The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable. 43. Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to the third-party vendor. 44. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 6 45. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 46. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 47. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) prohibits the use of threats to take any action that are not intended to be undertaken. 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 50. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 51. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 52. The Letter states the “Due Date” for payment as December 11, 2020. 53. The Letter further states that, “if the account is not resolved, we will assume that you have no intention of settling this outstanding debt.” 54. The Letter makes it appear that the payment would need to be made by the above- mentioned date or it will not be accepted. 55. However, the Defendant continues to send more of these letters with the same false threat after the expiry of the due date. 7 56. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from false threats pertaining to actions that are not intended to be undertaken. 57. Plaintiff has the interest and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from debt collectors, including Defendant. 58. As such, Defendant’s representation that payment to be accepted can only be made till the due date, is a false, deceptive, and/or misleading representation made in connection with the collection of the alleged debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 59. Defendant’s representation that payment to be accepted can only be made till the due date is a threat that to signify the payment window will close, which is false threat not intended to be acted upon in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). 60. Defendant’s allegation that payment to be accepted can only be made till the due date is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 61. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(5) and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 62. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in the State of New York. 63. Plaintiff seeks to certify two classes of: i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third-party vendor without obtaining the prior consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. ii. All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter with payment due dates, only to send subsequent collection letters with additional due dates, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 8 64. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 65. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 66. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 67. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 68. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10) Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and § 1692f

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17. Maison Kayser owns and operates bakery-restaurants throughout the United States, including locations at 355 Greenwich Street, New York, New York and 326 Bleecker Street, New York, New York. It sells, at these bakery-restaurants, eggs, bread, pastries, coffee, desserts, coffee, salads, tartines, sandwiches, beverages and other similar items. 18. Maison Kayser offers its Website to the public and it offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that it offers about its bakery-restaurants. 19. Maison Kayser’s Website is heavily integrated with its bakery-restaurants, serving as a gateway to those locations. Through the Website, Maison Kayser’s customers are, inter alia, able to: find information about the bakery-restaurants’ locations and hours of operation; learn about the menu items, including its ingredients; and learn about Maison Kayser’s philosophy. 21. Plaintiff Fischler cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 22. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about January 23, 2018, Plaintiff Fischler encountered multiple access barriers that denied him full and equal access to the facilities and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied him the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Maison Kayser’s bakery- restaurants in New York. Because of these barriers he was unable to: find information about the bakery-restaurants’ locations and hours of operation; learn about the menu items, including its ingredients; and learn about Maison Kayser’s philosophy. Of prior websites he has attempted to browse, Plaintiff Fischler found this Website to be arguably the worst one. 25. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, view goods and service items, locate Maison Kayser’s bakery- restaurants and learn their hours of operation, learn about the menu items and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 26. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 28. Maison Kayser therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 29. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 31. Although Maison Kayser may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Maison Kayser lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 32. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 33. Maison Kayser has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 34. Maison Kayser has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 35. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Maison Kayser’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Maison Kayser’s bakery-restaurants, during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 37. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Maison Kayser’s New York City bakery- restaurants, during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 39. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Maison Kayser has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 40. Plaintiff Fischler will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Maison Kayser has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 41. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 43. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 44. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 45. Maison Kayser’s bakery-restaurants are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Maison Kayser’s bakery-restaurants. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 46. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 47. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 49. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Fischler, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 50. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Fischler requests the relief as set forth below. 51. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Maison Kayser’s State of New York bakery-restaurants constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Maison Kayser’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Maison Kayser. Maison Kayser’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these bakery- restaurants. 54. Maison Kayser is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its bakery-restaurants and the Website. Maison Kayser is a “person” within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 55. Maison Kayser is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its bakery-restaurants to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Maison Kayser makes available to the non-disabled public. 57. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 58. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 60. Maison Kayser discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Maison Kayser’s Website and its bakery-restaurants under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Maison Kayser from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 61. As Maison Kayser’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 62. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense. 63. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 65. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. Maison Kayser’s New York City locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the meaning of the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 68. Maison Kayser is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its bakery-restaurants in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 69. Maison Kayser is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its bakery-restaurants to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Maison Kayser makes available to the non-disabled public. 70. Maison Kayser is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 72. As such, Maison Kayser discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Maison Kayser from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 73. As Maison Kayser’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 74. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines for each offense. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 75. Plaintiff Fischler is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 78. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that Maison Kayser denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its bakery-restaurants, which Maison Kayser owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 79. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Maison Kayser, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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27. Defendant offers the commercial website, https://www.jonnyseeds.com/, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services offered by the Defendant and which Defendant ensures delivery of such goods throughout the United States including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant’s website include, but are not limited to, purchasing a wide selection of plant seeds, and to ascertain information relating to pricing, shipping, ordering merchandise and return and privacy policies. 28. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered thereby. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 29. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 30. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in April, 2021, in an attempt to purchase a product from the Defendant, the Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted person and full and equal access to the goods and services offered to the public and made -11- available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the goods, and services of the Website by being unable to purchase seeds and to ascertain information relating to pricing, shipping, ordering merchandise and return and privacy policies. 31. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired persons that include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Lack of Alternative Text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt-text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen-reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the keyboard moves over the picture. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, Defendant’s visually- impaired customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse, or make any purchases; b. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. They can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users; c. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and d. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then -12- has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 33. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually-impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 34. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 35. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s Website and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to use and enjoy the Website in the same manner as sighted individuals do, preventing Plaintiff from using the Website to purchase items and to view the items. -13- 36. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 37. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 38. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 39. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 40. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals -14- with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 41. Because Defendant’s Website is not and has never been fully accessible, and because, upon information and belief, Defendant does not have, and has never had, adequate corporate policies that are reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seek a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to: a) Retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Web Accessibility Consultant”) who shall assist in improving the accessibility of its Website, including all third-party content and plug-ins, so the goods and services on the Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by visually-impaired persons; b) Work with the Web Accessibility Consultant to ensure all employees involved in Website and content development be given web accessibility training on a biennial basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c) Work with the Web Accessibility Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether Defendant’s Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by visually-impaired persons on an ongoing basis; d) Work with the Web Accessibility Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on at least a quarterly basis with said testing to be performed by humans who are blind or have low vision, or who have training and experience in the manner in which persons who are blind use a screen reader to navigate, browse, and conduct business on websites, in addition to the testing, if applicable, that is performed using semi-automated tools; e) Incorporate all of the Web Accessibility Consultant’s recommendations within sixty (60) days of receiving the recommendations; f) Work with the Web Accessibility Consultant to create a Web Accessibility Policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address, instant messenger, and toll-free phone number to report accessibility-related problems; g) Directly link from the footer on each page of its Website, a statement that indicates that Defendant is making efforts to maintain and increase the accessibility of its Website to ensure that visually-impaired persons have full and equal -15- enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of the Defendant’s Website; h) Accompany the public policy statement with an accessible means of submitting accessibility questions and problems, including an accessible form to submit feedback or an email address to contact representatives knowledgeable about the Web Accessibility Policy; i) Provide a notice, prominently and directly linked from the footer on each page of its Website, soliciting feedback from visitors to the Website on how the accessibility of the Website can be improved. The link shall provide a method to provide feedback, including an accessible form to submit feedback or an email address to contact representatives knowledgeable about the Web Accessibility Policy; j) Provide a copy of the Web Accessibility Policy to all web content personnel, contractors responsible for web content, and Client Service Operations call center agents (“CSO Personnel”) for the Website; k) Train no fewer than three of its CSO Personnel to automatically escalate calls from users with disabilities who encounter difficulties using the Website. Defendant shall have trained no fewer than 3 of its CSO personnel to timely assist such users with disabilities within CSO published hours of operation. Defendant shall establish procedures for promptly directing requests for assistance to such personnel including notifying the public that customer assistance is available to users with disabilities and describing the process to obtain that assistance; l) Modify existing bug fix policies, practices, and procedures to include the elimination of bugs that cause the Website to be inaccessible to users of screen reader technology; and m) Plaintiff, his counsel, and their experts monitor the Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates the Website are free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure Defendant has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. To this end, Plaintiff, through his counsel and their experts, shall be entitled to consult with the Web Accessibility Consultant at their discretion, and to review any written material, including but not limited to any recommendations the Website Accessibility Consultant provides Defendant. 42. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an -16- inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by visually-impaired persons. 43. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 44. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 45. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 46. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as -17- a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 50. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class and Sub- Classes, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to visually- impaired persons, violating the ADA; and -18- d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to visually- impaired persons, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 51. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, including ADA litigation and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions are common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by visually-impaired persons throughout the United States. -19- 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 57. Defendant’s online retail store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail store 58. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 59. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 60. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: -20- [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 61. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 62. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. -21- 64. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 65. Defendant’s Website operates in the State of New York and constitutes an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s online retail establishment. 66. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 67. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the -22- nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 70. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 71. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or -23- c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 73. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 74. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 78. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 79. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 80. Defendant’s website is an online sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its online sales establishment. 81. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind consumers full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to -25- enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 84. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and Sub-Class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Sub-Class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 87. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. -26- 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 90. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 91. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 92. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods and services of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 93. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website ������������������������ ������������������������ -24- �����������������������������������������et seq.

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44. Plaintiff incorporates here the previous allegations of this Complaint. 45. This count arises from Defendant’s violation of the FLSA by failing to pay overtime to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members when they worked over 40 hours in individual workweeks. 46. Plaintiff was not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 47. The Collective Action Members were not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 49. Other Collective Action Members were directed by Defendant to work, and did work, over 40 hours in one or more individual workweeks. 50. Defendant paid Plaintiff a salary and no overtime compensation. 51. Defendant paid other Collective Action Members a salary and no overtime. 52. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime to Plaintiff at one- and-one-half times her regular rate of pay when she worked over 40 hours in one or more individual workweeks. 53. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay overtime to other Collective Action Members at one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay when they worked over 40 hours in one or more individual workweeks. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Collective Action)

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1. Defendant should have provided a certification to the consumer reporting agency that it would comply with the adverse action requirements of the FCRA prior to obtaining a consumer report on the Plaintiff. 2. Defendant should have provided a certification to the consumer reporting agency that information from the consumer report would not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation prior to obtaining a consumer report on the Plaintiff. 20. Plaintiff applied online for employment with the Defendant in or about July 2015. 22. Plaintiff returned a few days after the interview to perform additional testing for the position at Caterpillar. 23. Defendant obtained information regarding the Plaintiff from Hireright. 24. The information obtained from Hireright concerning the Plaintiff was a consumer report. 25. Plaintiff received a phone call in or about late July 2015 from Defendant informing him that due to his consumer report he would not be considered for employment. 26. Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the consumer report until sometime in or about August 2015. 27. The manner in which Defendant obtained a consumer report on the Plaintiff is consistent with its policies and practices. 28. The manner in which Defendant obtained a consumer report on the Plaintiff is the same or similar method used to obtain consumer reports on other putative class members. 29. Defendant is aware of the FCRA. 30. Defendant has knowledge that it must comply with the FCRA. 31. Defendant is required to obtain a consumer report for employment purposes in accordance with the FCRA. 32. Defendant paid a fee to a consumer reporting agency in order to procure information on the Plaintiff. 34. Plaintiff was denied employment by Defendant, in whole or in part, due to information contained in a consumer report. 35. Plaintiff was not provided a pre-adverse action notice prior to being denied a position with the Defendant. 36. Since Plaintiff did not receive proper notice prior to the adverse action he was not provided a reasonable amount of time to cure or explain any inaccuracy in the consumer report that may have affected the Defendant’s decision. 37. Defendant certified to Hireright that prior to taking an adverse action it would provide the Plaintiff with proper notice pursuant to the FCRA. 38. The FCRA states that in using a consumer report for employment purposes, before taking any adverse action, based in whole or in part on the report, the person intending to take such adverse action shall provide to the consumer to whom the report relates a copy of the report; and a description in writing of the rights of the consumer. 39. Defendant is aware that it is required by the FCRA to have provided a copy of the consumer report to the Plaintiff before taking any adverse action. 40. Despite having knowledge of the requirements of the FCRA, Defendant failed to comply with the FCRA. 41. Defendant's failure to provide the Plaintiff with a copy of the consumer report, a reasonable notice period in which to challenge any inaccuracy in the consumer report, or a written description of his rights under the FCRA prior to the adverse action, constitutes multiple violations of the FCRA. 43. Defendant should have provided a certification to the consumer reporting agency that it had complied with the disclosure and authorization requirements of the FCRA prior to obtaining a consumer report on the Plaintiff. 43. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 44. Plaintiff asserts the following adverse action class defined as: Proposed Adverse Action Class: All employees or prospective employees of Defendant in the United States that suffered an adverse employment action on or after March 8, 2014, that was based, in whole or in part, on information contained in a consumer report, and who were not provided a copy of such report, and/or a reasonable notice period in which to challenge any inaccuracy in the consumer report in advance of said adverse employment action. Numerosity 46. Virtually all of the issues of law and fact in this class action predominate over any questions affecting individual class members. Among the questions of law and fact common to the classes are: a. Whether Defendant uses consumer report information to conduct background checks on employees and prospective employees; b. Whether Defendant violated the FCRA by taking adverse action against Plaintiff and other members of the Adverse Action class on the basis of information in a consumer report, without first providing a copy of the report to the affected individuals; c. Whether the Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to provide the Plaintiff and other members of the Adverse Action Class with a reasonable amount of time to cure any inaccuracy within the consumer report prior to the adverse employment action; d. Whether Defendant's violations of the FCRA were willful; e. The proper measure of statutory damages and punitive damages; and Typicality 48. Plaintiff, as a representative of the classes, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Putative Classes and has no interest that conflict with or are antagonistic to the interest of the class members. Plaintiff has retained attorneys competent and experienced in class action litigation. No conflict exists between Plaintiff and members of the class. Superiority 49. A class action is superior to any other available method for the fair and efficient adjudication this controversy, and common questions of law and fact overwhelmingly predominate over individual questions that may arise. 50. This case is maintainable as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the putative class would result in inconsistent or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Further, adjudication of each individual class member’s claim as a separate action will potentially be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not a party to such action, impeding their ability to protect their interests. 51. This case is maintainable as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that any final relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. 53. Defendant, as the amount of each class member's individual claims is small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution, the Plaintiff is unaware of any similar claims brought against Defendant by any members of the Putative Class on an individual basis. Class certification also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result the inconsistent judgments concerning Defendant’s practices. Moreover, management of this action as a class action will not present any likely difficulties. In the interests of justice and judicial efficiencies, it would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all putative class members' claims in a single forum. 54. Plaintiff intends to send notice to all members of the putative class to the extent required by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The names and address of the potential class members are available from Defendant's records. Adverse Action Violations 55. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. Defendant used a consumer report, as defined by the FCRA, to take adverse employment action against Plaintiff, and on information and belief, other members of the adverse action class. 58. Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to provide Plaintiff, and other adverse action class members, with a copy of the consumer report that was used to take adverse employment action against them prior to the adverse action. 59. Defendant violated the FCRA by failing to provide the Plaintiff and other adverse action class members with a reasonable time to cure any inaccuracies within the consumer reports prior to the adverse action. 60. The foregoing violations were willful. Defendant acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and rights of Plaintiff and other adverse action class members under the provisions of the FCRA. Defendant's willful conduct is reflected by, among other things, the following facts: a. Defendant is a large corporation with access to legal advice through its own General Counsel's office and outside employment counsel; b. Defendant committed multiple violations of the FCRA by not providing the Plaintiff with a copy of the consumer report and not providing the Plaintiff with a reasonable notice period to cure inaccuracies before taking adverse employment action as mandated by the FCRA; c. The Defendant has ignored regulatory guidance from FTC Informal Staff Opinions and the unambiguous language of the FCRA; and d. 15 U.S.C. §1681-1681y, requires consumer reporting agencies to provide notice to users of consumer reports of the users legal obligations under the FCRA prior to the procurement of consumer reports. 62. Plaintiff and the adverse action class members are also entitled to punitive damages for these violations, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(2). 63. Plaintiff and the adverse action class members are further entitled to recover their costs and attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681n(a)(3). WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court issue an Order for the following: a. Order that this action may proceed as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; b. Order designating Plaintiff as class representative and designating Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the Putative Class; c. Order directing proper notice to be mailed to the Putative Class at Defendant's expense; d. Order finding that Defendant committed multiple, separate violations of the

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22. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and the members of the proposed class. The proposed class shall be defined as follows: All consumers in the State of New Jersey that purchased a product from Defendant via www.poptropica.com subject to the “Terms of Use” during the applicable statute of limitations through the date of final judgment in this action. 24. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand, narrow or add additional classes by amendment as investigation and discovery continues. 25. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder is impractical. On information and belief, the Class consists of thousands of members, the precise number of which is within the knowledge of and can be ascertained only by resort to Defendant’s records. 26. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: a. Whether Defendant’s Terms of Use violates the TCCWNA; b. Whether the Class is entitled to a class-wide injunction barring Defendant from asserting or attempting to enforce the aforesaid illegal provisions in its Terms of Use; c. Whether the Terms of Use’s Disclaimers and Limitation of Liability provision constitutes one or multiple TCCWNA violations; d. Whether the Terms of Use’s Indemnification clause constitutes one or multiple TCCWNA violations; e. Whether the Terms of Use’s Controlling Law provision constitutes a TCCWNA violation; and f. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a civil penalty of not less than $100 for each TCCWNA violation in Defendants’ Terms of Use. 28. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of: (1) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant; or (2) adjudications with respect to such individual members of the Class, which as a practical matter may be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 29. Class certification is further appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 31. This lawsuit may be maintained as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of fact and law common to the Class predominate over the questions affecting only individual members of the Class, and a class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this dispute. 32. The damages suffered by each individual Class member may be disproportionate to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of complex and extensive litigation to proscribe Defendant’s conduct and practices. Additionally, effective redress for each and every Class member against Defendant may be limited or even impossible where serial, duplicate, or concurrent litigation occurs arising from these disputes. Even if individual Class members could afford or justify the prosecution of their separate claims, such an approach would compound judicial inefficiencies, and could lead to incongruous and conflicting judgments against Defendant. A class action is superior to any other available method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, because: (i) common questions of law and fact overwhelmingly predominate over any individual questions that may arise, such that there will be efficiencies to the courts and the parties in litigating the common issues on a class basis rather than on an individual basis; (ii) class treatment is desired for optimal deterrence and compensation; (iii) the economies of scale inherent in litigating similar claims on a common basis will enable this case to be litigated on a cost-efficient basis as a class action, especially when compared to repetitive individual actions; (iv) no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action as the proofs as to liability are common to all Class members; and (vi this action would be effectively impossible to bring as individual actions leaving Plaintiff and others similarly situated with no viable remedy. 34. Plaintiff hereby incorporates and realleges paragraphs 1-33, as if fully set forth herein. 35. The TCCWNA states “No seller … shall in the course of his business offer … or enter into any written consumer contract … which includes any provision that violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller … as established by [New Jersey] or Federal law ….” N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. 36. Defendant is a “seller” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. 37. Plaintiff is a “consumer” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15. 38. Defendant’s Terms of Use constitute a consumer contract displayed and/or offered to consumers. 39. The Terms of Use, as detailed above, include provisions that purport to violate the legal rights of New Jersey consumers and/or limit Defendant’s responsibility including specifically pursuant to the Disclaimers and Limitation of Liability provision, the Indemnification clause, and the Controlling Law section. 40. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:12-17, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to (a) civil penalty of not less than $100, payable to Plaintiff and each Class Member, for each violation of the TCCWNA; and (b) reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs. 41. Plaintiff reserves the right to identify additional provisions of the law violated Defendant as further investigation and discovery warrant. Violations of the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA)

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12. Upon information and belief, Defendants had a longstanding agreement to control their employees’ wages and mobility by agreeing not solicit each other’s employees. 14. The mutual non-solicitation agreement itself constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992 between Defendants from 2013 until it was brought to light by the AG’s investigation commencing in 2018 in the course of the AG’s investigation into similarly illegal mutual non-solicitation and anti-poach agreements entered into between several of the largest fast food franchisors operating in the United States. 16. Arby’s, AMAC, US Beef, and the other DOE defendants’ conduct constituted a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in violation of the Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992, C.R.S. § 6-4-101, et seq. 17. As set forth herein, upon information and belief, all of the Defendants entered into the mutual non-solicitation agreements with the common interest and intention to keep their employees’ wage costs down, so that profits continued to rise or at least not be undercut by rising salaries across the industry. As a result, Defendants engaged in anti-competitive behavior in advancement of a common and illegal goal of profiting at the expense of competitive market- based salaries. 18. Defendants agreements unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., and constituted unfair competition and unfair practices in violation of Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992, C.R.S. § 6-4-101, et seq. Plaintiffs Larry Rice and Duane Ferrell, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of the Class defined herein, seek to recover the difference between the wages and salaries that Class Members were paid and what Class Members would have been paid in a competitive market, in the absence of Defendants’ unlawful agreements, treble damages, attorneys fees, and interest, allowed under the law. 30. Plaintiffs bring this case as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) on behalf of a Class consisting of: All persons who were employed by AMAC, Inc., United States Beef Corporation, or Arby’s Franchisor, LLC, or any of the ten largest franchises of Arby’s in Colorado at any time from July 12, 2014 through the conclusion of this action (the “Class Period”).3 31. Plaintiffs believe there are more than 500 current and former employees in the Class. Given Defendants’ systemic failure to comply with United States and Colorado laws outlined in this case, the members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The Class is ascertainable from either Defendants’ employment or hiring records. 33. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have no conflict of interest with any member of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation with the resources and expertise necessary to litigate this case through to conclusion. 35. Class action treatment is superior to any alternative to ensure the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without duplication of effort and expense that numerous individuals would entail. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The Class Members are readily identifiable from Defendants’ employee rosters, payroll records or other company records. 36. Defendants’ actions are generally applicable to the entire Class. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class creates the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications of the issues presented herein, which, in turn, would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 41. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 42. Defendants, by and through their officers, directors, employees, agents or other representatives, have entered into an unlawful agreement, combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. Specifically, each Defendant agreed to restrict competition for Class Members’ services through non-solicitation agreements, all with the common purpose and effect of suppressing Class Members’ compensation and restraining competition in the market for Class Members’ services. 43. According to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), “…no-poaching agreements, among employers . . . are per se illegal under the antitrust laws.” DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidance for Human Resources Professionals, Oct. 2016, at p. 3. “It is unlawful for competitors to expressly or implicitly agree not to compete with one another, even if they are motivated by a desire to reduce costs.” Id. at p. 2. 44. Defendants’ conduct injured Class Members by lowering their compensation and depriving them of free and fair competition in the market for their services. 46. In similar actions for defendant restaurant franchisors’ violation of the Sherman Act, courts have denied defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-05627-RJB, Dkt. No. 33 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018); Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, No. 17 C 4857, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105260 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018). 47. Plaintiffs seek the relief set forth below, including underpaid and treble damages. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Colorado Revised Statutes Section 6-4-101, et seq., prohibits illegal restraint of trade or commerce. Specifically, C.R.S. § 6-4-104 states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is illegal.” 51. Defendants’ acts were unfair, unlawful, and/or unconscionable, both in their own right. 52. Defendants’ conduct injured Plaintiffs and other Class Members by lowering their compensation and depriving them of free and fair competition in the market for their services, allowing Defendants to unlawfully retain money that otherwise would have been paid to Plaintiffs and other Class Members. Plaintiffs and other Class Members are therefore persons who have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of the illegal restraint of trade or commerce under C.R.S. § 6-4-104. 53. The harm to Plaintiffs and members of the Class in being denied payment for their services in the amount of higher wages and salaries that they would have received in the absence of the conspiracy outweighs the utility, if any, of Defendants’ illegal non-solicitation agreements and, therefore, Defendants’ actions described herein constitute an illegal restraint of trade or commerce within the meaning of C.R.S. § 6-4-101, et seq. 54. Pursuant to C.R.S. § 6-4-114, any person who is injured by a per se violation of the Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992 may bring a civil action to recover actual damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. 55. Plaintiff seeks the relief set forth below. X. ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF TRADE OR COMMERCE [Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992, C.R.S. § 6-4-101, et seq.] VIOLATION OF SECTION ONE OF SHERMAN ACT [15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.] (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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17. Defendant manufactures, distributes, and sells a variety of sweet and tart flavored candies under the brand name, “SweeTARTS” (the “Products”). 18. The Products all contain artificial flavors but Defendant does not disclose this to consumers; they label and advertise the Products as if they were only naturally-flavored. 88. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated (the “Class”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 89. The Class is defined as follows: All California citizens who purchased the Products in California on or after January 1, 2012 until the date notice to the Class is disseminated in this action, excluding Defendant and Defendant’s officers, directors, employees, agents and affiliates, and the Court and its staff. 90. During the Class Period, the Products unlawfully contained the undisclosed artificial flavors d-malic acid or d-l malic acid and were otherwise improperly labeled as alleged herein. Defendant failed to label the Products as required by California law and the Class was damaged as described herein. 91. The proposed Class meets all criteria for a class action, including numerosity, typicality, superiority, and adequacy of representation. 92. The proposed Class satisfies numerosity. The Products are offered for sale at over a thousand supermarkets in California; the Class numbers at a minimum in the tens of hundreds or thousands. Individual joinder of the Class members in this action is impractical. Addressing the Class members’ claims through this class action will benefit Class members, the parties, and the courts. A. Defendant Does Not Disclose That the Products Contain Artificial Flavors. A. Defendant Does Not Disclose That the Products Contain Artificial Flavors. ............................................................................................... 3 B. Defendant’s Competitors Label Their Products Lawfully. .................. 9 C. Plaintiff’s Purchases of the Misbranded Products ............................... 9 V. VII. CAUSES OF ACTION ............................................................................... 15 FRAUD BY OMISSION ............................................................................ 15 NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION .................................................... 15

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31. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and other employees similarly situated as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The employees similarly situated are: Collective Class: All persons who are or have been employed by IRi as Client Service Managers including Client Solutions Managers, Client Service Consultants, Client Service Analysts, and other similar, non-management positions, within the United States at any time from three years prior to the filing of the initial Complaint through the final disposition of this case. 32. Upon information and belief, IRi suffered and permitted Plaintiff and the Collective Class to work more than 40 hours per week without appropriate overtime compensation. 33. IRi’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 34. Upon information and belief, IRi knew that Plaintiff and the Collective Class performed work that required overtime pay. IRi has operated under a scheme to deprive these employees of appropriate overtime compensation by failing to properly compensate them for all hours worked. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the California Class, alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of the preceding paragraphs. 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference in this cause of action each allegation of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 53. Plaintiff consents in writing to be party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s written consent form is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Plaintiff anticipates that other individuals will sign consent forms and join as plaintiffs. 61. Plaintiff incorporates by reference in this cause of action each allegation of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 62. By failing to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiff and similarly situated California Class Members as alleged above, IRi has violated California Labor Code § 510 and IWC Wage Orders, which require overtime compensation for non-exempt employees. 63. IRi’s failure to pay overtime was done willfully, in bad faith, and in knowing violation of the California Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders. 64. As a result of IRi’s unlawful acts; Plaintiff and similarly situated California Class Members have been deprived of overtime compensation in an amount to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, plus interest thereon, penalties and attorneys’ fees and costs, under California Labor Code § 1194 and California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference in this cause of action each allegation of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 85. Plaintiff incorporates by reference in this cause of action each allegation of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 86. While acting on the direct instruction of IRi and discharging their duties for it, Plaintiff and California Class Members have incurred work-related expenses. Such expenses include, but are not limited to, use of home internet for IRi purposes, printing and photocopying, cloud storage for IRi documents, car expenses for work-related travel, and expenses incurred while entertaining clients. Plaintiff and California Class Members incurred these substantial expenses and losses as a direct result of performing their job duties for IRi. 87. IRi has failed to properly indemnify Plaintiff and California Class Members for these expenditures and losses that they incurred in direct consequence of the discharge of their duties for IRi and/or in obedience of IRi’s direction without properly indemnifying for these losses, IRi has violated California Labor Code § 2802. 89. Plaintiff incorporates by reference in this cause of action each allegation of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 90. Section 17200 of the California Business & Professions Code – California’s Unfair Competition Law – prohibits unfair competition by prohibiting, inter alia, any unlawful or unfair business acts or practices. The foregoing conduct by IRi, as alleged, constitutes unlawful business actions and practices in violation of § 17200 et seq. 91. Pursuant to § 17200 et seq., Plaintiff and California Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief against IRi’s ongoing unlawful business practices. If an injunction does not issue enjoining IRi from engaging in the unlawful business practices described above, Plaintiff, California Class Members, and the general public will be irreparably injured. 92. Plaintiff and California Class Members have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. IRi, if not enjoined by this Court, will continue to engage in the unlawful business practices described above in violation of § 17200 et seq. in derogation of the rights of Plaintiff, of California Class Members, and of the general public. FAILURE TO PROVIDE AND/OR AUTHORIZE MEAL AND REST PERIODS (Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512; IWC Wage Orders) (ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS) FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCURATE ITEMIZED WAGE STATEMENTS (Cal. Labor Code § 226; IWC Wage Orders) (ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE CALIFORNIA ITEMIZED WAGE FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW (Cal. Labor Code §§ 510, 1194; IWC Wage Orders) (ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS) FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME UNDER THE FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 207) (ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE COLLECTIVE CLASS) FAILURE TO PAY WAGES DUE UPON DISCHARGE AND WAITING TIME PENALTIES (Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-204) FAILURE TO PROVIDE REIMBURSEMENT OF BUSINESS EXPENSES (Cal. Labor Code § 2802) ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS VIOLATIONS OF THE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.) (ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND THE CALIFORNIA CLASS)

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11. The FCRA is intended “to protect consumers from the transmission of inaccurate information about them, and to establish credit reporting practices that utilize accurate, relevant, and current information in a confidential and responsible manner.” Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 706 (3d Cir. 2010). 12. The FCRA requires that consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 13. The maximum possible accuracy standard “requires more than merely allowing for the possibility of accuracy,” meaning that CRAs do not meet that standard by suggesting that certain consumers are “possible” matches for individuals on the OFAC List. Ramirez v. Trans Union, LLC, No.12-cv-00632-JSC, 2017 WL 1133161, *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017) (quoting Cortez, 617 F.3d at 709) (emphasis added). 14. In 2010 in Cortez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that OFAC information is subject to the maximum possible accuracy standard, and that a CRA acted “reprehensibly” and was in willful violation of FCRA section 1681e(b) by using only first and last names to associate consumers with criminals on the OFAC List. 617 F.3d at 707-08, 723. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) 15. Later, a court in the Northern District of California certified the FCRA section 1681e(b) claims of a class of 8,192 individuals who a CRA inaccurately associated with the OFAC List. Ramirez, 301 F.R.D. at 413. A jury found that the CRA’s matching procedures willfully violated the FCRA. Ramirez v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 3:12-cv-632-JSC, 2017 WL 5153280, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2017) (upholding jury’s verdict). 17. Defendant is a CRA within the meaning of FCRA section 1681a(f), in that, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, it regularly engages in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, while using means of interstate commerce, specifically the U.S. mail and internet, for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 18. Defendant regularly compiles information bearing on consumers’ creditworthiness, including credit tradelines and public records, and includes this information on reports for the purposes of evaluating consumers’ eligibility for credit. 19. MicroBilt is well aware of the implications of noncompliance with federal regulations pertaining to doing business with individuals on the OFAC List and markets itself as a reliable way for businesses to “find out fast” whether their customers are “on the OFAC watchlist.”3 20. MicroBilt fails to follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the OFAC information it sells about consumers, regularly selling reports to prospective creditors that inaccurately label innocent consumers as criminals on the OFAC List. 21. MicroBilt’s practices for including references to OFAC information on the consumer reports it sells are uniform and not unique to each consumer or transaction. 23. Defendant does this because it wants to provide some OFAC-related information to its customers (accurate or not), to maximize its profits and advertise that its products “work.” 24. Defendant thus intentionally employs procedures that maximize the likelihood of a match between data on the OFAC List and consumers, thereby compromising accuracy. 25. Defendant’s treatment of OFAC information is not accidental, but instead a result of deliberately designed policies and procedures. 26. At all relevant times, Defendant’s conduct, as well as that of its agents, servants, and/or employees who were acting within the course and scope of their agency or employment and under the direct supervision and control of Defendant, was intentional, willful, reckless, and in grossly negligent disregard for the rights of consumers, including Plaintiff. D. The Experience Of Plaintiff Maria Hernandez 27. On or about November 9, 2020, Plaintiff applied for a loan through Oasis1 Marketing, and provided her full name, date of birth, address, and social security number on the application. 28. Oasis1 Marketing requested a consumer report about Plaintiff from MicroBilt in connection with her application and provided Plaintiff’s full personal identifying information to MicroBilt. 29. On November 9, 2020, MicroBilt prepared and sold to Oasis1 Marketing a consumer report about Plaintiff. 30. MicroBilt included on the first page of the report, in red typeface, “Matches found” for the “OFAC WatchList.” 31. MicroBilt did not include on the report any additional information about the allegedly matching OFAC record(s). 33. Plaintiff’s year of birth is 1989. Other than sharing the same common first and last names, she does not share any other identifying information with the individuals listed on the OFAC List. 34. Plaintiff is not on the OFAC List or any other government watch list. 35. Despite having been provided with Plaintiff’s full name, address, social security number and date of birth, MicroBilt used a loose name matching procedure to determine whether to include OFAC information on the consumer report, and disregarded available date of birth information that disqualified any match. 36. Plaintiff’s loan application was denied based upon the OFAC information on the MicroBilt report. A representative of Oasis1 Marketing wrote to Plaintiff as follows: “Unfortunately, your Line of Credit request has been denied because the Instant Bank Verification process that you completed has come back with a flag that you are on the Federal Government OFAC Watch List. For more information, you can contact MicroBilt, the company that supports the Instant Bank Verification process. Their customer service phone number is 800-884-4747.” 37. As a result of MicroBilt’s inaccurate reporting of the OFAC information, Plaintiff was denied credit and sustained other damages including harm to reputation and emotional distress. V. 39. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the definition of the Class based on discovery or legal developments. 40. Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all is impractical. Upon information and belief, the number of consumers harmed by Defendant’s practices are more numerous than what could be addressed by joinder, and those persons’ names and addresses are identifiable through documents or other information maintained by Defendant. 41. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over the questions affecting only individuals. The common legal and factual questions include, among others, whether MicroBilt maintains reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the OFAC information on its consumer reports. 42. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of each Class member. Plaintiff has the same claims for relief that she seeks for absent Class members. 43. Adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because her interests are aligned with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Class she seeks to represent, she has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and she intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of members of the Class. 45. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length here. 46. Pursuant to sections 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA, Defendant is liable for negligently and willfully failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the consumer reports it sold, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 6. The United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) “administers and enforces economic trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals against threats to national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.” Ramirez v. Trans Union, LLC, 301 F.R.D. 408, 413 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citation omitted).1 7. OFAC directs those sanctions at, among others, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and persons involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and publishes a list of those “Specially Designated Nationals” (“SDNs”) and “Blocked Persons” on its website (the “OFAC List”).2 8. Persons on the OFAC List are legally ineligible for credit in the United States, may not be employed, and may even be subject to deportation or criminal prosecution. 9. The full OFAC List as maintained by the Treasury Department is publicly available information, and whether a person is on the OFAC List is a matter of public record. A. The United States Treasury Department’s Office Of Foreign Assets Control And Its List Of Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons

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(Violation of NCWHA – Class Action) (Violation of FLSA – Collective Action) 12. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been employers within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 13. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been a joint employer under the FLSA. 15. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of Section 3(s)(1) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1), in that the enterprise has had employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person and in that the enterprise has had and has an annual gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately stated). 16. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff has been an employee within the meaning of Section 3(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). 17. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff was an individual employee who was engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as required by 29 U.S.C. § 207. 18. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been employers within the meaning of Section 95-25.2(5) of the NCWHA, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.2(5). 19. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been joint employers under the NCWHA. 20. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff was an employee within the meaning of Section 95-25.2(4) of the NCWHA, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.2(4). 22. Manigo and the similarly situated individuals provided services essential to the fundamental business purpose of Defendants, i.e., cable television services including installation, maintenance, upgrade and repair. No prior experience was required for Manigo and the similarly situated individuals to perform work for the Defendants. Instead, Defendants provided Manigo and other similarly situated individuals with on-the-job training at the start and during their employment. 23. As installation technicians, Manigo and the similarly situated individuals had no control over the manner and method by which they were paid. Manigo and the similarly situated individuals were paid on a “piece-rate” basis, receiving a specified amount of money for each job they performed. Although they regularly worked in excess of forty hours per week, Manigo and the similarly situated individuals received no overtime pay from Defendants. 24. As installation technicians, Manigo and the similarly situated individuals worked solely for Defendants on a full-time and continuing basis. Manigo and the similarly situated individuals did not advertise their services to the general public, or work as installation technicians for anyone other than Defendants. 25. Although Manigo and the similarly situated individuals were classified by Defendants as “independent contractors,” they were, in fact, Defendants’ employees under the FLSA and other relevant laws and regulations. As a result of this knowing and willful misclassification, Manigo and the similarly situated individuals were denied overtime pay. 27. Defendants’ installation technicians routinely work 6 days per week and approximately 50 to 70 hours weekly. 29. Defendants employ installation technicians in North Carolina and South Carolina. 30. Manigo is similarly situated to other current and former installation technicians in that they share similar titles, job duties, and compensation schemes, including the uniform policy and practice of failing to pay overtime wages. 31. Application of the aforementioned policy and practice was not dependent on the personal circumstances of individual installation technicians, but rather affected Plaintiff and all putative collective action class members. Application of this policy or practice does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Plaintiff or those joining this lawsuit. Rather, the same policy or practice that resulted in the failure to pay overtime at the rates required by the FLSA applied to Plaintiff and all putative collective action class members. Accordingly, the class is properly defined as: All current and former North Carolina and South Carolina installation technicians employed by Defendants within three years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 32. Defendants willfully violated the provisions of the FLSA by failing to pay installation technicians in compliance with the FLSA. 33. Plaintiff brings Count II of his Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and the following class: All current and former North Carolina installation technicians employed by Defendants within two years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 35. This action under NCWHA, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8, is maintainable as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 for unlawful payroll deductions from the paychecks of Plaintiff and members of the proposed class. 36. The proposed class is easily ascertainable. The number and identity of NCWHA class members are determinable from Defendants’ payroll records or records over which they have control. 37. The proposed class is so numerous that the joinder of all such persons is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. While the exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, upon information and belief, the class is comprised of in excess of 50 individuals. 38. There is a well-defined commonality of interest in the questions of law and fact involving and affecting the proposed class in that Plaintiff and all members of the proposed class have been harmed by Defendants’ failure to pay earned wages and unlawful wage deductions. The common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendants refused to timely pay Plaintiff and members of the proposed class promised and earned regular and overtime wages for all hours worked on their regular pay day in violation of NCWHA §§ 95-25.6 and 7; and (b) whether Defendants made unlawful deductions from the compensation earned by Plaintiff and members of the proposed class in violation of NCWHA § 95-25.8. 39. The damages suffered by the named Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class arise from the same nucleus of operative facts. 41. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of all members of the class, and there are no known conflicts of interest between Plaintiff and members of the proposed class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is experienced and competent in both wage and hour and multi-plaintiff litigation. 42. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Individual joinder of all class members is impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because the loss, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual class members are modest, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual class members to redress the wrongs done to them. 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-43 of his Complaint. 45. Count I arises from Defendants’ violation of the FLSA, for its failure to pay overtime wages earned by Plaintiff and members of the proposed collective class. 46. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff and members of the proposed collective class an overtime premium rate of pay as required by the FLSA for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 47. Defendant’s violation of the FLSA was willful. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 47 of his Complaint. 50. Defendants violated N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-25.6 and 7 by failing to pay Plaintiff and similarly situated employees all promised and earned wage payments on the employees’ regular payday for all hours worked. 51. Defendants violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.8 by making unlawful deductions from the wages earned by Plaintiff and similarly situated employees. 52. Defendants’ violation of the NCWHA was willful.

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17. The business of Defendants and their affiliates consists of manufacturing, delivering, and selling breads and baked goods to grocery stores and other outlets across the United States under the brand names Sara Lee, Nature’s Harvest, and others. 19. Defendants and their affiliates operate out of several terminals in New York, including warehouses in Watertown and Canton, New York. 20. Defendants and their affiliates have employed several hundred individuals in New York since April 10, 2014 to deliver baked goods products in New York. 21. Plaintiffs and other individuals who perform this work are designated as independent contractors, as opposed to employees of Defendants. They are referred to by Defendants as Distributors (“Distributors”). 22. Bimbo asserts on its website that it is the “[o]nly commercial bakery manufacturer to serve all 50 states,” and that it is “a leader in the baking industry, known for its category leading brands, innovative products, freshness and quality,” and that it “operates more than 60 bakeries, employs more than 22,000 associates and distributes products through 11,000 sales routes throughout the United States.” 23. Plaintiffs and other Distributors deliver Defendants’ baked goods and other Bimbo products to retailers and other customers, thereby providing an integral service to the baked goods business of Bimbo and its affiliates and performing their work within Defendants’ usual course of business. 25. The duties of Plaintiffs and other Distributors entail operating commercial motor vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,001 pounds within New York to transport commercial goods. At times, Plaintiffs also operate vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds for more than a de minimis period of time because, for example, Plaintiffs and others often visit stores in their personal vehicles to drop off small orders of products and to arrange displays. 26. Defendants compensate Plaintiffs and other Distributors for delivering Defendants’ products, based on a formula that is unilaterally determined by Defendants and takes into account the number and types of products that are delivered and sold. 27. Defendants treat Distributors as independent contractors, claiming that they are not entitled to the protections of the New York Labor Laws. 28. In addition, the use by Defendants of Distributors allows Defendants to reduce their normal business expenses, and to reduce the burdens on their employees, and to shift those burdens to Distributors without additional compensation and by deducting amounts from the Distributors pay. 29. In order to work for Defendants, Plaintiffs and other Distributors were required to pay a substantial sum of money to purchase purported “Distribution Rights” and then enter into a “Distributor Agreement” with Defendants. Most Distributors finance these purchases through loans facilitated by Defendants. 30. The terms and conditions of each Distributor’s Distributor Agreement are the same in all material respects. 48. Plaintiffs bring this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all individuals who, either individually or through a corporate entity, personally deliver or have delivered Defendants’ products in New York pursuant to a Distributor Agreement since April 10, 2014. 49. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all of them is impracticable, and treatment of a class action is the superior method to adjudicate the class members’ claims. Upon information and belief, there are approximately fifty members of the putative class. 50. There are issues of law and fact common to all class members because Defendants have misclassified them as independent contractors rather than as employees and have unlawfully deprived them of the wage treatment and benefits accorded employees. These questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 51. The named plaintiffs and class counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. 53. Plaintiffs and other putative class members are Defendants’ employees, as defined by N.Y. Lab. Law § 862 (the New York State Commercial Goods Transportation Industry Fair Play Act). 54. Defendants routinely diverted, withheld, and deducted amounts from the wages of Plaintiffs and other Distributors. 55. These deductions constituted a violation of N.Y. Lab. Law § 193. 56. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if restated herein verbatim. 57. Plaintiffs and other putative class members are Defendants’ employees, as defined by N.Y. Lab. Law § 862 (the New York State Commercial Goods Transportation Industry Fair Play Act). 59. Defendants failed to supply Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class with an accurate statement of wages as required by N.Y. Lab. Law § 195, containing the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof; whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. 60. Plaintiff and other similarly situated drivers are entitled to damages of $50 for each workweek that Defendants failed to provide a wage notice, or a total of $2,500 per class member, and damages of $100 for each workweek that Defendants failed to provide accurate wage statements, or a total of 2,500 per class member, as provided for by N.Y. Lab. Law § 198, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief. 61. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation above as if restated herein verbatim. 62. Plaintiffs and other putative class members are Defendants’ employees, as defined by N.Y. Lab. Law § 862 (the New York State Commercial Goods Transportation Industry Fair Play Act). 63. Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed Rule 23 class routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek for Defendants. N.Y LABOR LAW § 193 - UNLAWFUL WITHHOLDING AND DEDUCTIONS FROM WAGES (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS ACTION) N.Y. LABOR LAW § 650, et seq. – FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS ACTION) N.Y. LABOR LAW § 195 - NOTICE AND RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENT VIOLATION (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS ACTION)

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22. Bitcoin was the world’s first decentralized cryptocurrency. It is also the largest and most popular cryptocurrency, with a market capitalization of approximately $126 billion. Bitcoin spawned a market of other cryptocurrencies that, together with Bitcoin, have a current market capitalization of approximately $192 billion. (The term “bitcoin” can refer to both a computer protocol and a unit of exchange. Accepted practice is to use the term “Bitcoin” to label the protocol and software, and the term “bitcoin” to label the units of exchange.) 23. At its core, Bitcoin is a ledger that tracks the ownership and transfer of every bitcoin in existence. This ledger is called the blockchain. 24. Blockchains act as the central technical commonality across most cryptocurrencies. While each blockchain may be subject to different technical rules and permissions based on the preferences of its creators, they are typically designed to achieve the similar goal of decentralization. 25. Accordingly, blockchains are generally designed as a framework of incentives that encourages some people to do the work of validating transactions while allowing others to take advantage of the network. In order to ensure successful validation, those completing the validation are also required to solve a “Proof of Work” problem by expending computational resources, which has the effect of making the blockchain more accurate and secure. For Bitcoin, those who validate the blockchain transactions and solve the “Proof of Work” program are rewarded with newly minted bitcoin. This process is colloquially referred to as “mining.” 27. In April 2013, there were only seven cryptocurrencies listed on coinmartketcap.com, a popular website that tracks the cryptocurrency markets. As of this filing, the site monitors more than 2,000 cryptocurrencies. 28. For a time, Bitcoin was the only cryptocurrency available on exchanges. As cryptocurrencies grew in popularity, exchanges began listing other cryptocurrencies as well, and trading volumes expanded. In early 2013, daily Bitcoin trading volumes hovered between $1 million and $25 million. By the end of 2017, daily Bitcoin trading volumes ranged between $200 million and $3.8 billion. B. Ethereum 29. Ethereum is the second-most popular cryptocurrency, with a market capitalization of approximately $16 billion. The Ethereum blockchain functions similarly to the Bitcoin blockchain insofar as its miners act as the validators of the network. Miners of the Ethereum blockchain are paid for their services in the form of newly minted ether. (The term “Ethereum” refers to the open software platform built on top of the Ethereum blockchain, while the term “ether” is the unit of account used to exchange value within the Ethereum “ecosystem,” i.e., the overall network of individuals using Ethereum or participating in the development of its network.) 30. Unlike Bitcoin’s blockchain, Ethereum was designed to enable “smart contract” functionality. A smart contract is a program that verifies and enforces the negotiation or performance of a contract. Smart contracts can be self-executing and self-enforcing, which theoretically reduces the transaction costs associated with traditional contracting. 32. A smart contract enables these two people to submit the ether to a secure destination and automatically distribute the ether at the end of the month without any third-party action. The smart contract self-executes with instructions written in its code which get executed when the specified conditions are met. 33. In order to enable widespread adoption and standardized protocols for smart contracts, the Ethereum community has created certain out-of-the box smart contracts called Ethereum Request for Comments (“ERCs”). 34. An ERC is an application standard for a smart contract. Anyone can create an ERC and then seek support for that standard. Once an ERC is accepted by the Ethereum community, it benefits Ethereum users because it provides for uniform transactions, reduced risk, and efficient processes. The most widespread use of ERCs is to allow individuals to easily launch and create new digital tokens. C. ERC-20 Tokens 35. ERC-20 is a standardized application standard that the creator of Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin, first proposed in 2015. ERC-20 is a standard that allows for the creation of smart-contract tokens on the Ethereum blockchain, known as “ERC-20 tokens.” 36. ERC-20 tokens are built on the Ethereum blockchain, and therefore they must be exchanged on it. Accordingly, ERC-20 tokens are functionally different than cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum because they do not operate on an independent blockchain. 38. ERC-20 tokens are simple and easy to deploy. Anyone with a basic understanding of Ethereum can use the ERC-20 protocol to create her own ERC-20 tokens, which she can then distribute and make available for purchase. Even people without any technical expertise can have their own ERC-20 token created for them, which can then be marketed to investors. D. The Advent Of The “ICO” 39. Between 2014 and 2016, Bitcoin’s price fluctuated between $200 and $800. During this same time frame, ether’s price fluctuated between roughly $1 and $10. 40. By the end of 2016, interest in cryptocurrencies began to accelerate, with prices growing at a rate historically unprecedented for any asset class. Over the course of 2017 alone, bitcoin’s price increased from approximately $1,000 to approximately $20,000. Ethereum’s growth was even more startling. On January 1, 2017, Ethereum was trading at approximately $8 per ether. Approximately one year later, it was trading at over $1,400 per ether—a return of approximately 17,000 percent over that period. 42. In the case of SNT, the initial offering occurred over an approximately twenty-four-hour period, with 100 percent of the available supply of SNT tokens sold, raising approximately $100 million. 43. Investors would explore the various cryptocurrency exchanges and social media sites that published active and upcoming ICOs. Many of these postings encouraged trading in SNT for profit. As one poster explained: “On paper, [SNT] has some substance that most other ICOs lack . . . Potential short-term ROI is appealing, but it’s something that I might consider [holding] long-term.” 44. Over 2017 and 2018, nearly $20 billion was raised through ICOs, none of which was registered with the SEC. Of the approximately 800 ICOs launched between 2017 and 2018, the vast majority were issued using the ERC-20 protocol. 45. Like most ICOs, ERC-20 ICOs were typically announced and promoted through public online channels. Issuers, including Status, typically released a “whitepaper” describing the project and terms of the ICO. These whitepapers advertised the sale of tokens or coins through the ICO. They typically advertised the creation of a “new blockchain architecture.” 46. The whitepapers typically contained vastly less information than a registration statement filed with the SEC would have included. For example, whitepapers often did not include a “plain English” description of the offering; a list of key risk factors; a description of important information and incentives concerning management; warnings about relying on forward-looking statements; or a standardized format that investors could readily follow. 48. These tokens were frequently listed on cryptocurrency exchanges, where they were bought and sold using other cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin or Ethereum) or traditional currencies such as the U.S. dollar. E. Status Solicited And Sold The SNT Token Through Both An ICO And Through Subsequent Sales On Cryptocurrency Exchanges 49. In June 2017, Status published a whitepaper for “The Status Network.” Casting the Status platform as “a window into the emerging decentralized web,” the whitepaper described the platform as an “ecosystem of decentralized applications” that would “become[] a gateway to undeniable free trade, peer-to-peer payments, and encrypted p2p communication for anyone with a smartphone and internet access.” The whitepaper asserted that, through SNT, Status would “allow[] the behavior of the network and its software[] to become aligned with the interests of its Users,” enabling users “to steer the direction of development and influence how the network evolves over time.” 50. SNT was launched through use of the ERC-20 protocol. At launch, approximately 3 billion tokens were made available for purchase through use of the ERC-20 protocol. 52. The remaining 41 percent of the tokens were sold during SNT’s ICO, which Status organized and ran. Over its twenty-four-hour ICO, from June 20 to June 21, 2017, Status raised approximately $100 million in proceeds. 53. The Status ICO was promoted on unregistered cryptocurrency exchanges: 54. Status promoted and advertised SNT tokens in the United States. For example, Status was represented at the 2019 Blockchain Week New York conference, which held numerous events in this district. And on February 18, 2020, for example, Status hosted a product “Launch Party” in New York City that, on information and belief, was attended by residents of this district. F. Investors Would Not Reasonably Have Understood Prior To April 3, 2019, At The Earliest, That SNT Was A Security 56. The Status whitepaper assured potential investors that it “fit within regulatory parameters in any new market we enter,” yet failed to register its offering of SNT with the SEC, thus further confirming to investors that SNT was not a security. 57. Misleadingly, Status also promoted itself as being similar to Bitcoin, which is not a security nor required to be registered with the SEC. The Status whitepaper asserted, for example, that SNT was “[i]nspired by one of Satoshi Nakamoto’s original suggested use cases for Bitcoin”; “organized around smart contracts running on Ethereum”; “the first ever mobile Ethereum client,” which “connects directly to the Ethereum network”; and that “Status and Ethereum provide the foundation necessary to give all stakeholders in a socioeconomic network equal footing.” 58. At the time of the SNT ICO, Status took advantage of the market’s lack of understanding and awareness concerning how cryptocurrencies worked. In the face of suggestions that SNT would be similar to Bitcoin, and considering the new technology at issue and Status’s other statements, many investors were understandably unaware that SNT tokens had fundamentally different features than other cryptocurrencies, which the SEC has determined are not securities. Prior to April 3, 2019, when the SEC released its Framework, it was therefore unclear to a reasonable investor that SNT was a security. 60. Other thought leaders in the space, such as the lawfully registered broker-dealer Coinbase, opined in late 2016 that “we have considered the question of whether issuance of a Blockchain Token prior to the existence of a system would constitute a security. We have not found conclusive law on the subject, but believe that the better view is that a non-security Blockchain Token does not become a security merely because the system as to which it has rights has not yet been created or completed.” 61. In sum, before the SEC issued its Framework on April 3, 2019, a reasonable investor would not have concluded that ERC-20 tokens like the SNT token were generally securities subject to the securities laws. On the contrary, they were confronted with representations both from token issuers and from cryptocurrency discussions that would have led reasonable investors to conclude they were not investing in securities. And the Status whitepaper said nothing about the issue whatsoever. G. The SNT Tokens Are Securities 62. SNT tokens are securities because they constituted an investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others. At issuance, as described above, it was not clear that the SNT tokens were securities as defined under federal and state securities laws. Status acted as if the SNT tokens were not securities, for example, by not ensuring that a registration statement was filed with the SEC, which would have provided important disclosures to investors of the risks inherent in these investments, including their speculative nature. 64. By contrast, Status issued a substantial portion of the total stock of SNT tokens at issuance, at very little economic cost to Status’s founders. The creation of SNT tokens thus occurred through a centralized process, in contrast to Bitcoin and Ethereum. This would not have been apparent at issuance, however, to a reasonable investor. Rather, it was only after the passage of time and disclosure of additional information about the issuer’s intent, process of management, and success in allowing decentralization to arise that a reasonable purchaser could know that he or she had acquired a security. Purchasers were thereby misled into believing that SNT was something other than a security, when it was a security. 65. Within the last year, however, the SEC has clarified, pursuant to its statutorily delegated authority, and with the benefit of labor-intensive research and investigations, that many ERC-20 tokens, including SNT, are securities. On April 3, 2019, as noted, the SEC published a “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets,” in which it “provided a framework for analyzing whether a digital asset is an investment contract and whether offers and sales of a digital asset are securities transactions.” Among the most significant statements therein is the SEC’s description of how to analyze the various facts surrounding ICOs in determining whether a given digital asset, like SNT, is a security. Under application of the Framework, the SNT tokens were securities at issuance. 67. Investors in SNT tokens made an investment of money or other valuable consideration for purposes of Howey. The SEC Framework states: “The first prong of the Howey test is typically satisfied in an offer and sale of a digital asset because the digital asset is purchased or otherwise acquired in exchange for value, whether in the form of traditional (or fiat) currency, another digital asset, or other type of consideration.” 69. The SEC Framework states: “In evaluating digital assets, we have found that a ‘common enterprise’ typically exists.” This is “because the fortunes of digital asset purchasers have been linked to each other or to the success of the promoter’s efforts.” 70. The SNT tokens are no different. Investors were passive participants in the SNT token ICO and the profits of each investor were intertwined with those of both Status and of other investors. Status was responsible for supporting SNT, pooled investors’ assets, and controlled those assets. Status also retained a significant stake in SNT, thus sharing in the profits and risk of the venture. 71. To this effect, Status asserted that its governance structure “empower[ed] stakeholders in the Status Network” by giving them rights akin to holders of voting stock in a corporation. The whitepaper asserted that “[a] core part of the Status Network Token is giving stakeholders the ability to choose the direction that the software is developed. The token is used to make decisions on proposals, which can be made by any Stakeholder. . . . The amount of tokens you hold at that time becomes your voting power for that decision.” Accordingly, investors in SNT participated in a common enterprise by purchasing the token. c. SNT Token Investors Purchased The Tokens With A Reasonable Expectation Of Profit From Owning Them 72. As to “reasonable expectation of profits,” the SEC Framework states: “A purchaser may expect to realize a return through participating in distributions or through other methods of realizing appreciation on the asset, such as selling at a gain in a secondary market.” 75. The SEC Framework clarifies that investors purchased the SNT tokens with a reasonable expectation of profits. 77. The SEC Framework provides that the “inquiry into whether a purchaser is relying on the efforts of others focuses on two key issues: Does the purchaser reasonably expect to rely on the efforts of an [Active Participant]? Are those efforts ‘the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise,’ as opposed to efforts that are more ministerial in nature?” 80. Purchasers of pre-functional tokens, such as SNT, necessarily rely on the managerial efforts of others to realize value from their investments. The success of these managerial efforts in developing the networks on which these tokens will operate is the primary factor in their price, that is, until such tokens transition into being functional utility tokens. The SNT token was a security at issuance because profits from SNT would be derived primarily from the managerial efforts of Status in developing the associated network on which SNT would function, rather than having its profit derived from market forces of supply and demand, such as might affect the price of a commodity such as gold (or Bitcoin). 81. This dependency, however, on the managerial efforts of Status was not apparent at issuance to a reasonable investor. Considering the limited available information about how SNT was designed and intended to operate, if such an investor were even able to interpret the relevant law at the time, a reasonable investor lacked sufficient bases to conclude whether SNT was a security until the platform at issue, and its relevant “ecosystem,” had been given time to develop. In the interim, the investor lacked the facts necessary to conclude—let alone formally allege in court—that the token she had acquired were securities. It was only after the passage of some significant amount of time, and only with more information about Status’s intent, process of management, and lack of success in allowing decentralization to arise, that an investor could reasonably determine that a token that was advertised as something other than a security was a security all along. 83. Indeed, both Hope’s and Bennett’s biographies were featured in the Status whitepaper and were held out to be integral parts of the success of SNT. The whitepaper emphasized that “Carl and Jarrad, the co-founders of Status, have had a working relationship for 6 years on various projects, and 3 of those years were spent operating a software distribution network, driving over 20 million installs to various software offerings, the profits of which were used to fund Status and our team of 10 until this point. During the operation of this business we were uniquely positioned to see firsthand how personal data on the internet is bought and sold and how users are acquired and retained.” 84. Under this Framework, however complex the resolution of the issue would strike a reasonable investor, SNT satisfies most if not all of the factors the SEC described as relevant to its determination that a digital asset is a security. Status created SNT tokens from thin air. Status represented that it would develop an ecosystem (i.e., the overall network of individuals using SNT or participating in the development of its network) that would increase the value of SNT tokens. Plaintiff and the Class reasonably expected Status to provide significant managerial efforts, to develop and improve the SNT ecosystem, to develop and sustain a supportive network, and to secure listings at exchanges through which SNT tokens could be traded or liquidated. And Status represented that it would provide significant managerial efforts to achieve these objectives and make the issued ERC-20 token a success. H. The SEC Has Concluded That Tokens Such As SNT Are Securities 86. In arriving at its determination that the EOS token is a security, the SEC reached the following conclusions:  “Companies that offer or sell securities to US investors must comply with the securities laws, irrespective of the industry they operate in or the labels they place on the investment products they offer.”  “Block.one did not provide ICO investors the information they were entitled to as participants in a securities offering.”  “[EOS] Tokens were securities under the federal securities laws”  “A purchaser in the offering of [EOS] Tokens would have had a reasonable expectation of obtaining a future profit based upon Block.one’s efforts, including its development of the EOSIO software and its promotion of the adoption and success of EOSIO and the launch of the anticipated EOSIO blockchains.”  “Block.one violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act by offering and selling these securities without having a registration statement filed or in effect with the Commission or qualifying for an exemption from registration.” As a result of the SEC’s enforcement action, Block.one consented to a settlement whereby it would pay $24 million to the SEC. The SEC’s recent conclusion—that EOS is a security—applies with equal force to SNT. I. The Class Has Suffered Significant Damages From Defendants’ Actions 88. Hope has admitted that Status has “collectively failed to deliver the SNT use-cases [it] promised” in the whitepaper, and that Status had not reached the point where “people can actually use SNT.” News reports have observed that although Status, at the time, had “98 employees in 24 countries who earn an average salary of $108,000 . . . [t]he Status token has almost no functioning purpose.” To the extent Plaintiff and the Class still hold any SNT tokens, they hereby demand rescission and make any necessary tender of the SNT tokens. V. 89. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and seek certification of the following Class: all persons who purchased SNT tokens which were first sold on or about June 26, 2017. The Class Period is thus June 26, 2017 through the present. 90. The Class excludes individuals subject to any enforceable arbitration clause contained in any of the purchase agreements executed in connection with the SNT ICO. The Class includes all other individuals who purchased SNT tokens, including those individuals who purchased SNT tokens in sales made through online cryptocurrency exchanges. 91. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their officers and directors, and members of their immediate families or their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 92. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if investigation or discovery indicate that the definition should be narrowed, expanded, or otherwise modified. 93. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, but it is believed to be in the tens of thousands. 95. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members as all Class members are similarly affected by Defendants’ respective wrongful conduct in violation of the laws complained of herein. Plaintiff does not have any interest that is in conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. 96. Plaintiff and members of the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ common course of unlawful conduct based upon the loss in market value of the SNT tokens. 97. Plaintiff has fairly and adequately protected, and will continue to fairly and adequately protect, the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class. 99. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by some of the individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. 100. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. A. The First Cryptocurrency: Bitcoin

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17. Unfortunately for consumers, Defendant utilized (and continues to utilize) a sophisticated telephone dialing system to send text messages to individuals en masse promoting its services. On information and belief, Defendant obtained these telephone numbers (i.e., leads) by purchasing marketing lists containing consumers’ telephone numbers. 27. Plaintiff restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 28. Defendant sent unsolicited and unauthorized text messages using an ATDS to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones for the purpose of marketing products and/or services to Plaintiff and the Class. 29. Plaintiff sent the text messages without obtaining prior express written consent from Plaintiff and the Class. 30. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 31. Defendant’s conduct invaded Plaintiff’s privacy. 32. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 33. Because Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiff and the Class did not consent to the receipt of the aforementioned telephone solicitations, and Defendant knowingly and intentionally made the telephone solicitations to Plaintiff, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the Class. 34. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 51. Plaintiff restates, re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 27 as though fully set forth herein. 52. On or about December 27, 2019, Plaintiff received a text messages (“Text”) on her cellular telephone stating “The Care Team at MultiCare Health System values your feedback. Please take a short survey. https://pgsms.co/h6v6x3y3hf3n5k5g.” A true and correct copy of the screen shot of the Text is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 53. Plaintiff is informed and believes, upon such information and belief avers, that Defendant sent text messages to consumers en masse. 54. The texts are advertisements of Defendant’s services containing automated content. COUNT I VIOLATONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 FOR THE USE OF AN ATDS UNSOLICITED TEXT MESSAGES

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21. Defendant North Homes Realty is a Washington corporation with its principal place of business at 1133 164th Street SW, Suites 102, 105 and 109, Lynnwood, Washington. 22. North Homes Realty is a Century 21 real estate office that provides services to clients who are buying or selling real estate. See https://www.century21.com/real-estate- office/profile/century-21-north-homes-realty-10016203 (last visited June 8, 2021). 23. North Homes Realty has 46 real estate agents, including Defendant Robert Dowell. Id. 24. Mr. Dowell is a Real Estate Broker/Realtor at North Homes Realty in Washington and has held that position since June 2012. See, e.g., https://www.linkedin.com/in/robdowell/ (last visited June 8, 2021). 25. Mr. Dowell can be contacted at a Century 21 email address: Robert.dowell@century21.com. Id. 26. Mr. Dowell’s website, myfavoritenwbroker.com, directs to his North Homes Realty branded webpage, which features his photo, contact information, listings, and recent sales. See https://www.snohomishrealtygroup.com/ (last visited June 8, 2021). 27. Mr. Dowell’s business page on Facebook states: “Put Robert's Energy & the Marketing Power of Century 21 North Homes Brokerage to work for you… I'll help you make your real estate goals a reality with my skills and the Marketing Power of Century 21 North Homes.” See https://www.facebook.com/RealtorRobSeattle/about/?ref=page_internal (last visited June 8, 2021). B. Factual Allegations Regarding Plaintiff 28. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by A. Factual Allegations Regarding Defendants Telephone Consumer Protection Act Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant operates 212 DENTAL CARE offices as well as the 212 DENTAL CARE website, offers it to the public and it offers features that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that Defendant offers regarding its offices. 22. Defendant operates 212 DENTAL CARE offices in New York. At least one of these offices is located in New York City, including its office located at 286 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10017. 23. These offices constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s offices provide to the public important services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of services including office locations and hours, information about dental services and other services available online and in Offices, special pricing offers, privacy policies, promotional information, and other services. 25. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s offices. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s offices and the numerous facilities, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired clients and prospective clients such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical office locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical offices on its Website and other important information about the offices locations and hours, information about dental services and other services available online and in Offices, special pricing offers, privacy policies, promotional information, and other services. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and learn about Defendant’s operations as sighted individuals do. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s office locations and hours, information about dental services and other services available online and in Offices, special pricing offers, privacy policies, promotional information, and other services. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired clients and prospective clients. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of facilities and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s offices are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s offices. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokesher right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 80. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 82. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 86. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 97. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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10. Handy offers customers the ability to request and schedule a cleaner on a mobile phone application or through its website. 12. Cleaners are paid hourly for the time they are scheduled to spend cleaning. Their hourly wage may be raised or lowered depending on their performance. Cleaners are not compensated for additional time they may spend cleaning beyond the scheduled period of a given job or for time spent traveling between jobs. 13. Although classified as independent contractors, Handy cleaners are employees. They are required to follow detailed requirements imposed on them by Handy, and they are graded, and are subject to termination, based on Handy’ discretion and/or their failure to adhere to these requirements (such as rules regarding how they must perform the cleaning work, when they are permitted to cancel a job, how long they must spend at a given job, etc.) 14. In addition, Handy is in the business of providing cleaning service to customers, and that is the service that Handy cleaners provide. The cleaners’ services are fully integrated into Handy’s business, and without the cleaners, Handy’s business would not exist. 15. However, based on their misclassification as independent contractors, Handy cleaners are required to bear many of the expenses of their employment, including expenses for their cleaning supplies. 16. Some of these expenses for cleaning supplies are deducted from the cleaners’ paychecks. 9. Handy is a cleaning service that provides cleaning in cities throughout the country via an on demand dispatch system. Failure to Pay Minimum Wage in Violation of the FLSA Defendant’s willful conduct in failing to ensure its employees receive the federal minimum wage, and requiring its employees to pay for the expenses of their employment (all of which contribute to them not receiving the federal minimum wage), violates the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. This claim is brought on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals who have worked for Handy anywhere in the country (other than California) and may choose to “opt in” to this case, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 149 §§ 148 and 148B As set forth above, Defendant has misclassified Handy cleaners in Massachusetts as independent contractors, in violation of Mass. Gen. L. c. 149 § 148B. As a result of this misclassification, cleaners have improperly been required to bear the expenses of their employment (such as expenses for cleaning supplies), in violation of Mass. Gen. L. c. 149 § 148. This claim is brought pursuant to M.G.L. c. 149, § 150.

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11. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communication to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692f. 16. The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to December 8, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Aurora Advanced Healthcare Inc. 22. The Aurora Advanced Healthcare Inc. obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically medical purposes. 23. The alleged Aurora Advanced Healthcare Inc. obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 24. Aurora Advanced Healthcare Inc. is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 25. Defendant SCS, a debt collector, was contracted by Aurora Advanced Healthcare and is collecting the alleged debt. 27. On or about December 8, 2019, Defendant SCS sent the Plaintiff a debt collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Defendant Aurora Advanced Healthcare Inc. See Exhibit A. 28. The Letter states: “If requested, this office will notify you if and when it intends to report this claim to a credit bureau, but in no event will that happen until after the 30-day validation period described below.” 29. Upon information and belief, the Defendant knows which accounts are eligible to be reported and can let the Plaintiff know in their Letter if and when the account is being reported. 30. Instead, the Defendant seeks to lure the Plaintiff into a phone call by not providing information they already know regarding credit. 31. Furthermore, the Defendant fails to explain in what method the Plaintiff can invoke the rights being offered. It is unclear if the Plaintiff must call, write, or even what to say to invoke the above stated offer. 32. It is deceptive to withhold information in a deceptive manner to try to get a consumer to call a debt collector. 33. Plaintiff incurred an informational injury due to Defendant’s deceptive statements in the letter attempting to lure Plaintiff into contacting them through deceptive means. 34. The Plaintiff wanted to invoke this right but had no knowledge as to how it would occur. 36. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 37. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 38. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 39. Defendant violated said section by making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 40. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 41. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 42. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 43. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 45. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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20. SquareTwo and CACH purchase charged-off debts and then attempt to collect on alleged debts owed. Once an alleged debt is purchased, SquareTwo and CACH place the accounts for collection within their network of branch offices. 21. Mandarich Law is a member of SquareTwo’s and CACH’s network of branch offices. 22. As a part of that network, Mandarich Law exclusively performs debt collection services at the direction of and for the benefit of SquareTwo and CACH. See http://www.mandarichlaw.com/faqs (last visited on September 20, 2016). As a part of that network, SquareTwo and CACH actively monitor Mancarich Law’s debt collection efforts. 23. In an effort to collect on alleged debts owed, SquareTwo and CACH engaged and directed Mandarich Law to place thousands of unsolicited phone calls to consumers nationwide. At all times relevant Mandarich Law worked exclusively on behalf of SquareTwo and CACH and “utilized [their] account management system” in their debt collection efforts. http://d1lge852tjjqow.cloudfront.net/CIK- 0001505966/3aed6172-0c9d-456e-a695-ce0f51dfcfab.pdf?noexit=true 24. Beginning around at least November 2013, although Plaintiff never provided Defendants with his cellular number or consent to contact him on his cellular number, Plaintiff began receiving unsolicited phone calls from Mandarich Law, attempting to collect on an alleged debt owed on behalf of SquareTwo and 36. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. 48. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 49. Each such telephone call was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. By using such equipment, Defendants were able to effectively make thousands of phone calls simultaneously to lists of thousands of wireless phone numbers of consumers without human intervention. 50. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants and their agents constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 51. As a result of Defendants’ and Defendants’ agents’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 52. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 53. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-47 of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 58. As a result of Defendants’ and Defendants’ agents’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 59. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ.

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36. Defendant Sunny Delight manufactures, distributes, advertises and sells a variety of fruit-flavored juice beverages under the brand name, “SunnyD” or “Sunny Delight” (the “Products”). 37. The Products’ labels all mislead consumers and violate California and federal law. 38. As shown in Figure 1, above, the “Orange Strawberry” flavor Product’s label shows life-like pictorial representations of fresh, ripe, whole strawberries. 39. The Product’s name, “Orange Strawberry”, along with these pictorial representations, informs the consumer by operation of California and federal law that the Product is made exclusively from and is flavored only with the named natural fruit juices. A. Defendant’s Product Labels Deceive Consumers and Violate the Law. A. Defendant’s Product Labels Deceive Consumers and Violate the Law. .................................................................................................... 5 B. Defendant’s Products Are Artificially-Flavored Sugar-Water Masquerading as Fruit Juice. ............................................................. 10 C. Competitors Label Their Products Lawfully. .................................... 16 D. Plaintiffs’ Purchases of the Misbranded Products ............................. 17 V. VIII. CAUSES OF ACTION ............................................................................... 24 CLAIM FOR FRAUD BY OMISSION ...................................................... 24 CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION .............................. 25

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26. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit as a class action on their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated as members of the proposed Class, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) and/or (b)(2) and/or (c)(4). This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of those provisions. 27. The proposed classes are defined as: Nationwide Class All persons or entities in the United States that purchased or acquired a Power King Towmax STR trailer tire (“Class Tires”). California Subclass All persons or entities in California that purchased or acquired a Power King Towmax STR trailer tire (“Class Tires”). Arizona Subclass All persons or entities in Arizona that purchased or acquired a Power King Towmax STR trailer tire (“Class Tires”). 40. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the Nationwide Class. 41. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 42. Defendants engaged in both speaking and silent fraud, and in fraudulent and deceptive conduct, throughout the Class Period. As described above, Defendants’ conduct defrauded Plaintiffs and Class Members, intending and leading them to believe, through affirmative misrepresentations, omissions, suppression and concealments of material fact, that the Class Tires, marketed by Defendants as safe and suitable for use on trailers, possessed important characteristics that they in fact did not possess—namely that they were safe and durable for trailer use, and would perform in ordinary driving conditions—and inducing the purchase and acquisition of the Class Tires. 53. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the Nationwide Class. 54. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 55. Defendants have been unjustly enriched in that they intentionally sold the Class Tires knowing that they could not deliver the safety, durability and performance promised to consumers. Defendants enticed Plaintiffs and Class Members to purchase or acquire the Class Tires through false and deceptive advertising, promotional, marketing and warranty materials, and were unjustly enriched as a result. 56. Plaintiffs and Class Members conferred a benefit on Defendants by purchasing or acquiring the Class Tires. 57. When purchasing or acquiring the Class Tires, Plaintiffs and Class Members reasonably believed that the Class Tires were safe, durable and would perform as advertised, warranted and represented by Defendants. 58. Plaintiffs and Class Members received less than what they paid for in that the Class Tires were not as advertised, warranted and represented by Defendants. 59. Defendants know of and appreciate the benefit conferred by Plaintiffs and Class Members, and have retained that benefit notwithstanding their knowledge that the benefit is unjust. 60. The above did not occur by accident or conditions not within Defendants’ control. If fact, the Class Tires were dangerous and unsafe, and did not perform safely under ordinary driving conditions. 62. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the Nationwide Class. 63. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 64. The Class Tires are “consumer products” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1). 65. Plaintiffs and Class Members are “consumers” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3), because they are persons entitled under applicable state law to enforce against the warrantor the obligations of its express and implied warranties. 66. Each Defendant is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)-(5). 67. Section 2310(d)(1) of Chapter 15 of the United States Code provides a cause of action for any consumer who is damaged by the failure of a warrantor to comply with a written or implied warranty. 68. In connection with the purchase of the Class Tires, Defendants provided an express Limited Warranty Against Defects in Workmanship and Materials for the life of the original tread, or five years from date of purchase (whichever comes first). 69. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class experienced defects within the warranty period. Despite the existence of the warranties, the Defendants failed to inform Plaintiffs and Class members that the Class Tires were defective and unsafe, and prone to failure and tread separation. Common Law Fraud and Violations of Cal. Civ. Code sections 1709, 1710, 1572 & 1573 (Brought on Behalf of the Nationwide Class) Numerosity and Ascertainability ………………………………………….. 7 Typicality ………………………………………………………………….. 7 Adequate Representation ………………………………………………….. 7 Predominance of Common Issues …………………………………………. 8 Superiority …………………………………………………………………. 10 Quasi-Contract Unjust Enrichment (Brought on Behalf of the Nationwide Class) Violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. Breach of Express Warranty (Brought on Behalf of the Nationwide Class)

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15. Food manufacturers are required to comply with federal and state laws and regulations that govern the labeling and packaging of their products. 40. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following classes (collectively, the “Class” or “Classes”): National Class: All persons in the United States who made retail purchase of Defendant’s Rice Products in containers made, formed or filled as to be misleading and with non-functional slack-fill, during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate. California Subclass: All California residents who made retail purchase of Defendant’s Rice Products in containers made, formed or filled as to be misleading and with non-functional slack-fill, during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate. New York Subclass: All New York residents who made retail purchase of Defendant’s Rice Products in containers made, formed or filled as to be misleading and with non-functional slack-fill, during the applicable limitations period, and/or such subclasses as the Court may deem appropriate 41. The proposed Classes exclude current and former officers and directors of Defendant, Members of the immediate families of the officers and directors of Defendant, Defendant’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, assigns, and any entity in which it has or has had a controlling interest, and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. 53. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 65. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 85. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further allege as follows: 86. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class Members for Defendant’s violations of New York’s Deceptive Acts or Practices Law, NY 94. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein, and further allege as follows: FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS PROHIBIT NON-FUNCTIONAL SLACK FULL NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. VIOLATION OF NEW YORK DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349 VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S CONSUMER LEGAL REMEDIES ACT, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S FALSE ADVERTISING LAW, California Business & Professions Code § 17500, et seq.

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. COUNT IV - NEGLIGENCE…………………………….……………………………………21 COUNT IV - CONSPIRACY……………..…………..………...………….…………….….…22 27. Mrs. Polanco first moved to the Vineland area in November 2011 so that she and her husband could provide a better life for themselves and minor their daughter, who is now six (6) years old. 28. Since moving to the Vineland area, the Polancos’ daughter has suffered from a series of medical events, including upper respiratory infections, bronchitis, fevers and episodes where her throat swells making it difficult for her to breath. 29. Mrs. Polanco has taken her daughter to both the SJH Regional Medical Center and the Elmer Hospital owned by SJH at least five (5) times since 2011. 30. During each of her visits to SJH hospitals, the Polancos’ daughter has been treated in the emergency room given the sudden on-set of her symptoms. 31. Given the suddenness of her illnesses and her readily apparent distress in breathing, it has been Mrs. Polanco’s goal to get her daughter to the closest hospital to seek treatment for her daughter as quickly as possible. 32. During those visits to the SJH hospitals, the Polancos’ daughters’ treatment has included antibiotics administered intravenously. 34. During her visits to SJH, Mrs. Polanco was also provided with a copy of SJH’s privacy policy indicating that SJH would take appropriate measures to safe-guard her and her daughter’s PCI. The representation of SJH that it would safeguard the privacy of her PCI was one of the reasons why she opted to visit the SJH hospitals. 35. As stated in a December 31, 2012 letter from Omnicell, on the night of November 14, 2012, “an Omnicell electronic device issued to an Omnicell employee was stolen from his locked car.” See Exhibit “A”. 36. Based upon media reports, the electronic device stolen from the Omnicell employee’s car was a laptop computer and the PCI data on the laptop was not encrypted. 37. The failure to encrypt the PCI constitutes as violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, as discussed below. 39. Although the December 31, 2012 Notice Letter provided certain information about the theft of the PCI of Plaintiff and the Class, it failed to advise Plaintiff and the Class about the material information concerning the loss of their PCI, such as how and why an Omnicell employee came to have in his possession, outside a medical facility, an Omnicell laptop computer containing PCI of Plaintiff and the Class; how and why the PCI was unencrypted, in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996; and what concrete steps were being taken by all Defendants to secure existing PCI to ensure that the PCI of Plaintiff and the Class was not compromised in the future. 40. The delay between the November 14, 2012 theft and the December 31, 2012 Letter by Omnicell was unreasonable and was not mandated by law enforcement. 41. According to media reports, tens of thousands of patients were affected by the Omnicell data breach including 8,500 patients from SJH; 4,000 from UMHS; and 56,000 from Sentara. 43. The reasonable actions of Mrs. Polanco to seek treatment for her daughter at the Memorial Hospital of Salem County has resulted in increased costs for Mrs. Polanco to seek treatment for her daughter. It is believed and therefore averred that additional Class members have incurred, and continue to incur, additional expenses by seeking care at alternative hospitals following the data breach described in the December 31, 2012 Notice Letter. 44. Pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) issued the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“the Privacy Rule”). The Privacy Rule was effective December 28, 2000. 45. The Privacy Rule was implemented to protect all individually identifiable health information which is defined by the Privacy Rule as Protected Health Information 59. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of herself, and on behalf of all individuals who had their PCI stolen from the electronic device issued to the Omnicell employee on the evening of November 14, 2012. 60. Plaintiff also seeks certification of a Class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. 61. The Class consists of numerous individuals and entities throughout the United States, making individual joinder impractical, in satisfaction of Rule 23(a)(1). 62. The disposition of the claims of the Class members in a single class action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and to the Court. 63. The claims of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class, as required by Rule 23(a)(3), in that the representative Plaintiff had her PCI stolen on the evening of November 14, 2012 and has thereafter suffered damage as a proximate result. 64. The factual and legal bases of each of the Defendants’ misconduct are common to the Class Members and represent a common thread of fraud and other misconduct resulting in injury to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 66. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, as required by Rule 23(a)(4). Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting nationwide consumer class actions. Plaintiff and their counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to those of the Class. 67. Plaintiff and members of the Class have all suffered, and will continue to suffer, harm and damages as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful and wrongful conduct. 69. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the Court and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 70. The Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the Class and require that the Court impose uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class, thereby making appropriate equitable relief to the Class as a whole within the meaning of Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2). 71. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth here and further alleges as follows. 72. Upon information and belief, Defendants first knew, or should have known, that the PCI of the Plaintiff and the Class had been stolen on the night of November 14, 2012. 73. Defendant Omnicell waited a full forty-seven (47) days to issue letter to Plaintiff (and presumably other members of the Class) about the theft. 74. Defendant SJH has never notified Plaintiff or members of the Class of the theft. 76. By the acts and omissions set forth herein, Defendants have violated security breach notification laws of New Jersey, Virginia, Michigan and the other states where members of the Class reside. 77. The New Jersey law, N.J. Stat. 56:8-163, specifically provides that: Any business that conducts business in New Jersey … shall disclose any breach of security of those computerized records following discovery or notification of the breach to any customer who is a resident of New Jersey whose personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, accessed by an unauthorized person. The disclosure to a customer shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in subsection c. of this section, or any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the data system. … * * * Any business … required under this section to disclose a breach of security of a customer’s personal information shall, in advance of the disclosure to the customer, report the breach of security and any information pertaining to the breach to the Division of State Police in the Department of Law and Public Safety for investigation or handling, which may include dissemination or referral to other appropriate law enforcement entities. The notification required by this section shall be delayed if a law enforcement agency determines that the notification will impede a criminal or civil investigation and that agency has made a request that the notification be delayed. The notification required by this section shall be made after the law enforcement agency determines that its disclosure will not compromise the investigation and notifies that business or public entity. 8.2 miles from Mrs. Polanco’s home and Elmer Hospital is 13.3 miles from her home. 88. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth here and further alleges as follows. 90. New Jersey, Virginia and Michigan have enacted laws to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive or fraudulent business practices, unfair competition and false advertising and unconscionable business practices. 91. New Jersey, Virginia and Michigan allow consumers a private right of action under such laws. 92. By the misrepresentations and non-disclosure of material facts alleged above, the Defendants deceived and continue to deceive consumers, such as Plaintiff and the Class. This conduct constitutes unconscionable, unlawful, unfair, deceptive and/or fraudulent business practices within the meaning of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, 56:8-1, et seq ., The Virginia Consumer Protection Act, VA Code Ann. § 59.1-196 et seq., and the Michigan Consumer Protection Act, M.C.L.A. 445.901 et seq. 93. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants= unfair and deceptive trade practices, Plaintiff and the Class have and will continue to suffer damages in an amount to be determined at trial. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully seeks the relief set forth below. 94. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth here and further alleges as follows. 96. Defendants have made false and fraudulent statements and material misrepresentations and omissions to Plaintiff and the Class relating to the receipt, storage, maintenance and privacy of their PCI, as well as the time, place and manner of the unauthorized access to their PCI. Defendants’ statements were misleading, at best, and materially false and fraudulent, at worst. 97. Defendants intended that Plaintiff and the Class would rely on their statements, representations and omissions to their detriment. In particular, the Defendants made misrepresentations about the security of the PCI they sought and received from Plaintiff and the Class. Then, after the breach, they failed to timely notify Plaintiff and the Class of the breach, as required by law. Plaintiff and the Class have relied on Defendant’s misrepresentations to their detriment. 98. In addition, the Defendants concealed and suppressed and/or omitted material facts as to their knowledge of the unauthorized access PCI. BREACH OF STATE SECURITY NOTIFICATION LAWS CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS………………………………………………….………..12 COUNT I - BREACH OF STATE SECURITY NOTIFICATION LAWS……..…....…..…15 COUNT II - VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY, VIRGINIA AND MICHIGAN FRAUD VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY, VIRGINIA AND MICHIGAN CONSUMER FRAUD LAWS

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12. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 13. Plaintiff and those similarly situated are individuals who were or are employed by Defendants as homecare providers through the In-Home Supportive Services program at any time between January 1, 2015 and February 1, 2016 (the “Collective Period”). As IHSS Homecare Providers, Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals were responsible for providing in-home assistance for IHSS recipients. 14. At all relevevant times, Defendants are, or have been, Plaintiff’s and the similarly situated individuals’ “employers” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 15. For example, Defendant CDSS exercises significant control over IHSS Homecare Providers’ work. CDSS provides the form IHSS Homecare Providers use to apply for employment. CDSS issues payment to IHSS Homecare Providers, and CDSS has control over the number of hours IHSS Homecare Providers may work. CDSS also played a role in deciding whether to pay overtime to IHSS Homecare Providers. 22. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and other similarly situated employees as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiff’s consent form is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit A. 23. The proposed FLSA Collective class is defined as follows: All people employed by Defendants as homecare workers, home care providers, or in other similar job titles, through the In- Home Supportive Services program, and who were paid for hours in excess of forty (40) per week at a rate of less than 1.5 times their regular rate at any time from January 1, 2015 to February 1, 2016. 24. Pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, employers are generally required to pay overtime compensation at a rate of 1.5 times an employees’ regular rate of pay for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek. 25. The FLSA contains an exemption from overtime for “domestic service” workers who provide companionship and other services to individuals who are unable to care for themselves and also contains an exemption for live-in domestic service workers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(15) and 213(b)(21).

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