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tex. dep't of pub. safety v. foster, 398 s.w.3d 887, 890 (tex. app.dallas 2013, no pet.). under this standard, we conduct an independent analysis of the record, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions.

""intoxication may be proven by the defendant's behavior including: loss of balance, slurred speech, lack of body coordination, and impairment of motor reflexes.""

fww raises essentially the same argument here.

we therefore disapprove the court of appeal's decision in diaz, supra, 13 cal.app.4th 1755, insofar as it is inconsistent with the views expressed in our opinion in the present case.

accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

by this determination, i conclude that in re fenstermacher, supra, is not good law and should be and hereby is overruled.

this is because the law generally assumes that a person who encounters such conditions will take care to avoid any danger inherent therein.

contrary to the grandmother's contention on appeal, under the circumstances of this case, there was a binding and effective waiver by her of the right to counsel (cf. matter of soto v willis, 143 ad3d 728, 729-730).

to the extent that any of our cases hold that direct evidence is required to establish a mixed-motive case, they are no longer good law.

this decision typically can be made without a hearing because eligibility is often obvious on the incontrovertible written record.""

tex. civ. prac. & rem. code ann. 150.002(f) (west 2011).

similarly overruled is the extension of the hopkins rule and rationale as the basis for naming the mspb respondent in appeals of its decisions dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.

we quash the decision below and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

because the judgment in the taxpayer action is an illinois judgment, we would look to the law of illinois to determine whether claim preclusion bars the claim.

we overrule himont to the extent that it permitted such a remedy.

to the extent that this opinion conflicts with kilpatrick v. state, 622 so.2d 1032 (fla. 2d dca 1993), we recede from kilpatrick.

consequently, w e disapprove the decision in state v. falcon 556 so.2d 762 (fla. 2d dca 1990), which, contrary to ferrair, held that section 713.34 (3), florida statutes (1985), created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.

we thus disapprove of the language of these court of appeals cases to the extent that they hold or suggest otherwise.

cf. ammons v. okeechobee county, 710 so. 2d 641, 645 (fla. 4th dca 1998) (rejecting a claim of violation of substantive due process based on allegedly wrongful revocation of occupational license, as ""[t]he denial of such a license does not prevent a business owner from pursing a lawful occupation,"" but ""merely prevents the business from operating at a particular location"") appellants' allegations do not support a claim that they were prohibited from engaging in their chosen trade or profession or that they were unable to operate the club at another location.

we have reconsidered the rule of those cases in light of our decisions in law and adams, and we today overrule those cases to the extent that they allow parole revocation to be made effective upon the completion of a sentence imposed for an offense while the prisoner was on parole, or to be made effective in futuro upon similar future occurrence or condition.

we now apply these principles of appellate review for the sufficiency of evidence for the armed robbery in this case.

because we find the trial court erred in holding wife in contempt for refusing to cooperate with husband and his lender between the date of the approval until the closing of the loan, we reverse all damages resulting from that ruling.

to the extent graham, in re s.h. (1),and in re s.h. (2) are in conflict with this decision, they are overruled.

appellant's ground of error is accordingly overruled.

casey is overruled.

after considering these arguments, we agree that king should be overruled to the extent that it is inconsistent with the plain language of the provisions at issue.

blue diamond coal co. v. meade, supra, is overruled to the extent that it implies that an award or settlement may be reopened on the ground of mistake in every case where a claimant is able to demonstrate that he was entitled to more compensation than he actually got at the time of his settlement or award.

the decisions on which welton principally relied, including united states v. harris, 536 f.3d 798, 813 (7th cir. 2008); united states v. clanton, 538 f.3d 652, 660 (7th cir. 2008); and united states v. millbrook, 553 f.3d 1057, 1067 (7th cir. 2009), likewise are overruled on this issue.

the petitioner has not demonstrated that the absence of an evaluation by a mental health expert had any effect on the outcome of the proceeding, and he is not entitled to relief.

the assistant state's attorney's actions may or may not have been inadvertent; however, it is still the role of the prosecutor to present the pertinent law to the grand jury. di vincenzo, 183 ill.2d at 254, 233 ill.dec. 273, 700 n.e.2d 981. subjecting a defendant to criminal prosecution in this case based on the state's incorrect presentation of the law to the grand jury deprived him of his right to due process, whether the assistant state's attorney's actions were intentional or not.

for the reasons set forth below, we quash the fourth district's decision in alcorn because the fourth district incorrectly analyzed the prejudice prong, but we also disapprove the conflict cases revell and lewis because their analysis is inconsistent with the united states supreme court's decisions in frye and lafler.

thus, florida has always required jury verdicts to be unanimous on the elements of criminal offenses.

thus, in cases presenting factual scenarios like that before us, we can no longer adhere to our decision in johnson, and to the extent it thus conflicts with our holding today, it is overruled.

our decision here necessarily overrules hyman.

four of the articles were commentaries predicting that the 2016 election could turn violent, and of these four, two were based on a report of the same election observer.

hill v. hill , 244 n.c. app. 219, 22324, 781 s.e.2d 29, 3334 (2015) (alternation in original) (citations omitted).

id. 4 cmt.

we hold that carter and earlier decisions declaring that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment constitutes a motion for a new trial were incorrectly decided.

repko moved for reconsideration and argued, among other things, that because the county simply pled it was entitled to immunity under subsection (12), the gross negligence standard contained in subsection (12) must be read into the immunity provisions contained in subsections (4), (5), and (13).

we have reassessed dorsey and overrule it, finding its arguments unpersuasive when considered in the light of the demands of fair and efficient administration of justice.

had we intended deliberately to take an opposite view of section 16(c) (8 usca 216(c), we should certainly have said so; our decision is overruled.

the order states that the assignors ""shall be treated as parties to the case for discovery purposes in producing documents and appearing for deposition . . . with the same protections and obligations applying to the assignors as apply to [the] parties.""

as such, la.civ. code art. 2365 is not applicable to the matter before us, and we specifically overrule this holding in nash.

having decided that united states v. hartley is no longer the law of this circuit, we remand to the original panel in this case all other matters to be resolved in this appeal.

it is therefore, to that extent, overruled.

accordingly, the holdings on this point in state ex rel. nelson v. sims and state ex rel. west v. kivett are overruled to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.

the inverse process includes ""stuffing"" containers off-site and eventually loading them onto the cargo ships for export at the terminals.

accordingly, we recede from that portion ofhenderson which conflicts with our ruling here, affirm washington's convictions, and certify conflict withcrawford.

in re h.b.c., 482 s.w.3d 696, 702 (tex. app.texarkana 2016, no pet.) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

aclu pretrial justice manual at 42.

when asked what happened and who stabbed him, the defendant answered, ""i'm depressed.

in re t.p., 12th dist. butler no. ca2015-08-164, 2016-ohio-72, 19.

appellant argues the alleged charge error ""at least in theory"" could have allowed the jury to convict him for brandishing a hammer.

crim. app. june 18, 1999).

to the extent morning fresh farms can be read as holding that the mere presence of a building, without more, provides sufficient connection to meet the requirement that the product "originate from the land's productivity," we decline to follow it.

we are not persuaded by the rationale of either opinion and insofar as hillman v. commissioner, supra, is in conflict with our decision it is overruled.

the sentencing commission's commentary fully supports this construction.

three courts of appeals have reached the opposite conclusion on similar facts.

that was the mandatory minimum under the armed career criminal act (""the acca"" or ""the act""), and the district court imposed it because of peppers's previous convictions.

see commonwealth v. beverly, 389 mass. 866, 870 (1983).

when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the well-established standards of review.

to the extent that barnes can be read to permit a direct appeal from an adjudicative agency decision reviewed by the superior court within the meaning of 5-6-35 (a) (1), it is hereby disapproved.

neither party disputes the sentencing court's decision to apply the version of the guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing.

in view of this holding, the decision in state ex rel. west virginia department of transportation v. cookman, 219 w.va. 601, 639 s.e.2d 693 (2006), is overruled in its entirety.

we are aware of govan v. state, 682 s.w.2d 567 (tex.cr.app. 1985), holding an objection such as the instant one to be sufficient to preserve error, but govan appears to be an aberration, and is overruled to the extent of any conflict.

and because 1367(b) contains no exception for joinder of plaintiffs under rule 20 or class actions under rule 23, the court concludes, clark and zahn have been overruled.

but to the extent the court of appeal's implication might be read to suggest that the magistrate's failure cannot deny a defendant a substantial right affecting the legality of the commitment even when the failure is prejudicial as well as erroneous, the appellate court's opinion is unsound under the analysis set out above and is hereby disapproved.

see commonwealth v. diaz, 448 mass. 286, 288 (2007).

[2] father and t.b. (""mother"") are the parents of child, who was born october 7, 2014. three months later, on january 16, 2015, the indiana department of child services (""dcs"") filed a petition alleging child was a child in need of services (""chins"") because mother had tested positive for various drugs at child's birth.

to the extent that these decisions advance this reasoning, they are disapproved.

we here merely recede from prior cases in order to establish a rule which we are convinced will be productive of results more nearly consonant with the demands of justice and the dictates of ethics and morality.

district 6 retains 70.3% of its predecessor district (old district 1). however, as discussed above, the senate in drawing this district did not perform a functional analysis, but rather focused on keeping the core of old district 1. old district 1, however, was drawn at a time when compactness was not a constitutional imperative.

because we determine that plaintiff's combined rule 52, 59, and 60 motion was not timely served on defendant as to the 10 january orders, which in turn rendered plaintiff's appeal from those underlying orders untimely, we decline to grant plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari in coa17-1119 to address the merits of his appeal, see infra.

therefore, the entire july 31, 2013 invoice is within the scope of the award.

moreover, the consent order mandated that the father was to have skype contact with the child one time per week, and the mother failed to comply with that directive.

a hearing on all three motions was conducted.

for clarity, we pause to note that by overturning winter storm, we also abrogate any decision insofar as it has relied on winter storm, specifically, consub delaware llc v. schahin engenharia limitada.

we, therefore, overrule trahan, supra, to the extent that it conflicts with this holding and modify the cases listed in footnote six to conform to our holding here.

another case in which a new rule was created by overruling precedent is state v. ikezawa.

because courts of appeals have reached differing conclusions about what the due process clause requires of the united states when it seeks to provide notice to a federal inmate of its intention to forfeit property in which the inmate appears to have an interest, we granted certiorari to consider the adequacy of the fbi's notice to petitioner of its intended forfeiture of the cash.

consequently, once proof is made that the judgment is void based on extrinsic evidence, the judgment is said to be equally ineffective and unenforceable as if the judgment were void on its face because it violates constitutional due process.

he argues his postconviction petition stated an arguable claim that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because his counsel did not argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss juror cross for cause.

here, the analyst statement provides an example of how forgery and identity theft convictions must have been made ""in connection with"" each other to preclude relief under proposition 47.

for the foregoing reasons, we overrule willis and hold that the cartwright act applies to the professions.

i join the court's opinion.

to the extent that the miller case may be construed as declaring unlawful the picketing of a business by non-employees, it is no longer authoritative.

but here, the district court denied leave to amend based on futility.

defendant sent four letters to counsel between january 2011 and november 2014. he received no response from counsel and waited four years before contacting the clerk's office.

because that proposition is contrary to the restatement rule as adopted in gross, barber and joe cooper are, to that extent, overruled.

syllabus point 1, in part, chambers, 157 w.va. at 77, 198 s.e.2d at 807.

upon re-examination of the rule set forth in those cases, we find it to be improper and confusing to the jury, and we therefore recede from it and overrule those cases to that extent.

32 for a time we articulated a standard formulation of waiver that did not mention any requirement of proof of prejudice.

any statements to the contrary in johnson v. county of fresno, 64 cal.app.2d 576 [ 149 p.2d 38]; klimper v. city of glendale, 99 cal.app.2d 446 [ 222 p.2d 49]; brown v. sequoia union high school dist., 89 cal.app.2d 604 [ 201 p.2d 66]; and slavin v. city of glendale, 97 cal.app.2d 407 [ 217 p.2d 984], are disapproved.

the intention of the parties or their own beliefs as to what state is the child's home state are irrelevant.

we also overrule our prior decisions adopting the corpus delicti rule.

whether to grant an award under 97-88.1,

smith, 355 s.w.3d at 148.

dissent is instructive, noting specifically that the majority found waiver and suggests, therefore, that any further substantive analysis is

the first section of part 2a of article 81b of chapter 15a of the north carolina general statutes is n.c.g.s. 15a-1340.19a, which is entitled ""applicability"" and provides that ""a defendant who is convicted of first degree murder, and who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense, shall be sentenced in accordance with this part."" n.c.g.s. 15a-1340.19a

we also overrule that portion of berry v. mclemore, 670 f.2d 30, 34 (5th cir. 1982), in which we relied on jones to find an abuse of discretion in the district court's failure to assess as an item of costs the full fee of an expert witness who was "important" to the plaintiff's 1983 case.