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to the extent the daum language may be construed to sanction the award of interest on interest in the absence of an agreement for such payment, it is disapproved.

app. 1985), is overruled.

but that is a very narrow slice of the pie; we have said the term ""'questions of law' refers to those issues that were historically reviewable on habeasconstitutional and statutory-construction questions, not discretionary or factual questions.""

defendant's exhibit c shows that officer butler conducted the rfi evaluation in 2008.

to the extent that double view ventures can be construed as adopting a categorical rule requiring a full retrial as the result of any apportionment errora reading we do not necessarily adopt, given the absence of any analysis of the issue in the opinionit is overruled as to this issue.

we overrule courier-journal v. mcdonald, ky., 524 s.w.2d 633 (1974) to the extent that it is in conflict with this opinion.

(city of industry v. gordon (1972) 29 cal.app.3d 90, 94; see also county of los angeles v. ortiz (1971) 6 cal.3d 141, 148.)

busby, 253 s.w.3d at 663.

to the extent that tracy v. macintyre, 29 cal.app.2d 145 [ 84 p.2d 526], is inconsistent with the views expressed herein, that case is disapproved.

we, therefore, overrule that portion of smith v. simpson that limits the act's definition of a pedestrian.

. on direct appeal, this court reversed the trial court and ordered a new trial.

we disapprove the statements in the opinion on rehearing in day that implied the contrary, and (like the author of those statements) we disapprove the decisions that have held the contrary.

mccaa v. mccaa, supra, and perry v. perry, supra, are overruled insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion.

all appellate decisions of our state conflicting with this decision are receded from or are overruled and in particular burke v. o'brien

united states v. lewis, 467 f. app'x 298, 299 (5th cir. 2012) (unpublished).

to the extent any language in herman suggested otherwise, we disavow it.

ordering the parties to recalculate was not erroneous burden-shifting.

furthermore, coleman is necessarily overruled by holly farms.

see bock v. united states, 375 f.2d 479, 480 (9th cir. 1967).

the evidence supporting termination under one of the grounds listed in section 161.001(b)(1) can also be considered in support of a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.

spokeo does not hold otherwise; although it focuses on injury-in-fact, it reiterates that all three elements form the ""'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing.""

although she could not recall exactly where he put his penis, she explained it happened so frequently that it was either her vagina or butt.

ecause we find such an approach contradicts the logical underpinning of arbuckle, we decline to follow rosaia.

on reconsideration in light of feola, newson and other recent opinions, we are convinced that the holdings in findley and baltrunas requiring knowledge of the jurisdictional facts cannot be sustained and should be overruled.

in any case, mhs rests its personal jurisdiction assertion against collins on the ""conspiracy theory"" of jurisdiction, which requires the plaintiff to plead an unlawful act and a conspiracy to commit that unlawful act.

to the extent that marshall-silver can be read to hold otherwise, it is overruled.

while williams' pending claim was not affected by this 1999 legislation, this new legislation is relevant, as explained below, in that it further supports overruling boutte.

schmidt v. skolas, 770 f.3d 241, 248 (3d cir. 2014).

the ij's conclusion that baba's testimony was too vague to meet his burden of proof raises concern.

(jeske v. maxim healthcare servs., inc. (e.d. cal. 2012) 2012 u.s. dist. lexis 2963, at p. 37 [plaintiff ""need not have suffered all paga violations for which she seeks to pursue civil penalties.""];

thus, we reverse such a denial ""only if the evidence points so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of the nonmoving party that no reasonable juror could return a contrary verdict.""

the reasoning of our precedent, which we reject today, would mean that any prevailing market rates obtained by any non-profit legal organization affiliated with any public organization, such as the naacp or the sierra club, would allow their respective organizations to obtain an indirect benefit by decreasing the amount which each organization would need to raise to continue their non-legal activities.

according to the court, the categorical approach is unconstitutionally vague.

see g. l. c. 131, 91. an appeal from a decision by an agency, pursuant to g. l. c. 30a, 14, must be filed in the superior court within thirty days of the issuance of the agency's determination.

we have concluded that the holdings in wyman, spillers, evangelical, supra, and their progeny, should be overruled and a new sense of direction established.

in that 1) brashier has engendered confusion on attorney fee recoverability in um/uim litigation by an insured against his/her insurer; 2) brashier does support insurer's argument that the attorney fee issue should have been submitted to the jury for resolution as an element or item of damage under barnes' tort theory of recovery; 3) brashier misinterpreted the import of christian, supra as to the potential for the recovery of attorney fees in um/uim litigation between an insured and his/her insurer; and 4) brashier, in our view, exhibited an unwarranted deviation from the american rule concerning the allowance of attorney fees, we decide in this case that brashier, to the extent it held a um/uim insured plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney fees as a common law element of damage for an insurer's bad faith refusal to settle a um/uim loss, should be overruled.

""summary judgment is warranted only if the record shows that 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"" wenk v. o'reilly, 783 f.3d 585, 593 (6th cir. 2015) (quoting celotex corp. v. catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 322 (1986)).

indeed, this court has recognized that a party may make allegations on information and belief in the fraud context when ""(1) the facts constituting the fraud are not accessible to the plaintiff and (2) the plaintiff provides the grounds for his suspicions.""

debilitating medical condition means cancer, glaucoma, positive status for human immunodeficiency virus (hiv), acquired immune deficiency syndrome (aids), hepatitis c, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (als), crohn's disease, parkinson's disease, multiple sclerosis or other conditions for which a physician believes that the medical use of marijuana would likely outweigh the potential health risks for a patient.

accordingly, we overrule davis insofar as it holds that the prosecution can never meet its burden of proving a valid waiver of miranda rights if it fails, without explanation, to call as corroborating witnesses all officers who witnessed the defendant's interrogation.

in reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency, we determine whether all of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the challenged finding is true.

to that extent, we overrule farris on that point as well.

to the extent that our statement in griffin suggests that the jury could not have found parker guilty of both intentional and reckless assault because the two crimes require proof that a defendant simultaneously acted intentionally and recklessly with respect to the same result, we disavow any such suggestion because, as we have explained, the state's evidence may establish that the defendant acted intentionally and recklessly with regard to a different result.

to the contrary, it forms the basis of his ineffectiveness claim.

we disapprove the opinion in brawner v. arellano, 757 s.w.2d 526 (tex.app. san antonio), pet. dism'd by agr., 758 s.w.2d 756 (tex. 1988), to the extent that it is inconsistent with our holding herein.

to the extent that these cases directly and indirectly misconstrued the rationale of hedges, they are hereby overruled.

the government and the dissent argue that rule 11(a)(2) means that ""a defendant who pleads guilty cannot challenge his conviction on appeal on a forfeitable or waivable ground that he either failed to present to the district court or failed to reserve in writing.""

the court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding the existence of a material change in circumstances affecting the best interests of the children.

evidence not properly and officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record.

wife received from husband on august 28, 2014, as the buyout amount based upon their then-current equity in the family residence.

to the extent that these cases conflict with our decision today, such language and holdings are disapproved.

this case is similar to norred, in which we overruled prior precedent to hold that ocga 9372, which tolls the limitations period for medical malpractice case where a foreign object has been left in a patient's body, is not limited to cases in which the object is left unintentionally.

the declarant's impression need not be corroborated by an ""independent and equally percipient observer,"" booth, 306 md. at 327, 508 a.2d at 982, so long as the declarant renders his or her recollection of the events perceived.

carmen and fugate, to the extent that they conflict with this opinion, are overruled.

at the very least, this court ought to address the problem created by kar because, as this case illustrates, kar is distorting the burden of proof in this important area of the law.

""a district court may, however, permit discovery in a habeas proceeding if the 'petitioner presents specific allegations showing reason to believe that the facts, if fully developed, may lead the district court to believe that federal habeas relief is appropriate.'""

we hereby disapprove coble to the extent it imposes such a limitation.

to the extent the motions to dismiss raised the issue, it is apparent plaintiffs' subsequent summary judgment motion explicitly waived and abandoned this issue.

austero v. national cas. co. (1978) 84 cal.app.3d 1, 24-25 [ 148 cal.rptr. 653], is disapproved.

to the extent that it is contrary, the reasoning of matchett v. gould, 131 cal.app.2d 821 [ 281 p.2d 524], is erroneous and is disapproved.

10 the restatement further views as irrelevant whether the mortgagee had actual or constructive notice of the intervening lien. according to the restatement, a mortgagee is entitled to subrogation provided that it reasonably expected to receive the security and priority of the lien it paid, and provided subrogation will not materially prejudice the rights of the intervening lien holders.

barclay's rule 60(b) motion was a ""true"" one, and not a second or successive habeas petition, because it alleged ""a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding.""

walker process, 382 u.s. at 174.

see tex. r. app. p. 48.4; see also in re schulman, 252 s.w.3d at 412 n.35; ex parte owens, 206 s.w.3d 670, 673 (tex. crim. app. 2006).

to the extent it is inconsistent with this analysis, we disapprove

id. 2255(f)(3). dodd v. united states clarifies that this limitation period begins when the supreme court declares a new right, not when courts first acknowledge that right to be retroactive.

for example, in jaffee v. jaffee, the court correctly stated the principle ""that an alimony award may not be modified because of a 'change' in the circumstances of the parties which was contemplated and considered when the original judgment or agreement was entered.""

to the extent that notarfonzo v. kline, 464 so.2d 656, 657-58 (fla. 4th dca 1985), can be read for the proposition that the uccja does not apply to custody and shared parental responsibility issues in a paternity action, we recede from it.

to the extent that cox v. state, 1986 ok cr 154, 3-7, 726 p.2d 909, 910-11, in fact, applies the 742 corroboration requirement to the conspiracy conviction at issue in that case (in addition to the presenting a false insurance claim conviction), it is hereby overruled.

the result reached by the trial court is consistent with our recent opinion in orlando/orange county expressway authority v. w f agrigrowth-fernfield, ltd., 582 so.2d 790 (fla. 5th dca), rev. denied, 591 so.2d 183 (fla. 1991).

such an approach strikes us as being eminently sensible, and it is our judgment that a similar principle should be applied in the case at bar.

whatever may be said for the proposition that vines was overruled sub silentio by spears, we conclude that insofar as it stands for the proposition that a utility company owes no duty to persons who may, through foreseeable negligence, come in contact with its poles, vines must be overruled.

accordingly, we now overrule hall v. state, supra, and its progeny, to the extent these cases hold that it is not error for a trial court to refuse to give a requested instruction on accomplice corroboration so long as the state relies in part on other evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.

believing, as we do, that there is no basis for a presumption of vindictiveness where a second sentence imposed after a trial is heavier than a first sentence imposed after a guilty plea, we overrule simpson v. rice, supra, to that extent.

however, determining whether the requirements for class certification are met ""will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim.

we vacated and remanded, instructing the district court to evaluate bernal's claims under section 2255.

but the government in jones never took a position as to plain error review (because the challenge to the firearms and toolmark examiner's testimony was preserved).

thus, to the extent the language in baltins v. james, supra, 36 cal.app.3d 1193, can be read as implying that "actual injury" is determined by any bright line rule, we disapprove that language.

alternatively, the state argues that there is no evidence that the police engaged in an ""ask first, warn later"" interrogation in violation of seibert, and so at least his second statement, which he made after receiving miranda warnings, was admissible.

five of the other partieswells fargo, lehman brothers, aurora, bnc mortgage, and sascare in privity with u.s. bank and sailt through various contracts or arrangements.

however, to the extent either decision may be inconsistent with the analysis herein, it is disapproved.

we further disapprove the decision in d.f.

in what almost amounts to an afterthought, we employ a footnote to partially overrule more than fifteen published opinions of this court decided within the last six years.

given that petitioner's due process rights were violated and that this situation is comparable to the outright denial of the constitutional right to call witnesses, expungement is the proper remedy (see matter of doleman v prack, 145 ad3d at 1290-1291; cf. matter of texeira v fischer, 26 ny3d at 234-235).

see, e.g., thomas v. city lights sch., inc., 124 f. supp. 2d 707, 713 (d.d.c. 2000) (holding school for at-risk youth owed duty under 319 to supervise its students while on a school field trip).

28 the first requirement of the tacit admission rule actually has two parts: that the statement was incriminating and that the natural reaction of an innocent person would be to deny it.

it concluded that the tolling rule we announced in hughes v. mahaney higgins, 821 s.w.2d 154 (tex. 1991), was modified by our later decision in murphy v. campbell, 964 s.w.2d 265 (tex. 1997), and did not toll limitations in this case.

weconnect's evidence was neither newly discovered nor unknown; moreover, it could easily have produced these documents and affidavits the first time around.

the defendants asserted that there were obvious statute-of-limitations problems with the key claims, that publically available court records contradict most of tobey's key factual assertions, and that his attorneys failed to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to filing the action.

sheley v. fla. parole comm'n, 720 so. 2d 216, 218 (fla. 1998).

3 (2011); accord sanchez, 770 n.w.2d at 526.

the jury could have disbelieved such evidence, but it was not subject to multiple interpretations.

also see, coggins v. joseph, 504 so.2d 211, 213-14 (miss.

in howard, we rejected the appellant's sixth amendment claim because we found the chemist's reports were ""sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the purpose of the confrontation clause."" 473 a.2d at 839.

we have concluded that it is erroneous and to the extent that sutton v. commonwealth, supra, indicates that a person may be prosecuted both for theft and knowingly receiving the same stolen article, it is overruled.

the policy does not provide deadlines.

any prior cases to the contrary such as montoya and romo are expressly overruled.

those cases (cavarly and clark) and such cases as estate of blake, 157 cal. 448 [ 108 p. 287], and estate of hamon, 136 cal.app. 517 [ 29 p.2d 326], are disapproved insofar as the question herein decided is concerned.

in franchise tax bd. of cal. v. hyatt, o.t. 2002, no. 42, p. 12. we reviewed that decision, and we affirmed.

as a result, there simply is no basis for concluding that the 911 call was outcome-determinative.