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chavers, 991 s.w.2d at 460

tobey filed his complaint on april 1, 2016.

brown eventually lost consciousness due to defendant's actions.

see jaghory v. new york state dep't of educ., 131 f.3d 326, 329 (2d cir. 1997).

""attorneys have wide latitude in opening and closing statements, subject to the trial court's control, and limitation of the scope of the arguments is within the trial court's discretion.""

while we believe that we have distinguished the kelly and godfrey cases it should perhaps be said that to the extent those cases may be considered as conflicting with this opinion they should no longer be followed.

the trial court's finding is neither defendant's stated salary amount nor the amount to which defendant testified at trial.

language to the contrary which we used in duehay v. acacia mutual life ins. co., infra, was unnecessary for decision in that case and is overruled.

similarly, the published opinion of the court of civil appeals in metcalf v. oklahoma state board of licensure and supervision, 1992 ok civ app 174, 848 p.2d is also expressly disapproved to the extent that it might be construed to support the argument that district courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from a decision of the board denying an application for a medical license.

aguilar's distinction between inherently and noninherently deadly weapons is reflected in calcrim no. 875's definition of ""deadly weapon,"" which states: ""a deadly weapon other than a firearm is any object, instrument, or weapon that is [1] inherently deadly or [2] one that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily injury.""

accordingly, the fair political practices opinion is disapproved to the extent that it is inconsistent with the present decision.

kopera testified for the state at mcghie's trial.

see also state v. rose, 11th dist. lake no. 2016-l-067, 2017-ohio-4235, 15.

the decision in jopes v. salt lake county, 9 utah 2d, 297, 343 p.2d 728 (1959), is hereby overruled.

therefore, the language in crawford that is in conflict with our holding here is expressly disapproved.

state v. banks, no. 1992841cf at 8 (fla.2d jud. cir. ct. final order denying motion to vacate filed oct. 15, 2014).

in response to hughes , we have overruled the killingsworth procedure and substituted the following procedure:

insofar as the language in magezis v. municipal court, supra, 3 cal.3d at p. 58 and in grimes v. municipal court, 5 cal.3d 643, 646 [ 97 cal.rptr. 9, 488 p.2d 169] requires a more substantial showing by appellants than is required under mayer, they are disapproved.

we flatly rejected this logic a century ago in state ex rel. state capitol commission v. lister, 91 wash. 9, 156 p. 858 (1916), and we reject it again now.

lopez also argues that, as a procedural matter, the bia should have remanded the case so the ij could consider his request for cancellation in light of the new evidence.

that view has been disapproved.

as we determined in the case of jackson v. nat. harrison associates, 283 so.2d 27 (fla. 1973), filed this date, stephens v. winn-dixie stores, inc., supra, is no longer controlling since the apportionment statute (fla. stat. 440,15(5)(c), f.s.a.) has been substantially altered since the rendition of the stephens' opinion.

see holbrook, 475 us at 569-571.

in his first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court plainly erred when it failed to advise him of the information required by ors 426.100(1).

retitled ""written deposition,"" the proposed form was intended to be completed by the evaluator and reflect the evaluator's assessment of the capacity of the alleged incapacitated person.

on the contrary, we hold that forcing green to defend title to cargill's cattle cannot be characterized as an interference with green's property as we have defined such an injury today, and we disapprove of the anomalous holding in bridgers to the extent that it expands the reach of special injury to include the incidental effects of an injunction on those who were not directly targeted by the injunction.

the false statement must point to the plaintiff and ""to no one else."" newspapers, inc., 339 s.w.2d at 894; houseman, 242 s.w.3d at 525.

see scott, supra at 352; commonwealth v. ruffin, 475 mass. 1003, 1004 (2016).

r.m. v. swearingen, 510 s.w.3d 630, 633 (tex. app.el paso 2016, no pet.); see tex. code crim. proc. ann. art. 7a.01(a)(1)-(2) (west, westlaw through 2017 1st c.s.).

we therefore overrule j.w.j. v. p.k.r., supra, and reaffirm the holdings in m. u., supra, and heller.

in muhammad, this court rejected a similar claim by an inmate that the clemency process was flawed and amounted to a denial of due process.

we therefore overrule our decision in jones v. wfyr radio/rko general, supra, and hold in this case that an order denying a motion for appointment of counsel is not immediately appealable, but may be reviewed only on appeal from a final judgment.

the portion of anderson v. calderon, 232 f.3d 1053, that reached a contrary conclusion is overruled.

i would not have issued this order since i would not have known what [physician's] needs would be for the procedure to remove the battery.

we overrule any suggestion in beam that there may be an inevitable constitutional barrier to the use of dual juries in capital cases, experimentally or otherwise.

texas osage co-operative royalty pool v. sullivan, tex.civ.app., 93 s.w.2d 566, an opinion of this court, is not in point on the facts, but statements in that opinion conflicting with our own conclusion, if any there be, are overruled to the extent of the conflict.

{57} however, even if he did not waive the issue by withdrawing the request, he did waive the kastigar issue when he entered a guilty plea. united states v. gaffney, 469 f.3d 211, 215 (1st cir.2006), citing united states v. lujan, 324 f.3d 27, 30 (1st cir.2003) (a guilty plea waives an appeal based on a kastigar claim based on the fifth amendment.).

martinez, 127 s.w.3d at 794-95; coleman v. state, 440 s.w.3d 218, 223-24 (tex.app.--houston [14th dist.] 2013, no pet.). generally, unspecific offers to help are not likely to induce one to make an untruthful statement and will not invalidate a confession.

silbernagel v. silbernagel , 2011 nd 140, 11, 800 n.w.2d 320. ""a party may not collaterally attack a final decision, that was not appealed, in subsequent proceedings.""

to the extent that state v. hinton, 680 p.2d 749 (utah 1984) (per curiam) is inconsistent with this rule, it is overruled.

cases such as people v. stathos, supra, 17 cal.app.3d 33, are disapproved insofar as they are inconsistent with the views expressed herein.

we do not read lang to have overruled hoben.

we believe, to the contrary, that the supreme court silently retracted the anderson dictum in ennis v. state, 95 so.2d 20 (fla. 1957), cert. den., 355 u.s. 868, 78 s.ct. 117, 2 l.ed.2d 74 (1957) and held, as did state v. yarboro, 194 n.c. 498, 140 s.e. 216 (1927) and state v. avery, 111 kan. 588, 207 p. 838 (1922) under comparable statutes, that a conviction under section 832.05 may be had absent proof of an intent to defraud.

that case is hereby overruled.

after the evidence was presented at the denial hearing, the court ruled that it would enter a ""true finding as to the sole count of criminal trespass.""

to the extent that the shumaker and howard cases are inconsistent with the views expressed herein, they are disapproved.

accordingly, we hereby overrule hicks and its progeny, including thomas v. state, 284 ga. 327328(1), 667 s.e.2d 375 (2008) and capote v. ray, 276 ga. 1, 2(1), 577 s.e.2d 755 (2002).

however, on occasion the court has declined to adopt legislative changes to the evidence code because of significant concerns about the amendments, including concerns about the constitutionality of an amendment.

see in re mission consol. indep. sch. dist., 990 s.w.2d 459, 461 (tex. app.corpus christi 1999, orig. proceeding [mand.

as we explained earlier, md. rule 8-131(a) requires a party to make ""'timely objections in the lower court,'"" or ""'he[/she] will be considered to have waived them and he[/she] cannot now raise such objections on appeal.'"" breakfield, 195 md. app. at 390, 6 a.3d at 388 (quoting caviness, 244 md. at 578, 224 a.2d at 418).

to the extent that it holds otherwise, delia s. v. torres (1982) 134 cal.app.3d 471, 483-484 [ 184 cal.rptr. 787], is disapproved.

in sum, hernandez is modified as follows: double credit should not be awarded where a defendant is sentenced to consecutive sentences under separate indictments and receives the optimal benefits of jail credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody.

that is because ""if counsel has failed to conduct a reasonable investigation to prepare for sentencing, then he cannot possibly be said to have made a reasonable decision as to what to present at sentencing.""

this analysis is not inconsistent with dudewicz v norris-schmid, 443 mich. 68, 78-80; 503 nw2d 645 (1993).

in doing so, we recede from jackson, russman and our other cases holding that unpronounced, but otherwise unobjectionable, conditions of probation contained in probation orders must be stricken and cannot be reimposed.

pt today, inc v comm'r of office of fin & ins servs, 270 mich app 110, 127; 715 nw2d 398 (2006) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).

however, for the reasons assigned by judge (now justice) lemmon in his dissent to the original opinion of this court and judge redmann in his dissent to the opinion on remand in seavey we overrule the seavey case.

nenno is overruled to the extent it decides article 38.22, section 6, applies only to custodial statements.

for example, disposition reports routinely set forth the circumstances of the offense as described in the police report including witness statements and the minor's statement.

defense counsel questioned grimes at length about what defendant had been wearing and whether he had made inconsistent statements about defendant's shirt and boots.

attorney for appellant rory gallaghermarion county public defenderindianapolis, indiana attorneys for appellee curtis t. hill, jr.attorney general of indiana ian mcleandeputy attorney generalindianapolis, indiana appeal from the marion superior court the honorable david hooper, magistrate trial court cause no. 49g12-1610-cm-39839 bailey, judge.

diaz-diaz contends that the government failed to prove venue and that he was prejudiced by the district court's rejection of his proposed jury instruction on venue.

in the wake of johnson v. united states, 135 s. ct. 2251 (2015), dean filed a 2255 motion in which he argued that his convictions for attempted armed robbery and aggravated battery do not qualify as violent felonies under the ""elements clause"" of the acca, 18 u.s.c. 924(e)(2)(b)(i).

unlike mr. swann in dover, however, holzhauer did not offer expert testimony to attempt to explain why the escalator malfunctioned.

and, to the extent dennis v. william penn life assur. co. of america, 714 f. supp. 1580 (w.d. okla. 1989), expresses a contrary interpretation of section 3609, it is disapproved.

a further reason for wiping the rule enunciated in united states v. feinberg off the books is that in practice it is no longer followed in this circuit when reviewing the denial of motions for acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence.

moreover, our conclusion today is not intended to alter an insured's ability to assign his or her right to past or presently due benefits to a healthcare provider.

##note: i cannot find rose v. sears, roebuck co. in the snippet or full text.

for the reasons that follow, we disapprove campanella and kotoff to the extent they conclude that a court exercising its discretion on a motion for special trial preference may not consider the plaintiff's lack of diligence or prejudice to the defendant once the five-year bar is imminent.

state v. schwaderer, supra.

there is no law or legal precedent specifically directing that a transit authority must control the schedules and work hours of transit employees to provide safe public transit, and the cta cannot show a well-defined and dominant public policy that prevents collective bargaining of the type of scheduling and work hour matters at issue here.

to the extent that the language in johnson supports the plaintiff's position, we now expressly disavow any suggestion that the decision of the statewide bar counsel not to refer a grievance complaint to a screening panel pursuant to 232(a)(2) is essentially unreviewable.

the state maintains that the compassionate use act is broader than the act, ""does not involve any of the same oversight,"" and there ""are no safeguards to prevent abuse.""

. rognrud

{8} ""'(t)his court utilizes r.c. 2953.08(g) as the standard of review in all felony sentencing appeals.'

in this case, the trial court did not clearly err by finding clear and convincing evidence to support termination under mcl 712a.19b(3)(g) and (j).

we disapprove the following cases to the extent they are to the contrary:

in peteja, the court of appeals incorrectly held that whether the investigation involves a felony offense depends upon whether the evidence that was destroyed, altered, or concealed would have tended to demonstrate the commission of a felony.

in this case, like winnebago and contrary to tyson foods, employer's admission played a substantial role in the case's disposition.

as such, we find that the specific test set forth in cruz has been eliminated by section 777.201.

even though we have not been referred to a clear constitutional provision or doctrine invalidating the jurisdiction conferred by section 3.2, petitioner has cited statements and language in a number of authorities in support of its position, including those statements in city of pasadena v. railroad com., supra, 183 cal. 526, heretofore disapproved.

we recede from lyles and williams to the extent that they declined to apply ree retrospectively to nonfinal cases.

. . . the connection between the cause of death and the burglary . . . must involve more than just their occurrence at the same time and place.""

rather, as discussed, the board separately set out why it would be appropriate to bring employee picketing within that frameworkincluding by reasoning that picketing can be noncoercive and nondisruptive, as the board found was true of the peaceful, stationary holding of picket signs in this case.

we are constrained to respectfully disagree with that approval and overrule that particular aspect of the myers case.

insofar as those cases hold that the testimony of a witness given at a former trial, and read at the instant trial, because of the nonavailability of the witness cannot be impeached by contradictory statements made subsequent to the former trial, or by statements made prior thereto but where the impeacher clearly shows that he had no knowledge of such contradictory statements, they are, and each of them is, overruled.

to the extent winkle v. jones, ky., 265 s.w.2d 792 (1954), and harvey coal corp. v. smith, ky., 268 s.w.2d 634 (1954), are inconsistent with this decision, they are overruled.

the district court dismissed count i because ""without some factual basis for the allegation that an elevated table in a galley was defective or that [ncla] had notice of its dangers, [allen]'s claim for jones act negligence fails as a matter of law."" allen had ""not asserted facts that any instrumentality he was required to use was defective nor [had] he asserted he was instructed to perform his duties in an unsafe manner.""

we do so now and overrule part iii of montenegro.

moreover, the legislature asserts that good enough or close enoughas only the legislature has the power to define those termssuffice when asking the people to consent to the adoption of a constitutional amendment.

because here, as in workman and in contrast to ex parte new york, the defendant was an entity generally within the jurisdiction of the district court, ex parte new york is inapposite, and workman compels the conclusion that the county is unprotected by sovereign immunity.

id. a judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.

to the extent that busot v. busot, 354 so.2d 1255 (fla.2d dca 1978); clemons v. morris, 350 so.2d 519 (fla. 4th dca 1977); hall v. air force finance center, department of the air force of the united states, 344 so.2d 1340 (fla. 1st dca 1977); and decastro v. decastro, 334 so.2d 834 (fla.3d dca 1976), are inconsistent with this decision, they are disapproved.

bonnell at 29.

finally, agerbrink argues that the contract is unenforceable because msa is an illegal employment agency under new york law. but, as noted above, the court has already rejected this claim in a prior opinion.

to the extent that hudson provides otherwise, it is overruled.

see also the progeny of the williams decisions, likewise overruled as to this holding: state v. fisher, 362 so.2d 553 (la. 1978); state v. proctor, 354 so.2d 488 (la. 1977); state v. dickerson.

however, we take this occasion to disapprove of our decision in kenai peninsula insofar as it would bar the rule 60(b) motion in the case at bar.

dr. hunter used the minnesota multiphasic personality inventory-2 to diagnose stacie with ""major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate.""

likewise, we have relied on the framework of that section in recognizing the principle that even when an actor's conduct does not create a risk of physical harm, the actor may still owe an affirmative duty of care based on a special relationship.