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tex. code crim. proc. ann. art. 36.31 (west 2006); see melancon v. state, 66 s.w.3d 375, 383 (tex. app.houston [14th dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (en banc op. on reh'g).

on july 10, 2014, the state charged martin by amended information with one count of sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public park or a publicly owned recreational facility and one count of unlawful use of a two-way communication device. martin proceeded to trial and was found guilty as charged.

accordingly, we affirm in part, and in part reverse and remand with directions.

(id. at pp. 903-904.)

the rationale behind the principle that a ""defendant may not receive a harsher sentence solely, or even partially, because he refuses to plead guilty and proceeds to require the prosecution to prove his guilt"" ""is that the coercion or inducement casts a chill over the exercise of guaranteed fundamental constitutional rights.""

in the wake of hohn, we must overrule beeler and kelly iii's holding that a habeas corpus "case" is not pending until the habeas petition itself has been filed.

to the extent that hurth v. state, 688 so.2d 275 (ala.cr.app. 1995), conflicts with this case, it is due to be overruled.

to the extent our opinion in boxx v. long warrior, 265 f.3d 771, 776 (9th cir. 2001), states that montana's first exception is limited to "commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements" and that "such [other] arrangements also must be of a commercial nature," we disapprove the statement.

the report showed that, in cook county, the average lapse of time between the date of filing to the date of verdict, was 37.5 months, and that the average time between the date of filing to the date of verdict in st. clair county was 36.6 months.

in accord with robbins, we overrule turner in part and implement the following procedure to govern cases where appellate counsel represents an indigent criminal defendant and does not believe his or her client's case presents any arguable issues on appeal:

people v chambers, 430 mich 217, 222; 421 nw2d 903 (1988).

see, e.g., estate of redden v. redden, 179 n.c. app. 113, 117, 632 s.e.2d 794, 798 (2006) (concluding that an order for partial summary judgement requiring the defendant to pay the sum of $150,000.00 and costs affected a substantial right).

restitution of an excessive fee, therefore, can be ordered as a condition of readmission or reinstatement, and we recede from winn to the extent that it conflicts with this holding.

chevron has been overruled.

the majority wisely corrects our mistake in mendiola by overruling that case's interpretation of these rules.

to the extent that these cases are inconsistent with our conclusion herein, they are disapproved.

you must not consider this evidence for any other purpose.""

most error, even constitutional error, may be waived by the failure to properly put the trial court on notice of the objection or request.

id. at 248-49.

today that decision has been overruled.

sosataquechel's affirmative answer to the court's plea colloquy question about whether he had an adequate opportunity to discuss the facts of the case and defenses thereto does not adequately resolve his present claim as to the defense of self-defense.

appellant now appeals from his two convictions for the felony offense of aggravated assault against a public servant and his conviction for the felony offense of aggravated assault against a family or household member and the resulting concurrent sentences of seventy years for each conviction.

see 691 n.w.2d 726, 729 (iowa 2005).

all prior holdings to the contrary on this point are overruled, including the two roselle opinions, supra.

id. like here, it was undisputed that schrock had permission to make the photographs.

justice reyes and justice lampkin concurred in the judgment.

accordingly, insofar as any statement in mcnemar relative to faline may be irreconcilable with our conclusions herein, such statement is hereby overruled.

(shoemaker v. myers (1990) 52 cal.3d 1, 7.)

{ 13} we have considered the issue raised in this case on numerous occasions.

as an initial matter, should evidence of dm's pregnancy be excluded, the evidence of the abortion would cease to be relevant to the extent it is needed to explain why no dna evidence is available.

cf. doj guidance notice, 76 fed. reg. 470 at 7472 ([c]ompliance with section 5 of the voting rights act may require the jurisdiction to depart from strict adherence to certain of its redistricting criteria.).

as the u.s. supreme court has stated, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion directed to a trial judge.

anything in settle that can be read to be contrary to the holding of this case is likewise overruled.

that interpretation of 6-5-125 is overruled.

to the extent that our nance decision is to the contrary it has been overruled.

we disapprove wilkerson v. wells fargo bank (1989) 212 cal.app.3d 1217 [ 261 cal.rptr. 185], the only published court of appeal decision adopting a broader view of the jury's function in this species of wrongful discharge litigation.

accordingly, we recognized in coopers & lybrand that ""[w]hatever similarities or differences there are between plaintiffs and defendants in this context involve questions of policy for congress.""

[20] after an arrest is made, the arresting officer may search the person to ""'remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape'"" and also ""'to search for or seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.'""

washington has adopted a number of provisions of the federal adoption and safe families act of 1997, designed to speed up the process of permanency planning for children in foster care.

we overrule so much of kerwin as holds that a criminal defendant is not entitled to inspect and make an analysis of the seized controlled substance.

to the extent that our holding on this point overrules this court's prior analyses of the exhaustion requirement in tinsley v. united parcel service, 635 f.2d 1288 (7th cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 452 u.s. 934, 101 s.ct. 3072, 69 l.ed.2d 948 (1981); baldini v. local 1095, uaw, 581 f.2d 145 (7th cir. 1978); battle v. clark equip. mfg. co., 579 f.2d 1338 (7th cir. 1978); harrison v. chrysler corp., 558 f.2d 1273 (7th cir. 1977); and newgent v. modine mfg. co., 495 f.2d 919 (7th cir. 1974), this result is mandated by clayton.

to the extent that they are inconsistent with our ruling here united states gypsum co. v. shaffer, supra, 7 cal.2d 454, is overruled and bernstein v. rubin, supra, 152 cal.app.2d 51; bank of america v. gesler, supra, 252 cal.app.2d 565 and estate of vose, supra, 4 cal.app.3d 454, are disapproved.

in light of our decision to overrule prior precedent limiting the scope of 53a183 (a), we now must decide whether, as the defendant claims, constitutional principles of fair notice bar the state from retrying her under our more expansive construction of that provision.

id. 8(f)(i); see also br. in support of ans. to pet. to open, 1/21/16, at 1-2 (unpaginated) (alleging that on december 30, 2014, chief julian tried to ""persuade and bully [mr. burrelli] into filing a 'settlement paper' in return for copies of [the department's] 'investigation'"").

accordingly, buian is hereby overruled.

we disapprove not about water com. v. board of supervisors, supra, 95 cal.app.4th 982, to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.

on this point casey overruled the holdings in two cases because they undervalued the state's interest in potential life.

however, for the sake of clarity, to the extent it may be inconsistent with this opinion, we, again, overrule adventist.

accordingly, the legislature has ipso facto made clear that semen, pregnancy, or disease, while perhaps related to sex, are not themselves the specific instances of sexual conduct envisioned by mcl 750.520j.

however, to the extent that national wildlife suggests that an eis must be prepared where the government has not surrendered its absolute right to prevent the use of resources, national wildlife is in conflict with conner, and is therefore not persuasive precedent.

""phoenix"" presumably refers to phoenix v. pennsylvania board of probation and parole (pa. cmwlth., no. 1243 c.d. 2017, filed april 5, 2018), 2018 wl 1630602.

state v. baker, 453 md. 32, 47 (2017) (quoting simmons v. state, 436 md. 202, 213 (2013)).

to this extent, the majority opinion in cooper is in error and is overruled.

we now explicitly overrule hartwich.

riedlinger, 2013 nd 14, 10, 826 n.w.2d 340. ""summary judgment is inappropriate if neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or if reasonable differences of opinion exist as to the inferences to be drawn from the undisputed facts.""

we then explain why we conclude that smothers clearly erred in tying the remedy clause to the common law in 1857 and should be overruled.

in our judgment, robinson mandates the conclusion that gonzales is no longer good law and must be deemed overruled.

on reviewing the relevant statutory and case law, however, we are compelled to revisit our previous interpretation.

in short, we reject the view, expressed in in re ishihara chemical co., that 1782 comes into play only when adjudicative proceedings are "pending" or "imminent."

a trial court has plenary power to reinstate a case on its own motion within thirty days after it signs an order of dismissal for want of prosecution.

no further acknowledgment of hampton's effect on those cases needs to be recited hereafter.

we conclude that these decisions were erroneous and must be overturned, but that tracts of land granted by the board that have been improved or filled are, to the degree hereinafter described, free of the public trust.

capital argues that the board erred in relying on its previous decision in town & country supermarkets, which, in capital's view, was inadequately reasoned and materially distinguishable in its treatment of picketing.

schambach v. afford-a-pool & spa, 7th dist. no. 08 be 15, 2009-ohio-6809, 8, quoting juhasz v. costanzo, 144 ohio app.3d 756, 762, 761 n.e.2d 679 (7th dist.2001).

the language and structure of t.r. 75(a) dictate that these cases were wrongly decided.

any language in stanley, roach or vestal which implies otherwise, is expressly disapproved.

accordingly, we approve amisub and ventimiglia and disapprove leikensohn, argonaut, north miami general hospital, and teperson to the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion.

olson's plea colloquy reflects confusion; he admitted to both soliciting a minor whom he believed was 15 years old and a minor who was ""over the age of 16."" due to this discrepancy, the district court concluded that olson had not provided a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea.

he was never present for the court to ask him whether he could pay the forfeiture, nor did kerr ever ask for an indigency hearing.

the city decided that the training would include the milwaukee police citizen academy and the ride along with both of these training components being subject to the recommendations of the board's executive director.

on rehearing the majority reasserts its position that johnston v. nanney is controlling and quotes from pellegrini v. mccarthy for the purpose of showing mccarthy v. gonnet has been impliedly overruled, thus apparently suggesting pellegrini as an added reason why johnston is controlling here.

here, the trial court imposed two concurrent two-year sentences for brown's convictions for possession of cocaine or a narcotic drug and possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle, as level 6 felonies.

as stated above, this issue was properly preserved for appeal, and thus, we must determine whether the trial court erred by overruling

heard complied, ""but she did not stop hollering.""

as a result, the davis court overruled the holding in sablatura and dismissed the appeal.

we cannot conclude that counsel's error, if any, was so serious as to deprive appellant of a fair trial.

nor does simply having not yet had occasion to exercise one's authority under a power of attorney equate to a declination to serve.

to the extent that the plaintiffs intended to raise a different claim, it is not readily discernible from their brief, and, therefore, we decline to engage in further review on the basis of an inadequate brief.

on march 14, 2018, the district court filed a notice in this court certifying that, in light of the nevada supreme court's recent decision in williams v. state department of corrections, 133 nev. ___, 402 p.3d 1260 (2017), it would reconsider appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus if appellant sought a remand to the district court.

(miratti's inc., supra, 132 nlrb at p. 701.)

c. overcoming the presumption of undue influence 27. although we do not find that the chancellor erred by failing to address whether a presumption of undue influence arose, we hold that, based on the record and the chancellor's findings, if such presumption arose, davis successfully rebutted it. 28.

ms. matlock argues that the alj failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion evidence related to her mental impairments.

it further found that his statement midway through the interview was not a clear, unequivocal, unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent.

while a warrant was obtained in that case, to the extent that burnstad can be said to stand for the proposition that the warrant requirement of flack and roaden is rendered unnecessary by a defendant's own pejorative characterization of the material it is hereby disapproved.

the vehicle appeared to be the same one the officer had observed from the highway.

arguably, if campbell intended to be bound, then one should just read any gaps in the draft contribution agreement against him, when he signed a document that, on issues that the court of chancery found unresolved when looking at the parol evidence, tended to be highly unfavorable to him, if one ignores those gaps and the parol evidence, and solely focuses on the language of the draft contribution agreement.

insofar as this court's decision in lamb v. page, 482 p.2d 615 (okla.

with this understanding of solatium damages, we turn now to plaintiffs' challenges to the district court's decision in this case.

""the odor of raw marijuana - especially an overwhelming odor of raw marijuana - creates probable cause to believe that a large quantity of raw marijuana will be found.""

as such, we also conclude that the defendant's cell phone was lawfully seized incident to his arrest.

to the extent deal v. madison can be read to hold that section 2(e) applies only at the option of the defendant, it conflicts with the statute and this opinion, and it is disapproved.

father raises two issues for our review, which we restate as:

cummings left the service door of the garage open and went into his house to shower.

with this ruling, the court necessarily abandons as unworkable the overly complex standards employed in cases such as cline and adkins.

lack of a sua sponte self-defense instruction.

in the event the trial court cannot, for reasons of fairness, enter the order within the forty-day window rodgers is overruled.

to the extent that our holdings in patman v. state, 244 ga.app. 833, 537 s.e.2d 118 (2000), shivers v. state, 258 ga.app. 253, 573 s.e.2d 494 (2002), state v. fossett, 253 ga.app. 791, 560 s.e.2d 351 (2002), state v. charles, 264 ga.app. 874, 592 s.e.2d 518 (2003), boldin v. state, 282 ga.app. 492, 639 s.e.2d 522 (2006), and martinezvargas v. state, 317 ga.app. 232, 730 s.e.2d 633 (2012), could be interpreted as support for the premise that the odor of raw marijuana emanating from a particular location cannot be the sole basis for the issuance of a search warrant for that location, such interpretations are hereby disapproved.

we disapprove orange county v. sealy to the extent that it conflicts with this decision.

to the extent that our previous opinion in state of louisiana, and ralph slaughter, secretary, department of revenue and taxation v. bp exploration oil inc., 95-2031 (la.app. 4 cir. 1/31/96), 667 so.2d 1219 conflicts with this decision, it is overruled.

as will be discussed below, the court finds that reversing its position and placing the ultimate burden of proving subparts (a) or (b) on the debtor in no way prejudices her under the facts of this case.