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""[t]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.""

here, the district court awarded almost the maximum amount of enhanced damages, but did not adequately explain its basis for doing so, and failed to even mention campbell's public use defense, which presented a close question in this case.

163 ill. app. 3d at 103.

we conclude that we should.

id. subsequently, the beneficiaries filed an amended petition, seeking raymon's immediate removal as trustee and a ""demand for damages of $1,500,000 for fraudulent misappropriation and intentional dissipation of trust funds.""

##note: in re chavez was reversed not overruled.

the same standard applies when a defendant fails to raise a timely objection under brady.

see, e.g., united states v. coven, 662 f.2d 162, 176 (2d cir. 1981).

therefore, to the extent that cases in this jurisdiction imply that misconduct must be intentional before it constitutes reversible error, they are disapproved.

he appealed, and in united states v. ferguson, 831 f.3d 850 (7th cir. 2016), we vacated his sentence and remanded the case to a new judge, who imposed a 35-year sentence.

for these reasons, we overrule rosenstein and wilson to the extent that they incorrectly hold that an appellate court has no authority to grant an extension of the time to file a discretionary application under ocga 5639.

to that extent chetkovich v. united states must be overruled.

an abuse of discretion occurs if the court ""'fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.'""

we overruled his assignments of error and affirmed in state v. beverly, 2016-ohio-8078, 75 n.e.3d 847 (2d dist.).

western wireline services, inc. v. pecos western corp., 377 so.2d 892 (la.app. 4th cir. 1979), and c-craft marine services, inc. v. llog exploration co., 470 so.2d 241 (la.app. 4th circ.), writ denied, 472 so.2d 921 (1985) are contrary, or may be contrary, they are overruled.

exxon corp. v. department of conservation & natural res., 859 so.2d 1096, 1102 (ala.2002) (quoting bolden v. slosssheffield steel & iron co., 215 ala. 334, 340, 110 so. 574, 580 (1925) (somerville, j., dissenting)).

in light of the fact that ducote represented a significant departure from the interpretation of pollution exclusion clauses in louisiana, and, more importantly, because ducote runs counter to the true intent of the exclusion, we overrule it at this time.

the jury reasonably could have inferred that appellant purchased the rugs, obtained the department number and uline number from the receipt, returned the rugs, wrote the department number and uline number from the original rugs on inferior rugs that did not belong to the chain store, and then presented the inferior rugs and a receipt that did not pertain to those two rugs to the second store, seeking a refund.

we overrule it.

rather than perpetuate that error, we acknowledge our mistake and overrule our prior opinion on that issue.

this appeal compels us to revisit our decision inhenderson v. state, 727 so.2d 284 (fla. 2d dca 1999), from which we now recede to the extent that it conflicts with our decision here.

in accord then with the numerous considerations discussed throughout this opinion, and on the basis of the legislature's amendment of alabama's homicide statute to include protection for an unborn child in utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability, 13a61(a)(3), we overrule lollar and gentry, and we hold that the wrongful death act permits an action for the death of a previable fetus.

as such, he was entitled to immunity as previously discussed.

to the extent that warren is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled.

he also left the scene of the crime, wrote a note to his mother under the apparent belief that he would be going to prison, and proclaimed a plan to commit suicide.

id., 77. we observed further that ""the involvement of a police officer in the interview does not automatically preclude a statement from falling within the medical diagnosis and treatment exception.""

accordingly, we will apply the same standard of review to all of appellant's sufficiency complaints.

we therefore overrule leonard and palmer.

moreover, the herbsts seek only to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals remanding the case to the trial court.

writ denied on the showing made in part and denied in part. relator failed to include a copy of the bill of information, the district court's ruling, the state's answer, if any, the boykin transcript, and any other documents from the district court record that might support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

suppose a defendant misrepresented her travel history to convey she had met that requirement, when in fact she had not.

e.d. tenn. 2013); in re crosby, 261 b.r. 470, 472 (bankr.

we disapprove this dicta.

parker vi, 873 so.2d at 283.

. balliette

if we have a case where the conditions are not identical, then the dissimilarity goes to the weight of the evidence of the experiment but not to its admissibility.

even as such practices can help employers ensure their workers are compensated for regularly worked minutes that might have once been treated as ""off the clock,"" they also highlight the need for subsequent line drawing to implement existing law.

the child lived with hensch and mysak from the time of his birth until november 2015, when mysak moved out of the shared residence.

because we find that the crane case was wrongfully decided, we overrule that decision and reverse the trial court's order dismissing muhammad's claims.

(pariente, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 138 s. ct. 471 (2017).

cases in which it has been held or assumed that those rules apply to reinstated appeals are disapproved insofar as they are inconsistent with the views expressed herein (e.g., people v. jaquish (1966) 244 cal.app.2d 444, 448 [ 53 cal.rptr. 123]; people v. boyden (1965) 237 cal.app.2d 695, 697 [ 47 cal.rptr. 136]; people v. garner (1965) 234 cal.app.2d 212, 215, fn. 1 [ 44 cal.rptr. 217]; people v. benavidez.

this balancing concern was the basis of our decision in lucas, which the majority overrules today.

we overrule national loan investors to the extent it is inconsistent with this approach.

the court's decision today overrules a fundamental holding in conkle.

therefore, we hereby expressly overrule hollis.

defense counsel objected, but was overruled by the trial court.

in the wake of hauserincluding this courthave declined to allow such an individual action to proceed.

1998), implicitly overruled that line of cases when it held that c.a.r. 26(a) "guides the computation of time in determining whether a person has complied with the jurisdictional requirement; it does not alter the jurisdictional effect of a statutory deadline for taking an appeal.

the court may instruct jurors regarding victim impact evidence or other sections of the final instructions (#7.11) as part of the preliminary instruction.

""however, before projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived; the employee's rejection of or failure to seek other available employment of a different or inferior kind may not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages.

southern reporter. appeal from jefferson circuit court, bessemer division

in light of the above discussion, therefore, we overrule in re oberkoetter.

the court noted at the outset that the guarantees of that constitutional provisionfreedom from discrimination in housing and employmenthad been legislatively implemented through the illinois human rights act.

id. at 581, citing pappas, supra at 431.

accordingly, we overrule zepeda v. bulleri,

we expressly overrule baird v. cincinnati, new orleans texas pacific r. co., ky., 368 s.w.2d 172, and our cases cited therein to the extent they hold that a wife has no cause of action for loss of consortium of her husband resulting from injury to him due to the negligent act of another.

the federal circuit has concluded that, in such cases, the declaratory judgment is "moot" in a jurisdictional sense, a conclusion that it considers dictated by two of our earlier opinions, electrical fittings corp. v. thomas betts co., 307 u.s. 241 (1939), and altvater v. freeman.

the district court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of simple battery, yet the jury found green guilty as charged on knowing aggravated battery.

more importantly, a sufficient factual basis exists here because mccoy stipulated he ""was a member of a conspiracy with others, in gaston county . . . to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, commonly known as 'crack cocaine.'""

for that reason, we will assume that trial counsel performed unreasonably when they failed to object to these statements.

farac v. permanente med. group, 186 f.supp.2d 1042, 1045 (n.d.cal. 2002) (" circuit city implicitly overruled duffield.");

to the extent the following cases, and any others, are inconsistent with this holding, they are hereby overruled:

to the extent some cases have held differently, we disapprove of them.

to the extent this opinion is in conflict with state v. malone, 654 so.2d 92 (ala.crim.app. 1995), malone is hereby overruled.

we hereby disapprove of merendino v. burrell, 923 s.w.2d 258, 261 (tex. app. beaumont 1996, writ denied), and miller v. cozart, 394 s.w.2d 22, 24 (tex.civ.app. dallas 1965, no writ), to the extent that they hold that a person who owns or is otherwise responsible for horses has a duty to prevent the horses from roaming onto a farm-to-market road that is free from a local stock law.

edwards v. firemen's retirement system of st. louis, mo.app., 410 s.w.2d 560; mitchell v. city of springfield, mo. app., 410 s.w.2d 585; and heusmann v. priest, mo.app., 366 s.w.2d 42, are disapproved insofar as they hold that in this situation a reviewing court may not weigh the evidence and make its own findings of fact.

where a trial court sustains an objection to the admission of evidence, in order to preserve the issue for appeal, there must be a proffer.

in concluding that in situations not subject to a specified exclusion, section 3051 supersedes section 1170.1, subdivision (c), trejo invoked the statutory maxim of construction, ""expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, [a court] may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.""

see id. like in any proximate cause analysis, an intervening event may break the chain of causation between the allegedly wrongful act and the plaintiff's injury.

salmons urged that ""all of the elements of the felony of possession of pseudoephedrine are contained in the felony of the manufacture of methamphetamine,"" but the court ruled that knowledge of the specific controlled substance was an element of each charge, so the separate prosecution for possessing pseudoephedrine did not violate double jeopardy.

to the extent it is contrary to this opinion, george pepperdine foundation v. pepperdine, 126 cal.app.2d 154 [ 271 p.2d 600], is disapproved.

thus, we disapprove of the reasoning of bates, which was followed in owens and soriano, and we approve judge sharp's dissent in owens.

intervening defendants argue that stand up does not apply here because the language of const 1963, art 2, 9, which was at issue in stand up, is substantially different from the language of const 1963, art 12, 2, at issue here.

for example, in the well-known case of harris v. balk, 198 u.s. 215 (1905), epstein, a resident of maryland, had a claim against balk, a resident of north carolina. harris, another north carolina resident, owed money to balk.

early, 330 ga. app. at 655 (1) (a) (punctuation omitted); accord hardy, 239 ga. app. at 596 (1).

the court of appeals affirmed.

lori swanson, attorney general, st. paul, minnesota; and jonathan d. frieden, hubbard county attorney, park rapids, minnesota (for respondent) cathryn middlebrook, chief appellate public defender, sara j. euteneuer, assistant public defender, st. paul, minnesota (for appellant)

id., at 70a.

therefore, we are compelled to overrule blanton, in which the issues were similar to those in the case at bar, on the strength of the supreme court cases of green v. united states and benton v. maryland.

the victim went into the bedroom and when she hesitated, the defendant pushed her down on the bed.

for the reasons that follow, we overrule the simpson decision.

there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that garcia was present for the signing of the subcontract, garcia helped mata run fast & neat, and the plaintiffs were employees of and paid by fast & neat.

id. at 248 (citations & quotation marks omitted).

id. at 943-44 (citing rosado v. state, 1 so. 3d 1147, 1148 (fla. 4th dca 2009)).

we conclude that the neff and ward holdings are inconsistent with the limitations on the maintenance and cure remedy imposed by the supreme court and must be overruled to the extent of such inconsistency.

after careful consideration, we have decided to resolve this conflict by receding from g.d.w. and gainer to the extent they hold that an improper transfer order renders all proceedings following such an order null and void.

we have ultimately determined that we were in error in the statutory construction reached by these decisions, for the reasons to be stated below, and therefore overrule them prospectively, see state v. ray, 259 la. 105, 245 so.2d 540 (1971), as of the date of publication of this opinion in the southern reporter.

all inconsistent opinions are hereby overruled.

i also look to the more recent case of

see 20 c.f.r. pt. 404, subpt. p, app. 1.

we overrule part of norman and hold that alaska foods' action should not have been dismissed.

defendants argued that public release of the information in the stipulation would violate their right to privacy, put them at a competitive disadvantage in business transactions, and jeopardize their safety and the safety of their families.

we overrule our prior cases which have authorized use of the concurrent sentence doctrine.

see s.c. dep't of soc. servs. v. headden, 354 s.c. 602, 613, 582 s.e.2d 419, 425 (2003) (declining to address additional grounds for tpr when clear and convincing evidence supported tpr on another ground).

therefore, to the extent that the ica in prior decisions has applied harmless error analysis to violations of the principles set forth in grindles , 70 haw. 528, 777 p.2d 1187, these decisions are overruled

prior cases holding otherwise are hereby overruled.

while this course of action was proper under our earlier precedent, the supreme court's holding in glenn directly repudiated the application of any form of heightened standard of review to claims denials in which a conflict of interest is present.

under these circumstances we must conclude that the contrary holdings of darlington v. owen county recc, ky., 299 s.w.2d 599; aetna life ins. co. v. bethel, 140 ky. 609, 131 s.w. 523; and madison coal corp. v. altmire, 215 ky. 283, 284 s.w. 1068, are out of harmony with the present view, and to the extent of their conflict with the rule here approved, are overruled.

here, there similarly was an accrued claim against his insurer that was held by hensley for payment of health care services that had already been provided by plaintiffs before hensley executed the assignment.

we answer the certified question in the negative, quash the district court's opinion, and disapprove gellert to the extent of conflict with this opinion, but we approve the result of the instant case.